EPISODES IN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE TOWN UNIONS AND THE EZE

INSTITUTION IN IGBOLAND OVER ISSUES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

A.C.Nwosu

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Problem

The consequent entrenchment of powerful and centralised institutions of governance in society

has continued to threaten the existential essence of man in his local and national environment.

The Igbo were originally free from such centralized and despotic institutions of governance.

However, to facilitate governance in Igboland where kingship institutions were few, or to achieve

uniformity with the rest of the country, the colonial masters created the "warrant chiefs" with the

ordinance of 1916. With the attainment of independence, the warrant chiefs became anachronistic

and irrelevant. Perhaps to achieve the same objective as the colonial masters, the military

government in 1978 created autonomous communities and decreed that each community be

placed under a traditional ruler (Eze or Obi in some areas). The proliferation of kingship

institution was thus engineered in an area of Nigeria where the predominant political organization

was the "democratic village republic" in which the traditional local institution for governance has

been the town union. The situation now is that there exists in most communities in Igboland two

dominant institutions for governance - the town union which is at the apex of the system of

unions/assemblies that are part of the democratic village republic and the Eze Institution fostered

by the government.

The problem is that conflict situations have arisen in many communities. There is conflict over

the relationship between the town union (or its president) and the Eze. There is conflict over

accession and succession to the Eze stool, which has tended to destabilize the town union. There

is also conflict over the Eze's area of jurisdiction and the town unions' area of jurisdiction. The

gravity of the situation is perhaps evidenced by the numerous litigations on these matters pending

in law courts all over Igboland.

1.2 The Objectives

The broad objective of the study is to analyse the involvement of the Town Union and Eze

Institution in governance, highlighting the consequent encounter between the two bodies using

case studies. More specifically, the study has attempted to achieve the following objectives:

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1. Examine the roles of the Town Union and the Eze Institution in the governance of

communities;

2. Analyse the relationship and identify the interface between the Town Union and the Eze

Institution with a view to understanding the nature, sources and causes of the conflicts

between them.

3. Make recommendations to foster harmonious relationship between the Eze and the Town

Union in the governance of communities.

1.3 Area of Study

For studying episodes in the encounter between the Town Union and the Eze Institution, two

autonomous communities were purposively selected to reflect situations of harmonious and

conflict relationships. The autonomous communities selected are Ifakala in Mbaitoli Local

Government Area and Mbieri also in Mbaitoli Local Government both in Imo State.

The population of Ifakala consists largely of indigenes of Ifakala. There are nevertheless some

non-indigenes who work for government establishments located in the community. The

commonly spoken language is a dialect of Igbo. Ifakala is a rural community composed of five

villages with an aggregate population of about 30,000. The villages are: Owere, Umuagwuoche,

Uba/Amazu, Umutaku/Umungwo and Amafor.

Each village is composed of two or more kindreds. Beyond the family, the individual derives

support from the kindred, the village and the town, in that order.

Mbieri, another community chosen for study, consists predominantly of the indigenous

population. However, there are non-indigenes who either do business in the community or work

in government establishments in the community. Igbo is the commonly spoken language. Mbieri

is 705 rural communities composed of 18 villages with a population of about 75,000 people. The

villages are Obokwe, Umuahii, Umuomumu, Umuduru, Umuobom, Ubakuru, Amankuta,

Umuagwu and Ebom. Others are: Ohohia, Awo, Eziome, Amaulu, Umunjam, Umuonyeali,

Umudagu, Obazu and Achi. Each village is composed of four or more kindreds. Though the

family is the basic social and political unit, the individual derives support from the kindred, the

village and town, in that order.

1.4 Methodology

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Face-to-face interviews of selected persons from the community was the method of data

collection adopted for the study. The persons interviewed include present and past members of

the executive of town unions, members of Eze's council and other knowledgeable persons and

leaders in the community. A comprehensive interview guide prepared by the researcher was used

to ensure that the interview was focused. The interview guide was aimed at eliciting information

on the roles of both the Town Union and the Eze Institution in governance and, more particularly,

on the relationship between the two institutions.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the mid-1980s, scholars and policy analysts have taken increasing interest in the role of

local institutions in the social and economic development and governance of communities in the

developing world. Slocum et al (1995:3) maintains that popular participation in development is

broadly understood as active involvement of people in making decisions about the

implementation of processes, programmes and projects which affect them. Escalating social and

economic crises have led to the questioning of the pre-eminent role of the state and state-based

institutions in social and economic management, hence the World Bank has been giving

increasing attention of late to the social and institutional conditions for sustainable development.

These include the organizational capacities not only of governments but also of communities and

civil society (Cleaver 1993: vi). The persistence of social and economic crisis is seen as an

indication of the poor performance of the state and state-based institutions. Therefore, there is a

need to involve civil society in governance. To achieve this level of collaboration Cleaver says:

It will be necessary to overcome the evident 'disconnect' between government and

community, both by enabling and supporting local initiatives and increasing the

responsive-ness and accountability of government services.

The interest in local development institutions is further reinforced by the need for structural

change - in particular, economic management, forced on many Third World nations by the

persistent economic and social crisis. In Nigeria, an important aspect of the structural change was

the "public sector reforms" aimed at reducing the overbearing influence of the public sector in

virtually all facets of Nigerian economic and social life. The reforms were aimed at reducing the

scope and activities of the public sector to create more room for private sector participation. In

this connection, there is increasing awareness of the need to strengthen and incorporate

indigenous organizations and administrative structures which have existed almost incognito, but

have provided stability and fostered self-reliant development within local communities. African

scholars and policy-makers are beginning to realise that the local institutions appear to have

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proved more successful in engineering development within local communities than the state has

done in economic and social management (see Richards, 1985; Ake, 1987). In Nigeria, even the

effort made in recent years to decentralise governance to the level of local governments appears

inadequate for effectively reaching the grassroots (see Wansch and Olowu, 1990).

The point that should be stressed is that the historical and contemporary roles which indigenous

institutions play in the governance and administration of communities in Nigeria have not

received much attention. What has been emphasized is the development role of such institutions.

Mitchel (1967) has identified eight types of indigenous institutions which play dominant roles in

rural development. The author identified the council of chiefs and advisory body of elders

instituted by the people to provide governance in most villages. Another institution identified by

the author consists of the village-street councils which bring together family kinships, street-

households and male and female groups to discuss and find solutions for their common problems.

There are also the various women's institutions or unions whose primary objectives are to solve

domestic and community problems especially those affecting the women.

The fourth indigenous institution identified by Mitchel consists of "resource institutions." These

include thrift and credit organizations such as the "esusu" and the weekly savings union of men

and women. There are also the "craft" institutions which are largely trade guilds for members in

skilled/unskilled trades, merchandise enterprises and various non-farm crafts. The guilds regulate

the conduct of members in the practice of the trade.

Yet, other institutions are the labour supply institutions, the market institutions, and the market

unions. Examples of the labour supply institutions are the "Owe" and the "Aro" in the Yoruba

speaking areas of Nigeria and the age-grade forms of rotational labour found in many parts of

Eastern Nigeria. The market institutions consist of the producers, wholesalers, retailers, and

middlemen associations found in most major markets. The associations regulate the conduct of

market transactions and protect the interest of their members. Finally, there are the religious

institutions, including the traditional and modern religions. The regulations, mode of worship,

and festivities of religious institutions are, according to Mitchel, a major force in economic

transactions and social behaviours in the rural areas. Various other analysts have highlighted the

important contributions of local institutions to community development. According to Michael

(1973), the Isusu (Esusu in Yoruba and Adashi in Hausa) is a typical example of an indigenous

cooperative which has evolved in the face of the inability of the formal savings and credit

institutions to cater adequately for the financial needs of rural communities. Fafunwa (1974) has

highlighted the social, political and economic functions of age grades in terms of road

construction, building of bridges, erection of public buildings and cleaning of village paths and

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markets. Nsugbe (1974) has also talked about the rivalry among age-sets in Ohafia with respect to

the inception of community development projects. The move by one age group to initiate a

development project is seen by other age-grades as a challenge. Chima (1982) in his study of the

age-grade system in Afikpo has emphasized the role which Ndichie (Council of elders) play as

the judicial arm of the community. Ujoatuonu (1985) identified the main objectives of the town

unions in Mbaise as promoting peace and unity, providing moral and financial support to

members and promoting community development projects.

The role of town unions in the developmental process of Igbo towns is as old as the Igbo nation.

Honey et al. (1998:7), citing Chinua Achebe, highlights the activities of "Umuofia Progressive

Union" in Achebe's novel, No Longer at Ease, featuring prominently the assistance the union

gave to a promising son of Umuofia Obi Okonkwo.

Ejeh (1988) has emphasized the crucial role which local institutions played in the massive

reconstruction of facilities and infrastructure in Eastern Nigeria following the end of the civil war.

Health institutions, roads, bridges markets and other projects were constructed by the

communities. The reconstruction of primary and post primary schools and the building and

equipping of new ones were initiated by one local institution or the other.

A type of local institutions not mentioned by Mitchel consists of the "Social Clubs", which have

gained prominence in many parts of Eastern Nigeria. As the name implies, the clubs cater

primarily for the social and, sometimes, economic welfare of its members. According to

Mgbeahuru (1983), social clubs have usually looked beyond the welfare of individual members

and have contributed significantly to the provision of recreational centres, roads, bridges, postal

agencies and schools for the use of the entire community. In the opinion of the author, social

clubs have helped to redefine the traditional obligation of the Igbo descent group in the light of

modern urban life.

In recognition of the important contribution of local institutions to community development, the

Anambra Government enacted Edict No.22 of 1986, to enhance the role played by the

institutions. The edict gave legal status to town unions and community development associations

in their rural development activities, and made provisions for safeguarding community

contributions for self- help projects. The edict, perhaps the first of its kind in the country, was

aimed at providing a legal framework for the smooth implementation of rural development

projects in the state.

