chintan delhi garbage privatization

8/7/2019 Chintan Delhi garbage Privatization

1/13

The Impact of Privatization of Solid Waste Collection and Transportation inDelhi : The Impact on the informal Recycling Sector

Background

Since the late 1990s, two important public interest litigations have been filed in theSupreme Court, the highest court in India. Both demand greater accountability from themunicipality for cleaner cities. The first, B.L. Vadhera Vs the Union of India, resulted inseveral court orders, even personal appearances of senior officials in the Court andrules being created for Hospital Waste. The second case, Almitra Patel Vs. The Union ofIndia, has resulted in rules being made for Municipal Solid Waste. The case was alsofocused on technology as a primary solution for a cleaner country.

Apart from their individual outcomes, both these cases resulted in great pressure on themunicipal authorities to perform their tasks in a more efficient manner. The mediakeenly reported the proceedings and frequently mocked municipal inability to meet thecourts and publics exacting standards.

Continuous court pressure and frustrated attempts to clean the city was an importantreason for the municipalities in Delhi to seek privatization as an opportunity to respondto the courts. Subhash Chopra, a vocal member of the Delhi Legislative Assembly hasstated, privatization of garbage collection and disposal will be for the city. The MCDhas been a total failure on this count.i

Other Roads to PrivatizationAnother reason was the change in Delhis own position as the capital of an increasinglyimportant player in the global economy. The Masterplan 2021 includes many newfeatures that are geared towards international conferences, entertainment etc. Theproblem of waste handling and a filthy city remained an environmental and visual

impediment to the new city. With legislation that encouraged investment in servicesand several developing countries seeking to privatize waste management, Delhi wasencouraged to do so too, as part of its quest to be what is often described as a worldclass city.

Another important reason was Commonwealth Games, scheduled to be held in 2009 inDelhi. The leader of the Delhi Parliament described the need, All these measures wouldenable Delhi to become a clean and neat city, which is the need of the hour in view ofthe fact that the Commonwealth Games are due to take place in 2010 and thousands offoreign tourists would be visiting Delhi. There is a need to give a complete facelift to theMunicipal Solid Waste Management System in MCD. ii

Hence, privatization of waste collection and transportation (hereby referred to asprivatization) was not just a policy, but indicated a fundamental loss of confidence in theability of the municipality to supply the city with essential services. The decision alsoindicated the perceived new needs of a rapidly changing Capital City.

This paper unpacks the interaction between the informal sector and the private wastecontractors and the impact of privatization on the informal sector in Delhi. It uses theunfolding of privatization in Delhi and global experiences to understand the issue and tosuggest how waste can be handled in an equitable manner.

Framing Privatization


2/13

There have been several ways by which governments across the world haveapproached privatization of services. The early ideas of privatization began in thelate 1970s and 1980s, with governments like that of Margaret Thatcher in the UKand Ronald Reagan in the USA. In this context, privatization came to mean a shift inactivities or functions from the state to the private sector as well as the shift ofproduction of goods from the public to the private sector. iii Governments then beganto stop directly producing services, but enacting legislation and the framework forthese to be privately produced.

In this case, privatization has been privatization by attrition, as the quality ofservices was seen to be allowed to run down and in need of urgent reinvigoration.

In India, privatization of solid waste handling has two components, from themunicipal perspective. The first is related to transportation of the waste and thesecond to its appropriate disposal, recycling or use in waste to energy projects.

Privatization of waste handling in Delhi is currently limited to the MCD. It has beenframed by officials here as a taking over of existing municipal systems for more

efficient functioning. Hence, the waste contracts demand efficient collection fromthe dhalaos, transportation to the landfill and a stage wise segregation of the waste.

A few of the most significant clauses in the contract are as followsiv:

Article 5.15 : Sale/distribution of recyclable substances

The concessionaire shall be free to sell or otherwise dispose of recyclable substancesand other materials recovered from the Municipal Solid Waste at such price and tosuch persons and using such marketing and selling arrangements and strategies as itmay deem appropriate.

Article 5.19d : Endeavor to improve the ancillary conditions and infrastructure

related to the project, including assistance to the project including assistance toinformal recycling workers

Article 5.19l. Be responsible for all the health, security, environment andsafety aspects of the project at all times during the concession period.

