checkpoint of the future blueprint - aci...
TRANSCRIPT
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 1
Checkpoint of the Future
Blueprint
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 2
Forward
The December 2009 attempted bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight bound for
Detroit, Michigan demonstrates that in the future aviation needs smarter and faster, next-
generation passenger screening measures to confront new and emerging threats. It also
dramatically illustrates that those who would do harm by injuring innocent passengers
and disrupting national economies continue to view aviation infrastructure as a primary
target.
This and other recent events also provide instructive lessons on the detection
capabilities of today’s checkpoints and illustrate a lack of correlation between passenger
inconvenience and increased detection fidelity. A system focused on finding bad objects
and offering no additional capabilities in exchange for long wait times and intrusive
personal inspections cannot expect to maintain the confidence of increasingly
sophisticated and experienced passengers.
Security and technology are often confused. IATA remains concerned that novel
technology is being viewed as the silver bullet for future checkpoints. Discussions by
national legislative bodies, regulators, and industry on novel drop-in technologies for
checkpoints should not mask the need for a new philosophy behind checkpoint
architecture.
For these reasons we believe that the day is rapidly approaching where the 40
year old concepts which serve as the underpinning for current checkpoints will become
obsolete. IATA has developed a Checkpoint of the Future blueprint.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 3
Introduction
There is a need for a new concept in passenger security screening that
emphasizes enhanced security and more efficient throughput. Today’s screening
paradigm globally tends to be “one size fits all.” Elevated risk passengers use the same
lanes as the frequent fliers, which use the same lanes as everyone else. Passenger data
is not used at the checkpoint to make intelligent screening decisions. This paradigm has
created long queues, inconvenienced passengers, and generally not resulted in higher
detection levels of threatening objects.
The Checkpoint of the Future described here, relies on two basic concepts. First,
passengers should be screened at the airport with devices and processes
commensurate with what is known about them. Second, while passengers need to be
both physically and electronically screened, varying ratios of each can be used to create
a complete security picture of the traveler before a cleared-to-board is issued.
IATA is planning development of this Checkpoint in two phases. The first step is
to repurpose and reintegrate existing technology into an intermediate checkpoint. This
reworked checkpoint would integrate several central elements of the Checkpoint of the
Future including passenger data, behavioral analysis and the creation of new screening
lanes. In the longer term, we envision an interruption free passenger transit from curb to
aircraft. Combining biometrics, stand-off screening, and passenger data, travelers
should walk uninterrupted through a “tunnel of technology”1 where security and customs
processing occurs in a transparent manner.
Passenger information plays a driving role in Checkpoint of the Future. Data
collected by customs and immigration agencies would be merged with data collected for
security. Intelligence agencies then would conduct pre-screening to determine which of
two possible outcomes occur. Either a passenger is categorized as a “no fly” or into one
1 “technology” means all technologies that play a role in screening, including systems that enable data, information and intelligence to be gather, analyzed and transmitted and those that enable pre-screening, risk categorization and detection
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 4
of three risk levels for screening and it is this that marks a significant improvement over
previous processes. The results of categorization would be made known to screeners at
the checkpoint and that encoded information would be used to direct the passenger to
one of three new screening lanes: Known Traveler (KT), Normal Screening (NS), or
Enhanced Security (ES) for elevated risk passengers.
For example, a Known Traveler who has passed a background check and
registered their biometric data would be eligible for a high speed Known Traveler (KT)
lane at the checkpoint. Shoes would be left on, laptops allowed in bags, and coats would
remain on. Conversely, a passenger whom a regulator has categorized as an elevated
risk would go through an Enhanced Security (ES) lane where extremely thorough
screening would be performed. Shoes come off, coats are taken off, laptops come out of
bags and sophisticated explosives screening is performed.
Removing these two categories of passenger from regular screening lanes and
creating an optimized normal risk lane would greatly speed the screening process for the
remaining passengers. These individuals would proceed through a Normal Screening
(NS) lane which would allow for shoes to stay on, liquids/gels to stay in bags, computers
to remain in bags, but jackets would come off. Basic questions for behavior observation
would be asked.
In summary, this concept creates:
• New Enhanced Security lane where elevated risk passengers are removed from
the regular flows of the passenger checkpoint and screened rigorously.
• New Known Traveler lane where Known Travelers receive expedited screening
in exchange for enrolling into a program where they provide regulators with
extended biographical background information.
• A new and faster Normal Screening lane, where advanced passenger
information can be viewed in an encoded format at the checkpoint by screeners,
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 5
who will also observe behavior, and re-direct passengers to an enhanced
security lane if necessary.
It is important to note we consider there is not a single “correct” design
appropriate to all operating environments. To be relevant at the widest range of airports
and threat environments, Checkpoint of the Future is envisioned as a menu of screening
processes and components that can be implemented in isolation, in combination or in
full, as deemed necessary and practical by the state regulator.
The following pages more completely describe the concepts, processes, and
technology that form the basis of this framework.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 6
1. The Foundations of this Screening Strategy
This screening strategy offers states and airports that are facing either new
checkpoint design or refurbishment of existing checkpoints, a solution in the form of a
menu of options, capable of being implemented in isolation, in combination or in full in a
manner compatible with that states’ ambient security environment and resource
availability.
Recent airline bombings and attempted bombings have been predominantly
aimed at the passenger cabin and not checked baggage. Terrorist intent appears to
have shifted from hold baggage to the checkpoint in the early 1990s. Some argue that it
may be easier to test and probe the vulnerability of the checkpoints than hold baggage
EDS systems. Because the level of terrorist threat is a function of intent and ability to
attack, the continued use of suicide attackers means that the threat may now actually be
higher at the checkpoint than from hold baggage.
