CHAVEZ  VS  JBC  MENDOZA,  J.:    The   issue   at   hand   has   been   in   hibernation   until   the   unexpected   departure   of   Chief   Justice   Renato   C.  Corona  on  May  29,  2012,  and  the  nomination  of  former  Solicitor  General  Francisco  I.  Chavez  (petitioner),  as   his   potential   successor,   triggered   the   filing   of   this   case.   The   issue  has   constantly   been  nagging   legal  minds,  yet  remained  dormant  for  lack  of  constitutional  challenge.    As  the  matter  is  of  extreme  urgency  considering  the  constitutional  deadline  in  the  process  of  selecting  the  nominees  for  the  vacant  seat  of  the  Chief  Justice,  the  Court  cannot  delay  the  resolution  of  the  issue  a  day  longer.  Relegating  it  in  the  meantime  to  the  back  burner  is  not  an  option.    Does   the   first   paragraph   of   Section   8,   Article   VIII   of   the   1987   Constitution   allow   more   than   one   (1)  member  of  Congress  to  sit  in  the  JBC?  Is  the  practice  of  having  two  (2)  representatives  from  each  house  of  Congress  with  one   (1)   vote  each   sanctioned  by   the  Constitution?  These  are   the  pivotal  questions   to  be  resolved  in  this  original  action  for  prohibition  and  injunction.    Long  before  the  naissance  of  the  present  Constitution,  the  annals  of  history  bear  witness  to  the  fact  that  the   exercise   of   appointing  members   of   the   Judiciary   has   always   been   the   exclusive   prerogative   of   the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of  the  government.  Like  their  progenitor  of  American  origins,  both  the  Malolos  Constitution[1]  and  the  1935  Constitution[2]  had  vested  the  power  to  appoint  the  members  of  the  Judiciary   in   the   President,   subject   to   confirmation   by   the   Commission   on   Appointments.   It   was   during  these  times  that  the  country  became  witness  to  the  deplorable  practice  of  aspirants  seeking  confirmation  of  their  appointment  in  the  Judiciary  to  ingratiate  themselves  with  the  members  of  the  legislative  body.[3]    Then,  with  the  fusion  of  executive  and  legislative  power  under  the  1973  Constitution,[4]  the  appointment  of  judges  and  justices  was  no  longer  subject  to  the  scrutiny  of  another  body.  It  was  absolute,  except  that  the  appointees  must  have  all  the  qualifications  and  none  of  the  disqualifications.    Prompted  by  the  clamor  to  rid  the  process  of  appointments  to  the  Judiciary   from  political  pressure  and  partisan  activities,[5]   the  members  of   the  Constitutional  Commission   saw   the  need   to   create  a   separate,  competent  and  independent  body  to  recommend  nominees  to  the  President.  Thus,  it  conceived  of  a  body  representative  of  all  the  stakeholders  in  the  judicial  appointment  process  and  called  it  the  Judicial  and  Bar  Council   (JBC).   Its   composition,   term   and   functions   are   provided   under   Section   8,   Article   VIII   of   the  Constitution,  viz:    Section  8.   (1)  A   Judicial   and  Bar  Council   is   hereby   created  under   the   supervision  of   the  Supreme  Court  composed  of  the  Chief  Justice  as  ex  officio  Chairman,  the  Secretary  of  Justice,  and  a  representative  of  the  Congress   as   ex   officio   Members,   a   representative   of   the   Integrated   Bar,   a   professor   of   law,   a   retired  Member  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  a  representative  of  the  private  sector.    (2)  The  regular  members  of  the  Council  shall  be  appointed  by  the  President  for  a  term  of  four  years  with  the  consent  of  the  Commission  on  Appointments.  Of  the  Members  first  appointed,  the  representative  of  the  Integrated  Bar  shall  serve  for  four  years,  the  professor  of   law  for  three  years,  the  retired  Justice  for  two  years,  and  the  representative  of  the  private  sector  for  one  year.      (3)  The  Clerk  of  the  Supreme  Court  shall  be  the  Secretary  ex  officio  of  the  Council  and  shall  keep  a  record  of  its  proceedings.    (4)   The   regular  Members   of   the   Council   shall   receive   such   emoluments   as  may   be   determined   by   the  Supreme  Court.  The  Supreme  Court  shall  provide  in  its  annual  budget  the  appropriations  for  the  Council.    (5)   The   Council   shall   have   the   principal   function   of   recommending   appointees   to   the   Judiciary.   It  may  

