Verbatim Mac

FrameworkNOTEA vast majority of these cards were already produced by the camp. They were present in the FLA labs AT: Kritiks file. In order to avoid backfile card proliferation just prior to the camp tournament, I have simply used those cards as most of the 2NC extensions. I figured that organizing them this way would help students utilize them on the negative when debating against Affirmatives that choose not to defend USFG action. This way everything is organized in a manner that makes life easier if debaters wish to read framework on the negative. Thanks to the FLA lab for these cards! 1NC ShellA) Our interpretation is that the Affirmative must take a topical course of action through the United States federal government. Resolved means debate should be a legislative forumArmy Officer School 4(5-12, # 12, Punctuation The Colon and Semicolon, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

The federal government is the government in Washington DC not its individual membersAHD 2[The American Heritage Dictionary. 2002, Pg 647] Of or relating to the central government of a federation as distinct from the governments of its member units.

Should means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental meansEricson 3(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debaters Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---The United States in The United States should adopt a policy of free trade. Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb shouldthe first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

Curtail means to reduce.Merriam Webster NO DATE (Merriam Webster Dictionary, Online Dictionary, Curtail, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/curtail)//ghs-VAto reduce or limit (something)

Its means that the topic is about state centered surveillance. Dictionary.com NO DATE (Online Dictionary, its http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its)//ghs-VAthe possessive form of it1.(used as an attributive adjective)

B) Violation The AFF doesnt defined USFG implementation of a policy action, rather .

C) Vote negative.

First, a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable thats distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of factSteinberg & Freeley 8 *Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posedsuch as "What can be done to improve public education?"then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned withpoems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being comparedfists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Engaging democracy through effective decision-making outweighs it is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problemsChristian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Tradition of Debate in North Carolina in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speechas indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

And independently a voting issue for limits and ground---our entire negative strategy is based on the should question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative--- these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates

Second, discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development---we control uniqueness: students already have preconceived notions about how the world operates---government policy discussion is vital to force engagement with and resolution of competing perspectives to improve social outcomes, however those outcomes may be defined Esberg & Sagan 12 *Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND **Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy, 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome bureaucratic myopia, moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institutions Saban Center and at Harvard Universitys Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research their governments positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

Third, Switching sides is key to effective advocacy allows students to build agency through viewing the other sideDybvig and Iverson 2K (Kristin and Joel, Arizona State U., Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of Debate Research on Personal Advocacy, http://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html)Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy and challenge peoples' assumptions. Debaters must switch sides, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, supporting and researching both sides of an argument actually created stronger advocates. Not only did debaters learn both sides of an argument, so that they could defend their positions against attack, they also learned the nuances of each position. Learning and the intricate nature of various policy proposals helps debaters to strengthen their own stance on issues.