Globally, many legislatures have been directing their security services to spend a
preponderance of their investments in deployment and improvement of hold baggage
screening and not the checkpoint. To date regulators have spent less than 10% of their
aviation security equipment investment budgets addressing checkpoint vulnerabilities
with the balance going toward hold baggage screening and more recently to cargo2. This
is in spite of the fact that detecting bomb components on passengers and in cabin bags
(in addition to weapons that might be used in hijackings), presents more daunting
screening and detection challenges than finding fully assembled bombs in checked
baggage. This indicates that a concentrated focus at the checkpoint may be warranted.
Today’s terrorists have evolved away from simple pipe and dynamite bombs with
alarm clock activators toward sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that
use a broad range of explosives and triggering mechanisms. They are less detectable
2 “Cabin Baggage Screening: Best Practices and Effective Technologies”, S. Wolff. Aviation Security International, August 2010; DHS Exhibit 300 Public Release BY11 / TSA - Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) (2011);
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 7
by screening technologies and are better concealed from manual and visual searches.
Terrorists have attempted to disperse components and use teams to bring distributed
IED components - each of which can appear innocuous, through the checkpoint and
assemble them in the sterile area or on board the targeted airliner (UK 2006 liquids plot).
Further, today’s checkpoint can only screen on a bag-by-bag and passenger-by-
passenger basis. The ability to inspect for items dispersed among different passengers
and their cabin bags is not a current capability.
This document shows how the underlying strategy and procedures for passenger
screening need to be, and can be, completely reassessed to increase the ability of the
system to interdict threats and improve passengers’ experience. It does this by:
• Integrating available government and passenger-specific information with the
physical screening process.
• Dividing passengers into risk categories so that the screening process for each
category can be more appropriately designed.
• Searching for components spread across passengers and cabin bags; to counter
tactics likely to be used by individual terrorists and terrorist teams.
• Using advanced and costly technologies and processes only on passengers that
are categorized as elevated risk and using lower cost screening methods on low
risk passengers enhancing prevention while reducing overall costs.
Using advanced and costly technologies and processes only on passengers that
are categorized as elevated risk and using lower cost screening methods on low risk
passengers enhances prevention while reducing overall costs.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 8
2. Governing Principles of the Strategy
This checkpoint concept aims to combine intelligence, passenger information and
physical search into a single, integrated process that screens all passengers to a higher
standard. It removes cumbersome processes of moderate security value and replaces
the “one size fits all” screening approach with a series of processes that are tailored to
each passenger’s risk category based on information known about them.
The checkpoint has the following key goals:
• Substantially increase the likelihood of countering the next terrorist attempt.
• Improve the ease with which most travelers pass through security.
• Focus the use of expensive technologies and time-consuming processes only on
elevated risk passengers.
• Improve the traveling public’s experience and confidence in the screening
process.
To achieve these goals, the checkpoint relies on the following guiding principles
each of which will be discussed in turn:
• Pre-screen passengers into three risk groups based on intelligence, traveler
information and observed behavior.
• Apply physical screening methods appropriate to each group.
• Ensure that the system is capable of countering attempted attacks by terrorist
teams.
2.1 Pre-screen and Categorize Passengers Pre-screening sorts passengers into three categories: elevated risk, normal risk
and Known Travelers. Pre-screening is based on what is known from government and
industry sources about each passenger. Extensive data on passengers (both from
government databases and industry sources) already exists, but it is not effectively used
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 9
as part of the screening process at the checkpoint. Without compromising the security
integrity of the underlying data, the Checkpoint of the Future collects risk information
from these various sources and uses it to sort passengers a risk category that will
subsequently be identified in encoded format on the passenger’s boarding card.
2.2 Different Procedures but Equivalent Security Effectiveness Currently, all passengers are screened at the checkpoint by the same technology
tuned to the same threat levels. This leaves it up to security officers to decide whether
to direct potentially suspect individuals to a standardized secondary search. In the
Checkpoint of the Future, each passenger is subject to physical screening that is tailored
to the passenger’s risk category. The Checkpoint of the Future will ensure that the
scrutiny applied to each passenger is sufficient, but it combines differently the mix of
prescreening and physical inspection for each risk category.
Intelligence has resulted in the interdiction of terrorists. Intelligence and
passenger data are hence important determinants of the Checkpoint of the Future’s
effectiveness and efficiency, and their use allows this checkpoint to select physical
screening intensity according to each passenger’s risk level.
By sorting passengers into three groups, screening officers will know that, for
example, each elevated risk passenger will be sent to an enhanced security lane for a
reason and that its screening process will collect and enable the use of additional data to
reduce system vulnerability. This helps security managers to assign and motivate
screening officers much more effectively than when all passengers are considered of
equal risk. It results in an appropriate overall level of security that combines intelligence,
passenger data, and integrated information from scanners and physical searches, rather
than relying solely on specific search results.
2.3 Appropriate Physical Screening Passengers that have been thoroughly vetted via background checks according
to international and state specific standards will be considered lower risk and hence
subject to much less intensive, faster, less inconvenient physical screening.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 10
Watch-list and other elevated-risk passengers will be subject to a much greater
level of security screening and interpretation along with data collection and storage. The
most time-consuming (and often most expensive) technology and processes will be used
routinely on the small subset of elevated-risk passengers and less often and
unpredictably on lower threat passengers.
2.4 Countering Team-based Attempts To combat the threat of terrorist teams, the Checkpoint of the Future may also
include the ability to look across different passengers’ and bags’ data to assess whether
bomb components are being carried individually. We call this process “flight-based
screening”. Flight-based screening would initially be applied to elevated risk passengers
only, though ideally this could expand to normal risk passengers at a later date.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 11
3. Elements of the Checkpoint of the Future
The checkpoint consists of three elements:
• Prescreening
• Passenger and cabin baggage screening (checkpoint)
• Flight based screening (optional element)
In this section, we show how the checkpoint works and justify why it sorts
passengers into three categories, discuss for each category the screening technology
that would be used, and show how passengers would be processed.
Only a small fraction of passengers can be screened as intensively as is
necessary to interdict the attacks of well-prepared terrorists. Even then, enhanced
security screening requires so much staffing, costly, slow, and space consuming
equipment that its use must be balanced with expedited screening of passengers who
have been categorized as low risk, in order to prevent congestion and excessive queues
at checkpoints.