exercise  such  other  functions  and  duties  as  the  Supreme  Court  may  assign  to  it.    In   compliance   therewith,   Congress,   from   the   moment   of   the   creation   of   the   JBC,   designated   one  representative  to  sit   in  the  JBC  to  act  as  one  of  the  ex  officio  members.[6]  Perhaps   in  order  to  give  equal  opportunity   to   both   houses   to   sit   in   the   exclusive   body,   the   House   of   Representatives   and   the   Senate  would   send   alternate   representatives   to   the   JBC.   In   other   words,   Congress   had   only   one   (1)  representative.    In  1994,  the  composition  of  the  JBC  was  substantially  altered.  Instead  of  having  only  seven  (7)  members,  an  eighth  (8th)  member  was  added  to  the  JBC  as  two  (2)  representatives  from  Congress  began  sitting  in  the  JBC  -­‐  one  from  the  House  of  Representatives  and  one  from  the  Senate,  with  each  having  one-­‐half  (1/2)  of  a  vote.[7]  Then,  curiously,  the  JBC  En  Banc,  in  separate  meetings  held  in  2000  and  2001,  decided  to  allow  the   representatives   from  the  Senate  and   the  House  of  Representatives  one   full   vote  each.[8]  At  present,  Senator  Francis  Joseph  G.  Escudero  and  Congressman  Niel  C.  Tupas,  Jr.  (respondents)  simultaneously  sit  in  the  JBC  as  representatives  of  the  legislature.    It  is  this  practice  that  petitioner  has  questioned  in  this  petition,[9]  setting  forth  the  following    

GROUNDS  FOR  ALLOWANCE  OF  THE  PETITION    I  

 Article  VIII,  Section  8,  Paragraph  1  is  clear,  definite  and  needs  no  interpretation  in  that  the  JBC  shall  have  only  one  representative  from  Congress.    

II    The  framers  of  the  Constitution  clearly  envisioned,  contemplated  and  decided  on  a  JBC  composed  of  only  seven  (7)  members.      

III    Had  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  intended  that  the  JBC  composed  of  the  one  member  from  the  Senate  and  one  member   from   the  House  of  Representatives,   they   could  have  easily   said   so   as   they  did   in   the  other  provisions  of  the  Constitution.    

IV    The  composition  of   the  JBC  providing   for   three  ex-­‐   fficio  members   is  purposely  designed  for  a  balanced  representation  of  each  of  the  three  branches  of  the  government.    

V    One  of   the  two  (2)  members  of   the   JBC   from  Congress  has  no  right   (not  even  ½  right)   to  sit   in   the  said  constitutional  body  and  perform  the  duties  and  functions  of  a  member  thereof.    

VI    The  JBC  cannot  conduct  valid  proceedings  as  its  composition  is  illegal  and  unconstitutional.[10]    On   July   9,   2012,   the   JBC   filed   its   Comment.[11]   It,   however,   abstained   from   recommending   on   how   this  constitutional   issue  should  be  disposed   in  gracious  deference  to  the  wisdom  of   the  Court.  Nonetheless,  the   JBC   was   more   than   generous   enough   to   offer   the   insights   of   various   personalities   previously  

