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The History of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Agents during Zimbabwe's LiberationWar of 1965-80 by Rhodesian ForcesAuthor(s): Ian MartinezSource: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 6, (Dec., 2002), pp. 1159-1179Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993569Accessed: 14/08/2008 01:37

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Third WorldQuarterly,Vol23, No 6, pp 1159-1179, 2002 CarfaxPublishingp #115-kY~~~~~~~~~~~TaylorFrancisroup

T h e h i s t o r y o f t h e u s e o fbacteriological n d chemical a g e n t sd u r i n g Zimbabwe's l iberation w a r o f1965 -80 b y Rhodesian f o r c e sIAN MARTINEZABSTRACT In 1979 the largest recorded outbreak of anthrax occurred inRhodesia, present day Zimbabwe.The incident, widely known in Africa and inintelligence circles is not widely known in the USA or Europe. At the timeRhodesia was fighting a guerilla war against black nationalist insurgents.Rhodesia first accused the nationalist side of using anthrax as a weapon. Inallegations that surfaced in 1998-and which persist to this day-externalresearchersand the currentgovernmentof Zimbabwe nsist that the outbreak n1978-80 was anythingbutbenign. Theyargue that the original outbreakwas theresult of a calculated move by the Rhodesian governmentwith the duplicitousacknowledgment f apartheidSouthAfrica. Furthermore,he governmentallegesthat a currentoutbreak s the workof disgruntledwhitefarmers in the country.The allegations over the 1979-80 outbreakare given credence by the acknow-ledgementby Ken Flower,Chief of Rhodesia'sCentralIntelligence Organisation(cdo), and by cio Officer Henrik Ellert that the white minority regime of IanSmithused biological and chemicalweapons against the guerillas, against ruralblacks to preventtheirsupportof the guerillas and against cattle to reduceruralfood stocks. Thecurrentgovernmentand researchershave drawn inferences romhis statements o show that the unusualoutbreak n 1978-80 was a deliberate useof weaponizedanthrax. These inferences rely on important acts which will behighlighted in this paper, namely that: 1) by 1978 the 'writing was on thewall' for the white regime and recourse to a weapon of last resort was notunfathomable;2) because of its international status, Rhodesia had become anexpert in sanctions busting; 3) the alliance between South Africa and Rhodesiamakes theallegationsmore credible; and 4) the currentgovernmentof Zimbabwehas purposefully ailed to launch a formal investigationbecause it is convenientto its continuedsurvival to vilify theformer regime and currentwhite armers inorder to deflect attention away from the 21-year-old dictatorship of RobertMugabe and the economic woes that have followed from the regime's mis-management.

Ian Martinez can be contacted at 6725 SW 51 Street, South Miami, FL 33155, USA. E-mail: [email protected] 0143-6597 prnt/ISSN 1360-2241 online/02/061 159-21 ? 2002 Third World QuarterlyDOI: 10.1080/0143659022000036595 1159


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IANMARTINEZIn December 1962 the RhodesianFront (RF), ed by Ian Smith, won Rhodesia'sgeneralelections.'Rhodesia,whichalong withNyasalandandNorthernRhodesiahadmade up the CentralAfricanFederation,wanted eitherindependence-as theother countries were given-or dominion status within the Commonwealth.InApril 1964 amid rising internalpressureto find a solution, the Prime Ministerresigned and Ian Smith became Rhodesia's first native-bornPrime Minister.2Britain'sLabourGovernmentwas unwilling to turnback the 'winds of change'and grantindependenceto anotherwhite minority regime. Negotiationsdraggedon and on 11 November 1965 Ian Smith went on the radio and unilaterallydeclared ndependence UDI).3 'Britainrecoiledin angerat this firstrebellionby aBritish territorysince the AmericanRevolution.'4Wilson applied sanctions andbacked themby deployingtwo carrier askforces to cut off Rhodesia's supply ofoil. Later, to secure internationalco-operation,5Wilson engineered mandatorysanctions from the United Nations underChapterVII of the Charter.Selectivesanctions were imposed against the regime in 1966 andthese were made total in1968. Sanctions busting became a nationalpriorityand was refined to an art.6Sanctions were also weakened by the co-operation of Rhodesia's neighbours,Portuguese-ruledMozambiqueandSouthAfrica.7

TheSecondChimurengaRhodesian Intelligence broke down the Rhodesian conflict into three phases.8Phase one lasted from UDI until 1968. Phase two saw a complete cessation ofinsurgentmovements. Phase three, from 1972 until 1980, saw the collapse ofPortuguese rule in neighbouring Mozambique, and the intensification ofinsurgent movements within Rhodesia. This phase allegedly saw the use ofbacteriological and chemical weapons.9 Because insurgency essentiallychallengesthe law, the police tookthe lead with the military n support.Thus, thecounter-insurgency campaign began on a low key, led by the British SouthAfrican Police (BSAP).'0Phase onePhase one was characterisedby small-scale incursions into Rhodesia, mainlyfrom newly independentZambia.These incursions were a 'complete failure'."On 28 April 1966, the first 'battle'occurredwhen seven rebel soldiers infiltratedRhodesia in an attemptto occupy the town of Sinoia.'2In quick order the BSAPdispatchedthe infiltrators.Nonetheless, the 28 April battle is the date on whichblacks commemoratethe second uprising against the white colonisers, whichthey call the beginningof the Second Chimurenga.'3 romApril 1966 onwards,groups of guerrillas infiltratedRhodesia from neighbouringZambia in steadilyincreasingnumbers,but the warremaineda relativelyminorpolice action.'4Phase threeand the use of biological weaponsAfter theircollapse in 1966, the guerillamovementstook differentapproaches ooverthrowing the Smith regime. ZIPRA, led by Nkomo and influenced by the1160


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BACTERIOLOGICALNDCHEMICAL SAGEBY RHODESIAN ORCESUSSR, concentratedon invading Rhodesia as a conventional army.'" ANLA,ledby Robert Mugabe and influenced by China, adopted a Maoist strategy ofwinning the hearts andmindsof the ruralpopulationand waging a guerillawar inthe easternborderareas of Rhodesia.'6Phase three was the most intense and it began on 21 December 1972, whenZANLAattacked a farm in the CentenaryDistrict, with further attacks on otherfarms in the following days.'7 As the guerrilla activity increased in 1973,'OperationHurricane' startedand the military prepareditself for all-out war.During 1974 a major effort by the security forces resulted in many guerrillasbeing killed andthe number nside the countrywas reducedto less than 100.In 1974 a coup in Lisbon ushered in the end of the Portuguese empire inAfrica. The first colonial power in Africa would be the last to haul down thecolours.'8Almost immediatelyafter the coup, Portuguesecolonial troopsstoppedtheir patrols and remained in their bases.'9 Even though Portugal was stillnominally in control, the effect was to create a second open front alongRhodesia's long borderwith Mozambique, which was exploited by ZANLA. In1975 the Portugueseleft Mozambiqueand a Marxist government-sympatheticto the Zimbabweannationalistcause-came to powerin the formercolony.20As the guerillawar heated up, the BSAPwas soon overwhelmed and the govern-ment turned o the securityforces. As earlyas 1956 the securityforces, includingthe police, had recognised that the majorproblem confronting them would beAfrican unrest.2'The securityforces therefore trainedand prepared or counter-insurgencynot only athome, but also by reinforcing he successful British effortsin Malaya and studying the counter-insurgencyeffort against the Mau Mau inKenya. The Rhodesians had inherited a number of military units from theFederationbreak-up.Most importantwere:

* the RhodesianAir Force (RHAF);* the Army, consisting of the Special Air Service (SAS),22 he RhodesianAfrican Rifles-formerly a unit of the King's African Rifles and ananachronism of the Victorian era in which white officers commandedblacks23-the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI)24and an Armoured CarRegiment,25ollectively,the 'SecurityForces'.