Once passengers have been screened as individuals, the flight based screening
element looks across elevated-risk individuals that may pose a combined risk to each
flight.
3.1 The Pre-screening Process Pre-screening is an initial categorization of passengers according to the degree
of risk they present. The degree of risk corresponds to the likelihood of a passenger
having the intention to participate in the bombing or hijacking of a flight. Pre-screening
thus produces three risk-based categories of passengers:
• Known Travelers (KTs) who will be screened by an expedited, less intensive
process;
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 12
• Elevated risk passengers, who will be subjected to enhanced security
screening; and
• Normal risk passengers who will be screened in an innovative manner that
includes a number of technical and process improvements to increase
throughput and enhance the passenger experience.
The pre-screening process may include:
• Comparing passenger’s names against state terrorist screening lists,
• Reviewing Passenger Name Records and Advanced Passenger Information for
potentially unexpected or inconsistent data that warrants investigation
• With the cooperation of air carriers, functionality associated with the US system
known as the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System, which was
in use from 1996 to 2009.
• Designating a passenger as elevated risk based on the observations of a
behavioral observation screener at a checkpoint.
In addition to selecting elevated-risk passengers using the above process, the
pre-screening system would also employ the concept of unpredictability. Known
Travelers, air crew, other relevant staff and normal travelers would be randomly moved
to a lane with enhanced screening measures. The random selection rate could vary
depending on the number of passengers already being selected at any time. Random
selections would decrease when overloading, congestion, and delays in the high-
security lanes become imminent.
Terrorist attacks are very rare events, and the incidence of attackers is on the
order of one in some billions of passengers. So even if the elevated-risk category
comprises 10% of passengers, and the terrorists are among that 10%, only one in
hundreds of millions will actually be an attacker. It follows that high-risk passengers must
be treated with the courtesy and consideration accorded to other passengers.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 13
Sorting of passengers into Known Travelers, enhanced security, and normal risk
categories, begins when they reserve their flights:
Passengers will check-in for their flights in the current manner, either in advance
(printing their own boarding papers) or at kiosks or counters at the airport. Algorithms
prevent issuing boarding cards to persons who are on state no-fly type lists and such
persons would be directed to counters for identification and appropriate disposition.
Know Travelers will proceed to the entrance of the Known Traveler screening
lane(s), partitioned from the rest of the checkpoint, where they will be admitted on the
basis of their boarding card and on-line validation of their biometric identifier against the
database. Validly identified aircrew and airport staff would also use the Known Traveler
lane(s). A possible refinement would be an automatic entrance set of doors activated by
a validated biometric; a properly constructed Known Traveler entrance could be totally
automated and un-staffed.
The process of separating elevated risk from normal risk passengers at the
checkpoint entrance is ideally automatic, but if necessary, a security officer would
positively direct each passenger into the correct screening lane. The passengers would
queue and present their ID media and boarding papers at the second (non-known
traveler) checkpoint entrance and, as indicated by boarding card readers, would be
positively directed into reliably separated normal and enhanced security lanes. Behavior
observation could cause normal risk passengers to be re-categorized as higher (but not
lower) risk on the basis of their observed behavior.
3.2 Passenger-Screening Checkpoint. Very high capacity consolidated checkpoint operations at large international
airports would be governed by three physically separated lane configurations (Known
Traveler /Normal/Enhanced Security) as shown on Page 39. Smaller airports with single
or dual lane checkpoints as well as width-restricted locations at larger facilities will be
supplied with a full complement of equipment used for an enhanced security lane that
can be positioned (staggered) in the small checkpoint to allow for appropriate screening
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 14
of the three groups. It is likely that this will require more customized layout design and
passenger management than when the lanes can be physically separated.
Separation of the three categories of passengers will be simplified by Known
Traveler’s being biometrically linked to their system and having a separate check-in
queue. They self-sort. Normal and elevated risk passengers will be separated at the
checkpoint entrance as described above. Once a passenger has been directed to an
Enhanced Security lane, that passenger will be physically separated from the normal
lane. A one-way entry gate to the high security lane as well as rigid translucent partitions
will prevent lane jumping. These arrangements are subject to whatever physical
limitations and other (aesthetic/architectural) issues that might be present at an
individual facility. The overriding concept is that physical separation must be maintained
once an elevated risk passenger has been selected and directed to an Enhanced
Security lane.
An essential pre-requisite for selection of detection technologies to be deployed
at each type of security lane is for regulators to assess how much of what types of
explosives need to be found. To date, terrorists have used a fairly wide range of military,
commercial, and homemade explosives in quantity ranges of roughly 100g. The
Checkpoint of the Future will incorporate technologies and processes that can both
counter that threat and also give probable indications of smaller masses. This process
is better than having a fixed threshold for detection whereby an amount slightly under
the threshold mass would be cleared. In terms of available technologies, we divide
devices into 3 tiers:
• Tier 1: Devices that form the core components of the security lanes.
• Tier 2: Supplementary devices to fill any gaps of detection related to types,
configurations and quantities of IED components in the assessed threat. The
assessed threat is liable to change unpredictably based on new intelligence of
terrorist capabilities and this may affect the technology selection in the High
Security lane.
• Tier 3: Aggressive, high cost technologies that would only be used to fill a
dangerous systemic gap in detection capability.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 15
The final choice of technologies along with processes and configurations would
be determined by simulation modeling and then assembling and testing an Enhanced
Security lane with various components against the regulators’ assessed threat.
Table 1 shows an overview of the various screening technologies, capabilities and
attributes but does not include all technologies (such as transmission x-ray AIT,
quadrapole resonance (QR Portal) that could be used for inspecting elevated-risk
passengers internally, a vulnerability. Such technologies are either immature or
controversial, but may be necessary for certain elevated risk passengers in future and
could be added to the Enhanced Security lane, should the threat assessment warrant
them.