Article 5.19t :Endeavour to employ the informal Municipal Solid Wastecollectors within the concession area to carry out the work of collection andsegregation of MSW, in accordance with this agreement and applicable law.

Article 6 : MCD Obligations : Give all assistance to the concessionaire to employthe existing informal Municipal Solid Waste collectors including rag pickers andassist the concessionaire in solving issues arising from the redeployment and

employment of such waste collectors by the concessionaire

Therefore, the contract shows that the MCD is aware of the sector.

In the context of this discussion, the following aspects of the contract must be keptin mind:

The private contractor is paid for the waste collected by weight

The ownership of the recyclable waste lies with the contracting company


3/13

The private contractors have the right to manage the dhalaos as their ownspaces , with rights to advertise on the walls and to fence off the wastedumped there

Additional spaces to store the segregated dry waste will be allocated to thecontractors during the 8 year contract period. The contractor is expected tosegregate waste in a graded manner over time

Therefore, despite how it is framed in official discourse, privatization in Delhi is not adirect transfer of a set of services from the government to the private sector. A newrole, in keeping with evolving thinking by technical experts, and the changing natureof the city itself, was created for the private company. Both the collection anddisposal services provided by the government and the segregation services by theinformal sector, were handed over to the private contractor. Public assets of builtland and space were also handed over as part of the contract.

II. Implementing Privatization

In order to implement the process, the IDFC (Infrastructure Development andFinance Corporation), was contracted to manage the process of privatization on a

turnkey basis. A global tender was put out and bids sought. There were no detaileddiscussions or consultations with any other interest groups, except for an initialmeeting prior to the writing of the bid. During this meeting, there was intenseopposition by NGOs to the privatization on various counts. These included the in-build disincentive for waste generators to segregate, the marginalization of theinformal recycling sector and the level of private involvement. The last point wasbased on whether the contractor should also be involved in collecting waste from thehouseholds or not. There was no further discussion.

Finally three companies were selected and their work was scheduled to begin in June2005.The most notable amongst the private companies, Delhi Waste Management (DWM),

is a consortium of transportation companies and financiers. What sets this companyaside is that it was allocated what were perceived by the competing companies andthe municipal workers as the most lucrative zones. The others were allotted zonesthat were less developed, or older and therefore, with poorer infrastructure and withless influential residents.

Each contractor was to ensure that the waste in the dhalao (an intermediary transferpoint, often like a room ) was segregated, the dhalao and its defined surroundingsof 25 feet was clean and the waste was collected and transported at regular hours tothe landfill. Each contractor was given a list of existing dhalaos to ease their work.

Prior to this, for over two years, the Delhi Government initiated the Bhagidari (literal

meaning : partnership) scheme where middle and high income residential areaswere trained to understand the importance of segregation of waste into dry and wetcategories. This programme was well publicized and several hundred residents fromthe more affluent parts of Delhi were invited to attend these trainings. This does notseem to have been implemented, since the waste arrived at the bins in anunsegregated manner, despite a law that made it mandatory for waste generators tosegregate. The task of the private company therefore was not impacted by theBhagidari scheme, underlying the failure of the exercise. This failure also drovehome the point that residents were unlikely segregate their waste and an externalagency would have to continue to do so for them. Traditionally, the informal


4/13

recycling sector has always segregated the waste and sold it in the chain forreprocessing.

A survey of the privatized areas undertaken in January 2006v, preceded by adiscussion with managers of DWM revealed that the company had sub-contractedeach area to smaller players, who acted as labour providers. Using this model, eachsub-contracted party would provide a fixed number of workers who would be calledbin guides. They would be stationed at a dhalao or bin, cleaning the bins,segregating waste and helping load the compactors. Many of them would also live inthe bins overnight, as they were unable to find inexpensive housing neaby. Few ofthem were waste pickers, but several were simply paid daily wagers. On an average,they were paid appx. 1/3rd of the minimum daily wages, or Rs. 1000 and had nosocial security. However the workers had informal access to dry waste, which wassold to a junk dealer and significantly supplemented the income.vi

This model was only viable in high income areas where there was adequaterecyclable waste discarded. In lower income areas, the worker was forced to live offthe payments and often, undertake responsibility for a cluster of bins, in order tooptimize hisvii earnings. This resulted in lower quality of work and poorer work

conditions. It was also difficult to implement this in areas where large amounts oforganic waste were produced. In South Delhis Dakshin Puri area, the waste fromprocessing fruit and vegetables was so enormous that the workers were forced tostay out of the dhalaos and work from a distance.

