Some Reasons Not to Do the Best You Can

Some Reasons Not to Do the Best You CanChristopher JayDepartment of PhilosophyUniversity of YorkDoing the best you can [morally]There are some things which are [morally] good

One action or state of affairs is better than another if it is more good

An action of state of affairs is best if there is no action or state of affairs better

Doing the best you can [morally]There are some things which are [morally] good

One action or state of affairs is better than another if it is more good

An action of state of affairs is best if there is no action or state of affairs better

ConsequentialismOne always ought to do the thing which will produce the most good possible.

ConsequentialismOne always ought to do the thing which will produce the most good possible.

or:

One always ought to do the thing which will have the best resultConsequentialisms Two ClaimsWhat is (intrinsically) morally good is X, Y, Z...

One always ought to do the thing which produces the most X, Y, Z... possibleE.g.: Classical Utilitarianism (Bentham)What is (intrinsically) morally good is pleasure

One always ought to do the thing which produces the most pleasure possibleE.g.: Welfare UtilitarianismWhat is (intrinsically) morally good is wellbeing

One always ought to do the thing which produces the most wellbeing possibleConsequentialisms Two ClaimsWhat is (intrinsically) morally good is X, Y, Z...

One always ought to do the thing which produces the most X, Y, Z... possibleConsequentialisms Two ClaimsWhat is (intrinsically) morally good is X, Y, Z...

One always ought to do the thing which produces the most X, Y, Z... possibleThis is the distinctive claimConsequentialisms Two ClaimsWhat is (intrinsically) morally good is X, Y, Z...

You dont have to be a Consequentialist to believe this

One always ought to do the thing which produces the most X, Y, Z... possibleCommon GroundThe Uncontroversial ClaimOne ought to perform the act with the best consequences, other things being equalCommon GroundThe Uncontroversial ClaimOne ought to perform the act with the best consequences, other things being equal

i.e.: unless there are decisive reasons not to

maximising the good is the default right thing to doEmbarrassing CasesEmbarrassing CasesOrgan harvestingEmbarrassing CasesOrgan harvesting

Hanging the innocentEmbarrassing CasesOrgan harvesting

Hanging the innocent

The Rwandans dilemmaEmbarrassing CasesOrgan harvesting

Hanging the innocent

The Rwandans dilemma

Gifts for your childrenEmbarrassing CasesOrgan harvesting RightsHanging the innocent

The Rwandans dilemma DutiesGifts for your childrenDeontologyThere are some things which one ought not to do regardless of the consequences.The crucial question:Are there ever decisive reasons not to do the best you can?

Consequentialists: No

Deontologists: YesReasons and RationalityConsequentialists might say: There cant be decisive reasons to be irrational, and it is always irrational not to (try to) maximise the good.Reasons and RationalityDeontologists and Consequentialists can agree that morality is a matter of practical rationality

So they can agree that if it is necessarily irrational not to maximise the good, we can have no decisive reasons not toReasons and RationalityAn Aristotelian conception of rationality:

Rationality is responsiveness to reasons to be rational is to respond appropriately to the reasons which there are

(i) There might be some reasons which we can only see and respond appropriately to when affected by, e.g., love or angerReasons and RationalityAn Aristotelian conception of rationality:

Rationality is responsiveness to reasons to be rational is to respond appropriately to the reasons which there are

(ii) Being rational does not require us to be perfectly rationalReasons and RationalityAn Aristotelian conception of rationality:

Rationality is responsiveness to reasons to be rational is to respond appropriately to the reasons which there are

(iii) Rationality does not require us to have beliefs about reasons in order to respond appropriately to themReasons and RationalityAn Aristotelian conception of rationality:

Rationality is responsiveness to reasons to be rational is to respond appropriately to the reasons which there are

(iv) Rationality requires us to respond with both actions and attitudesRationality and AgencyRationality is closely connected to agency

Agents act well when they act rationally (in the Aristotelian sense described)

Since morality is about acting well too, morality is connected to practical rationalityVarieties of Agency[A]gents are not necessarily concerned, at all times and in all places, with the production of goodness. Hence bringing about goodness is not the role of agency. It is just one thing that agency sometimes does. ... [A]nother thing that agents sometimes do is express their loyalty to some form of goodness. And one way of expressing ones loyalty to a form of goodness is to observe a constraint that it grounds.(Timothy Chappell, Intuition, System, and the Paradox of Deontology: p.275)

Varieties of AgencySince practical rationality is a matter of acting well, the varieties of agency tell us something about the varieties of practical reason including, perhaps, different ways in which it is rational to respond to good and bad.

Promoting and HonouringWe can promote some good by trying to secure as much of it as possible

And we can honour some good by trying to act in a way which exemplifies it.

(E.g. War in the interests of peace (promoting) vs. pacifism (honouring).)So is it necessarily irrational not to promote?Consequentialists might say: Agency might involve lots of different projects, but the very meaning of rational entails that it is irrational not to promote the good.So is it necessarily irrational not to promote?Consequentialists might say: Agency might involve lots of different projects, but the very meaning of rational entails that it is irrational not to promote the good.

But what about the rationality of beliefs? There, rationality is a matter of responding to evidence in the right way; not having as many true beliefs as possible, or responding to evidence in as many cases as possible!So is it necessarily irrational not to promote?Consequentialists might say: Agency might involve lots of different projects, but the very meaning of rational entails that it is irrational not to promote the good.

And in practical rationality, we accept that facts about what is possible and what isnt give us reasons to abandon certain projects; but the rationality of that is not at all a matter of trying to maximise anything! So is it necessarily irrational not to promote?Consequentialists might say: Agency might involve lots of different projects, but the very meaning of rational entails that it is irrational not to promote the good.

So if there is some privileged role for promotion/maximising in practical rationality, it is not established by the nature of rationality itself. Where does this leave us?Deontologists and Consequentialists can agree about what is morally goodWhere does this leave us?Deontologists and Consequentialists can agree about what is morally good

They can agree that unless there are decisive reasons to do otherwise we ought to promote the goodWhere does this leave us?Deontologists and Consequentialists can agree about what is morally good.

They can agree that unless there are decisive reasons to do otherwise we ought to promote the good

But Deontologists accept that there are sometimes decisive reasons not to promote the good, because rationality requires us to honour some goods rather than promote them (especially if promoting them conflicts with honouring them).