connected  with  it.[12]    Through  the  Office  of  the  Solicitor  General  (OSG),  respondents  defended  their  position  as  members  of  the  JBC  in  their  Comment[13]  filed  on  July  12,  2012.  According  to  them,  the  crux  of  the  controversy  is  the  phrase  “a   representative   of   Congress.”[14]   Reverting   to   the   basics,   they   cite   Section   1,   Article   VI   of   the  Constitution[15]   to  determine  the  meaning  of  the  term  “Congress.”   It   is   their   theory  that  the  two  houses,  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives,  are  permanent  and  mandatory  components  of  “Congress,”  such   that   the   absence   of   either   divests   the   term   of   its   substantive   meaning   as   expressed   under   the  Constitution.  In  simplistic  terms,  the  House  of  Representatives,  without  the  Senate  and  vice-­‐versa,  is  not  Congress.[16]   Bicameralism,   as   the   system   of   choice   by   the   Framers,   requires   that   both   houses   exercise  their  respective  powers  in  the  performance  of  its  mandated  duty  which  is  to  legislate.  Thus,  when  Section  8(1),   Article   VIII   of   the   Constitution   speaks   of   “a   representative   from   Congress,”   it   should   mean   one  representative  each  from  both  Houses  which  comprise  the  entire  Congress.[17]    Tracing   the   subject   provision’s   history,   the   respondents   claim   that   when   the   JBC   was   established,   the  Framers   originally   envisioned   a   unicameral   legislative   body,   thereby   allocating   “a   representative   of   the  National  Assembly”  to  the  JBC.  The  phrase,  however,  was  not  modified  to  aptly   jive  with  the  change  to  bicameralism,   the   legislative  system  finally  adopted  by   the  Constitutional  Commission  on   July  21,  1986.  According   to   respondents,   if   the   Commissioners   were   made   aware   of   the   consequence   of   having   a  bicameral  legislature  instead  of  a  unicameral  one,  they  would  have  made  the  corresponding  adjustment  in  the  representation  of  Congress  in  the  JBC.[18]    The  ambiguity  having  resulted  from  a  plain  case  of  inadvertence,  the  respondents  urge  the  Court  to  look  beyond  the  letter  of  the  disputed  provision  because  the  literal  adherence  to  its  language  would  produce  absurdity   and   incongruity   to   the   bicameral   nature   of   Congress.[19]   In   other  words,   placing   either   of   the  respondents  in  the  JBC  will  effectively  deprive  a  house  of  Congress  of  its  representation.  In  the  same  vein,  the  electorate  represented  by  Members  of  Congress  will  lose  their  only  opportunity  to  participate  in  the  nomination  process  for  the  members  of  the  Judiciary,  effectively  diminishing  the  republican  nature  of  the  government.[20]    The  respondents  further  argue  that  the  allowance  of  two  (2)  representatives  of  Congress  to  be  members  of  the  JBC  does  not  render  the  latter’s  purpose  nugatory.  While  they  admit  that  the  purpose  in  creating  the  JBC  was  to  insulate  appointments  to  the  Judiciary  from  political  influence,  they  likewise  cautioned  the  Court   that   this   constitutional   vision   did   not   intend   to   entirely   preclude   political   factor   in   said  appointments.   Therefore,  no  evil   should  be  perceived   in   the   current   set-­‐up  of   the   JBC  because   two   (2)  members   coming   from   Congress,   whose  membership   to   certain   political   parties   is   irrelevant,   does   not  necessarily   amplify   political   partisanship   in   the   JBC.   In   fact,   the   presence   of   two   (2)   members   from  Congress   will   most   likely   provide   balance   as   against   the   other   six   (6)   members   who   are   undeniably  presidential  appointees.[21]    

The  Issues    In   resolving   the   procedural   and   substantive   issues   arising   from   the   petition,   as   well   as   the   myriad   of  counter-­‐arguments  proffered  by  the  respondents,  the  Court  synthesized  them  into  two:    (1)  Whether  or  not  the  conditions  sine  qua  non  for  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  judicial  review  have  been  met  in  this  case;  and    (2)  Whether  or  not  the  current  practice  of  the  JBC  to  perform  its  functions  with  eight  (8)  members,  two  (2)  of  whom  are  members  of  Congress,  runs  counter  to  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  1987  Constitution.    