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The Imo State government had also sought to harness the energies and resources of major local

institutions to facilitate rural development. The government in its "Blueprint on Rural

Development in Imo State", introduced in 1986, defined roles for local development institutions

and the Eze (i.e. the traditional rulership) institution. According to the document, "town unions

are to disseminate information about government policies, mould public opinion, raise funds,

expand and extend the utilities, undertake and encourage group farming activities and help in the

maintenance of law and order". Women's groups are to diffuse innovation and implement

programmes. The social clubs are to serve as agents of social mobilization for economic ventures.

The Eze - the traditional head of the autonomous community - has the responsibility of

mobilizing the people for constructive work. The state and local governments are to supply

grants-in-aid.

A greater awareness of the relevance of indigenous institutions was created with the programme

aimed at strengthening local development institutions, initiated by the Directorate of Food, Roads

and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) in the late 1980s. Through the programme, the development

capacity of local institutions such as traditional councils, community unions, age-grades, social

clubs, credit unions, occupational groups and religious organizations was to be enhanced. The

DFRRI attempt now appears to have achieved limited success as it perhaps did not go beyond the

identification of types of local development institutions.

A recent study undertaken by the research group on Local Institutions and Socio-economic

Development in Nigeria (LISDP) focused on the mode of operation and the performance of local

development institutions in their development role (Olowu et al, 1991), without delving

significantly into their roles in the governance and administration of communities. The indication

nevertheless, is that local institutions make significant contributions to the governance of,

especially, rural communities. Such roles, however, have not been emphasized in available

literature. What has been emphasized is their role in the development of a social and economic

infrastructure.

According to Afigbo (1972), attempts by the colonial administration to introduce a centralized

political system met with considerable resistance. The attempts nevertheless culminated in the

creation of "warrant chiefs" who assumed the position of governance and subjected the other

local institutions to social and economic role. The warrant chiefs assisted in tax collection and

conveyed the directives of the colonial administration to the people. The ordinance of 1916

enacted by the colonial administration was aimed at protecting the position of the warrant chiefs

and the "few constitutional village monarchs".

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The Chieftaincy Edict of 1978 would therefore appear to be a contemporary extension of colonial

attempt to create kingship institutions in Igboland. Article (25)2 of the Chieftaincy Edict shows

government recognition of two ruling houses in Oguta autonomous community in

Ohaji/Egbema/Oguta local government based on the colonial warrant chief lineage. The problem

which the colonial administration and later the national governments had perhaps stems from the

fact that there were no centralized political mechanisms that function continuously in Igboland.

Such centralized and authoritative political systems existed within other major ethnic groupings

and appear to have been used, especially, by the colonial and military governments to reach the

"grassroot". The "democratic village republic" characterised by the family, kindred and village

assemblies that give virtually equal hearing to the elders and other adult male members alike is

too decentralized to serve the purpose of both governments. Its administrative structure is

undifferentiated, its processes are rather informal and authority is diffused. Though the warrant

chiefs and Ezes have come to stay, the resultant conflicts between these institutions and the town

union are a matter for concern in Igboland.

The conflicts that arise from the inter-relationships of local institutions and the obstacles which

such conflicts pose for community development has been analysed generally by several authors

(see Dabrender E. 1959; Simmel, 1961; Mills, 1965; Giddins, 1978, and Lukcas, 1976). The

authors have presented theoretical exposition of the types, sources and effects of conflicts on the

development of rural communities.

Scholars and policy analysts have shown greater interest in the contribution of grassroots

institutions to governance and socio-economic development of local communities since the

1980s. Worsening political and socio-economic conditions appear to erode the confidence of the

state and state-based institutions in the political, social and economic management of

communities. Increasing social and economic crisis is regarded as an indication of failure on the

part of the state and state-based institutions.

The analyses that have focused on the situation in Igboland are those of Nwosu (1991 and 1996),

and Ukaegbu and Agunwamba (1995). The authors drew examples of conflict situations in Imo

and Anambra state. According to the authors, antagonistic social relations arise from "conflicts

over resources" or "conflict over core values".

In the opinion of Ukaegbu and Agunwamba, the proliferation of the Eze institution and

chieftaincy titles has been a major source of social conflicts in Igboland. Conflicts have arisen

from lack of unanimity in the mode of accession and succession to the Eze stool. In some places,

it is the intrinsic desire to maintain tradition by restricting rulership to the ruling class (or

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families) that has fuelled the conflict. In other instances, it is the extrinsic factor of the quest for a

group of people to retain traditional political power that is the source of the conflict. The extrinsic

factor perhaps also explains the clash and incompatibility that appears to characterise the

relationship between the Town Union (or its chairman) and the Eze.

3.0 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

To put subsequent discussions in proper perspective, it is considered necessary to deliberate on

some conceptual issues. The primary focus of the study is the state/civil society relationship in

governance. It is considered important to briefly examine the concepts of the state and civil

society as they apply in this study, to ensure that the study has relevance in the context of the

broad research on civil society and governance. More specifically it is necessary to properly

situate the two institutions: to identify the particular "niche" which they occupy in the state or

civil society. This is important since both are community-based local development institutions

and can easily be confused as belonging to the same realm. The analysis in this section will

therefore be in three parts. In sections one and two, profiles of the Town Union and Eze

Institution will be provided. Section three will attempt to justify their inclusion in the realm of

either the civil society or the state.

3.1. The Town Union

A review of the socio-political structure of the pre-colonial Igbo society will not only provide the

background within which to situate the problem of the study but will also provide the track record

required to trace the genesis of the conflicts that exist between the Town Union and the Eze

Institution. Prior to the advent of the colonial masters, African societies had their own institutions

of governance which controlled political, economic, social and cultural activities to attain the

collective and societal objectives of the people. The Igbo therefore possessed their own political

system different from that of the Hausa/Fulani, the Yoruba, the Benin Kingdom, etc. Afigbo

(1972:17) says that:

For the Igbo the largest political unit was usually the village-group, each member village

being in fact largely autonomous. Therefore the Igbo political system operated through a

complex confederacy which balanced central authority under the village-group council or

"Ogbako Umunna" with the more locally derived authority of the village-group or

"Umunna", elders, Ozo title holders and Okparas who are also the Ofo title holders.

The terms village-group council and village assembly will be used interchangeably to refer to the

Igbo confederate central authority, while Umunna village-group and "ndi amala" refers to the

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more locally derived authority made up of the Okparas, elders and Ozo title holders at the village

level. It is also important to note that secular power was reinforced with the sanction of the

supernatural, and religious and political issues were therefore closely related as revealed by Igbo

ceremonies and festivals. Thus Jones (1957:16) opines that:

The traditional government of communities in the eastern region of Nigeria depended on

the general will of the component segment groups as expressed through their

representatives at a general meeting of the tribe. Every local community has some person

or persons whom they referred to by a term signifying head.

The segmentary confederacy in the Igbo nation therefore provided for governance at the various

levels of the component units that make-up the people's political system. Onwuka et al.

(1997:128), describes the Igbo political system thus:

Political participation starts from the family which is the smallest social unit. The next is

the compound which consists of a number of families and house-holds of common

descent held commonly together economically, politically and culturally. Here the

"Okpara" (first-born) of the most senior family exercised political authority.

Thus the family and the compound form the primary political units at the local level. Other higher

level political units are the kindred assembly, the village assembly and the village group council.

The family meeting maintains order within the extended family by ensuring that family members

behave in a manner that is conducive to interpersonal relations within the family. Family

meetings also ensure orderly allocation of common resources. Enforcement of family meeting

decisions is largely by moralisation and peer pressure, and sometimes coercion. In very rare cases

a flagrant breach of the family code may attract ostracisation especially in moments of distress

(like death and burial of one's wife or child) when the individual would need the support of other

family members. However, an aggrieved member, dissatisfied with the family decision, may

appeal to the kindred union or invite some elders to examine the case between him and his family

group.

The kindred is made up of related family groups which share a common ancestry (or founder). It

is the next political structure above the family. The kindred assembly is presided over by the

eldest Okpara1. The kindred union is similar to the family meeting except that it ordinarily deals

with issues that affect the entire kindred.

The village assembly or village group may be referred to as the "Umunna". It is usually made up

of every adult male of the village while the executive is made up of the Okparas who are also the

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Ofo holders, other elders and the Ozo title holders2. The eldest Okpara of the most senior kindred

who is the holder of the big Ofo (Ofo ukwu)3 presides over the village assembly. Describing the

make-up of the village assembly, Onwuka et al. (1997:129) say that the Okpara (first son) of the

most senior kindred in the village presides over the meetings of the village assembly held at the

village square. It also consists of Ofo staff office holders and other titled men. They go further to

opine that the village assembly is therefore democratic as vital political, social and economic

decisions are usually taken here through dialogue, consultation and consensus.

The village union handles issues and problems that concern the entire village. Individuals can

nevertheless take their complaints to the village union especially if they are not satisfied with the

decisions taken at the kindred union or if the dispute is between people from different kindreds

within the village.

The town group union is what Afigbo (1972:17) calls the village-group council. He says that the

village enjoyed autonomy in its own affairs but matters which involved outside interests go to the

village-group council, a body which comprised all the village heads of all other segments as well

as other elders. In actual fact any adult male member of the village group could attend and insist

on being heard. Onwuka et al. (1997:130) maintains that "this body could be rightly described as

the supreme body of Igbo towns".

From the above political arrangement, centralized and powerful traditional rulers were rare in pre-

colonial Igbo society. Afigbo (1972:34) affirms that the conclusion which emerges from the

whole analysis is that at the time British rule was imposed on the Ibo and their neighbours, no

community east of the Niger had a leader who could be made, without compromising the

traditional constitution of fulfilling the role with a chief. There were nevertheless a few places in

the border towns in Igboland where there were traditional rulers. These border towns were

influenced by the neighbouring towns such as in the Benin kingdom, Ijaw, Igala and Ibibio tribes.

Onwuka et al. (1972:1270) says that the presidential monarchy was common among the Igbo

communities which had close contact with non-Igbo neighbours like Benin and Ibibio.

Therefore, apart from the few centralized traditional rulers at the border towns, the Igbo pre-

colonial political system was, according to Dare et al. (1987:81), "an exercise in direct

democracy. It involved participation by all the male adults". Political, economic, social and other

matters of public interest were thrown open at the village group council for discussion and

implementation.