The Rhodesiansmade a strategicdecision and made special operations (mainlythe SAS, RLIandRHAF)theirprimary unctionandtraditionalmilitaryunits (ie theArmored CarRegiment) their secondaryoption.26They took the lessons learnedby their SAS in Malaya,27rom the British in Kenya against the Mau Mau andfromthe US experiencein Vietnamandadapted hem to theirwar.Although theymastered the art of counter-insurgency operations-using the SAS-and themobile use of helicopter-borne roops, the Rhodesians-because of their racistpolicies-were never able to win the campaign for the 'hearts and minds' ofblack Africans, a prerequisite n any guerillacampaign.With a populationratioof 1:10 in favor of blacks, thatcampaignwas critical.In the early 1970s the Rhodesians turned to a concept called 'pseudooperations' ('pseudo ops'), creatingthe Selous Scouts in 1973 and placing theunit under the auspices of the CentralIntelligence Organisation's CIo) Special

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Branch,rather han the Army.28 Security personnelwould dress as insurgentsandinfiltrate rural communities seeking out real insurgents.29When they found thereal insurgents, they could opt for an engagementor call in their position andallow other army units, notablythe RLIto come in. At first highly trainedwhiteofficers of the SAS were used for the operations.But languagebarliersand thedistinct physical facial features of the whites necessitated the use of blackZimbabweans.To do this, injuredor captured nsurgentswere 'turned'andmadeto serve the Selous Scouts.30Thus compromised, hey could never return o theirvillages andwere beholden to the regime for their lives.3' The new recruitswereable to provide intelligence and the latest call signs used by the real insurgents.The Britishhad used a similar pseudo ops concept in Malayaand Kenya.32TheSelous Scouts were housed in a secret facility near Mount Darwin within theHurricaneTheatreof the war. 'The Selous Scouts proved extremelyeffective inproviding the security forces with useful and timely intelligence' and 'wereresponsiblefor a staggering 68 percentof all insurgentkills and capture n theirareasof operation'.33The cio consisted of two branches:Special Branch, responsible for internalsecurity-thus the placement of the Scouts under its wings-and Branch II,responsiblefor external operations,propaganda,disinformation, overt ops, andpsychological operations.34The Selous Scouts' unrivalled tracking abilities,survival and counter-insurgencyskills made them one of the most feared andhated of the army units.35The unit was known for 'murder,rape, smuggling,and poaching',36 nd its members were 'psychopathickillers' and 'vaingloriousextroverts'.37 'To avoid confusion and prevent other government forces frommistakingthe Scouts for actualinsurgents,any areathey were operating n was"frozen"-that is no othersecurityforces were allowedin the vicinity.'38In 1976 Operations 'Thrasher'and 'Repulse' startedin order to contain theever-increasing nflux of guerrillas.39 t the same time, rivalrybetween the twomain guerrilla factions increased and resulted in open fighting in the trainingcamps in Tanzania,with over 600 deaths.40 he Soviets increasedtheirinfluenceand began to take a more active role in the training and control of the ZIPRAguerrillas.New tactics were developedon both sides. The Rhodesiansdecidedtotake the war to the enemy. Cross-borderoperations-which had started n 1976with a raid on a majorbase in Mozambique n which the Rhodesians had killedover 1200 guerrillasand capturedhuge amountsof weapons-were stepped upby the SAS and later the Selous Scouts. Attackson large guerrillacamps such asChimoioandTembueresulted n thousandsof guerrilladeaths and the captureofsupplies sorely needed by the Rhodesians.4" he concept of 'Fireforce'was alsointroducedat this time. This concept involved helicopters inserting a 'stick' ofmen from the RLI into an area identified by Selous Scouts as containinginsurgents.42 Externally and internally the war was 'heating-up' for theRhodesians.By 1976 'no one would say so in public-except for the very publicactof emigrating-but in privatemanywereprepared o admit that even if defeatwas unlikely, victory was impossible'.43From 1976 to 1978 the war was at itsmost intense-during this period it is alleged that biological and chemicalweaponswere used.1162


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BACTERIOLOGICALND CHEMICAL SAGEBY RHODESIAN ORCESThe end of the warBy March 1978 Smith-ready to end the war-hammered out an internalsettle-ment.44A black prime ministerwas elected throughuniversal suffrage, but themilitary and intelligence apparatusremained in firm white control.45The inter-nationalcommunityrefused to recogniseZimbabwe-Rhodesiaas it was known.46In June 1978 the war spiralledout of control, as insurgentsshot a civilian airlinerout of the sky.47 ome passengersmanagedto survive, only to be butcheredonthe ground by the insurgents.In retaliation,in October 1978 Rhodesian forcesinvaded Zambia and Mozambique, killing thousands of guerillas in trainingcamps.48 ritainand the USA condemnedthe raids,saying that they could lead toa superpower onfrontationn southernAfrica.Towards he end of 1979 talks hadbegun at LancasterHouse in England,withboth sides seriously interestedin stopping the war, but Rhodesian cross-borderraids continued in the meantime, hitting supply lines, strategic bridges andrailwaysin an effort to convince Zambia andMozambique o put pressureon theguerrilla leaders to end the war.49Rhodesian losses in men and aircraft wereincreasing,whereas the supplyof equipmentandrecruits o the guerrillasseemedendless. By the end of 1979 therefore it was becoming obvious that theRhodesianswould be unable to end the war, despitethe fact thattheirtroops werewinning every battle andskirmish hey engagedin. With the warunwinnableandwhite emigrationon the rise, Ian Smith signed the LancasterHouse Agreementin December 1979. The Agreement ushered in majority rule 14 years afterSmith's UDI.50 n effect, the clock was turned back to 1965, and a BritishGovernorarrivedon 12 December 1979. All partiessigned a ceasefire agreementon 21 December.The Union Jack was raisedupon the governor'sarrival,only tobe lowered on 9 April 1980 as the nation of Zimbabwe emerged to join thefamily of nations.51

The dirty tricks: biological and chemical weaponsEarly in 1976 the securityforces, farmersand officials urgedthe governmenttoimpose firmer and swifter methods of justice on the 'terrorist'. From 1976onwardsthe 'gloves were off' againstthe insurgents.52he Army'sPsychologicalOperationsUnit (PsYoPs)presented a plan to eliminate terrorists. The aim ofPSYOPS as: 'to kill and capture terrorists and to win over the local population'.5The RLIbeganto kill prisoners t captured n the field.54Governmentassassinationof oppositionmembers was authorisedand zANu'snational chairmanwas assas-sinated in Zambia by CIO operatives.55Zambian officials sympathetic to ZANUrounded up other leaders because of disinformation implicating them in theassassination.The loss of the leadershipset ZANU back politically at least twoyears,according o the CIO.56The effectiveness of the assassinationand the desperationof the war effort leadto the use of bacteriologicaland chemical weapons as 'dirty tricks' In the late1970s, under siege, orders were given to use chemical and biological agentsagainstthe enemy.57The techniquesused were: a) poisoning wells; b) spreadingcholera; c) infecting clothing used by 'terrorists';and d) using anthraxto kill

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IAN MARTINEZcattle and thus deny food supplies to the guerillas.58

Doctors and chemists from the University of Rhodesia were recruitedby theCIo in 1975 and asked to identify chemical and biological agents thatcould beused againstthe guerillas.59 rofessor RobertSymingtonis credited as being thefather of Rhodesia's biological warfare programme.60 ymington developedRhodesia's stockpile of toxins and other agents to help 'supplement' the wareffort by the Rhodesianforces.6" he Rhodesiansused three toxins: 1) ricin,62anextremely potent toxin that 'comes from the castor bean and enters the bodyintravenously'63; ) thallium, a lethal heavy metal similar to rat poison; and c)Parathion.?By 1975 clinical trials werebeing performedon humans-a clear andrecognised crime againsthumanity-provided by the cio fromthe Selous Scouts'secretdetentioncentrein Mount Darwin.65 he doctors would administervariousagents to the prisoners, experimentingwith agents and dosages.66The CIo thendisposedof the bodies of the victims downmine shafts.67By 1976 deployments of the agents were ready and carriedout by the CIo,Selous Scouts and South Africans.68 he chemical andbiological agentsused bythe CIo in the field includedthallium,organophosphate oisons, warfarin,anthraxbacterium,and other as yet unidentifiedbacteriologicalagents.69 he CIo and theScouts used thallium at first. Thallium was injected into canned meat and,through the use of pseudo ops techniques, the poisoned meat was given toinsurgents who believed they were being resupplied by other friendlyinsurgents.70n one instance, because of a shortageof food in the Tribal TrustLands-another deliberatetactic of the cio and Psyops-the guerillas gave theirthallium-laced ood to innocentvillagers,thuskilling them.7'Unfortunately for the cio, the use of thallium became known. Neither themanufacturer of the canned meat, nor the Ministry of Health knew of thisprogramme.72 hey began an investigationthatultimatelyled to the uncoveringof the facts in the case.73 n another ncident, holes were drilled into bottles ofwater and this was laced with cyanide or poisons.74 n their unwaveringuse ofpseudo ops, Selous Scouts-perhaps in an attempt o show that the guerillaswereresponsible-used an unknownpoison to contaminatea well near heavy guerillaactivityclose to the Mozambiqueborder.75 t least 200 civilians died because thewell was the sole source of drinkingwater for the area.76 elous Scouts wereinstructedto poison watering holes, stagnant water, slow moving streams andother bodies of water77 earguerilla camps inside the Mozambiqueanborder,assuch sources were essential for supplylines.78Cholera was also alleged to have been used by the CIO.79elous Scouts weretold to spread the disease near the border. SAS operatives-responsible forexternalraids-probably spreadcholera inside Mozambique.Nevertheless, theCIowas worriedthat the use of cholera could backfireandspread nto Zimbabweuncontrolled and affect the Selous Scouts who operatedin the field.80SelousScouts were also told to dumpcholera in watersupplies,most notablythe RuyaRiver. This incident correspondsto a cholera epidemic along the Mozambicanside of the river, in which an unknown number of fatalities occurred.8'Thepractice was discontinuedbecause the agentwas thoughtto dissipatetoo quicklyto provide any lastingtacticaladvantage.The Rhodesians, with possible assistance from the South Africans, also1164