The  Power  of  Judicial  Review    

 In  its  Comment,  the  JBC  submits  that  petitioner  is  clothed  with  locus  standi  to  file  the  petition,  as  a  citizen  and  taxpayer,  who  has  been  nominated  to  the  position  of  Chief  Justice.[22]    For  the  respondents,  however,  petitioner  has  no  “real  interest”  in  questioning  the  constitutionality  of  the  JBC’s   current   composition.[23]   As   outlined   in   jurisprudence,   it   is   well-­‐settled   that   for   locus   standi   to   lie,  petitioner  must  exhibit  that  he  has  been  denied,  or  is  about  to  be  denied,  of  a  personal  right  or  privilege  to  which  he  is  entitled.  Here,  petitioner  failed  to  manifest  his  acceptance  of  his  recommendation  to  the  position  of  Chief   Justice,   thereby  divesting  him  of  a   substantial   interest   in   the  controversy.  Without  his  name  in  the  official  list  of  applicants  for  the  post,  the  respondents  claim  that  there  is  no  personal  stake  on  the  part  of  petitioner  that  would  justify  his  outery  of  unconstitutionality.  Moreover,  the  mere  allegation  that   this   case   is   of   transcendental   importance   does   not   excuse   the  waiver   of   the   rule   on   locus   standi,  because,   in   the   first   place,   the   case   lacks   the   requisites   therefor.   The   respondents   also   question  petitioner’s  belated  filing  of  the  petition.[24]  Being  aware  that  the  current  composition  of  the  JBC  has  been  in  practice  since  1994,  petitioner’s  silence  for  eighteen  (18)  years  show  that  the  constitutional  issue  being  raised  before  the  Court  does  not  comply  with  the  “earliest  possible  opportunity”  requirement.    Before  addressing  the  above  issues  in  seriatim,  the  Court  deems  it  proper  to  first  ascertain  the  nature  of  the  petition.  Pursuant  to  the  rule  that  the  nature  of  an  action  is  determined  by  the  allegations  therein  and  the   character   of   the   relief   sought,   the   Court   views   the   petition   as   essentially   an   action   for   declaratory  relief  under  Rule  63  of  the  1997  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure.[25]    The  Constitution  as  the  subject  matter,  and  the  validity  and  construction  of  Section  8  (1),  Article  VIII  as  the  issue  raised,  the  petition  should  properly  be  considered  as  that  which  would  result  in  the  adjudication  of  rights  sans  the  execution  process  because  the  only  relief  to  be  granted  is  the  very  declaration  of  the  rights  under   the  document   sought   to  be  construed.     It  being   so,   the  original   jurisdiction  over   the  petition   lies  with  the  appropriate  Regional  Trial  Court  (RTC).  