The following sections describe how each type of passenger is handled.
3.3 Known Travelers (KTs) Enrollment of Known Travelers will optional. The objective is to establish with
high confidence the trustworthiness – the complete absence of association with terrorism
– of as many passengers as practicable. The basis for that is a combination of first
knowing the passengers and then clearing them by checks against state crime and
terrorism databases.
The first step is self-nomination by passengers that are currently flying frequently.
Candidate nominees are thus better known from a security viewpoint, and they have the
added benefit of making up a disproportionately high fraction of passengers on any day.
When the candidate nominees have given their consent, they are cleared for registration
by two processes: a fingerprint-based criminal history check; and a check against a state
terrorism database. Although additional checks/ constraints could be incorporated into
the Known Traveler registration requirements at the discretion of individual states’
regulatory authorities, Checkpoint of the Future will set standards and best practices to
minimize the need for differences; establishing global standards is a key objective. If
these checks are completed without issue, the passenger can be enrolled as a Known
Traveler, with his or her biometric identifier and relevant personal data entered in a
government database.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 16
It should be noted that these combined processes are similar to those used by
some states to clear airport workers to have unescorted access to an airport’s secure
area, airliners in the secure area, and practically everything that is loaded into the
airliners. Such checks on airport workers often take less than 72 hours from submission
of the required data and fingerprints, so they should take a similar time for checks on
Known Traveler applicants. The processing cost is not large, and since the Known
Traveler lanes will save considerably in staff and equipment in addition to improving the
passenger experience, it could be borne by the state or the passenger. The advantage
for the Known Traveler is a much quicker and more convenient screening process.
Once at the checkpoint, technology used to screen Known Travelers will consist
of:
• An AT X-ray in automated mode that has been set to a threshold alert level
that corresponds with the Known Travelers’ low risk level. It would allow
laptop computers to remain in bags. This is backed up by operator inspection
of any rejected bags.
• A walk-through metal detector calibrated to allow for shoe shanks and small
metal objects such as belt buckles while still reliably detecting Known
Traveler level threat objects. It would allow Known Travelers to keep their
shoes and jackets on.
Secondary search of Known Travelers or their cabin baggage that has caused
alarms on primary detectors could consist of metal detection hand wand or pat down and
an open bag search augmented by explosives trace detection, in a secondary search
area without impacting throughput of the Known Traveler lane. Exit from the Known
Traveler checkpoint is unrestricted after the KT passenger has completed the screening
process. Since these travelers have no need to “re-assemble” themselves, no benches
tables or chairs will be needed to be directly adjacent to their exit, because the KT will
have ample opportunity to gather the few objects that they needed to divest prior to
exiting. Since entrance to the Known Traveler lane is fully automated, physically
separated from the other lanes and entry gate controlled, the personnel required for
each Known Traveler lane could be reduced to as few as three, possibly two as soon as
the false alarm rate for this checkpoint configuration is validated.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 17
3.4 Normal Risk Passengers
Normal risk passengers make up a considerable fraction of the total at the
checkpoint. They are the passengers who have none of the characteristics that would
cause them to be categorized as elevated risk but have not been enrolled as Known
Travelers, possibly because they are infrequent flyers. Given the high probability that
proper pre-screening has placed potential terrorists in the elevated risk category, it is
highly unlikely that the normal risk category includes any terrorists. Improving the overall
travel experience for normal risk travelers will be achieved by a combination of
technology and process enhancements that reflect the normal risk associated with this
group.
Normal risk passengers are identified as such at check-in by being neither Known
Travelers or in the elevated-risk category. Their category (normal) would be encoded on
their boarding cards, in the same manner as the other two categories are identified on
the boarding cards of Known Travelers and elevated-risk passengers. At the checkpoint
entrance, boarding card readers will show the directing security officer the risk category
of each passenger. Normal risk passengers will then be guided into the appropriate
screening lane. Any normal risk passengers who have been re-categorized as
enhanced risk by behavior analysis officers through questioning will either have their
boarding cards reprocessed to incorporate the higher risk or be escorted into the high
security screening lane, and the passenger’s change of category will be entered in the
security database. Families and motion-limited passengers should have the option of
being directed to a normal lane configured and reserved for them.
Normal security passenger screening will employ:
• Passenger identification;
• Brief questioning based on passenger data supplied to the screener at the
checkpoint to elicit behavioral characteristics that may warrant a referral to
enhanced screening.
Passengers will be screened by:
• Walk through metal detector
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 18
• Shoe scanner to eliminate the need to remove footwear.
• Cast/ prosthetic limb inspection systems in the family and motion limited lanes.
Passenger carry on bags and divested items will be screened with:
• Non-automated advanced technology x-ray with operator inspection,
• Liquids/ Bottle inspection system, if not employing advanced technology x-ray
w/liquid detection
• Any bags that require secondary search will be subject to:
o Open bag Trace detection
o Quadrupole resonance (QR) wand
o A secondary liquids inspection system to resolve any liquids flagged
by primary search
3.5 Elevated-Risk Passengers Elevated-risk passengers are those that present a higher likelihood of posing a
threat to airliners or which little biographical/law enforcement data is known. All such
passengers must be identified and directed to an enhanced security lane, in order to be
screened by the technology and processes needed to detect and interdict, with
sufficiently high confidence, the types of IEDs, and their disassembled components,
terrorists are known to use today. It is of course essential that any and all would-be
terrorists intending to attack an airliner will be included in the elevated category. It
follows that the pre-screening of passengers should have several layers, and if any layer
indicates that the passenger should be designated elevated risk, then that must be the
pre-screening system’s final determination, even if all other layers do not.