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Society and culture are dynamic; therefore social institutions grow with the society. The village-

group council has continued to grow with the Igbo society and has acquired new names like

central union, group union, progressive association, development union, town union, etc. Thus,

in the developing Igbo societies the town union has assumed the status of civil society

organization with improved administrative structures. Apart from undertaking several

development and infrastructural projects, it has continued to serve as the organ for local

administration in Igboland.

3.2. The Eze Institution:

Perhaps the best way to start the analysis in this section is to make reference to a popular Igbo

saying - "Igbo enwe eze"- which literally translated means "Igbo have no king". This saying is in

obvious reference to the fact that historically the Igbo never established "kingdoms or empires

presided over by supreme rulers". According to Uchendu (1965), the few kingship institutions

that emerged among the Igbo before the 1978 Edict were "intrusive traits". Kingship institutions

were more like aberrations in an area where the dominant political organization was the

democratic village republic.

The problem which the colonial administration and later the national governments faced in the

governance of the Igbo derived from the fact that there were no centralized political mechanisms

that functioned continuously in Igboland. Such centralized and authoritative political systems

existed within other major ethnic groupings and were used by colonial and national governments

to provide governance at the grassroots. The "democratic village republic" characterized by the

family, kindred and village assemblies, that give virtually equal consideration to the elders and

other adult male members alike, could not quite serve the bureaucratic purpose of government.

Thus after the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, the colonial masters, in

the period between 1916 and 1925, inflicted a devastating blow on the old and established order

of local governance in Igboland. Unable to find centralized and powerful traditional rulers, the

colonial masters, according to Dare et al. (1987:94), "employed the services of the most forward

among the people by making them chiefs by warrants without due regard for the status of the

people concerned".4 Thus there was no attempt by the British to study and understand the Igbo

and find out who possessed political power and where the system's political sovereignty lay. The

British police, backed by the colonial native courts, intimidated the Ofo and Ozo title holders to

succumb to British imperialism. According to Afigbo (1972:68), "it was also official policy to

seize local leaders and keep them as hostages to be released only if government demands were

met by their people". The people could not resist the British military superiority. In collaboration

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with their loyalists, therefore, the British tried to disintegrate the village-group councils and town

unions. In their place, Afigbo (172:21) reveals that the British selected certain natives who they

thought were traditional chiefs and gave them certificates of recognition and authority called

warrants.5 The warrants entitled each of these men to sit in the native courts from time to time to

judge cases. It also empowered them to assume within the community they represented executive

and judicial powers which were novel both in degree and territorial scope.

Consequently, with the 1916 ordinance that created the warrant chiefs, local authority in Igboland

became centralized. Conflict arose between the village assemblies and these newly imposed

centralized authorities by the colonial masters. Through their village-group councils and town

unions, the Igbo organized themselves and resisted the autocratic administration orders of the

warrant chiefs6 which is an extension of the colonial government.7 According to Dare et al.,

(1987:95):

The people of Eastern provinces had resisted the warrant chief system for some time but

in 1929 they had an opportunity to show their dis-satisfaction openly. One of the

outcomes of the people's dissatisfaction is Aba riots of 1929, which spread like bush fire

throughout the eastern region.

Even though the degree and territorial scope of the warrant chiefs' authority was alien to the Igbo,

their mode and method of operation reflected their determination to endorse government policy

and undermine the interests of civil society organizations and the people they represent. Afigbo

(1972:257) observes that because the warrant chiefs were not accountable to their kith and kin,

this was proof to the people that the chiefs, like the court messengers, the police, soldiers, court

clerks and the like, were civil servants.8 Thus, the warrant chiefs were the outcome of a vagrant

search by the colonial masters for a political system that would serve their dictatorial and

exploitative model for governance. Consequently, the resultant conflict between the government

representatives and the town unions destabilized the socio-political equanimity prevalent in the

pre-colonial Igbo society.

The inference to be drawn from the above analysis is that there were no centralized traditional

authorities like Eze Institution in Igboland before the colonialists came. However, the termination

of colonialism and attainment of independence on 1st October 1960 brought mixed blessings to

the warrant chiefs. They were neither relevant nor scrapped from the political system of the

country. The national government continued the retention of some of these alien traditional

institutions with statutes, despite their waning influence and rejection by the people. Adeniran et

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al. (1969:35) affirms that in most if not all the states, the traditional local leaders and ex-officio

members still had a vital role to play on local councils.

The civil war which devastated all aspects of the Igbo's life did not leave out the warrant chiefs.

The consequent military dictatorship which followed the end of the civil war did not help matters

either; thus the civil war and the post civil war military regime eroded what was left of the

influence of the warrant chiefs in Igboland.

It is important to note that from the available data, the Igbo town unions became strong and

flourished once more as the accepted civil society organizations for local governance. Between

1971 and 1978 town unions took up reconstruction and development projects like town halls,

civic centres, water and electricity projects in their various communities.

Ejeh (1988) says that since the town unions were the people's indigenous organ of governance,

mobilization of the people and fund raising became easier. The democratic nature of the town

unions was the secret of their acceptability and viability.

The above period however was to be another fleeting moment in the re-emergence of the town

unions as the dominant institution for governance, as the Olusegun Obasanjo military regime, in

revealing their plans to return the country to civilian rule, came out with the idea of creating a

House of Chiefs at state level as a second legislative arm. Since, unlike the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba

and Bini Kingdoms, the Igbo lacked centralized and powerful traditional rulers the question of

who should be members of the House of Chiefs and the chiefs' constituencies in the Eastern

States posed a problem to the government. To solve this problem the federal government set up a

Chieftaincy Committee in the former East Central State headed by Professor Udenigwe. The

Committee, which had Professor A.E. Afigbo as member, was charged with the responsibility of

reviewing the "chiefless" situation in Eastern Nigeria and making recommendations to the federal

government. Before the committee could start work, however, new states were created, and

members of the Chieftaincy Committee parted ways, while the chieftaincy issue was shifted to

the military governors. The fact that the military governors during the period under review were

soldiers and non-indigenes of the states, and perhaps cared very little about what constituted the

political system of "Ndi Igbo", may explain the turn of events. The military governors created

autonomous communities as constituencies for the would-be chiefs and passed the 1978

Chieftaincy Edict creating the Eze or chieftaincy institution in each autonomous community.

Ogbuagu (1995:7) affirms that since Nigeria gained political independence from Britain, the

foundation on which the traditional system stands has shifted many times; traditional rulership in

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Igboland has become a creature of, and sustained by, statutes particularly that of the constitution

of the land.

Thus, the Eze Institution emerged in Igboland through the military administration with Edict

No.22 of 1978 titled Chieftaincy Edict 1978. Although Article 3.1 of the Chieftaincy Edict asked

the autonomous communities to select their own chiefs, the same article of the edict required the

people to present the selected chief (or Eze in Igboland) to the chief executive of their local

government, who is to present the Eze with the staff of office. Thus, the Eze Institution was

juxtaposed between the local government and the community, where the town union already

existed as the apex institution of local governance.

Article 2 of the edict nevertheless says that the chief will be identified and selected by his people

according to their own tradition and usages. At this juncture it is important to note that:

1. The government created the chieftaincy (or Eze) institution with government statute

(Chieftaincy Edict of 1978.)

2. The Eze or chieftaincy Institution was not created by the tradition and cultural mores of the

people.

3. Even though the government asked the people to select the chiefs according to their own

traditions and usages, the traditions were not in existence because the centralized Eze or

chieftaincy institution created by the government did not conform with the "village democratic

republic" which the people were used to.

Since there were no laid down traditions and indigenous methods for selecting the chiefs, the

Chieftaincy Edict of 1978 would appear to be a contemporary extension of the colonial attempt to

create kingship institutions in Igboland. The government would appear to indirectly revive the

warrant chiefs. The families and descendants of the colonial warrant chiefs saw the edict as an

ample opportunity to regain power once more. They paraded themselves as heirs to the warrant

chiefs whom they claim to be the people's "last Ezes". In many places the various households of

the colonial warrant chiefs assumed the status of ruling houses and subsequently claimed

hereditary right of succession to the Eze stool of the created autonomous communities. This

received government backing and recognition.

Article 25(2) of the Chieftaincy Edict actually recognized two ruling houses in Oguta

autonomous community in Ohaji/Egbema/Oguta local government area of Imo State. Thus

14

backed and recognized by government, traditional rulers (or Ezes) became a major instrument of

local governance for national government. Ogbuagu (1983:489) opines that even:

In the often-cited 1976 nation-wide local government reforms, traditional rulers (chiefs)

were accorded positions in the local government councils.

Hence the powers of the "Ezes" assumed larger dimensions despite the fact that the Chieftaincy

Edict of July 15 1978 defined the functions of the traditional ruler as follows:

(i) Representing the communities at ceremonies and receiving dignitaries.

(ii) Presiding at community festivals and other important occasions of the community.

(iii) Assisting in the maintenance of law and order, and acting as the custodian of the culture,

custom and tradition of their people;

(iv) Involving himself in development projects and assisting local governments in the collection

of taxes, rates and community levies.

The function of the Eze would appear to be ceremonial. The Eze has no legislative powers and, in

practice, he is hardly involved in the collection of taxes, rates and levies.

In many communities, however, the Ezes sought to encroach into the town unions' areas of

jurisdiction. Some sought to dissolve the town unions. Thus, the introduction of the Eze

institution generally generated conflicts which have manifested in several court cases all over

Igboland.

3.3 The Role of Women in Governance

In the Igbo pre-colonial society, governance and administration of the communities were not

exclusive affairs for men, even though the men were at the apex of the system which Okonjo

(1988) referred to as the "dual political system." In Igboland, the women have their own

1 Okpara: First son of each family; he holds the family ofo.2 Ozo Title Holders: The noblemen of Igbo society. Ozo title is the highest title in Igboland.3 Ofo Ukwu: Big ofo, the kindred's staff of office - the holder of the big ofo is the president of the village assembly.4 The warrant chiefs created by the colonial masters were the first centralized institution of governance aimed at fostering colonialism and domesticating the people.5 The British created the warrant chiefs without due cognisance of the existing socio-political system in Igboland so as to understand the strata of Igbo society.6 Those who wielded political power in the traditional institutions like the Okpara, Ofo and Ozo title holders were neglected by the system.7 The system eventually gave power to "Peti-Lilliputes" who now try to lord it over the Ozo and Ofo title holders the ruling and highest class in Igbo society.8 The colonial masters concentrated much powers on the warrant chiefs, which eventually resulted to powerful central authorities novel and unacceptable to the Igbo.

