china navy iii

8/9/2019 China Navy III

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PART 3:

When Grand Strategies Collide

A p r i l 1 , 2 0 0 9


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STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

C

it will also pose new ones. The transitionfrom an agricultural economy to a

resource-intensive industrial economy

means that China must shift its strafocus to protect its maritime trade. A

happens, Chinas trade routes parallelthose of other powers or traverse othe

maritime domains. The farther a Chinese

blue-water fleet ventures out, the greaterthe chance it will bump into another blu

water fleet, which could result in a Cold-

War confrontation with the United States.

Editors Note: This is the third part of a three-part series on Chinas de

hinas development of an oceangoing navy with global reach is intended to mitigate certain risks, but

tegic

s it

r

e-

velopment of a blue-water

navy.

d in part one of this series, China has had three core geopolitical imperatives for much of itshistory: maintaining internal unity in the Han Chinese regions, maintaining control of the buffer

a-

les Liberation

As note

regions, and protecting the coast from foreign encroachment. To these can be added a fourthimperative, predicated on Chinas shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy: securing se

lane approaches to the Chinese mainland and maritime routes of resource acquisition.

It is this fourth imperative that has prompted the modernization and reform of the Peop

Army to include a naval expeditionary focus. But such a focus will put China on a collision course with

ss the Himalayas, is nearly as populous as China but covers a muchsmaller land mass. While the Indian culture and population have spread throughout history, the

ts of

other emerging or established maritime powers. Chinas supply lines are, for the most part, identical toJapans supply lines and run through Indias maritime domain. Chinese naval expansion also runs

square in the face of a key U.S. imperative preventing any major regional or international navalpower from developing and thus challenging U.S. domination of the seas.

Indias Imperatives

India, Chinas neighbor acro

subcontinent itself has been fairly isolated by geography, surrounded as it is by the jungles and

mountains of Myanmar to the east, the Himalayas and Tibetan Plateau to the north and the deserwestern Pakistan and Afghanistan to the west. The geopolitical imperatives of India have evolvedwithin this island, though not all have been achieved:

Achieve suzerainty in the Ganges River basin. Expand nominal control from the core of the subcontinent to the natural geographical barriers.

ndus River basin.

ruggle with

neighboring Pakistan, where Indian security focuses most of its attention. However, this has not

loping a

is development, when it isnttrying to develop technologies and training doctrine on its own. Russia poses little threat to Indian

ited

Expand control past the Ganges River basin to the I Expand power into the Indian Ocean basin to deter foreign penetration.

India has not yet achieved its third imperative and thus remains in a constant st

prevented India from moving on to the early stages of achieving its fourth imperative deve

navy capable of exerting nominal control over the Indian Ocean basin.

New Delhi has alternately relied on Moscow and Washington to assist in th

naval expansion and has even encouraged it, so long as New Delhi remained close to Moscow. Russia

can offer equipment that is far beyond the reach of indigenous Indian development, but it is the UnStates, which has dominated the Indian Ocean for decades, that India must turn to either as a

competitor or as a partner in extending its maritime influence.
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Beijings push into the Indian Ocean has left New Delhi worried about a Chinese strategy ofencirclement. China has close relations and/or port and tracking facilities in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri

Lanka and Pakistan all Indias neighbors and, in Pakistans case, a direct competitor. While Beijingsat run

and

ough the Strait of Malacca tothe western coast of Australia. Like China, India has a strategic vision based on a combination of

Delhi

closer to Washington

move may have more to do with preventing interdiction of its long, vulnerable supply lines th

from Africa and the Middle East through the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea, even moves

intended for defense can be interpreted (or used) for other purposes.

The Indian navy sees its own necessary sphere of operations pushing out from the Indian Ocean

Bay of Bengal to the Persian Gulf and east coast of Africa, and west thr

potentially vulnerable trade routes and the need to protect the country from seaborne threats.

In many ways, Indian naval development remains in its nascent stage. But a perceived Chinesemaritime encirclement of India has spurred a surge in Indian naval investment and driven New

as a strategic naval partner. This, in turn, can be seen by Beijing as a growing

Like China, Japan is a resource-dependent industrialized nation. As an island, however, Japan is more

om overseas than China is and has been for a longer period of time. As a

result, Japan is a much more developed naval power, one that was able to strike a serious blow to the

g off an Asian landmass rich in space and resources.