According to several media reports, the performance of DWM in handling waste hasbeen poor, based on the quality of visual cleanliness. Other companies havereceived less flack and none of it is reported as yet in the media. viii

The NDMC is also now preparing to privatize the waste handling, on the same linesas the MCD.

Initial cost comparisons are known only informally and via discussions with theprivate operators. According to a former official of DWM, ix the cost per truck to thecompany was only $ 40, which is significantly less than that of the MCDs $. 140 orthe NDMCs $ 180 per truck. Greater efficiency and stricter monitoring is likely to beone cause for this significant drop, as are, possibly, different approaches tocalculating the cost, which may hide some costs. A recent World Bank reportx

suggests that this difference is an India wide phenomenon, and that the differencecan be in the range of 20-40%. Comparing the costs of waste collection andtransportation in 10 towns in the southern Indian state of Karnataka, the reportshows the trend of cost reduction across the board. However, the Bank suggests thatOne of the reasons for the relatively lower costs incurred by the contractor isquoted as differential wages, particularly when private contractors tend to pay lower

than minimum wages to their sanitary workers. The government, on the otherhand, cannot indulge in such practices and therefore would incur much higher costsfor the same labour performed by the same number of workers. It also pays socialsecurity to many of them.

Comparing these findings, it is likely that the privatization process is economicallyviable only at the cost of underpaying the workers.

III. The Impact on the Informal Sector Waste Recyclers


5/13

According to the former Municipal Commissioner of Delhi, Rakesh Mehta, the design ofthe privatization system was intentionally different from that of other cities in that thecontract did not start at the doorstep of the generator. Instead, this space was left openfor informal players, so that they could access the waste that they wanted. Anotherreason was also that this was likely to prove too complex for the private contractorsthemselves. xi

Despite this, a study of the contract signed with the private contractor reveals that thework of the informal sector, as it is being actually performed, has not been taken intoaccount. Although their role has been acknowledged by various government bodies forwell over a decade prior to privatization, it finally excludes them. This is likely to be forthree reasons. Firstly, that the sector has not been well appreciated in the past to meritadequate inclusion. It is not on the radar of government bodies. Second, the working ofthe sector is poorly understood by those involved in designing the process and itsinclusion is therefore unlikely to have a good fit, should it be undertaken. Thirdly, thevision of a city with an efficient system of privatized waste does not includewastepickers or other informal sector recyclers, since they are in contradiction to theidea of the modern and the ordered. A former Chairperson of the NDMC expressed theimagined city succinctly when he remarked, I want our streets to look like

Singapore.

xii

The following sections analyze the impact of privatization on the various levels of theinformal sector.

Wastepickers

Many of the workers are not wastepickers, but other informal sector workers or wagelabourers. This indicates a gradual displacement of the wastepickers from their work. Italso indicates an artificially increasing competition for a limited resource. By itself, thisfall out is clearly an undesirable one.

But there are several other ways by which the means of privatization is breaking downthe waste picking system.

A recent survey showed that in such sites where a wastepicker was on duty, it wasoften to the exclusion of all other wastepickers.xiii Usually, most wastepickers move frombin to bin at peak hours along a fixed territorial route which is shared by otherwastepickers. Alternatively, a few wastepickers take over dhalaos, from where theymine the waste as it is thrown in. This is then their monopoly. Wastepickers find severalways to both collaborate and compete through unwritten codes of conduct andcommunity and peer pressure. As a result, a complex and evolving system of resourcesharing comes into play, resulting in one of the highest rates of recycling in the world.xivThis informal system therefore plays out not as the tragedy of the commons but

remarkably, the opposite of it.

By breaking the existing system and replacing it with bin guides, waste is no longerable to be shared amongst a vast community of the poor. It is instead monopolized viaan individual. Moreover, by hiring persons who are inherently entrepreneurial, theincentive to seek out waste to segregate and sell is killed, as a new debilitatingdependency is fostered. Many such people are stuck, because refusing an underpayingjob may result in job loss or a lost opportunity to leverage better terms of work.