Individual acts of resistance reinforce the surveillance state apparatus legislative change is key. Their K is an advantage to our political strategy. Monahan 10 (Torin, Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Surveillance in the time of Insecurity, 2010, Chapter 9 pg. 128-130)//ghs-VAResistance to surveillance, especially to dominating forms of surveillance, is a vital dimension of power negotiations. As Michel Foucault observes, Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.1 Put differently, resistance is not reactive or in dialectical relationship to power; rather, it is co-constitutive of it. There are clearly many forms that resistance to surveillance can take; they range from civil society organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union challenging government spying programs in courts, on one end of the spectrum, to individuals not complying with marketers requests for personal information like zip codes and e-mail addresses, on the other. People are not simply passive subjects compliantly succumbing to demands for their behaviors, preferences, and beliefs to become more transparent to and controllable by others. Nevertheless, when the field for social action and identity construction is radically constricted, opportunities for effective resistanceat least effective resistance without great personal riskare diminished. One dominant argument of this book, for instance, is that neoliberal policies and practices have transformed public spaces and rights into private ones and have individualized what might be thought of as collective problems. Demands for people to become insecurity subjects fit neatly within this neoliberal framework because these demands push responsibility onto individuals to meet security needs through consumption, regardless of the veracity of security threats or their probability of actualizing. Resistance to surveillance can also function within and therefore unintentionally reinforce these security cultures if it does not also challenge the rules that govern possibilities for resistance. To make this case, this chapter analyzes practices of countersurveillance by activists and media artistsparticularly against video and closed circuit television (CCTV) systems in urban areasand theorizes their political implications. Countersurveillance activism can include disabling or destroying surveillance cameras, mapping paths of least surveillance and disseminating that information over the Internet, employing video cameras to monitor sanctioned surveillance systems and their personnel, or staging public plays to draw attention to the prevalence of surveillance in society. In some cases, marginal groups selectively appropriate technologies that they might otherwise oppose when used by those with institutional power.2 These examples illustrate the underdetermination of technologies and suggest further avenues for political intervention through countersurveillance. However, because surveillance systems evolve through social conflict, countersurveillance practices may implicate opposition groups in the further development of global systems of control. Countersurveillance operates within and in reaction to ongoing global transformations of public spaces and resources. According to social theorists, a crisis in capital accumulation in the 1970s precipitated a shift from mass production to flexible production regimes, catalyzing organizational decentralization, labor outsourcing, computerized automation, just-in-time production, and, increasingly, the privatization of that which has historically been considered public.3 These structural transformations aggravated conditions of social inequality, leading to the development of new mechanisms of social control to regulate bodies in this unstable terrain. Some of the most effective forms of social control are those that naturalize the exclusion of economically or culturally marginalized groups through architecture or infrastructure. Mass incarceration of over 2.3 million individuals in the United States alone is one extreme measure of such postindustrial exclusion.4 Less dramatically, but perhaps more pervasively, fortified enclaves such as gated communities, shopping malls, and business centers have multiplied exponentially over the past decade and seem to be as prevalent in developing as in developed countries.5 Additionally, privatized streets, parks, and security services effectively sacrifice civic accountability and civil rights while increasing affordances for the monitoring of public life.6 Finally, telecommunications and other infrastructures unevenly distribute access to the goods and services necessary for modern life while facilitating data collection on and control of the public.7 Against this backdrop, the embedding of technological surveillance into spaces and infrastructures serves to augment not only existing social control functions but also capital accumulation imperatives, which are readily seen with the sharing of surveillance operations and data between public and private sectors.8 Through a range of interventions into the logic and institutions of global capitalism, countersurveillance tacticians seek to disrupt these trends in the privatization, sanitation, and elimination of public spaces, resources, and rights. While the ideologies and intentions of those engaging in countersurveillance are manifold and disparate, they are unified in the mission of safeguarding or creatingthe necessary spaces for meaningful participation in determining the social, environmental, and economic conditions of life. Because of this orientation, the term countersurveillance will be used here to indicate intentional, tactical uses or disruptions of surveillance technologies to challenge power asymmetries. In this chapter I review several countersurveillance practices and analyze the power relations simultaneously revealed and reproduced by resistance to institutionalized surveillance. The emphasis here is upon the framing of surveillance problems and responses by activists, or on points of symbolic conflict rather than physical confrontation. Thus, it is assumed that while countersurveillance practitioners may have immediate practical goals, such as circumventing or destroying video cameras, that they are foremost engaged in acts of symbolic resistance with the intention of raising public awareness about modern surveillance regimes. I analyze two categories of countersurveillance effortsinterventions into the technical and social faces of public surveillanceand then theorize the efficacy and implications of countersurveillance more generally. The data are drawn primarily from Web sites, video productions, and publications, but I conducted several interviews with activists in the United States to corroborate the critical readings offered here. The main argument is that activists tend to individualize both surveillance problems and methods of resistance, leaving the institutions, policies, and cultural assumptions that support public surveillance relatively insulated from attack. Furthermore, while the oppositional framing presented by activists (that is, countersurveillance versus surveillance) may challenge the status quo and raise public awareness, it also introduces the danger of unintentionally reinforcing the systems of social control that activists seek to undermine.2NC Institutions GoodOrganizational Decision-Making Understanding trade-offs, budget decisions, and opportunity costs are vital to organizational decision making. De Vita, et al, 1 (Carol J., senior research associate, with Cory Fleming, center administrator, and Eric C. Twombly, research associate @ Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, The Urban Institute, Building Capacity in Nonprofit Organizations, The Urban Institute, ed. Carol J. De Vita and Cory Fleming, April, Chapter 2: Building Nonprofit Capacity: A Framework for Addressing the Problem, p. 5-33)The literature on organizational and management theory emphasizes the operational decisions and trade-offs that groups face when building their financial and political capacity. Decisions concerning the use of staff, choice of products and services, fundraising and marketing strategies, and even the selection of a board of directors can significantly impact the success or failure of an organization. Decision making involves foregoing one option in favor of another. In short, organizational management decisions produce trade-offs that may be either beneficial or detrimental to the short-run or long-term viability of the organization. All types of organizations face pressures from other groups when attempting to meet their goals. Institutions such as government and for-profit firms may either cooperate or conflict with one another in their efforts to promote community decision making each with a specific view on what constitutes economic and social balance. Nonprofits also play a key role in affecting local decision making, particularly by representing less popular and competing views in the political process. However, to be effective players, nonprofit organizations must build and sustain financial and political capacity.That skill set is vital to actualizing social change in our communities means our framework solves their K better.Algoso, 11 (Dave, Director of Programs at Reboot, MPA, International Development Blogger, Why I got an MPA: Because organizations matter, 5/31, http://algoso.org/2011/05/31/why-i-got-an-mpa-because-organizations-matter/)Because organizations matter. Forget the stories of heroic individuals written in your middle school civics textbook. Nothing of great importance is ever accomplished by a single person. Thomas Edison had lab assistants, George Washingtons army had thousands of troops, and Mother Teresas Missionaries of Charity had over a million staff and volunteers when she passed away. Even Jesus had a 12-man posse. In different ways and in vastly different contexts, these were all organizations. Pick your favorite historical figure or contemporary hero, and I can almost guarantee that their greatest successes occurred as part of an organization. Even the most charismatic, visionary and inspiring leaders have to be able to manage people, or find someone who can do it for them. International development work is no different. Regardless of your issue of interest whether private sector investment, rural development, basic health care, government capacity, girls education, or democracy promotion your work will almost always involve operating within an organization. How well or poorly that organization functions will have dramatic implications for the results of your work. A well-run organization makes better decisions about staffing and operations; learns more from its mistakes; generates resources and commitment from external stakeholders; and structures itself to better promote its goals. None of this is easy or straightforward. We screw it up fairly often. Complaints about NGO management and government bureaucracy are not new. We all recognize the need for improvement. In my mind, the greatest challenges and constraints facing international development are managerial and organizational, rather than technical. Put another way: the greatest opportunities and leverage points lie in how we run our organizations. Yet our discourse about the international development industry focuses largely on how much money donors should commit to development and what technical solutions (e.g. deworming, elections, roads, whatever) deserve the funds. We give short shrift to the questions around how organizations can actually turn those funds into the technical solutions. The closest we come is to discuss the incentives facing organizations due to donor or political requirements. I think we can go deeper in addressing the management and organizational issues mentioned above. This thinking led me to an MPA degree because it straddles that space between organizations and issues. A degree in economics or international affairs could teach you all about the problems in the world, and you may even learn how to address them. But if you dont learn how to operate in an organization, you may not be able to channel the resources needed to implement solutions. On the flip side, a typical degree in management offers relevant skills, but without the content knowledge necessary to understand the context and the issues. I think the MPA, if you choose the right program for you and use your time well, can do both.Solely exposing injustices fails institutional participation is vital for social transformation.Komesar 94 - professor