The Japanese imperatives start at the center and move outward, like the layers of an onion.

Maintain control of the seas around the Japanese islands.

Become the dominant influence in the land masses abutting the territorial seas, namely thestline, at least as far south as

Shanghai.

trol of access to mineral resources in mainland China/Southeast Asia (and later to

ging raids along the Korean and Chinese coastlines

and down into the South China Sea. At the end of the 15th century, Japanese forces, under the

threat to its own maritime security, which could accelerate a regional maritime arms race.

Japans Imperatives

dependent upon resources fr

U.S. Pacific Fleet at the onset of World War II.

Like any country, Japan has strategic imperatives shaped in large part by its geography. Japan is acollection of relatively resource-poor islands lyin

Keep the home islands under the control of a central government and unified military.

southern portion of far eastern Russia and the Chinese coa

Be the dominant maritime power in the Northwest Pacific, south to Formosa/Taiwan andsoutheast to Iwo Jima.

Secure conthe Middle East as resource routes expand).

Even before Japans consolidation in the 16th century, the Japanese islands were known regionally asa center of trade and pirate activity, with pirates sta

leadership of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, led a massive naval and amphibious assault on Korea, with the

intent of moving through to Tang China.


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Initially, the invasion demonstrated the

strength of Japanese naval power, but itsend showed the major weakness of a

maritime invasion of mainland Asia the

Japanese were outnumbered by thecontinental Asians. When the Koreans cut

the Japanese maritime supply lines, theinvasion collapsed. Two and a half

centuries later, an insular Japan was

forced open by the gunboat diplomacy ofthe imperial powers, including the United

States. In response, Japan underwent arapid shift in its own military evolution,

embracing maritime power as the way todefend its interests and expand its

influence. Click to enlarge

By the 1930s, Japans growing need for

resources led to the invasion of Chinaand the military drive into Southeast

Asia. Once again, Japan found it difficult

to conquer mainland Asia; the population

was just too large for the Japanese toovercome. At the same time, Japans

expansion into Southeast Asia createdthe need to control the waters along the

vital supply lines, placing Japan squarelyon a confrontational course with the United States. The outcome was World War IIs Pacific War, which

resulted in a U.S. victory and the loss of all of Japans strategic interests, including sovereignty of thehome islands. After World War II, as the Cold War intensified, Washington saw a need for a strong ally

in Japan as a way to contain the spread of Communism and Soviet power. Japanese strategic needs

were met in a new manner Washington provided maritime security while Tokyo dealt with domesticissues and focused on economic expansion.

Decades later, Japan transitioned from being a vanquished foe of the United States to being a majoreconomic competitor, underwritten by U.S. naval power. Rising competition, the end of the Cold Warand the reduction of U.S. willingness to underwrite the Japanese economy led Tokyo to begin

reassessing its own military capabilities, particularly its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).Japan would embark upon a revitalization of its own navy and prepare to take more responsibility for

its own maritime security. This inevitably will involve a Japanese challenge to China in the East ChinaSea over territory and undersea resources.

Because Japanese supply routes, particularly for access to Middle Eastern energy sources, are virtually

the same as Chinese routes, Japan sees Chinas maritime defense moves as a potential threat. This isan untenable situation for Tokyo, and Chinese action and Japanese reaction are feeding a regional

maritime arms race. Tokyo is re-engaging Southeast Asian nations, reviving ties left dormant whenJapans economic malaise in the 1990s slashed Japanese development assistance money that had

been going to the region. Japan also is looking to enhance ties with India and Mongolia part of astrategy to refocus Chinas security concerns and perhaps redirect Chinese investments.