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BACTERIOLOGICALND CHEMICAL SAGEBY RHODESIAN ORCESlaunched a programmeof contaminatingclothes. In a mea culpa account, KenFlower, the Chief of the cio stated:For more years than I would like to tell, young men were recruited or the guerillacause under the aegis of cio and with the willing cooperationof [ReverendArthur]Kanodarekaand his helpers who supplied them with poisoned uniforms. The menwould be sent on theirway to the guerilla trainingcamps,but before reaching theirdestinationwould die a slow death in the African bush. Many hundredsof recruitsbecame victims of this operation.It became so diabolically successful that exposureseemed inevitable and so the principal perpetrators had to be eliminated[Kanodareka]-rather as a hunter will finish off a wounded animal to stop furthersuffering.82The SouthAfricans had two dedicatedbiological weapons facilities, the Instituteof Virology in Johannesburgand the other in a South African Defence Force(SADF)veterinary facility near Pretoria.83Under an umbrella project named'Alcora' the South Africans and Rhodesians used poisoning agents.84Accordingto a formerCIOofficer,they:

would give us briefings about certain places and we would be warned that thedrinkingwateror, you know, the wells mighthave been poisoned-but our soldiersdid not do it. There were places where we were told that the waters had been saltedwith choleraand we would have to be careful. Truth s, Rhodesiawas being used asa laboratory.There were civilian operators,strange types, from SouthAfrica.To bemorepreciseit was South AfricanMilitaryIntelligence.85

Sweatshirts,uniforms,andotherapparelwere soaked in chemicals;86hroughtheSelous Scouts these were distributedto insurgentgroups near the border withMozambique.The Rhodesians used organophosphates o poison the clothing ofguerillas.87Anthrax n RhodesiaFor centuries bacillus anthracis, anthrax,has caused disease in animals and,uncommonly, serious illness in humans throughout the world.88Anthrax isendemic to certain parts of Africa. Naturally occurring anthrax is a diseaseacquired following contact with an anthrax-infested animal or its byproducts.Herbivores are the most common carrier, they usually ingest anthrax spoorsresiding in the soil. Animal vaccination programmeshave reduced the rate ofinfection among animals.89n humans, the disease is not contagious, ie it cannotbe spread readily from one human to another. Three types of human anthraxinfection can occur: inhalational,in which spores enter the lungs and within amonth or sometimes less release two types of toxins which result in bloodpoisoning; cutaneousor subcutaneous, n which the bacteriapenetratethe skin;andgastro-intestinal,n which the sporesareingested.9'Cutaneousanthrax s themost common natural orm of the disease with an estimated 2000 cases reportedannually.91 he humandisease typically follows exposureto a diseased animal.92Research nto the use of anthraxas a weapon began more than80 years ago, andit remains a popularchoice as a weaponof terror,particularlyn it its most deadlyinhalation orm.93

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IANMARTINEZIn Rhodesiabefore 1978 there were an average of 13 cases a year.94 y 1979

the Departmentof Veterinary Services announced that a cattle-borne illness,anthrax, had broken out in three Tribal Trust Lands.95The disease had onlyclaimed 21 people. But, there is an inconsistency. On 19 October 1979, threedays after its announcement, the government announced that the anthraxoutbreak had spread to six Tribal Trust Lands.96From 1978 to 1980, 10 783Zimbabweans were infected and 182-all black Zimbabweans-died ofcutaneousanthrax.A formerRhodesianofficer recently reported n confidence:It is true that anthrax spoor was used in an experimental role in the Gutu,Chilimanzi, Masvingo and Mberengwa areas, and the anthrax idea came fromPsYoPs.The use of anthrax poorto kill off thecattleof tribesmen .. was carriedoutin conjunctionwith the psychological suggestion to the tribespeople hattheircattlewere sick and dying because of disease introduced into Zimbabwe fromMozambiqueby the infiltratingguerillas.97

According to anotherreport from a former member of the Rhodesian forces,anthraxwas used to kill the cattle of the Zimbabweans.9'The operationwas toreinforce the notion thatforeign guerillas were bringingback diseases thatwouldkill cattle. This was another variation of Psyops, in the ongoing campaign toalienatethe local populationfrom the insurgents.99n contrastto the devastationin the black Tribal Trust Lands, only 11 cases of human infection werereported-with no deaths-in the European armingareas.The use of anthraxas a weapon of last resort is not far-fetched.The area ofnortheasternZimbabwe has ideal conditions, with the right mixtureof alkalinepH, nitrogen,calcium andorganicmatter. n attempting o crushtheiropponentsand maintaintheir white minorityregime, the Rhodesians,accordingto Cilliers,often used food as a weapon. On 28 January1977 the Rhodesian governmentintroduced an amendment to the Emergency Powers Act, whereby control offood supplies was institutedin various areas of Rhodesia.'0? sYoPspushed forfood control to keep ZANLAinsurgentsfrom obtainingfood from friendly ruralblacks who worked on the white farms. PSYOPSnstitutedOperationTurkey in1977. The aim of OperationTurkeywas twofold: to cut the food supplyto ZANLAand to increase animosity between the insurgentsand the local populationbycontrolling the supply of food. The operation was relatively successful-guerillas,believing thatthey werepoisoned by villagers soughtout anddestroyedvillages andkilled villagerswho hadprepared ood for them.Further estrictionswere put upon the blacks by PsyoPs, such as introducingration cards, placinglimits on the amount of food availablein stores, and limits on bulk purchases.'01Viewed from this perspective, anthraxmay have been more part of a plan toreduce food stocks to the native population and not-like the chemical andcholeraincidents-an effort at directgenocide.TheNass ReportThe first non-Zimbabwean to suspect the deliberate use of anthrax was anAmericandoctor, Meryl Nass, a biological warfareepidemiologist."02rom 1989to 1992 she researched he events of 1978-80.103 he became interested n how1166


