Andrew Jackson Detsch VIAFF 3182U.S. National Security Challenges and the Role of Military ForceDr. Thomas ParkerDecember 3, 2012

China’s “Middle Kingdom” Strategy

The Mandarin word for China (zhongguo) means simply: “Middle Kingdom.” China considers itself the rightful political and economic center of gravity in the Asia-Pacific, and since the unification of the People’s Republic in 1949, it has consistently sought to leverage greater control over its geopolitical neighborhood. This trend began with Chairman Mao Zedong’s pledge to resist “aggression in the guise of the UN," in Korea, sending military reinforcements into the country on November 1, 1950 after American troops crossed the 38th parallel.1 Utilizing the largest economy in the region, the effect of this psychology on China muscular security strategy, has increasingly magnified. China now aggressively pursues control of contested deposits of oil and natural in the South China Sea, the Senkaku and Diayu Islands claimed by Japan, and expansion of medium and long-range sea missile capabilities and anti-access (A2) and area denial (AD) capabilities to deter the United States from assisting critical allies, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, in Southeast Asia.2

Assisting North Korea remains paramount to preserving the China’s “Middle Kingdom” strategy. The Politburo’s blatant unilateral posturing has led a coalition of rival states to begin a campaign of military encirclement. China now faces nuclear countries on each of its borders: with Russia to the Northwest, India to the Southwest, and Japan to the Northeast. South Korea also faces the “Middle Kingdom” across the East China Sea, and a rising Vietnam has been increasingly eager to participate in closer bilateral dialogues with the United States and Japan.3

Although its Pyongyang’s antics have consistently frustrated Beijing, preserving the North Korea is the linchpin of China’s “Middle Kingdom” strategy. Total encirclement by hostile powers in the event of North Korea’s dissolution would, in all likelihood, destroy China’s nationalist dream of being the preeminent power in the region, causing it to lose grasp of many, if not most, of its key objectives.

With no domestic revenue base to speak of, economic aid emerging from Beijing has largely what has kept the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) afloat for the past decade. This is not a new phenomenon: ever since its partition with the South in 1953, after an international conflict which left much of its industrial base in ruins, the North Korea has largely depended on Chinese and Russian aid to drive its socialized, agrarian economy. While economic data emerging from Kim Jong-un’s autarkic regime

1 Chinese Military Science Academy (September 2000). History of War to ResistAmerica and Aid Korea (抗美援朝战争史). I. Beijing: Chinese Military ScienceAcademy Publishing House. pp. 35-36. ISBN 7-80137-390-1.2 Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Pyongyang Tests Beijing’s Patience,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Comparative Connections (July 2009): 5. 3 Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea” Congressional Research Service Special Report (April 12, 2012): 12.

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in Pyongyang, one of the last avowed Communist governments in the world, is largely unreliable, expert analysis suggests that the country faces persistent food shortages, starvation, and stagnant growth.4

China is not just backing North Korea with economic aid, but it increasingly accounts for a larger share of its trade: constituting 40% of Pyongyang’s exports in 2008 and a total of $3.4 billion.5 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows generated by China have skyrocketed to $41.2 million, and have spurred joint sponsorship of economic development zones throughout the country, at Sinuiju opposite Dandong, dams along the Tumen River at the far Northeast part of the border, the Rason project between Rajin and Sonbong on North Korea’s northeast coast, and along a nearly 250-kilometer stretch of the Yalu River.6 The DPRK’s $1.25 billion trade deficit is practically subsidized entirely by China, as it supplies 90% of the country’s oil, 80% of its consumer goods, and 45% of its food.7 These investments appear to target the mineral and mining sectors, targeting raw, extractable goods which play a major role in China’s production of finished goods produced for export. Correspondingly, with increasing involvement from the Politburo, many of Pyongyang’s other traditional trade partners, including South Korea, are pulling back trade.

Still, the overall Beijing’s efforts to promote economic opening have gone unheeded: Pyongyang’s sole attempt at reform, a substantial devaluation of the currency in 2010 designed to stoke economic growth, had the opposite effect, causing drastic inflation and shortages in many basic subsistence goods.8 Multilateral sanctions against the regime, resulting from a failure to curb its nuclear program, further compound these problems, and enable persisting stagnation.9 While China’s North Korea strategy has ascertained the solvency of the state apparatus, it remains inherently unstable.

