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ORIGINAL ARTICLE China’s Rise, Developmental Regionalism and East Asian Community Building: Cooperation Amid Disputes in the South China Sea Ling Wei 1 Received: 8 February 2018 / Revised: 26 March 2018 / Accepted: 12 May 2018 / Published online: 30 July 2018 Ó Asiatic Research Institute 2018 Abstract Why the rapid rise of China coincides with peace and cooperation in East Asia? The paper argues for a distinctive form of regionalism practiced in East Asia, which can be called developmental regionalism. It means that regional processes are development-oriented and development-focused, featuring pragmatism, flexibility and developmental security. In development-oriented region- alization, practices and institutions coevolve for progress. Practices of developmental regionalism nurture the habit of cooperation and promote community building. As the growth engine in the region, China facilitates develop- mental regionalism. The paper takes the South China Sea disputes in the past few years as a case to illustrate how conflicts were averted and cooperation maintained and deepened between China and ASEAN and in East Asia even in a most sensitive area of territorial disputes and in the context of the dramatic change in regional power structure with China’s rapid rise. In conclusion, the paper also briefly discusses conditions and implications of developmental regionalism in world politics. Keywords China’s rise Á Developmental regionalism Á East Asian Community Á South China Sea 1 Introduction: Rise of China Coincides with Regional Integration in East Asia? Why do states in East Asia 1 accommodate China as it rises rapidly to great power status? How come that East Asia has witnessed parallel developments between the rapid rise of China and regional integration with ASEAN at the insti- tutional center in the past 20 years? East Asian regional cooperation has prospered since its initiation after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The region has enjoyed economic dynamism and proliferation of multilateral cooperation processes and mechanisms at various tracks in various fields. In 2002, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit adopted the proposal made by East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) that the long-term goal of regional cooperation be an East Asian community (EAVG 2001). In 2009, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama declared the great importance his administration attached to Asian diplomacy and put forward the initiative of an East Asian Community based on the philosophy of ‘‘yu-ai’’ (Hatoyama 2009). In 2012, the APT Commemorative Summit adopted the pro- posal made by East Asian Vision Group II (EAVG II) that an East Asian Economic Community (EAEC) be realized by 2020 as a main pillar for regional cooperation and community building (EAVGII 2012). Some may argue that the EAEC building is somewhat lacking momentum. However, there is no denying that this is one significant step forward toward East Asian community building. China’s integration into the region started with the establishment of dialog relations with ASEAN. Confronted with the Asian financial crisis, China made valuable con- tribution to the region by not devaluing RMB and hence & Ling Wei [email protected] 1 China Foreign Affairs University, Xicheng District, Beijing, China 1 ‘‘East Asia’’ discussed in this paper refers to 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and ROK (ASEAN Plus Three). East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32 https://doi.org/10.1057/s42215-018-0002-8

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Page 1: China's Rise, Developmental Regionalism and East Asian ... · ORIGINAL ARTICLE China’s Rise, Developmental Regionalism and East Asian Community Building: Cooperation Amid Disputes

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

China’s Rise, Developmental Regionalism and East AsianCommunity Building: Cooperation Amid Disputes in the SouthChina Sea

Ling Wei1

Received: 8 February 2018 / Revised: 26 March 2018 / Accepted: 12 May 2018 / Published online: 30 July 2018

� Asiatic Research Institute 2018

Abstract Why the rapid rise of China coincides with

peace and cooperation in East Asia? The paper argues for a

distinctive form of regionalism practiced in East Asia,

which can be called developmental regionalism. It means

that regional processes are development-oriented and

development-focused, featuring pragmatism, flexibility and

developmental security. In development-oriented region-

alization, practices and institutions coevolve for progress.

Practices of developmental regionalism nurture the habit of

cooperation and promote community building. As the

growth engine in the region, China facilitates develop-

mental regionalism. The paper takes the South China Sea

disputes in the past few years as a case to illustrate how

conflicts were averted and cooperation maintained and

deepened between China and ASEAN and in East Asia

even in a most sensitive area of territorial disputes and in

the context of the dramatic change in regional power

structure with China’s rapid rise. In conclusion, the paper

also briefly discusses conditions and implications of

developmental regionalism in world politics.

Keywords China’s rise � Developmental regionalism �East Asian Community � South China Sea

1 Introduction: Rise of China Coincideswith Regional Integration in East Asia?

Why do states in East Asia1 accommodate China as it rises

rapidly to great power status? How come that East Asia has

witnessed parallel developments between the rapid rise of

China and regional integration with ASEAN at the insti-

tutional center in the past 20 years? East Asian regional

cooperation has prospered since its initiation after the 1997

Asian financial crisis. The region has enjoyed economic

dynamism and proliferation of multilateral cooperation

processes and mechanisms at various tracks in various

fields. In 2002, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit

adopted the proposal made by East Asian Vision Group

(EAVG) that the long-term goal of regional cooperation be

an East Asian community (EAVG 2001). In 2009, Japanese

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama declared the great

importance his administration attached to Asian diplomacy

and put forward the initiative of an East Asian Community

based on the philosophy of ‘‘yu-ai’’ (Hatoyama 2009). In

2012, the APT Commemorative Summit adopted the pro-

posal made by East Asian Vision Group II (EAVG II) that

an East Asian Economic Community (EAEC) be realized

by 2020 as a main pillar for regional cooperation and

community building (EAVGII 2012). Some may argue that

the EAEC building is somewhat lacking momentum.

However, there is no denying that this is one significant

step forward toward East Asian community building.

China’s integration into the region started with the

establishment of dialog relations with ASEAN. Confronted

with the Asian financial crisis, China made valuable con-

tribution to the region by not devaluing RMB and hence& Ling Wei

[email protected]

1 China Foreign Affairs University, Xicheng District, Beijing,

China

1 ‘‘East Asia’’ discussed in this paper refers to 10 ASEAN countries

plus China, Japan and ROK (ASEAN Plus Three).

East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32

https://doi.org/10.1057/s42215-018-0002-8

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facilitated the launching of region-wide integration under

the APT in 1997. From then on, China has also embarked

on a fast track of development toward great power status,

with GDP growing from USD$ 961.6 billion in 1997 to

USD$ 11.2 trillion in 2016, which ranked the second lar-

gest in the world only after that of the USA and made up

55.7% of the GDP total of the ASEAN Plus Three.2 China-

ASEAN dialog relationship is widely regarded as the most

comprehensive and fruitful among all ASEAN’s dialog

relationships despite the fact that China was a late comer to

ASEAN-led regional processes (Li 2017b). China was the

first major power outside ASEAN that acceded to the

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC),

the first to launch an FTA negotiation with ASEAN and the

first power outside ASEAN to express its willingness to

support a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia.