of law at the University of Wisconsin(Neil, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, p. 41-42)Even the constitutions of totalitarian states have contained high-sounding announcements of rights. The welfare of the populace depends on the presence of institutions capable of translating high-sounding principles into substance. Issues of institutional representation and participation seem especially important for the least advantaged, who almost by definition have had difficulties with representation and participation in existing institutional processes. If representation and participation are important for resolving the simpler version of the difference principle, they would seem even more important in confronting the more complicated standard that Michelman derives from Rawls. They would seem more important yet when society faces the immense task of fulfilling a measure of justice that seeks to integrate this difference principle with the concepts of equal opportunity and liberty. Determining the character of the legislature or agency given the task of this integration seems central here. The real content of Rawlsian justice depends on such a determination. Any theory of justice capable of even minimally capturing our basic sensibilities has many loosely defined components. Because such loosely defined elements and complicated standards are inherent in goal choice and articulation, the character of institutions that will define and apply these goals becomes an essential perhaps the essential component in the realization of the just society. The more complex and vaguely defined the conception of the good, the more central becomes the issue of who decides the issue of instiutional choice. The discussion of Boomer showed that these questions of institutional choice dominate issues of resource allocation efficiencya definition of the social good more confined and better defined than broader conceptions of the good such as Rawlss theory of justice. The lessons about the importance and complexity of institutional choice derived from Boomer are even more appropriate with more complex definitions of the good.Political Action Good Stops ExtremismChoosing to avoid institutions doesnt wish them away it only cedes them to the worst type of extremists.Flinders, 12 (Matthew, Professor of Parliamentary Government & Governance @ University of Sheffield, Defending Politics: Why Democracy Matters in the Twenty-First Century, p. 17-19)In order to answer these questions and arrive at a more balanced and optimistic account of modern politics, we undoubtedly need to focus on the attitudes and behavior of politicians but we also need to take a rather harsh and honest look at ourselves. Democratic politics is not a spectator sport. Whether we like it our not, we are all political actors and within a democracy this brings with it rights and responsibilities; carping from the sidelines and blaming politicians for failing to deliver painless solutions to painful questions is simply too easy. We also need to cast the light of public scrutiny away from the public and politicians and towards those hitherto large invisible political actors who play a role in shaping the way we interpret and understand the world around us. This brings us back to Cricks original Defence and particularly his willingness to defend politics from a range of foes, because the publics anxieties and frustrations with politics that Crick was amongst the first to identify and challenge have increased significantly despite his valiant defense; healthy skepticism has mutated into a corrosive cynicism and as a result the gap between the governors and the governed has widened. I would suggest, however, that looking back to Cricks work in order to understand the present and possibly influence the future risks overlooking the manner in which the nature of political rule has altered. By this I mean that the basic challenges of governing, the role and capacity of politicians, and the position of the public vis--vis politics has changed. In order to examine the changing nature of political rule and close the fifty-year gap between Cricks original Defence and this attempt to revisit and update his arguments, I want to employ the metaphor of a storm. Politics is hard business. It has never been a profession for the faint-hearted because at times it demands a form of statecraft that some might call aggressive diplomacy but others call raw skullduggery. However in todays politics the pressures are so intense, the criticism so brutal, the targeting so arbitrary, the challenges so great, the control levers so weak, that it is like operating in the middle of a mighty storm that allows little room for reflection and views politics as little more than a contagion to be demonized at every turn. If we really want to understand what drives this storm and why politicians frequently adopt self-protection strategies that infuriate the public then we need to focus on the changing dynamics of democratic politics, in terms of its demands, challenges, and opportunities, in the twenty-first century. At the heart of this book is the belief that the public do not hate politics but that it is closer to the truth to suggest that they expect too much from it and do not understand it. We should not therefore jump too high when scholars write of the end of politics or the emergence of post-democracy but we should be very aware of the manner in which the bad faith model of politics risks destroying a beautiful and civilizing society. The widespread perception that politics is failing matters because it plays into the hands of extremists who proffer simple solutions to complex problems. Im always amazed when the World Values Survey reveals that most people think of politics as not at all important in their lives. The fruits of democratic politics are all around us in the schools that educate our children, the clerks that administrate various benefits, the hospitals that tend the sick, the teams that build and maintain highways, the gardeners who tend the parks, the officers that imprison the dangerous, etc. in a manner that illustrates the collective essence of democratic politics and underpins the notion of everyday politics as a useful shorthand tool for revealing the positive day-to-day impact of politics on peoples lives. And yet the nature of politics and the challenges of governing are almost unrecognizable when compared to the situation fifty years ago. Governing has become far more difficult, the demands on politicians are far greater, and the storm is raging with increasing intensity. The argument of this section, and indeed this book, is to try to calm the storm by explaining that if democratic politics is deemed to be broken or failing, the reasons for this are systemic in nature. The great danger of the rise of anti-political sentiment is that it may generate a shift from collective action and externalized rationing (discussed above) towards a more individualized structure that is simply ill-equipped to deal with the major social, economic, and environmental challenges that will shape the twenty-first century less equipped in the sense that we will have lost those levers of social trust and social engagement, direction, and mutual support that politics delivers. Democratic politics is the politics of life chances, of opportunity, and constant renewal. Life politics, by contrast, revolves individualized responses to social problems that can only ever fail. The bad faith model of politics is therefore not only wrong but it also belittles our collective achievements and potential. It glamorizes those who heckle from the sidelines and encourages us to despise the very people we vote for. With this in mind let me outline the challenges that now face those who are foolish enough to enter the political arena by identifying eight ways in which the nature of political rule has altered during the past fifty years. Apolitical/Criticism FailsThe Affs rejection of political engagement disincentivizes concrete resistance and empowers the socially privileged. It turns their entire advocacy. You can only win if you play the game. Flinders, 12 (Matthew, Professor of Parliamentary Government & Governance @ University of Sheffield, Defending Politics: Why Democracy Matters in the Twenty-First Century, p. 188-189)Away from the bear pit of the legislature or television studio, political life is focused on the maintenance of a system in which ideas, conflicts, and interests are openly articulated and peacefully resolved. It is rarely glamorous or easy, it is often dull and messy, and it is generally not a profession full of liars, cheats, and scoundrels (every profession has its bad apples and politics is no different). It is, however, an increasingly hard and brutal business. It is not for the faint-hearted and although this has always been the case there has been a step-change in recent years in relation to the intensity of the pressures, the brutality of the criticisms, the personalized nature of the attacks, and the arbitrary targeting by the media. The storm that to some extent inevitably encircles democratic politics has for a range of reasons become more intense and toxic. My concern is that we are hollowing out the incentives that exist to attract the best people from all walks of life to get involved and stand for office. A process of demonization has occurred that can only end in a situation where normal people feel inclined to walk away, leaving only the manically ambitious, socially privileged, or simply weird in their stead. In a sense we risk creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that politicians are all the same exactly because of the climate we have created. This narrowing of the talent pool from which politicians are increasingly drawn is directly attributable to the sheer force of the storm that is constantly breaking upon the shores of politics. Politicians must operate with an almost perpetual swirl of scandal and intrigue breaking around their heads. Many good people currently brave the storm in the hope of making a positive difference to their community, city, or country but someone with a life, a family, interests beyond politics, the ability to do other things, can feel deeply inclined to stick to them and leave the political storm to itself. We need to calm the storm. Attack politics benefits only the sellers of expensive advertising space and certainly not the public. The real question with which this book leaves us is: how does politics need to evolve and mature for the modern world? This is a subject of profound importance to all countries no matter at what stage they are in terms of democratic progress. The problems we face in the twenty-first century cannot be solved by thinking the way we did when we created many of these same problems in the twentieth century. As a result we need to rethink the way we make decisions and relate to each other and the way in which we conduct our politics. The sooner we have this debate and have it in a sensible and educated and reasonably generous spirit, the better. It is the issue of our times. The twenty-first century is going to change dramatically in its geopolitics with the rise of major new power centres in the world, not all of which will be democracies. If we want to protect our democratic freedoms and play a role in which we shape the future, rather than being tossed about in a storm that will take us who knows where, we need to be able to show that we are able to redefine what politics means to us in a meaningful way. Ultimately, what matters is the moral ambience, the background on which public life is conducted and carried forward, but the bad faith model of politics provides a very poor canvas for us to draw upon. As such, there is an urgent need to decide how democracy is going to change as a result of all the other changes that are going on around us. With this debate in mind I want to acknowledge my great debt to Bernard Crick and and this book by going back not fifty years to his Defence but almost exactly a hundred years to a speech delivered with both anger and passion by Teddy Roosevelt in April 1910. The Man in the Arena remains the most authoritative rebuke ever given to those who carp from the sidelines about the failure of politics. It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcomings; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause. It is in this spirit that I urge readers to reject the bland fatalism that has for too long blinded us to the merits of democratic politics and in future dare to sing out in its defence.