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  only  questions  of   law  are  raised  in  the  petition,  an  action  for  declaratory  relief  is  not  among  those  within  the  original  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  as  provided  in  Section  5,  Article  VIII  of  the  Constitution.[26]    At   any   rate,   due   to   its   serious   implications,   not  only   to   government  processes   involved  but   also   to   the  sanctity   of   the   Constitution,   the   Court   deems   it   more   prudent   to   take   cognizance   of   it.   After   all,   the  petition   is   also   for   prohibition   under   Rule   65   seeking   to   enjoin   Congress   from   sending   two   (2)  representatives  with  one  (1)  full  vote  each  to  the  JBC.    The  Courts’  power  of  judicial  review,  like  almost  all  other  powers  conferred  by  the  Constitution,  is  subject  to  several  limitations,  namely:  (1)  there  must  be  an  actual  case  or  controversy  calling  for  the  exercise  of  judicial   power;   (2)   the   person   challenging   the   act  must   have   “standing”   to   challenge;   he  must   have   a  personal  and  substantial  interest  in  the  case,  such  that  he  has  sustained  or  will  sustain,  direct  injury  as  a  result   of   its   enforcement;   (3)   the   question   of   constitutionality   must   be   raised   at   the   earliest   possible  opportunity;   and   (4)   the   issue  of   constitutionality  must   be   the   very   lis  mota  of   the   case.[27]   Generally,   a  party  will  be  allowed  to  litigate  only  when  these  conditions  sine  qua  non  are  present,  especially  when  the  constitutionality  of  an  act  by  a  co-­‐equal  branch  of  government  is  put  in  issue.    Anent   locus   standi,   the  question   to  be  answered   is   this:  does   the  party  possess  a  personal   stake   in   the  outcome  of  the  controversy  as  to  assure  that  there  is  real,  concrete  and  legal  conflict  of  rights  and  duties  from  the  issues  presented  before  the  Court?  In  David  v.  Macapagal-­‐Arroyo,[28]   the  Court  summarized  the  rules  on   locus   standi   as   culled   from   jurisprudence.  There,   it  was  held   that   taxpayers,   voters,   concerned  citizens,  and   legislators  may  be  accorded  standing  to  sue,  provided  that   the   following  requirements  are  met:   (1)   cases   involve   constitutional   issues;   (2)   for   taxpayers,   there   must   be   a   claim   of   illegal  disbursement  of  public  funds  or  that  the  tax  measure  is  unconstitutional;  (3)  for  voters,  there  must  be  a  showing  of  obvious  interest  in  the  validity  of  the  election  law  in  question;  (4)  for  concerned  citizens,  there  

