check mike check sound circulate attendance today’s lecture: john fitzgerald kennedy and...

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Check Mike Check Sound Circulate Attendance

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  • Slide 1
  • Slide 2
  • Check Mike Check Sound Circulate Attendance
  • Slide 3
  • Todays Lecture: John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Presidential Decision Making
  • Slide 4
  • Lecture Organization: Class Announcements John Kennedy The Bay of Pigs Cuban Missile Crisis Red Scare and the National Security Apparatus Decision Making Bureaucracy cabinet executive office of the president White House Staff
  • Slide 5
  • Class Announcements course journal -- Hand them in on Nov 6 th original notes copies of any web activities (cover form will be handed out next week)
  • Slide 6
  • Class Announcements exam -- anyone can retake. Essay still available.
  • Slide 7
  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.6 John Kennedy 1. An introduction A. War Hero -- operated PT boat 109 in the United States Navy -- the boat is cut in half by a Japanese destroyer B. Extremely close election -- Kennedy beat Nixon in the popular vote by 1/10th of 1 percentage point. (118,000 votes). -- first nationally-televised presidential debates (imagery) -- Kennedy won only 1/3rd of the white protestant vote compared to 80% of the catholic vote (Irish catholic) Kennedys Heroism -- On August 2, 1943, PT Boat 109 was cut in half by a Japanese destroyer. The destroyer rammed the boat, slicing it in half. Kennedy was in command. He had a bad back from an old football injury. Despite that, he was able to rescue some of his crew members. He swam to land, carrying one of his crew members. He held him while having the strap from his life jacket in his teeth. Kennedy is towing him as he swims. At great personal peril, Kennedy then swims to other islands seeking help. He eventually found two natives. He scratched out a message on a coconut shell which was eventually delivered to us forces and a rescue mission organized.
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.7 C. Inaugural address -- one of the 4 greatest ever given in US history -- tries to place his generations ascendancy to the presidency in historical context D. Style -- hopeful and visionary rhetoric that captures the public imagination -- intellectualism (reading speed) and humor works to his advantage -- pragmatic decision maker (Bobby, his brother, is more idealistic) -- Bobby is the attorney general John Kennedy
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.8 2. His presidency -- very short term of office (1,000 days -- assassinated) -- domestic agenda accomplishments -- domestic agenda failures: Tax cuts Education Medicaid/Medicare (new additions to social to security to deal with health care for the poor and disabled, and old). Civil Rights Legislation Proposed in 1963 (Kennedy had delayed the issue) Kennedys Domestic agenda -- Increased the minimum wage, passed new housing legislation, aid to economically-depressed areas, investment tax credits, legislation mandating equal pay for women (the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which was the first major piece of legislation designed to deal with discrimination against women since in the 1920s). The tax cuts -- In 1962 after the stock market fell, he endorsed a Keynesian tax cut. He called for tax cuts in personal and corporate income to stimulate the economy. The proposed $ 11 billion tax cut was too large to get through Congress. It was thought to be too bold and might cause deficits. Prioritizing Education -- He proposed massive federal aid to education. He claimed this was necessary to put the United States in effective competition with the Soviets (we needed engineers, people in mathematics, scientists, etc). The measure was too large to pass. John Kennedy
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.9 3. Argument -- his failures are actually successes? -- the items in his domestic agenda come down to us today (through history) as good ideas (other people would pass these measures) 4. Vietnam Probably would not have been a Vietnam war if Kennedy would have lived -- He had only sent about 16,000 advisors to South Vietnam to train and equip their fighting force The Argument from Failure -- Kennedy had a really good sense of vision. He doesnt come down to us as a failed president even though many of his initiatives did not pass. Why? The things that failed eventually were passed by later presidents and were regarded as successes (tax cuts, education, Medicare and Medicaid proposals, civil rights). This was HIS agenda. John Kennedy
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.10 -- He didnt want to go further (there are enough historical conversations in the record to say this) -- Johnson would send over 525,000 American troops to fight Kennedy and Vietnam -- Kennedy was always skeptical of the military advice of wanting to deploy in regions where he did not have complete power or resources. At the start of his term there were 1,000 (600 by another account) advisors over there. He increased it to 16,000 (16,800 by another acct). He does not want to send in combat troops; he thinks that will be a mistake. There are all sorts of conversations in the historical record now to indicate that Kennedy would never have done what Johnson did, which was commit 535,000 American troops to fight the war. Everyone around Kennedy was saying he was going to get out of Vietnam. The 1963 speech in Dallas, which was never given, said he would support the anti-communists in Vietnam (but that doesnt mean an American war). John Kennedy
  • Slide 12
  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.11 The Red Scare and the National Security Apparatus red scare -- 1949: the Soviets will explode their first atomic bomb. China will fall to the communists. North Korea is going to invade south Korea.