Once at the Enhanced Security lane entrance, a security officer scans the boarding card
and receives the high-risk passenger’s information. A photo of the passenger is taken
and stored by the Enhanced Security lane control computer along with the passenger’s
information. The passenger will then start the screening process. Passengers will
remove outer garments (coats, sweaters), shoes, wallets, belts, keys and other objects
on their person and place them in trays on the screening belt. Two tray colors will be
used, one for electronics, the other for non-electronic items. To ensure 100% control
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 19
over the passenger and cabin bag data and decisions, a bar code or RFID tag will be
printed and placed on cabin bags. Trays will have permanent identification tags so that
all items placed in trays will be tracked as well.
Advanced technologies to be deployed in the Enhanced Security lane are
described as being “orthogonal” to each other. The term as used here is meant to mean
that independent technologies produce results that combine so that the weaknesses of
one technology is compensated for the by the strength of another and vice versa. In this
schema the whole is (in terms of detection) greater than the sum of its parts. This
concept was validated in the US by the 2003 National Safe Skies Alliance study of
advanced checkpoint technology.
Therefore technologies of the Enhanced Security lane will be selected to be
orthogonal to each other and combined to achieve the highest detection rates available.
Bags will be screened using a carefully configured combination of the following devices:
• Computed tomography X-ray for bulk explosives and inspection of liquids/ bottles.
• Quadropole Resonance (QR) for scanning cabin bags and non-electronic divested
items for sheet and distributed explosives.
• Secondary search of rejected cabin bags will be conducted by manual and visual
inspection and:
o Open bag explosives trace detection for contents and electronics.
o Quadrupole resonance wand for searching linings.
o Liquid scan for any liquids flagged by the CT system.
If needed at a future date, Tier 3 technology options would include nuclear-based
systems (e.g. thermal neutron analysis, fast neutron analysis) for bulk material
inspection.
Passengers will be screened by a combination of the following devices:
• A second-generation (e.g. ion mass spectrometry-based) walk through trace detector
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 20
• A high-resolution (non-automated) body scanner in conjunction with a highly
sensitive walk-through metal detector for detection of concealed explosives that
might be carried by the passenger3.
• Shoe scanner (using, for example, a combination of QR and explosives trace
detection), which will be used to ensure explosives are not concealed inside socks
• Passengers requiring secondary search will be directed to a privacy booth to resolve
alarms in the passenger’s clothing or on his or her body.
o Desktop explosives trace detectors.
o A quadrupole resonance wand or technology with similar capability would be
useful for non-intrusively searching passengers and medical casts for
explosives complementing explosives trace detection. Technology for the
inspection of casts and prosthetic limbs will also be on hand and used as
needed.
3.6 Flight-based Screening (Optional) Flight-based screening is a method for determining whether elevated risk
travelers on the same flight might be working in tandem to bring various IED
components onto an aircraft by distributing them across themselves and their cabin
bags. Flight-based screening will work as follows:
1. Software first assesses any connections between/among elevated-risk passengers
on the same flight.
2. The process then allows all screening data on these travelers and bags to be stored
along with the passengers’ information organized by passenger and flight number in
a database.
3. A flight security inspector is assigned to any flight where the above connections have
been determined and uses the passenger data and screening results from the
Enhanced Security lane to assess the probability that a team attack is being
attempted.
3 A quadrupole resonance-based walk through portal or possibly wand would be valuable in addressing existing AIT technology coverage limitations
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 21
4. If indications of a possible team attempt are found, the inspector forwards the data,
along with any notes, and the flight-based screener’s recommendations to a PDA
carried by a roving security team.
5. The security team would meet the passengers at the gate and the security concern
would be resolved prior to boarding either at the gate, or by taking the passengers to
a security room at the terminal for a thorough inspection.
6. Depending on the search results, passengers would be released to board or sent to
law enforcement for further disposition.
Upon completion of the flight, the data would be erased from the server.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 22
4. Performance considerations of this Checkpoint concept 4.1 Performance in general
Today’s screening paradigm globally tends to be “one size fits all.” Elevated risk
passengers use the same lanes as the frequent fliers, which use the same lanes as
everyone else. This paradigm creates long lines, inconveniences passengers, and
generally not resulted in higher detection levels of threatening objects. Further the
passenger information provided by travelers to states is not used in the current
checkpoint paradigm.
This Checkpoint, as opposed to today’s traditional checkpoint, relies on a basic
concept and that is to screen passengers with devices and process commensurate what
is known about them. It relies on the premise that passengers need to be both physically
screened and electronically screened, but varying ratios of each can be used to create a
complete security picture of the traveler.
Checkpoint performance is enhanced through the creation of three new
screening processes:
• Enhanced Security lanes where elevated risk passengers are removed from the
regular flows of the passenger checkpoint and more thoroughly screened than
today.
• Known Traveler lanes where Known Travelers receive expedited screening in
exchange for enrolling into a program where they provide regulators with
extended biographical background information.
• Optimized Normal Screening lanes, where screeners use Advanced Passenger
Information (API) and combine it with brief behavior observation/active
questioning to determine if enhanced security lane is necessary.
There are two factors that need to be considered as part of this concept. First, to
detect today’s threats, Enhanced Security lanes will require several orthogonally linked
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 23
technologies to screen passengers, their clothing, and their cabin baggage. The overall
screening system will have a high false positive rate, and ultimate alarm resolution by
visual and manual searches will require exceptionally well trained screening staff. Even
more difficult will be the detection and interdiction of threats distributed among several
terrorist passengers and their cabin baggage.
It follows that the Enhanced Security lanes will be expensive in capital investment and
operating costs.
Second, relatively few Enhanced Security lanes may be required in any airport,
because only a small fraction of passengers will require such intensive screening.
Hence, the extra costs of this lane design will be offset by the more numerous normal
and Known Traveler lanes’ lower capital and operating costs. The key to affordability, as
well as effectiveness, is the categorization and screening of passengers according to the
degree of risk they present.
The Checkpoint of the Future will be judged on its performance outcomes, good
and bad. So we will set service level standards and test its performance against these;
the Checkpoint of the Future must be credible in operation and effect,
4.2 Addressing Countermeasures Today’s highly static and visible screening systems make it easier for adversaries
to learn limitations and plan methods to circumvent the processes. This Checkpoint
integrates physical security and relevant information about the passenger, and adapts
the former based on the latter. The overall process is thus concealed from adversaries
and further elements of unpredictability are added by a random selection process and
variation in the types of screening processes that will be used.