China has been fully integrated into the regional processes

with ASEAN Centrality and in ASEAN Way. In the last

few years, despite intensification of the disputes in the

South China Sea between China and some ASEAN clai-

mant states, regional cooperation continued to broaden and

deepen with, for instance, among others, the progress of the

negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic

Partnership (RCEP), the framework agreement reached for

the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea and the

establishment of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation

Mechanism.

All these developments seem to have contradicted the

conventional wisdom of world politics. Why has coopera-

tion been maintained and deepened in East Asia with

China’s phenomenal rise? For realists, China’s rise changes

regional power structure and inevitably leads to violent

power transition. For institutionalists, regional institutions

led by ASEAN are merely talk shops, not legally binding or

effective enough to produce and guarantee peace and

cooperation. For constructivists, ‘‘we-feeling’’ is yet in the

making and there is no cooperative culture based on

common identity in the region.

The paper argues for a distinctive form of regionalism

practiced in East Asia, which can be called developmental

regionalism. It means that regional processes are devel-

opment-oriented and development-focused, featuring

pragmatism, flexibility and developmental security.

Development defined in sustainable terms is the goal and

main content for regional processes, a strong adhesive and

shared understanding for community building. Pragmatism

means importance is attached to practical results and

benefits rather than any fixed ideology or model in regional

processes. Flexibility means flexible arrangements and

minimal institutionalism are usually preferred in regional

cooperation. Developmental security refers to a security

norm which sees development and security mutually rein-

forcing each other. In development-oriented regionaliza-

tion, practices and institutions coevolve for progress. As

China continues to rise rapidly and plays the role of growth

engine in the region, regional states which prioritize

development in their domestic politics tend to seek,

maintain and deepen cooperation with China, and accom-

modate China in regional processes. Such practices have

shaped developmental regionalism and in turn promoted

regional integration and community building in East Asia.

The paper takes the South China Sea disputes in the past

few years as a case to illustrate how conflicts have been

averted and cooperation maintained and deepened between

China and ASEAN and in East Asia even in a most sen-

sitive area of territorial disputes under developmental

regionalism. The paper concludes that developmental

regionalism has enabled cohesive and resilient regional

processes, nurtured the habit of cooperation and promoted

community building in East Asia. In the end, it also briefly

discusses necessary conditions, and the theoretical and

practical implications of developmental regionalism in

world politics.

2 Structures, Agents and Processes in RegionalIntegration

Existing literature on China’s rise and East Asian region-

alization roughly falls into the following three categories

with respective focuses on structures, agents and processes.

They fail either to predict about continuing peace and

cooperation in East Asia or to provide adequate or accurate

explanations about the impetus and dynamism of the pro-

cesses. The rapid growth of China is typically regarded

disruptive to regional order or simply reactive in the

actually two-way social construction in its engagement

with the region.

2.1 Structures and Power Rivalry

Mainstream international relations theories, neorealism,

neoliberal institutionalism and social constructivism are

basically structural theories (Qin and Wei 2008, 116).

Stability of international system is determined by the

structures of material capabilities (Waltz 1979), interna-

tional institutions (Keohane 1984) and international culture

(Wendt 1999), respectively. According to neorealists, the

growth of China’s material capabilities inevitably leads to

violent power rivalry and power transition (Organski 1980,

19), firstly within the region between China and Japan and

2 Calculated by the author with data from the World Bank and

ASEAN Secretariat, https://data.worldbank.org/country/china, http://

www.aseanstats.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ASEAN-Statistical-

Leaflet-2017_Final.pdf, accessed 23/01/2018.

20 East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32

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then on a global scale between China and the USA

(Mearsheimer 2001, 2010). In recent years, dual structures

have emerged in East Asia, namely, the China-led eco-

nomic structure and the US-led security structure. The

strengthening of the dual structures increases uncertainty of

regional order and risks of conflicts in East Asia (Ikenberry

2016). Neoliberal institutionalism assumes that China’s

rise challenges the US-led international order based on

rules and norms despite the fact that China has benefited

enormously from this order since its integration into the

international system. It maintains that the US hegemony

will sustain as long as the US-led institutions continue to

strengthen and prevail (Ikenberry 2008). Hence, regional

stability relies very much on the strengthening of the US

institutional power, and the growth of China’s institutional

power is regarded as a fundamental challenge to US

regional hegemony (Ikenberry 2004). For social construc-

tivists, since there is too much diversity in the region and

states do not typically identify with each other or with the

USA (Katzenstein 2005), a cooperative or community

culture is yet in the making and cooperation is not guar-

anteed. Finally, the English school argues that international

society is norm-based. As China differs from the west in

values and ideology, it cannot be fully or peacefully inte-

grated into the international society based on western val-

ues and norms. As China rises, it will attempt to establish a

different normative order from that of the West, and hence,

China’s rise will not be peaceful (Buzan 2010). None of

these structural theories predicts China’s peaceful rise in

the region. However, in the past 20 years and more, not

only has the region been free from major conflict, but also

it has witnessed proliferation of cooperative institutions

and processes with a regional community as the long-term

goal.

2.2 Agents and Regional Order

Some scholars emphasize the agency of major actors in the

region in shaping regional order. For instance, Archaya

studies ASEAN agency in developing ASEAN Way and

building a security community in the Southeast Asia sub-

region (Acharya 2001). Although ASEAN has successfully

localized norms from the West (Acharya 2004), diffused

the ASEAN Way to a wider region (Acharya 1997) and

established ASEAN Centrality in institutional framework

of regional cooperation, ASEAN alone cannot guarantee

peace or cooperation in East Asia. Katzenstein and Mear-

sheimer argue for the agency of the USA in preserving

stability and order in East Asia, respectively, by estab-

lishing bilateral security alliance (Hemmer and Katzenstein

2002) and designating Japan as a core regional state

(Katzenstein 2005) and by playing offshore balancing

(Mearsheimer 2001). However, being static, such theories

fail to capture the dynamism of the East Asian cooperation

and neglect the agency of regional actors, especially

ASEAN and China. Kang argues for a hierarchic system

with Chinese preeminence in East Asia in history, in which

lesser states typically bandwagoned instead of balancing

China and the regional stability relied on the strength and

stability of China’s power (Kang 2005, 2007). However,

China as a civilization in process in history is not the

nation-state China of today. The ancient tributary system

contradicts the modern Westphalian system on the funda-

mental norm of sovereignty. Moreover, there is no band-

wagon observed in East Asia and middle and lesser powers

typically avoid choosing sides between major powers.

2.3 Processes and Socialization of Power

There has also been increasing literature on process-fo-

cused model of East Asian regionalism, which goes beyond

structures and agents and maintains that East Asian inte-

gration is process-driven, although the process is defined in

different terms. Some see the process as institutionaliza-

tion. They argue that the level of institutionalization of

regional cooperation in East Asia is rather low and the

process is not producing much substance (Searight 2005).

