christon archer - the royalist army in new spain civil-military relationships

7/28/2019 Christon Archer - The Royalist Army in New Spain Civil-Military Relationships

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The Royalist Army in New Spain: Civil-Military Relationships, 1810-1821Author(s): Christon I. ArcherReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (May, 1981), pp. 57-82Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/156339 .

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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 13, I, 57-82 Printed in Great Britain

The Royalist Army in New Spain:Civil-Military Relationships, I8IO-I82Iby CHRISTON I. ARCHER

A late-comer in the privileged corporatestructure of New Spain, the armystruggled to wrest a position and to gain recognition. Otherjurisdictionssuchas the merchant consulados, the Acordada, the Mining Guild, and thejealous creole-dominatedayuntamientos, contested military pretensions andtriggered numerous judicial and jurisdictional disputes over how far themilitary could extend its legal powers. Representatives of the reformedBourbon civil administration,unsure in some instances of the limits of theirown authority, did not welcome a dynamic and grasping presence.For theirown part, the army officers dispatched to command Mexican regular andmilitia units often representedthe aggressivelyhaughty airs of the EuropeanSpaniard- attitudes that rasped at the deep-rootedinferiority of the creolesand left them enraged. Little wonder that there was a constant stream ofdisputes, misunderstandings, and challenges directed against the army andthe fuero militar.l

Expansion of the provincial army to meet the defensive needs of theturbulent final decades of colonial peace strained relationships that weretenuous enough without the threats of foreign invasion and revolution.Because the ayuntamientos controlled militia appointments, financing ofprovincial regiments and battalions,and promotions,Europeanofficers couldnot escape close connections with the civilian sector. This did not mean,however, that the guardians of local interests would come to understand orrespect the defenders of the empire. Officers expressed bitter complaints atthe municipal authorities and the provincialpopulace.In 1797, when ColonelJuan Velazquez visited the town of Zamora to enlist a new militia dragoon

1For backgroundsee Lyle N. McAlister,The 'Fuero Militar' in New Spain, 1764-I800 (Gainsville, '957); Santiago Gerardo Suarez, El ordenamiento militar deindias (Caracas,1971); Mariadel CarmenVelazquez,El estado de Guerraen NuevaEspana, 1760-1808 (Mexico, 1950); Leon G. Campbell, The Military and Society inColonial Peru, 750o-181o (Philadelphia, 1978); Allan J. Kuethe, MilitaryReformand Society in New Granada, I773-i808 (Gainesville, 1978); and my own book,The Army in Bourbon Mexico, 1760-I810 (Albuquerque, I977).0022-216x/8I/JLAS-I3I2 $02.00 ? I98x Cambridge University Press.

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58 Christon . Archerregiment, he was incensed when the ayuntamientorefusedhis suggestionsforofficer candidates,and the young men who were to serve in the unit took tothe hills. Velazquez condemned Zamora as 'an ungrateful town' and wroteto Viceroy Marques de Branciforte, '. . this stormy cabildo commits errorsthat are the legitimate sons of its ignorance.'2Lieutenant Colonel Pedro deLaguna encountereda similar situation in Oaxaca during 1796 when he triedto raise an infantry battalion. Members of the ayuntamiento blocked hisefforts and showed no understanding of the problemsof defense. Their out-look was narrowly provincial and Laguna dismissed the alcaldes ordinariosappointedby the municipal government with the comment '... in their livesthese officialshave seen no other population than Oaxaca.' They abused thenew miliatmen, stirredup disputes, and caused jurisdictionalfeuds with themilitia commander. Although the incidents were insignificant in them-selves, Laguna was certain that the ' . . immortal hatred they (the alcaldes)have for militiamen' would continue to exacerbate relations between thetwo sectors.3When similar conflicts occurred in Queretaro and Mexico City, Sub-Inspector General of the Army, Pedro de Gorostiza, incurred the ire of theayuntamientos by attempting to take over the power to appoint militiaofficers.As might be expected,no cabildorelinquishedits hold over patronagepowers without a struggle; in the capital the city government resistedGorostiza and Viceroy Conde de Revillagigedo by making sure that therewere insufficient donations to mobilize the regiment at private cost.4Armyofficers argued that civilians lacked knowledge of the military professionand should not exercise control over candidatesfor commissions. They citedexamples of ayuntamientos handing out militia posts without adequateconsiderationof social position, wealth, and the ability of individuals to taketime from their regular professionsto train with the unit. The ayuntamientoof Guanajuatowas prodigal in its distribution of commissions- often assign-ing captaincies and lieutenancies to men who were visiting the region orwho had no knowledge that they were being considered.When Guanajuatominer and smelteroperator,Franciscode Septieny Montero,receivedsurprise

2 JuanVelazquez to Viceroy Marquesde Branciforte,January1795, Archivo Generalde la Naci6n, Indiferentede Guerra(cited hereinafteras AGN:IG),Vol. 2II-B.3 Pedro de Laguna to Branciforte,Oaxaca,9 February1796, AGN:IG, Vol. I75-A.4 Ayuntamientoof Mexicoto ViceroyConde de Revillagigedo, I2 May I793, ArchivoGeneralde Indias, Section 5, Mejico (cited hereinafteras AGI, Mexico), leg. I437;Captainsof the ProvincialRegiment of Mexico to the King, 29 July I794, ArchivoGeneral de Simancas,GuerraModerna,leg. 6969; and Branciforte o the Ministerof War, Conde de Alange, 5 OctoberI794, AGI, Mexico, leg. 1438. Also see C. I.Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, pp. I47-9.


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The Royalist Army in New Spain: Civil-Military Relationships 59news that he had been awarded a captaincy, he had to petition the viceroyfor permissionto decline the honour.5It is significant that Felix Calleja, the most outstanding soldier of thedecade of insurrection,emerged early as an opponent of civilian interventionin military affairs. Writing in 1798, Calleja noted that in America alladministrative branchesof government exhibited tendencies toward disorderand the army was no exception. Officers often lacked talent or ability andthey covered their weaknesses by blaming the system rather than improvingthe existing situation.6 As commander of the Tenth Militia Brigade based atSan Luis Potosi, Callejadeterminedto root out errorsin the militia structureand to establish his own office with powers to over-rule civilian direc-tion. In i805 when command of the Dragoon Regiment of San Carlos be-came vacant with the death of Colonel Conde del Pefiasco, Calleja rejectedthe terna (list of three candidates)proposedby the ayuntamiento of San LuisPotosf. Scouring through the various regulations and ordinancesgoverningthe provincial militias, Calleja found differing interpretations dependingupon which rules were in force. While it was obvious that the crown hadgranted a few municipal authorities the right to propose officer candidates,therewas no specific ruling on the subjectby the crown.7

Quoting a series of reglamentos governing the provincialmilitias of otherAmerican provinces, Calleja convinced himself that there was no room forcivilian interference,Since the militia ordinancesof Cuba (1769) and NuevaGranada (I794) left officer selection in the hands of the army commanders,he saw no excuse for relaxing general practicein New Spain.8Moreover,theestablishment of a system of Mexican militia brigades had placed the powerof inspection in the hands of the commanders.9Obviously, argued Calleja,the crown wanted the chiefs who knew the qualities and abilities of officersto initiate promotions and to evaluate candidates for commissions. In hisview, the selection of officersby a group of merchantswould debasemilitary5 Francisco de Septien y Montero to Revillagigedo, Guanajuato, 14 March I794,AGN:IG, Vol. I55-B.6 Felix Calleja to Viceroy Miguel Jose de Azanza, 8 October 1798, AGN:IG, Vol.I57-B.7 Callejato ViceroyJose de Iturrigaray,6 September1805, AGN:IG, Vol. 315-A. Asa result of the dispute in I794 between the sub-inspectorgeneral and the ayunta-miento of Mexico,the ministerof war grantedthe municipalauthoritiespermissionto proposemilitia officer candidates.In I795, Viceroy Branciforteused the rulingto permitall ayuntamientos he right of patronage n this area.8 See the Reglamentoparalas miliciasde la Isla de Cuba .. (Madrid,1769); and theReglamentopara as miliciasdisciplinadasde Infanteriay Dragonesdel Nuevo Reinode Granada .. (Madrid,1794).9 Instrucci6nque deben arreglarsus funciones los comandantesde brigada, I2 MarchI8oo, AGN: IG, Vol. 386-A.