State DebateState Inevitable and Key

State is inevitable and necessary part to get rid of current mechanisms that exist and cause violenceWelsh et al 10 (John F. Welsh, Independent Scholar (Louisville, KY, USA), E. Wayne Ross University of British Columbia Kevin D. Vinson University of the West Indies, To Discipline and Enforce: Surveillance and Spectacle in State Reform of Higher Education, Vol.3, No. 2 (February 2010) Pp. 25-39)//ghs-VAAt the base of the society of the spectacle is the division of labour produced by the specialization of political power. The specialized role played by the spectacle is that of spokesperson for all other activities and the source of the only discourse which society allows itself to hear (Debord 1994:28). Politically, the spectacle is an endless discourse upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise. The spectacle is the self-portrait of power in the age of powers totalitarian rule over the conditions of existence (29). The spectacles division of society into those who wield power and those who passively observe or contemplate the spectacle is inseparable from the modern State, which, as the product of the social division of labor and the organ of class rule, is the general form of all social division (30). For Debord, the spectacle maintains its own regime of control and discipline, differentiated from surveillance and the Panopticon. The spectacle exists for its own reproduction and, through the economic and political realms, subordinates all human life to its needs. It controls by isolating and fragmenting, distorting communication, alienating human action, and restructuring communication to ensure oneway, instantaneous messaging. It operates to mitigate community and dialogue and, thus, to control image, conflict, and change. Those who control images have the ability to mystify being and hierarchical power relations within the spectacle. Both Foucault and Debord articulated libertarian and antistatist visions of power, authority, and control in contemporary society. Both are centrally concerned with the role of the state and the mechanisms it uses to ensure direct and ideological social control in a society characterized by a loss of community and the structures of civil society that mediate relationships among people. Foucaults studies envisioned a Panopticon of surveillance. Debords studies envisioned society as a collection of spectacles where appearance is more important than being. What is unique today is the merging of surveillance and spectacle where it is technologically possible and culturally desirable to see and be seen simultaneously and continuously. The potential of a totally administered society becomes more real as culture and technology become media through which everyone can watch everyone across all time and space. At the extreme, society becomes nothing more than a totality of isolated individuals incessantly under surveillance whose relationships are mediated by images. Postsecondary reform provides one case in which the merger of surveillance and spectacle can be understood, and which can itself be understood as surveillance and spectacle. One example of the operation of surveillance is the hierarchical observation of the attitudes, behaviours, and performances of institutions, programs, faculty/staff, and students within higher education. An example of spectacle occurs in the presentation and reporting of institutional and system performance to higher educations many constituencies. Both surveillance and spectacle elevate image above authenticity and operate as vehicles of social control, political domination, and cultural conformity.