must  be  a  showing  that  the  issues  raised  are  of  transcendental   importance  which  must  be  settled  early;  and   (5)   for   legislators,   there  must  be  a   claim   that   the  official  action  complained  of   infringes  upon   their  prerogatives  as  legislators.    In   public   suits,   the   plaintiff,   representing   the   general   public,   asserts   a   “public   right”   in   assailing   an  allegedly  illegal  official  action.  The  plaintiff  may  be  a  person  who  is  affected  no  differently  from  any  other  person,   and   can   be   suing   as   a   “stranger,”   or   as   a   “citizen”   or   “taxpayer.”   Thus,   taxpayers   have   been  allowed   to   sue  where   there   is   a   claim   that   public   funds   are   illegally   disbursed   or   that   public  money   is  being  deflected  to  any  improper  purpose,  or  that  public  funds  are  wasted  through  the  enforcement  of  an  invalid  or  unconstitutional   law.  Of  greater   import   than  the  damage  caused  by  the   illegal  expenditure  of  public   funds   is   the  mortal  wound   inflicted  upon   the   fundamental   law  by   the  enforcement  of   an   invalid  statute.[29]    In  this  case,  petitioner  seeks  judicial  intervention  as  a  taxpayer,  a  concerned  citizen  and  a  nominee  to  the  position  of  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court.  As  a  taxpayer,  petitioner  invokes  his  right  to  demand  that  the   taxes   he   and   the   rest   of   the   citizenry   have   been   paying   to   the   government   are   spent   for   lawful  purposes.  According  to  petitioner,  “since  the  JBC  derives  financial  support  for  its  functions,  operation  and  proceedings   from   taxes  paid,  petitioner  possesses  as   taxpayer  both   right  and   legal   standing   to  demand  that   the   JBC’s   proceedings   are   not   tainted   with   illegality   and   that   its   composition   and   actions   do   not  violate  the  Constitution.”[30]    Notably,  petitioner  takes  pains  in  enumerating  past  actions  that  he  had  brought  before  the  Court  where  his  legal  standing  was  sustained.  Although  this  inventory  is  unnecessary  to  establish  locus  standi  because  obviously,   not   every   case   before   the   Court   exhibits   similar   issues   and   facts,   the   Court   recognizes   the  petitioner’s  right  to  sue  in  this  case.  Clearly,  petitioner  has  the  legal  standing  to  bring  the  present  action  because  he  has  a  personal  stake  in  the  outcome  of  this  controversy.    The  Court  disagrees  with  the  respondents’  contention  that  petitioner  lost  his  standing  to  sue  because  he  is  not  an  official  nominee  for  the  post  of  Chief  Justice.  While  it  is  true  that  a  “personal  stake”  on  the  case  is  imperative  to  have  locus  standi,  this  is  not  to  say  that  only  official  nominees  for  the  post  of  Chief  Justice  can   come   to   the   Court   and   question   the   JBC   composition   for   being   unconstitutional.   The   JBC   likewise  screens  and  nominates  other  members  of  the  Judiciary.  Albeit  heavily  publicized  in  this  regard,  the  JBC’s  duty   is   not   at   all   limited   to   the   nominations   for   the   highest  magistrate   in   the   land.   A   vast   number   of  aspirants   to   judicial  posts  all  over   the  country  may  be  affected  by  the  Court’s   ruling.  More   importantly,  the   legality   of   the   very   process   of   nominations   to   the   positions   in   the   Judiciary   is   the   nucleus   of   the  controversy.  The  Court  considers  this  a  constitutional  issue  that  must  be  passed  upon,  lest  a  constitutional  process  be  plagued  by  misgivings,  doubts  and  worse,  mistrust.  Hence,  a  citizen  has  a   right   to  bring   this  question   to   the   Court,   clothed   with   legal   standing   and   at   the   same   time,   armed   with   issues   of  transcendental   importance   to   society.   The   claim   that   the   composition   of   the   JBC   is   illegal   and  unconstitutional  is  an  object  of  concern,  not  just  for  a  nominee  to  a  judicial  post,  but  for  all  citizens  who  have  the  right  to  seek  judicial  intervention  for  rectification  of  legal  blunders.    With   respect   to   the   question   of   transcendental   importance,   it   is   not   difficult   to   perceive   from   the  opposing   arguments  of   the  parties   that   the  determinants   established   in   jurisprudence  are   attendant   in  this  case:   (1)  the  character  of  the  funds  or  other  assets   involved   in  the  case;  (2)  the  presence  of  a  clear  case   of   disregard   of   a   constitutional   or   statutory   prohibition   by   the   public   respondent   agency   or  instrumentality   of   the   government;   and   (3)   the   lack  of   any  other   party  with   a  more  direct   and   specific  interest   in   the   questions   being   raised.[31]   The   allegations   of   constitutional   violations   in   this   case   are   not  empty  attacks  on  the  wisdom  of  the  other  branches  of  the  government.  The  allegations  are  substantiated  by  facts  and,  therefore,  deserve  an  evaluation  from  the  Court.  The  Court  need  not  elaborate  on  the  legal  and   societal   ramifications   of   the   issues   raised.   It   cannot   be   gainsaid   that   the   JBC   is   a   constitutional  innovation  crucial  in  the  selection  of  the  magistrates  in  our  judicial  system.    

