chemical weapons in question

CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN

QUESTION

July 10, 2013 | Brussels, Belgium

MODERATOR:

Sinan Ülgen, visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe

SPEAKER:

H.E. Ahmet Üzümcü, director general of the

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Transcript by Way With Words

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery

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JAN TECHAU: It’s great to have people in such large numbers actually on a day like this, on a topic like this. We have chosen a particularly beautiful topic as our season closes for the summer break, chemical weapons – not usually something that is pretty and pleasant to talk about. Still, I hope that we will have a good discussion tonight because they have of course become very popular to talk about again because of the Syrian crisis and the Syrian civil war and the alleged or proven use of those weapons in that theatre. What’s often overlooked is that of course, behind the scenes and for years and years there have been efforts on these specific weapons – to ban them, to get rid of them, to work with them, to create awareness about them. Those efforts have actually been actually been quite successful because stockpiles around the world have been going down pretty much continuously. Ambassador Üzümcü, who’s here today, who represents this organisation, leads this organisation, has been instrumental in these efforts, has agreed to talk to us today. It’s a great honour to have him. We just had a fascinating little discussion upstairs to get it really going, including about the question: why chemical weapons are actually so much nastier weapons than just guns. You think you have a clear answer for that, but it’s actually not that easy – it actually borders on the philosophical, but obviously there are many aspects to this that warrant discussion. The Ambassador will kick off with an introduction to the regime that his organisation is overseeing and trying to implement. Then, as always with Carnegie, it’s up to you and you will have your questions and then get into a discussion. The event will be moderated by Sinan Ülgen who is of course a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, as hopefully all of you will know. You are our final audience before the summer break; I hope you will enjoy this and stock yourself up with the reading material over there, and enjoy the evening. Thank you very much, Sinan? SINAN ÜLGEN: Thank you so much, Jan, and again, welcome to you all. By way of introduction Jan has already said the main theme, has set out the framework, so without further ado, Ambassador Üzümcü, I would like you to start sharing your insights with us. AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: Thank you, Sinan, it’s indeed a pleasure for me to be here at Carnegie Brussels office, and the topic is already known. I’m going to speak about the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. I am heading the Technical Secretariat of this organisation for the last three years, and in fact I have to say that this is one of the success stories in the field of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. The Chemical Weapons Convention in fact took some time to finalise. In fact the negotiations themselves were conducted in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for about 20 years and these negotiations, in fact, have been carried out on the basis of the principle of consensus, so there were of course give and takes. Still the International Community was able to conclude a comprehensive treaty convention, a legal instrument, in


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fact, which prohibits the production, stockpiling and development and use of those weapons. This is in itself a major achievement. Clearly, in this background we have to see that the massive use of the chemical weapons during the First World War had several attempts to prevent the use of those toxic substances in the warfare. In 1925 the Geneva Protocol was concluded which in fact prohibits the use of those weapons, but did not prohibit the production of them. In the 1940s, during the Second World War, many states had produced those weapons; they did not use them extensively, but they were stored and developed, even though they were not used. When this instrument in fact was first signed in 1993 then entered into force in 1997, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW, was in fact established in The Hague. We have a Technical Secretariat, as we call it, staffed by around 500 officers, and a large part of them are inspectors who carry out the verification mechanism of the Convention. Since then, actually for the past 16 years, this secretariat in fact oversees the implementation of the Convention by states’ parties. We have an executive council composed of 41 countries’ representatives, which rotates and which are, in fact, equitably shared by five geographical regions. We have an annual conference which means that at the end of November or early December every year, and a review conference which meets every five years. Clearly, conferences bring together across all the states’ parties. Our review conferences have the mandate to review the implementation and also to propose some recommendations for the future. Last year the conference was held in April, and which started on the 8th and ended 19th, and it produced quite a comprehensive report which includes several recommendations for the future of the organisation. This is the decision-making and the consensus principles that continues to be applied with a few exceptions. In fact, the organisation’s states’ parties were able to take decisions on the basis of consensus. This was also a major achievement, I believe. The first priority for the past 16 years has been the disarmament or demilitarisation, as we call it, and the goal was to destroy the existing stockpiles, to eliminate them forever. Clearly, this was quite a labour-intensive, hazardous, as well as costly exercise, costly operation. Seven countries, seven states’ parties have declared chemical weapons - three of them have already completed destruction operations – Albania, India and a state party which requested anonymity, completed them. The Russian Federation, United States, Libya and Iraq are continuing their destruction activities. Overall, the destruction level is about 80%, although the final extended deadline of 29th April 2012 was not met. This issue was an extremely important issue that states’ parties had to address for almost three years, and at the end of 2011. In fact, there was a decision by the Conference of States’ Parties which enabled the possessor states to continue destruction activities with a wider transparency: regular reports by the SPS, regular reports by the director-general, myself, who has the task, in fact, to monitor the progress