Distinctively different from European integration based on

treaties, East Asian regional process based on declarations

and statements is unlikely to realize the goal of a com-

munity. However, the ASEAN Way of minimum institu-

tionalization has been proven effective and successful in

maintaining peace and promoting cooperation in Southeast

Asia since the founding of ASEAN in 1967 and in inte-

grating major powers into East Asian cooperation since the

founding of the APT in 1997. Some see the process as

social construction, i.e., socialization of major powers and

the building of ‘‘we-feeling’’ (Qin and Wei 2008, 124).

Maintaining cooperative relations is the core and content of

the process, and the dynamism to keep the process going

(Wei 2016a, b, 39). However, the process defined as both

means and end still seems somewhat insufficient in solving

the puzzle of why states cooperate in the first place and

why keeping the cooperative process going is even more

important than realizing preset material goals.

In sum, existing literature on East Asian regionalism

fails either to predict or to provide satisfying explanation

for the parallel developments between the rise of China and

peace and cooperation in East Asia. A fundamental reason

for such failure or inadequacy is their neglect of a basic

factor in the local context in their pursuit of generality and

universality of their theories, that is, development.

East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32 21

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3 Background Knowledge, Practice and Habitas Basic Assumptions

This paper argues for a distinctive form of regionalism

practiced in East Asia, which can be called developmental

regionalism. It is based on the following assumptions about

background knowledge, practice and habit.

3.1 Background Knowledge

Locality and background knowledge matters. Locality

refers to the specific area where actors exist. It constitutes

part of the background knowledge of the actors. Partly tacit

and partly reflexive, background knowledge consists

mainly of ‘‘intersubjective expectations and dispositions.’’

It does not necessarily ‘‘create uniformity of a group,’’ but

organize ‘‘their differences around pervasive understanding

of reality’’(Adler and Pouliot 2011, 16). Most East Asian

countries had colonial or semicolonial experiences in

modern history and gained independence at the end of

World War II. The pervasive understanding of reality in the

region crystallizes into two fundamental norms, namely,

non-intervention and development. Non-intervention is a

dominant norm in the normative hierarchy of East Asia

(Acharya 2004, 239). Development, as late Chinese leader

Deng Xiaoping’s famous line goes, is of overriding

importance (Deng 1993, 377). And as Chinese President Xi

Jinping argues, development is the biggest security for

most Asian countries (Xi 2014).

3.2 Anchoring Practice

Background knowledge is embedded in practice, and the

anchoring practice in East Asian regional processes is the

practice of development. A practice is competent perfor-

mance, which tends to be patterned, socially significant and

recognizable (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 7). A fundamental

task and basic incentive to join regional process for most

East Asian countries is development. Development has

been the anchoring practice in East Asian regional pro-

cesses, which means that the practice of development has

not only rendered other practices in regionalization possi-

ble, but also embodied defining rules and principles for a

whole set of practices in interactions of states with each

other in the region, and provided the infrastructure for

states to go on and engage in other practices in regional

integration (Sending and Neumann 2011, 237). After

World War II, East Asia has witnessed waves of devel-

opments and rise led, respectively, by Japan in the 1960s,

the Four Little Dragons in the 1970s, and China from the

1980s onward. From 2006 to 2015, the combined GDP of

ASEAN countries rose by 66%, making ASEAN Economic

Community the third fastest growing economy in Asia only

after China and India, and the fifth largest economy in the

world (East–West Center 2017). Such growth could not

have been possible without the practice of development

being placed at the core of domestic and regional politics

for East Asian countries. Narrowing the development gap,

the key of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (ASEAN

Secretariat 2007) is a core interest of ASEAN in ASEAN

Community building.

3.3 Logic of Habit

Logic of habit tends to be predominant in institutionalized

environment, which reduces uncertainty and prolongs sta-

bility and cooperation. Habits are automatic and unreflec-

tive reactions of actors to the world around them, including

perceptions, attitudes, emotions and practices. Acquired

from the social structures in which actors are situated, and

‘‘maintained through use, utility, the absence of challenges,

and the physiology of the brain,’’ habits are broken or

replaced only when actors become aware that ‘‘they are no

longer working, instrumentally, normatively, or function-

ally’’ (Hopf 2010, 540–544). There are different kinds of

logics, including logics of consequentialism, appropriate-

ness, affect, practice and habit. Institutionalized settings

and durable relationships are favorable conditions for the

logic of habit to work; and ‘‘even deliberate reflective

decisions are still made on the background of structured

habits’’ (Hopf 2010, 547). If states habitually cooperate

with each other in institutionalized environments, uncer-

tainty about each other’s intentions that conventional IR

theories assume will be significantly reduced, and coop-

eration is often taken for granted and likely to be sustained.

4 Developmental Regionalism and CommunityBuilding in East Asia

Development regionalism means regional actors interact

with each other to promote national and regional economic

growth and strength, and to improve people’s lives. It takes

development as its core and content, builds on cooperative

practices and aims at a sustainable regional community,

where habit of cooperation is nurtured and the logic of

habit works for coevolution between agents and structures,

and between institutions and practices (Fig. 1). Engaged in

the anchoring practice of developmental regionalism, states

in East Asia typically address security challenges and

disputes in consultative processes to maintian cooperation

and facilitate development.

22 East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32

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4.1 Developmental Regionalism in Contestation

As ‘‘a contested concept’’ (He 2017, 7), regionalism

invokes different understandings of and approaches to a

region and regional arrangements. According to Higgott,

they fall into four categories, namely, de facto regionalism,

de jure regionalism, instrumental regionalism and cognitive

regionalism, referring, respectively, to market-led eco-

nomic integration, state-led institutional cooperation,

common policy based on common interest, and shared

culture (Higgott 2007a, b, He 2017, 8). Hettne and

Soderbaum regard developmental regionalism as new

regionalism, referring to ‘‘concerted efforts from actors

(i.e. state, market and civil society) within a geographical

area to increase the economic development of the region as

a whole and to improve its position in the world economy’’

(Hettne and Soderbaum 1998, 19). Scholarly work on

regionalism in East Asia mostly deals with regional eco-

nomic cooperation and free trade arrangements (He 2017,

7). A few scholars have used the term ‘‘developmental

regionalism’’ to discuss East Asian regional processes.

Nesadurai puts forward the concept of ‘‘developmental

regionalism’’ as a way to incorporate domestic politics in

understanding the globalization–regionalism relationship.