The poor typically harness their social capital to get through difficult times. Systemssuch as the one described above are likely to break up this social capital because they


6/13

rupture the basis on acting like a community and instead, seek to create a newprofessional individual outside this system. This considerably weakens the individualand the community, which is seen to provide valuable services where thestate/government fails or is unable to.

The model above is indicative of the many problems with this form of privatization. Thesystem of contracting to the lowest bidder has a ripple effect at the dhalao level, whereunderpayment to workers becomes the only economically viable form of functioning.Sub-contracting places priorities on cleanliness, but does not lay safety standards forworkers. Moreover, it continues to operate along the same degraded quality of work,involving standing in waste, and exposes the worker to the same hazards as previously.

In some areas, a quid pro quo system appears to have been established. A site visit to asmall dhalao in Delhis elite Gulmohar Park Areaxv suggested that in smaller and morediscreetly located bins, a wastepicker may access the waste in return for helping withloading the compactors. In other parts of Delhi, municipal workers were seen at the binsites supervising wastepickers who were loading waste into receptacles installed for thepurpose. A discussion with the workers indicated that their role was both unclear at thatpoint as well as in transition. In the meantime, they were still responsible for overseeing

the waste handling by the private operator. Given that on site cleanliness was linkedwith efficient supervision, the officials continue to use existing linkages of coercion tocarry out the task at hand.xvi

The ownership of space-the dhalaos and bins-has also negatively impactedwastepickers. Earlier, they would segregate their waste in these dhalaos, as the onlyavailable space to undertake such work. Now, DWM does not allow this and hastherefore taken away the only work space available to such persons. The decision totake away public spaces and make such assets available exclusively to a single privateplayer therefore disincentivizes recycling.

A newer trend is that of DWM beginning to make rightful claims on the recyclable

waste.

xvii

. A clash between the black letter legal owners and the customary legal ownersis inevitable. Recent documentation shows that the contractors usually intimidate,abuse, harass and even beat wastepickers who attempt to break into a newlyprivatized space to carry out their work. In a more recent series of events, wastepickerswho were simultaneously engaged in collecting waste from the doorstep to access therecyclables also found themselves disallowed from entering bins for segregation andeven disposal of waste that is depleted of it recyclables.

It would therefore seem that by not explicitly defining the rights and role of thewastepickers, and by not clearly identifying them as legitimate players in the process ofwaste management, they are perceived as a category without rights.

Junk Dealers

In the recycling hierarchy, junk dealers buy waste from the waste picker and itinerantbuyers, further segregate it and sell it ahead to specialized dealers or directly toreprocessing factories. In this, they are dependant on the materials flow from thewastepickers.

The previous section showed that privatization, as it is unfolding in Delhi, has begun tofracture the wastepickers work and access to recyclables. This clearly impacts the junkdealers as well. According to DWM officials, their own short term plan is to sell the


7/13

waste directly to the reprocessing factories. In the medium term, they hope to recycle itthemselves.xviii

Unless they begin to expand and compete for other, alternative sources of waste, junkdealers are likely to be badly hit by privatization, as they cannot even be hired, unlikesome of the wastepickers.

Reprocessors

Reprocessors are unlikely to be impacted by privatization significantly, as they willreceive most of the waste they require. Even recycling operations will not absorb theentire amount generated. Much of it is likely to be in an aggregated form, from a singlesource, thereby making it only marginally harder for them to negotiate prices. Withinthis group, the smaller, semi-legal or illegal factories may face greater uncertaintyabout supplies and the sector will require to upgrade itself.

It is clear that the current form of privatization is fracturing the informal recyclingsector. Waste, which was till now a public good, handled by the government as part ofits public duty, has been transferred to the private sector. There has been no public

discussion about giving off public assets in this case. Moreover, along with this, thedhalaos, which were similar to common public spaces in that they were manned onbehalf of the public by government agencies, have been privatized and the wastecontained therein fenced off. The ramifications of this have been described in thissection already, but further include:

An lowering of incentives to pick out the lowest grade recyclables. Onceownership is removed, wastepickers as employee will no longer feel compelled tomine the waste of its least lucrative recyclables. This will result in more residualrecyclables reaching the landfill and an increase, not decrease in the spacerequired for landfills in a city. The cost of new landfills is mounting, with anestimate budgetary requirement of $ 2 billion in the next 10 years.