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anthrax spores spread so quickly-even in the absence of bovine cases-andengulfed six of the eight Rhodesian provinces."'Even more remarkablewas thatthe white farmers ost only four heads of cattle, with 11cases of human exposureand no deaths."'5Nonetheless, why does Nass believe that it was a deliberatespread?First, the large amountsof those infected. Rhodesia had had only 334cases from 1950 to 1978. Doctors in Zimbabwe in 1977 had rarely seen ananthrax case. Yet, during the war, anthraxbecame one of the country's majorcauses of hospital admissions."6Next, the large-scale infestation is additionalproof of a deliberate spread. Most anthrax outbreaks have a high degree offocality. '7In Zimbabwe most of the TribalTrust Lands, stretchingacross six ofthe eight Provinces, was infected. ll Many of the cases occurred in areas wherethere had not been a previous case. The outbreakwas centred only in Zimbabwe.None of its neighbours,accordingto Nass, had higher than normal reportingofinfections."'9Finally, Nass points out that the outbreakoccurred when the warintensifiedto its greatestlevels.""However, Nass ends her investigation into theuse of anthrax,by concluding that 'there exists no generally accepted method-ology to serve as a guide for the design of an investigationin the possible use ofbiological weapons'."'Perhaps the first outside confirmation came in 1990 from a DefenseIntelligence Agency Cable from Harare to Washington:'According to [sourcedeleted], a memberof the Rhodesian Selous Scouts admitted n 1978 that"they"had tried both chemical and biological warfaretechniquesto kill terrorists.'Thereportwent on to say that Rhodesian forces used cholera to poison the watersupply."12It appears that Washington was and still is oblivious to the use ofbacteriological weapons in Zimbabwe."3 Nonetheless, officials of the USEmbassyin Harare eem awareof the situation,but dubious as to its credibility."'In 1997 the Minister of Health, Tim Stamps-a white Zimbabwean-personallyordered an official investigationinto the use of bacteriologicalagentsin the LiberationWar.Stamps is convinced that, through forged documents, theUSA or UK shipped anthraxfor legitimate research in a third country, but iteventually wound up in Rhodesia."5Stamps is convinced that the spread ofthe disease was deliberate. He points out the severe restrictions on Africans'movements,the focality of the outbreakbeing so widespreadand the targetingofcattle in particular.Analysis of anthraxand otherbacteriologicalagentsDrawinginferences from the circumstantial vidence, particularlywhen coupledwith the personalaccounts-of which Flower's andEllert'spersonalmea culpasare the most convincing-leads one to the conclusion that bio-weapons wereused in Rhodesia by the security forces, notwithstandingIan Smith's flippantresponse when confronted by a reporterover the alleged use of these weapons:'first time I've ever heard about it'."' While there is one explanation for apossible naturaloccurrence, t is not convincing underthe circumstances:by mid1978 veterinaryservices outside the white farmingarea had collapsed and suchservices were no longer provided."7Because of the level of violence in thecountryside,inoculationof cattle againstdiseases had become sporadicsince at

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IANMARTINEZleast 1974 and, even then, vets were sent in with armed soldiers."8Malaria,bilharzias and other endemic diseases soared during the period of anthraxspread."9Yet the collapse of the veterinaryand medical system alone does notprovide a satisfactoryexplanation of a naturallyoccurringoutbreakof anthrax.The reason is that anthrax vaccination was not practised in Zimbabwe evenbefore the outbreak because of the low prevalence of the disease.'20 As aconsequence, the collapse of veterinaryservices would not have had a majorimpact on cattle in the TribalTrustLands.The collapse did affect other diseases,such as preventabletick-borne diseases. Between 1975 and 1979 an estimated260 000 head of cattle died because 'dipping'services in the ruralareas had beenshut down.'2'Sleeping sickness also rose dramaticallyduring his period.Additional inferences of a deliberate spread can be gleaned from otherpractices of the Rhodesian cio, along with PsYoPs.cio's and PsYoPs'use ofanthraxwould have been consistent with threeother practices.It would continuethe PsYOPs peration of continuing psychological warfare on rural blacks byhighlightingthe fact thatforeigndiseases were the fault of the guerillas. Second,cio was already seeking to deny food supplies to the guerillas in line with'OperationTurkey'. Third, cio would have been attracted o a weapon of lastresortto break the morale of the ruralblacks. To understand io's thinking, onemust look at Zimbabweat the time. As in other parts of southernAfrica, wealthis primarilymeasuredby the numberof cattleone has.'22 herefore,without cattleto measure their wealth, rural blacks' morale would sink and support for theuprisingwould end.Forexample:

There is always hardship,but if cattle die, the family loses its source of wealth;without motive power for ploughing, crops can not be planted, leading to no food,no moneyto purchase ood, pay school fees, bus fares, taxes, orbuythe essentialsoflife. The family is reduced o grindingpovertyand malnutrition ecomes rife.'23The use of the Selous Scouts furthered hisgoal. Formerofficers have retoldhow,by imitatingthe guerillas,massacreswere perpetrated.Thus the ruralpopulationwould feel threatenedby the guerillas.The land allocatedto the Zimbabweanswas mostly arid,whereasthe white areas were relativelyfertile. The alkalinity nthe soil and the arid conditionswould be ideal for the spreadof anthrax.Nasssuggests that aerial sprayingis one possibility.'24As in other third world insur-gencies, the Rhodesians built special protected villages into which the nativepopulationwas concentrated,mostly involuntarily.Congregationof the ruralthepopulation nto one areacould have contributed o the ease of intentional nfesta-tion by the Security Forces.'25This goal would meet the first prong of theirdesireduse.The second reasoncio andPSYOPSould use anthraxwas that, by destroyingfood stocks in ruralareas, the original goals of 'Operation Turkey' would beenhanced.Food was used as a weaponin Rhodesia.Therefore, t is conceivablethat the anthrax programme was meant to destroy Shona wealth and foodprocessing. By denying the guerillas food their morale would sink, as theirsupplylines would be unableto support hem: this was especially true as the SASwas simultaneouslyhitting targetsoutsideRhodesia. The CIohoped the guerillaswouldmerelystarve n thefield.1168


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BACTERIOLOGICALNDCHEMICAL SAGEBY RHODESIAN ORCESFinally, the CIOand PsYoPsknew thatby 1978 the war was unwinnable.TheSecurity Forces could not be beaten, as they had won each battle, but neithercould they win. In addition, the constant call-up of the male population wasincreasing emigration."26ost knew that concentrated fforts to end the war hadfailed and thatthey had their 'backs to the wall'. The enemy was seen to be thevillager as well. As shown earlier,post-1975, the CIO and Selous Scouts useduntraditionalmeans of warfare.Their operationswere always along the line ofreducing ruralsupportfor black nationalists and lowering morale. To that end,cholera was spread, halliumwas used to poisonpeople, and watersupplieswerepoisoned. More generally, the Rhodesians had 'taken off the gloves'. Aninteresting analysis is that of the main operational area during the war-theHurricaneTheatre.Here, there were numerousno-go or frozen areasbecause ofSelous Scout activityin the borderarea at the time.127It is plausiblethat,togetherwith legitimate military operations, the Scouts were engaged in spreadinganthrax.For example, as noted previously,the Selous Scouts were instructed opourcholeraagentsinto the RuyaRiver.Starting n August 1973 'ExerciseLongWalk' was begun along the Ruya River near Mozambique.Selous Scouts wereactive in the area and otherSecurityForceswere told to pull out when the Scoutsneared their positions. Henceforth, Security Forces were instructed not toapproach he frozen zone andto stay at least 4000 metresfrom the RuyaRiver.'28In 1978 in Mozambique arge numbers of ZANLAsoldiers arrivedfrom training

bases near the borderwith a bleeding disorder.129t first a haemorrhagic everwas suspectedbut lab results showedwarfarinpoisoning.130The firstcase of anthraxn humanswas reported n November1978, accordingto Nass.131This is one month after the Rhodesian invasions and bombingsof Mozambique and Zambia-the height of the war. The outbreak thereforecoincided directly with a peak in hostilities. The use of anthraxcould havestrengthened he hand of the whites at the negotiating table, illustrating hat theblack populationwas enduringthe worst consequencesof the war and thus hadthe most to gain througha negotiatedsettlement. It was the classic bargaining-from-strength osition.The evidence shows thatRhodesia had a small indigenousbacteriologicalandchemicalprogrammeby 1975 led by Dr Symingtonunder the supervisionof the

CIO.Anthrax s obtainedby lab specimens or throughcollection of spores in thesoil.132As noted, the Rhodesiansbecame experts at sanctionsbusting, with false-end certificates,dummy companies and fake airlines. The RhAF set up dummycorporationssuch as Air Gabon in Gabon, CargOman n Oman and Air TransAfrica. 3 It is not too hard to imagine that Rhodesians could have obtained abatchof Britishanthraxspores from sympatheticadmirers n Britain or throughUS labs.'34Britainexperimentedwith anthraxduringthe Second WorldWar.3Anthraxdoes occur naturally in Zimbabwe, but not in sufficient quantities tojustify the expense of field cultivationof spores. And if we discount the evidenceanddismiss the ingenuity of the Rhodesiansat sanctionsbusting,the mainculpritin the proliferationof bacteriological weapons to Rhodesia was most probablySouthAfrica.