Derived from the concept of ‘‘developmental state,’’

developmental regionalism is used to emphasize ‘‘state

intervention in markets to promote national development

agendas’’ (Nesadurai 2003, 235, 238). Dent points out the

‘‘strong ‘developmental’ characteristics of East Asia’s new

regionalism,’’ where regional cooperation and integration

activities ‘‘are particularly orientated to enhancing the

economic capacity and prospects of less developed coun-

tries with the view of strengthening their integration into

the regional economy, and thereby bringing greater

coherence to regional community building overall’’ (Dent

2008, 767). In Elumbre’s definition, developmental

regionalism in ASEAN integration is ‘‘strategic and pro-

gressive ideas aimed at the economic convergence of

member-states’’ (Elumbre 2014, 83).

‘‘Developmental regionalism’’ proposed in this paper is

different from the above-discussed regionalisms. First, it

follows analytical eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein 2010,

441) by integrating elements from different theoretical

traditions to build complex arguments and provide prag-

matic solutions. Hence, ‘‘development’’ here is not just

about economic growth, but also carries political-security

significance and sociocultural values. When talking about

East Asian regionalism, people mainly refer to the APT,

which is ‘‘the first exclusive East Asian grouping’’ that has

been created (Dent 2008, 769) and the institutionalization

of East Asian regionalism (He 2017, 6). According to the

study of Asian Development Bank, East Asia encompass-

ing the APT countries has by far been the most integrated

part in Asia at both micro- and macro-level since the late

1990s (Dent 2008, 771–772). Despite different political

systems, almost all East Asian countries share ‘‘the basic

characteristics of elite governance political systems,’’

where the legitimacy of the regimes and stability of

domestic order rely very much on the material wealth

generated for citizens (Nesadurai 2003, 239). Therefore,

development carries vital political, security and social

significance.

Second, developmental regionalism puts emphasis on

state-led regional development processes. Domestic insti-

tutions and political practices play a significant role in

shaping the foreign policy preferences of a state (Mo-

ravcsik 1997). Since the launching of the APT, the regional

integration has been state-led and development-driven.

However, both features have remained understudied.

Besides economic growth promoted by states through

trade, FDI and manufacturing, development also has a very

strong indication of poverty alleviation and narrowing the

wealth gap at both domestic and regional levels. Devel-

opment, being the overriding priority for most East Asian

countries, has shaped their preferences in regional politics.

Developmental regionalism is consistent with ‘‘the region’s

mainstream economic ideologies,’’ the Japanese develop-

mentalism (Dent 2008, 780) at first and the Chinese

development

•pragma�sm•flexibility •developmental security

coopera�on

•prac�ces of and for developement

community

•habit of coopera�on

•coevolu�on

Fig. 1 Developmental regionalism

East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32 23

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developmentalism in sequence, aiming at realizing trans-

formative growth by institutions and policies in both

domestic and foreign contexts. Therefore, developmental

regionalism proposed in this paper emphasizes that devel-

opment is the driving force, the focus, the goal and the

main content of regional integration in East Asia.

Third, developmental regionalism indicates that ‘‘de-

velopment’’ is the underlying common value and norma-

tive base for regional integration. Development, being the

priority and fundamental challenge to most East Asian

countries, concerns domestic stability and political legiti-

macy. It has to be inclusive and sustainable. Narrowing the

development gap is imperative in both domestic and

regional contexts. National governments in East Asia have

to meet the growth demands of both states and individuals.

They also have to manage the balance between economic

development and ecological sustainability, and parallel

processes of industrialization and post-industrialization.

Hence, inclusive and sustainable development is the motive

and the biggest common ground in regional integration.

4.2 Pragmatism, Flexibility and Developmental

Security

Developmental regionalism in East Asia features pragma-

tism, flexibility and developmental security. The spirit of

pragmatism is probably best captured in Deng Xiaoping’s

famous line—‘‘It does not matter whether a cat is black or

white; if it catches mice, it is a good cat,’’ which is inter-

preted as ‘‘Results matter’’ by Mahbubani (2010, 37). The

ultimate goal and intended result of East Asian regional

processes is development, which is a lesson learned from

the region’s recent history of humiliation and colonization.

As Deng Xiaoping put it, ‘‘being backward invites invasion

and defeat’’.3 For China, to realize internal development, it

needs decades of peace and cooperation from the region,

which can be achieved by sharing its growth with its

neighbors. For other East Asian countries, though at dif-

ferent stages of development, they in general welcome

China’s rise as an economic opportunity. The proposal of

an East Asian community is pragmatic as it is expected to

bring both economic and political benefits to the region.

The economic benefit is significant particularly in terms of

sharing growth and narrowing the development gap. The

political benefit is to secure the gains and dividends from

closer cooperation and deeper integration.

Distinctively different from the EU model of regional

integration built on legally binding treaties, pragmatism in

East Asia is showcased by pragmatic institutionalism,

meaning relatively low level of institutionalization and

much room for flexibility and autonomy. It often consists

of politically attainable goals, practical agenda tailored to

the needs of members, decision-making by consensus

which aims at seeking and expanding common ground and

cares for the comfort level of concerned parties, and

pragmatic agreements where voluntary implementation can

be expected from all (Maric 2018). Contrary to the pre-

diction of neoliberal institutionalism, despite the lack of

legally binding power, the declarations, statements and

pragmatic agreements on which East Asian regional pro-

cesses are based do produce results. The success of the

APT process is due exactly to Asians’ pragmatism (Mah-

bubani 2010, 39). The proliferation of bilateral and regio-

nal FTAs since 1999 also demonstrates the pragmatic

feature of developmental regionalism in East Asia (Desker

2004, 3).

Flexibility means minimum institutionalism and flexible

practices in regional processes. Flexibility results from the

‘‘compressed development’’ of China and most East Asian

economies. As Tianbiao Zhu argues, the acceleration of

globalization since the 1980s has given rise to a new

development paradigm in East Asia—compressed devel-

opment, where ‘‘different stages and sequences of devel-

opment are collapsed into one single point in time’’ (Zhu

2012, 101–102). Late developing countries like China find

that they are fully integrated into regional and global

economy and engaged simultaneously in processes of

industrialization and deindustrialization, experiencing the

coevolution of traditional, modern and postmodern values

and practices. As states in compressed development are

confronted with multiple tasks and different challenges

from different developmental stages simultaneously, they

cannot exactly follow the examples of early developers in

institutionalization, standardization and rule-based

bureaucratic operations. They tend to make flexible adap-

tations, experiment and improvise rather than to go for the

preset goals. Hence, flexibility in policies and practices has

become a prominent feature of developmental regionalism

in East Asia, where states bend rules, adapt quickly to new

circumstances, and learn quickly to ‘‘deploy new tactics

and find practical solutions’’ when facing new challenges

(Zhu 2012, 105–106).