An associated concern with reduced recycling rates is the problem of sustainableuse of resources.

Currently, wastepickers are estimated to pick up between 15% to 59% of thetotal waste generated in Delhi. This waste is segregated into several categoriesalong the chain, before it is accepted by any reprocessor. The schedule set forthe private operator, on the other hand, demands 20% segregation only in the 8 th

year of operation. Prior to that, and even during this period, the operator is paidby the weight that is delivered at the landfill. This creates a disincentive tosegregated. Seen in the light of Article 5.15, giving the operator rights over therecyclables, the contract creates competing interests between the privateoperator and the wastepicker.

Table 1 : Segregation Requirements from Private OperatorsYear ofoperation

Months from COD Segregationbenchmark forcorrespondingmonth (in %terms)

Applicable penaltyfor correspondingmonths (in %terms)

Year 1 1-12 0 -Year 2 13-24 5 15%Year 3 26-36 10 15%Year 4 37-48 12 15%


8/13

Year 5 49-60 15 15%Year 6 60-72 18 15%Year 7 73-84 20 15%Year 8onwards

85 onwards 20 15%

Source : Contract signed between the MCD and Private Operator, 2005

Waste recyclers, particularly at the lower levels of the chain, arecharacteristically poorly educated, earning less than 2 dollars a day, and selfemployed. Recycling is one of the few occupations open to them, where theyprovide themselves with employment and contribute essential services to thecity. They typically do not have the access to resources that allow them upwardmobility, and are particularly vulnerable. A system that does not take them intoconsideration is likely to increase urban poverty and place greater stress on therecyclers. The impacts of this can be felt by the entire family; Reduced parentalincome amongst the poor require children to contribute to the family income,differential priorities for childrens education come into play, increase thepressure of work on women, reduce available nutrition, reduced expenses formedical care and differentiated access within the family to health care, the

breaking up of social capital and the consequences of that. This in turn violatesthe objectives of the Millennium Development Goals, to which India is alsocommitted

Waste, which is a mixture of discards, is no longer able to lend itself to adevelopmental, social role but becomes a purely commercial object

IV. The Global Experience

It is useful to examine comparable global experience and to determine to what extentthe experiences have been similar. In general, the three regions about which the mostinformation is available are Africa, East Asia and Latin America.

In Central Africa, unlike in Egypt and South Africa, there are little informal wasterecycling activities. This is because of the low level of industrialization, particularly ofthe recycling sector. Where factories exist, they are able to reprocess the waste ofseveral countries, leaving little scope and viability for other units.

However, in Egypt, privatization has resulted in a loss of livelihoods for the Zabaleen, orthe traditional waste handlers. Estimates are that in 1997, the Zabaleen handled onethird of Cairos waste, which was almost 3000 tons. Of this, 85% was recycled directlythrough the Zabaleens self-owned and operated micro-enterprises that were constantlyupgraded.xix Despite this, officials did not wish to include them in their privatizationplans as their work was considered unhygienic and the new private investors seemed tobe a better prospect for Cairo.

When privatization began here in the early years of 2000, it included waste collectionfrom the doorsteps. The Zabaleen were additionally impacted as many of them earnedby pelletizing plastics. Loss of access to waste plastics resulted in an additional loss ofincome.

Some estimates put the number of job losses at 75,000. After a period of beingdisplaced, and an international campaign, the Zabaleen were able to regain some lostground by being involved in the waste collection. Researchers have concluded that theirinclusion was related to the fact that implementing the contract became impossible


9/13

without the help of the Zabaleen and their skill sets. Moreover, in Egypt, theprivatization companies used mechanical means to collect waste, which was unviable inthe old city with narrow roads. It was here that the Zabaleen with donkey carts wereable to help the companies to fulfill their legal obligations.xx

Currently, several, but not all the Zabaleen have been able to regain their former work,but they claim to earn less than they used to. xxi Additionally, local NGOs say that whilethey were organized, after prolonged negotiation, to work on a more equal footing withthe traditional middlemen, Wahiya previously, they have now been re-hired as workersunder the same middlemen.xxii The picture is unclear, as others assert that they arenow free of the Wahiya, who, ironically, paid them more than the private companiescurrently do. Private contractors now claim , It is our strategy to employ the localZabaleen. We want to avoid conflict and this satisfies the social component of ourcontract. On their part, the Zableen have constantly emphasized that their earningsare not based on payment as much as access to the recyclables. The companies havetherefore turned a blind eye to the fact that the Zabaleen now additionally take thewaste and are not characteristic employees.

