china,iran alliance

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China, Iran and North Korea Alliance: Report by MERIA

A report March, 2010 by the Middle East Review ofInternational Affairs

CHINA, IRAN, AND NORTH KOREA: A TRIANGULARSTRATEGIC ALLIANCE

ByChristina Y. Lin * While the international community is facing a nuclear stalemate withIran and North Korea, China is increasingly emerging as a Great Wall in blocking the pathtowards sanctions and peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis and denuclearizatonof the Korean Peninsula. While much recent literature has been written on the deleteriouseffects of a regional nuclear arms race should Iran become a nuclear power, there has been

relatively little effort to explore why China persistently defends Iran by blocking or wateringdown UNSC sanctions and on the strategic partnership between Iran and North Korea inmissile and nuclear collaboration. This paper explores the triangular strategic alliancebetween China, Iran, and North Korea and the attendant negative spill-over that poses athreat to East Asia and Middle East regional stability.

Introduction: Iran in Chinas Strategic Calculus

There is a paucity of research on Sino-Iran relations in the international security literature,

yet this relationship has important implications for East Asia and Middle East regionalsecurity. Historically, Sino-Iran relations span back thousands of years, and their modernpartnership began in the 1970s, first with the Shah and then continuing with the IslamicRepublic of Iran. The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, coupled with the Shahs fear of Sovietmisadventures in Iran and the Gulf, paved way for Sino-Iran rapprochement. This wasfurther reinforced by their shared sense of history as great ancient empires that werehumiliated by the West.[1] From 1858 to 1860, Russia seized large swaths of Siberia fromChina, while throughout the 1800s, European powers carved up China and Iran.[2]Currently, on a pragmatic level, China is paving a new energy silk road with Iran to meet itsenergy security-driven foreign policy goals and to hedge against U.S. domination over theirenergy supply in the Persian Gulf.

Chinas Persian Gulf Strategy

In 1993, China became a net importer of oil and is now the second biggestenergy consumer in the world, after the United States. However, Chinas peercompetitor, the United States, with its formidable naval power, controls sealanes of communications (SLOC) for oil supplies that may be cut off over apotential Taiwan clash. As such, in 2000 a Chinese article in the influentialStrategy and Management Journal recommended that Chinas strategy in the


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Persian Gulf should be to align with Iran.[3]In the article, the author positsthat since the United States already controls the west bank of the oil-richPersian Gulf via its pro-American proxies (e.g., Saudi Arabia and the smallerGulf states), the Gulf is in effect an internal sea for the United States, andchallenges to that position are likely to fail. However, if China and Russiaexpand relations with Iran, they could maintain a minimum balance to

thwart U.S. moves. Since securing oil imports from the Gulf requires both theU.S.-controlled west bank and the China/Russia-supported Iranian east bank,this axis would block U.S. efforts to impose oil embargoes against othercountries. Should the United States and China ever have a military clash overTaiwan, the United States would not shut off Chinas Gulf oil supplies sinceChina, Russia, and Iran control the Gulfs east bank.[4]Indeed, in 2001, Chinafollowed this strategic vision and formed the Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO) with a Sino-Russia-Iran axis to counterbalance perceivedU.S. hegemony.[5]

Iran-Iraq War

Chinas Persian Gulf Strategy of aligning with Iran played out during the 1980-1988 Iran-

Iraq War. Similar to its current stance towards Iran, China maintained neutrality whilevoting against the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution for sanctions,stating that sanctions intensify conflicts. China also refused to move Resolution 552 (passedin 1984) that prevented attacks on neutral commerce in Persian Gulf to sanctions.Moreover, China supplied arms to Iran; in 1982, U.S. officials charged China and NorthKorea with supplying 40 percent of Irans arms, and by 1987 this figure had increased to 70percent.[6]In 1986, Iran began attacking neutral Kuwaiti vessels. U.S. satellite imagery in1987 indicated Iran was installing Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missiles along the Strait ofHormuz. The United States responded by reflagging Kuwaiti vessels, yet the United Statesand China almost went to war over Iran when in October 1987 a Silkworm struck a U.S.reflagged tanker. U.S. forces retaliated by striking and destroying an Iranian oilproduction platform in the Gulf, followed by another round of U.S.-Iran military conflict inApril 1988, when a mine nearly sank a U.S. frigate. This was followed by subsequent

attacks between Iran and the United States Navy. As tensions escalated, China becameconcerned about developing a negative perception that it was perpetuating the war byarms proliferation to Iran and by helping Iran to militarily challenge the United States.[7]Finally, the Sino-Iran fear of escalation into full war with the United States prompted Iranto accept Resolution 598 for ceasefire in July 1988. During this war, Iran perceived Chinato be a reliable partner, and thereafter China became a key interlocutor for Iran.Nuclear IranChinas Persian Gulf strategy is continuing to be played out in the current stalemate overIrans illicit nuclear program. China is emerging as the key impediment to new UNSC

sanctions, given its past history and its strategic interests in Iran. China signed a $40 billiondeal in July 2009 to refine Irans oil,[8] and it surpassed the EU to become Irans number-one trading partner, with bilateral trade at $36.5 billion, in 2009 (compared with $35 billionfor European states), mainly in the energy sector.[9] Some pundits expect that energy-hungry China would not support sanctions, whether to maintain their trade relations or forfear of Iranian retaliation by corking the Strait of Hormuz bottleneck; however, this appearsto be a relatively minor concern to China. Although one-third of Chinas oil imports flowingthrough the Hormuz seems to be a large figure, by disaggregating the data and looking atChinas overall energy mix, it can be seen that oil consists of only 20 percent of its total mix,


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while 70 percent of Chinas economy is fuelled by its abundant domestic supply of coal (seeFigure 1).[10] Thus, one-third of 20 percent yields just 6.6 percent of Chinas total energy usecoming through the Strait of Hormuz, a reason for Beijings reluctance to flag the HormuzStrait as an issue.[11] Another reason is having Iran as a key node in the land-based energysilk road.

Figure 1: Chinas Energy Mix

Source: EIA Country Analysis Brief, China, U.S. Department of Energy, updated July2009.

Chinas New Silk Road

China needs Iran not only to keep open the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf but also as anode in the new energy silk road connecting the Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea, and Central Asiato China. In this Asian Energy Security Gridor Pipelineistan[12]China needs Iran in aseries of pipelines, including the Iran-Pakistan (IP) pipeline and the interconnection betweenIran and Turkmenistan, which will have an eventual direct land link between Iran and Chinain order to bypass the Strait of Malacca, which is patrolled by the United States Navy. InDecember 2009, Turkmenistan announced it would begin to supply natural gas through anew pipeline to China.[13] Chinas current energy silk road appears to be modeled on theancient silk road, with both maritime and overland routes.