To ensure that potential adversaries cannot pass through the Known Traveler
lanes (where physical screening has been largely obviated by thorough background
checks), these lanes will be physically separated from other lanes and use a one-by-one
entry gate that requires biometric data and boarding card (or crew member ID) to be
confirmed prior to allowing an KT passenger to proceed into the lane. In addition,
translucent barriers will prevent non-KT passengers from observing the KT process.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 24
Likewise, the Enhanced Security lane will be physically separated from other lanes
where possible. If not possible, at checkpoints with only one or two existing lanes, then
the enhanced security components and processes will be surrounded by translucent
barriers to prevent external observation.
The attempt to distribute components among different terrorists and cabin bags
(in a team-based attack) represents a substantial threat that needs to be addressed
using a new process: flight-based screening.
4.3 Operations The percentages of Known Travelers, normal and elevated risk passengers can
be forecast adequately by analyzing airline passenger data against the risk
categorization process and each of the three types of lanes will differ in both the dwell
time (the time that passengers reside within the screening process) and overall
passenger throughput.
The Known Traveler lane should be able to operate with significantly greater
speed than the pre 9/11 security checkpoints, especially if it incorporates integration
technology to collate primary search data and forward it to secondary search to expedite
that process. Intuitively, it is estimated that processing rate could possibly be twice faster
than today’s average screening lane times but this estimate will need to be validated
with real world testing.
On the process side, the use of Known Traveler programs to include wider cross
section passengers will reduce passenger numbers in the normal lanes and increase
throughput.
The Enhanced Security lane will require a longer dwell time and will handle fewer
passengers per hour. Based on operational studies performed in 2002 by the US
National Safe Skies Alliance using an early version of such a line (called the Advanced
Technology Screening Checkpoint – ATSC), the operational data indicated that the
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 25
ATSC handled roughly 50% of the throughput of a pre 9/11-era checkpoint4. With the
additional technologies and processes proposed for the Checkpoint of the Future, it is
likely that the Enhanced Security lane will operate at between 25 – 33% of the speed of
the proposed Normal Security lane.
Flight-based screening will be performed independently from the checkpoint
process once data have been collected on Enhanced Security lane passengers. Highly
trained inspectors will review data for each flight at a remote location (either at the
airport or centralized within a country) after the passenger has passed through security
but prior to boarding.
A critical part of the design will be to collect data and perform operational modeling
of these screening processes to understand how best to configure the technologies for
maximum operational efficiency and minimum dwell time without compromising security.
4.4 Cost5 The cost of aviation security in general and screening in particular, have
increased exponentially since 2001 in particular. While security represented 5 – 8
percent of airport operating costs a decade ago, that figure has increased to as much as
35 percent at some airports today and there can be no confidence this trend will change.
Checkpoint of the Future aims to arrest and if possible, reverse this trend.6
Facility build-out requirements and cost for the various options in FT Lanes,
Normal lanes and Enhanced Security lanes will vary greatly per site and are not included
in the following assumptions. Additionally, pre-existing equipment on site (depending
on its vintage and capability) could be incorporated into these designs and would reduce
capital costs accordingly. The cost estimates below are based on purchasing new
screening equipment: 4 Advanced Technology Detection System of Systems for Passenger Checkpoints Report Summary, National Safe Skies Alliance, May 2003 (Proprietary Document) 5 Data generated by consultants (Steve Wolff, Cathal Flynn, John Huey) and summarized in Table 1 6 Passenger Security Screening: Where to From Here? Prepared for ACI by Sydney Airport Corporation Limited. 5 November 2010
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 26
• Frequent Traveler Lane: US$468K
• Normal Screening Lane: US$369K (assuming shared secondary screening
equipment) Lower capital cost if existing equipment is used.
• Enhanced Security Lane: US$1.3M
• Flight-based Screening:
o Networked Computer workstation and storage: US$7.5K per station;
number of units will depend on peak # flights at each airport.
o Build-out costs will include a single centralized room, networking,
database storage and management estimated at US$50K per facility
o The centralized server and database software is estimated to cost
US$50-100K per facility.
o Non-recoverable engineering costs for development are unknown and will
depend on the final specifications for the flight-based screening process.
For planning and budgetary purposes, an installation and commissioning charge
of 10% of total value should be assumed and an annual maintenance cost (for
equipment only) should be assumed as 10% of equipment value after the first year,
assuming a one-year warranty on new equipment.
Due to the different challenges of the various screening processes, three skill levels of
screeners are likely to be required:
• Skill Level 1 – equivalent to today’s security officers, having proficiency in
operating and interpreting equipment and an understanding of procedures used
to select and conduct secondary search methods in response to primary search
decisions.
• Skill Level 2 – equivalent to today’s supervisors, excellent proficiency, aptitude
and skill in use and interpretation of decisions. Training in the nature
• of IEDs, components and a proven ability to identify IED components in images
and in physical searches
• Skill Level 3 –Specialist Screeners to be deployed on the Enhanced Security
Lane/Flight Based Screening Console only. New skill level. In addition to
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 27
excellent technology/ image interpretation proficiency, strong training and
understanding into IED construction, component alternatives and cross
referencing on databases
The total estimated head count for each of these lanes is shown in Table 2 below:
Table 2: Manpower Allocation between the Various Screening Processes
# Primary Screeners # Secondary
screeners
# Supervisors
KT Lane: 27 1, Skill Level 1.