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on destruction, and through our inspection activities. I have to report whether those operations in fact are on track, or not. The United States has reached a level of 90% of destruction of its stockpiles. They have already completed in seven facilities, and two other facilities are being built. It will take some five or six years more to destroy their remaining stockpiles. Just to give you an idea, the US has already spent $25 billion to $26 billion to destroy 90% of their stockpiles, and they plan to spend $6 billion to $7 billion more. That’s, as I said earlier, very costly; in each plant 1,000 people are working round the clock, and they carry out those destructions under the verification of the OPCW inspectors who are permanently present during the destruction activities. In the Russian Federation, at the moment there are four facilities which are operational. The last and fifth one will become operational towards the end of this year. They’ve reached a level of 75% so far, and the progress is quite steady and encouraging. The planned completion date for the Russian destruction activities is the end of 2015, and the destruction so far seems to be on track. In the case of Libya, you may recall that Libya in fact joined the organisation in 2004, and they destroyed parts of their chemical weapons. Recently they destroyed the Bulk Sulphur Mustard they had, but there were also newly discovered weapons which were in fact declared by the new regime. Those weapons will be destroyed hopefully by the end of this year or early next year. There are other stocks of Category 2 CWS which are precursors, which will be eventually destroyed. In the case of Iraq, there are remnants of chemical weapons in two bunkers, and this requires quite a careful treatment. We will help them, and some other states’ parties do help the Iraqis on technical grounds, and we hope to get rid of them in the next two or three years. This is itself a major achievement, because the idea, in fact, the goal is to reach Global Zero as far as the states’ parties are concerned on chemical weapons, to get rid of all existing stockpiles and then focus more on prevention of re-emergence of chemical weapons. In terms of prevention of re-emergence of chemical weapons, we have verification mechanisms: under Article 6 of the Convention we verified the chemical industry plants which produce dual-use chemicals which might be used for the production of chemical weapons. We also monitor their transfers. The states’ parties have the obligation to declare their exports and imports, so we have compared those data and if there are discrepancies between the two we address them directly with the states’ parties concerned, and reconcile them. Those verification inspections are aimed at verifying the accuracy of declarations, so this is a system which is functioning on the basis of declarations. States’ parties know what to declare and how to do it. We have communication means that we are in the process of improving. We will soon, hopefully, establish an electronic transmission of those


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declarations in the coming months, which will allow us, in fact, to apply a more electronic software verification mechanism. Having said that, is everything perfect? No. We have to improve this verification mechanism – we realise that. In cooperation with the chemical industry, which is an important partner for us - and the chemical industry, in fact, has also been a partner in the negotiations of the Convention, so this partnership is continuing - we want to make this mechanism more effective in the coming years. These are for the obligations, but there are also rights. The Convention itself has been a balanced instrument between the obligations and rights. For instance, if a state party feels the threat of use of chemical weapons, or is subject to the use of chemical weapons, it, in fact, can request some assistance from the organisation as well as from other states’ parties. We have the obligation, in fact, as also the states’ parties have the obligation, to assist this particular state party. In that respect, we also have routine, regular capacity-building activities for protection in order to build some capacity for effective emergency response in our states’ parties. Over the past two, three years we’ve encouraged them, in fact, to develop some regional capacities. In that context, we want to cooperate more, for instance, with the European Union, which is working on regional centres of excellence. We have also the programmes for the promotion of peaceful use of chemistry. In that context, we have several activities throughout the year, be it on a regional basis as well as in The Hague. Developing countries, especially, show a particular interest those programmes because, from their perspectives, since they don’t have chemical weapons, they don’t have declarable chemical industrial plants, so their interest would be limited if we didn’t have these programmes. This represents a major incentive for them to remain engaged in the implementation of the Convention. From that perspective, these programmes are extremely important to keep the developing countries engaged in the OPCW work. Having said that, in spite of those achievements, there are challenges. For instance, the universality of the Convention is not yet full. We have at the moment 189 states’ parties, which is considerable in numbers, but there are still seven countries which are not yet on board, among them Syria, which I will come to in a moment. In Africa, there is Angola and South Sudan which are not yet members. In Asia, North Korea and Myanmar are not yet parties to the Convention, and in the Middle East, Egypt, Syria and Israel. Israel and Myanmar, by the way, are signatories, but they do not ratify the Convention. That’s a very important issue. The states’ parties as well as the Technical Secretariat have been making special efforts to ensure full universality over the use, but there were some impediments to do it, especially... let me first deal with Angola, Myanmar and South Sudan. We think for those three countries, in fact South Sudan has been a member in our bigger Sudan in the past, this is a matter of time for them to become members. This has not been a priority for those countries, that we understand, but it’s going to happen soon, as we see it.