Figure 2: Ancient Silk Road, Both Maritime and Overland Routes

Source: Silk Road by Wikiality123 using En: Image: Silk Route Extant.JPG, 18 September2007.

Maritime Route: String of Pearls

China is already establishing a maritime route, called the String of Pearls.[14] Broadlyspeaking, each pearl in the string of pearls is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical or militarypresence.[15]

Figure 3: Reproduced from IntelliBriefs, Chinas String of Pearls Strategy,April 1, 2007.

Several things are needed in a string of pearls: access to airfields and ports, increase indiplomatic relations, and a modernizing military force to move effectively to maintain/hold


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individual pearls. These pearls extend from the coast of mainland China through the littoralsof the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and onto the littoralsof the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. Some of the pearls include: upgraded military facilitieson Hainan Island; an upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelagoabout 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam; a container shipping facility in Chittagong,Bangladesh; construction of a deepwater port in Sittwe, Burma; construction of a navy base

in Gwadar, Pakistan; a pipeline through Islamabad and over the Karakoram highway toKashgar in Xinjiang province that would transport fuel to China itself; intelligence gatheringfacilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal near the Strait of Malacca; and the Hambantota portin Sri Lanka.[16]

India fears Chinas strategic encirclement in the Indian Ocean, as China garlands its Stringof Pearls around India, having established a listening post in Gwadar, Pakistan, equippedBangladesh with Chinese military hardware in an anti-India defense cooperation, concludeda military agreement with Cambodia in November 2003, and established military ties withBurma and leased Coco Island in 1994 for SIGINT installation.[17] The latest pearlacquisition was on October 31, 2007, to construct the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka.

Figure 4: [Chinas Maritime Route] Reproduced from China Garlands India withString of Pearls,http://www.marinebuzz.com.

China is also constructing an overland route of the Silk Road.

Iran: A Node for Maritime and Overland RoutesIran may also be a new pearl in Chinas maritime pearl necklace. China is increasing itsnaval presence in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, with a call in December 2009 by

Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhou to set up a permanent naval base in the Gulf of Aden.[18]Chinese warships in the Gulf of Aden have been using a French naval base at Djibouti forresupply. While Rear Admiral Yin Zhou did not specify any country where a permanentChinese naval base might be set up, some pundits have assessed it could be Iran. GivenSino-Persian close cooperation in energy security and a greater willingness to embraceChinas naval vessels making port calls to Iran, this may be a prelude to more extensiveagreements to perhaps provide a small Chinese naval outpost on one of Irans Persian Gulfislands.[19]Iran may be inclined to offset U.S. pressure by playing the China card shouldthe United States try to project military power by utilizing some of the UAEs man-madeislands. Indeed, in November 2009, NATO entered into the advanced stages of negotiatinga Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the face ofIrans nuclear threat.[20]

According to Janes Intelligence Review, China is pursuing a two-pronged strategy tosecure its energy, using the navy to protect maritime supply and building newpipelines.[21]In addition to Chinas major deepwater port on the Arabian Sea at Gwadarin Pakistan, which could host Chinas expanding submarine fleet and possible futureaircraft carriers, China is also building oil and gas pipelines from the Central Asia towestern China to reduce its dependence on vulnerable maritime routes. Since 1991, many inthe West have discussed development of a modern silk road of highways, pipelines, and raillines linking Central Asia with Europe, but few have paid much attention to Chinas activeprogram to build these corridors. In January 2010, an article in the Georgian Daily


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discussed Chinas Silk Road Strategy of building gas pipelines and railways through itsSCO Central Asian partners and connecting with rail networks in Iran and Turkey toEurope.[22]China, Iran, Turkey, and Europe all use the standard 1435 mm rail gauge, butthe central Asian republics between China and Iran use the Soviet/Russian track width of1520 mm. As such, China is already negotiating with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan toharmonize its Russian/Soviet track with the international standard and to allow China to

move goods to Iran, Turkey, and the EU without changing equipment at the border.[23]Itis also building a freight railroad from its Aynak copper mining project in Afghanistan toGwadar, Pakistan, where it has a large naval base, enabling China to transport futuregoods from the Middle East and Africa via railway links through Pakistan, Afghanistan,Tajikistan, and into western China.[24]Thus, China appears to be steadily advancing inrestoring its ancient maritime and overland routes of the silk road.Given the strategic significance of Iran as Chinas partner in the Middle East, including as akey node for its overland and maritime routes along its modern energy silk road; given that itis an SCO partner to hedge against U.S. global hegemony and NATO expansion into itsbackyard in Central Asia;[25] Given that a relatively small portion of its energy need (6.6percent) comes from the Strait of Hormuz; given increasing trade links and the surpassing of

the EU as Irans number-one trading partner in 2009 ($36.5 billion); and given the history ofChinese assistance to Irans nuclear program and recent nuclear proliferation of pressuretransducers (for precise measurements in production of weapons-grade uranium) via aTaiwan front company,[26] it seems unlikely that China would jump on the bandwagon toallow a fourth round of UNSC sanctions. As a corollary, unless there is a full embargo orcrippling sanctions from a coalition of the willing, this may likely force the hand of amilitary option of a precision strike by allied powers of like-minded states, perhaps similarto the 1999 NATO air strike in Kosovo when it was clear Russia would not approve UNSCresolutions.

DPRK and Irans Strategic Partnership

Similar to China, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iranhave also shared strategic cooperation for more than three decades. Yetscholars in the international security literature continue to treat them asseparate variables, with the bifurcation of regional studies between Middle Eastand East Asian studies. This strategic cooperation has entailed the proxydevelopment of missile and nuclear technologies to sidestep sanctions,collaborative efforts to share test data and weapons designs, and theimplementation of a strategy of exploiting the Six Powers Talk (and Six PartyTalks) in breaking international commitments to achieve a nuclear faitaccompli.[27] An article appeared in 1997 in The Middle East Review ofInternational Affairs, wherein the author warned that DPRK was perhaps themost important single leak in international anti-proliferation effort, playing adestabilizing role in the Middle East.[28] Since radical Middle East regimes facearms embargoes from Western sources of military technology, and China andRussia can only supply up to a point due to international pressures, DPRK fillsin the gap as an isolated regime that is by and large impervious to internationalpressure.