Normal Screening Lane:
2 – 3 2, Skill Level 1 1, Skill Level 2
Enhanced Security lane:
3 2-3, Skill Level 2 1, Skill Level 3
Flight-based screening
1 per flight, Skill Level
3
In terms of estimated salary levels each skill level is estimated to compensate (relative to
today’s baseline) as follows:
• Skill level 1: Existing baseline
• Skill level 2: 150% of baseline
• Skill level 3: 200% of baseline
7 Automation and integration technology may reduce the number of primary screeners by 1
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 28
5. The Passenger Experience:
5.1 Known Traveler Any business passenger who is a Known Traveler and whose data is vetted by
government authorities would be virtually unimpeded after using his/her biometrics to
enter the checkpoint and will be able to rapidly proceed through the checkpoint. Any
secondary search required would be optimized and short in duration. The process
would be:
1. At check-in, the passenger’s data is acquired from a centralized database and
printed on the boarding card.
2. On arrival at the checkpoint, the traveler accesses a kiosk where biometrics and
identification data is compared with the stored data and, once confirmed, a gate
opens and the passenger is granted entry to the inspection process.
3. These passengers simply drop their bags on a belt while removing only
overcoats, and electronic items from their pockets. Computers will remain in
bags
4. The passenger then walks through a metal detector without removing shoes
5. A fully automated high speed process with equipment settings optimized to the
low threat level posed by a KT will keep the alarm rate low for both bags and the
passengers.
6. In the event of any alarm, all of data from the scanners are integrated and sent to
secondary search, allowing short duration, targeted search of any item that was
flagged by the X-ray and/or metal detector.
7. The KT will now be able to proceed to the departure area.
5.2 Crew member/employee The checkpoint would accommodate on a region-by-region basis the expedited
screening of crewmembers. This would either be via a separate crew lane modeled on
the same technologies and processes used in the KT lane, or if there is insufficient
space, the KT lane itself.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 29
It is anticipated that false alarm rates for crews and employees will be even lower
than for regular KT’s given the experience they will develop with the process. To counter
the potential “insider” threat introduced into this part of the program a random number of
individuals will be sent to the normal or enhanced lanes.
5.3 Senior citizens Senior citizens should expect a significantly better, more leisurely screening
experience through security. Note that old age will not be used to redirect a passenger to
the normal lane if prescreening has categorized him as elevated risk.
5.4 Families Families should pass through the Normal Security lane. Families (particularly with
small children) typically require more time for screening and will be recommended to use
the distinct “family” lane within the Normal Security lanes, if in place at the airport.
Known Travelers that are traveling with their families can opt for normal lane screening
with their families if they wish.
The random selection algorithm for the Enhanced Security lane should include the
provision for preventing a single member of a family group from being randomly
designated as elevated risk. The intent being to keep family members together; either all
will be re-categorized, or none will. Note that this will not be used to redirect a
passenger to the normal lane if he otherwise would be considered elevated risk.
We anticipate families needing a well thought-out layout, space allocation (for
waiting family members and for reassembling their possessions) and the use of
secondary screening technologies (combined with shoe scanning on the front end) to
handle the expected higher false alarm rate and to both greatly enhance throughput and
yield a more positive experience for this lower threat group. Secondary search
technologies will be consistent with those used for the rest of the Normal Security lane
passengers.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 30
5.5 Elevated Risk Passengers
This small group (estimated at less than 10%) of passengers will encounter a
multi-step, rigorous inspection process:
1. At the entrance to the checkpoint, an agent reading boarding cards will identify
enhanced risk passengers
2. Enhanced risk passengers will be sent to the Enhanced Security lane, which will
be visually isolated from the rest of the screening process and will utilize the
most highly trained and effective screeners and handling agents, who could be
dressed appropriately to distinguish themselves from the Normal- and Known
Traveler lane screeners.
3. Enhanced Security lane passengers will be required to remove from their person:
shoes, outer garments, belts, all items in pockets such as wallets, keys, etc,
4. Passengers will divest items from baggage, namely electronics and liquids for
screening and place them in trays. Ideally, different colored trays will be used for
divested electronics and non-electronics.
5. Passengers will pass through each of the primary screening technologies in turn
6. In parallel, bags will be sent through each primary screening system.
7. In the event of primary search rejection, the data from primary search will be
consolidated and stored in the passenger’s security record and sent to a
secondary search station
8. For secondary search, passengers and their bags will enter a private, gender
specific screening room where they will be searched. In the event of additional
concern, a thorough hand search will be used.
9. All data from both primary and secondary search will be stored in an enhanced
security passenger database for use by the flight-based screening process,
which occurs after they leave the security lane but prior to boarding.
10. Any passenger groups flagged by the flight-based screening process will be
intercepted at the gate, questioned either at the gate or at a nearby private room.
Additional search of their bags and persons will be necessary prior to being
released for boarding or referred to law enforcement.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 31
Proper explanations beforehand (including a vigorous public relations effort)
combined with a dedicated and highly trained/professional screener will ensure that all
Enhanced Security lane passengers will be screened thoroughly and effectively while
being treated with dignity and respect.
6. Moving Forward
This section summarizes the main components used in the checkpoint concept
as well as describing follow-on tasks. List of primary components
6.1.1 Known Traveler Lane
Items that could be immediately researched and investigated
Entrance Biometric Reader (10 finger)
Video Surveillance Camera (wide angle)
Scanner (Boarding Card, Biometrics reader)
Scanner (Employee/Crew ID Card Reader)
Dual Sliding Door (Man Trap Assembly with Anti Piggyback Feature)
Opaque Glass Entry/Clear Glass Exit
Baggage screening X-ray in-feed conveyor and tray retrieval system
AT X-ray (automated mode for large object/weapon detection) with
Operators Console
Automatic bag diverter and reject bag conveyor
Cleared bag conveyor with bin return system.
Passenger screening Walk Through Metal Detector
Sorting AT Exit End Conveyor with bin-return system.
Secondary search Table Top Trace Detection System
Secondary Search Integrated Display Panel.