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.12 The Red Scare and the National Security Apparatus red scare -- Communist spies? Alger Hiss (selling secrets to the Soviets) The Rosenbergs (convicted of selling secrets to the Soviets; they were executed) -- people were wondering who else was spying?
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.13 The Red Scare and the National Security Apparatus McCarthyism -- Took advantage of this policy market The Policy Market -- In February of 1950, McCarthy took advantage of this policy market (red scare). He began saying that Democrats were soft on communists and that there were subversives inside the government. The truth, however, was that the actual communist spying network was dismantled when the Rosenbergs and Hiss and the rest of them went down. What McCarthy was doing was a bunch of hysteria, filling a policy market. [Movie: Edward R. Murrow].
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.14 The Red Scare and the National Security Apparatus McCarthyism -- Hunting for subversives Registration -- Congress passed a law requiring communists and communist- front groups to register with the govt., and allowed the government to intern subversives. It set up a subversive activity boards to review the activity of government employees to see whether or not they were subversive.
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.15 The Red Scare and the National Security Apparatus McCarthyism -- Loyalty Oaths (teachers, etc) -- Korean War -- Castro in Cuba.
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.16 The Red Scare and the National Security Apparatus national security apparatus -- extremely powerful bureaus created in the wake of the soviet threat after WWII
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  • 1/18/2007(C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.17 The New Powerful Structures -- In 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act. It reorganized military command and consolidated military control under the civilian officer of the Secretary of Defense, giving that officer cabinet rank, and established a Central Intelligence Agency. It established a National Security Council within the Executive Office of the President
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.18 The Red Scare and the National Security Apparatus national security apparatus -- Truman provides the basic command structure -- the Korean War provided the rest NSC 68
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  • 1/18/2007(C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.19 NSC 68 -- The Korean war helped to change and launch the national security apparatus of America. During the war, there was a secret document known as NSC 68. The NSC had recommended a much more massive and substantial undertaking by America and her allies to build up her offensive capabilities. This would necessitate billions of dollars and reorganize the priorities of government. It would have a structural and seismic effect on the budget. There is little chance that it would have happened on its own -- American sentiment probably would not have supported it. But the Korean war made it seem more necessary and helped launch an era that greatly expanded the military industrial complex.
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  • 1/18/2007(C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.20 Command and Control -- At the end of Trumans administration you have the National Security State that enabled the United States to defend its military and economic interests. It launched the era of big defense budgets which created competition in spending for dollars. This led to the dependence of industry on defense contracts and to a shift in national educational priorities to defense-related skills. It also led to the establishment of the military industrial complex, as high defense budgets benefited defense contractors, who gave senators pet projects in their states.
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.21 The Bay of Pigs 1. Castro leads the revolution in 1959 2. Eisenhower adopts a proposal made by Nixon, his vice president: the US government will train exiles from Cuba for Guerrilla warfare against Castro CIA confidence grew: wanted to upgrade the plan to a full scale invasion (distinguish the two kinds of warfare) Invading force = 1400
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.22 The Bay of Pigs 3. Politics of Kennedys decision -- Campaign promise: he promised to help the exiles -- if he didnt, it would look as if he chickened out -- time: the longer he waited, the stronger Castro became -- Kennedy approves the mission upgrade 4. His thinking: -- invasion had a good chance of succeeding -- and if it fails, they could retreat to the mountains and conduct a terror or Guerilla campaign. (perpetual rsistance on Cuban soil)
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.23 The Bay of Pigs 5. The reality -- Castros air force sank two of the four ships that were supposed to provide munitions and supplies -- The other two ships promptly departed the scene and sought safer waters -- Although all reports suggest that the invaders fought valiantly, by the third day they surrendered. -- Kennedy looked inept
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.24 The Bay of Pigs -- He could not understand how he could be so off base (how could I have been so stupid?) -- He did not believe that Castro personally posed a threat, but in the abstract, having a communist regime 90 miles away was a source of irritation. 6. Bad information: -- No one would know that we did it REALITY: stories began to appear in the press about an impending invasion of Cuba as early as one week prior to the event We have secrecy? CIA: no one would ever be able to trace the invasion plan back to the U.S. government. The exiles were being trained in secret camps in Nicaragua and Guatemala, and the American B-26s that were to be used for air cover in the invasion would be pained to look like Castros own B-26 bombers, thus creating the impression that his own men had defected to the other side. Question: What caused the decision to be so poor?