In Tanzanias Dar-es-Salaam, the impulse to privatize was driven by the poor impression

of that country. The privatization of waste was undertaken in collaboration with UNHABITAT and was deemed a resounding success, because of the noticeable cleanliness.The scale of privatization was unique. Rather than foreign companies, it was the localcommunity based organizations and small local businesses that were facilitated toprovide waste collection services from households. The savings by the municipal bodieswas used for road construction and maintenance. xxiii

We do not have any known information about the informal sector operations here priorto this. Based on the available information, this kind of privatization is noteworthybecause it built upon existing structures. After this phase, as larger players entered thescene, the scenario may have been altered. In sharp contrast, in Kenya, an Italiancompany, Jacorossi International, was invited to take over waste management amidst

wide spread protests.

In Accra, Ghana, researchers point out that privatization has achieved nothing that arevitalized private sector could not have done, had it complied by the countrys lawsand enforced existing regulation. Instead, the authors point out, the privatization effortis structured to benefit private interests by excluding the public. xxiv

In Columbia, local initiatives have borne results. The results of organized wasterecyclers are already visible. Across the country, 10,000 wastepicker families haveformed 118 cooperatives that are allowing them to bring in over 300,000 tons ofrecycled materials into the market. The strength of the groups lie in their ability tofederate under the National Association of Recyclers, which helps them to enhance their

business activities through capacity building and credit. They also offer waste handlingservices to various institutions. Although privatization has been challenging for thesector, they have been able to negotiate for niche work, such as fees based serviceprovision.xxv More recently, in 2003, under Decree 1713, part 1505, wastepickers havebeen included and their rights to participate in solid waste management plans , at thedevelopment and follow up stages, has been made formal. xxviIn Argentina, a ZeroWaste Decree makes it mandatory for private waste handlers to provide facilities for theinformal sector to segregate and store recyclable waste. In this case, the wastepickingsector has consciously not pushed for a strict implementation of the rule, since many ofthem see themselves in the work only temporarily, due to economic hardships. xxvii


10/13

A common experience in several countries has been that of formal sector workersorganizing against privatization, for fear of job losses. From Singapore to Pakistan,reports show that agitating workers are able to negotiate with the government to retaintheir employment, often even scaring them to delay privatization. In Singapore, one ofthe suggested ways to handle the fallout was to set up a fund for displaced workers.xxviiiIn Pakistan, workers were forced to take to the streets. xxixFrom this, it becomes clearthat formal sector workers, already in the formal realm, are able to organize themselvesto protest more effectively. It is therefore critical that the informal sector also beorganized.

Based on these experiences, it is clear that:

Waste recyclers must be organized if they are to negotiate in the event ofprivatization

The access to waste is a critical part of any waste recyclers work. Beingemployed is more a means than a desired end

Where the informal sector activity is already very low, the impact of privatizationwill not be easy to discern

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

The analysis in the preceding sections makes it clear that it is economically and sociallydesirable to include the informal recycling sector in any waste management initiative.The errors, experiences and the studies detailed previously throw light on the possibleways by which this can be done.

This author believes that privatization of waste is inevitable in the developing world,because of the overriding trust that policymakers and multilateral donors globally havein this path. As cities become more global and require competing for visibility, funds,investments, expertise and drawing in economic prosperity, many more city planners

and policy makers will be under pressure to take this path of seemingly, the leastresistance. Much of the citizenry and the media sees privatization as a good step andhas created a demand for this market driven form of services.

In several cases, privatization has come to mean the right to exclude others.xxxProponents of this argue that if this is not the case, the tragedy of the commons willkick in. We have seen that that the contrary holds true in the case of Delhi. The fencing-off of common resources and transferring of public property into private hands isindicative of poor policy making. The informal waste recycling sector is also a privateplayer, offering important environmental services to the city. It is therefore important tosee its work as already operating in the private sector and therefore, follow similarpolicies to promote it.