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60 Christon . Archerhonor and position. As if to underline his own feelings should his interpreta-tion be rejected,Calleja requesteda transferto the regulararmy cantonmentat Jalapaaway from provincialmilitias '. . . the command of which is not foran officerwho takespridein his position of being one.'10Although the army commanders chafed under what they termed to beunacceptable civilian meddling and checks by competing corporations, theregime ruled consistently against any expansion of military powers. Theauditor de guerra, Miguel Bataller,dismissed Calleja'scase when it came tothe audiencia. In his view, neither the Cuban nor the Nueva Granadanordinanceswere the law of Mexico, and all royalordersaffectingthis provinceupheld the rights of the ayuntamientosto proposeofficercandidatesfor royalapproval.Batallerpointed out that article four of the Instructionfor BrigadeCommanders was specific in its assignment of these privileges to municipalauthorities and not to the army.1l Quite clearly, until I810 the army washeld within a controlled constitutional framework in which civil authoritieschecked the aspirationsof those officers who desired additional autonomy.For Callejaand otherchiefs, many of the weaknesses sufferedby the Mexicanmilitary could be attributedto this straitjacketof corporationsand balances.The revolt which seared the fabric of Mexican society altered the form ofthe Bourbon regime and caused dramatic changes in the power structure.Overnight, the checks upon the army dissolved. In the struggle for survival,Felix Calleja and a small group of predominantly European Spanish officersre-arranged military relationships with existing corporations, the ayunta-mientos, and all other institutions. Even the viceroy, Francisco Javier deVenegas, had to play an ancillaryrole. In many respects,the military policiesthat would underlie the basic principlesof the royalistcause were hammeredout in the first two years of the struggle. Calleja, ably supported by officerssuch as BrigadierJose de la Cruz, who arrivedin Mexico from Spain just intime to play a majorrole in the revolt, launched the armyas a majorpolitical,social, and economic power.'2 Together, Calleja and Cruz as commandersofthe Armies of the Center and the Right, and then as viceroy and captain-general of Nueva Galicia based at Guadalajara, prepared the counter-insurgency program to defeat Miguel Hidalgo, Jose Maria Morelos, and the10 Calleja o Iturrigaray, September1805, AGN:IG, Vol. 3I5-A.11 Dictamen de Miguel Bataller,9 February1806, AGN:IG, Vol. 3I5-A. IturrigarayapprovedBataller's eport n a note dated i i February 806.12 Cruz arrived n Mexico in OctoberI8Io, on the warshipMino and was orderedtoreportto the capital for immediateservice. He was named commanderof the FirstMilitia Brigadeand of the Ejercitode la Derecha. See FranciscoJavierde VenegastoJose de la Cruz, 6 November 18io and I5 November 18io. AGN: OperacionesdeGuerra(citedhereinafteras OG),Vol. 14I.


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The Royalist Army in New Spain: Civil-Military Relationships 6Imultitude of guerrilla chieftains. In doing so, these royalist commanderssetup a pattern for military-civilrelations in a war and revolution-tornsociety.The shock of the insurrection of September 6, 18Io, its popularitywithplebeian sectors, and the speed with which it spread through the fertileBajio provinces, left senior army officers momentarily stunned. Like thecivil authorities, the army was caught unpreparedfor internal war and wasincapable of rapid response to the violence directed against the regime andthe hated gachupines. Although Viceroy Venegas ordered the army to con-centrate at Queretarofor a rapid assaulton the insurgent-heldtowns of SanMiguel el Grande, Dolores, and Celaya, and to raise the siege of Guanajuato,the army was scattered and dispirited. Calleja received news of the Hidalgoinsurrection at 10.30 a.m. on September I9, but, instead of conducting arapid mobilization of his brigade, he had to begin the process of formingunits, collecting arms, and requisitioning provisions. Since the only availablefirearmsbelonged to his two provincial dragoon regiments, he had to com-mission blacksmiths and other artisans to make lance points and to seewhether or not the technologicalskills were availableto castcannon, to makeswords, and construct other weapons. At the same time, he ordered thecountryside to be scoured for mounted vaqueros, Indian bowmen, and anymen who could beararmsor serve the army.13Although confusion reigned, Calleja moved quickly to establish his ownpre-eminence over the Intendant of San Luis Potosi, Manuel de Acevedo.The intendant was to mobilize transport, gather provisions, direct armsmanufacture,and prevent speculation by war profiteers.14All resourceswerere-directed o the army and, as terrifiedEuropeanand creole refugees pouredinto San Luis Potosi from Aguascalientes and Zacatecas,there could be nodoubt about the failure of vacillating civil administratorsand the old bureau-cracy.At first, neither Calleja nor any other army commander showed muchtaste for a quick test of strength with the insurgents. Calleja describedHidalgo's forces as a 'swarm', moving over the land, and he dared not takethe offensive until he could trust his own troops and guarantee the safety ofSan Luis Potosi. In Queretarowhere Manuel de Flon, Conde de la Cadena,Intendant of Puebla, arrived with a small force on September 29, the citywas in turmoil and the commanderof the Eighth Militia Brigade of Quere-taro, Ignacio Garcia Revollo, resented having been bypassedas army chief.

13 Calleja to Venegas, 21 September I8io, and 28 September 18Io, AGN:OG, Vol.I69.14 Manuel de Acevedo to Calleja, I OctoberI8IO, and Callejato Acevedo, 14 October181o, AGN:OG, Vol. 91.


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62 Christon I. ArcherIn a consejo de guerra, officers voted to dispatch a force of 6oo troops andfour cannon to attack San Miguel but Cadena expressedlittle confidence inthe project. None of the junta officers volunteered to lead the proposedexpedition and Garcia Revollo doubted the loyalty of the troops. Theayuntamiento objected to the removal of 600 troopsfor fear of the plebeianclasses.15Cadena was certain that the insurgentswere gathering booty at SanMiguel for a flight to New Orleans. Calleja wrote to the Intendant ofGuanajuato, Antonio Rianio,encouraging him to hold out and explainingthat he could not march immediately to relieve the siege.'6 Cadena followedthe events in Guanajuato with even greater interest because Riafio was hisbrother-in-law. Although many officers considered the reduction of theGuanajuatodefensesto the fortifiedAlh6ndiga de Granaditasa greatdisaster,Cadena believed that it might be a good thing since the insurgents lackedartilleryand might suffer enormous losses assaultingthe fortifications.l7The fall of Guanajuatoand the massacre of its Europeanresidentsgalvan-ized the royalists into action and hardened their policies toward the popu-lationof New Spain. News of the disasterat theAlh6ndiga reachedQueretaroon October 2 and a saddened Cadena feared for the safety of Queretaroandits 60,ooo inhabitants. Insurgent bands now operated within five or sixleagues of the city, forcing a delay of the plan to send a column to attackSan Miguel. Cadena reported to Venegas: 'the insurrection has taken on aformidable size that merits the full consideration of Your Excellency. Therebels have ravaged the country and left it a skeleton'.18Calleja, still strug-gling to form his army near San Luis Potosi, was little better off. The insur-gents were less than eight leagues from his advanced positions and heanticipated attacks at any time. As he wrote to Cadena on October 2: 'Mytroops are short in numbers and of the same quality as yours. I lack artillery,infantry officers, and I am in a country so undermined by sedition that Icannot abandon it without exposing it'.19 Despite these fears, however,Callejanow realized that it was essential to concentratethe royalistforcesandto strikeat the insurgenthordes.One of the first royalistchiefs to emerge from near panic and to prepareareasoned response to the insurgent masses was Jose Alonso Teran, com-mander at Valladolid. Teran pointed out to the nervous Cadena that15 Conde de la Cadena to Ignacio Garcia Revollo, 30 September I8Io, AGN:OG,Vol. 94-A.16 Cadena to Venegas, 29 September I8io, and Calleja to Antonio Riafio, n.d.,AGN:OG, Vol. 94-A.17 Cadena o JoseAlonsoTeran, 2 OctoberI8Io, AGN:OG, Vol. 94-A.18 Cadena to Venegas, 5 October 1810, AGN:OG, Vol. 94-A.19 Calleja o Cadena,2 October18ro, AGN:OG,Vol. 94-A.