Individual Reflection Bad

Institutional change is key abstract post-modernism ignores the reality of everyday peopleMonahan 10 (Torin, Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Surveillance in the time of Insecurity, 2010, Chapter 9)//ghs-VAThis countersurveillance intervention is explicitly conceived of as an art project that appropriates surveillance technologies to challenge their dominant meanings and uses. Mann mobilizes a tactic he calls reflectionism, or reflecting experiences of being surveilled back on the surveillers, with the goal of destabilizing store employees to make them realize that they are merely totalitarianist officials involved in acts of blind obedience and conformity. 21 Mann writes: It is my hope that the department store attendant/ representative sees himself/herself in the bureaucratic mirror that I have created . . . [and that this helps them] to realize or admit for a brief instant that they are puppets and to confront the reality of what their blind obedience leads to.22 Beyond this somewhat dubious educational goal, the Shooting Back project further aspires to explode the rhetoric behind systematic public surveillance in places of commerce. For example, the project raises the question: if surveillance is intended for public safety, then would not more cameras increase the potential for such safety? The answer is an obvious no, because the primary intended function of cameras in stores is theft prevention, and they are as often trained on employees as on customers.23 Shooting Back is a provocative project because it calls attention to the embodied experiences of watching and being watched, of recording and being recorded. Usual uses of video surveillance, in contradistinction, tend to erase all sense of embodied action and interaction through their ambiguity (you do not know who is watching or when), through their integration into infrastructure (they become the taken-for-granted backdrop to social life), and through their mediation of experience (camera operators may feel a disconnect from those they are watching, and vice versa). Shooting Back disrupts the illusion of detached, objective, impersonal, disembodied monitoringa camera in ones face personalizes the experience of being recorded in a very direct and uncomfortable way. One can speculate that the project is especially destabilizing and annoying for employees, because for them store surveillance systems and monitoring practices are institutional projections that they are relatively powerless to alter. Manns rather unforgiving denouncement of individuals working in stores, however, reveals certain assumptions about the problems of modern surveillance. First, by criticizing employees as being puppets who blindly accept their companies explanations for surveillance and comply with company policies, Mann implies that all individuals are rational actors with equal social and economic footing. Thus, if low-income employees elect not to fight the system as he does, then they must be either ignorant or weakwilled, or both. Second, by calling store clerks and security guards representatives of totalitarian surveillance regimes, Mann conflates individuals with the institutions they are a part of, effectively sidestepping the important but more difficult problem of changing institutional relations, structures, or logics. Both these assumptions lead to the conclusion that one can contend with the problem of rampant surveillance by intervening on the level of the individual and by educating people about their complicity with the systems. Unfortunately, the fact that people have very real dependencies upon their jobs or that vast power differentials separate workers from the systems they work within (and perhaps from activists and academics as well) become unimportant issues once the critique of surveillance is abstracted and individualized in this way. Surveillance Camera Players The Surveillance Camera Players (SCP) is a New Yorkbased ad hoc acting troupe that stages performances in front of surveillance cameras in public places.24 Founded in 1996 with a performance of Alfred Jarrys Ubu Roi in front of a subway station, it has since performed numerous play adaptations of famous (and not-so-famous) works of cautionary fiction or troubling nonfiction, ranging from George Orwells 1984 to Wilhelm Reichs The Mass Psychology of Fascism.25 Because most surveillance cameras are not soundequipped, the troupe members narrate their performances with large white placard signs, which they hold up for remotely located camera operators to read. A performance of 1984, for instance, uses placards describing scene locations (for example, ROOM 101) or key lines from the book (for example, WE ARE THE DEAD).26 When possible, fellow troupe members document the plays with video cameras and distribute information brochures to curious spectators. The players are routinely confronted by security guards or New York City police and asked to disperse, often before the conclusion of their performances. Up close, it appears as if SCP is directing its messages at camera operators, police, or security guards. The troupes determination to notice and respond to video surveillance, rather than let it fade uninterrogated into the urban landscape, places it in confrontation with institutional representatives. By speaking to cameras (and their representatives), the actors become perceived as threats to the political and economic systems that support and indeed demand public surveillance, so institutional agents move in to contend with the perceived threat. As with Steve Manns concentration on individuals, SCP performances force interactions with others, and, because of this, they draw attention to the always present embodiment of surveillance technologies and the social relations they engender. If one takes a step back, however, the Surveillance Camera Players are really performing for the public: they enroll the unwitting police and security personnel into their play so that the public can witness the spectacle and perhaps the absurdity of modern surveillant relations. The troupe acknowledges this staging explicitly: The SCP no longer consider their primary audience to be the police officers and security guards who monitor the surveillance cameras installed in public places. Today, the SCP concentrate on the people who happen to walk by and see one of their performances.27 In a mode true to its situationist theoretical orientation, SCP affirms that the revolutionary potential of art thoroughly infuses everyday life because everyday life is a complex artistic performance. In this vein, SCP seeks to repoliticize the everyday by inviting the public to participate in its performances, by inviting all of us to recognize that we are already enmeshed in political performances and that we are required to actand act well. The primary adversary for SCP is the state. SCP is concerned about the erosion of public space and personal privacy brought about by the states support of police surveillance and its permissive non-regulation of private surveillance. Its members write: The SCP is firmly convinced that the use of video surveillance in public places for the purposes of law enforcement is unconstitutional, and that each image captured by police surveillance cameras is an unreasonable search. We also believe that it is irresponsible of the government to allow unlicensed private companies to install as many surveillance cameras as they please, and to install them wherever they please.28 The implication is that the state is not living up to its responsibility to safeguard civil liberties through improved regulation of public surveillance. Thus, SCP performances confront individual agents of public and private sector security, but the troupes primary audience is the general public, whom it hopes to cast as transformative actors who can collectively agitate for social change, especially on the level of public policy. Both Steve Manns Shooting Back project and the Surveillance Camera Players performances intervene on an overtly social level by challenging institutional agents of surveillance. Mann draws upon relatively sophisticated technical apparatuses to place store representatives in uncomfortable positions. By doing so, he aims to reflect back to them the hypocritical logics and empty rhetoric that they impose upon others and to raise their awareness about their complicity with the surveillance society. SCP, on the other hand, employs decidedly low-tech countersurveillance props such as signs and costumes to address police and security guards with the aim of creating a public spectacleand to raise public awareness about the everyday surveillance spectacle of which we are all already a part. These two interventions share in common their focus on individual representatives of institutionalized surveillance. By engaging with store employees or speaking to those behind the cameras, Mann and SCP seek to reveal and challenge the larger structures and rationalities that those individuals represent. A key difference is that SCP overtly enrolls members of the public in activist performances, whereas Manns project invites public involvement only through the technical mediation of Web sites. Because of this difference, SCP seems more successful at moving beyond its initial site of intervention (the individual) to critique institutions for their dominance over the public, which is a relationship betrayed by the ironic juxtaposition of police removing SCP performers from public streets while private companies remain free to monitor the public at will. While each of the four countersurveillance interventions discussed in this chapter so far seeks to raise public awareness and to mobilize for social change, none is completely successful at moving its critique from the individual to the institutional plane. SCP comes closest to doing this, but so far its plays remain too isolated and discrete to effect long-term change. This deficiency may be in part because activists construct surveillance problems in individualized and abstracted terms in order to make them somewhat tractable and receptive to intervention. The challenge lies in ratcheting up the unit of analysis to the institutional level so that lasting change can be achieved. The desired outcomes might take the form of better regulation and oversight of surveillance and/or meaningful democratic participation in the process of setting surveillance policies, for instance. In the long run, as I will argue in the next section, the oppositional framing of surveillance versus countersurveillance may be counterproductive for meeting these goals.