Why does China have such a formidable interest in preserving North Korea? The motivations are not ideological by nature: China has showed a similar distrust of capitalist and communist countries in the development of their policy, as is evidenced by the Sino-Soviet split of 1960 and the 1972 rapproachment with the United States in order to enable the division of Vietnam.10 Furthermore, in contrast to most major world powers of the past century, appears to have little interest in spreading its ideology of “illiberal

4 Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea” Congressional Research Service Special Report (April 12, 2012): 12. 5 Bates Gill, “China’s North Korea Policy,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 283 (July 2011): 7. 6 Ibid, 4.7 Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Pyongyang Tests Beijing’s Patience,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Comparative Connections (July 2009): 7. 8 Barbara Demick, “Nothing Left: Is North Korea finally facing collapse?” The New Yorker, July 10, 2010, accessed December 7, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/07/12/100712fa_fact_demick.9 Kelsey Davenport, “Sanctions Seen Slowing N. Korea Progress,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/2012_07-08/Sanctions_Seen_Slowing_N_Korea_Progress10 Richard C. Thornton, Soviet Asian Strategy in the Brezhnev Era and Beyond: Is Détente Inevitable? (Washington: Washington Institute Press, 1985), 34.

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capitalism,” Deng Xiaoping’s model of economic liberalization paired with extreme social and political controls, throughout the world.

But like any other power, China seeks regional hegemony: overall excellence in the political, economic, and military affairs of the Asia-Pacific. The Politburo’s policy appears to be consistent with Mao Zedong’s “divide and conquer” notions of the 20th Century: the rise of a unified, nuclear Korea, could serve as a further deterrent challenge in the East Asian neighborhood, distracting China’s hopes to expand its naval reach into the South China Sea and the middle Pacific at a time when it is facing slowing economic growth.11

But the centrality of North Korea to the “Middle Kingdom” strategy is not just based on political-military calculations: most modern Koreans trace their ancestral origins back to ancient China and Mongolia, a point which is not lost on party cronies inside the Politburo. Their aversion to state failure in North Korea is as much based on strategic interest as it is moral imperative: similar to the Taiwan problem, the Chinese believe it is their political right and responsibility to drive Korean affairs, extending back to Chairman Mao’s decision to intervene in Korea following General Douglas MacArthur’s landing at Inchon in 1948 in hopes to push the Americans back past the 38th parallel. 12

Ties have further tightened following Kim Jong Il’s stroke in January of 2008: Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao seemed more readily able to deal with more pragmatic regime elements that emerged in the subsequent power vacuum than the isolationist, erratic Mr. Kim, son of the nation’s founding father, increasing party-to-party ties and ministerial relationships which lie at the heart of the relationship.

Furthermore, Chinese strategy is also focused on the development of deterrent capabilities against the United States, as the PLAN hopes to create “a variant of the DongFeng (DF) 21 (CSS-5) medium range ballistic missile capable of targeting U.S. naval surface combatants-notably aircraft carriers-at distances of up to 1,500 kilometers (810 nautical miles) from the Chinese mainland.”13 Area-denial efforts in the air-sea battle theatre of the Pacific would come under increasing strain were Korea to be unified under the banner of the South: undoubtedly, the United States would immediately look to secure basing agreements near the Chinese border, constraining operations.

These trends, improving Chinese military technology and regional force posture, suggest that China is comfortable with the status quo and seeks to extend upon its perceived gains in the region through the paradigm of its North Korea strategy. As is the case with most foreign policy issues, this has led the Politburo to take a methodical approach to the nuclear weapons regime: Mr. Hu roundly condemned Mr. Kim’s decision to detonate a nuclear device in 2006, arguing that the action amounted to “flagrantly

11 Bates Gill, “China’s North Korea Policy,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 283 (July 2011): 7.12 Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 6, 2010, accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097.13 Barry D. Watts, “The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Testimony (May 2011): 7.