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The Royalist Army in New Spain: Civil-Military Relationships 63Queretaro, unlike Guanajuato, was located on a flat plain and could bedefended. In his opinion, the insurgents were concerned primarily withplunder and he pointed out that '.. . a single infantry regiment which canmake sustained and orderedfire, with necessaryevolutions, will probablybesufficientto disperseall of thatmultitude.'20Furthermore,since the insurgentslacked artillery, although they were casting cannon at San Miguel, Teransuspected that the enemy '. . will disperse like a handful of flies at the firstcannonades.' From his intelligence reports, Teran knew that Hidalgo andAllende had not garrisonedSan Miguel, Celaya,or Salamanca,and that theirforces were weighed down by their booty. The rebels were not fearful fortheir physical strength as much as for their 'moral force of deceit and seduc-tion.' Towns accepted their threats and saw the pitiful European prisonerswhom they marchedbefore them - threateningexecutionsand destructiontoany who resisted. The plebeiansjoined simply for booty and, while Europeanproperty lasted, they would be satisfied. Teran was certain that Cadena'sforces would not encounter much resistance, but it was essential to strikequickly and to deny Hidalgo the resources of San Miguel, Guanajuato,Celaya, and Irapuato. He proposed an immediate march on Celaya, Sala-manca and Irapuatowith Cadena's main force and an attack on San Miguelwith its cannon foundry by a smaller column consisting of an infantrybattalion, a squadron of cavalry, and 500 armed countrymen. This latterforce could then march on Guanajuatoand remain behind enemy lines untilthe arrivalof Calleja's army.21Like Calleja, Cadena was fearful of withdrawing troops from his majorcity since priests and others reported that insurgent agents were under-mining royalist support. Between October 9 and i i, seventy-four soldiersdeserted and Cadena placed no confidence in men from the QueretaroandCelaya districts. Only twenty-five officers and dragoons of two companiesof the Regiment of the Prfncipe from Guanajuatoremained and there wereso few left in the Regiment of Celaya that he transferredthem to other units.He begged the viceroyto send troopswho were not native to the Bajforegionbecause those who were escapedto the insurgents less than two leagues fromQueretaro. He wanted men from Puebla, Veracruz, Tlaxcala, and Toluca,even doubting the loyalty of the regular regiments since they had soldiersfrom Queretaro and the insurgent-held cities. He proposed sending theremaining troops from Celaya to Spain to fight because they would not inMexico.22

20 Teran to Cadena,3 OctoberI8Io, AGN:OG,Vol. 94-A.21 Ibid. Teran did not know thatGuanajuatohad fallento the insurgents.22 Jose Alonso to Cadena, 12 October I8Io; and Cadena to Venegas, 12 October18Io, AGN:OG,Vol. 94-A.


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64 Christon . ArcherDespite his fears of losing Queretarofrom within, Cadena blundered intohis first victory and proved correct much of the advice Teran had givenabout insurgent weaknesses. On October 6, Cadena dispatched a strongdetachment of cavalry and infantry to reconnoiter the country surroundingQueretaro. At Puerto de Carroza, about nine leagues from the city, theroyalists encountered an insurgent force estimated at between 2,000 and3,000 men. The royalist commander, Captain Bernardo Tello, decided towithdraw, but the enemy attacked. Before any hostilities commenced, theauxiliary cavalry accompanying Tello's column fled back to Queretaro.There, they reported that Ioo men of the Regiment of Celaya had beenslain and, doubtless, the two cannon they had with them, castby the cabildoof Queretaro,had been lost. Shockedby what appearedto be a majorreverse,Cadena dispatched a relief force of 200 regular dragoons and 200 regularinfantry of the Regiments of Spain and the Crown.23 Instead of rescuing abatteredcolumn, the relief force arrived to find that Tello had defeated the

insurgents, killing more than 200 Indians. Only one soldier was killed inTello's force and he died by error when he wandered in front of his owncannon after dark. Only four to six soldiers had been wounded by enemyfire and all of these suffered no more than contusions caused by stonesthrown by hand or sling.24From this point forward until the insurgents changed tactics and began tofortify positions and to force sieges, Calleja, Cruz, Cadena and other royalistchiefs smashed rebel troop concentrations almost at will. The Battles ofAculco, Guanajuato,and even Calder6n,if they can be given the name, werenot in any sense even matches between opposing armies. The rebel hordesmelted as Teran had said they would when confronted by semi-disciplinedsoldiers. Even so, Calleja was not at all certain that his troops would fight.At Calder6n near Guadalajaraon JanuaryI7, 181I, he was highly critical ofhis green soldiers who, during the conflict, '. . . showed little or no sign thatthey were imbued with principles of honor and martial enthusiasm.' Whenthe insurgents did not run, many units wavered and began to fall back indisorder. Cadena's troops were repulsed twice and Calleja had to join thesoldiers himself to bolster their sagging morale. Cadena died during theassault on the insurgents' grand battery. In summing up, Calleja reportedthat it was only the cowardliness and disorder of the rebels that madethe royalist troops look better. This time, 60 soldiers were killed and gowounded. While Calleja claimed inflated figures of 6,000 to 7,000 dead on

23 Cadenato Venegas,7 October 8I0, AGN:OG, Vol. 94-A.24 BernardoTello to Cadena,Chichimequillas,6 OctoberI8o1, AGN:OG,Vol. 94-A.


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The Royalist Army in New Spain: Civil-Military Relationships 65the insurgent side, he was concerned that the enemy was learning how tofight.25Although the royalist commanders regained their confidence quicklyenough to prevent Hidalgo from obtaining total victory, success on thebattlefield could not suppress what was obviously a popular revolutionarymovement. Writing on January7, 181 , just ten days before his own death,Cadena told Calleja that only two more months of inaction would have lostNew Spain. The uprising was a general insurrection that included all in-habitants, even the friars, nuns, and ecclesiastics.Cadena felt that the popu-lace would remain quiet because of the 'fear and terror' the royalist armyhad put into them, but it could not be forgotten that ' . . in their hearts theyabhor the Europeans.'26Even earlier, after the recapture of San Miguel,Cadena had stated '.. . there is not a resident who does not deserve to havehis head cut off for being a supporterof Allende and the priest.'27Callejadescribed the revolt as a 'hydra reborn as fast as one cuts off its heads.'28While the royalist troops were present, the populace appeared humble,sincere, and loyal, but no sooner than the army moved on to a new location,they returnedto take up armsor evade their duty to the crown.29 n his view,large numbers of Spanish troopswould be needed to restoreorderin Mexico.

Calleja was realistic in his appraisalof the situation in New Spain. In aconfidential and frank assessmentpreparedjust after his victory at Calder6n,he informed Venegas that, without reforms, the province could not be keptas a Spanish possession:its nativesand even the Europeansare convincedof the advantages hat wouldresult rom an independent overnment. f theabsurd nsurrection f Hidalgohadresteduponthisbase,it seems to me that it would havesufferedittleopposition.30Calleja noted that everyoneblamed the lack of specie in Mexico upon Spain,and condemned the mother country for its policies that permittedmercantilespeculation, high prices, and limited availability of goods. He was particu-larly critical of the 'egotistical and greedy' European Spaniards. The fewwho had deigned to join his army demanded special treatmentand acted asif they were doing the royalist cause a favor by enlisting. He condemnedtheir 'lack of patriotism and criminal indifference.' Instead of uniting todefend their interests in a struggle which saw them as a central issue, they

25 Calleja to Venegas, I8 January I8II, AGN:OG, Vol. I71; and Lucas Alaman,Historia de MejicoII (Mexico, 1968), p. 92.26 Cadenato Venegas,7 January 81ii, AGN:OG,Vol. 94-A.27 Cadena to Venegas, 25 OctoberI8io, AGN:OG,Vol. 94-A.28 Calleja to Venegas, 20 August 1811, AGN:OG, Vol. I90.29 Calleja o Venegas, 14 August, I8I I, AGN:OG,Vol. I90.30 Callejato Venegas,29 January 8II, AGN:OG,Vol. I7I.


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66 Christon1.Archerleft the creoles to defend European lives and property.31Calleja pointed outthat his army of 'buenos criollos' resented European attitudes. He askedVenegas to issue badges and medals honoring those soldiers who had seencombat in the battles against Hidalgo. As time passed, Callejabecame moreand more critical of the Spaniards who lived in luxury and '...occupythemselves exclusively with their interests and backbite the army that savesthe smallest of their possessions.'He pointed out: 'they believe that they willsave themselves at the cost of others, but no: they are mistaken; if the armyloses, in moments the devouring fire will run to the extremesof the coasts'.32If Calleja was irked by the lack of martial zeal shown by the Europeans,he and his associateshad much more trouble developing a response to theguerrillabandsthat sprangup everywhereto harasscommerce,raidhaciendasand towns, and generally to submergemuch of Mexico in an enervating andprolonged conflict. From the outset, Viceroy Venegas proposed the use of'extraordinaryrigor' and 'terror' to crush insurgency and to frighten thepopulation into non-belligerency.While Calleja and other officers practisedsummary justice, Jose de la Cruz became one of its major exponents. Sweep-ing northward from Mexico City with his Army of the Right in Novemberand December, I8Io, Cruz experienced the frustration of trying to engageguerrillabandsled by Julianand JoseVillegran (El Chito), and Angel, Diego,and EstebanAnaya. These insurgentshad interruptedcommercebetween thecapitaland the vital distribution and gathering point of Queretaro.When theVillagrans captured an ammunition convoy and executed the auditor of thearmy, Jose Ignacio Velez, and several other senior administrators, Cruzvowed to use 'blood and fire' to deter those who had not yet joined therebellion.33

Calleja had introduced less brutal means to end the insurrection and onNovember 4, I8Io, he issued a pardon to insurgents who would surrender,identify their leaders, and give up their arms, machetes and knives. AtIrapuato,however, one of his bandospardoning rebels was torn down duringthe night. He ordered an investigationof this 'insolent act', but when no onecame forward to identify the aggressor,he ordered the arrestof those foundanywhere near the site of the removed proclamation. They were asked to31 See, for example, Francisco Rendon to Venegas, Guadalajara,27 January I8II,AGN:OG, Vol. 17I; and Venegasto Calleja,3 February1811, AGN:OG, Vol. I8I.Also see Romeo Flores Caballero,La Contrarevolucion n la independencia:los

espanolesen la vida politica, social y economica de Mexico (I804 1838) Mexico,I969), p. 69.32 Calleja o Venegas, 12 August 181 , AGN:OG,Vol. I90.33 Cruz to Venegas, 17 November I8io; and Venegas to Cruz, 22 November I8Io,AGN:OG, Vol. I41.