As an isolated hermit kingdom, DPRK proliferates weapons of massdestruction (WMD) to the Middle East in order to generate income, implementDPRK ideology ofJuche/self-sufficiency, modernize its military, and prepare


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for forced reunification with the Republic of Korea (ROK).[29] Oftentimes,Middle East clients such as Iran underwrite DPRKs research and developmentfor missile and nuclear weapons technology, which it then purchases to expandits arsenal.[30] The improved WMD technology is also passed back to DPRKsown armed forces, so that this collaboration simultaneously threatens theMiddle East and Asia. On April 5, 2009, DPRK launched a Taepodong 2 rocket to

put a satellite in orbitonly two months after Iran launched its Safir-2rocket.[31] Japans Sankei Shimbun newspaper claimed a 15-person delegationfrom Tehran had been in the country advising the North Koreans since thebeginning of March.[32] Indeed, Iran-DPRK missile collaboration has beenongoing for sometime: Iranians attended the May 1993 DPRK No-dong missiletesting; DPRK observed the Iranian testing of Shahab 3 in 1991 and 1998; andIranians were present at the launch site of the July 2006 missile testing ofTaepodong 2.[33] A high-level Iranian defector, Ali Reze Asghari, says Iran alsofinanced DPRK participation in Syrias nuclear weapons program.[34] Thus,this flurry of activities underscored the growing proliferation threats posed byDPRK assistance to Irans missile capabilities, which has also led tocollaboration in the nuclear realm.[35]

Missile Collaboration

DPRK and Iran established diplomatic ties in 1973, and missile collaboration reportedlybegan in 1985 through an agreement under which Iran helped underwrite DPRK productionof 300 kilometer-range Scud-B missiles in return for receiving the new technology, as well asthe option to purchase the completed Scud-Bs.[36] In 1987, Iran reportedly purchased 100Scud-Bs for use in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.[37] This relationship expanded in the1990s, with Iran and DPRK cooperating on joint development of Iranian Shahab missileseries, closely based on DPRKs nuclear-capable Nodong missile. Koreas Nodong,Taepodong-1, and Taepodong-2 missiles were the basis for development of Irans Shahab 3,Shahab 4, and Shahab 5/6, respectively (see Figure 5).[38] The two states are thought to be

collaborating on the development of a nuclear-capable ICBM, the DPRK Taepodong-2 andIranian Shahab-6, which has a 5,000-6,000 kilometer range (see Figure 6).[39]

Figure 5: Iran-DPRK Missile Cooperation

Source:Special Report: Challenges of Iranian Missile ProliferationPartnership withNorth Korea, WMD Insights, October 2006.

Figure 6: Taepodong and Shahab Missile Ranges


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Source: WMD Insights, October 2006.

Proxy Testing to Circumvent SanctionsIran and DPRK have partnered closely on missile flight-testing, proxy testing of DPRKsystems in Iran, and data exchanges. DPRK agreed to a moratorium in September 1999 onlong-range missile tests, increasing the need for proxy testing of such systems.[40] Itaccepted this restraint to sidestep U.S. sanctions following its August 1998 test of the long-range Taepodong-1 missile, which flew over northern Japan.[41] In May 2004, an unnamedsenior U.S. official indicated Iran was probably giving DPRK telemetry and other data frommissile tests to improve DPRKs own missile systems.[42] In return, DPRK allegedlyprovided Tehran with onsite engineering consultation for future Iranian missile tests.

Proxy testing in Iran of jointly developed missiles allowed DPRK to avoid sanctions after theSeptember 1999 missile test moratorium while continuing its missile advances. Up to

DPRKs September 1999 moratorium on long-range missile testing, press accounts statedthat Iran regularly sent technical teams with missile telemetry and monitoring equipment toDPRK missile launches.[43] Thus, it is no surprise that Iranians were present to observeseven DPRK missile tests on July 5, 2006, which broke the September 1999 moratorium. AJapanese paper indicated that 10 Iranians were invited to the tests, and an anonymous SouthKorean military expert stated he heard Iranians were stationed at two launch sites alongNorth Koreas east coast and on a boat in Sea of Japan.[44]

Nuclear Collaboration

In the field of nuclear collaboration, numerous public reports have appeared since 1993

describing elements of DPRK-Iranian collaboration in the development of nuclearcapabilities. Cooperation reportedly began at the same time DPRK negotiated with IransIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for cooperation in developing and manufacturingNodong missiles in Iran. A 1993 Economist Foreign Reportcited CIA sources that Iran washelping to finance the DPRK nuclear program in exchange for nuclear technology andequipment, with the goal of developing enriched uranium in the bilateral agreement.[45]Information disclosed in 2008 revealed that DPRK had negotiated with Pakistan for thenPrime Minister Benazir Bhutto to supply DPRK officials data on developing highly enricheduranium during her 1993 DPRK visit.[46] The 1993-94 timeframe of the initial DPRK-Irannuclear cooperation and interest in uranium enrichment coincides with and circumvents the1994 DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework to halt DPRKs plutonium activities at Yongbyon: DPRKwas signing a uranium enrichment agreement with Iran around the same time as signing theAgreed Framework with the U.S. to halt plutonium production.

The next stage of cooperation, from 2003 onwards, appears to have been influenced by thejoint advancement of the Nodong (Shahab) program in Iran. Increased visits to Iran byDPRK nuclear specialists in 2003 reportedly led to a DPRK-Iranian agreement for DPRK toeither initiate or accelerate work with Iranians to develop nuclear warheads that could befitted on the DPRK Nodong missiles that DPRK and Iran were jointly developing.[47] Sodespite the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate stating that Iran in 2003 had halted


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weaponization of its nuclear program, this was the time that Iran outsourced to DPRK forproxy development of nuclear warheads and offered oil and gas shipments as payment.[48]

A February 2008 report of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) also claimedDPRK-Iranian collaboration in nuclear warheads development at secret sites in Iran.[49] Italleges that the Iranian Defense Ministry has a secret facility at Khojir on the edge of Tehran,code named B1-Nori-8500, which is engaged in development of nuclear warheads forintermediate-range ballistic missiles and that DPRK specialists are at this facility. Europeanand Israeli defense officials stated in early 2007 that DPRK and Iran had concluded newagreement for DPRK to share data from its October 2006 nuclear test with Iran.[50] Theextensive history of DPRK-Iran cooperation on nuclear capable missiles and collaboration onre-entry vehicles were moving towards the realm of nuclear collaboration.[51] A January2007 article in The Daily Telegraph stated that DPRK was helping Iran prepare anunderground nuclear test similar to the one Pyongyang carried out in 2006. A seniorEuropean defense official informed The Daily Telegraph that DPRK had invited a team ofIranian nuclear scientists to study the results of the October 2006 underground test to assistTeherans own test.[52]