Even more importantly, Japan already has what many consider the second-best navy in the world. The

JMSDF is well-funded, developing rapidly and fields some of the latest in modern naval hardware. In

this competition, as in the competition with the U.S. Navy, the Peoples Liberation Army Navy is at aprofound disadvantage.
http://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China-Navy-Competing-Spheres.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China-Navy-Competing-Spheres.jpghttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090318_japan_south_korea_naval_competition_speedshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japan_shifting_bmd_balance_east_asiahttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japan_shifting_bmd_balance_east_asiahttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090318_japan_south_korea_naval_competition_speedshttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China-Navy-Competing-Spheres.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China-Navy-Competing-Spheres.jpg


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U.S. Imperatives

In their naval expansion, China, India and Japan all must deal with the reality of the worlds dominant

maritime power: the United States. In many ways, U.S. naval expansion beginning in the late 1700s

also was an expression of defense, but the degree of expansion over almost two centuries createdroom for offensive, or pre-emptive defense around the globe. A Chinese navy that is aggressively

expanding, no matter the reason, poses a potential challenge to the fundamental U.S. interest ofmaintaining control of the seas.

The strategic imperatives of the United States are rooted both in the relative isolation of the country

and in its contact with both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Dominate North America through expanding colonization, conquest and concessions. Allow no power to emerge in the Western Hemisphere to challenge U.S. domination of North

America. Control the waters of the Western Hemisphere to prevent the approach of foreign military

power. Dominate the worlds oceans to protect global trade and ensure that no power can build a navy

to challenge the United States.

Ensure that no single continental power arises on the Eurasian landmass capable of challengingthe United States.

The expansion of the young United States from a colonial holding of Great Britain to a continentalnation to the worlds sole superpower attests to its focused, if not always overt, efforts to fulfill and

maintain these imperatives. Control of the worlds oceans remains a major goal of the United States

because it provides the ability not only to protect trade, but also, essentially, to attack any country

anywhere while preventing any country from attacking the continental United States. U.S. dominanceof the seas is thus a core imperative of U.S. strategic defense, and emerging challengers are either

confronted or redirected.

World War II saw the clash of the two emerging naval powers in the Pacific the United States and

Japan. Neither could allow the other to become dominant; Japan needed to expand its empire in order

to preserve the security of its natural resources, and the United States could not allow Japan tointerdict emerging trade routes in the Pacific or threaten the U.S. Pacific coastline. This clash of

strategic imperatives drove the two economic partners to a military confrontation at sea, whether they

wanted one or not.

After World War II, the United States dealt with the potential emergence of the Soviet Union as a sea

power by encircling it through a series of alliances, redirecting Soviet technology and priorities to aland-based defense. The United States also has employed this strategy in space, another potential

battlespace where Washington must ensure that it can strike any country anywhere while preventing

any country from attacking the United States. At least for the , whether on the sea, under the sea orin space, when an emerging power begins to push out more aggressively, it will meet resistance from

the United States.

Chinese naval developments have definitely drawn the attention of the U.S. military, and

confrontations and accidents have already occurred as the United States has asserted its claimed right

to operate off the Chinese coast for whatever purpose. Beijing will find U.S. resistance not only at sea.Its flirtations in space have drawn serious U.S. responses, and Washington still holds the strategic cardof alliance encirclement, which in this case would link Japan, Australia, India and a few key Southeast

Asian nations in the effort. Perhaps more troubling for China is the potential for the United States, orpossibly even India or Japan, to stir up unrest in Chinas buffer regions, such as Tibet or Xinjiang.

Strategy of Distraction
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Despite the risks, China now considers it necessary to become a naval power, and it has madedramatic progress in doing so. Its interests have become too global for it to focus inward and rely

mainly on land-based defense. This recognized imperative, along with Chinas unwillingness or inabilityto align with a powerful ally to help guard its interests, is already raising the potential for a maritime

arms race in East, Southeast and South Asia, drawing in not only Japan and India, but also South

Korea, Malaysia and other Southeast Asian states.

The biggest challenge, of course, will come from the United States. If history is any guide, Washington

will work with other countries in the region to enclose Chinas maritime expansion within the first

island chain, from Japan to the Strait of Malacca. And a U.S. strategy of containment may not be

limited to maritime activity. As the United States demonstrated in dealing with the Soviets, causingtrouble for China along its land periphery could be a useful tool and China has many internalproblems that could be exacerbated by foreign pressure. While China has no choice but to look to the

sea, its strategic focus could be forced to turn inward again, as it has been for virtually all of its

history.


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