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IAN MARTINEZThe SouthAfrican connectionThe main culprit over the Rhodesians getting hold of biological weapons hasbeen South Africa. South Africa was an original signatory to the BiologicalWeaponsConvention n 1972, ratifying t on 5 November1975. SouthAfrica hasalways maintained that its biological weapons programme was solely fordefensive use.'36South Africa producedchemical weapons duringWorld WarIIin Gauteng-responsible for mustard gas production-for the allies.'37SouthAfrica claimed that undelivered stocks were destroyed after the war. However,former allied productionsites continued to be used by the South Africans formilitarypurposes.Tomanufacture nthraxunder 'ideal' conditions,high-contain-ment suites are used. However, such facilities were not available to the alliesduringWorldWarTwo, according o Nass.South Africa providedRhodesia with military support.In 1968 it sent a smallcontingentto Rhodesia to help againstthe insurgency.'3" onetheless, to see bothas an inseparablealliance of white supremacistss somewhatmisleading.In 1975South Africa pulled out most of its military assistance to Rhodesia. If SouthAfrica assisted in the use of bacteriological weapons in Rhodesia, it was mostlikely for its own personal gain in research, rather than for benevolent love.South Africa and Rhodesia were quite dissimilar,with their one unifying aspectbeing continuationof white minorityrule. SouthAfrica, accordingto Ian Smith,was willing to sell out Rhodesiain orderto appeasethe international ommunityand buy time for its own apartheid state.'39However, one major factorexculpating the South Africans from involvement has been the Truth andReconciliation Commission's findings on South Africa's ProjectCoast. ProjectCoastmay have commencedin the late 1970s to early 1980s, with an exact dateunknown. What is known is that by 1981 the head of 'Project Coast,' one DrBasson-aka Dr Death-visited the USA and met CBWscientists.'40 rojectCoastexperimented with cholera, botulism, anthrax,chemical poisoning and lethalmicro-organisms.The military s alleged to have used cholera-as in Rhodesia-to poison wells, to have placed anthrax in cigarettes, and placed paraoxon inwhiskey and then distributed it.'4' There is no mention of South African andRhodesiancollusion; however, formercio membershave indicatedthat the SouthAfricansbankrolled he Selous Scouts and had unfetteredaccess to theirMountDarwinbase.'42Nonetheless, the methods and choice of weapons used would leadto an inference that at least there was communicationon sharedtechnology andapplication at the operational level. In addition, South Africa launched'OperationWinter'whereby largeassets of the Rhodesianmilitaryleft Rhodesiaupon majorityrule.'43 n some cases, whole units of the Selous Scouts and SASjoined the SouthAfrican Defence Force, takingwith them Rhodesia'sdirtylittletricks.'"

Legal analysisThe main legal questions are: a) who should be held responsible? b) underwhatmechanisms?Shouldthe state of Rhodesia be held liable or should the per-petrators?1170


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BACTERIOLOGICALND CHEMICAL SAGEBY RHODESIAN ORCESInternational awThe first attempt to deal with chemical weapons were the Hague series ofConventions, which codified the law of war and entered into force in 1910.Rhodesia may have violated the 1907 Hague Convention.ThroughArticle 1, theconvention is applicableto members of the RhodesianSecurityForces. Article23(a) prohibits the use of 'poison or poisoned weapons'. The use of cholera,thallium and other bacteriologicalagents is a clear violation of this article. Theuse of bacteriological weapons was outlawed by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, towhich the UK is a party.In 1949 the Geneva Conventionbroadened he applica-bility of the treaty by adopting the phrase 'armed conflict' to replace thenarrowerphrase of 'laws or customs of war', as used in the 1907 Hague and1925 Geneva Conventions.The 1949 Geneva Conventionwas built upon priortreatieswhich have been universallyapplied.Under Common Article III of the Geneva Convention-which makes itselfapplicable to internal conflicts and civil wars-Rhodesia committed several'grave breaches'. By killing cattle, the Rhodesian Security Forces targetedthewealth of the rural population a violation of Article 111(1). Furthermore,the Selous Scouts killed captured nsurgentsor used them for biological experi-mentation if they did not 'turn'. These practices are a violation of ArticleIII(l)(a). Great Britainwas a signatoryto the GenevaConvention,but Rhodesiawas not. Nonetheless, internationalaw and recent cases have elevated CommonArticle III of the GenevaConvention o customary aw. A violation of the Articleis a violation of customary aw.In addition to these two treaties, there is the 1972 Biological WeaponsConvention (BWC), which renounces biological weapons use against humanbeings. The BWC reflects the post-World War II renunciation of biologicalweapons by the defeated Axis powers and the unilateralrenunciationof the useof suchweapons by the USA in 1969. By enlarging he scope of the 1949 GenevaConvention, through Common Article III, the use of chemical weapons ininternal armed conflicts is outlawed. Because of its declaration of UDI, it isarguablewhether the use of these weapons would have been 'illegal' under theGenevaProtocol,since Rhodesia was never a partyto the Convention.However,Rhodesia's independence was illegal and not recognised by the internationalcommunity.145Furthermore,he use of such weapons is now acknowledgedto bea violation of customary nternational aw. For a practiceto become customaryinternational law there must emerge a general consensus in the internationalcommunity that furthering he practiceviolates internationalcustomarylaw. In1988 Iraqused chemicalweaponsin an internalconflict. International ondemna-tions of the use of chemical weapons againstan internalcivilianpopulationwereswift, and Iraqwas accused of violating the 1925 Geneva Convention.'46 here-fore, under the Hague Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the use ofchemical or biological weapons againstinternalpopulationshas been raised to aviolationof customaryhumanitarianaw.The successor to Rhodesia throughdecolonisation is Zimbabwe. Under theVienna Convention a newly independentstate begins its existence free of theobligationsof its predecessorstate-the 'clean slatedoctrine' At independence

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IANMARTINEZthe UK attempteda legal fiction. It turnedback Zimbabwe'sclock to 1965 byappointinga Governorandreincorporating imbabwe nto the CommonwealthofStates,the successorto the BritishEmpire.The illegalityof the regimewas over-turnedand Zimbabweemerged as a new nation underthe clean slate doctrine.Therefore,since violationof the treaties s a violationof international ustomarylaw Zimbabwe s liable for violationsby Rhodesiansecurityforces. This is a nonsequitur,andthusillogical. Therefore,one mustturnto the next logical question:if the stateis not responsible,arethe perpetrators nd underwhatjudicial modelcanthey be brought o justice?HoldingindividualsaccountableThe law of nations does not confine its reach to state actions.'48There areinnumerable eferencesto individualscommittingan offence againstthe law ofnations.149herefore ndividualswho were partof the RhodesianSecurityforceswho violated internationalcustomary aw duringthe internalarmedconflict of1965-80 should be prosecuted. For example, Symington's experiments onhumansarea clear crimeagainsthumanity.'51Underinternationalaw, the RhodesianSecurityForces committedtwo majorinternational crimes: war crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva Con-ventions.'5'War crimes-violations of the customs of war, ie Hague 1907-include murderor ill-treatmentof prisonersof war, wanton destruction,use ofbiological agents, and devastation not justified by military necessity. Gravebreaches ncludewillful killing, biological experiments,compellinga prisonerofwar to serve in the forces of a hostile power, making the civilian populationtargets of attack, racial discrimination,deportationof population of occupiedterritory,and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body andhealth. If a Nuremberg-stylecourt is established-doubtful because of the timelapse in the events-criminal prosecutioncan take place againstthose membersof the Security Forces who perpetuated the crimes and their leaders whoauthorised he use of these tactics.'52

In 1999 a call was made by university professors to the government ofZimbabweto investigate the 1975-80 incidents of bacteriologicalwar, in partbecause of Health Minister Stamps' insistence.'53Yet to date nothing has beenofficially undertaken y the governmentof Zimbabwe.The reasonsfor not actingagainstthe reportaretwofold.First,the whitepopulation n Zimbabwehas fallenfrom around190 000 in 1980 to 90 000 in 2000.'54Whites were the economicbackbone of the country.'55 o his credit, Mugabe tried to build a multiracialcountry.Reconciliationwas the tone. The whites were allowed to stay as long astheyknew theirplace in the new country.Duringthe 1990s Mugabefaced severalproblemsto his rule.'56n 1990 therewere fewerjobs for blacks than there were in1975 andreal incomes were downfrom what they were in 1975. 7 In an attempt to escape domestic problems,Mugabe turnedto the legacy of land distribution n Zimbabwe. In 2000 farminvasions began as the government attemptedillegally to seize white-ownedfarms. White emigrationbegan again and, in 2001, the white population wasless than 50 000, consisting mostly of retired persons. Mugabe-through his1172