15

organizations for governance parallel to those of men. Just as the men have family, kindred,

village and town level unions/ associations, the women have similar organisations. Women's

voices are heard from their organizations, and through these they participated in governance at

various levels of the community. Okonjo (1988) succinctly reveals this pattern of authority in the

following extract:

In this Society, political power is diffuse and leadership was fluid and informal.

Community decisions were made and disputes settled in a variety of gathering, village

wide assembles, women's meetings, age grades, secret and title societies... Decisions

were made by discussions until mutual agreement was reached.

Therefore, women participated in decision making at various levels and in different ways in many

communities. For example, among the Igbos of Midwestern Nigeria, the villages are ruled jointly

by the Obi (King) and Omu (Queen). The Omu is not the Obi's wife. She is selected by the

women on her own merit. There is a division of power between the Obi and Omu.

In some other communities in the eastern Nigeria, some aged women and unmarried daughters

attend the same village-group council with men.

Around the old Owerri province the "Umuada", an organization of women born within the

village, constitutes part of the governing body of the village. They help to run women's and other

community affairs with the association of married women in that community, which is called

"Asawa".

Umuada also help to make sure that decisions taken at the village-group council are implemented.

They settle disputes for men and women alike, and thereby help to maintain peace.

The asawa around the old Owerri province is the equivalent of the kindred and village

associations of the men, and is headed by a chairperson. The executive also includes a secretary, a

financial secretary, a treasurer and a provost. The officers hold office for a defined period. There

is however usually no limit to the number of terms. The executive usually includes two men

called "Diasawa", which, literally translated, means "the husband of Asawa". Diasawa are usually

selected from the noble men of the kindred by the women through some kind of balloting at a

meeting. The selected men are informed of the intention of the women to make them diasawa.

The diasawa apart from advising the women on issues pertaining to the custom and tradition of

the kindred provide a necessary link between the asawa (i.e. women's association) and the

kindred union (i.e. the men's association). This arrangement is the same at village level. There is

usually, also, an umbrella organisation for the women - "Asawa Ukwu" - at the town level.

16

Unlike the town union, membership to Asawa or to Asawa Ukwu is not automatic. Usually every

newly married woman registers at the kindred level with some money and drinks. However all

the married women in each kindred belong to the Asawa. At the town level "Asawa ukwu", that is

the women wing of the town union, coordinates all the Asawa at village level. The Asawa ukwu

apart from mobilizing the women also undertakes community development projects like building

of markets, secondary schools, hospitals, bore holes etc.

The Asawa also settle disputes among women as well as disputes between husband and wife that

could lead to divorce. The role of the "Asawa ukwu" as a parallel organization to the town union

is vital - it helps to mobilize the women and settle disputes concerning the women folk in

particular. It is an important organ of local administration in Igboland.

In the communities chosen for study, Ifakala and Mberi, the "Asawa Ukwu" has different names.

The difference in name notwithstanding, the system and nature of the organization is the same.

In Ifakala, the "Asawa Ukwu" is Ifakala women's organization (ITU), women's wing. The ITU

women's wing is headed by chair-person, Mrs., E.N. Ndulagum, of Agwuoche village. Even

though all the five villages in Ifakala have been with their Asawa since the existence of the

villages, the "Asawa Ukwu" or ITU women wing can be traced to the early 1970s immediately

after the Nigerian civil war. The executive of the women's wing consists of all the officers of the

association, i.e. the Chair-person, the Secretary, Financial Secretary, Treasurer, three Provosts

and other appointed members.

The women's wing also has branches in major cities in Nigeria: e.g. (ITU) women's wing Aba,

Onitsha, Lagos Port-Harcourt, etc.

All the married women in Ifakala are members of the (ITU) women's wing; some unmarried

daughters who are elderly are also members of the (ITU) women's wing. Membership of the

village "Asawa" is mandatory. You must belong to the village Asawa before you are registered in

the "Asawa Ukwu".

The (ITU) women's wing organizes the women, and helps to enforce code of conduct for women

in Ifakala. The Asawa ukwu also has executed or participated in the execution of some notable

community projects like the building of Ifakala Market, Ifakala Water project, and Ifakala

Vocational College now known as Ifakala junior girls.

The women recognize the (ITU) women's wing as the apex union for the women in Ifakala; the

women can easily be mobilized through the union.

17

The annual general August meeting, popularly called "Abroad meeting". is an important forum

for decision making. Ifakala women at home and abroad attend this meeting. In the meeting

abroad, matters concerning women's welfare and development projects in Ifakala are discussed.

Presently the (ITU) women's wing is trying to find its feet. The crises between the late Eze

Ahaneku and the Mr. Uba L. of Ifakala Town Union affected the "Asawa ukwu". Women from

Amafor village and Owerre village pulled out of the (ITU) women's wing and formed the

"Obiwuruotu" women's association. Though the Obiwuruotu women's organization has achieved

some success, like sinking a bore hole beside Ifakala market, its formation has affected the

strength of (ITU) women's wing.

The newly installed Eze, Eze Michael Ekeruo, who is like the chief patron of (ITU) women's

wing, is contributing a lot to revitalise the (ITU) women's wing. The Eze started (ITU) women's

wing widows' fund, which the Itu women's wing helps to operate. Ever widow in Ifakala

autonomous community is given Two Thousand Naira (N2,000.00) annually from this fund,

provided by Eze Michael Ekeruo.

The women are in the majority; mobilizing them and organizing them is important to ensure good

governance. The (ITU) Eze crisis is a major set back which affected good governance in Ifakala.

The women could have gone far in terms of community development projects and other areas of

good governance.

However, the crisis is also an "eye opener". The newly installed Eze is participating actively in

women's affairs, perhaps to popularize himself and gain the support of the women. The Eze/town

union crisis must have heightened the Eze's responsiveness and involvement in the affairs and

welfare of the women through the Itu women's wing. This is a remarkable improvement and

indication of good governance. The situation was not like this before the crisis; in fact, the late

Eze Ahaneku has had no business with the (ITU) women's wing since the crisis ended.

The (ITU) also invites the chairperson of the (ITU) women's wing during their Christmas and

Easter Conferences. The (ITU) confers with the leaders of the women's wing on issues of

administration and good governance in the community. This has improved the relationship

between the men and women and improved good governance in the community considering the

numerical strength of women. Their participation in the organization and administration of the

community will definitely enhance good governance and general mobilization of the people.

ALADIMMA WOMEN ASSOCIATION MBIERI (Mbieri Development Union Women's Wing)

18

The apex women's organization in Mbieri is called the Aladimma Women Association. The

association is led by Mrs. C. U. Iheukwu of Ubakuru village. In all the eighteen villages in Mbieri

there is an "Aladimma". Though, the Aladimma is as old as the villages, it became an important

forum for women's organization and mobilization since 1971. Thus the Aladimma became an

important instrument of local administration.

The Aladimma Women's Organization (MDU Wing) has a written constitution. Its executive is

made up of the General President, the Secretary General, the Financial Secretary, Treasurer and

Provosts.

The women's wing has branches in all the major cities in Nigeria. Membership is compulsory for

all married women in Mbieri, and these women from the various towns form the branches

although the women from the villages are also a part.

The Aladimma organizes the women from kindred level to Mbieri level. The women see to the

peaceful co-existence of men and women. The Aladimma has undertaken important development

projects like Mbieri general hospital, bore hole scheme and electricity project. The women

executed the Mbieri general hospital themselves, and also contribute to projects executed by the

MDU. The various village Aladimmas also execute community development projects: the

Aladimma of Awo village is currently building a civic hall.

The women recognize the Aladimma women's organization, MDU wing, as the apex organization

for Mbieri women.

Important decisions and elections take place during the annual general meetings in August in

which women living at home and abroad participate.

The Eze and General President of MDU attend the women's general meeting in August. Their

role is to declare the meeting open, address the women and leave the women to continue with

their meeting. There is no interference from the MDU or any other organization. This has fostered

good governance because decisions are taken through the democratic process.

The Eze's wife, lolo Achuke, is like a matron to the Aladimma; she works hand in hand with the

general President of the Aladimma.

The MDU also invites the leaders of the Aladimma to their Christmas and Easter Conferences.

There is an harmonious relationship between the MDU and Aladimma. This has fostered good

19

governance in Mbieri, since there is peace, stability and security in the community which makes

for progress and good governance.

3.4 Other Local Institutions for Governance

In both Ifakala and Mbieri, there are other institutions that play roles in the governance of the

communities. There is the council of "Ozo" title holders commonly called "Nde Nze na Ozo".

There is also the council of elders called "Nde Okii" in the old Owerri province. The Ozo title is

the highest traditional title in most of the community in Igboland, although in some areas there

appear to be higher titles. Nde Nze is an exclusive association for the noble and wealthy men of

the community. Holders of the Ozo title, apart from being sufficiently wealthy to take the title,

are men of transparent character and honesty. A man who is found wanting in character cannot

hold the Ozo title. In fact, the town crier of the community goes round the village with the name

of any aspiring candidate making inquiries and beckoning on the villagers to come and testify to

the candidate's conduct and character before he is initiated. "The title elevates the holder to a

superior social, ritual and political status" (Nzimiro, 1972).

The candidate passes through different stages before he is initiated. The first stage, which is "Ikpo

Oku nze", involves inviting all the holders of Ozo titles in the community to a gathering. After

lavish entertainment, the candidate informs them of his intention to take the Ozo title.