Against this backdrop, privatization needs to be reconsidered in fundamental ways. Itshould not be seen as a solution to a dirty city, or a formula held exclusively in theprivate sector. Rather, it must be viewed as one of many possible solutions to specificaspects of the waste management cycle. One of the important aspects is developingdisposal facilities, a section not discussed in this paper, but one that requires largeinvestments and technical know-how.

Nor should privatization be privileged over other indigenous forms of waste handling,whether they be waste recycling through the informal sector or community based


11/13

innovations. Instead, it should be clearly accepted that complete corporatizedprivatization will result in more asymmetrical outcomes. It should be clear that theinformal recycling sector is also providing private services to the city and should beviewed as such.

A central shift in understanding must inform policy on privatization. Currently, wastemanagement companies involved in privatization are typically accountable in highlyquantitative terms, such as the amount of waste collected, the response time tocomplaints and the fleet efficiency. However, in a developing country, in whose citiesalmost 1% of the population is dependant on waste recycling for a living, this must bedovetailed into all practices. As previously explained, the sector is based on a complexsystem of cooperation and competition, which is still not entirely understood and whichitself seems to be constantly evolving. Therefore, instead of trying to de-construct thissector, it is more practical to follow guidelines that are likely to encourage it to developand incentivize its participation in the process, instead of alienating it.

Clearly, then, the social efficiency of privatization must be considered too. Not doingthis fractures the social fabric, particularly amongst the poor and the most vulnerable,leading to irreparable losses of social capital and of their increased vulnerability, and in

theory at least, increasing the burden on the government. This is the single mostimportant lesson learnt from the Indian and International experiences of privatization ofwaste services.

Some recommendations that flow from this conclusion are described below :

The central site of conflict is the ownership of recyclable, or dry waste. In boththe Indian cases as well as the international case of Egypt, it is clear that accessto waste, not payment for working at site, remains central to the wastepickers.Hence, any contract must necessarily include a clause specifying that right overrecyclable waste belongs to the wastepickers first. Access to waste forwastepickers is the backbone of any policy made for waste in India

Global experiences show that privatization must not begin even at the dhalaolevel, and must be restricted to transportation. Bids should be for thetransportation and dumping sector, and not prior to that. A lesson should bedrawn from the decision of the MCD not to enter the household level forprivatization. This is an example to follow.

Some wastepickers work at the landfills. Although this is unsafe work,privatization should include their rights over waste that reaches here. In themedium term, the wastepickers and their organizations should examine other,safer ways to earn through recycling activities

Any plan for solid waste management in India must necessarily be informed byan understanding and an appreciation of the informal recycling sector. Thisimplies designing systems that can strengthen an existing system and ride on it.

In this case, the bid should have included a section on including the sector andallow the bidders to suggest how they would want to do this, after helping themto understand the issue. Understanding the sector must be made a part of thebidding process, just as several other aspects are explained and clarified. It iscritical not to leave the bidders without this understanding on their own

The informal sector must be treated as a tightly knitted chain, and one that mustnot be fragmented, if the city is to reap the benefits it offers. Hence, the chainshould not be tampered with or be modified to become modern except whereconsensual use of newer technologies or new design can be offered, though not


12/13

imposed. The case of Egypt, where plastic is recycled by the Zabaleen, is a casein point.

In order to be able to participate gainfully in a shifting city, waste recyclers mustorganize themselves as a tangible, legal entity that can enter into contracts andnegotiations on behalf of its members. It is often difficult for policymakers to findways of including a sector that exists through individual or family enterprise, butwithout any defined collective organization and indeed, it is beyond the

imagination of defined structures to work with these Taking a cue from the policies in place in Columbia, such recyclers organizations

should be recognized and be privileged through the cycle of waste handling.Studies have shown that allowing the sector to work legitimately significantlyimpacts their poverty levels and improve their work conditions.xxxi

One commonly observed trend in community level waste management is that oflocal resources, such as volunteer time, subsiding the lives of waste recyclersand detailed networks, creating innovative kinds of social security for workers inthe urban context. Instead of overriding those, privatization should let them beand not attempt to meddle with them for homogeneity. A study of ChurchillCounty, in the United States, calculated that privatization of waste handling couldresult in 279 less jobs, reduction in county household income by $36.171 million,

14,735 hours of voluntary time, and $ 85,233 in charitable donations. Theseunaccounted for costs are only in the developed world. xxxiiThey are likely to evenhigher in the developing world and should be left undisturbed

The MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) should be mainstreamed into wastehandling, because of the opportunity this provides in tackling poverty throughmicro enterprises, individual enterprise and demonstrated low capital andrunning costs.