AT: Rejection Solves

Individual approaches reify neoliberalism and cant solveMonahan 10 (Torin, Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Surveillance in the time of Insecurity, 2010, Chapter 9)//ghs-VACountersurveillance and Global Systems of Control When viewed from a distance, surveillance and countersurveillance appear to be engaged in a complicated dance, with the larger, cumbersome partner pushing and pulling while the smaller, defter dancer negotiates her- or himselfand othersout of harms way. The oafish leader is, of course, the state and corporate apparatus surveilling the public, and the partner is the collective of activist adversaries circumventing or destabilizing surveillance systems. Drawing upon Michel Foucaults insights about the disciplinary potential of modern bureaucratic regimes, one could read surveillance societies as bringing about disciplinary or panoptic relationships.29 But Foucault was also insistent upon the productive capacity of power to generate and sustain social relations apart from any property of control that might be possessed by individuals. As Gilles Deleuze expresses it: Power has no essence; it is simply operational. It is not an attribute but a relation: the power-relation is the set of possible relations between forces, which passes through the dominated forces no less than through the dominating.30 Therefore, the metaphor of the panopticon is not a static or transcendent statement of disciplinary power but is instead a contingent and situated articulation of modernity in a fluid field of production regimes.31 In specific response to Foucaults work, Michel de Certeaus book The Practice of Everyday Life provides a point of departure for thinking about the agency of individuals and groups within disciplinary power structures.32 For de Certeau, the practices of the dominant dancer clearly would be strategic ones of building control structures to regulate the activities of those in the field of power, whereas the practices of the defter dancer would be much more tactical, poaching off the existing structures to create new meanings and possibilities. The two dancers may be in opposition, but that does not change the fact that they are engaged in a reciprocal relationship and collective activityalthough without comparable degrees of influence or control. It is this tense connection that is worth probing, even if there is never an embrace or a union, because after all the exchanges of strategic structuring and tactical appropriation, the dance has moved somewhere across the floor and created a pattern, or a logic, or a world that was not there before.33 Examples of this problematic, if not dialectical, relationship between surveillance and countersurveillance practitioners abound. The capture on videotape of the beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1991 did not necessarily catalyze correctives to actions of police brutality, nor did it motivate greater police engagement with urban communities. Instead, police have seemingly used this event to further distance themselves from and maintain antagonistic relationships with communities,34 while learning from the blowup that they must exert greater control over the conditions where brutality occurs. This enhanced and learned control can be seen in the torture case of Haitian immigrant Abner Louima by the New York City police in 1997. Louima was beaten in a vehicle on the way to the 70th Precinct stationhouse and was then sodomized with the stick from a toilet plunger in the police restrooms. 35 Regardless of the fact that the story did finally emerge, the police officers obviously exercised extreme caution in regulating the places of abuse (a police vehicle and a police restroom), and one can speculate that this level of control was a response to their fear of being surveilled and thus held accountable for their actions. Another example of the dance of surveillance and countersurveillance can be witnessed in the confrontations occurring at antiglobalization protests throughout the world. Activists have been quite savvy in videotaping and photographing police and security forces as a technique not only for deterring abuse but also for documenting and disseminating any instances of excessive force. According to accounts by protesters of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the police, in turn, now zero in on individuals with video recorders and arrest them or confiscate their equipment as a first line of defense in what has become a war over the control of media representations.36 Similarly, vibrant Independent Media Centers (IMCs) are now routinely set up at protest locations, allowing activists to produce and edit video, audio, photographic, and textual news stories and then disseminate them over the Internet, which serves as an outlet for alternative interpretations of the issues under protest.37 As was witnessed in the beating of independent media personnel and destruction of an Indymedia center by police during the 2001 G8 protests in Genoa, Italy,38 those with institutional interests and power are learning to infiltrate subversive countersurveillance collectives and vitiate their potential for destabilizing the dominant system. A final telling example of the learning potential of institutions was the subsequent 2002 G8 meeting held in Kananaskis, which is a remote and difficult-to-access mountain resort in Alberta, Canada. Rather than contend with widespread public protests and a potential repeat of the police violence in Genoa (marked by the close-range shooting and death of a protester), the organizers of the mountain meeting exerted the most extreme control over the limited avenues available for public participation: both reporters and members of the public were excluded, and a no-fly-zone was enforced around the resort. It could be that grassroots publicizing of protests (through Indymedia, for example) is ultimately more effective than individualized countersurveillance because such protests are collective activities geared toward institutional change. While the removal of the 2002 G8 meetings to a publicly inaccessible location was a response to previous experiences with protesters and their publicity machines, this choice of location served a symbolic function of revealing the exclusionary elitism of these organizations, thereby calling into question their legitimacy. So, whereas mainstream news outlets seldom lend any sympathetic ink or air time to antiglobalization movements, many of them did comment on the overt mechanisms of public exclusion displayed by the 2002 G8 meeting.39 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri would describe these ongoing exchanges between dominant and subordinate groups as a mutual and perhaps unwitting advancement of Empirethe larger system of global capitalism and its colonization of lifeworlds.40 They note, for instance, how humanitarian efforts by Western countries first establish discursive universal orderssuch as human rightsas justification for intervention, and how these universals are then capitalized upon by military and economic institutions as rationales for imperialistic invasions. Similarly, activist struggles appear to teach the system of global capitalism, or those manning its operations, how to increase strategic efficiency by controlling spaces available for political opposition. From this perspective, the flexible ideologies of the 1960s counterculture movements may have disturbed the capitalist system, but in doing so they also described a new territory (the self) and a new mode of operation for the growth of capitalism: Capital did not need to invent a new paradigm (even if it were capable of doing so) because the truly creative moment had already taken place. Capitals problem was rather to dominate a new composition that had already been produced autonomously and defined within a new relationship to nature and labor, a relationship of autonomous production.41 The postindustrial colonizations of public spaces and resources today are outgrowths of an earlier colonization of flexibility as a viable and successful challenge to the rigidities of technocratic bureaucracies. I would build upon these observations to say that the conflicts between surveillance and countersurveillance practices today represent a larger struggle over the control of spaces and bodies. It is doubtful that most police or security forces are manipulating spaces and bodies with surveillance and other strategies because they intentionally wish to neutralize democratic opportunities; in fact, they probably believe that their actions of social control are preserving democracy by protecting the public and safeguarding the status quo. Be that as it may, such activities advance neoliberal agendas by eliminating spaces for political action and debate, spaces where effective alternatives to economic globalization could emerge and gain legitimacy if they were not disciplined by police and corporate actions. Therefore, it should not be seen as a coincidence that the demise of public spaces is occurring at the same time that spatial and temporal boundaries are being erased to facilitate the expansion of global capital. The two go hand in hand. Whereas one can readily critique Hardt and Negri for their attribution of agency to capitalism or to the amorphous force of Empire, their systemic viewpoint is worth preserving in what has become a contemporary landscape of social fragmentation, polarization, and privatization. Dominant and subordinate groups serve as asymmetrical refractions of each other in emerging global regimes. Surveillance and countersurveillance are two sets of overlapping practices selectively mobilized by many parties in this conflict, but the overall effect is unknown. Perhaps non-governmental organizations are the best place to look for effective countersurveillance movements on the institutional level. There are a host of remarkable groups tackling surveillance abuses in societies and lobbying for accountability and policy reform. Some of the best-known organizations are the American Civil Liberties Union, Privacy International, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Statewatch, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Other organizations represent niche issues of concern to specific audiences, such as Katherine Albrechts fundamentalist Christian organization Caspian, which opposes RFID technologies on the grounds that they are the mark of the beast (see chapter 5). According to surveillance studies scholar Colin Bennett,42 who has done extensive research on civil society groups, their narrow focus on particular issues, especially on privacy, hinders coalition building for widespread policy changes or lasting social movements. In fact, focusing on privacy alone may hamstring such organizations at the outset because privacy is a highly individualized rather than collective concept, and it cannot meaningfully account for issues of power or domination.43 This does not mean that such groups or similar ones do not attempt to challenge surveillance from a collective standpoint, but in an individualistic political, legal, and cultural climate, such an approach meets with serious difficulties in generating support, especially financial support, for their efforts.