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conducting a nuclear test in disregard of the common opposition of the international community.”14

Beijing’s overall attitude towards the nuclear program is one of frustration and impatience: with international perceptions suggesting the Politburo is the kingmaker Pyongyang, failed missile launches undermine China’s credibility as the dealmaker in the region, hurting the symbolic construction of the “Middle Kingdom” as a whole. As a result, the tests embarrass China on a global scale.15

Still, the P.R.C. is by far North Korea’s staunchest backer on the United Nations Security Council and has thus far resisted most efforts on behalf of the United States to enact serious sanctions against Pyongyang’s weapons program, only bucking that trend in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 in 2009.16 China never formally scolded the DPRK for leaving the six-party talks later that year, the international community’s diplomatic hedge against Kim Jong II’s decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003.17 It even tolerates increasing migration flows Westward into the country, despite the serious economic drain it causes.

Even after DPRK tests of the Unha-3 ballistic rocket on December 12, 2012, which led the State Department to call for intensified sanctions, Xi Jinping and the Politburo remain mum on the subject, and continue to resist utilization of their own economic leverage to force the Worker’s Party to come to the table with the international community for talks.

ConclusionChina’s aversion to instability is commendable: rapid unification of the Koreas

would be inherently destabilizing for both the United States and the nations of the Asia-P tolerance of a nuclear North Korea is at the root of the problem.18

Serious economic development, in the long run, will likely be impossible without the abandonment of Mr. Kim’s weapons program. While, to a certain extent, this limits the Politburo’s leverage, ultimately, China would rather have a thorn, as opposed to a gash in its side, which is what a failed North Korea would constitute.

The reality is that China has built a solvent state in North Korea, but only barely. To maintain their ambition to establish the “Middle Kingdom” at the center of the Asia-

14 Bates Gill, “China’s North Korea Policy,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 283 (July 2011): 1.15 Aidan Foster-Carter, “Harsh Realities for North Korea’s unseen heir,” Financial Times, September 28, 2010, accessed December 1, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/a90ac8b2-cae3-11df-bf36-00144feab49a,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2Fa90ac8b2-cae3-11df-bf36 00144feab49a.html&_i_referer=#axzz2FXXUPIh9.16 “Council on Foreign Relations: UN Security Council Resolution 1874 – North Korea,” accessed December 7, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/un-security-council-resolution-1874-north-korea/p19625.17 “China resists moves to sanction N. Korea: diplomats,” accessed December 9, 2012, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1243348/1/.html.18 Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Pyongyang Tests Beijing’s Patience,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Comparative Connections (July 2009): 5.

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Pacific, it will be vital, in the long-run, that China promote the denuclearization of North Korea, increasingly pressing the regime through minimization of economic aid.

Bibliography

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Gill, Bates. “China’s North Korea Policy.” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 283 (July 2011).

Foster-Carter, Aidan. “Harsh Realities for North Korea’s unseen heir.” Financial Times, September 28, 2010. Accessed December 1, 2012. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/a90ac8b2-cae3-11df-bf36-00144feab49a,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2Fa90ac8b2-cae3-11df-bf3600144feab49a.html&_i_referer=#axzz2FXXUPIh9.

“Council on Foreign Relations: UN Security Council Resolution 1874 – North Korea.” Accessed December 7, 2012. http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/un-security-council-resolution-1874-north-korea/p19625.

“China resists moves to sanction N. Korea: diplomats.” Accessed December 9, 2012. http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1243348/1/.html.

Snyder, Scott. “China-Korea Relations: Pyongyang Tests Beijing’s Patience.” Center for Strategic and International Studies Comparative Connections (July 2009).

Bajoria, Jayshree. “The China-North Korea Relationship.” Council on Foreign Relations, October 6, 2010. Accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097.

Watts, Barry D. “The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs.” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Testimony (May 2011).

Demick, Barbara. “Nothing Left: Is North Korea finally facing collapse?” The New Yorker, July 10, 2010. Accessed December 7, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/07/12/100712fa_fact_demick.

Manyin, Mark E. and Mary Beth Nikitin. “Foreign Assistance to North Korea.” Congressional Research Service Special Report (April 12, 2012).

Davenport, Kelsey. “Sanctions Seen Slowing N. Korea Progress.” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/2012_07-08/Sanctions_Seen_Slowing_N_Korea_Progress.

Chinese Military Science Academy (September 2000). History of War to ResistAmerica and Aid Korea (抗美援朝战争史). I. Beijing: Chinese Military ScienceAcademy Publishing House. pp. 35-36. ISBN 7-80137-390-1.

Thornton, Richard C. Soviet Asian Strategy in the Brezhnev Era and Beyond: Is Détente Inevitable? Washington: Washington Institute Press, 1985.

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