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For the other countries, North Korea, unfortunately did not respond to our several demarches in the past. As to the three countries in the Middle East, the issue was linked to the nuclear issue for years, and no progress was achieved. Of course, there was this initiative to hold a WMD Free Zone conference in Finland, which was, in fact, supposed to be held by the end of 2012 but which didn’t happen. We were hoping that this process, or the process that could begin with the conference, could pave the way for also universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The indication of Syria... there have been numerous reports about the existence of chemical weapons in this country, and estimates go between 100 tonnes up to 1,000 tonnes of different kinds of weapons and different kinds of delivery vehicles. As the OPCW, we are not able to verify them. This is not a state party and we don’t have any legal ground to do and inspect this particular country and verify the reports. As you know, on 19th March there was a allegation of use near Aleppo, and the Syrian Government made a request to the UN Secretary-General. There is a mechanism, in fact, based on the 1925 Geneva Protocol according to which the Secretary-General could invoke this mechanism and, in fact, ask a team of experts to investigate the alleged uses of chemical weapons. This mechanism was used in the past, in late 80s and early 90s, before the existence of the OPCW. In the Convention, when the Convention was negotiated, one specific provision was made according to which the OPCW has the obligation to provide its resources to support such an investigation if it’s invoked in the future. This is the first time that this mechanism was invoked by the UN Secretary-General since the inception of the Chemical Weapons Convention. When we were asked by the UN Secretary-General, we responded immediately, actually, affirmatively, and we made available some experts. Following this request by the Syrian Government, there were other requests by UK and France, then later by UK again and recently by the United States. As a whole, there are now seven cases of allegations of use in Syria. The UN Secretariat, in fact, has worked out terms of reference. Unfortunately, it was not finalised. Therefore, this fact-finding mission, headed by a Swedish expert appointed by the UN Secretary-General and supported by the OPCW as well as WHO, was not able to deploy to Syria. We had sent an advance team to Cyprus, but then we had to withdraw them because there was no immediate possibility of deploying the team to Syria. In the absence of that, the investigation team is continuing to gather information from different sources. Recently they were in Turkey, they had some contact interviews, and they are also receiving some information from some other states’ parties. In the end, they will submit a report to the UN Secretary-General, and all their findings will be the property of the United Nations. If the UN Secretary-General... actually, I suppose that it is going to share with the UN Secretary Council and UN members, eventually. I should add that the team has the mandate to identify or to determine whether chemical weapons are used or not; they don’t have the mandate to identify who used those chemical


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weapons, if they are used. As for Syria, we hope that the team still could be deployed, because in the absence of that, the chain of custody, as we call it, will not be in place. According to this procedure, the samples will have to be collected by the investigation team itself. It’s not really a matter of trust or mistrust. I know that some states’ parties have stated that they’ve found some evidence, but the UN investigation team cannot use them as evidence. Still, it may be eventually useful to compare that information with their own findings. Having said that, one important point that I missed, perhaps related to our verification method, I should add that we have a challenge inspection mechanism. Challenge inspection mechanism has never been invoked, so far, in the history of the OPCW, but any state party has the right, in fact, to invoke this mechanism if they have some serious suspicions about the compliance of other states’ parties. If there is such a request, the Secretariat has the mandate to be ready to conduct such inspections, at any given time within 24 hours. We have to send our inspectors and find out whether the claims of the particular state party are correct or not. We have the obligation, of course, to report back to the Executive Council. Another mechanism is investigation of alleged use, so, apart from the UN mechanism, of course, if, for instance, there were claims of use by a state party or in any state party, it would be the task of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW to carry out such a mission. Since Syria is not a state party, only the UN mechanism could be invoked. I spoke about Syria, I spoke about universality, and, again, for the future, once the destruction of existing stockpiles is over, clearly the future of the OPCW actually has to be determined: what would be the future parties and so on. I think the new balance, in fact, has to be targeted between the verification mechanism, through the inspection of chemical and industrial plants and other monitoring of transfer and so on, on the one hand, and the Article X, assistance and protection, as well as promotion of issues, purposeful use of chemistry activities, on the other. That’s what we are aiming at in the future. One important area is also to raise awareness about the Convention and its obligations among relevant communities. For instance, even in scientific communities, we have observed that the Convention is not adequately known, so we want to undertake some education and outreach activities in order to raise awareness. We will, in fact, launch a campaign in 2014, in several states’ parties, be it at national regional levels or regional levels, with a view to having a conversation in The Hague at the end of 2014. In the same vein, we want to further promote the achievements of the Convention and to reaffirm the determination of the International Community, using the centennial of the first massive use of chemical weapons, in 2015. We will work together with the Belgian