AT: IdentityStructural Reform Key

Reform has to be methodologically based around structural reform -- not a purely identity based responseWills 12 (David Barnard, Research Fellow in the Department of Informatics and Sensors at Cranfield University, Surveillance and Identity: Discourse, Subjectivity, and the State, 2012, pg. 24-28)//ghs-VAResistance to Surveillance There is a rich emerging literature on resistance to surveillance, which Lyon positions as an important corrective to the dystopian trends in surveillance research (2007:160). Much of this research necessarily involves paying attention to subjects of surveillance, their experience and activities. Lyon identifies a number of caveats when considering resistance to surveillance: firstly that surveillance is ambiguous, it is not a purely negative phenomenon, secondly that surveillance is complex, with different institutions or perspectives playing a large part in the specific politics of surveillance. Thirdly, that surveillance technology is not infallible (Lyon 2007:162). In analyzing surveillance, we should be wary of taking the claims of those designing or promoting surveillance technologies and practices as social fact, although intentions of technologists are important. Marx suggests that the existence of a potential for surveillance does not mean that this surveillance occurs, and that much of the reason for this is resistance of various types (Marx 2003:294). These three factors affect the way that surveillance is complied with, negotiated, and resisted. As the converse of resistance, surveillance is frequently complied with for reasons of: the widespread presence of surveillance practices, that many practices are taken for granted, that we are unaware of many surveillance practices, and that many systems are accepted as legitimate and necessary (Lyon 2007:164). Resistance can range from ad hoc and individual, (avoiding CCTV cameras by walking a different route) to organized and collective (joining a group to campaign against the introduction of identity cards), instrumental or non-instrumental, direct or strategic. Marx presents a typology of eleven forms of resistance to surveillance These include discovery, avoidance, piggy-backing, switching, distorting, blocking, masking (identification), breaking, refusal, cooperative and counter-surveillance moves (Marx 2003). These moves can be contrasted with explicitly political strategies to remove surveillance systems and practices through democratic political process or direct action. Work in political theory on resistance to surveillance often tends to take the form of analyses of privacy and practices of the regulation of personal data, emphasizing the individual, owned nature of privacy rather than collective or social resistance. Sociology has also contributed research into the experiences of the subject under surveillance. Insights have been drawn from the work of Goffman on the presentation of self (Goffman 1990). including the social work done by individuals to present an appropriate public face to other members of their social group. Additionally there are accounts drawing upon phenomenological and psychological approaches focusing on differing degrees of scopophobia and scopophillia (the fear and love of being watched) (Jay 1994). Many analyses of resistance to surveillance emerge from this level of analysis, focusing on the experience of the individual under surveillance (Ball & Wilson 2000; Koskela 2006; Matheson 2009). as do many of the artistic contributions to a cultural understanding of surveillance practices (Levin et al. 2002; MeGrath 2004). Lyon argues an important part of understanding resistance to surveillance is the subjectivities of those resisting surveillance, especially the alternate identities which can be mobilized against imposed and attributed surveillant representations (Lyon 2007:67). There is a politics of resistance associated with (he subject's own understanding of their identity or identities and interaction with the data double. Another important question involves the connection between individual and collective responses - understanding the ways in which individual resistance acts become taken up in collective and organized ways (Marx 2003:304). Monahan is concerned that current modes of activism tend to leave institutions, policies and cultural assumptions supportive of surveillance in place because of their focus upon individualistic resistance to specific instances of surveillance (Monahan 2006a: 1). Sieve Mann (Mann 2002) has popularised the practice and concept of sous-veillance, watching 'from below" in which surveillance technologies are turned upon those in power. Mann has built and advocated wearable cameras to facilitate this. This approach suffers from simple binary models of power, in which 'the powerful" do surveillance, and the less powerful are surveilled. Surveillance is not automatically effective in supporting the ends to which it is put. Sousveillance is therefore best understood as surveillance that is being used to draw attention to power relations (of surveillance) and as a type of consciousness raising activity. There is nothing wrong with this, but to assume the automatic success (or subversiveness) of sousveillance is to perpetuate some of the myths about the automatic functioning of surveillance and visual power. Photojournalists have long realised that simply documenting or creating an image of some immoral or harmful practice is not sufficient to bring about its end. Mann argues that photographing low level clerks in department stores1 is an effective way of getting to speak with the manager. This misses that the clerk is already likely under surveillance by in-store CCTV system. Surveillance, as we have seen is not simply an up/down binary Mann's form of resistance is also not available to all, being based upon technological literacy, but also on social capital. Rose identifies a problem with identity based responses to surveillance. He argues experience of the actuarial processes of contemporary surveillance practices does not produce collective identities in the same way as the collective experience of workplace exploitation or racism (Rose 1999:236). Anticipating the same impediments, Ogura provides a potential solution to this problem. He suggests that "identity politics" should be drastically transformed. Rather than attempting to 'establish the collective identity of social minority groups against cultural, ideological or political integration or affiliation by social groups' he points in the direction of a "de-convergent politics' able to resist methodological individualism and biological determinism he sees as present in information technology identity systems. Whilst he acknowledges that we have not yet seen such a social movement or politics based on identity, he identifies "criminal* identity activity, such as fake ID cards and identity theft as manifestations of a surveillance orientated society's focus on methodological individualism and biological determinants of identity (such as biometrics). He predicts the possibility of a politics based around self-determination of identity, potentially associated with the (non-criminal) use of multiple identities, collaborative identities or anonymity (Ogura 2006). If the exploitation of identity expands and deepens, resistance against it to achieve self determination rights of who 'is' will also follow. In the very near future, we may grab hold of an alternative identity politics based on an identity of identities that is against identity exploitation. (Ogura 2006:292) Brian Martin suggests that a sense of unfairness is not inherent in the act of surveillance, but rather people's sense of unfairness is subject to a continual struggle between interests. He places privacy campaigners on one side, trying to increase a sense of concern about surveillance, with surveillance purveyors on the other side. This suggests that motivations for resistance come from understanding and evaluation of the practice of surveillance, as well as the meaning of fairness, the possibility of resistance, subject positions and political alternatives, all of which are contested discursively. One of the key elements of interpretative struggles is language (Martin 2010) Aaron Martin, Rosamunde Van Brakel and Daniel Bernhard conducted an insightful review of the literature on resistance in international relations, social psychology, information systems and education, to counter a tendency in surveillance studies accounts to focus exclusively on the resistance relationship between the surveyor and the surveilled. They address an assumption that the resisting actor, is an autonomous agent capable of interaction with technology and observers, resistance emerging because surveillance is recognised and rejected. They also find this binary in the sousveillance literature. They find instead that resistance is multiple and rhizomatic, and that many actors beyond the surveillance subject are capable of resistance. This includes powerful actors seeking to prevent other resistance, and. drawing upon information systems perspectives, technologies themselves. They find that resistance is not an unavoidable consequence of surveillance, but the result of interpreting surveillance as overbearing, and that this representation is dependent upon specific relational histories of the actors involved, including the content of previous interactions. The ability of an actor to resist, the ways they resist and the actors at whom their resistance is directed are determined in large part by the power relations of the resisting actor to others as well as by the context. (Martin et al. 2009:226) From education contexts they draw the insight that not all authority is resisted, and that authority can be allowed if it is perceived as legitimate and just. On the other hand, resistance is problematic if there is no clearly identifiable figure of dominance. They also identify the way that structural roles affect resistance, showing how different actors are likely to resist at different stages of a technology development and introduction lifecycle. For Martin et al, understanding resistance to surveillance requires understanding the context, roles and relationships of various actors. We can expand this account by suggesting these shared histories and contexts also depend upon conventional representations of the world, and of the structures of legitimate and illegitimate power. Roles are not just structural but are subjective.