Developmental security refers to a security norm which

sees development and security mutually reinforcing each

other. Tønesson proposes ‘‘developmental peace’’ and

argues that the priority placed on economic development

by leaders of regional states is the key to the long peace in

East Asia where international war has been avoided for

well over three decades and unrivaled economic growth

has been witnessed. He also finds that there is a typical

pattern in their foreign policies when East Asian states

prioritize state-driven economic growth. They typically

strive to maintain external and internal stability, accom-

modate the USA, and adopt pragmatic policies toward their3 Quoted from Mahbubani (2010, 37).

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neighbors (Tønesson 2015, 10–13). Feiteng Zhong con-

ceptualizes ‘‘developmental security’’ to specifically refer

to China’s grand strategy as a rising power, and argues that

China should continue to actively maintain peaceful and

favorable external environment for economic growth even

after it rises to great power status (Zhong 2017, 10–11).

Different from the discussions in the above, ‘‘develop-

mental security’’ in this paper refers to a dominant norm

and belief in East Asia that security and development are

indispensable from each other. On the one hand, develop-

ment is promoted to preserve stability and peace. On the

other, stability provides necessary conditions for develop-

ment. Development is fundamental to a regional commu-

nity of common prosperity. Indeed, as East Asian

regionalization is crisis-driven—financial crisis in 1997,

the common security challenge which brought East Asian

countries together was challenge to sustainable growth and

development.

4.3 Practices of Development, Habit of Cooperation

and Community

East Asian regional cooperation has consisted mainly of

practices of development and for development. First,

institutionalization took place first and foremost in areas of

economic and functional cooperation, the most

notable among which include the Chiang Mai Initiative

Multilateralization (CMIM), the ASEAN Plus Three

Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), Asian Bond

Market Initiative (ABMI), ASEAN Plus Three Emergency

Rice Reserve Agreement, etc. Cooperation in political-se-

curity areas lags behind, not only because they are sensi-

tive, but also because there is a tacit understanding among

East Asian countries that the priority is development and

narrowing development gap is the key to regional com-

munity building. Second, connectivity has been a leading

project in regional integration in recent years with the

rational that it is a key step toward reducing development

gap and realizing regional community of ‘‘continued eco-

nomic growth’’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2010, 2016a). Initi-

ated by ASEAN, it has become a major area of cooperation

between ASEAN and its dialog partners with both signif-

icant institutional and financial support. Third, regional

FTA arrangements have made significant headways as

demonstrated by increasing bilateral FTAs, ‘‘ASEAN

Plus’’ FTAs, and the ongoing China-Japan-Korea Trilateral

FTA and RCEP negotiations. China-ASEAN FTA was the

first and a very smart move in ‘‘ASEAN Plus’’ FTA

arrangements, which enhanced regional peace by facili-

tating trade and sharing economic prosperity (Mahbubani

2010, 37). Intra-regional trade of APT has exceeded 50%,

with China being the No.1 or No.2 trading partner of all the

other 12 countries and home to most of the regional pro-

duction networks (Wong 2018).

As practices are repeated, patterned and competent

performances with social recognition, and the practices of

East Asian cooperation for development have reached

unprecedented width and depth in the past two decades,

cooperation for development is becoming a habit in

regional processes. First, cooperation for development has

become a diplomatic working routine4 as institutionaliza-

tion of regional processes enhances. For instance, all major

powers have sent and ambassadors and diplomatic missions

to ASEAN. And hence maintaining and promoting coop-

eration with ASEAN and supporting ASEAN-centered

regional cooperation have become their daily routine, and

probably the most important routine. Second, as regional

cooperation continues to broaden and deepen, not only the

number of stakeholders grows significantly, but also they

increasingly identify themselves with regional processes.

Third, practices embody social norms, which can be

stronger than legal norms (Percy 2007, 367). Cooperation

for development, through repeated practices, has become a

very strong social norm in East Asia, which is self-evident

with the remarkable progress made in regional integration

over the years.

Practices of cooperation of and for development in East

Asia lead to coevolution of agents and structures, and of

institutions and growth, which is part and parcel of regional

community building. Yuen Yuen Ang argues that suc-

cessful development is a coevolutionary process in which

markets and governments mutually adapt and that it

unfolds in a three-step sequence, weak institutions being

harnessed to build markets, emerging markets stimulating

strong institutions and strong institutions preserving mar-

kets (Ang 2016). Making a compelling case for China’s

rapid growth out of poverty, her argument actually applies

for most economies in East Asia and the growth of the

region as a whole. First, ‘‘weak institutions,’’ for instance,

the APT in 1997, are established to promote cooperation

for long-term peace and sustainable development. Second,

regional integration grows rapidly and stimulates stronger

institutions, for instance, the CMIM and the AMRO. Third,

strong institutions preserve regionalization process, for

instance, the adoption by the APT summits of the long-

term goal of building an East Asian community and the

recent goal of an EAEC by 2020. In development-oriented

regionalization, practices and institutions, states and

regional structures coevolve. Not only has the goal been set

to build a regional community, but also a community of

practice of cooperation of and for development has

4 For discussions of diplomatic working routine, see Neumann

(2007).

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emerged, which aspires and strives for long-term peace and

sustainable security.

5 Cooperation Amid Disputes in the South ChinaSea as a Test Case

The regional processes around the South China Sea issue

are taken as a case to test developmental regionalism

proposed by this paper. The reason to choose this case is

because a most unlikely case can provide more compelling

evidence than others when well established. The South

China Sea case is most unlikely because of the following

reasons. First, South China Sea has been regarded as a hot

spot for regional conflicts in the past few years. Second, it

involves the most sensitive hard security issue for East

Asian countries, territorial disputes. Third, it has become,

to some extent, an area for China-US power competition

and rivalry, concerning the reshaping of regional security

order. Regional states have been confronted with not only

intensified territorial disputes among themselves, but also

challenges of probable changes in regional power structure

and generally assumed ensuing instability. Under such

circumstances, did they maintain development-oriented

and development-focused regional cooperation for the

long-term goal of a regional community? The test will

focus on the interactions mainly between China and

ASEAN for two reasons. One is that the claimant states are

China and several ASEAN countries, and the Code of

Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) is being negotiated

between China and ASEAN. The other is that China and

ASEAN are the core of the economic APT (Wong 2018),

which is generally regarded as the foundation for an East

Asian community. ASEAN states are treated as both a

group and individual actors in this case.