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ministers-keeps the spectre of whites being all-powerful and treacherous.Nonetheless, he cannot institute an inquiry because it just might show thatanthraxwas not used in the conflict or, worse yet, that Mugabe andhis side mighthave carried out their own dirty tricks. Mugabe and his ministers have recentlyinsinuated that the remaining whites may use anthrax again against the blackpopulation. On 25 October 2001 the Deputy Health Minister said that exiledRhodesians and white Zimbabweans were preparing an anthrax attack.'58Thestate-controlledmedia interviewedruralfarmersabouta recent anthraxoutbreakthe same week. The ruralfarmers claim that the remaining white commercialfarmershave activated the anthraxused in the liberationwar.'59n January2002the governmentorchestratedan 'anthraxscare' and blamed it on the oppositionpolitical party and white farmers-one of the latter's supporters.'60However,these inquirieswere quickly suppressed:

ZANLAand/orZIPRAmay also have hadcomplicityin spreading he biotoxins around.The war between ZANLA and zIPRAwas by far the deadliest and most destructiveaspect of the liberationstruggle. ZANLA was fighting zIPRAas much as it was theRhodesian Army. ZANLA may have become aware of the Rhodesians' bio 'dirtytricks' and used them,such as the poisonedfood tins, against villages sympathetic oZIPRA, possibly even with the Rhodesians' help. Or, ZIPRA may have done thesame to ZANLA, but I think the former is more likely. I think this is a more logicalexplanation or why a morecomprehensive nvestigationhas neverbeen undertaken.In the currentenvironment, his is the perfect storyto villify the remainingwhites inZimbabwe andjustify seizing their property.The GOZ[governmentof Zimbabwe]would only have to go after a handfulto makethe case thatits campaign againstthewhites was partof the war on terrorism,and this, in turn, could give the West pausein villifying the GOZ I don't think it would lead to a mass white exodus, however).Instead,the 'story' that the whites were planningan anthraxattack,and the 'story'about anthrax-like substances turning up at the central post office disappearedquickly. I suspect someone on high squashed any further nvestigationsbecause ofwhereit mightlead.'6'

In conclusion, domestic remedies against those remaining Security Forcespersonnelwould be highly unlikely under the Mugabe regime and his co-optedjustice system. If the trials were to show that there was no use of chemical orbiological weapons, Mugabewould be unable to continue to use whites as scape-goats. If whites were found to be guilty of the use of these weapons, the stigmaattachedcould well producethe final exodus of whites in the country,plungingitinto completeeconomic chaos.Therefore,the last option and the most feasible for those affected duringtheliberation war is to use the forum of a third country, like the USA, whose lawswould allow an alien to seek compensation for damages. In the USA Zimbab-weans may use the Alien Tort Claim Act, 28 USC ss 1350 (1988), enacted in1789, which creates federal court jurisdiction for suits alleging torts committedanywhere in the world against aliens in violation of the law of nations.'62 naddition, federal common law has incorporated nternationalcustomary law.'63Therefore, an alien within the USA can pursue a claim against the formerRhodesianSecurityForces. In fact, on 9 September2000 Zimbabweans iving inthe USA filed suit against Mugabeand two of his associates underthe Alien Tort

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IAN MARTINEZAct for torturingtheir relative in Zimbabwe because he belonged to anotherparty.'64

SouthAfrican actors-exemptIf South Africaused bacteriologicalweapons, it was in violation of Article II ofthe Geneva Convention. If it possessed and developed bacteriological agentssuch as cholera and thallium along with Rhodesia, then it was in violation ofArticle I of the Convention. If it helped proliferate the spread by helpingRhodesia acquirethe technology and the means to use biological weapons, it isalso in violation of ArticleIII of the Convention.Rather han stop or preventthedevelopmentof these weaponsdomestically,South Africaactively participatedntheir development in violation of Article IV of the Convention. Under thisArticle,only state partiesto the Conventionmay lodge allegedviolations. To datenone has. Nonetheless, domestically, under the Truth and ReconciliationCommission, crimes committed under apartheid may be pardoned if the per-petrators estify about their crimes. Many in the biological programmedid andwere subsequentlypardoned.However, South Africa's 'Project Coast' is still astate secret and its machinationsare under 'lock and key'67 A trial conductedin Afrikaans, whose main witnesses were a throwback to the 1970s defenceestablishment, recently found even 'Dr Death' -who did not repent-notguilty.'68n addition, South Africa was not a belligerentunderArticle I of the1907 HagueConvention.

ConclusionThroughpractice,a custom can emerge.Most countrieshave forsakenthe use ofbacteriologicalagents. Therefore t can be arguedthat the use of bacteriologicalweapons by Rhodesians in 1975-80 was a violation of the 1907 HagueConvention,regardlessof Rhodesia's international tatus and Article III of the1949 Geneva Convention,and regardlessof its status as an 'illegal' state, sinceindividual responsibility can be used. The Rhodesian Security Forces can beprosecuted or warcrimes,althougha propervenue will be difficult to find. If thecurrentgovernment s unwilling to put forwardclaims againstthe priorregime,ordinarycitizens who were affectedcan bringforth claims. Since Zimbabwehasdescendedinto a one-partydictatorship,Zimbabweansmay have to look abroadfor ajudicial solutionto the crimes committedagainstthem.

NotesI Ian Douglas Smith, The Great Betrayal, London: 1997, pp 60-61.2 GrahamBoynton, Last Days in Cloud Cuckooland: Dispatches from WhiteAfrica, New York: 1997,p65.3 Smith, The GreatBetrayal, pp 103-106.4 JTR Wood, Rhodesian Insurgency, available at http://www.rhodesia.myweb.nl/rhomil.htm, lastvisited 10 November 2001. See also Smith, The Great Betrayal, p 109.5 Wood, Rhodesian Insurgency;and Smith, The Great Betrayal, p 117.6 Roy Nesbit & Dudley Cowderoy, Britain's Rebel Air Force: The War From the Air in Rhodesia,1174


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BACTERIOLOGICALND CHEMICAL SAGEBY RHODESIAN ORCES1965-1980, London:1998, pp 56-65. An entirewing of the RhodesianAir Force was dedicated osanctionsbusting.The planes lew with fake tail numbers.Bills of ladingwere routinely alsifiedwithfalse countryreceivers.The sanctionsbusting also consisted of forming 'dummy' corporations nthirdcountries.For example, he RhodesianAir Force flew Alouettehelicopters or missions againstthe insurgents.The French producerof the Alouette complied with the UN arms embargo. TheRhodesiansmerelyset up a dummyciviliancorporationn a neighbouringAfricancountrywhichhadan Alouette. In the life of this 'company,'the single Alouette requirednumerousengine repairs,dozensof gearboxes and ail rotor eplacements.Alan Best & Harmde Blij, AfricanSurvey,New York:1977,p 305.

8 Nexbit & Dudley, Britain's Rebel Air Force, p 29.9 Ibid.'1 Bruce Hoffman et al, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience,

RAND Institute, 991, pp 18-19. See also Wood,Rhodesian nsurgency.Hoffman et al, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies, p 7.12 Nesbit &Cowderoy,Britain's Rebel Air Force, pp 29-30.13 See ibid,pp 29-33 for a description f the 'battle'.14 Ibid,p 35.15 Hoffman et al, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies, p 9.16 Ibid. The Land Apportionment ct of 1930 dividedRhodesia nto distinctfarmingcommunities-excludingblack Africans romownershipof the best farmland.Whites were given the most fertileland.Whitesreceivedaround 1% of the land andblacksreceivedaround 2%of the land, while therest was set aside for futurepurchasing. he effect was to force Africans o workon white farmsandin mines and factories.It was this resentmentwhich would contribute o recruitment rives by theguerrillas.17 Boynton,Last Days in Cloud Cuckooland, p 75. See also Peter Abbott & Philip Botham,ModemAfrican Wars: Rhodesia 1965-80, London: 1986, p 11; and Hoffman et al, Lessons for ContemporaryCounterinsurgencies, p 14.18 See, forexample, an-IllychMartinez,The Cubanmilitaryn Angola: helimits of internationalism',