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Government, because they were used in Ypres, in Belgium, for the first time. We will also carry out some activities back in The Hague at the OPCW headquarters. Maybe I should stop here. Of course, I welcome any comments or questions, and I’ll be ready to answer them. Thank you for listening. SINAN ÜLGEN: Thank you very much, Ambassador Üzümcü. I’m sure there will be many, but before I turn to you for your questions I will use the advantage of being the chair today of perhaps asking you one question, to start the discussion, which is going to be on Syria given the importance and the salience of the issue. I would like to know whether as an organisation, when you’re asked – well, in the case of Syria, it didn’t really happen – but if you were able to go to the country, some of your team that is part of the UN team that was waiting in Cyprus: A, how do you establish evidence that chemical weapons have been used? Could you possibly do that outside of the country, outside of Syria, by examining some of the alleged victims, taking blood samples and so on? Is that possible, technically? Secondly, more importantly, what is the process that the OPCW carries out in order to establish which party actually used chemical weapons - in your own terminology, the chain of custody? What are the steps that are taken to establish without any sort of ambiguity that either the state or the opposition has used chemical weapons? Now, we’re talking about a hypothetical situation, obviously, because your technical experts have not had the opportunity to do this. If they were allowed to, what is it that they would have done that would have shown the International Community that this is, or the other side is responsible for the use chemical weapons? AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: First of all, let me make it clear that this UN investigation mission is totally independent, and we, as the OPCW, do not interfere with their work. We just, as it was stated at the Convention, make our resources available in support of the UN mission. They report to the UN Secretary-General and they get instructions, in fact, from the UN Secretary-General. Recently, in fact, in the absence of the possibility of going to Syria, the UN Secretary-General has asked the team to go to Turkey, to a neighbouring country, and have some interviews over there. I don’t know whether they have the possibility to meet some alleged victims or not. The same could apply to Jordan; I don’t know whether they have a plan to go to Jordan at the moment. It was in this context that they went to Turkey. If the team was able to deploy to Syria, in fact, they would have gone to the site of alleged use of chemical weapons and, hopefully, without much delay, because as to the... especially, environmental samples, as we call it – air, soil, water, plants, remnants of the weapon, metal parts and so on, if there are any. All this would have been collected and sent to the designated laboratories.


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We have a network of designated laboratories, 22 of them, in several parts of the world, which go through proficiency tests every year. They have to go three consecutive tests in order to be seen as capable of carrying out this kind of analysis. This applies also to the bio samples, as we call them – hair, tissue, blood, urine. They should be collected by the experts themselves or it should be done in their presence. These samples have to be attended until they reach the designated laboratory. The laboratories will have to analyse them; we have some permanent arrangements with them, and only report to the mission itself. This is in this chain of custody context that the procedures were established. The same procedures, in fact, were developed also by the UN investigation missions in the past, before the existence of OPCW, and they overlap with the OPCW procedures themselves. I don’t know whether, in response to your question, they are collecting some samples from alleged victims outside Syria, so I’m not able to answer this question. In any case, if they are, they have to do it themselves. SINAN ÜLGEN: I’d like to turn to you now and ask you whether... Yes, please. If you also present yourself before the question... ROBERT VANDEMEULEBROUCKE: Thank you. My name is Robert Vandemeulebroucke; I’m the retired Ambassador for Belgium. I have a remark and one question. The remark: chemical weapons since World War Two have been used very expensively [?], almost on certain occasions, so very little. Does that mean that countries and states are getting more disciplined? Is your organisation doing a splendid job so that most of the stocks are being destroyed? As you said, I heard figures of 80% and 90%. Is it going to be that way for the years to come? My question: chemical weapons – what kind of chemical weapons are we talking about? When we were talking about chemical weapons in the First World War, we were talking about chemical weapons based on mustard gas. Now we heard a lot of Sarin being in chemical weapons. There must be a gradation in chemical weapons; some are more lethal than others. Can you enlighten me on this point? AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: You are right in saying that the chemical weapons were not frequently used. Maybe this should be seen also as an achievement of the Chemical Weapons Convention, because I think with the collective will of the International Community complete prohibition of chemical weapons was established. It’s become, in fact, an international norm, both a legal norm, as well as, I think, a moral, ethical norm not to produce and not to use those chemical weapons. Having said that, in 1987 and 1988 the Saddam regime, in fact, used those weapons against Iran, as well as against its own people, while the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention were ongoing in Geneva. According to those who were involved, these two chemical attacks have served as catalysts to accelerate and to finalise the negotiations.


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On another instance, in fact in Japan, it was used by a cult in 1995: Aum Shinrikyo. You mentioned Sarin; they produced Sarin at the laboratory scale and they used it in a very primitive way, but, still, there were hundreds of injuries and 13 people were killed. There have been several reports of intentions of use by terrorists, non-state actors, as we call them, over the years. In fact, the terrorist use of chemical weapons seems to be the major concern among our states’ parties. When we talk about capacity-building for emergency response, they are rather focused on emergency response against the possible use of chemical weapons by terrorists, rather than a use by a country against another one in a larger scale. As to the kinds of chemical weapons, that’s correct: sulphur mustard, in fact, was used in the First World War, this was a blister agent. Over the years, some countries have developed nerve agents, VX, Sarin, Tabun, Soman and others, and these are more sophisticated weapons. Also, they developed the delivery means; delivery means of chemical weapons are quite important in order to increase their effectiveness, because if you use it massively, if you use the proper means, then, clearly, the impact would be wider and more effective. Those weapons, in fact, are clearly listed in the Annex of the Convention. The Convention itself has 24 articles; it’s not a large document, but it has quite large comprehensive annexes for the verification and all kinds of... listing weapons and so on. At the same time, we are continuing to follow the developments in this field, scientific and technological developments, which is extremely important. We have a scientific advisory board composed of 25 scientists from different states’ parties which meet regularly at the headquarters of the OPWC. It has also some temporary working group. A temporary working group, for instance, is working on the convergence issue between biology and chemistry, which has become a topical issue. Another one is working on verification techniques. Another one is working on education and outreach. Those scientists are sharing their views about the developments. Nanotechnology is apparently quite relevant for our verification mechanism. Therefore, scientific and technological developments will have to be followed for the better implementation of the Convention. This includes, in fact, new substances which may be developed in the future. DIMITRIS ILIOPOULOS: Thank you. Dimitris Iliopoulos from the External Action Service, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament part. First of all, before putting my question to the DG, I would like to praise him personally for his contribution in bringing... because, of course, it’s a success story. It’s a success story for everybody, but it always needs a leadership that will push business forward, and I think this is done to a big extent, and we are grateful to the DG for that. Now my question - the European Union is the biggest contributor for OPCW’s Technical Secretariat activities, and we intend to keep it that way. There have been three Council