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TheRoyalistArmyin New Spain:Civil-Military elationships 67identifythe culprits,but whennone did so Callejacondemned ne in tentodeath, practisingdecimationagainstthe forty prisoners.The unfortunatevictims were drawnby lots and then executedby firing squads.34 s moreinformation ecameavailable bout nsurgentatrocities,Calleja trengthenedtheresponse f his army.OnNovember27, 181o, at Guanajuato, e orderedtheexecutionof i8 insurgents fter ots had been drawn.35By thispointanyrebelof captain'srank or abovewas executedalmostautomatically, ut itwasimpossibleo chastise ll whohadhelped heinsurgency.Havingevokedtotalterroranduncertaintyn the populace,Calleja ssueda new pardonsothat hecitycouldreturn o normalcy.36

Venegasdemanded ven moreterror o punishrebelsandto deterothers.He had reportsof manyEuropeansbeingexecutedat Valladolid(Morelia)andof I30 killedat SanFelipe.Sinceasmanyas 600 Europeans ndcreoleshadbeenmurdered t Guanajuato,heviceroywarnedagainstanyrelaxationof counter-insurgentiolence.He demandedan energeticcampaignwhichset humanityasidein order to annihilateanyonewho had the least role inthe atrocities.In Venegas'sview, 'the cancer must be cut out withoutsensibilities.'At Zapotlanel Grande, or example, he Indianshad risenupand put all Europeansand AmericanSpaniardso the knife withoutdis-tinction.37As has been mentioned,Jose de la Cruz was even more effectivethanCalleja n using terrorand,with experience,he evolvedan efficientsystemof counter-insurgency. eginning at Nopala and Huichapan, he heldexecutionsof insurgentsbefore the assembledpopulace.The bodies werethenhungup at theentranceso thetownsas a 'healthfulexample.'He thentotally disarmedthe population; n Huichapan,only two residentsweredeclared ree enoughof guilt to be left in possession f their kitchenandtableknives.38Besides iberaluse of the firingsquadto intimidate he sub-jectsof reoccupied reas,Cruz developed he conceptof the destacamientovolante(flyingdetachment) f about300 mounted oldiers,designed o carryout searchand destroymissions nto rebel-heldterritory.The objectwas torecover rms,confiscate ll horsesandlivestock,destroy ll forges,apprehendrebelcanalla,and to make examplesby using summary ustice. Capturedinsurgentswere permittedfour hours to prepare or death as Christiansbeforetheymet theirend andwerehungupin treesalongroadsordisplayed34 CallejaoVenegas,6 November8io, AGN:OG,Vol.170.35 Calleja o Venegas,27 November I8Io, AGN:OG,Vol. 170.36 Calleja o Venegas, 28 November I8Io, AGN:OG,Vol. 170.37 Venegasto Calleja,io DecemberI8Io, AGN:OG,Vol. i70.38 Cruz to Venegas, 23 Novemberand 30 November 18Io, AGN:OG, Vol. 141.


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68 Christon . Archerat the approachesto towns as a gruesome reminder to others.39Cruz dis-covered that by using several flying detachments, he could scatter theinsurgent bands and impair their effectiveness. He was concerned aboutpetitions from blacksmiths begging that their forges be spared destruction,but since some had made lance points and swords, he wondered if anyexceptionsshould be allowed.40Although Cruz's policy of making 'harsh and repeatedjustice' resulted inmany men being draggedbefore firing squads, some other commandersweresickened by the high level of inhumanity and bloodshed. Cruz wrote toCalleja: 'already I have caused suffering in this infamous race and I amgoing to completelyterrorize them. I have almost reduced two towns to ashesand done the same to all haciendas belonging to the highwaymen.'41WhileCalleja also employed terrorto pacify former insurgent towns, he was not atall convinced that Cruz was correctin being overly cruel. He responded:It is true thattheyareevil and that it is necessaryo employrigor;but in my viewone must use this meanswith suchprudence hat therealwaysremains to themthe hope of saving themselvesand of obtaininga pardon. Experiencehas mademe see this and everyday someindividualspresent hemselves o ask for peace.42

Notwithstanding Calleja's advice. Cruz continued to pursue insurgentswith the utmost violence. After having been appointedcommanderof NuevaGalicia, he developed an effective system of divisions that held the provinceuntil I821. He viewed Valladolid as the source of insurgent activity andsuggested to Calleja half seriously: 'we need to shoot half the canalla whoform the population, and by not doing so the war will never be concluded.'43Until he gained total controlover Nueva Galicia, however, Cruz maintaineda harsh policy of war to the death against the insurgents. During May andJune, 18I , more than 600 rebelswere executed.44His system was to use hisdivisions to prevent any insurgent coalescenceof more than 300 men. Oncea rebel chief managed to accumulate 600 men, there seemed to be a spon-taneous growth to as many as 6,ooo in little more than a month. Once thattook place, a large force was required to extinguish the insurgents and torestore peace. Cruz pointed to the large rebel gatherings at Patzcuaro,Zitacuaro,and Cuautla as examples of royalistfailure to act quickly enough.

39 Cruz to Venegas, I December 18 0, AGN:OG, Vol. I42.40 Cruz to Venegas,6 December18io, AGN:OG,Vol. I42.41 Cruz to Calleja,2 DecemberI8I0, AGN:OG,Vol. 140.42 Calleja o Cruz, 5 Decemberi8Io, AGN:OG,Vol. I40.43 Cruz to Calleja, I JuneI8Io, AGN:OG,Vol I45.44 Cruz to Calleja,9 July i8II, AGN:OG,Vol. I45.


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TheRoyalistArmyin New Spain:Civil-Military elationships 69He described his own approachas 'shoot hundreds, punish towns, and makethe name soldieras fearfulas death itself.'45

Despite Calleja'senormous military and political power, he chose a muchless sanguinary approach to terminating the insurgency. The ignominiouscapture of Hidalgo, Allende, and other prominent insurgent chiefs onMarch 21, I8 I,46 gave hope of an earlyend to hostilities. Indeed, in a mostimportant Reglamento Politico Militar dated June 8, i 8i, Calleja decidedto announce the conclusion of the insurrection.In this document, he reducedthe status of any continuing insurgents to that of 'bandits, thieves, anddelinquents' who did not deserve the royal pardon. He declared that theirsole motivation was to rob, interrupt commerce, destroy agriculture, andterminate mining.47 Through his plan, Calleja sought to mobilize andmilitarize the whole population and to employ a wide-ranging militia net-work to isolateand destroyinsurgentbands.Since the army could not respondto every attack on a village, hacienda, orrancho, the obligationfor defense devolved upon each community. The armywould create garrisons and mobile divisions in strategiclocations so that aidwould be forthcoming without long delays. In each city, town, or district, acomandantede armaswould be named - if possible uniting the military andcivil jurisdictionsin one individual to avoid delays and conflicts. This officerwould form urban infantry and cavalrycompanies, arming them with lancesand machetes or even slings and bows and arrows if no other weapons wereavailable. Each company was then to place Ioo to I50 men on daily guardand patrol duty according to local needs. The costs would be supportedbytaxes and forced contributions levied according to ability to pay. In thecountryside, hacendados and ranch owners were obliged to form smallermilitia companies or squadronsfrom their workers. Their primarytask wasto watch the roadsand to detain anyone who appearedsuspicious.In casesofattacks, the companies would coalesce into larger units. Militiamen were tocarrya certificateof identification since no one elsewas permittedto bear arms.Even muleteers were restrictedto one axe and a short knife without a point.4845 Cruz to Calleja, 15 July I8ii, and Cruz to Calleja, 9 April I814, AGN:OG,Vol. 145.46 See Hugh M. Hamill, The Hidalgo Revolt: Prelude to Mexican Independence(Gainesville,1966), pp. 20-I I; and CharlesHarrisIII, A MexicanFamily Empire:The Latifundio of the Sanchez Navarro Family, 1765-1867 (Austin, I975),PP- 134-5.47 Reglamento politico militar que deberan observarbajo las penas que sefiala lospueblos, haciendas,y ranchos a quienes se comunique por las autoridades,8 June81I, AGN:OG, Vol. 186.48 Ibid., and Calleja to the Alcalde of Le6n, Ildefonso Septien, 13 August 18ri,AGN:OG, Vol. 145.