5.1 Escalation of Tensions

Disputes in the South China Sea mainly focus on sover-

eignty and rights over the Nansha Islands and their sur-

rounding waters.5 A recent wave of claims and disputes

was triggered by the discovery of abundant oil and gas

reserves in the Nansha waters in the late 1960s and the

introduction of international arrangements concerning the

Exclusive Economic Zones or the continental shelf.6

Nonetheless, despite ‘‘a continuing tug-of-war’’ (Fu and

Wu 2016) over ‘‘territorial sovereignty and maritime rights

and interests’’,7 the general situation in the South China

Sea was under control from the late 1970s to the late 2000s,

as China gradually established and normalized its diplo-

matic relations with all countries in East Asia, became

ASEAN’s dialog partner and joined ASEAN-centered

regional processes.

Tensions started to build up in 2009, escalated since

2012 and took a turn to calming down in late 2016. The

tensions started with two main triggers. One is the official

deadline set by the UN Commission on the Limits of the

Continental Shelf (CLCS) which requires states concerned

‘‘to submit claims over a continental shelf extending the

200 nautical miles from its territorial sea by 15 May 2009’’

(Fu and Wu 2016). The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia

and China subsequently made submissions to the CLCS.

And the other is Obama administration’s pivot to Asia

(Wei 2013). In 2010, Hilary Clinton stated at the ASEAN

Regional Forum that the USA ‘‘had a national interest’’ in

the South China Sea.8 Under such circumstances, disputes

in the South China Sea became intensified, complicated

and internationalized. In 2009, at least 5 confrontational

incidents took place between the US and Chinese ships in

the South China Sea (Fu and Wu 2016).

Tensions escalated in 2012. Besides increasing military

exercises and maritime border patrols, the following inci-

dents are worth mentioning. First is the Philippine–China

interaction over the Huangyan Island Incident. In May

2012, Aquino III signed an administrative order, renaming

the part of the South China Sea west to the Philippine

archipelago as ‘‘West Philippines Sea’’ (Philippines Presi-

dent’s Office 2012). As countermeasures, China sent

marine surveillance ship for long-term deployment in the

waters surrounding Huangyan Island, and put the Island

under its control. Second is the Vietnam–China interaction.

In June 2012, Vietnam adopted a Maritime Law to legalize

its territorial claims in the South China Sea. Upon the

adoption, China announced establishment of Sansha City

on Yongxing Island in the Xisha Islands with administra-

tive, jurisdictional and military arrangements (Fu and Wu

2016).

From 2013 to 2016, the disputes in the South China Sea

centered on the arbitration case, freedom of navigation,

island reclamation and so-called ‘‘militarization’’ (Wei

2016a, b). In 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitral pro-

ceedings against China at the International Tribunal for the

Law of the Sea, and China launched reclamation projects

on its controlled Nansha islands. In 2014, the standoff

between China and the Philippines over Ren’ai Shoal and

the China-Vietnam tensions over the drilling operation of5 For a brief review of the history of the arrangements and exercise of

sovereign rights over Nansha Islands from the colonial years to the

end of World War II, see Fu and Wu (2016).6 Such as the Convention on the Continental Shelf and the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

7 Term adopted from China’s official document, see Chinese Foreign

Ministry (2016b).8 Quoted from Firestein (2016).

26 East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32

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China’s HYSY 981 rig further deteriorated the situation. In

the meantime, the USA significantly intensified its

surveillance at the Nansha Islands and its surrounding

waters, and increased its military deployment in the region

and joint military exercises with some claimant states (Fu

and Wu 2016). In July 2016, China declared that the award

rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea

arbitration established at the unilateral request of the

Philippines was ‘‘null and void,’’ and that China neither

accepted nor recognized it (Chinese Foreign Ministry

2016a). The tensions in the South China Sea mounted.

However, in late 2016, after newly elected Philippine

President Duterte took office, a dramatic turn was made in

Philippine policy toward China and the tensions over South

China Sea were gradually released. And such a turn toward

calming down the tensions and resolving the disputes was

consolidated when ASEAN-China Framework for the Code

of Conduct for the South China Sea was endorsed in

August 2017 (Storey 2017).

5.2 Cooperation Amid Disputes

Over the years, despite the tensions and disputes discussed

in the above, China-ASEAN cooperation has been main-

tained and deepened, demonstrating vitality and resilience.

The following is not going to deal with the low-hanging

fruit in trade and economic cooperation, but to focus on

more difficult issues like security norms and institutions,

the solidarity of the groupings, and the momentum of

regional cooperation at the time when interactions in the

South China Sea made a positive turn.

First, successive efforts and progress have been made

amid the disputes to build trust and confidence, and to

maintain stability in the South China Sea. In 1994, the

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was set up as an instru-

ment to practice ASEAN norm of cooperative security

(Acharya 2004) for regional stability, where South China

Sea became a major agenda in its preventive diplomacy

and China a very active participant. Even in the initial

years of ARF, China regularly stated its positions on the

South China Sea issue, including setting aside disputes, no

resort to force, acknowledgement of the concern about

freedom of navigation, and taking the U.N. Convention on

the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the basis for solution,

etc. (Foot 1998, 426–431). Progress at the ARF improved

mutual trust between China and other claimant states,

contributed to confidence building over the South China

Sea issue and the regional security at large, and to a great

extent created favorable conditions for future

achievements.

Alongside with the ARF, China and ASEAN countries

also dealt with the South China Sea issue at Senior Offi-

cials’ Meetings and multiple Track 1 and Track 1.5

meetings and dialogs. In 1998, the ASEAN Summit

adopted the Hanoi Plan of Action, proposing that efforts be

made to establish a regional code of conduct in the South

China Sea among the parties directly concerned, on which

China agreed in principle. In July 2002, in consideration of

different views on the binding powers and on areas to be

covered, Malaysia proposed to replace ‘‘the code of con-

duct’’ with a compromising and non-binding ‘‘declaration’’

(Fu and Wu 2016). After many rounds of difficult negoti-

ations, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the

South China Sea (DOC) was signed by ASEAN and China

in November 2002. Since then, the DOC has played a

significant role in building confidence, promoting cooper-

ation based on common interests and maintaining general

stability in the South China Sea. In 2003, China made

another significant step forward by acceding to the TAC

and elevating its dialog relations with ASEAN to strategic

partnership, furthering exercise of self-restraint with leg-

ally binding commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes.

Since 2002, ASEAN and China have been engaged in

negotiating the COC within the framework of compre-

hensively and effectively implementing the DOC. In 2011,

the Guidelines to Implement the DOC was adopted by

China and ASEAN. In 2012, ASEAN drafted and presented

to China a document containing the major elements of the

COC, and China expressed its willingness to start the COC

process. In 2013, the first China-ASEAN Senior Officials’

Meeting on the COC was convened in Suzhou, where all

agreed to ‘‘start the COC process on the principles of

observing consensus and adopting a gradual approach’’ (Li

2014). In 2014, China expressed its support for ‘‘dual-track

approach’’ proposed by Brunei, i.e., ‘‘relevant disputes

being addressed by countries directly concerned through

friendly consultations and negotiations and in a peaceful

way, and peace and stability in the South China Sea being

jointly maintained by China and ASEAN countries’’

(Chinese Foreign Ministry 2014). By August 2017, when

the Framework for the COC was endorsed, China and

ASEAN had 14 Senior Officials’ Meetings on the imple-

mentation of the DOC.