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decisions and five action plans that support this activity, and we are talking about considerable money invested there. Of course, there are also ways to, obviously, implement those actions, and we are looking now, we are working very closely with the Technical Secretariat to improve the implementation. Now my question is the following: the implementation of these actions, among other things - for instance, target the universality, and we hope that it has helped – in what way? Because by bringing awareness - I’m very glad that I heard now that we have this campaign that might bring bigger results, we have an almost complete universalisation of the Convention – since the first Council decision that was adopted, we had 18 new members who have ratified the Convention, so that’s very encouraging. This shows us also the way that these decisions and joint actions could be used. The second thing which is very important also for the next phase is the post-destruction era, which is the national implementation for the non-reemergence. Now we are looking into that, and, of course, we are working very closely with the Technical Secretariat to find out to what degree these joint actions have helped, especially developing countries, to implement their obligations nationally. The degree, I have to say, can definitely be improved. Could we have your insight on what has gone wrong and how can this be improved? Of course, you mentioned it already - this new mechanism, the new tool, the centres of excellence, could be useful in this domain, i.e. of course we count very much on your own collaborations through your accumulated experience for training and otherwise. Could that be a tool perhaps to improve national implementation which is crucial for the success of the Convention? Thank you. AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: Thank you for those questions; in fact, there are several questions. Let me first acknowledge, in fact, the significant contributions made by the European Union over the years, which we highly appreciate. We have a limited budget, I should say; it’s transparent on our website. It’s been €75 million three years ago, now it’s less than €70 million, and we have been presenting zero nominal growth budgets for the last seven years. This, for the year 2014, I’m going to present the draft budgets on Friday, is going to be around €69 million. Therefore, the €9 million, in fact, that the European Union has so far provided is extremely important for us. Some other states’ parties, individually, also provide some voluntary contributions which we try to use in the most effective way. That’s correct that these contributions have helped us, in fact, to undertake and carry out several activities which, in fact, improve the implementation of the Convention. On national implementation per se, I recognise that some states’ parties are lagging behind. What is national implementation? Everything depends, of course, on the implementation of the Convention by individual states’ parties. Those states’ parties have to introduce the legislations based on the Convention in order to enforce the different provisions of the Convention, at the domestic level. For instance, if they don’t have the regulations and legislation they cannot ask their chemical industrial plants to declare the relevant sites;


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they cannot ask their relevant institutions or companies to declare the transfers of relevant chemicals, and so on. In fact, they also have the obligation to introduce some provisions in their penal codes in order to penalise, punish those who are carrying out activities prohibited by the Convention, but some countries have not done it. Our observation has been that this is because this was not really a priority in view of several other priorities for those countries. What the Technical Secretariat has been doing over the years was, in fact, to provide some technical assistance and legal assistance to develop those legislations and regulations and help them, in fact, to raise awareness also at the domestic level. I think one additional element that we want to introduce is also to raise awareness through some regional schemes of cooperation, or regional organisations. From now on, and actually we have already started to use some regional organisations in order to raise awareness as well as try to sensitise the states’ parties concerned. From their perspective, they don’t think that, in the absence of any declarable site or very limited exporting ports, it’s relevant for them to have such legislations, which we don’t agree with, because they may always be used as a transit especially by non-state actors. I think the question is really to try to sensitise them further and to continue to help them. We have now, I should say, a mentorship programme within our countries, states’ parties, with others, so that they can help each other with support of the Technical Secretariat. This is a major issue, I recognise. At the moment, for instance, over 80 countries – 84 countries, in fact - are declaring chemical plant sites, and overall declarations go up to 5,000 sites, and we inspect 241 of them every year. China alone is declaring 1,300 chemical plant sites, so the chemical industry, in fact, has shifted from the West to Asia, gradually. CBRN centres are very important. I think this may help not only to build some emergency response capacities in those regions but also to raise some awareness about Chemical Weapons Convention as well as the Biological Weapons Convention, and other obligations related to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. As the OPCW, we are ready, in fact, to support EU CBRN centres. We have to formalise this relationship in the future, and, in principle, we don’t want to duplicate other efforts but rather to complement them. In that context, I should underline that we will work more closely with other relevant international organisations and institutions. We have already put in place a permanent arrangement with UN OCHA; we want to do the same with WHO and other UN agencies or international organisations so that we can use our limited resources in the most effective way and complement each other. SINAN ÜLGEN: No more questions? Maybe I’ll have one. What we have seen in relation to the non-state actors in the past - there has been one clear incident, as you referred to, in Japan in 1995 when a terrorist cell has used these agents. From where you sit and from


