Radek Skoda, December 2017

Cheating in nuclear safety:

2015 Czech Dukovany lesson

Czech NPPs

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Installed electric power

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Welding “exercise”

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Radiographs and welds reinspectionsafter 10 years of collective cheating

All Czech NPPs underwent total radiographs and welds

reinspections since 2015

Robust financial impact about 1bn EUR

Governmental blind eye on years of cheating

Legal actions so far inefficient, all key personnel still in charge

Credibility of nuclear industry and the regulator destroyed

Dukovany radiographs inspection - beginning 06/2015 – unit 4 shutdown to repair a leak on the ultimate emergency feedwater

nozzle into the steamgenerator No. 43 (not radioactive medium), nozzle

repaired

radiographs inspection – actions

Backward analyses: nozzle was inspected and evaluated as a free of

defects during outage in 2014 (contractor)

Decision to reevaluate quality of the welds radiographs (sample)

09/2015 decision to perform a comprehensive re-evaluation of all

radiographs since 2007 and consequent safety evaluation (thousands

radiographs per unit; > 90% radiographs of impulse lines)

The same approach applied in Temelin NPP

“immediate and longterm systemic corrective actions”: official line

ČEZ cancelled contract with contractor involved and transferred relevant

activities to CEZ group company UJV Rez

multilevel surveillance established (included independent expert

organizations, e.g. TUV)

long term reinspection program based on graded approach established

for both NPPs

many organizational changes in NPP departments, engineering

department, safety department etc. (including human resources

enforcement)

process changes in relevant areas

…

It all started in 2007

2 programmes to get bonuses for CEZ managers:

• Bezpecne 15 TERA v Temeline• Bezpecne 16 TERA v Dukovanech

Outsourcing of critical functions to shorten outages –motivation to make fake NDT checks.

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NDT

experts

NDT

experts

NDT

experts

DURING CHEATING REGULATOR +TSO AFTER CHEATING

Dukovany lesson

• one of the best VVER plant record (before 2015)

• lenient regulatory oversight

• complacent nuclear safety approach

• top CEZ managers no nuclear education/experience

• support of top brass from the government

• operator interlink with the regulator

• = TOTAL LACK OF SAFETY CULTURE

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