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70 Christon . ArcherThe first problem with Calleja's plan was that it depended upon hispremise - that the insurgents had become little more than bands of maraud-

ing outlaws. Secondly, to be successful, the counterinsurgency programrequired the active support of the urban and rural populations. Cruz dis-agreed with Calleja on the first point and argued in favor of his flyingdetachments that were more suitable to 'annihilate the rabble gathered indistant and diverse points.'49Cruz was quite right. It became painfully clearthat without close proximity of Calleja's Army of the Center, the cities andtowns of the Bajio were wide open to guerrilla attacks. Through I811 and18 2, the citiesof Guanajuato,San Miguel, and Celayafell preyon numerousoccasions to wandering bands that simply walked or rode into the urbanareas and temporarilytook over. Usually, the urban militias were noticeablyconspicuousby their absence and their arms were often confiscatedby theiropponents. Finally, Calleja had not anticipated the ability of the rebels torecover and to begin fortifying themselves in positions such as Zitacuaro,Cuautla, Izucar, and on the Island of Mezcala in Laguna de Chapala, and,under JoseMariaMorelos,to surroundand threaten to isolateMexico City.In Guanajuato, the reoccupationof the city by the royalists introduced alengthy period of disastrousinstability. Beginning as earlyas the departureofCalleja's army to chase Hidalgo to Guadalajara,rebel bands attacked out-lying mines and executed principal residents. The nearby towns of SanMiguel, San Felipe, and Dolores were sacked and preventedfrom any returnto normal.50 Representatives of the Guanajuato ayuntamiento, miningdeputation, and merchant group feared that they would become victims ofthe plebeian insurgents based in the mountains and valleys near the city.Indeed, there were daily reportsof thefts, murders, and planned attacks. OnJanuary I8, 8 ii, the Intendant of Guanajuato, Fernando Perez Maranion,was awakened at 7.00 a.m. when 80 to Ioo insurgents showed up at hisdoor. They said that they were the vanguard of an insurgent army of 6,oootroops and claimed that Calleja had been defeated. They asked for lodgingand other aid, but the intendant refused to help them. A great crowdgathered to witness these events and would not disperseuntil exhorted to doso by the priests.51Perez Marafion managed to send a message to the Guanajuato militia,but most of the men had disappearedwhen the insurgents arrived. Aftersome effort, a total of I poorly armed individuals were scraped together,but they were not disposed to fight. In the meantime, the insurgent leader,49 Cruz to Calleja,15 July I8I1, AGN:OG,Vol. 145.50 FernandoPerez Marafion o Calleja,20 December 18II-, AGN:OG, Vol. I95.51 Perez Marafion to Venegas, 19 January I8II, AGN:OG, Vol. I79.


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TheRoyalistArmyin New Spain:Civil-Military elationships 71Fernando Mallagoitia asked the intendant for I00 pesos plus a smaller sumfor expenses. The intendant, teniente letrado, and regidores considered thisrequest and agreed to pay the money since they had no forces and feared apopular tumult. The insurgents went to their lodgings and Perez Marafionhastened to the militia barracks to see if he could animate the men intocapturing their enemies. This was a waste of time since none were willing totake any risks. Finally, at 3.00 a.m., Mallagoitiaand his band rode out of thecity.52As might be anticipated from the success of this visit, another insurgentband numbering about 300 men armed with lances and some with musketsreturnedto Guanajuatoon January31. They aroused the populace, emptiedthe jail of prisoners,ransacked the treasuryoffices, burned the archives, androbbed some houses and haciendas. By the time they departed the city onthe following morning, total anarchy reigned.53 Under his counter-insurgency plan, Calleja raised four additional urban companies inGuanajuato and several others in surrounding mines and haciendas. ByNovember, 181 , there were ,60oo Voluntarios Distinguidos, most armedwith muskets. Despite numbers, however, Calleja lacked confidence in thecapacity of these troops to resist attacks. As he feared, the rebels enteredGuanajuato again on November i8 with 500 cavalry, but few carried fire-arms. This time, however, some 200 militiamen awaited them in the plazamayorand, in a battle that raged from 9.00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m., the insurgentswere expelled from the city. On the 26th, they returned with a large forceestimated at 5,000 men led by the implacableinsurgent chief Albino Garcia.Once again, the urban militia held and the rebels were forced to suspendtheirattacks.54Conditions were even worse in San Miguel. On September 24, 181I,using the excuse that they were the vanguard of an army commandedby theNegro Abanero, 300 guerrillas took over the town. The subdelegatesoughtrefuge in a church, leaving the rebels to rob stores,wreck houses, and collectall armsthey could find. Public offices were sacked and the archivesscattered.Finally, loaded down with booty, they left San Miguel, taking a number ofprisoners to hold for ransom.55During the raid, the local defense forcesdissolved and the militiamen did not reappearuntil later without their horsesand arms. The few residents of San Miguel who opposed the insurgentswere so frightened of the plebeian classes that they met in secret juntas to

52 Ibid.53 JoseLuis Garcia o PerezMaranion, 21 January 8I I, AGN:OG, Vol. s95.54 P&rez Marafion to Calleja, 19 November i81i, AGN:OG, Vol. 195.55 FranciscoUragato Calleja,24 September 81o, AGN:OG,Vol. I89.


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72 Christon . Archerdiscuss defense. Little could be accomplished,however, without arms,horses,or even men who were willing to serve as officers. With few exceptions, thepopulation of the town was paralysed by fear of the rebel chiefs - especiallythe Indian Bernardo Huacal, the Negro Abanero, Bruno Guardiana, andPadre Pederosa.56About the only positive factor in this raid was that thelower classes refused to turn over the subdelegateto the insurgents.Encouraged by a number of loyal ecclesiasticsled by Padre Francisco deUraga, new efforts were made to re-arm and re-equip the urban defensecompanies. An Indian sling unit was formed, lance points readied, and asearch conducted to see whether any firearms could be found. All went wellfor a week when the insurgents returned to confiscatethe newly-constructedlances, strip the town of horses, and demand that the Indians and otherplebeiansjoin with them. Most did so and the result was total anarchy.Onlytwo priests resisted and attempted to restore order.57At this point, Callejadispatchedan infantry and cavalrycolumn commandedby CaptainFranciscoGuizarnotegui to disperse the insurgents before they were strong enough tooccupy San Miguel.As might be expected, the honorable residents of the town welcomed therelief force. They thanked Calleja for their salvation, but were shocked tolearn that Guizarnotegui planned to leave after a short time to continue hismission elsewhere. The junta of 'honorable residents' identified three classesin San Miguel: the one-hundred people of the decente class; a coarse andnumerous class 'without ideas, honor, or religion;' and the ruralpeople whohad alreadyjoined the insurgency. The junta declared that the departureofthe royalist forces would be '. . . a sentence to our ruin' because the enemywere all aboutand their leader Huacal was 'a wild beast.'58When Captain Guizarnotegui met obstinate resistance from the men ofSan Miguel who were to form new urban companies, Calleja was forced totake harsh measures. The main force of his army was engaged in the cam-paign against Zitacuaroand could not respond to attackson the Bajio cities.In the event that Guizarnotegui failed to raise an adequate defense force,Calleja ordered him to publish a bando when he departedfrom San Miguel,ordering all ecclesiastics and honorable residents to accompany the royalistcolumn. They could take their valuables and the church ornaments, closingtheir houses, the churches, and public buildings. Those who remained in thetown would be treated as insurgents when the army returned. This was

56 Luis Caballero to Calleja, 27 September I81, and Uraga to Calleja 4 October 1811,AGN:OG, Vol. I89.57 Uraga to Calleja, 14 October 8I I , AGN:OG, Vol. 189.58 Vecinos honorados de San Miguel to Calleja, 12 October I811, and Uraga toCalleja, II November I8II, AGN:OG, Vol. I89.