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your perspective, why is it that the International Community has actually been able to prevent other non-state actors since 1995 from staging such attacks? Is it because technologically it’s difficult for a non-state actor to develop these weapons, or another explanation? Obviously we had one in 1995, but since then the International Community has been able to control this. What’s the secret to the success in preventing the use of these weapons by non-state actors? AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: There are some observers who claim that this attack in 1995 in Tokyo would not have happened if CWC was in place at that time. I don’t know whether it’s a correct observation or not. Since the CWC entered into force in states’ parties, of course the relevant authorities in those countries did develop their legislation regulations, and, in fact, consult better the circulation of dual-use chemical materials, the internal distribution of them, transport, and so on. An overall awareness has been raised about the sensitivities associated with the handling of dual-use chemical material. This includes also chemical industry and scientists. I think a significant progress has been achieved over the past 15 to 20 years now in that respect. I think those substances are better protected than before, not only now because of their obligations, but also because of the awareness which has been raised. Having said that, we have seen several reports – in fact, states’ parties also have shared some information as to the intentions of terrorists producing and using chemical weapons. The only explanation which was given by some experts is that the damage that these weapons could inflict upon themselves apparently prevented wider use of those weapons by the terrorists. I don’t know whether this explanation is satisfactory or not, but, in principle, the technology that they would use and the access to those materials would not pose a big hurdle to produce those weapons in limited amounts and use in a limited scale. Of course, if they tried to have access to larger amounts of material, this could be easily detected and prevented. BROOKS TIGNER: Brooks Tigner, Jane’s Defence. I have two questions, if I may? I was just wondering if you could clarify again why Damascus, what reason, official or otherwise, they gave for not allowing the inspection team into the country? We read it was for safety purposes; it could have been something else. I was just wondering if you could shed some light on that. Have they given any signals that they intend to pick up the ball and try again on this issue? Separate from that, are there any countries or regions whose chemical controls give you any reason for concern or worry around the world – I’m just curious? AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: Excuse me – in the same region? BROOKS TIGNER: No. Is there any region or courtly around the world that gives you any concern for the level of their chemical controls?


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AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: As to Syria, in fact, the Syrian Government was the first who made such a request of investigation. When other countries came up with other allegations of use and the request for their investigation, the UN Secretary-General decided that the fact-finding mission, in fact, covers all credible allegations of use, using these terms, whereas the Syrian Government insists that the investigation should begin with their request. That was this agreement between the Syrian Government and the United Nations Secretary-General; that’s why, in fact, the team could not be deployed. Reportedly, yesterday or the day before the Syrian Government made an offer, in fact, to the head of the investigation team, as well as a senior official from the UN, to come to Damascus, and being informed by the Syrian authorities. I don’t know where this offer stands and what the purpose really is, so I’m sure we will hear more from the UN. As I said earlier, since we are not directly monitoring the investigation mission, I don’t have more detailed information. As to the chemical control by states’ parties or concerns based on the chemical control, actually there is no stated or reported major concern by states’ parties on this particular issue. Nevertheless, for instance, when states’ parties want to host major events, Olympics, summits, and so on, they always ask the OPCW to provide some support for the duration of those events, in fact, in terms of prevention of possible attacks by non-state actors and also to train their own experts, if they need to be trained. We are now using quite sophisticated detection equipment. We are following technological developments in this respect. In fact, they are very sophisticated equipment now through which you can detect from quite remote distances whether there are some toxic chemicals around or not. These are all for prevention activities. One other issue that I just want to actually touch upon is the expertise on toxic chemicals, chemical weapons, and so on. Clearly, this expertise is also gradually dissipating and this is one of the major concerns for the future of the OPCW and CWC regime. That’s why, in fact, the recent EU conference asked the Technical Secretariat to develop some projects in order to sustain this knowledge and expertise on toxic chemical weapons. We already submitted a concept paper on this. The idea is, in fact, to establish a knowledge management centre through which we can maintain this expertise, because one of the handicaps that we have at the Technical Secretariat is that we cannot keep our experts beyond seven years. We have a ten-year policy and they cannot continue to work after seven years, whereas in other organisations, like the IAEA, CTBTO and others, they can stay, either longer, or they can come back to the organisation after a while. SINAN ÜLGEN: Sebastian [?], you had a question? SEBASTIAN: I just have a question on Syria. I did hear you say that the Syrian stockpile is between 100 tonnes and 1,000 tonnes of chemical weapons. Is that correct? AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: Reportedly. These are the estimates. We are not able to] to verify them.