DPRK-Iran nuclear collaboration also includes joint assistance for Syrias nuclear program,as highlighted by the 2007 Israeli airstrike of the DPRK-assisted Syrian nuclear reactor.[53]Der Spiegelcited intelligence reports seen byDer Spiegel that DPRK and Iranian scientistswere working together at the Syrian reactor site at the time of bombing. Some of theplutonium production slated for the reactor was to have gone to Iran, which viewed thereactor as a reserve site to produce weapons-grade plutonium to supplement Irans ownhighly enriched uranium program.[54]

Tunneling Technology

Tunneling for HizballahDPRK-Iran joint assistance of tunnel-digging for Hizballah terror campaigns against Israelhas also been documented.[55] DPRK tunneling technology was first discovered in 1974 inSouth Korea. Under the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea, alliedreconnaissance troops discovered a 45-meter deep tunnel at 3,500 meters long, replete withelectricity, railways, and track vehicles.[56] Since then, several more tunnels have beendiscovered; one discovered in 1978 was 73 meters deep and 16.35 meters long. About 30,000ranked, heavily armed troops can pass per hour.

In southern Lebanon, following the 2006 war, the Israeli Defense Forces and the UNdiscovered several sophisticated underground complexes abandoned by Hizballah militantsthat offered electricity, ventilation, and running water. The tunnels were strikingly similar tothe ones that had been unearthed by the South Koreans.[57] French, Israeli, and SouthKorean sources have reported extensive programs by DPRK to arm/train Hizballah since thelate 1980s and 1990s.[58]


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The three top Hizballah officials who received training in DPRK are Hasan Nasrallah,Hizballahs secretary general and the head of the Hizballah military organization; IbrahimAkil, head of Hizballahs security and intelligence service; and Mustapha Badreddine,Hizballahs counter-espionage chief.[59]

According to the April 2007 Paris-based Intelligence Online, the DPRK program reportedlyexpanded when Israeli forces withdrew from southern Lebanon and Hizballah forcesoccupied the area. DPRK dispatched trainers to southern Lebanon, where they instructed aHizballah cadre in the development of an extensive underground military installation.[60]Moreover, Takashi Arimoto, the Washington correspondent for the Japanese newspaperSankei Shimbun, reported a document of an international organ that stated that in 2004Syrian President Bashar al-Asad met with DPRK officials in Damascus and requestedassistance in helping Hizballah to design and construct underground militaryinstallations.[61]

Tunneling for Iranian Nuclear Sites

DPRK tunneling technology has also been used to hide Irans nuclear sites such as the oneuncovered by Qom in 2009.[62] A January 2006 article in Janes Defence Weekly revealedthat IRGC was undertaking procurement contracts with DPRK to bolster fortifications fornuclear facilities in anticipation of possible preemptive strikes. A group led by Lyu-DoMyong, affiliated with the DPRK government, was involved in the project for tunneling anddesigning underground construction around the Isfahan and Natanz sites.[63]

Chinas Underground Great Wall

Incidentally, DPRK is not the only one with tunneling technology. In early December 2009,Chinas Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) publication, China Defense Daily (Zhongguo

Guofang Bao), published a report about underground tunnels built by its Second ArtilleryCorps (SAC)PLAs strategic missile forcesin the mountainous region of Hebei Province innorthern China.[64] This network of tunnels stretches for more than 3,107 miles and wasdubbed by the Chinese media as Underground Great Wall (Dixia Changcheng). It was builtfor concealing, mobilizing, and deploying Chinas growing arsenal of nuclear weapons, andexperts in various reports say this is to give the strategic forces, 2nd Arty, a credible secondstrike capability. Given the extent of Chinas strategic alliance with Iran, this may involveChinas sophisticated nuclear tunneling technology to protect Irans clandestine nuclear sites,although currently there is no open source information to establish that link.

the TriangLE of THE China, Iran, and DPRK Strategic Alliance

China-DPRK WMD Proliferation to Iran


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China and DPRK have been sanctioned for decades for WMD proliferation (e.g., chemicalprecursor agents, missile and nuclear-related technologies) to Iran. For China, from 1991 to2009, 17 out of 26 (65 percent) cases of U.S. sanctions for WMD proliferation were related toviolations of the Iran Non-Proliferation Act, while others were to unspecified countries thatmay also be related to Iran.[65] Moreover, China has refused to join the 2003 ProliferationSecurity Initiative (PSI) and actually allows Iran and DPRK use of its ports and airspace.[66]

The Times (Asia edition)in 2003 reported that from April to July 2003, China gave over-flight rights to Iranian II-76 cargo planes that flew to DPRK at least six times to pick upwooden crates suspected of containing cruise missiles. At a Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee hearing on September 11, 2003, Assistant Secretary of State James Kellyconfirmed that the State Department formally protested to China on DPRK planes flyingthrough China airspace or making refueling stops in China.[67] In December 2009, aWashington Times article stated that China was complicit in allowing DPRK use of airspacein proliferating the arms cache that was seized by Thai authorities.[68] In January 2010, itwas revealed that China was proliferating nuclear parts via a Taiwan company to assist Iransuranium enrichment program.[69]

Thus, it seems China has its own agenda towards Iran and the Middle East and is unwilling

to take steps to hurt its strategic interests. Iran serves as an important buffer in the east bankof the Persian Gulf against U.S. client states in the west bank, and it is an important MiddleEast regional pole in Chinas goal of multipolarity to counterbalance U.S. global hegemony.

Just as Iran serves as a buffer between China and U.S. interests in the east bank of thePersian Gulf in the Middle East, DPRK serves as a buffer between China and U.S. troops inthe Korean Peninsula in East Asia.

DPRK in Chinas Strategic Calculus

Despite conventional wisdom and Chinese declarations that it is a non-aligned country,

China has a defense treaty with DPRK. Article 2 of the 1961 Sino-North Korean Friendship,Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty is a mutual defense clause.[70]

DPRK as Buffer Zone and Guard Post in Taiwan Contingency

A 2006 article by Shen Dingli, executive director of both the International Studies Instituteand the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, laid out the strategic significanceof DPRK in Chinas policy towards the United States. Chinas main goals are economicdevelopment and national reunification. To the latter end, he argued that DPRK is a keybuffer zone between China and U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, and it is also tied toChinas Taiwan contingency.[71] With a shared border of 1,400 kilometers, DPRK acts as a

guard post for China against U.S. troops in South Korea, thereby allowing China to redeploymilitary assets away from northeast Asia towards Taiwan.