MAthesis,University f Miami, 1998.19 Ibid, pp 31-33; and Adelino Serras Pires, The Winds of Havoc: A Memoir of Adventure andDestruction in Deepest Africa, New York: 2001, pp 89-107.20 See, forexample,Best & De Blij, AfricanSurvey,pp 306-307. In 1976Soviet-backedCuban roopsstationedn Mozambiquelashedbrieflywith the Rhodesians.21 Ibid.22 Abbott& Botham,Modem African Wars,p 18. Originallya partof the BritishSAS, the Rhodesiancontingentwas founded n 1950.Theunit trainedas late as 1962 withtheBritishSAS in Aden. Thisunit was the elite of the Rhodesianmilitary.Fora generalhistoryof theunit,see BarbaraCole, TheElite: TheStory of the Rhodesian SAS,Transkei:ThreeKnights Publishing, 1984.23 Abbott & Botham,ModernAfrican Wars, pp 14-15. The RAR was the oldest unit in the Army,founded n 1940. Black officerswere finallyallowedin 1979. For a generalhistoryof the King'sAfricanRifles,which ncludes he RAR, see MalcomPage,PRAR:A History of the King's African Rifles& East African Forces, London: 1998.24 Abbott& Botham,ModemAfricanWars,pp 16-17. TheRLIwas formed n 1961 as theFederation'sEuropeanArmy.AlongwiththeSAStheRLIwasnever ntegrated. ora generalhistoryof theRLI,seeChrisCocks,Fireforce,Alberton,SouthAfrica:Galago,1987.25 Abbott& Botham,ModemAfricanWars,p 21. The ArmoredCarRegimentwas formed n 1941. Itwas disbanded ponbreak-up f thefederation, ut was resurrectedn 1972.26 Hoffman et al, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies, pp 23-24. The Rhodesians showedthe worldthat smallbandsof guerrillasare best fought by small highly trainedbandsof specialoperationunits in the field, a tactic thatchangedthe US mode of conductingcounter-insurgencyconflicts.27 Abbott & Botham, Modern African Wars, p 18.28 See Ron R. Daly,Selous Scouts: Top Secret War, CapeTown: 1983 for a generalhistoryof thisunit;andSelous Scouts HomePage, http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/home_page.htm,ast visited14 August 2002. See also Hoffman et al, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies, p 31; and

Nesbit & Cowderoy, Britain's Rebel Air Force, p 39.29 Hoffman et al, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies, p 32.30 Ibid.JeremyBrickhill,'Zimbabwe'spoisoned egacy:secret warin southernAfrica',CovertAction, 43,1992/93,p 6.32 Hoffman et al, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies, p 31.33 Ibid,p 33.

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IAN MARTINEZJK Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, London: 1985, p 218. For a general overview ofRhodesian intelligence, see pp 218-237 of the same work.

3 See, for example, Brickhill, Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy, p 6.36 Ibid, p 7.37 Ken Flower, Serving Secretly, London: 1987, p 124.38 Hoffman et al, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies, p 33. See also Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, p 102, n 4, citing the Rhodesian Army Manual Military Support to the CivilOrder's 1976 definition of a no go area as: 'one [from] which all civilians are excluded by an order ofthe Protecting Authority ... Only authorized members of the security forces, on duty, will move in no-go areas and no action [civil] may be instituted against them for any death or injurywithin the area.'39 Cilliers, Counter-Insurgencv in Rhodesia, p 239. In 1973-74 there were a few 'hundred' insurgentswithin Rhodesia. By 1977 cio estimated that the combined ZANU/ZIPRA force numbered over '5000.'By 1978 the figure was over 9000. Meanwhile white emigration was accelerating. See, for example,Peter Godwin, Rhodesians Never Die: The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia1970-1980, Harare: 1993.4 Wood, Rhodesian Insurgencv.41 Ibid.42 Nesbit & Cowderoy, Britain's Rebel Air Force, p 40.43 Peter Godwin, Rhodesians Never Die, p 171; and Best & De Blij, African Survey, p 308.4 Smith, The Great Betraval, p 24945 Abbott & Botham, Modern African Wars, p 7; and Best & De Blij, African Survev, pp 307-308. TheSouth Africans took 'an active role, out of self interest in [the] behind-the-scenes diplomatic moveswith Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana to help create an atmosphere in which [a] [sic] constitutionalsettlement might be achieved'.4 Smith, The Great Betraval, pp 269-271.47 Godwin, Rhodesians Never Die, pp 228-231. The aeroplane was hit by a SAM 7 missile. The pilotwas able to land the plane safely, but at the last moment, hit a ditch and broke in two. Eighteen peoplesurvived the crash. Five of the least injured went to get help. Soon afterwards, insurgents showed upand killed 10 of the 13 still alive. ZIPRA's head, Nkomo claimed responsibility, and a rumour that helaughed about killing civilians sent Rhodesia over the edge.41 The operation in Zambia led to the RhAFbeing in control of Zambian airspace for over 30 minutes.Ibid, p 233. The action boosted morale in Rhodesia as the tape was played on the television.49 See Hoffman et al, Lessonsfor Contemporarv Counterinsurgencies, pp 82-90 for an exhaustive list ofthese cross-border raids into neighbouring countries.`0 Smith, The Great Betrayal, p 329.51 Thomas Packenham, The Scramble for Africa: the White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent From1876-1912, New York: 1991, p 671.32 Godwin, Rhodesians Never Die, p 168. According to the book, 'one can forget about the hearts andminds', the Rhodesians just wanted to 'go out and slay houts'.53 Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, p 156.54 Cocks, Fireforce, p 236.55 Godwin, Rhodesians Never Die, p 117; and Hoffman et al, Lessons for Contemporary Counter-

insurgencies, p 35.36 Hoffman et al, Lessonsfor ContemporarvCounterinsurgencies, p 35.57 Tom Mangold et al, Plague Wars: A True Storv of Biological Warfare, available at http://www.panmacmillan.com/plaguewars/chapters.htm, p 216; and Brickhill, Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy, p 7.38 Ibid.p 222.S9 Ibid; and Brickhill, Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy, pp 7-8 and n 14.60 Ibid.61 Mangold et al, Plague Wars, p 226.62 Fredrick R. Sidell et al, Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook, Alexandria, VA: 1999, pp 179-80. 'Ricin is atoxin made from the mash that is left over after processing castor beans.' Since processing is world-wide, the material is 'easily available'.63 Mangold et al, Plague Wars, p 226.64 Ibid.63 Brickhill, Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy, p 8; and Mangold et al, Plague Wars, pp 222-223.66 Ibid.67 Mangold et al, Plague Wars, p 223.68 Ibid, pp 221-223. 'South African military and security personnel who not only acted as advisers andmonitors, but likely played some partin the development of the chemical and biological agents.'69 Ibid.70 Ibid,p 223.1176


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BACTERIOLOGICALND CHEMICAL SAGEBY RHODESIAN ORCES7' HenrikEllert, The Rhodesian Front War:Counter-Insurgency nd Guerrilla War in Rhodesia1962-1980, Harare: 989, pp 146-147. Ellertwas a formerhead in the cio Special Branchsection,which makes his allegations hat much more credible.See also Al Venter, 'Biological warfare: hepoorman'satomicbomb,Jane's IntelligenceReview,11(3), 1999, p 42.72 Mangold t al, Plague Wars,p 223, citingEllert,pp 146-147.73 Ibid.I Venter, 'Biological warfare'. Selous Scouts also used conventionalweapons. They would placebombs in radios and distribute hem to guerrillas.Once in the field, the Scouts would detonate heradioskillingthe listeners.Brickhill,Zimbabwe's oisonedLegacy,p 6.75 It was through his border hatguerrilla ctivityhad spikedpost-1975.76 Mangoldet al, Plague Wars,p 223; and Brickhill,Zimbabwe'sPoisoned Legacy,p 8, citing Ellert,p 112.77 Sidell et al, Jane's Chem-BioHandbook,pp 165-166. Choleraexposure is throughcontact withcontaminatedwater. 'It can thrive n salinewateror waterpollutedwith organicmatter or up to 6weeks.'78 Mangold t al, Plague Wars,p 222.7 'Smith's chemical warfare secrets revealed', Observer,10 November 1991, p 18; and 'Kenya:terrifying ealityof plaguewars,TheNation Nairobi), 1 October 001.80 Mangold t al, Plague Wars,p 222.81 Sidell etal, Jane's Chem-BioHandbook; ndBrickhill,Zimbabwe's oisonedLegacy,p 8.82 Flower,ServingSecretly,pp 137-138; andMangold t al, Plague Wars.83 Submission o the ResearchDept of the TRCby the Netherlandsnstitute or SouthernAfrica,TheChemicalWarfareCases: QuestionsAbouttheDevelopment f the SouthAfricanApartheidRegimeand Its SecretServices in ExternalOperationsLike Hit Squads,Chemicaland Biological Warfare,1997,available thttp://www.contrast.org/truth/htmllchemical_biological_weapons.html,5.84 Ibid,p 6. The Portuguesewere also involved n the projectbefore heirempire ollapsed.85 Mangold t al, Plague Wars,p 221.86 ChemicalWarfareCases,p 6.87 'Smith'schemicalwarfare ecrets'.After ndependence rofessorSymingtonmoved to SouthAfrica,and is alleged to have participatedn making biological and chemical weapons in thatcountry.Brickhill,Zimbabwe's oisonedLegacy,p 8.88 'Anthrax s a biologicalweapon',Journalof theAmericanMedicalAssociation,281 (18).89 Ibid.90Sidell et al, Jane'sChem-BioHandbook, 162.9' 'Anthraxas a biological weapon';and 'Firstresponseto terror', nsighton the News, 26 January1998, p 10.92 Sidell et al, Jane'sChem-BioHandbook, p 162-163.93 FirstResponse o Terror,p 10.I Mangold,Plague Wars,p 218.95 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia:nBrief;AnthraxOutbreaknMatabeleland TLs,BBC, 16October1979.96 Ibid,19 October1979.97 Mangold t al, Plague Wars,p 222.98 'Rhodesia orcesused anthrax, holera n guerrillawarfare',AgenceFrancePresse,8 July 1993.99 Cocks, Fireforce, p 236.100Ibid,p 158.101Ibid,p 159;andBrickhill,Zimbabwe's oisonedLegacy,p 6.