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.25 -- Castros air force sucks REALITY: the Air Force was competent -- The morale of the troops is great REALITY: they lied. -- Castros army sucks REALITY: Castros army was competent. The Cuban Air Force -- Kennedy advisors also appeared confident that camouflaged B-26s could knock out Castros allegedly ill-equipped air force immediately before the landing of the invasion force. This was also wrong. The B26s were obsolete. Many of them developed engine trouble, and on the first day alone, half of them were shot down by Castros planes. Contrary to what Kennedy was told, Cuban air force was trained and equipped enough to meet the challenge. Also, there was the fuel issue: the flight from Nicaragua to Cuba and back again meant that you could not spend much time in the combat air zone. [Source: DiClerico] Morale -- Kennedy had repeatedly inquired about the morale of the invaders and was told it was high. However, at one point prior to the invasion, there was a MUTANY among the invaders, who didnt like some of their leaders. The CIA had to cart them off to Nicaraguan jails. Also, morale was artificially induced because the CIA had told the invaders that other forces were being trained besides them, and that American marines would assist the operation, and that landings would be made on other parts of the island so as to draw Castros forces away. Kennedy did not know this. [Source: DiClerico] Castros Army -- CIA had assured Kennedy that Castros army would pose no serious threat to the invading force. However, their training and equipment proved more than adequate to meet the task. The CIA had been told of this reality by experts in the State Department and British Intelligence, but chose to ignore these estimates and failed to pass them along to the president [Source: DiClerico] Question: What is the basic problem here? Question: Who is really the boss here? The Bay of Pigs
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.26 There will be a popular uprising against Castro REALITY: didnt happen They can escape to the Escambray mountains REALITY: whoops. 7. Poor decision making environment A. Relying upon a single source of information (CIA) B. Secrecy rules: need to know basis The uprising? -- The uprising that never was. The CIA suggested that the Cuban underground consisted of 2,500 men and 20,000 sympathizers that would rise up and swing into action once the invasion began. Everyone in the White House not only thought this fact was essential to the plan, but that it was clearly going to happen. In truth, the CIA really had no hard basis upon which to forecast this happenstance [Source: DiClerico] What Mountains? -- Kennedy wanted the invaders to have an escape route. He was assured it would be the Escambray Mountains. This would only work if the landing site was Trinidad. Later on, it was changed to the Bay of Pigs because planners thought Trinidad was too conspicuous. That made the mountains 80 miles away, separated by swamps and jungle. Kennedy was told of a change of the landing site, but not that it eliminated the mountains as a retreat. [Source: DiClerico] Question: What is the basic problem here? Question: Who is really the boss here? Secrecy Rules -- CIA would never share their invasion plan with anyone. The State Department was not allowed to view it. Neither were other aspects of the CIA itself. There was a need-to-know standard of secrecy that no one should be told about this project unless it became operationally necessary. [Source: DiClerico] The Bay of Pigs
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.27 C. Lack of tough questions D. Organizational ethic: dont speak up E. Freshman Effect -- Kennedy and his advisors simply thought they knew what they were doing, when, in fact, they were green. Tough questions -- Kennedy team failed to raise tough questions. No serious analysis of the first question: was this invasion necessary in the first place? How do you know this? Prove it. [Source: DiClerico] Keep your mouth shut? -- Advisors who may have some misgivings clammed up during the meetings. Examples: Arthur Schlesinger and Dean Rusk. One lower level person who had attended one of the meetings in Rusks place wrote a memorandum criticizing the proposed invasion, but when he asked Rusks permission to present it to the president, it was refused. [Source: DiClerico] The Bay of Pigs
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.28 F. Poor Meeting Protocol 8. The rest of the story -- recently declassified report there was no way that the invasion could have succeeded even if there was air cover provided by the Americans. (It was a ridiculous plan from top to bottom). -- Kennedy became very distrustful of the defense organizations and experts in the CIA. (Made Kennedy gun-shy when committing troops abroad elsewhere) -- Approval rating soared to 83% after Kennedy went on television and took personal blame for the incident Poor Protocol -- Papers and memoranda distributed at the meeting were collected at the end of the meeting. No effort was made to circulate the Schlesinger memo for debate. There was also a social club protocol: little people (undersecretaries) were not allowed to speak at meetings unless called upon. Chester Bowles could not speak in opposition. One person was invited to speak against the plan, Senator William Fulbright. He spoke, and then the table voted. There was no debate. [Source: DiClerico] The Bay of Pigs