He further argues that a nuclear DPRK is an asset to Chinas security because a nuclearDPRK could pin down U.S. forces in a Taiwan contingency and deter U.S. consideration ofpossible military intervention.[72] In this case, a nuclear DPRK makes war on the peninsulaless likely, since the United States would be wary of risking its troops in South Korea andJapan. He conceded that DPRK used the six-party talks to buy time to develop nuclearweapons. Chances are slim for denuclearization because DPRKs end goal is to possess


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nuclear weapons due to its perceived threat by the United States.[73] Indeed, Chinas actionshave supported this line of thought, as it has persistently watered down UNSC sanctionsagainst DPRK and supported DPRK economically so that sanctions were not very effective.China recently announced it would invest $10 billion in DPRK, which is about 70 percent ofDPRKs total GDP of some $15 billion.[74] Given Chinas de facto support of a nuclear DPRKand de jure economic support to prop up the regime, it seems unlikely DPRK would take the

path of denuclearization similar to the one taken by Libya. Indeed, DPRK does not see itselfas a Libya in eventual denuclearization but rather conveyed to U.S. officials that it aspired tobe the Israel of East Asia.[75]

Conclusion: Implications for Middle East and East Asia Regional Stability

As the international community is mulling over the next step to take in the face of Iranscontinued nuclear brinkmanship, Iran is already taking steps to prepare for an eventualmilitary strike by seeking closer ties with and eventual membership in the Russian-ledcollective security alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). CSTO has amutual defense clause similar to NATOs.

Iran to Join CSTO-SCO Alliance Bloc

In May 2007, the CSTO secretary general, Nicolai Bordyuzha, suggested that Iran could joinCSTO and reiterated this desire again in April 2009. This was followed by a July 2009 Russo-Iran joint military exercise in the Caspian region called Regional Collaboration for a Secureand Clean Caspian.[76] CSTO members include Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan,Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. All members of the Sino-Russian-led ShanghaiCooperation Organization (SCO), excluding China, are also CSTO members (that is, Russia,Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). Iran currently has observer status inthe SCO and is a candidate to join CSTO. In October 2007, CSTO signed a defensecooperation agreement with SCO. If Iran joins CSTO, it will become a member of a collective

security organization that has defense cooperation with China (SCO), which wouldcomplicate any U.S./Israeli military action against Irans nuclear sites (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Iran as Candidate to Join CSTO Alliance

Source: Emil Faro, Image made using File: Russian Federation (OrthographicProjection).SVG, February 9, 2009.

Indeed, Iran appears to be seeking CSTO-SCO protection against NATO-GCC (GulfCooperation Council) cooperation in the event of a conflict in the Middle East. In August2009, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) publisheda study entitled GCC-Iran: Operational Analysis of Air, SAM and TBM Forces on themilitary balance and operational fighting capabilities of GCC states and Iran.[77] NATO isalready stepping up military ties with Gulf states through the 2004 Istanbul CooperationInitiative (ICI) and offering a defense umbrella in the face of Irans nuclear threat. In January2010, the U.S. deployed a missile shield to the Gulf regionPatriot defensive missiles andcruisers equipped with advanced anti-missile systems.[78] As for Irans missile defense,


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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently visited Moscow to delay delivery of theS-300 air defense system in order to buy time for crippling sanctions to work and not forcethe Israeli military hand. However, some experts raise concerns that Russia could still deliverS-300 and other missiles via circuitous routes.

Iran-Russia Double Game in Missile Defense

Hans Ruele, the former head of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the head of planningin the German Ministry of Defense in the 1980s, argued in a November 2009 article thatimmediately after President Obama cancelled missile defense in Eastern Europe due toassessed short-range (less than 2,000 kilometer) missile capability of Iran, retired Russianmajor general Dworkin declared Iran would soon have missiles with a 5,500 kilometer range.Russia has sold Iran some SS-20 2-stage solid fuel missiles (minus nuclear warheads) with a5,500 kilometer range to hold Western Europe in its crosshairs.[79] SS-20 missiles shouldhave been dismantled following the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty,but Russia justified their re-use as aid for Irans space program.[80] Moreover, in September2009, Venezuela signed an arms deal with Russia for delivery of S-300, Buk-M2, Pechoraanti-aircraft missile systems, and others.[81] The S-300 is expected to deliver in 2010-11, sothere is a risk that Venezuela would serve as a transit country for the transfer of the S-300 toIran.

Nuclear Zero and Non-ProliferationWhile Iran and DPRK are pursuing the nuclear path and China is upgradingits 2nd Artys nuclear capability, President Obama is calling for globalnuclear zero and disarmament. As such, U.S. allies have increasing doubtsregarding the credibility of a U.S. and NATO nuclear umbrella and are at anuclear tipping point of proliferation. Without a robust U.S. and NATOnuclear arsenal, it is difficult to convince allies not to pursue their ownnuclear option and to depend on an eroding U.S./NATO nuclear arsenal.

This is even more pressing given Germanys recent announcement towithdraw all U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany and senior officials in theObama administration advocating elimination of nuclear weapons stationedin NATO countries.[82]At the same time, Russia, in August 2009, resumed itsZapad (West) exercises that it used to simulate attack on NATO during theCold War and is strengthening CSTO and defense cooperation with the SCO.The Zapad military exercises in Kaliningrad involved 13,000 Russian andBelarusian troops that featured a notional nuclear attack on Poland.[83]In aworst-case scenario, should Iran join CSTO, as it already has a defense treatywith Russia (the 1921 Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship), a military strike onits nuclear facilities or Iranian missile strikes against Israel/Gulf states maydraw CSTO in on Irans side and NATO in on GCCs side in a Middle East

regional conflict.

Moreover, Irans enabling of DPRKs nuclear program threatens East Asia. In East Asia,Japan is most likely to pursue its nuclear option given the recent rift in U.S.-Japan alliancerelations and the ruling DPJs animosity towards DPRK and China. Many senior-rankingofficials are critical of a U.S. security guarantee and warn of depending on a U.S. nuclearumbrella with a hole over Japan.[84] Should Japan go nuclear, there will be a regionalnuclear arms race because many countries feel threatened by the remilitarization of Japandue to its historical occupation and atrocities during World War II.