Second, cooperative process was kept going even in

most difficult times to maintain solidarity of regional

groupings and to institutionalize security and stability. In

2012, disputes in South China Sea escalated. ASEAN

found it difficult to reach consensus on the South China Sea

because not all members were claimant states. In June, the

ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting failed to produce joint

statement for the first time in its history, which was a shock

and heavy blow to ASEAN itself and to the region. Real-

izing the significance of ASEAN solidarity, ASEAN for-

eign ministers managed to build consensus and adopted

six-point principles on the South China Sea after intensive

shuttle diplomacy carried by Indonesian Foreign Minister

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Marty Natalegawa. ASEAN solidarity was eventually

safeguarded (Xinhua 2012). At the end of the year, the

APT summit adopted the Report of the EAVGII, which

studied the future direction of the APT and developed a

new vision for regional cooperation and community

building, of which the realization of an EAEC by 2020 was

the main pillar.

The years running up to the award of the arbitration case

initiated by the Philippines were extremely difficult for

regional cooperation. Especially, non-claimant states often

found themselves in a dilemma of having to taking sides.

Nonetheless, to maintain regional cooperative processes,

ASEAN, APT or EAS as groupings never took sides in

their official documents and settings. Moreover, efforts

were made in both Track 1 and Track 2 to focus on areas of

common interests and promote common development. For

instance, not only the official track II under the APT

framework, the Network of East Asian Think-tanks

(NEAT), continued joint study and pooled wisdom for

regional cooperation in functional and non-traditional

security areas, but also the Network of ASEAN-China

Think-tanks (NACT) and the Network of China-Japan-

ROK Trilateral Cooperation Think-tanks (NTCT) were

endorsed by national governments and established after the

NEAT model, respectively, in 2014 and in 2015 to promote

better mutual understanding, nurture trust and facilitate

cooperation in the region.9

China worked very hard to maintain its overall coop-

eration with ASEAN through both bilateral and multilateral

channels. On the one hand, China clarified its positions on

the South China Sea by issuing a series of position papers

and quietly adjusted its policies to demonstrate good will

for negotiation and peaceful resolution (Zhang 2016). On

the other hand, China worked with ASEAN to further

promote and institutionalize security cooperation. In 2013,

Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed building China-

ASEAN community of common destiny in Indonesia. In

2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang declared that China

would like to discuss the possibility of concluding a treaty

of good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation with

ASEAN, aiming at ‘‘providing an institutional framework

and legal guarantee for peaceful co-existence between the

two sides from generation to generation’’ (Xinhua 2014). In

2015, China-ASEAN Defense Ministers Informal Meeting

was held in Beijing for the first time. In 2016, ASEAN and

China held a commemorative summit, committed to

building a closer strategic partnership (ASEAN Secretariat

2016b). How China, ASEAN and regional countries

managed to keep cooperation on track under such trying

circumstances is illuminating.

Third, good momentum has been kept and new dyna-

mism injected into regional cooperation after the turn to

calming down was made over the South China Sea issue.

After the turnaround of China–Philippines relations in

October 2016, Philippine President Duterte made two visits

to China, attended the Belt and Road Forum for Interna-

tional Cooperation in Beijing, and reached important con-

sensus with Chinese leaders on properly handling the

maritime issues through friendly bilateral consultation and

strengthening cooperation in the South China Sea. The first

10 months of 2017 saw China become the Philippines’s

biggest trading partner (Li 2017a, b). In November 2017, a

China-Vietnam joint statement was issued, in which the

two sides pledged to strengthen their comprehensive

strategic cooperative partnership, agreed to jointly imple-

ment the five-year plan of bilateral economic and trade

cooperation, and promised to manage and control the dif-

ferences concerning maritime issues and refrain from tak-

ing actions to maintain peace and stability in the South

China Sea. The two sides agreed to strive for an early

conclusion of COC and a fundamental and long-term

solution of bilateral maritime disputes. The two sides also

decided to conduct joint inspection in waters outside the

Beibu Gulf and actively push forward joint development of

the area. In late 2017, on the occasion of the 20th APT

Commemorative Summit, the Manila Declaration was

adopted, reaffirming member states’ ‘‘commitment to fur-

ther strengthening and deepening the APT process which

plays a key role in regional community building efforts

with ASEAN as the driving force’’ (ASEAN 2017).

5.3 Maintenance of Regional Processes for Peace

and Prosperity

Why was cooperation maintained among East Asian

countries even in the most difficult time of the South China

Sea disputes? How come that bilateral and multilateral

cooperation has become even more robust after the

turnaround?

Duterte’s policy toward China is called by some ‘‘the

pivot to pragmatism’’ (Baviera 2017). In an interview with

the China Central Television, Duterte said he was not

breaking from the USA, but merely being ‘‘pragmatic,’’

and that there was no point of insisting on the ownership of

waters if it would not bring prosperity, but cost a world war

(CCTV 2016). Duterte has downplayed maritime disputes

to pursue close economic and political ties with China. His

strategy is to take full advantage of the economic benefits

from friendly relations with China and tackle non-tradi-

tional security challenge at home, such as drug abuse,

corruption and poverty, for sustainable growth. Many

9 China Foreign Affairs University is China’s focal point for NEAT,

NACT and NTCT. The author witnessed the establishment and

growth of the three regional track 2 groupings and participated in

almost all the major activities.

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believe that Duterte made a smart move and that a mutually

acceptable resolution of South China Sea disputes is likely

to be followed by a boost in Chinese aid and infrastructure

investment, which the Philippine economy can use to

maintain its healthy growth momentum, especially when

the Philippines is regarded as a welcome partner in China-

initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt

and Road Initiative (Baviera 2017).

The pivot to pragmatism of the Philippines also helped

with the ASEAN solidarity and consensus on the South

China Sea. It had ‘‘spillover effect’’ on other claimant

states, reduced disagreements within ASEAN, declined

free-riding on the Philippines by some stakeholders in the

disputes and eased pressure on the Philippines (Baviera

2017). It was under such circumstances that ASEAN con-

sensus was developed and ASEAN and China agreed on a

framework for a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea.

It is, thus, fair to say that the pivot to pragmatism driven by

the strategic goal of development made a significant con-

tribution to producing peace and stability in the region.