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SEBASTIAN: There is no more precise figure as to…? AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: It goes up to 1,000, reported, yes; metric tonnes. SEBASTIAN: I see. With regard to the logistical help that Syria is getting from Iran – training, hardware – would it be possible that some of the chemical stockpile in Iran would be moved to Syria? AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: Actually, Iran is a state party, a member country to the OPCW. SEBASTIAN: They did ratify the agreement? AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: Yes. They are a very active member of the organisation and they consider themselves as the last victim of the use of chemical weapons. Every year the victims from Iran are coming to our annual conferences and they hold some events over there. Iran did not declare any chemical weapons when they joined the Convention and no inspection mechanism was involved against any suspicions on Iran. ELENA DONOVA: Thank you very much. My name is Elena Donova; I’m from the Russian Delegation to NATO here. I’ve got two questions: one on Syria and another one on your transmission of data. On Syria, you said that the OPCW could make available resources to the UN fact-finding mission. Have you already provided any equipment, technologies or any access to laboratories, if there was any kind of request for any fact-finding mission so far? This is the first question. The second one, on the transfer of data from state parties to the Convention: does it contain data on the transfers to non-state actors or any kind of allegations to non-state actors of chemical weapons, or does it have only official data on their stockpiles? Thank you. AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: Let me begin with the second question. In fact, states’ parties have the obligation to declare their stockpiles, if they have any, and also declare the relevant chemical industrial sites, plants, and to update them regularly. If there are differences or changes in their production, they have to make the necessary amendments to declarations, and these are being done regularly to the organisation. Technical Secretariat, in fact, is monitoring those industrial activities. From the beginning, in fact, in March when this investigation mission was established, we have provided 15 experts to this mission and later on in the absence of the possibility of deployment we have down-sized the support to five experts. They have all the necessary equipment with them so they were ready to deploy if they were able. The team, as I said earlier, is working independently. If they collect samples they will send them to our laboratories, so we will not interfere with their activities, as I said earlier, and we are not informed about their activities. Our experts who are put at the disposal of the Secretary-General’s mission are working separately from our routine activities.


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THIBAULT BURSSON: Good evening. My name is Thibault Bursson [?]; I’m a student. I’d like to know, once we’ll have reached the Global Zero, which deterrence means will we have, if any, to prevent re-emergence of chemical weapons? AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: This is a very good question, in fact, but there is no straight answer. This requires, really, a collective effort to implement fully and effectively the Convention in all countries, in all states’ parties to monitor the movement of sensitive chemical materials, their production, but also their movement globally. This requires full universality – we have to get all countries on board, and after that we also have to raise awareness among the wider communities and, primarily, scientific communities, academia, chemistry students who may not be really aware of the risks associated with handling of those chemical substances. There are some professors, in fact, chemistry professors who came to lecture at our organisation, who told us that the youth may be tempted, in fact, to get into ventures, activities without really being aware of their consequences. There are such risks and, therefore, we have to raise awareness and sensitise, in fact, the relevant communities in this respect. That’s why, really, we want really to undertake a series of education and outreach activities throughout the world in 2014, and we will need, of course, the support of states’ parties. Some states’ parties are already engaged in the preparation of these kinds of events, but that’s extremely important – sensitising, raising awareness. MOHAMED-RAJA’I BARAKAT: Thank you very much. Mohamed-Raja'i Barakat. How serious are the investigations made by the three French journalists who said that the Syrian government used chemical weapons? How can experts distinguish between the use of these weapons by the Syrian army or the Islamist groups, because six or seven months ago on YouTube they diffused... the Islamist groups, or some of them, distributed short films showing the experiences using these chemical weapons. Do you think it’s very serious for French journalists to state that Syrian government uses these weapons? Thank you. AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: As we know, some states’ parties – France, United Kingdom, United States, now the Russian Federation, in fact – have stated that they found some evidences of use of chemical weapons. As I said earlier, this is not really an issue of trusting those findings or… not trusting them, but because of the procedures established by the United Nations as well as the OPCW, because of the chain of custody procedure, these findings could not be used as an evidence by the UN investigation mission. I don’t think it’s up to me to comment on the seriousness or non-seriousness of those findings. As to who used the chemical weapons, if they were used, [unclear] or in opposition – I’m sorry you asked that same question, but I forgot to answer it - first of all, the UN mission does not have such a mandate. Their mandate is committed to find out whether chemical weapons were used during those alleged cases – there are seven of them, as I said earlier -


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and not to really try to identify who used them, because it’s quite a complicated task technically, as I understand. Still, if not now, eventually there might be some technical needs, for instance looking at the delivery vehicles, whether the opposition has such weapons in their possession or whether it’s only the Syrian army which possesses them. As to the substances, the composition of the substances, also some in-depth laboratory analysis may give some indication about the origins of those chemicals, but we are not yet there, as I said. ALI BABAEI: Thank you very much. Good explanation. I’m Babaei from the city of Iran. Regarding the subject, I have two questions and also one comment. My first question is regarding the programme or your efforts in your organisation to encourage the countries, especially in the Middle East, to join to the Convention, and as you told, there are some countries who still haven’t joined to this Convention. The second question is regarding the countries and the companies, especially from European countries, who helped the Saddam regime during its war with Iran to equip the Saddam regime with chemical weapons and with agents. Do you do anything with them? Is it an obligation of this organisation or not? My comment is regarding one of the audience, actually: I just can tell that this is a very baseless allegation, and actually we don’t know why this allegation can be raised. There is no evidence despite there being much evidence European countries and some European companies helping Saddam Hussein, and we are seeing that nothing has been done with them. This is a strange comment. Thank you. ANNE NGUYEN: Thank you very much, Your Excellency, for your presentation and for the information you gave us about chemical weapons. I have one question, that can some… SINAN ÜLGEN: Present yourself. ANNE NGUYEN: Yes, thank you. I’m Anne Nguyen; I’m an academic intern at the Swiss Nation to NATO. I have a question that will sound a bit ingenuous, I think, but how do we now in the 21st Century prosecute the use of chemical weapons? Is there a special court or any institution which will prevent impunity in the use of these weapons? Thank you. SINAN ÜLGEN: Are there any more questions from the floor, before I turn perhaps to your last comments? AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: As to encouraging countries in the Middle East, especially to join the Convention, in fact, this has been done regularly. As a last initiative, towards the end of last year, in fact, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and I signed letters to the heads of state and government, including Syria, addressed to eight countries, urging them to join the Chemical Weapons Convention as early as possible.