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At a time when rogue regimes are seeking nuclear weapons, it is important to reassure U.S.and NATO allies on the robustness of its defense umbrella in preventing a cascade of regionalnuclear proliferation. Iran seems intent on pursuing nuclear weapons and has taken steps toally itself with a collective security organization to deter the U.S./Israeli military option.China and DPRKs enabling of Irans nuclear program coupled with Russias pulling Iran intoCSTO merits serious evaluation. During this critical time, allies are watching U.S. actions,

especially the START negotiations with Russia.

The situation in 2010 seems reminiscent of the 1970s, when President Jimmy Carteraggressively pursued nuclear disarmament in the SALT II treaty with Brezhnev. RonaldReagan, for one, believed in the futility of nuclear disarmament when he became a memberof the Committee on Present Danger (CPD) in 1976, whose subsequent members includedPaul Nitze, Eugene Rostow, William Casey, Richard Allen, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld,George Shultz, Jean Kirtkpatrick, and others.[85] They cautioned dtente and testified thatSALT II would leave the United States open for Soviet conquest and were vindicated whenthe Soviets invaded Afghanistan in the midst of signing the SALT II treatysimilar to Russiainvading Georgia in 2008 in the midst of START negotiations. Indeed, Reagan believed thata freeze campaign opened the United States to nuclear blackmail.[86] He famously

quipped to Gorbachev after signing the 1987 INF Treaty, Trust, but verify. Russiasduplicitous maneuvers of breaking the INF treaty and selling SS-20 to Iran when they shouldhave been dismantled, and China/DPRKs continued nuclear-technology proliferation toIran, are testament to trusting but not verifying. Hopefully, the current START negotiationswill learn from history to exercise caution to preserve a robust protect and defend posturefor the United States and its allies during these times.

To conclude, the best-case scenario now, given the failure of the previous three rounds ofUNSC sanctions to halt advancement of Irans nuclear program, is for China to abstain fromvetoing the proposed crippling sanctions on Irans energy sector. Russia is currentlyequivocating but may be onboard, along with Brazil, Turkey, Lebanon, and others, if China isamenable to the abstention option. The failure of crippling sanctions now would force the

hand of a military strike against Iran, at the risk of drawing in the GCC, NATO, and CSTO toa wider regional conflict. This would be anathema to Chinas long-term goal of regionalstability for its economic development and new energy silk road across Eurasia.

If China can be persuaded to go along with crippling sanctions through abstention in theUNSC, this may have some impact on Irans IRGC leadership. More than 80 percent of Iransexport earnings come from the energy sector, and 45-50 percent of government revenue(now increasingly consisting of IRGC) depends on it. Since China is the top trading partnerand investor in Irans energy sector, if China abides with the UNSC sanction, this may cripplethe IRGC leadership. China acts as the teeth that could make sanctions crippling. It is a keyplayer, just like it is a key player with DRRKsupporting some 70 percent of DPRKs entireGDP so that the UNSC economic sanctions have been largely ineffective.

Should sanctions fail and Iran become nuclear the implications would be disastrous. Not onlyis there a possibility of conflict between Gulf States (GCC) and Israel vis--vis Iran pulling inNATO and CSTO in an escalation of a wider regional conflict, a nuclear-armed Iran wouldprovide a nuclear umbrella for terrorists; it would spur a global nuclear arms race and theend of the non-proliferation regime; Israel could face an existential nuclear attack; and U.S.global power and freedom of action would be greatly limited. Time is running out. Now is thetime for the international communityincluding China as a responsible stakeholderto showa united front to confront this great challenge.


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*Dr. Christina Y. Lin is a researcher with Janes Chemical, Biological, Radiological andNuclear Intelligence Centre (JCBRN) at IHS Janes and former director for China affairs inpolicy planning at the U.S. Department of Defense.

NOTES

[1] John W. Garver, China & Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World(Seattle, WA:University of Washington Press, 2006), pp. 4, 38-39.

[2] Ibid,p. 7.

[3] Tang Shiping, Lixiang anquan huanjing yu xin shiji zhonguo da zhuanlue[IdealSecurity Environment and Chinas Grand Strategy in the New Century], Zhanlue yu Guanli[Strategy and Management],No. 6 (2000), pp. 45-46;Yueh-Chyn Lin, InternationalRelations in the Gulf Region after the Cold War(Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press,2002). Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei, in a 1973 visit to Iran, first laid out Beijings preferentialarrangement in the Persian Gulf that the Gulf should be handled by littoral countries, not byextra-regional powers (the United States), thereby endorsing Irans drive for regionalprimacy. Jon Alterman and John Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, The United States, andthe Middle East(Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2008), p. 37.

[4] This scenario would provide insurance against a remote contingency.Shiping, Lixiag.This Gulf strategy also fits into Chinas overall String of Pearls naval strategy, procuringChinese naval ports from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean and the Strait ofMalacca to secure Chinas energy supply in the event of conflict with the United States overTaiwan. Sudha Ramachandran, Chinas Pearl in Pakistans Waters, Asia Times Online, May4, 2005; Christina Y. Lin, Chinas Persian Gulf Strategy: Israel and a Nuclearizing Iran2009, China Brief,Vol. 9, No. 21 (October 22, 2009); Christina Y. Lin, Militarisation ofChinas Energy Security Policy: Defence Cooperation and WMD Proliferation Along its Stringof Pearls in the Indian Ocean, Denkwurdigkeiten, Journal der Politisch-MilitarischenGesellschaft,No. 45 (July 2008).

[5] The SCO consists of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan asmembers and Iran, Pakistan, India, and Mongolia as observers. Over the years, China,Russia, and Iran have been closely aligned in energy security issues within the SCO. M KBhadrakumar, Russia, China, Iran Redraw Energy Map, Asia Times Online, January 8,2010.

[6]Facts on File, 1987,p. 420.


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[7] Ibid.

[8] Vivienne Walt, How Iran might Beat Future Sanctions: The China Card, Times, July 16,2009.

[9] China Passes EU in Trade with Iran, United Press International,February 9, 2010.

[10] Energy Information Agency, China Country Profile, updated July 2009.

[11] Yitzhak Shichor, Iran Keeps China in a Chokehold, Asia Times Online,September 26,2008.

[12] Pepe Escobar, Iran, China and the New Silk Road, Asia Times Online,July 26, 2009.