If there is to be privatization of solid waste management services, it must be designedto be equitable for everyone. It can offer answers for urban poverty and the increasingurban environmental problems we face. If urban policy makers are to use this for theoptimal benefit of a city, then privatization should be seen as a means of enabling the

urban poor, not disempowering them. This requires a paradigm shift and visionaryleadership, but there are rudimentary examples to build up from.

Endnotes


13/13

i Jha, Ajay. Removal, Disposal of Waste Must be Privatized. Gulf News. November 26 1999

ii Jha, Lalit, K. Govt.-MCD tiff leads to garbage problem. The Hindu. Oct 7, 2004

iii Starr, Paul. The Meaning of Privatization. Yale Law and Policy Review. 1988iv Contract between MCD and Private Operator, signed in 2005. Original copy denied, current copy informallyobtainedv The survey was undertaken by the author of this paper, as part of an exploratory research survey of the postprivatization scenario for a filmvi Chintan Environmental Research and Action Group. Unpublished Survey. Delhi. 2006vii The pronoun he has been used because there were no women seen in this schemeviii Hindustan Times. August 27, 2006ix Personal discussions with Mr. Satyavir Chauhan, DWM. June 2006.Delhix The World Bank. Improving Management of Municipal Solid Waste in India : Overview and Challenges. May2006xi Bhargava, Vishal and Chaturvedi, Bharati, film, 60 kilos. Delhi February 2006xii Personal Discussion with B.P. Misra, Chairperson, NDMC. May 2001. Delhi.xiii Chintan Environmental Research and Action Group. Unpublished Survey. 2006 Delhi.xiv Ghosh et al. A Partnership for a Decarbonized Energy Future. World Affairs : The Journal ofInternational Issues. Volume Ten, Number One, Spring 2006.xv The survey was undertaken by the author of this paper, as part of an exploratory research survey of the postprivatization scenario for a film

xvi Bhargava, Vishal and Chaturvedi, Bharati, film, 60 kilos. Delhi February 2006sxvii Email from S.A. Rizwee et al, Chintan Environmental Research and Action Group. December 2006xviii Personal discussions with Mr. Satyavir Chauhan, DWM. June 2006.Delhi

xix Fahmi, Wael Sala. The Impact of privatization of solid waste management on the Zabaleen garbagecollectors of Cairo. Environment and Urbanization. Vol 17. No. 2. October 2005xx Iskander, Laila. Presentation at ASMARE Conference, Belo Horizonte. August 2006xxi , Wael Sala. The Impact of privatization of solid waste management on the Zabaleen garbage collectors ofCairo. Environment and Urbanization. Vol 17. No. 2. October 2005

xxii Iskander, Laila. Presentation at 5th Festival of Lixo and Cidadania. Belo Horizonte. August 23, 2006

xxiii Pan African News Agency (PANA). UN-HABITAT Policies work miracles for Dar es Salaam June 23. 2004xxiv Demanya, B.K. Remapping Garbage : The privatization of waste management in Accra, Ghana. MADissertation, Queens University, 2001. Canadaxxv Medina, Martin. Supporting Scavenger co-ops. Biocycle. Vol 38, Issue 6. June 1997xxvi Padilla, Nohora and Grisalez, Ruiz Silvio, National Association of Recyclers. Presentation at 5th Festival ofLixo and Cidadania. Belo Horizonte. August 23, 2006xxvii

xxviii Yap, Sonny. Set up a venture fund for displaced workers The Straight Times. August 25, 2001. Singaporexxix The Pakistan Newswire. Sanitary workers kick off protest against privatization. February 16, 2006.Karachixxx Rose, Carol. The Comedy of the Commons : Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public Property. The

University of Chicago Law Review. Volume 53. Issue 3. Summer 1986xxxi Medina, Martin. Presentation at CWG International Conference on MDGs and Waste. Calcutta. 2006xxxii Burkley, et al. Impacts of Privatization : Use of Multimodal Survey. Social Science Journal. Volume 43,Issue 4. October 2006

chintan delhi garbage privatization

Documents