The ‘‘dual-track approach’’ supported and advocated by

China, an important adjustment in China’s diplomacy in

the South China Sea, demonstrated both pragmatism and

flexibility. It broke the impasse over the issue and made

space for negotiation and progress. The approach was ini-

tiated by Brunei in 2014 and supported and advocated by

China, which indicated ASEAN ownership and ASEAN-

China cooperation even before its application. China’s

support and advocacy of the approach demonstrated flexi-

bility of China’ diplomacy, signaling a pragmatic turn from

total denial of discussions of South China Sea disputes on

any multilateral occasions to acknowledgement of the

necessity of such discussions under a specific multilateral

framework (Wu 2015). The approach on the one hand

enabled China to keep general consistency in its policy,

and on the other sought cooperation from the ASEAN. The

adoption of the ‘‘dual-track approach’’ helped further

establish the consensus that China–ASEAN relationship

was not all about the South China Sea, clarified the rights

and obligations of the claimant states and non-claimant

states, and hence to some extent prevented external inter-

vention and lifted non-claimant states from side-taking

dilemma. The ‘‘dual-track approach’’ actually prioritized

the maintenance of regional stability, encouraged bilateral

and multilateral cooperation in functional areas, and helped

pave the way for the turnabout of the situation. Such

important policy adjustment was made against the back-

drop that Chinese President Xi identified Southeast Asia as

a priority in China’s neighborhood diplomacy in late 2013

for its strategic bearing on creating favorable external

environment for China’s continued growth (Chinese For-

eign Ministry 2013).

Despite the complication, internationalization and

intensification of the disputes in the South China Sea from

2009 to 2016, regional cooperation continued to make

progress and achievements. An important reason is that

after years of practices of cooperation for common devel-

opment, it has become a habit and taken for granted by East

Asian states that eventually they have to seek common

ground, and manage to reach consensus and keep cooper-

ation going despite difficulties. It was because of such a

habit that ASEAN was shocked at the failure of producing

a joint statement after the 2012 foreign ministers meeting

and immediately shuttled diplomacy for common positions.

It was because of such a habit that functional cooperation

and institutionalization continued to develop in both China-

ASEAN and APT frameworks. Not a single official docu-

ment of the two mechanisms ever took sides concerning the

South China Sea disputes. Instead, China and ASEAN

endeavored, on the one hand, to fully implement the DOC

for functional and non-traditional security cooperation at

the sea, and on the other to facilitate the COC process.

Despite the disputes, China-ASEAN cooperation in general

has deepened and broadened. China has remained

ASEAN’s No.1 trading partner since 2009. Lancang-

Mekong cooperation mechanism involving China and five

ASEAN states was officially launched in 2016. The APT

embraced and adopted the goal of an EAEC by 2020.

In all the cooperation and disputes, coevolution between

structures and agents and between institutions and practices

took place. During the courses, almost all major powers

joined institutionalized East Asian processes, either

through the East Asia Summit or dialog relationship with

ASEAN, and some new arrangements were made or

negotiated in competition such as the Trans-Pacific

Strategic and Economic Partnership (TPP) and RCEP. The

South China Sea has become an arena for both cooperation

and competition, where related rules, norms and institu-

tions have been developed, which in turn guided practices

in sequence, for instance, the evolution of diplomatic

practices of individual states, the implementation process

of the DOC and the negotiating of the COC. Structures and

agents have evolved reciprocally with the processes.

Arguably, a regional community for cooperation is

emerging in East Asia, not one in which uniformity or

identification among members is in place, but one in which

members find cooperation a necessity, conflict undesirable

and development a common aspiration and joint endeavor.

6 Conclusion: Development Matters

The paper attempts to explain why China’s rise coincides

with East Asian regional peace and integration. Existing

literature tend to solve the puzzle with typical and abstract

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IR concepts and instruments, but fail to capture the most

fundamental element in the coincidence, that is, develop-

ment. China does not rise alone. With East Asia being the

fastest growing region in the world since the late 1990s,

China has risen along with regional partners and in the

context of the rise of East Asia. Development must be a

key variable for regional evolution. Thus, the paper pro-

poses developmental regionalism. It places development at

its core, featuring pragmatism, flexibility and develop-

mental security. Regional processes are development-ori-

ented, development-driven and development-focused.

Cooperation of and for development is the anchoring

practice in regional processes, which require regional sta-

bility, determine regional agenda, help nurture habit of

cooperation, lead to coevolution of agents and structures,

and institutions and practices, and build a regional com-

munity in the long run. The paper uses the South China Sea

issue as a case to test the argument and proves that

developmental regionalism played a key role in maintain-

ing peace and cooperation amid disputes.

Developmental regionalism works, but not without

conditions. The most important and delicate is to get the

right understanding of development because it is a process

itself, a fluid concept. What kind of development by nature

and definition is really wanted by the region? Getting

development wrong may invite divisions, disputes and

conflicts. For instance, many believe that globalization

backfired because it caused inequitable development and

deepened social divisions. How to maintain steady growth

on the one hand and ensure inclusiveness and equal

development opportunities will remain a big challenge for

the region for a long time. Another condition concerns the

agents or agency. The growth engine or the major powers

in the region shall exercise self-restraint and always share

its development with regional partners. China’s rise to

great power status has to take place in a peaceful regional

context, which in turn depends to a great extent on the

agency of China—how it is going to exercise its increasing

power. The developmental agency of China and the insti-

tutional centrality of ASEAN in the region have to be well

coordinated and balanced. Finally, the US factor in regio-

nal processes toward peace and development is important.

Hence, open regionalism shall be observed for mutual

adaptation and coevolution of parallel and competing

regional institutions, agencies and processes.

Development matters to peace and security. However,

the IR study of development remains far from adequate in

both theoretical and empirical terms. While development

regionalism applies in East Asia, one cannot but wonder if

it works in other regions. An inquiry into this is become

increasingly significant as China is promoting the Belt and

Road initiative and developing partnerships with groupings

in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa,

respectively. If developmental regionalism carries with it

conspicuous Chinese characteristics or oriental cultural

elements, then is it going to work in different regional or

cultural contexts? Developmental regionalism in compar-

ative perspective can enrich our general understanding

about world politics considerably.

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Dr. Ling Wei is Professor of International Studies, Director of the

Chinese Foreign Policy Studies Center at the China Foreign Affairs

University (CFAU). She was a Fulbright Visiting Research Scholar at

Cornell University (2012–13). Her research interests include interna-

tional relations theory and East Asian regionalism. She is China’s

Country Coordinator for NEAT (the Network of East Asian Think-

tanks), NACT (the Network of ASEAN-China Think-tanks), and

NTCT (the Network of Trilateral Cooperation Think-tanks). She is on

the editorial board of Foreign Affairs Review (Waijiao Pinglun) and

Southeast Asian Studies (Dongnanya Yanjiu). She holds a Ph.D in

international relations from CFAU.

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