[13] Vladimir Socor, Strategic Implications of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, Eurasia

Daily Monitor,Vol. 6, No. 233 (December 18, 2009).

[14] Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of Chinas RisingPower Across the Asian Littoral(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, July 2006).

[15] The phrase string of pearls was first used to describe Chinas emerging maritimestrategy in a report titled Energy Futures in Asia by defense contractor Booz-AllenHamilton, which was commissioned in 2005 by the U.S. Department of Defenses Office ofNet Assessment. Pehrson, String of Pearls.

[16] US is Threatened by Aggressive Chinese Sea Power, Al-Jazeera, September 14, 2005;Pehrson, String of Pearls, p. 3; Jennifer Chou, Chinas String of Pearls, The WeeklyStandard, November 5, 2007.

[17] Coco Island and the northern tip of the Andamans are separated by 18 kilometers of seaonly. This is efficient for monitoring Indian naval and missile launch facilities in theAndaman and Nicobar Islands, tracking movements of the Indian navy and other navies inthe eastern Indian Ocean. In 1992, Great Coco Island station began with the emplacement ofa 45-50-meter antenna tower, radar sites, and other electronic facilities, forming acomprehensive SIGINT (signals intelligence) collection facility.

[18] Chinas Navy Mulls Push into Arabian Sea, UPI,December 30, 2009.

[19] Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, A China Base in Iran?, Asia Times Online,January 29, 2008.

[20] Mina Al-Oraibi, An Emirati Vision for NATOs Gulf Strategy, RUSI Analysis,November 30, 2009.


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[21] Andrew S. Erickson, Pipe DreamChina Seeks Land and Sea Energy Security,JanesIntelligence Review, China Watch, Vol. 21, No. 8 (August 2009), pp. 54-55.

[22] Paul Goble, China Pursuing a Silk Road Strategy from the East, Georgian Daily,January 27, 2010; Turkey, China Set to Revive Silk Road, Hurriyet Daily News, January 8,2010.

[23] Goble, China Pursuing a Silk Road Strategy;Erica Marat, China Seeks to LinkCentral Asia by Railroad, Eurasia Daily Monitor,Vol. 7, No. 30 (February 14, 2010).

[24] Kevin Larkin, China in AfghanistanWill the Dragon Go over the Mountain?, Politicaland Security Risk in China,Vol. 2, No. 6 (November 24, 2009).

[25] China is furious with the United States over its recent arms package sale to Taiwan andmeeting with the Dalai Lama. It persistently calls for multipolarity in the global system andsupports Iran as a Middle East regional hegemon to challenge the United States as well as to

strengthen SCO to counterbalance what it perceives as U.S.-dominated NATO expansion intoits backyard.

[26] A Taiwanese company, Hsinchu-based Heli-Ocean Technology Co. Ltd, was tapped byChina to export 108 pressure transducers, which convert pressure into analog electricalsignals. A dual-use technology, transducers furnish the precise measurements needed in theproduction of weapons-grade uranium. David Albright of the Institute for Science andInternational Security said this equipment was likely for Irans gas centrifuge program.Debby Wu, Taiwan Firm: China Got Iran Part with Nuke Uses, Guardian,January 8, 2010;Chinas Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Iran, Nuclear Threat Initiative.

[27] Christina Y. Lin, The King from the East: DPRK-Syria-Iran Nuclear Nexus andStrategic Implications for Israel and the ROK, Academic Paper Series on Korea, Vol. 3, No.7 (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute, October 2008); Erich Follath and HolgerStark, How Israel Destroyed Syrias Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor, Spiegel Online, November 2,2009.

[28] Barry Rubin, North Koreas Threat to the Middle East and the Middle Easts Threat toAsia, Middle East Review of International Affairs, (1997),http://meria.idc.ac.il/books/brkorea.html.

[29] Kongdan Oh Hassig and Caroline Ziemke, Far East and Middle East: An Investigationof Strategic Linkage, Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Document D 2773, September

2002, p. 23; Rubin, North Koreas Threat to the Middle East and the Middle Easts Threat toAsia, p. 3.

[30] Rubin, North Koreas Threat to the Middle East and the Middle Easts Threat to Asia,p. 2.

[31] Patrick Goodenough, Missile Collaboration Between North Korea and Iran Goes BackYear, CNSNews.com, March 31, 2009.


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[32]Reports: Iran Experts Aiding North Korea Rocket Launch, Sunday Times, March 29,2009.

[33] Stephanie Griffith, Iran Present at North Korea Missile Launch Says US, AgenceFrance Press,July 20, 2006.

[34] Ryan Mauro, Iranian Experts in North Korea for Missile Launch, worldthreats.com,March 2009.

[35] Jennifer Kline, Special Report: Challenges of Iranian Missile Proliferation, WMDInsights, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, No. 9 (October 2006).

[36]NTI,Country Overviews: North Korea, Missiles,http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/index.html

[37] Ibid.

[38] The Shahab 5 Shahab 6 are thought to be in development and have not been tested.Kline, Special Report, p. 2.

[39] Michael Richardson, Missile Deals Muscle Up North Korea, New Zealand Herald,July 21, 2006.

[40] The New World After Iraq: The Continuing Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction,John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,Remarks to The Bruges Group, London, United Kingdom, October 30, 2003.

[41] Gary Samore, US-DPRK Missile Negotiations, The Nonproliferation Review,Vol. 9,No. 2 (Summer 2002).

[42] North Korea May Be Betting Missile Test Data from Iran: US Official, Kyodo NewsService, May 27, 2004.

[43] Barbara Demick, N Korea-Iran Ties Seem to Be Growing Stronger, Los Angeles Times,July 27, 2006.

[44] Ibid; Iran Present at North Korea Missile Launch: US, Korea Herald,July 22, 2006;Deborah Tate, US Official Says Iranians Witnessed North Korean Missile Tests, Voice ofAmerica, July 20, 2006.

[45] An Israeli Lesson for North Korea?, Economist Foreign Report,April 22, 1993, p. 2.See also: DPRK Reportedly Aids Iranian Nuclear Project, Yonhap News Agency, January26, 1993. DPRK military delegations Iran visit reported, Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network,February 24, 1994.


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[46] Glenn Kessler, Bhutto Dealt Nuclear Secrets to N. Korea, Book Says, Washington Post,June 1, 2008.