6.1.2 Enhanced Screening Lane
Entry Point Boarding Card Reader
Passenger Image Capture System
Entry Gate (ADA compliant Swinging or Turnstile)
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 32
Bag
Entry/Registration
Boarding Card Reader
Bag Tag Printer (Bag Entry/Registration)
Baggage screening Conveyor
Bag/Tray Tag Reader
Quadrupole resonance bag scanner
CT Bag Scanner with 3-D Workstation
Automatic bag diverter and reject bag conveyor
Cleared bag conveyor with bin return system.
Bag/ Tray Tag Reader/Exit End
Passenger screening Boarding Card Reader (enter body scan)
Walk Through Metal Detector
Walk Through Trace Detection Portal (Second Generation/Mass Spec)
Backscatter AIT with local console
Boarding Card Reader (exit Body Scan)
Secondary Search Boarding Card Reader
Private male and female search booths with reject bag entry points
Bench-top Trace Detector
Liquid Detection
Cast/ prosthetics screening system
Quadrupole resonance wand
Bag transfer powered rollers/ conveyor
Checkpoint Exit Integrated Exit End Supervisors Work Station (GUI)
Exit Gate (ADA Swinging or Turnstile)
6.1.3 Normal Screening lane
Entrance Boarding Card Reader for Entry with Results Display Station (2
units)
Baggage screening AT X-Ray Dual View including ECAC or US approved Category
C/ D liquid detection (if available) with operator console
Automatic bag diverter and reject bag conveyor
Cleared bag conveyor
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 33
Passenger
screening
Shoe Scanner
Walk Through Metal Detector
Secondary Search Search booth (semi private)
Trace Detection System
Liquid/Bottle Scanner
Millimeter-wave AIT with AIT Operator Console
Cast/ prosthetics screening system
We recommend focusing on the Known Traveler and Enhanced Security lanes
and assume initially that the Normal Security lane will largely resemble existing US and
European lanes with some level of process and throughput improvement. This can be
revisited later. The following tasks would allow the Checkpoint of the Future to rapidly
move forward.
6.2 Passenger Flow Analysis Understand passenger flow and load on each part of the process. With
regulators’ cooperation, this can potentially be done by off-line analysis:
• Collect and analyze IATA and carrier data to assess the percentage of likely KT
and Enhanced Security passengers on various types of flights.
• Assess the number of flights that have several elevated-risk passengers on them
as a percentage of the whole (this will allow estimation of the load on a flight-
based screening process) .
• Conduct operational modeling (using software) of KT and Enhanced Security
lanes to optimize technology configuration and design.
6.3 Design
• Develop requirements, specifications, and Concepts of Operations (CONOPS)
for the KT and Enhance Security lanes.
• Discuss with regulators the potential threat matrices that make sense for each
lane type.
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 34
• Review various core and ancillary technologies (biometrics, gates, integration
systems, inspection technologies) that are key parts of the KT and Enhanced
Security lanes.
• Combine the results into a final design and CONOPS for review with various
stakeholders
6.4 Implementation
• Configure a KT lane including gate access, screening technology and data
integration for optimized secondary search.
• Configure elements of an Enhanced Security lane at one or more airports.
• Depending on timeline and funding, perform some level of integration to show the
potential benefit of the combined user interface for the Enhanced Security lane.
6.5 Testing
• Operational testing of these elements at an airport.
• Efficacy testing at a Government-recognized independent test facility.
7. Conclusion The “object finding” checkpoint has served us well and kept the traveling public
safe. However, the December 2009 attempted bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight
bound for Detroit, Michigan demonstrates that in the future aviation needs smarter and
faster, next-generation passenger screening measures to confront new and emerging
threats. It also dramatically illustrates that those who would do harm by injuring innocent
passengers and disrupting national economies continue to view aviation infrastructure as
a primary target.
There is a need for a new concept in passenger security screening that
emphasizes enhanced security and more efficient throughput. Today’s screening
paradigm globally tends to be “one size fits all.” Elevated risk passengers use the same
lanes as the frequent fliers, which use the same lanes as everyone else. This paradigm
has created long lines, inconvenienced passengers, and generally not resulted in higher
CoF IATA VER 2.0_14Mar_11_MASTER 35
detection levels of threatening objects. Further the passenger information provided by
travelers to states is not used in the current checkpoint paradigm.
This checkpoint, as opposed to today’s traditional checkpoint, relies on a basic
concept and that is to screen passengers with devices and process commensurate what
is known about them. It relies on the premise that passengers need to be both physically
screened and electronically screened, but varying ratios of each can be used to create a
complete security picture of the traveler.
In summary, this concept creates:
• New Enhanced Security lanes where elevated risk passengers are removed from
the regular flows of the passenger checkpoint.
• New Known Traveler lanes where registered flyers receive expedited screening
in exchange for enrolling into a program where they provide regulators with
extended biographical background information.
• A new and faster Normal Screening lane, where advanced passenger
information can be viewed and used at the checkpoint by screeners to observe
behavior and direct passengers to an enhanced security lane if necessary.
It is important to stress there is no single “correct” design appropriate to all
operating environments and threat levels. The Checkpoint of the Future will not be a
one-size-fits-all solution. To be relevant at a wide range of airports and across the range
of threat situations, it will consist of a menu of screening components and processes that
can be used in isolation, in combination or as a whole. It speeds travel by moving Known
Travellers and those which may need enhanced screening out of the Normal Screening
Lines. It provides an intelligent resilient screening model that will be responsive to future
threat and attack attempts in an efficient, risk-based and cost effective manner.
CoF IATA VER 2 0_14Mar_11 36
Figure 1. Checkpoint of the Future – Tailored Screening Based on Risk
CoF IATA VER 2 0_14Mar_11 37
Figure 2. Known Traveller
CoF IATA VER 2 0_14Mar_11 38
Figure 3. Normal Screening
CoF IATA VER 2 0_14Mar_11 39
Figure 4. Enhanced Security
CoF IATA VER 2 0_14Mar_11 40
Figure 5. Tunnels of Technology
CoF IATA VER 2 0_14Mar_11 41
Figure 6. The Benefit of Orthogonal Screening. Combining limited performance technologies to achieve higher detection.