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TheRoyalistArmyin New Spain:Civil-Military elationships 73Calleja'smethod to end what he saw as lethargy and to compel the populaceto make a choice between the two sides. Realizing that his own system ofcounter-insurgencylacked sufficient compulsion, Calleja decided to makeexamples out of a few places like San Miguel. He orderedhis subordinatestoraze towns where no supportexistedfor la buenacausa.59SanMiguel took Calleja'sthreats to heart.The more faint-heartedresidentssuch as the subdelegate, the alcaldes, the alguacil mayor, and some militiaofficers departed with the royalist column. This left Jose Maria Malo incommand as subdelegateand militarycommander. On November 5, a bandof thirty insurgentsburst into the town and went to the chapel of San Felipede Neri. There, they stabbed a portero to death and refused to leave untilthey were threatened by the ecclesiastics. They returned the next morningcommanded by the fearsome BernardoHuacal - some carriedmuskets andpistols and they even brought a cannon without a carriage.Huacal took overthe treasury building, but the populace showed no inclination to join him.Indeed, Malo was able to unite some militiamen and members of the plebeianclasses and to attack Huacal's band. After an hour of fighting, Huacal wascapturedand his force dispersed.60Callejawas ecstatic;for the first time, thecommon people and the betterclasseshad combined to resistthe insurgents.61

From the examples of Guanajuato and San Miguel, one can understandwhy Calleja was loath to march his army away from the smoldering revo-lution of the Bajfo provinces. He was not even certain that his men wouldfollow him against Zitacuaro and then Cuautla. As early as the summer of18 I, the army was wracked by desertionand what the officers describedasan epidemic of venereal complaints. Like so many of his officers and troops,Calleja suffered constant dysentery and severe intestinal problems; hedoubted that he would be able to remain in command.62He was painfullyaware of the thin line between survival and total defeat for the royalistcause.Historians often describe Calleja as a conservative general, but, withoutfully realizing as he did that the Army of the Center was the one bulwark59 Calleja o Venegas, 15 OctoberI8II, AGN:OG, Vol. 192.60 Jose Maria Malo to Calleja, 17 November I81, and 23 November I8Ii, AGN:OG,Vol. 189.61 Calleja to Venegas, 28 November I8II, AGN:OG, Vol. 195. This event was widelypublicized in the Gazeta de Mexico. See the Gazeta, 14 December1811, and LucasAlamain,HistoriaII, 19I.62 Calleja to Venegas, 29 January 1812, AGN:OG, Vol. 197; and Calleja to the

Ministerof War, 5 March I813, AGI, Mexico, Leg. 1322. Calleja'sbad health hasbeen dismissed as a political illness by some historians. There can be no doubt,however, about his suffering. Calleja and Cruz discussed their -intestinal andstomach disordersand it was common knowledge in the army that he was in verybadhealth.


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74 Christon . Archerpreventing a rapid decline into total anarchy. Calleja knew that he could notrisk losing a single battle. He darednot split his armyinto too many divisionsand garrisonsfor fear of being overwhelmed by numbers. He worried aboutroyalist commanders who saw only the small picture within their provincesand who competed with each other for troops and weapons. They had tounderstand that four-fifths of the population wanted the insurrection tosucceed.63

By December, 1811, the Army of the Centerappearedto be close to break-down. Heavy rains and snow storms slowed the march toward fortifiedZitacuaro.Desertion and disease increasedand food suppliesbegan to falter.As Calleja approached the enemy town, pits and felled trees interruptedprogress.The scorched earth policy of the insurgents made food and foragedifficult to find. Despite these difficulties, however, Calleja was planningbeyond Zitacuaro. First, this town had to be made to 'disappear from thesurface of the earth' and then the attack carried to Morelos with the fullweight of the army of operationsso that the new insurgent leader would notbecome another Hidalgo.64 He would apply exactly the same policy atCuautla, arguing that, if it was not absolutely obliteratedand its defendersburied in the rubble, the insurgents would construct fortifications all overNew Spain. The smaller royalist forces might exhaust themselves, becomeintimidated, and eventuallyfail.65Both towns were put to the torch. At Zitacuaroafter the royalist victory,Calleja issued a bando, confiscating rebel property and condemning thetown to destruction. The people were permittedto carrywhat propertytheycould to other towns, but their entire town was burnedon January13, 1812.66Following the lengthy siege and defeat of Morelos at Cuautla, Callejaordered the defenses torn down and the town burned. Viceroy Venegas wasnot at all happy at the assault on real estate rather than on people, arguingthat both guilty and innocent would be punished. Fearful of latercriticismforsuch a brutal policy, on May 8, 1811, he ordered Calleja to suspend hisorders unless there were extraordinaryreasons for going ahead with thedestruction.67Calleja informed Venegas that he had passedon the order,but

63 Calleja to Venegas, i August I81 i, AGN:OG, Vol. I90.64 Calleja to Venegas, 7 November I811, AGN:OG, Vol. I95. Carlos MariaBustamantenoted in the margin of this document that the monster (Calleja)haddone just that to Zitacuaroby orderingthe town burned.65 Callejato Venegas,28 February 812, AGN:OG,Vol. 198.66 Bandoof Calleja,5 January 812, AGN:OG,Vol. I65, and JoseMariade Echeagarayto Calleja, 13 JanuaryI812, AGN:OG, Vol. I65. For a copy see CarlosMariadeBustamante,Cuadrohistoricode la revolucionmexicanaI (Mexico, I96I), 42-4.67 Calleja to Venegas, 6 May 1812, and Venegas to Calleja,8 May I812, AGN:OG,Vol. 201.


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The Royalist Army in New Spain: Civil-Military Relationships 75either by error or connivance the change of plan did not reach Ciriaco deLlano who was left in command at Cuautla. He informed Callejathathe wassorry to report that he could not put into effect the 'pious intentions' of theviceroy.He had burnedCuautla the day before and left only the churchesanda few otherbuildings."It is difficult to say whether the army overruledVenegas or if there wassimply an error of communications. Certainly, however, the power of thearmy over society and the civil regime was now quite obvious. WhenCalleja attempted to resign his command in January, 1812, claiming thatbecause of poor health he simply could not continue to serve, his officersbelieved that he was giving in to slander,back-biting,and rumorsemanatingfrom non-militarycircles in Mexico City. In a strongly worded petition sentto Venegas, Calleja's staff officers said they were certain that his illnessbecame worse with '. . . unjust criticism that men so destitute of knowledgeas of sane judgement have made publicly in the capital about the manage-ment of an army that has saved the kingdom from disasterso many times'.69They warned of 'enormous evils' if Calleja resigned, since he and he aloneenjoyed the supportof soldiersand officers. In anotherpetition to the viceroysigned by nineteen captains, they stated that the troops saw their general'...as a father rather than as a chief.' They noted Calleja was the onlycommanderwho had been able to turn common men againstthe insurrectionand to animate them to march so far from their families and homes. In theopinion of the captains, these troops would not take to a new leader andwould desert the army. Cautioning against any attempt to divide the armyinto divisions, they pointed out the difficulties and failures experienced bysmall royalist forces confronted by larger insurgent formations. The enemyknew the country and could exhaust the troops by depriving them of foodand weakening them through constant marches. They warned: '. . .if (thearmy) is subdivided into small parts, and if the name and reputation ofCalleja is separatedfrom us, the results will be regrettable,and the MotherCountrywill weep alwaysfor such conduct'.70

68 Calleja to Venegas, 9 May 1812, AGN:OG, Vol. 2oi; and Ciriaco de Llano toCalleja,io May 1812, AGN:OG,Vol. 288.69 Petition of the officers to Venegas,30 JanuaryI812, AGN:OG, Vol. I65.70 Petition of 19 Captains to Venegas, i February 1812, AGN:OG, Vol. 165. ForCalleja'sresponseto Venegas'srequestthat he stay in command,see LucasAlaman,Historia de Mejico II, 302-3; and Carol C. Ferguson, 'The Spanish Tamerlaine?Felix MariaCalleja, Viceroyof New Spain, I8I3-I816,' (unpublishedPh.D. Disser-tation, Texas ChristianUniversity, 1973). It is worth noting that the correspondencebetween Calleja and Venegas shows almost no sign of the conflicts and rivalriesattributedto them by Alaman and other historians. If there were personaldiffer-ences, the two officersdid manage to maintain excellentworking relationships.See


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76 Christon I. ArcherIt was difficult to recognize the army of 1812 as the same force that hadentered the war against Hidalgo. In I808, the officer corps watched instunned silence while a small group of peninsular merchants toppled theircommander, Viceroy Jose de Iturrigaray. By I812, the corporative spiritfeared earlierhad appeared.If Callejawas the ultimate authorityin his widejurisdiction, so too were other officers in their commands throughout New

Spain. The revolution with its capacityto generatenew centers of insurgency,guerrilla and bandit forces, and permanentrifts in the population, forced thearmy to bypass the regime, push aside competing comporations,and to dealdirectlywith the populace.Without total controls over resources and manpower, the royalist armycould not respond to the proliferatingrevolution. In every region touched byinsurrection, there were permanent shortages of manpower and equipment.As Jose de la Cruz wrote from Guadalajara:'a dozen eggs cannot make fiftyomelettes.' Criticized by Viceroy Venegas for permitting the rebel islandfortress of Mezcala to withstand attacks, Cruz wrote: 'Your Excellency, doyou believe that I can perform miracles? Can I make the rocks give memuskets, pistols, swords, or powder? My cavalryis entirelydisarmed'.71Evenwith all of the resources of Nueva Galicia, Cruz had to arm his cavalrywithlances - a weapon the soldiers abhorred.Swords constructedat great cost inGuadalajarawere so brittle that they broke with the movement of the horseand rider. Like most commanders, Cruz saw the regional rather than thegeneral picture. When Calleja became viceroy in I813, Cruz submitted hisresignation. Calleja chided him for his complaints and pointed out that allcommanders lacked weapons and that there was no surplus of troops in thecapitalor anywhereelse in New Spain.72In the struggle for resources and manpower, the military expanded itspowers and abused both the civil jurisdiction and the population. Men whomarched with Calleja from San Luis Potosi were not returnedhome for tenyears. The army was insatiable in its appetite for replacements and newrecruits, using the most arbitrarymeans and employing threats, levies, andsimply plain surprise.New recruits were jailed under military ordersto keepthem from deserting and then marched in cuerdas, chained together likecriminals on their way to the presidios.73 The ayuntamientos which had