"Igwuonumonu" is the administration of the Ozo oath on the candidate. The candidate is

reminded that his word must be his bond. He is accordingly forbidden from telling lies or

involvement in any form of injustice. He is expected, at all times and in all places, to conduct

himself with due decorum.

"Izu ahia Oza" is the last stage. This involves elaborate entertainment for both the Ozo title-

holders and commoners. It marks the formal introduction of the candidate to the community,

where he is accompanied by Ozo title-holders to the market where he is presented to the people as

an Ozo title-holder. These ceremonies transform the ritual status of the candidate and make his

person semi-sacred. "The elaborate and lavish entertainment which follows the procedure

indicates the social status" (Nzimiro, 1972). The candidate's wife or the most senior wife is also

initiated as a "Lolo". After initiation, the title-holder may no longer eat in public. He may not eat

cola-nut "broken" by a man who is not an Ozo title-holder. In the precolonial days a commoner

cannot speak in the midst of Ozo title-holders talk, as well as not breaking cola-nut or drinking

with them.

20

Collectively, the Ozo title-holders are called "Nde Nze" or council of Ozo title holders. The Ozo

title was regarded as a mark of accomplishment in many parts of Igboland. Truth and honesty are

recognized as distinguishing characteristics of Nde Nze. The word of an nze was his bond. It was

perhaps, in recognition of the sterling qualities of the title-holders that people had taken their

disputes to Nde Nze for adjudication. The practice however, has become less common and is

found only among the older and more traditional generation.

In the historic past, Nde Nze was a select and elite group, and personal integrity counted very

high as a requirement for entry into the group. Following the general debasement of societal

values, wealth and affluence have become dominant factors and anybody who has the means can

take up an Ozo title. The institution nevertheless still exist though its role in the governance of the

community has become minor.

The council of Ozo title-holders has legitimacy as an ancient and respected organ of governance

in traditional Igbo society. Another source of strength has been its stability which derives perhaps

from the fact that it has never been open to all and sundry but has been highly selective in the

recruitment of members.

The council of Ozo title-holders also derives strength from its judicial system that has proved

effective in conflict resolution. Because Nde Nze consists of men of integrity and influential

members of the traditional society, their decisions were respected. Their judicial system was fast,

simple, efficient and relatively much cheaper than the formal legal system.

A source of weakness of the Ozo institution is the fact that it is not entirely open; there is a

considerable level of secrecy in conducting the affairs of the institution. There are some elements

of divination or fetish practices involved in taking the Ozo title. For this reason, some Christian

denominations have barred their members from taking the title. Other sects have tried to modify

the initiation ceremonies by insisting that their members wishing to take the title must omit the

fetish practices but should instead come to church for blessing.

What appears to be another source of weakness is the lack of written records of the system.

Information is transmitted by oral means and there is no documentation of proceedings of

meetings and ceremonies.

There is also the argument that the Ozo institution has tended to fuse power into a few hands.

This situation derives, of course from the restricted membership of the institution.

21

The weakness notwithstanding, the Ozo institution has to some extent continued to serve the

purpose of an important organ for local governance and dispensation of justice. It also provides

the opportunity for perpetuating valuable traditional norms that have weathered the storm of time.

Besides, the institution, if not debased or corrupted, could provide the opportunity for giving

recognition to honest and diligent citizens who have made a significant contribution to the

welfare of the community and local administration.

Nde Okii is the council of elders. It is made up of the eldest men in each kindred or village. Land

disputes, inheritance cases, village and kindred seniority disputes are referred to Ndi Okii;

therefore the council of elders assists in local governance. It could be regarded as a special organ

of governance.

3.5. The Town Union and Eze Institution in the Context of Civil Society

Since the emergence of the society and the institution of government as an instrument of the state,

the increasing powers of the state have continued to be a source of concern to the people and civil

society organizations. The state and state-based institutions appear to have full control of civil

society in the management of social, economic and political affairs of the people. The persistence

of social, economic and political crisis is seen as an indication of the poor performance of the

state and state-based institutions in this role. There is therefore an increasing awareness of the

need to allow civil society organizations a greater role in the governance of communities,

decentralise governance, and encourage economic growth, political and social stability and foster

self-reliance as well as accountability and transparency.

Two conceptions of "civil society" appear to dominate current analysis. They are the political and

sociological conceptions. The two are as different as the disciplinary origins and the emergent

social and political philosophies from which they are derived. For the purpose of the broad

research programme of which this study is a part, civil society is defined as:

An intermediate realm situated between state and household, populated by organized

groups or associations which are separate from state, enjoy some autonomy in relation to

the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their

interests, values or identities.

The above definition provides some basis for classifying the Eze Institution and the Town Union.

The two institutions could appear to be social organizations situated in the public realm beyond

the basic blocks of society. By and large, the distinguishing features of the two institutions are

separation, autonomy and voluntariness. Both institutions would appear to be separate from the

22

government. The Eze Institution is nevertheless a creation of government and is perceived by

many as an arm of the state government at the autonomous community level. Having seen the

historical origin of the Eze Institution from the 1916 ordinance that created the warrant chiefs and

the 1978 Chieftaincy Edict that created the Eze Institution, this points to the fact that the Eze

Institution is state-based. In the first place, the Eze Institution is a creation of government.

Secondly, the Eze, though not selected by the government, is first of all presented on his selection

to the local government. Having gained the recognition of the chairman, he is subsequently

presented to the state administrator/governor from whom he receives the staff of office. Thirdly,

the Eze is a member of the government-instituted council. Traditional rulers functioned as a

consultative arm of the government especially during the military regime. As a member of the

council, the Eze receives a stipend from government. Finally, the Eze may be removed from

office by the government, a prerogative that the people over whom the Eze reigns do not

ordinarily enjoy.

From all indications, the Eze, established by government statutes, crowned by the government,

paid by the government and removed at will by the government, cannot be said to enjoy a high

level of autonomy. The system is highly dependent on the government. Lack of autonomy is

perhaps exemplified by the rather ignoble collective role of Igbo traditional rulers in lending

support to the self-succession bid of General sani Abacha, even against the wishes of the majority

of Igbo people. The action of the traditional rulers perhaps stemmed from the fact that General

Abacha's regime mapped out 5% of the national revenue for the traditional rulers. The dictum that

he who pays the piper dictates the tune would appear to apply in the relationship between the Eze

Institution and the government

The state government and the police consult with the Eze on various matters concerning his

community. The Eze enjoys official recognition as the representative of the people and generally

has greater access to government functionaries than the leadership of the Town Union. While

there is separation between the Eze Institution and the government, the Institution is seen as an

instrument of the state for effecting governance at community level. It is therefore considered to

be in the realm of the state for the purpose of this study.

The Town Union on the other hand has legitimacy which derives from the fact that it was created

by the people. It is the apex of the system of "unions" and "associations" which operate from the

family level through the kindred and village levels to the town level.

All other unions/associations (family, kindred and village unions, social clubs and cultural clubs

etc.) recognise the pre-eminence of the town union. Major issues concerning the town are decided

23

at the Town Union meeting. For instance, issues pertaining to the selection/election of the Eze are

usually discussed at the Town Union meeting. It is a forum for addressing all economic, socio-

cultural and political issues affecting the town. It provides the forum for fostering community

development and for implementing self-help projects. It also "legislates" against practices that

threaten law and order in the town and imposes sanctions as required. Thus, apart from the

developmental role, the Town Union is deeply involved in governance, mobilization and political

participation.

Government occasionally provides a matching grant for community development projects usually

executed under the auspices of the Town Union. Otherwise, the Town Union is independent of

government. The government does not exercise direct control over the Town Union, as is the case

with the Eze Institution.

The president (or chairman) of the Town Union wields as much influence as, if not more than, the

Eze in some respects. The fact is that the tradition of the Town Union and its chairman dates far

beyond the official creation of autonomous communities and Eze Institution. While the Eze is

suppose to take precedence in ceremonial and cultural affairs, and enjoys officials' recognition by

government, the chairman of the Town Union provides the real rallying point for local

governance and for incepting development projects. The relationship between the Eze and the

chairman of the Town Union has been likened to that of the British monarchy and the prime

minister. The relationship, however, as it applies here, is not clearly defined and has been a

source of conflict in the communities.

In summary, there is no doubt that the Town Union is separate from government. It is

autonomous and operates a constitution with no clearly defined links with government. It is a

civil society organisation.

4.0 CASE STUDIES OF ENCOUNTER BETWEEN TOWN UNION AND EZE

INSTITUTION.

4.1 Mbieri Town Union

The Mbieri Town Union is called the Mbieri Development Union (MDU). The MDU is said to be

almost as old as Mbieri town. The Union has a written constitution and is headed by a President-

General. It is at the apex of a system of 18 village unions and a host of kindred meetings.

The Mbieri Development Union has an executive council consisting of the President-General, the

1st and 2nd Vice Presidents, the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary General. Other

24

members of the executive include the Financial Secretary, the Treasurer, the Public Relations

Officer and Provosts.

The union has branches in major urban centres across the country. Notably strong branches exist

in Lagos, Aba, Port Harcourt, Umuahia and Owerri in the south, and Kano, Kaduna and Makurdi

in the north. The MDU also has a strong branch in Cameroon.

The membership of the union consists of all male indigenes who have attained the age of 21

years. In fact, all male indigenes automatically become members of the union on reaching the age

of 21 years. All unmarried daughters of Mbieri on attaining the age of 45 years also become

members of the MDU. There is no registration fee for individuals but villages pay a registration

fee of N50.00. A distinction however has to be made between active and nominal membership.

An active member would pay levies and participate in the programmes of the union. Apparently,

what one attains on reaching the age of 21 is nominal membership.

The common sanction for erring members is to impose fines. Where the erring member is

unwilling to pay the fine he loses his welfare rights in times of upheaval, like the burial ceremony

of a close relation. However, fines imposed as a result of an offence against the land is collected

with the use of "Okorosha masquerade" which among other functions plays the role of a

traditional civil police organization in Mbieri.

Besides the maintenance of law and order, the major achievement of the MDU is the inception of

community development projects. The projects which the MDU has to its credit include: Mbieri

water project, Mbieri Rural Electricity project, Mbieri Secondary Technical School project,

Mbieri General Hospital, Mbieri Local Roads project and Mbieri Scholarship Scheme.