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I don’t know whether it had an impact on Somalia or not, but Somalia, in fact, joined the Convention as the last member last month, in fact, at the end of June, which we welcome. We also received some positive feedback in Angola and in Myanmar, following this initiative. As I said earlier, as to the particular three countries, the issue is wider than the Chemical Weapons Convention itself. Nevertheless, we should continue to urge those countries to be part of the Convention and to be part of the OPCW as early as possible. I don’t think we can really speak about Global Zero or full universality if there are some exceptions in the world, and I don’t think the International Community should continue to allow this. As to the exports which, in fact, enabled the Saddam regime to produce chemical weapons, every state party has the obligation to notify when they join the organisation, to declare what they’ve produced and what they exported or imported before joining the organisation which could be used for the production of chemical weapons. This question, in fact, is raised to all states’ parties and information has been provided to the organisation by those countries. As to the prosecution of the use of chemical weapons, if the use is within one particular country, of course the states’ parties have the obligation to enforce and to try and punish those who used chemical weapons. For instance, in the United States there had been very individual use of toxic chemicals, here and there, and there was an argument on the application of state law or federal law, which is based on the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Supreme Court, in fact, decided that the federal law, based on the Chemical Weapons Convention, should be applied to any use of toxic chemicals. Clearly, the sentences are more severe than the state law for [unclear] conventions [?] or for other reasons, criminal use of toxic chemicals. If the chemical weapons are used by a country - in fact, I don’t expect that any member country to the Chemical Weapons Convention would use them - but speaking about the states’ party, the Rome Statute of the ICC, in fact, does prohibit the use of poisons, poisonous gases and so on in warfare. Recently, at Kampala in Uganda they also... there was an amendment to the Rome Statute which prohibits the use of poisons and, of course, chemical weapons too, in... because the first version was International Armed Conflicts, but the amendment, in fact, covers also Internal Armed Conflicts. This would apply only to those countries ratify this amendment, and I understand there is only a number of... six to seven countries which already ratified this amendment. SANJAY VILLA: My name’s Sanjay Villa [?]; I’m from the Turkish delegation to NATO. Mr Ambassador, thank you very much for this explanation; it was very useful for us to learn that the [inaudible] Convention itself... I will not [inaudible]. My question will be on the delivery means of chemical weapons: does the Convention have any provision to prohibit delivery means of chemical weapons? Thank you very much.


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AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: Delivery means of chemical weapons are also considered chemical weapons, so they have to be destroyed. In fact, when Libya joined the Convention in 2004 their first activity was to destroy arm-fields by aerial bombs, all 1,000 of them, and they were just destroyed by bulldozers and so on and quickly done. The metal parts of delivery means will have to be destroyed, and if it’s done in plants that I have already described in United States or Russia, they have to regulated; they are cut in two, three parts, and they are decontaminated in large furnaces, close to 700 degrees and so on. Then they can be used for recycling as metal for scrap. SINAN ÜLGEN: Mr Director-General, this is the part where we thank you for being with us. We’re now much wiser and well-versed in this subject, and, hopefully, that will also help the work of the organisation by building a constituency that is certainly more knowledgeable about this area. AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ: If I may just say, as a last word, I really appreciate this kind of opportunity, because, unfortunately, in spite of the achievements, the Convention, as I said earlier, is poorly known worldwide. We need to promote it a little further, not just to take credit for the achievements but rather to promote, in fact, the success of effective multilateralism which may also set a good example for other processes. Now, we are talking more and more about nuclear disarmament, for instance, and according to many experts, the verification mechanism of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in fact, could be emulated perhaps eventually in a nuclear disarmament process. In any case, I think the success of the OPCW regime would give some confidence to the International Community, would show that something is achievable if the International Community does demonstrate a collective will. That’s, I believe, the success story of the OPCW. We would, obviously, need the support of institutions like yours as well as others, think-tanks, NGOs, civil societies. Thank you very much for your attendance. SINAN ÜLGEN: Thank you for being with us. Thank you, all, for being with us as well. I think we now have the opportunity for some drinks and refreshments, if you want to stay a little bit longer with us. We hope to see you all with us after the summer break. [Applause]

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