Lucas Alam;an,Historia de Mejico II, 306; and Timothy E. Anna, The Fall of theRoyal Government n Mexico City (Lincoln, I978), pp. 86-7.71 Cruz to Calleja, I6 June i8II, AGN:OG, Vol. I45; and Cruz to Venegas, 27 Feb-ruary1813, AGN:OG,Vol. I49.72 Calleja o Cruz,6 July 18I3, AGN:OG,Vol. I49.73 Manuel de Acevedo to Calleja,6 August i8i5, AGN:OG, Vol. 93; and Acevedo toViceroyJuanRuiz de Apodaca,4 May 1817, AGN:OG,Vol. 94.


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The RoyalistArmyin New Spain:Civil-Military elationships 77controlled patronage over militia appointments lost complete touch withtheir units which became de facto regular army regiments and battalions.Writing in 1816, the ayuntamiento of San Luis Potosi complained toViceroy Juan Ruiz de Apodaca that it had lost touch with any aspect ofregimental appointments and promotions. Apodaca admitted the theoreticalrights of the municipal government, but blamed the urgency of the timesfor forcing the armyto take over this power.74What was worse, however, thecommander of the Brigade of San Luis Potosi, Manuel Maria de Torres,evaded the ayuntamiento and took full possessionover all militias under hiscontrol.75

While their powers over the military were curtailed, the ayuntamientosand intendants came under increasingpressureto raise new funds to supportthe army. What with economic dislocationscaused by guerrilla activity, themining, commercial, and agricultural base was eroded. Throughout theBajio, mines were flooded, livestock run off to supply the armies of bothsides, and the haciendas were ravaged and often abandoned.76 n Queretarofor example, while hacienda owners and mayordomoscrowded into the city,their workers joined the insurgents. By July, I8II, prices in the city hadrisen by seventy-fivepercent, all roads were blocked, and the ayuntamientopredicted the danger of famine. The fabrica de cigarrosclosed because of ashortage of paper and this resulted in severe unemployment.77The situationwas similar to the south of the capital when guerrillas blocked the roadsand threatened the grain harvest. In 1812, there were fears that theAtlixco wheat crop of between 35,000 and 40,000 cargas would be lostbecause of raids and a shortage of workers. Puebla, Mexico City and thearmy required this food source and its loss would have forced the govern-ment to import foreign grain.78Mexico City, the refuge of many from thewar-tornprovinces,sufferedfood shortagesand a general decline of income.79Despite the loss of revenues, the army had to discover ways of extractingmoney.In cities and towns that had been occupied by insurgents, the ayunta-mientos were obliged to levy forced contributionsaccording to the capacity

74 Ayuntamientoof San Luis Potosi to Apodaca,26 November 1816, and Apodacatothe Ayuntamiento,28 Novemberx816, AGN:OG,Vol. 92.75 Acevedo to Apodaca,28 NovemberI816, AGN:OG,Vol. 92.76 David Brading, Haciendas and Ranchos in the Mexican Bajio; Leon, 1700-1860(Cambridge,1978), pp. 200-I; and CharlesHarris II, A Mexican Family Empire,pp. 9 1-2.

77 Ayuntamientoof Mexicoto Calleja,I July181i, AGN:OG,Vol. 32.78 JoseMiguel Morphyto Venegas,Atlixco, 28 March I812, AGN:OG, Vol. 32.79 Timothy E. Anna, The Fallof the RoyalGovernment,pp. I40-6I.


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78 Christon . Archerof residents to pay. There was a punitive side to these payments and veryoften the liberating royalist commander intended to enlist the able malepopulation as well as to tap what remained of their fortunes. In Celaya, forexample, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Nepomuceno Oviedo activated two'volunteer companies' during the guerrilla menace of 88. Later, twoadditional companieswere placed on active duty and Oviedo assigned contri-butions of 26,515 pesos. Many of the hacendadoswere indigent because ofthe loss of income from rural properties,and others had moved for safety toQueretaro. Both of these groups either refused to pay or simply could notafford to support the militia. The garrison now totalled about 350 soldiersand the funds available expired. The ayuntamiento obtained permissionfrom Calleja to levy new taxes of 2 reales per fanega of maize and 4 realesper carga of flour entering the city granary. Unfortunately, the income ofboth taxes was only about 520 pesos per month - not enough to support thegarrison. The ayuntamiento then convened a junta general of honorableresidents which after great efforts raised another I4,595 pesos. The juntarecommendeda surtaxon tobacco,but this was rejectedby the ayuntamientosince it would impinge upon the royalmonopoly.80Towns with no stain of insurgency fared little better. Jalapa,for example,agreed to support a militia garrisonof 300 troops. However, because of theproximity to Veracruz, soldiers of the expeditionary forces from Spainstopped there to rest and to regain their health. Epidemics of yellow feverand other diseasesravaged many of the European battalions as soon as theyarrived at unhealthy Veracruz. The ayuntamiento of Jalapahad to establishand maintain adequate hospital facilities. This was expensive for a town ofonly I,000o inhabitants.By 1813, the Spanishbattalions of Asturias,Lovera,America, Castilla, Fernando VII, Savoya, and Extremadura had beenthrough Jalapa and several divisions of the Mexican army had stopped inthe town for some time. The ayuntamiento estimated that it had spentmore than 200,000 pesos in the three years since the outset of the insur-rections.81When the first battalion of the Regiment of Zamora arrived at Jalapaduring October, 1812, it had funds for only twelve to fifteen days' pay.Colonel Melchor Alvarez, commander of the Regiment of Savoya and ofthe expeditionary forces, asked the town for funds and instead of pesosreceived a long letter detailing the economic disasters that had befallenJalapa.By July, 1813, Alvarez's troops were suffering such great privationsthat he approached the commander of a silver convoy from Mexico City,80 Ayuntamientoof Celayato Venegas, 2 April 1812, AGN:OG, Vol. 32.81 Ayuntamientoof Jalapa o Calleja, 7 April 1913, AGN:OG,Vol. 32.


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TheRoyalistArmyin New Spain: Civil-Military elationships 79Miguel Menendez, to ask for funds. Already, the colonel had threatenedthe ayuntamiento, saying that he would allow his soldiers to use their bayo-nets to take food unless something was done.82Seeing their salvation, themunicipal government passed a tax of 1/2 percent on silver entering thetown. Alvarez was asked to collect by force, and the possibility of conflictseemed inevitable. After a great deal of discussion and quoting of differentsections of the Spanish Constitution, it was agreed that it would be a badprecedent for an ayuntamiento to touch a silver shipment and thereby toundermine the confidence of commerce.83As might be expected, some army commanders used their positions togenerate wealth for their own personaluse. When MelchorAlvarez was sentto Oaxaca in I814 to reoccupy the province, he was accused by his com-mander, BrigadierJose Moreno y Davis, of 'infidelity in the management offunds from the Oaxaca treasury.'84 n defending himself, Alvarez informedViceroy Calleja that his division commandersappropriatedall resourcesthatthey recovered from the tithes, alcabalas,tobaccomonopoly, and even fromthe ramo de bulas. They sold cochineal, cotton, tobacco, and other items ofcommerce confiscatedfrom the insurgents. Captain Antonio Requera of the5th and 6th divisions even distributed cotton among Indian towns and forcedthe women to weave mantas for his soldiers.85Alvarez describedRequera asthe absolute master of his territories from Ometepec to Jamiltepec.He hadnever given Alvarez any account of his operations,success in locating funds,or even the size of his units.86

Alvarez denied that he had profitedpersonally during the reoccupationofOaxaca.He claimed to have followed instructionsregardingthe maintenanceof inventories of ownerlessgoods, but . . . a million interestedpersonsfell onme like flies on a honeycomb, each demanding his property from thetreasury.'87n the end, despite the lists of recoveredjewels, silver, gold, tools,furniture, and utensils, the inhabitants demanded far more than the armyhad located. Other intendants made similar charges that they had no infor-mation about the booty captured during army operations in insurgentterritories. The Intendant of San Luis Potosi, Manuel de Acevedo, had noclear idea what happened to horses, weapons, and valuables taken duringraids conducted by Brigade CommanderManuel Marla de Torres. Acevedo82 Alvarezto the Ayuntamientoof Jalapa,4 July1813, AGN:OG,Vol. i.83 Ramon de Llano y Chavarri to Alvarez, 5 July I813, and 7 July I813, and

Ayuntamientoto Alvarez,7 July 18I3, AGN:OG,Vol. i.84 Alvarezto Calleja, 14 DecemberI814, AGN:OG,Vol. i.85 Antonio Requera o Alvarez, 15 July1814, AGN:OG,Vol. I.86 Alvarezto JoseMorenoy Davis, 15 OctoberI814, AGN:OG,Vol. I.87 Alvarez to Calleja26 FebruaryI8r5, AGN:OG,Vol. I.