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.29 The Cuban Missile Crisis 1. difference between the two kinds of decisions -- the stakes are higher -- had to react (wasnt planned) -- chances of nuclear war were estimated at 1 in 3 2. Kennedy had been given assurance that Cuba would never contain nuclear missiles -- Khrushchev had promised this -- defense intellectuals predicted this as well, using principles of game theory. [explain game theory] -- one month later, a U-2 spy plane provided proof that silos were being constructed
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.30 3. Kennedys reaction -- He summoned a group of advisors; disclosed the information; told them that the missiles were not acceptable; and asked them to devise a course of action. -- He had to react because (a) Khrushchev had bullied him in a prior meeting (b) This would alter the balance of power (c) Khrushchev thought he could get away with this because he thought Kennedy was weak. (he would never play a game of chicken with nuclear warheads) The Cuban Missile Crisis
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.31 4. develops EXCOMM -- the Executive Committee of National Security -- wider group of advisors (a) experts from varying groups (CIA, NSC) (b) people with good judgment that he trusted Kenneth O'Donnell (personal friend, appointments secretary) [author, Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye] Theodore Sorenson (Kennedys speech writer) Formal institutions are not sufficient? The Cuban Missile Crisis
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.32 (c) people in the lower levels of the bureaucracy various undersecretaries (p.251) us ambassador to the united nations soviet expert Llewellyn Thompson attorney general Robert Kennedy Treasury secretary Douglas Dillon (d) people outside of government former secretary of state former defense secretary former high commissioner of Germany The Cuban Missile Crisis
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.33 -- even communicated by phone with former presidents (Hoover, Truman and Eisenhower), but they were not involved in the deliberations. 5. Creates the situation room -- in the White House basement -- could hear all the cable traffic coming in from the Department of State, Defense and CIA -- No filter! He could get raw information first-hand instead of having to rely upon military advisors. 7. Fostering candid advice -- Strategic absences Question: Why is this important? Think about that: who has the power now? Planned absences -- Kennedy absented himself from several meetings. Sorenson and Robert Kennedy would be responsible for stirring up the views and debate while he was gone. Question: Why? What benefits come from this decision? The Cuban Missile Crisis
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.34 -- personal probing of views Kennedy would personally prod undersecretaries and lower-level people because they would not speak against their bosses in public -- members were allowed to talk outside the confines of their expertise -- traditional protocol was abandoned Smaller people would talk before being called upon -- the result? Discussions were much more free The Cuban Missile Crisis
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.35 8. Military options The committee came up with the following military options: 8 of 13 advocated the blockade -- U.S. had Naval Supremacy -- Allowed Khrushchev to make the first confrontational move -- the military was upset with the decision 9. The conclusion The Soviets backed down, and Kennedy negotiated a deal that ended the crisis Recent historical evidence Options: 1. Blockade Cuba (ships cant arrive) 2. Bombing the missile sites with pellets that would neutralize the missiles without causing casualties 3. Surgically bomb the missile sites but forewarn the Cubans and Soviets in the area 4. Surgically bomb the sites without any forewarning 5. Bomb all military targets in Cuba 6. Full scale invasion (take Cuba over) Question: Why? What benefits come from this decision? Tense Times Military was upset with the decision, but Kennedy stuck to his guns. He went on television to announce his decisions. The ships lined up, and it was one of the most dangerous days of the cold war. People were wondering what the soviets would do. Whether they would try to run the blockade and what would happen. People believed in their hearts that there was a real possibility of nuclear war and utter destruction. [mention bomb shelters]. The conclusion The ships eventually stopped and allowed the president to reach an agreement with Khrushchev. Kennedy removed missiles in Turkey in exchange for removal in Cuba. At first, the public was not aware of the Turkish-missiles portion of the deal. The public agreement was: (1) remove missiles; and (2) a pledge not to invade Cuba. Kennedy did not admit in public that Turkey was included in the deal. The term was silent because Kennedy had told Khrushchev that he couldnt agree to that term in public, and Khrushchev said OK. [note: each accommodating their own publics] Recent Evidence The soviets already had some of these missile systems set up in Cuba at the time we thought they were being set up, so that if we had just invaded Cuba, the local commanders in Cuba had authority to fire these missiles at the U.S. Kennedys blockade may have actually prevented a nuclear exchange of some sort. The Cuban Missile Crisis