Role Playing/Simulation GoodRice USFG Key

Public resistance to surveillance starting at the USFG is critical creates the most effective advocates and change Rice 15 (Rebecca, University of Montana, Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy, pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd)//ghs-VAPublic Sphere Resistance Based on these critiques, Greenwald identifies several actors who can change US surveillance policies: the public, the government, and journalists. As discussed above, the first group Greenwald calls on is the public, which he encourages to deliberate to resist surveillance. Greenwald reminds his audience that it is human beings collectively, not a small number of elites working in secret, who can decide what kind of world we want to live in (2014, p. 253). However, aside from average citizens, who can come together to discuss surveillance, Greenwald also names special actors within the public sphere. In the epilogue of NPTH, Greenwald says that Snowden's leaks triggered the first global debate about the value of individual privacy in the digital age and prompted challenges to America's hegemonic control over the Internet. It changed the way people around the world viewed the reliability of any statements made by US officials and transformed relations between countries. It radically altered views about the proper role of journalism in relation to government power. And within the United States, it gave rise to an ideologically diverse, trans-partisan coalition pushing for meaningful reform of the surveillance state (p. 248). These changes stem from the public sphere, and occurred through public discussion. Greenwald's trans-partisan coalition can be conceived of as a public, which he calls into being as he addresses this group in NPTH. Greenwald's created public. Warner (2002) encourages scholars to frame publics discursively, saying they exist by virtue of being addressed (p. 413). Greenwald calls a concerned public into being throughout NPTH, often by discussing his readers as a collective we. Greenwald's created audience is concerned about surveillance, and willing to take public action to advocate for reform. Greenwald emphasizes the choice readers can make with Snowden's leaked NSA documents. He says that Snowden's leaks can create a new discussion about surveillance, or they can fade due to public apathy. In the introduction to NPTH, he writes That's what makes Snowden's revelations so stunning and so vitally important. By daring to expose the NSA's astonishing surveillance capabilities and its even more astounding ambitions, he has made it clear, with these disclosures, that we stand at a historic crossroads. Will the digital age usher in the individual liberation and political freedoms that the Internet is uniquely capable of unleashing? Or will it bring about a system of omnipresent monitoring and control, beyond the dreams of even the greatest tyrants of the past? Right now, either path is possible. Our actions will determine where we end up. (2014, p. 6). Greenwald gives the audience two choices and links their actions to the two potential paths. In this way, he begins the process of public deliberation, which Goodnight (2012a) describes as a momentary pause in which we examine political paths, both taken and untaken. As deliberation raises expectations that are feared or hoped for, public argument is a way to share in the construction of the future, he says (Goodnight, 2012a, p. 198). Greenwald shares his interpretation of the choice the public must make with this information. He projects two alternative futures based on the public's deliberation about privacy. This shared future is emphasized through his use of the words our, everyone, and we, which link readers together as the American public. Greenwald's projected paths put the decision into the readers' hand, emphasizing the public's ability to act and intervene in technical surveillance. Through invitations to deliberate, Greenwald addresses his readers as part of a public sphere. Greenwald also argues that deliberation is an effective way to resist surveillance and curb surveillance abuses. Greenwald offers an example from his own life. He says he first learned of the power of deliberation when he heard