192 Mangold t al, Plague Wars,p 218.103 Ibid.104 Ibid.105Meryl Nass, 'Epitzootic n Zimbabwe,1978-80: due to deliberate pread?,PSR Quarterly,2 (4),1992, p 198.Seealso 'Rhodesia orcesusedanthrax'; ndMangold tal, Plague Wars,p 218.11' Nass, 'Epitzootic in Zimbabwe'.107 Ibid,p 199.108 Ibid.109 Ibid.110 Ibid, p 206.I Ibid.112 Mangoldet al, Plague Wars,p 218, citingDefenseIntelligenceAgency,ref DoD 5200-1-R, August1990,declassifiedunderFreedom f Information ct on 1February 994.113 PhoneInterviewwith StateDepartment eskOfficer,14November2001,Miami.114 E-mailInterviewwith author's onfidentialource,15November 001,Miami.115 Mangold t al, Plague Wars,p 218.

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IANMARTINEZ116 Brickhill, Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy, p 9.Nass, 'Epitzooticn Zimbabwe', 105;andCilliers,Counter-InsurgencynRhodesia,p 238.118 Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, p 141."I lbid, p 239.120 Nass, 'Epitzooticn Zimbabwe', 199.121 See TaperKnoxChitiyo, 'Land,Violence and Compensation: econceptualisingimbabwe'sLandAndWarVeteran'sDebate',TrackTwo,9 (1) 2000.122 Nass, 'Epitzooticn Zimbabwe', 205.123 Ibid,citingAO Pugh& JCADavies, 'HumanAnthraxn Zimbabwe', roceedings f the InternationalWorkshop on Anthrax, Salisbury Medical Bulletin, 68, 1990, pp 32-33.124 Nass, 'Epitzooticn Zimbabwe', 204.125 Ibid.126 See, forexample,Godwin,RhodesiansNeverDie, forthe effects of emigration n white moraleandmanpower.127 Nass, 'Epitzooticn Zimbabwe, 207. Nass suggests hat heremightbe a correlation etween heno-

go areasand heuseof anthrax y the Selous Scouts.128 Daly,Selous Scouts, p 41.129 Nass, 'Epitzooticn Zimbabwe', 206.Ibid,citingPaulEpstein, In southernAfrica,brutality nddeath',BostonGlobe,26 December1987,p 23. For example, he Ebola virusand its strainsarehaemorrhagicevers.In fact, Dr Tim Stamps,Zimbabwe'sMinisterof Health,has his 'suspicionsaboutEbola too' and deliberate preadby theRhodesians. Mangold et al, Plague Wars, p 220.Nass, 'Epitzooticn Zimbabwe', 204.132 Ibid."3 Nesbit & Cowderoy, Britain's Rebel Air Force, pp 56-65.34 Nass, 'Epitzooticn Zimbabwe',p 205; and Mangoldet al, Plague Wars,pp 218-219. Becauseoftheir sanctionbustingactivities, forgerywas dead simple n the catalogueof tricksused during hedirtywars n SouthernAfrica'.

'3 Nass 'EpitzooticnZimbabwe', 204; andMangold t al, Plague Wars,p 219.136 Chemical Warfare Cases, p 69.137 Ibid.138 Cilliers, Counter-Insurgencyin Rhodesia, p 9.13' Smith, The Great Betrayal, pp 281-282..140 See Special Investigationinto Project Coast, 'South Africa's chemical and biological warfareprogramme', vailableat http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/commissions/1998/trc/2chap6c.htm,astvisited 19 April 2002; and 'Dr Death implicatesWest', BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/143006.stm,ast visited8 August2002.Special nvestigationntoProjectCoast.142 Brickhill,Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy, p 10.413 Ibid,p 59.

144 Ibid.14S ResolutionConcerning outhernRhodesia,1265thMeetingSCRes.217, 20 SCOR,Resolutions ndDecisions,p 8.146 US Department f State,Press Guidance,9 September1988. 'Questionshave been raisedas towhetherheprohibitionn the 1925GenevaProtocolagainstchemicalweaponsuse "in war"appliesto use in internal onflicts.It is clearthat suchuse againstcivilianpopulationswouldbe contraryto thecustomarynternationalaw that s applicableo internal rmed onflicts,as well as other nter-national greements.'"7 See ViennaConventionArts 17, 24; andInternationalMilitaryTribunalNuremberg)udgment ndSentences 1 A.J.I.L., 20-221(1946).

148 Karadzic, 70 F.3d,p 238.149 See,forexample,USv Smith,18US (5 Wheat)153, 161-62,5 L.ed.57 (1820).'IOInternational ilitaryTribunalNuremberg).'5' Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and First Protocol of the Geneva Conventions of 1978,75/UNTS/31.ProtocolOne appliesalso because t applies o, 'armed onflicts n whichpeoplearefightingagainst olonialdomination ndalienoccupation ndagainst acistregimes n the exerciseoftheirright o self-determination,s enshrinedn the Charterf the UN.'152 KenFlower, hehead of cio, diedin 1987.IanSmith s still aliveat 83, andas of the time of writing,is living n Harare ndBulawayo,Zimbabwe.53 'Zimbabwe:overnment rged o probereports itinguse of chemicalagents',AfricaNews Service,12November1999.5 'A socialistconfrontspovertywith a wealthof pragmatism',Washington imes,5 November1990.1178


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BACTERIOLOGICALND CHEMICAL SAGEBY RHODESIAN ORCESThe white populationwas 125 000 in 1990;90 000 in 1991. 'Alienated romAfrica',AfricaReport,February 991.

155 'Zimbabwe's bushpeace"deadly o whitefarmers',Washington ost, 8 March1988. In 1988 whitesheld all but 12 of the top 200 executivepositions n Zimbabwe's100 largestcompanies.See also'Alienated romAfrica'.156 See Supra.157 Ibid.158 'Zimbabwe reparedor anthrax ttacks',Panafrican News Agency, 25 October 001.59 'Zimbabwe:anthraxcases reported n Zhombedistrict', ZTV1, BBC WorldwideMonitoring, 27October 001.

160 'Zimbabwe's anthrax"gimmick"',BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1752000/1752767.stm,ast visited10 January 002.161 E-mailInterviewwith author's onfidential ource,16April2002, Miami.162 Filartigav Pena-Irala,630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).163 ThePaqueteHabana,175 US 677, 700, 20 S. Ct. 290, 299, (1900).16 'Mugabe ued nNew Yorkover rightsabuses',Washington ost, 9 September 000, p A3.165 'Exiles seek Castro'sndictmentn Belgium', Washingtonost,4 October 001, p A32.166 'Belgium"embarrassed"y probeof Sharon',Washingtonost,6 July2001, p A18.167 'DrDeath mplicatesWest'.168 'Revenge of South Africa's Dr Death', BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/1926117.stm,ast visited8 August2002.

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