[47] Douglas Frantz, Iran Closes in on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb; Tehrans ReactorProgram Masks Strides Toward Weapons Capability, a Times Investigation Finds, LosAngeles Times, August 4, 2003; Military Source: DPRK, Iran Planning Joint Developmentof Nuclear Warheads, Sankei Shimbun,August 6, 2003; Iranian Nuke Experts Visited NKorea This Year, Kyodo World Service,June 10, 2003; Frantz, Iran Closes in on Ability toBuild a Nuclear Bomb.

[48] The NIE in 2007 highlighted that Iran appeared to have suspended the third element ofa nuclear programweaponizationin 2003 due to international pressure and scrutiny. TheWashington Institute for Near East Policy, Strengthening the Partnership: How to DeepenUS-Israel Cooperation on the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, June 2008.

[49] Iran Still Developing Nuclear Warheads: Exiled Opposition Group, Agence FrancePress,February 20, 2008. Marc Champion, Iran Arms Claim is LodgedTehran is

Developing Nuclear Warheads, Exile Group Tells U.N., Wall Street Journal Asia,February21, 2008.

[50] Jin Dae-woong, Concerns Grow over Missile Links Between N Korea, Iran, KoreaHerald,January 28, 2007; North Korea Aids Iran in Nuclear Testing, Dow JonesInternational News,January 24, 2007; Israel PM to Charge N Korea Link with Iran, Syria,Agence France Press,February 26, 2008.

[51] Con Coughlin, North Korea Helping Iran with Nuclear Testing, Daily Telegraph,January 25, 2007; Joseph S. Bermudez, North Korea Deploys New Missiles, Janes DefenceWeekly,July 30, 2004.

[52] Coughlin, North Korea Helping Iran with Nuclear Testing.

[53] Robin Hughes, Tehran Takes Steps to Protect Nuclear Facilities, Janes DefenseWeekly,January 25, 2006, pp. 4-5.

[54] Assads Risky Nuclear Game, Spiegel Online,June 23, 2008.

[55] Internal memo from House Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to Republicanmembers, North Koreas Support for Terrorist Groups and State Sponsors of Terrorism,

House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 8, 2008; Larry A. Niksch, North Korea: TerrorismList Removal, Congressional Research Service Report RL30613, July 1, 2009, pp. 18-19;Tariq Khaitous, Is Syria a Candidate for Nuclear Proliferation?, Nuclear Threat InitiativeIssue Brief, March 2008.

[56] DMZ-DPRK Tunnels, Global Security;Malcolm Moore, Inside North Koreas ThirdTunnel of Aggression, Telegraph,May 26, 2009.


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[57] Bertil Lintner, North Koreas Tunnels, Guns and Kimchi, Asia Sentinel,June 11, 2009.

[58] Niksch, North Korea.

[59] Internal memo from House Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to Republican

members.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Takashi Arimoto, International Document Points Concretely to Close CooperationBetween North Korea, Syria; Syria Also Asked for Assistance to Hizballah, Sankei Shimbun,January 7, 2008.

[62] William J. Broad, Iran Shielding Its Nuclear Efforts in Maze of Tunnels, New YorkTimes,January 6, 2010.

[63] Tehran Takes Steps to Protect Nuclear Facilities, Janes Defence Weekly,January 25,2006.

[64] Russell Hsiao, Chinas Underground Great Wall and Nuclear Deterrence, China Brief,Vol. 9, No. 25 (December 16, 2009).

[65] Shirely Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles:Policy Issues, CRS Report for Congress,RL31555, December 23, 2009.

[66] Ibid., p. 23.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Nicholas Kralev, China Fails to Stop Illegal North Korean Arms Shipments,Washington Times, December 17, 2009.

[69] Debby Wu, Taiwan Firm: China Got Iran Part with Nuke Uses, Guardian,January 8,2010.

[70] Li Kaisheng, Should China Treat North Korea as an Ally?, UPI Asia, November 30,2009; Yang Jung, North Korea-China Alliance Display Reveals Kim Weakness, Daily NorthKorea,November 25, 2009; China, North Korea Stress Strength of Alliance, USA Today,November 22, 2009.

[71] Shen Dingli, North Koreas Strategic Significance to China, China Security (Autumn2006), pp. 19-34.


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[72] Ibid, p. 21.

[73] Ibid, pp. 23-24.

[74] Jung Sung-ki, China Plans $10 Billion Investment in North Korea, Korea Times,

February 15, 2010.

[75] International Crisis Group, Shades of Red: Chinas Debate over North Korea, AsiaReport No. 179, November 2, 2009, p. 10.

[76] CSTO to up Security Cooperation with Iran, PressTV,April 17, 2009; Kaveh L.Afrasiabi, Russia and Iran Join Hands, Asia Times Online, July 30, 2009; CollectiveSecurity Treaty Organization, Wikipedia; Emil Faro, Collective Security TreatyOrganisation (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Members, February 9,2009, image made using File: Russian Federation (Orthographic Projections). SVG.

[77] Abdullah Toukan and Anthony H. Cordesman, GCC-Iran: Operational Analysis of Air,SAM and TBM Forces, CSIS, August 20, 2009.

[78] Chris McGreal, U.S. Raises Stakes on Iran by Sending in Ships and Missiles,Guardian,January 31, 2010.

[79] Hans Ruele, Iran and Russia Hot Double Games: SS-20 Missiles Sold as well as S-300and Plutonium Breeder, World Security Network,November 10, 2009.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Nabi Abdullaev, Venezuela Gets $2.2B Loan for Russian Arms, Defense News,September 17, 2009.

[82] Franklin Miller, George Robertson and Kori Schake, Germany Opens Pandoras Box,Centre for European Reform Briefing Note, February 2010.

[83] Bruce Jones, Russia to Launch Largest Military Maneuvers since Cold War, JanesDefence Weekly,August 24, 2009; Thomas Valasek, NATO, Russia, and European Security,CER Working PaperNovember 2009; Miller et al,Germany Opens Pandoras Box.

[84] Christina Y. Lin, The Writing on the Wall: China-Russia-Iran Axis in the ShanghaiCooperation Organisation and Nuclear Tipping Points in Middle East and East Asia,Institute fur Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW) Berlin? ETHZurich,January 26, 2010, p. 11.

[85] Lawrence S. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World NuclearDisarmament Movement(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 137, 142.


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[86] Ibid.,p. 166. Reagan was also a believer in the Bible prophecy of Ezekiel 38 and insistedthe day of Armageddon isnt far off Ezekiel says that fire and brimstone will be raineddown upon the enemies of Gods people. That must mean that theyll be destroyed by nuclearweapons, p. 42.

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