The MDU enjoys the respect and confidence of the people and has legitimacy as a creation of the

people. These factors are a major source of strength for the union. The system has been stable,

providing a rallying point for the people from one generation to another. Branches of the union

provide the forum for the meeting of indigenes of Mbieri outside their own home area.

Easily, the greatest source of strength of the town union is its democratic system. Important

decisions are taken at the union meetings. The union executive is selected through the democratic

process of election.

Decision-making, however, is sometimes slow as varied opinions and interests have to be

considered. The conflicts and quarrels that sometimes arise at general meetings lead to loss of

valuable time and would tend to make decision-making in the system quite inefficient.

25

The MDU is the oldest, apex institution of local governance in Mbieri. Its administrative

structures and system are sometimes informal. The point that should be stressed is that the Eze

Institution has been thoroughly assimilated by the Town Union. Rule 19 of the 1985 Constitution

of MDU is entitled 'Selection of an Eze For Mbieri Autonomous Community'. This section

provides an elaborate description of the processes for the selection, installation and removal (if

the need arises) of the Eze. Thus, the Eze Institution is subordinate to the Town Union. The Town

Union makes the Eze.

4.2. Eze Institution in Mbieri

The history and evolution of the Eze Institution in Mbieri is no different from the emergence of

the Eze Institution in Igboland. For Mbieri there were no known past Ezes until the appointment

of the warrant chiefs like Duruaku Eronini of Awo Mbieri, Agunwa, Ngumezi, Achuko and

others, who operated as colonial warrant chiefs in various parts of Mbieri.

However, the Eze Institution took firm root with the creation of autonomous communities by the

military government in 1978. The traditional title of the Eze of Mbieri is "Eze Ozuzuoha". The

current Eze is His Royal Highness Eze, S.U. Achuko, Eze Ozuzuoha II of Mbieri.

Prior to the 1985 MDU constitution, succession to the Eze stool of Mbieri was partially

hereditary; it is rotated among the recognized ruling houses which were the families of the

colonial warrant chiefs. At any rate, the mode of selection and succession to the Eze stool in

Mbieri has seen reforms. Having been assimilated by the town union, succession to the Eze stool

is now democratic, as clearly indicated in the constitution drawn up by the Mbieri Development

Union (MDU). Although the Eze is selected by the people, he is presented to the local

government chairman and then to the governor who installs him and presents him with the staff

of office. He is a member of the state council of "Ndi Eze" and receives a monthly stipend from

the state government.

The functions of the Eze Ozuzuoha are indicated in the Chieftaincy Edict of Imo State of July 15,

1978. One of these functions is assisting in the maintenance of law and order. Settling of land and

other disputes within the community forms an important aspect of the function. Otherwise, they

are largely ceremonial. As a member of the Imo state council of traditional rulers he liaises

between the Mbieri community and the state government. He is recognized by the state and local

government as the head of the Mbieri community.

The Eze Institution has gained acceptance in Mbieri. The Eze receives financial support from the

village and from individual members of the community depending on his perceived needs. This is

26

in addition to the monthly stipend received from the government. He adjudicates disputes

especially land disputes. He is generally regarded as the custodian of the people's custom and

tradition. In matters concerning land and the gods, the Eze uses the "Okorosha masquerade" as a

traditional civil police organization. He would of course invite the police to handle criminal cases

or difficult civil problems.

Acceptance of the institution is further illustrated by the institution of the village headship.

Village heads play roles similar to those of the Eze but at village level. The Eze Ozuzuoha Mbieri

confers chieftaincy titles on "deserving" persons. The choice of such deserving persons is left

almost entirely to the discretion of the Eze. The Eze's council might make an input in an advisory

capacity.

As already indicated the Eze has a council consisting of all the chiefs in the villages,

representatives of the villages and local institutions and other persons coopted by the Eze. The

legitimacy which the Eze institution in Mbieri enjoys with the state and local governments is the

principal source of strength. The Eze is recognized by government as head of the community. He

is recognised by government and police on matters concerning Mbieri. The verdict of the Eze in

council on dispute is generally accepted and further recourse to the law courts is hardly sought by

the disputants. Another source of strength is the collective decision-making process involving the

Eze and his council of chiefs and elders. In this connection, the Eze in council provides a useful

opportunity especially for women and the poor who may not have the financial resources to seek

redress in the law court.

The Eze Ozuzuoha holds his title for life. He can, however, be removed by the people as

indicated in the constitution through a vote of no-confidence at the Town Union meeting. The Eze

Institution in Mbieri provides stronger and closer linkage with, especially, the state government

and state-based institutions. The Eze enjoys official recognition as the representative of the

people of Mbieri and apparently has greater access to government functionaries than the

leadership of the Town Union.

4.3. Encounter Between Town Union and Eze Institution in Mbieri

The relationship between the Eze and MDU has been very cordial. The Eze understands his role

in the community; he respects the MDU which is the administrative machinery of the community.

While the MDU formulates administrative policies and carries out developmental projects, the

Eze Ozuzuoha II of Mbieri remains the ceremonial head of the community. Therefore, there is an

harmonious relationship between the Eze Institution and the Mbieri Development Union.

27

It is evident that the Mbieri Development Union is the dominant institution for providing

governance in Mbieri community. It is the oldest administrative structure in Mbieri.

Since its creation, the Eze Institution has gained acceptance by the Mbieri people. The Mbieri

Development Union has however assimilated the Eze Institution as a complementary institution

for governance. While the MDU attends to matters of community administration and inception

and implementation of development projects, the Eze Institution performs ceremonial functions

and adjudicates disputes especially land disputes.

The Eze's council in Mberi includes the executives of MDU. In this way, the MDU is involved in

all decisions concerning governance in Mbieri.

The Eze appears to understand his role in the community. The Eze attends the annual general

meetings of MDU, usually at Easter or Christmas. He presents his annual address on issues

concerning development and governance in Mbieri. He also offers advice on the location and

advantages of development projects to be undertaken by the Town Union. The Eze remains the

ceremonial head of the community while the MDU formulates administrative policies and carries

out development projects. This arrangement appears to explain the harmonious relationship

between the MDU and the Eze Institution in Mbieri.

4.4. Eze Institution in Ifakala

"His Royal Highness Eze Cyprain Ahaneku Ezeriohamma I of Ifakala" is the name and traditional

title of the traditional ruler of Ifakala.

Before the crises and conflict that brought major reforms, the succession to the Eze stool of

Ifakala was hereditary. The current constitution of Ifakala Town Union has made the succession

rotary. Though the Eze is selected by the people, he is first of all presented to the chief executive

of the local government before he is installed by the governor, who also presents him with a staff

of office. The functions of the Ezeriohamma is in line with functions of traditional rulers as

stipulated by the Chieftaincy Edict of July 15, 1978. He maintains law and order, settles land and

other disputes and performs other ceremonial functions. As a member of the Imo state council of

traditional rulers, he liaises between the Ifakala community and state government. He is

recognized by the state and local government as the head of Ifakala community.

The Eze institution has gained acceptance in Ifakala; therefore the Eze receives financial support

from individuals and villages that make up the community depending on his perceived needs. In

addition, he receives a monthly stipend from the government. The Eze is the custodian of the

28

people's custom and tradition, he adjudicates disputes especially land disputes and uses the

"Owu" society as the traditional civil police to enforce sanctions and maintain law and order.

Criminal and difficult civil cases are however referred to the police. The village headship is an

extension of the Eze Institution to the villages. The village heads perform the Eze's functions at

village level.

The Ezeriohamma confers a chieftaincy title on deserving persons. The choice of such deserving

persons is at the discretion of the Eze. The Eze's council might make an input in an advisory

capacity.

The legitimacy which the Eze institution in Ifakala enjoys with the state and local governments is

its principal source of strength. As already indicated, the Ezeriohamma is a member of the state's

council of traditional rulers. He is recognised by government as the head of the community. The

government and the police recognise him on matters concerning Ifakala. The verdict of the Eze in

council on disputes is generally accepted and further recourse to the law courts is hardly sought

by the disputants. Another source of strength is the collective decision-making process involving

the Eze and his council of chiefs and elders in this connection. Eze in council provides a useful

opportunity, especially, for women and the poor who may not have the financial resources to seek

redress in the law court.

The heredity nature of the Eze stool in Ifakala was a source of weakness in the system. The strife

that ensued with choosing a successor, which has been the bane of the system in most parts of

Igboland, caused enormous stress to the community.

The Eze holds the title for life. He, however, can be removed by the people as indicated by the

new constitution of the Ifakala Town Union through a vote of no-confidence at the Town Union

general meeting.

The Eze Institution in Ifakala provides stronger and closer linkage with particularly the state

government and state-based institutions. The Eze enjoys official recognition as the representative

of Ifakala and apparently has greater access to government functionaries than the leadership of

the Town Union.

The greatest threat to the Eze institution in Ifakala has been the increasing incidence of conflict

between the town union and its president general on the one hand and the Ezeriohamma on the

other. These conflicts arise when either party attempts to set aside any provision of the

constitution. By and large, the greatest threat to the Eze Institution appears to be the situation of

two 'captains in one boat'. One captain installed and apparently propped up by the state; the other

29

installed by the people apparently struggling to check the erosion of power occasioned by the

introduction of the former. Some episodes in the conflict-ridden relationship between the Eze and

the Town Union are discussed subsequently.

4.5. Ifakala Town Union

The Ifakala Town Union (ITU) is headed by a president general. There was no written

constitution when the union started, but this came into use in the 1990s after some crises. There

are village meetings at the five villages that make up Ifakala. The ITU is at the apex of the village

meetings.

The executive council of the union consists of the President-General, the Vice President, the

Secretary-General, the Assistant Secretary-General, the Financial Secretary, the Treasurer, the

Publicity Secretary, the Social Secretary, the Assistant Social-Secretary, five provosts, the Legal

Adviser and five Internal Auditors.

The union has branches in major urban centres across the country. Notably strong branches are in

Lagos, Port Harcourt, Aba, Umuahia and Owerri. Others are in Yola, Kano and Kaduna.