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80 Christon I. Archersaid that two of the best horsescapturedended up in the personal possessionof the armychief.88Another very lucrativesource of income for army officerslay in the exten-sive trade that went on between the royalistsand the insurgents. Although itis exceptionallydifficult to find solid evidence, militarycollusion was obvious.Regular exchanges of goods took place between rebel territories and thetowns of Le6n, Guanajuato, and Zacatecas. Large numbers of cattle weremoved without military escort, and sources indicate that in 1817 livestockwas more plentiful than it had been in I810. Merchants from Le6n andGuanajuato were known to visit insurgent strongholds to purchase stolenfurniture, firearms and swords. Some rebels sold their own products such asmescal, salt, and cotton. In a number of areas, the insurgents held weeklymarkets and charged taxes on the varietyof goods they had on sale.89 n onereport which reached Spain, it was suggested that royalist division com-manders actually tried to keep the insurrection alive so that they couldfurther their own interests. Agustin de Iturbide was mentioned by name forhis lack of activityin defeating the rebels.90

Although it is highly unlikely that officers orchestrated the revolution,the army did createnew enemies as the state of war continued. Officers whopermitted few controls over their activities became excessively arbitraryandshowed little sympathy for civilians or other jurisdictions. Soldiers preyedupon the common people - especiallythose of the lower classeswho enjoyedless recourse to the law. In Mexico City for example, poor Indians whocarried fruit or cargo for up to ten or twenty leagues to sell in the marketswere despoiled of their products. If they attemptedto resist, they were beatenunmercifully. Other residents of the capital were robbed on the streets inbroad daylight and the number of assaults involving soldiers who dealt outsword slaps and bayonet jabs became a matter for general concern.91Else-where, resistanceto militaryservice increasedamong artisansand shopkeeperswhose loyalty was stretched thin by years of active duty and by the know-ledge that their regular business suffered during their absences. Those whocould not serve personallyhad to pay between I2 and 14 pesos monthly to88 Acevedo to Calleja, 5 September 18I5, AGN:OG, Vol. 93.89 Hermengildo Revuelta to Cruz, 6 August i816, AGN:OG, Vol. xI5; and Cruz toApodaca, 26 December I818, AGN:OG, Vol. I55. Cruz blamed much of this tradeupon the laxity of Colonel Antonio de Linareswho commandedat Guanajuato.SeeDoris M. Ladd, The MexicanNobility at Independence,1780-1826 (Austin, I976),

pp. 16-17.90 Report of the Consejo de Indias, 26 February I8I7, AGI, Mexico, leg. II47. For adiscussion, see Brian R. Hamnett, Revolucion y contrarrevolucion en Mexico y elPeru: Liberalismo, realeza y separatismo, 1800-1824 (Mexico, 1978), pp. 249-51.91 Ayuntamiento of Mexico to Calleja, 20 October I815, AGN:OG, Vol. 32.


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The Royalist Army in New Spain: Civil-Military Relationships 81hire replacements.In cities where populationshad contracted since i 81o, thearmy required the same number of troops and level of financial support. InVeracruz, for example, the populationdeclined from 15,ooo in I8 1 to only8,934 in 1818.92 This marked a forty percent drop in available manpowerand caused the army to enlist visitors to the city and even foreign residents.By I816 to i8I8, both sides began to show signs of exhaustion. Callejaturned over the vice-regency to Apodaca who had to deal with the XavierMina invasion of 817, but he was more interested in declaring peace thanin continuing the war. Even if the struggle was far from won, Apodacapublished reports in the Gazeta de Mexico announcing a royalist victory,granting pardons, and anticipating a return to normalcy. While some historians accept Apodaca'sappraisalof the reduced state of insurgency,93 hereis compelling evidence that the viceroywanted to createan illusion. Althoughthe rebels did not have massive armies in the field by i8i8, many officersexpressed fears that the guerrillas had gone underground or temporarilywithdrawn to isolated areas.BrigadierJoseGayangos, governor of Zacatecas,feared new insurgent outbreaks and was sent a battalion of Spanish troopsofthe Regiment of Navarra. Incursions from the mountains of Guanajuato-'the seedbed of rebellion' as Jose de la Cruz described the region - demon-stratedthe existence of many small but tenaciousbands. Cruz warned that itwas folly to occupy the cities, towns, and villages of a province and then todeclare the area pacified. If the countryside remained in rebel hands, thearmy would have to evolve methods and develop strong forces that couldpursue guerrilla bands for as long as was necessaryto eliminate them.94Cruz was even more fearful of the great unguarded territoriessouth fromGuadalajarato Uruapan and Apatzingan. His own forces were subdividedinto so many garrisonsthat he lacked an expeditionary army to send aftertheinsurgents. During the latter part of 1818, an epidemic of fevers called themal de tierracaliente truck the royalistdivision garrisoningUruapan, leavingless than fifty soldiers fit for duty.95Since most of the rebels surroundingNueva Galicia were 'old and resolved insurgents,' Cruz saw little reason forgreatoptimism.96After ten years of warfare, the struggle of the royalist army was still far

92 Ayuntamientoof Veracruzto Apodaca,1 June i818, AGN:OG,Vol. 31.93 Timothy E. Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government,pp. 179-80; and LucasAlaman,Historiade MejicoIV, 409-10.94 Cruz to Apodaca, io July i8i8, AGN:OG, Vol. I54. Cruz pointed out that therewasno pointchasing ebelbands or I5 to20 daysand thensupposing region obe pacified.95Cruz to Apodaca, 3 October18 8, AGN:OG,Vol. 155.96 Cruz to Apodaca,i8 Decemberi8i8, AGN:OG,Vol. I55.


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82 Christon 1. Archerfrom over. Becauseso much of the Mexicanpopulationsupportedthe idea ofindependence, the level of oppression and control had to be maintainedconstantly. Had the army been able to keep up its own morale, it is possiblethat the colony could have been preserved. But with the restoration of theSpanish Constitution in 1820, soldiersjoined civilians in secretclubs, juntas,and conversations that favored the goal of independence. At Zacatecas,Brigadier Jose Gayangos reportedthat all classes of the city were meeting atnight outside the city, and soldiers of the Mixed Battalion were involved.97Cruz continued to worry about the subdivisions of the army and proposedtransferringsome units from the provinces in which they were located. Toomuch connection with the local population after lengthy periodsof sedentarygarrisonduty caused the officersand troopsto identify with civilians.In the postscript of a letter that he later deleted, Felix Calleja wrote inI81 I: 'A hundred battles won will not assure us, but one defeat loses thekingdom forever.'88While Calleja meant a loss on the battlefield, the resultswere the same when the royalistofficersand troopscaught the 'contagion' ofindependence and rushed to join what they perceivedto be the winning side.Even commanders who had been most loyal to the royalistcause had come toidentify themselves with Mexico. When ugly incidents broke out betweenthe European and creole soldiers, many Spanish officers wanted to identifythemselves with the Mexicans. As Timothy Anna has pointed out, the finalcollapse took place in such a short time that senior officials scarcely knewwhat had happened.99Even in May of I82I, Jose de la Cruz reported thatthe danger was not irreparablewhile only the desire for independence wasbeing expressed. The catastropheoccurred at the moment when the troopsembraced the separatistcause and dispersed.After that there was no turningback.100While Cruz and some senior officers could not compromisea careerof loyalty to Spain, the siren call of Augustfn Iturbidewas irresistibleand theroyalist army rushed headlong with the rest of Mexico into independence.Unfortunately, the officers who joined Iturbide's Army of the ThreeGuarantees carried with them their corporative spirit and willingness todefend military privilege at the expense of other sectors. Since the generalsand senior commanders assumed political offices from important regionalposts to the presidency of the new republic, they entrenched the gains theyhad made at the expense of the Bourbon civil regime.

97 Cruz to Apodaca,Conde del Venadito,20 September 820, AGN:OG, Vol. I57.98 Calleia to Venegas, 27 November 1811, AGN:OG, Vol. I95.99 Timothy E. Anna, The Fall of the RoyalGovernment,pp. 210-I I.100 Cruz to Venadito, I May I821, AGN:OG, Vol. 148

christon archer - the royalist army in new spain civil-military relationships

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