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.36 The Cabinet 1. The Constitution --. doesnt mention the cabinet as an office -- It does assume (generally) that departments will exist -- But it doesnt create any specific office or powers -- Offices are created by statute. -- President appoints but Congress approves 2. Historically: -- began as 4 departments in Washingtons administration -- now there are 14
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  • 1/18/2007(C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.37 Presidents Cabinet: Interior (1849) Defense Treasury (1789) State (1789) Justice (1870) Agriculture Commerce (1903) Labor (1913) Health and Human Services (1953) Housing and Urban Development (1965) Transportation (1966) Energy (1977) Education (1979) Veterans Affairs (1989) Homeland Security (2002)
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.38 The Cabinet 4 Presidents rejection of it -- Jackson kitchen cabinet -- Lincoln -- FDR did not take the cabinet into his confidence -- Wilson declined to include the cabinet in any major decision (involved them only in trivial matters) -- Eisenhower -- Kennedy Lincoln -- Got the cabinet together to read the emancipation proclamation to them, not to get advice about its draft or what it said Ike -- He tried to use the cabinet as a legitimate consulting body. However, many members came unprepared for the discussions. As a result, the discussions were sometimes aimless and off the top of their heads [Source: DiClerico] Kennedy -- Felt that cabinet discussions were a waste of time (not helping him). He scrapped the regular meetings and, instead, involved individual cabinet members in decision making only where their particular expertise warranted consultation for the issue involved. [Source: DiClerico] Question: Why dont they use it?
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.39 5 Secrecy -- to stop leaks, consult fewer people 6. Trust -- doesnt know cabinet members personally -- political appointments! (selected to make people happy) 7. Loyalty Many departments are tied to interest groups, who have considerable support in Congress Leads to pressure to hedge loyalty to accommodate a power network. Example -- Kennedy wanted Kennedy wanted Senator William Fulbright to be Secretary of State, but his record on civil rights offended civil rights groups [Source: DiClerico] The Cabinet
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.40 8. Organizational logic -- organizations designed to carry out basic labor are not the best consultants anyway [example] 9. inner and outer cabinet 1. some cabinet positions are more influential than others -- inner cabinet: national security, secretary of state, secretary of defense, secretary of treasury, attorney general -- outer cabinet: agriculture, education, labor, commerce, interior, transportation, etc etc The Cabinet
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.41 The Executive Office of the President 1. FDR: the Brownlow committee -- the president needs help -- led to the establishment of the Executive Office of the President 2. Truman is the one who really expanded it -- creation of the second government 3. How the new bureaus empower the president -- look
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  • 1/18/2007(C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007. 42
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.43 The Executive Office of the President 4. Most important offices National Security Council, Council of Economic Advisors, Office of Management and Budget, National Economic Council, The Office of the White House Staff
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  • 1/18/2007 (C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.44 1. Who are they? -- In general, inner-most important people -- power, immediate access 2. Key staffers emerge: Nixon? Haldeman, Erlichman Reagan? George Shultz and Don Regan Bush? Karl Rove -- control access to the president 3. Growth in the staff illustration Cabinet Officers Executive Office of the Presidency White House Staff #3#2#1 The White House Staff Command and Control -- Nixon: 60% of the time that Nixon spent with any staff member in 1972 was spent with his Chief of Staff, and that for 90% of the time they were alone Key Staffers -- Assistant for National Security Assistant for Domestic Affairs Counsel to the President Appointments Secretary Assistant for Communications Assistant for Legislative Affairs Press Secretary Chief of Staff
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  • 1/18/2007(C) Copyright Sean Wilson. 2007.45 Growth -- Jefferson = one messenger and a secretary, whose services he paid with his own money Grant = 3 staff assistants Wilson = 7 FDR = 11 (51)* Truman = 13 (272)* Eisenhower = 37 (351)* Kennedy = 23 (422)* Johnson = 20 (304)* Nixon = 48 (506)* Ford = 56 (583)* Carter = 48 (412)* Reagan = 83 (371)* Bush = 77 (380)* * number in parenthesis is support staff of the personal staff Question: What cased the growth? Question: Can you guess Nixons number?