Every indigene of the Ifakala autonomous community is in principle a member of the Ifakala

Town Union. However, the financial members are the registered members and those who pay

their levies regularly.

Besides the maintenance of law and order, the union also undertakes developmental projects in

the community. Some of the projects undertaken by the union are: Ifakala Market project, Ifakala

Water project, Ifakala Comprehensive Secondary School and Ifakala Civic hall.

Ifakala Town Union enjoys respect, confidence and legitimacy as a creation of the people. These

factors are a major source of strength for the union. The system has been providing a rallying

point for the people from one generation to another. Branches of the union provide the forum for

the meetings of indigenes of Ifakala outside their own home area.

Election and decision-making in the union is through democratic process. Decision-making is,

however, sometimes slow as varied opinions and interest groups have to be considered. The

conflicts and quarrels that sometimes arise at general meetings lead to loss of valuable time and

would tend to make decision-making in the system quite inefficient.

The greatest threat to the union appears to be the conflict between the Eze and the union which

has tended to polarise the community, alienating some sections of the community, and thus

30

eroding the power base of the town union. Some specific incidents in the relationship between the

Eze and the Town Union form the subject matter for discussion in the next section.

4.6. Episodes in the Encounter Between the Eze Institution and Ifakala Town Union

4.6.1 "Osu" Abolition

The source and cause of this conflict can be traced to the smallest village in Ifakala, an

autonomous community called Amafor. This village is the Osu of Ifakala community. In 1990 the

people of Amafor collectively asked Eze Cyprain Ahaneku to abolish the Osu caste system in

Ifakala and pass a law that the Osu and 'Diala' of Ifakala community could inter marry. Osu is the

lowest caste in the strata of the Igbo social system, while the Diala is the highest cast. According

to the traditions and culture of the Igbo, it is culturally unacceptable for a Diala to marry an Osu.

The Osus marry within themselves. The Diala, or "Nwadiala" as popularly used in Igboland, is a

free-born of every Igbo society. The Nwadiala has no cultural impediment or social disability,

thus he is free to occupy any political, social or religious position in the community. Unlike

Nwadiala, the Osu or "Ndi Osu" is subject to certain prescribed social disabilities, social stigma

and discrimination within the society. The Osu system is an integral part of Igbo religious

practice. The Igbo believe in gods, deities, ancestral worship and after-life as manifested in

rituals, sacrifice for propitiation and cleansing. Therefore, from time to time, the people offer

sacrifice to their gods with fowls, goats, cows and human beings as well depending on the nature

and purpose of the sacrifice and what is demanded by the gods. These human beings used as

sacrifice to the gods are Ndi Osu or Osu. According to Basden (1938:246):

Osu mean a "slave" but one distinct from an ordinary slave by the fact that he is the

property of a god - in plain language "a living sacrifice"

Thus sacrificed to a god deity or shrine, the slave and his descendants are therefore sentenced to

social degradation and political discrimination. An Osu also enjoys certain privileges because of

the ritual implication between him and the custodian god or deity. An Osu must not be harmed or

killed. If he is accidentally killed by anyone, a replacement is mandatory. Therefore "an Osu is a

person who has been dedicated to a shrine or a deity; that person and his descendants are

therefore regarded as social pariahs with no social rights" (Egwuonwu, 1979:18). The social

status of an Osu may be likened to that of an Indian "untouchable" before the Untouchability Act

of 1954.

However, unlike the Indian untouchables, a Ndi Osu is not without rights. The custom and

cultural mores of the people stipulate the duties of a Ndi Osu. According to Basden (1938: 249):

31

The duties of a Ndi Osu consist of cleaning the compound of the god which, as a rule, is

the market place. They must cut the bush and grass and keep the precincts tidy; they are

permitted to farm the land assigned to the god and they alone may eat of the fruits

thereof.

It is important to note that the abolition of the Osu system in Eastern Nigeria (Egwuonwu,

1979:17) makes it unconstitutional to refer to anybody or a group of persons as Osu or Ndi Osu

respectively. The enforcement of this law, however, has continued to pose a problem to both

political and religious leaders. The religious connotation and undertone and the social stigma

make it difficult to eradicate this system entirely. Thus the abolition of the Osu Bill in Eastern

Nigeria has only succeeded in driving the system underground rather than eradicating the

practice. The Ifakala Town Union and the majority of Ifakala people insist that the Osu Act of

Eastern Nigeria takes care of the abolition of the Osu system in Igboland at large. They maintain

that Ifakala does not need a separate law to abolish the Osu system in Ifakala. Thus despite the

fact that the Osu Act prescribes punishment for the continued practice of the Osu system, the

people in their minds are yet to let go of the system. Consequently, no Nwadiala or freeborn in

Ifakala will be intimidated or mandated by any leader through any type of legislation to inter-

marry with a Ndi Osu. The abolition of the Osu system in Igboland is a thing of the future which

will be eradicated by the forces of cultural and social dynamisms rather than legal or political

legislations. Good governance respects the popular will of the people; it is against the tenets of

good governance for the Eze, who initially refused to be dragged into the controversy of

abolishing the Osu system in Ifakala, to have turned round to impose inter-marriage between the

Nwadiala and Ndi Osu at the expense of good governance which is emphatic on law and order,

economic growth and political stability. The consequent political chaos and economic regression

in Ifakala which derive from the above conflict are a manifestation of the people's revolt and

rejection of the Eze and his allies. Based on this cultural norm, the Eze's rejection of this request

by the Amafor village was right since it was against the tradition of the people. However,

Amafor village felt aggrieved and ganged up against the Eze and the Town Union because the

Town Union supported the Eze's decision.

Thus Amafor village started different acts of insubordination to oppose the Eze and the Town

union. They went further to claim that Amafor village has passed a vote of no-confidence on the

Eze.

The Town Union as at then was Ifakala Central Union (ICU) headed by Chief J.I. Uba. The

Central Union saw this as an insult and a slight on the person and office of the Eze. The union

32

brought pressure to bear on Amafor village until the vote of no-confidence was withdrawn and a

public apology rendered to the Eze.

Though Amafor is the smallest village in Ifakala, it wields significant influence in Ifakala politics

on account of the relative wealth and influence of Amafor sons. Subsequently, it is said that

Amafor village made peace with the Eze and lured him to their side with money and gifts. Their

motive it was said was to put a wedge between the Town Union and the Eze and to win the Eze to

their side.

Having found an ally in the Eze, the village once again brought up the issue of abolishing the Osu

cast in Ifakala. The Eze was now convinced of the need to abolish the Osu system in Ifakala, and

made a declaration that the Osu and Diala should inter-marry, in violation of the tradition and

culture of the people. The Eze was backed by the local government which made reference to the

Osu Act of Eastern Nigeria.

The Town Union opposed the declaration because it was a violation of the people's cultural

norms. This disagreement created a rift between the Eze and the Town Union. Amafor backed the

Eze against the Town Union and the community was polarised into two.

Amafor and the Eze and his supporters withdrew their support from the Town Union. The Town

Union which depended heavily on the financial contributions of wealthy personalities from

Amafor became handicapped. Ifakala Water project, which is located at Amafor, was abandoned.

Amafor village became alienated from the rest of the community. Social interaction between the

two 'warring factions' stopped. Buying and selling could no longer take place between the two

sides. People lost patronage in their various business and social ventures (such as traditional

weddings and other ceremonies) as the crisis situation continued.

4.6.2 Dissolution of Ifakala Central Union

The Eze decided to dissolve the Town Union's executive douncil because of the rift created by the

Osu episode. It was a unilateral decision which the President General and Executive of Ifakala

Town Union (ICU) challenged at the Owerri High Court in 1991.

While the Town Union was struggling to survive the Eze's dissolution order, it lost a considerable

amount of resources prosecuting the court case. Meanwhile, the Eze's supporters withdrew their

financial and moral support from the Town Union. Consequently, all the development projects

33

embarked upon by the Town Union, including the erection of classroom blocks at the Ifakala

Comprehensive Secondary School, were abandoned.

4.6.3. Vote of No-Confidence on the Eze

The relationship between the Eze and the Town Union became a cat and mouse affair. The Town

Union, after a critical review of the Eze's conduct in a general meeting, passed a vote of no-

confidence in Eze Cyprain Ahaneku, Ezeriohamma I of Ifakala, on the 4th day of April 1992, as

was reported by the Daily Champion (page 14) of that date. The Eze reacted and dragged the

Town Union executive to court, questioning their authority to remove him from office.

The crisis created a vacuum in the governance of Ifakala. The people (except Amafor people)

withdrew their recognition and support from the Eze. The local and state governments tactically

supported the Eze, awaiting the decision of the court. There was political stalemate in Ifakala as

the cases were pending in court. Uncertainty ensued. Financial resources meant for development

were wasted in court. All development projects were abandoned because of financial stress and

the polarisation of the community.

The cases were still pending in court when Eze Cyprain Ahaneku, Ezeriohamma I of Ifakala died

suddenly. Because of the crisis, the Eze was buried without the usual community rites. A vast

segment of Ifakala people did not attend his burial. Ifakala remained without Eze. The crisis also

affected the ICU which virtually collapsed between 1993 and 1994.

Between 1994 and 1995, the newly elected Mbaitoli local government chairman, Chief Onu

Egbunihe, tried to restore peace and harmony in Ifakala. Chief Onu started with the revival of the

Town Union. A constitution drafting committee was set up to draft a constitution for Ifakala

Town Union (ITU) which was the name given to the revived union. The constitution drafting

committee, made up of prominent persons including the then Chief Justice of Imo State and other

lawyers from the Ministry of Justice, finished their job and an election was conducted. Mr.

Akwara of Uba Ifakala won the election and became president of ITU.

4.6.4 Selection of Another Eze

On the 29th day of June, 1994, the ITU declared the Eze throne in Ifakala vacant and called on

interested candidates to obtain the election registration form from the ITU after paying the sum of

N 10,000.00 non refundable deposit.

34

Trouble started once again when Cyril Ahaneku, the son of the late Eze Cyprain Ahaneku, laid

claim to the Eze stool. Cyril Ahaneku ignored the constitutional electoral process and installed

himself Eze with the support of some members of his village and Amafor village, the village that

supported his late father. He presented himself to the local government chairman as the traditional

ruler of Ifakala. The ITU and a majority of Ifakala people disowned him and disassociated

themselves from his leadership, and continued with the process of selecting a new Eze. To stop

the selection process, Cyril Ahaneku dragged the ITU to court seeking recognition from the ITU.

He claimed that the Eze stool was hereditary and that he was the heir to the stool.

While the case was still in court, the ITU continued with the Eze selection process, after which

Michael Ekeruo of Umuagwuoche village emerged as the Ezeriohamma II of Ifakala autonomous

community.

With the emergence of Eze Michael Ekeruo, Cyril Ahaneku sued Michael Ekeruo in court,

challenging his election and installation as the traditional ruler of Ifakala autonomous community.

The Town Union backed Michael Ekeruo against Ahaneku who was backed by Amafor village.

The crisis once again polarised the community into two blocks. The ITU, Eze Michael Ekeruo

and the majority of Ifakala people were called "black-legs" while the block supporting Cyril

Ahaneku (i.e. Amafor village and some members of Owere Ifakala Ahaneku's village) were

called "white-legs."

This polarisation affected all the economic, social and political activities in the autonomous

community. The black-legs could not interact with the white-legs. It was not until recently when

the court declared Eze Michael Ekeruo the recognized tradition ruler of Ifakala that some

semblance of calm returned to the community.

5.0 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EZE TOWN UNION RELATIONSHIP IN

MBIERI AND IFAKALA AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY.

In both communities the Eze is seen as a state-based institution which performs ceremonial

functions in the governance of the community, while the Town Union is the actual administrative

machinery of the community put in place by the people.

In both communities the head of the Town Union is the president general elected through a

democratic process. Both unions are as old as the two communities, while the Eze institution

officially dates back to 1978.

35

However, the relationship between the Eze and the Town union was much more cordial and

harmonious in Mbieri than in Ifakala. Eze S.U. Achuko, Eze Ozuzuoha I of Mbieri, who was

selected in 1978 after the Imo State chieftaincy Edict in 1978, has a good working relationship

with the Town Union.

The MDU has assimilated the Eze Institution; its constitution provides for the selection and

installation process of the Eze. The Eze is the first citizen and ceremonial head of the Mbieri

community. He is also the custodian of the people's tradition and culture.

The relationship between the Eze and the MDU is harmonious because the Eze does not meddle

or interfere with the policies of the MDU. The Eze is the chief patron of MDU; he attends the

MDU meetings only occasionally to present his annual address to the Union. He would normally

depart after this, leaving the conduct of the meeting to the president general. The Eze does not

confer chieftaincy titles without the knowledge of the MDU. The MDU leadership in turn

respects the Eze. Thus, there is harmony between the Eze and the MDU.

In Ifakala the situation is different. The relationship between the Eze and the Ifakala Town Union

(ITU) is conflict-ridden. While the conflicts in Ifakala affect the Eze Institution, the Town Union

and socio-cultural, political and economic activities negatively, the harmonious relationship in

Mbieri encourages good governance and community development.

The point that should be noted is that the MDU took steps to integrate the kingship institution into

its constitution even before the first Eze was appointed. Initially, succession was rotatory among

the families that produced warrant chiefs in the colonial era. Subsequently, with the review of

MDU's constitution, succession was through a democratic elective process. It is also relevant to

note that MDU executive formed part of the council of the Eze.

In contrast, Ifakala Central Union (ICU) had no constitution of its own and did not integrate the

kingship system into the existing system of local governance before the first Eze was selected.

After the selection of the first Eze, the twin problems of the mode of succession and hierarchical

order threatened the relationship between the Town Union and the Eze Institution. The Eze and

his supporters naturally argued for heredity as the mode of succession in contrast to the views

held by the Town Union and a generality of the people who opted for democratic election. The

Eze claimed ascendancy over the Town Union as manifested in his efforts to decree the

dissolution of the Union. The Union, for its part, flexed its muscle in the purported removal of the

Eze.

6.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION.

36

The need to decentralise and diffuse the powers of the state and state-based institutions has

become apparent, especially through the experience of Nigeria following decades of military rule

and the despotic use of power by the state and state-based institutions. Moreover, the persistence

of social and economic crises is seen as an indication of the poor performance of the state and

state-based institutions. There is the increasing awareness that to achieve societal objectives and

good governance, it has becomes imperative to assign greater roles to civil society organizations

in the governance of communities.

In Igboland, the Eze Institution and the Town Union are the most important local institutions for

governance. The Eze Institution was proliferated in Igboland by government edict. The Eze,

though selected by the people, is actually given the staff of office by the head of the state

government. The Eze is a member of the state council of traditional rulers and receives a monthly

stipend from the state government. The Eze Institution is considered paraphernalia of government

at the community level.

The Town Union, on the other hand, is at the apex of a system of unions/associations which have

provided governance at the community level before the introduction of the Eze Institution by the

government. Apart from the maintenance of law and order, the union provides a forum for

formulating and implementing self-help community development projects and the general

governance of the autonomous communities.

The interface between the Eze and the Town Union in Mbieri and Ifakala, the two communities

chosen as case studies, provides a contrast in harmonious and conflict relationships. The findings

indicate that in Mbieri autonomous community, the relationship between the Eze and the Town

Union has been generally cordial and their roles have been complementary.

In Ifakala community, conflicts have arisen because the government statutes that established the

Eze Institution failed to define the role of the Eze and the Town Union in the governance of the

community. Accordingly, a situation of two captains in one boat ensued, generating crises in the

community.

While the crises lasted, the Eze, Town Union and the community suffered. The crises are said to

have claimed the life of Eze Cyprain Ahaneku in the form of pressure from the crises and the

consequent vote of no confidence passed on him by the town union. Socially the crises

manifested in poor attendance at social gatherings like marriage ceremonies, burial ceremonies

and the Owu festival. People restricted attendance of these ceremonies within their own block.

37

Because of suspicion, acrimony and lack of patronage, the highest social and cultural institution

of the community, the Owu festival, almost collapsed.

Economically people restricted buying and selling within their own block. The white-leg, the

minority group, appears to have suffered more because they were not patronized by the black-legs

in their businesses within the community.

The ultimate outcome of the crisis is the strengthening of the Town Union. The Ifakala Town

Union now has a written constitution which has strengthened its operation and has successfully

defined the role of the Eze Institution in the community. The Town Union appears to have gained

some recognition from the local government. The local government chairman was instrumental in

reviving the Town Union and drafting the Town Union constitution that defined the modes of

accession and succession to the Eze stool. The new constitution has enabled the Town Union to

assimilate the Eze Institution for better collaboration and good governance.

The ultimate beneficiaries are the Town Union and the community. The Town Union appears to

have gained ascendancy over the Eze Institution. The power relationships have changed to the

advantage of the Town Union. Furthermore the encounter attracted the attention of both the state

and local governments, thereby gaining for the Town Union some measure of government

recognition. The system of accession and success to the Eze stool has now been democratised.

Any son of Ifakala can now aspire the Eze stool. The situation accords with the prevailing spirit

of democracy.

Experience further shows that the apparent ascendancy of the Town Union over the Eze

Institution in Ifakala has an additional advantage. In a broader context, military regimes appear to

have easily manipulated the Eze Institution to legitimize their stay in office and to achieve their

often unpopular objectives. In the event of a despotic regime, the manipulation of the more

diffuse Town Union that thrives on popular support would be much more difficult. The Town

Union as an institution offers better prospects for democracy to thrive than the Eze Institution.

In conclusion, the crisis that ensued in Ifakala should be seen in a broader perspective. The

problems posed by the mode of accession and succession to the Eze stool and the tussle for

supremacy between the Eze and Town Union easily constitute the greatest threat to both the

Town Union and kingship institution in Igboland. Since the promulgation of the Chieftaincy

Edict of 1978, many autonomous communities in Igboland have not been able to select the first

Eze for lack of agreement on the mode of accession. Some of the communities that, for

convenience, choose the first Eze from the families of the colonial warrant chiefs, have been

38

unable to replace their deceased Ezes again on account of lack of unanimity on the mode of

succession. The spirit of heredity appears to be incompatible with the spirit of the democratic

village republic in which leaders are produced by popular acclaim. The situation is such that all

over Igboland where the issue of succession to the Eze stool has not been resolved, the issue has

tended to polarise the community and destabilize the Town Union which is the traditional organ

for governance and for the inception of development activities in Igboland.

It should be stressed that the crisis in the relationship between the Eze Institution and the Town

Union derives principally from the fact that the government instrument that set up the Eze

Institution failed to take cognisance of the existing local institutions for governance at the

community level. Accordingly, it did not define the relationship or delineate the interface

between the Eze Institution and the existing dominant instrument for governance - the Town

Union. Furthermore, government instrument establishing the Eze Institution did not clearly define

the order of hierarchy, even though it implicitly accords the position of superiority to the Eze

Institution by making the Eze the ceremonial head and the custodian of the culture and custom of

the community.

The problem that stems from government neglect of existing institutions for governance in

hoisting the Eze Institution is widespread, as reflected by several court cases and protests to

government. It has usually taken the intervention of government or the law courts to resolve. The

resolution by law courts has usually taken long durations and the cost to communities in terms of

financial and other resources has been enormous.

To remedy the situation, the governments should formalise its relationship with the Town Union

just as it has done with the Eze Institution, to strengthen the town union in its role as a tried and

tested instrument for providing good governance at the community level. The relationship

between the two institutions should be defined by the government to enable the Town Union

assimilate the Eze Institution. The situation of two captains in one boat should cease to exist.

Experience shows that Town Unions have achieved much more for local communities than most

local governments in Igboland. Thus, the Town Union should be accorded more recognition as

the key organ for fostering good governance at the grassroots in Igboland. The Town Union

working harmoniously with the Eze Institution should provide an easy and dependable link for

reaching the people and for fostering social and economic development.

39

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