The  Composition  of  the  JBC    Central   to  the  resolution  of   the  foregoing  petition   is  an  understanding  of   the  composition  of   the  JBC  as  stated  in  the  first  paragraph  of  Section  8,  Article  VIII  of  the  Constitution.  It  reads:    Section  8.   (1)  A   Judicial   and  Bar  Council   is   hereby   created  under   the   supervision  of   the  Supreme  Court  composed  of  the  Chief  Justice  as  ex  officio  Chairman,  the  Secretary  of  Justice,  and  a  representative  of  the  Congress   as   ex   officio   Members,   a   representative   of   the   Integrated   Bar,   a   professor   of   law,   a   retired  Member  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  a  representative  of  the  private  sector.    From   a   simple   reading   of   the   above-­‐quoted   provision,   it   can   readily   be   discerned   that   the   provision   is  clear  and  unambiguous.  The  first  paragraph  calls  for  the  creation  of  a  JBC  and  places  the  same  under  the  supervision  of  the  Court.  Then  it  goes  to  its  composition  where  the  regular  members  are  enumerated:  a  representative   of   the   Integrated   Bar,   a   professor   of   law,   a   retired   member   of   the   Court   and   a  representative   from   the   private   sector.  On   the   second   part   lies   the   crux   of   the   present   controversy.   It  enumerates  the  ex  officio  or  special  members  of  the  JBC  composed  of  the  Chief  Justice,  who  shall  be  its  Chairman,  the  Secretary  of  Justice  and  “a  representative  of  Congress.”    As  petitioner  correctly  posits,  the  use  of  the  singular  letter  “a”  preceding  “representative  of  Congress”   is  unequivocal  and   leaves  no  room  for  any  other  construction.   It   is   indicative  of  what  the  members  of  the  Constitutional  Commission  had  in  mind,  that  is,  Congress  may  designate  only  one  (1)  representative  to  the  JBC.  Had  it  been  the  intention  that  more  than  one  (1)  representative  from  the  legislature  would  sit  in  the  JBC,  the  Framers  could  have,  in  no  uncertain  terms,  so  provided.    One  of  the  primary  and  basic  rules  in  statutory  construction  is  that  where  the  words  of  a  statute  are  clear,  plain,   and   free   from   ambiguity,   it   must   be   given   its   literal   meaning   and   applied   without   attempted  interpretation.[32]  It  is  a  well-­‐settled  principle  of  constitutional  construction  that  the  language  employed  in  the  Constitution  must  be  given   their  ordinary  meaning  except  where   technical   terms  are  employed.  As  much  as  possible,  the  words  of  the  Constitution  should  be  understood  in  the  sense  they  have  in  common  use.  What  it  says  according  to  the  text  of  the  provision  to  be  construed  compels  acceptance  and  negates  the  power  of   the  courts  to  alter   it,  based  on  the  postulate  that  the  framers  and  the  people  mean  what  they  say.[33]  Verba  legis  non  est  recedendum  –  from  the  words  of  a  statute  there  should  be  no  departure.[34]    The  raison  d’  être  for  the  rule  is  essentially  two-­‐fold:  First,  because  it  is  assumed  that  the  words  in  which  constitutional  provisions  are  couched  express  the  objective  sought  to  be  attained;[35]  and  second,  because  the   Constitution   is   not   primarily   a   lawyer’s   document   but   essentially   that   of   the   people,   in   whose  consciousness  it  should  ever  be  present  as  an  important  condition  for  the  rule  of  law  to  prevail.  [36]    Moreover,  under  the  maxim  noscitur  a  sociis,  where  a  particular  word  or  phrase  is  ambiguous  in  itself  or  is  equally   susceptible   of   various   meanings,   its   correct   construction   may   be   made   clear   and   specific   by  considering  the  company  of  words  in  which  it  is  founded  or  with  which  it  is  associated.[37]  This  is  because  a  word  or  phrase   in  a   statute   is  always  used   in  association  with  other  words  or  phrases,  and   its  meaning  may,  thus,  be  modified  or  restricted  by  the  latter.[38]  The  particular  words,  clauses  and  phrases  should  not  be   studied  as  detached  and   isolated  expressions,   but   the  whole   and  every  part   of   the   statute  must  be  considered  in  fixing  the  meaning  of  any  of  its  parts  and  in  order  to  produce  a  harmonious  whole.  A  statute  must  be  so  construed  as  to  harmonize  and  give  effect  to  all   its  provisions  whenever  possible.[39]   In  short,  every  meaning  to  be  given  to  each  word  or  phrase  must  be  ascertained  from  the  context  of  the  body  of  the  statute  since  a  word  or  phrase  in  a  statute  is  always  used  in  association  with  other  words  or  phrases  and  its  meaning  may  be  modified  or  restricted  by  the  latter.    Applying   the   foregoing   principle   to   this   case,   it   becomes   apparent   that   the   word   “Congress”   used   in  Article  VIII,  Section  8(1)  of  the  Constitution  is  used  in  its  generic  sense.  No  particular  allusion  whatsoever  is  made  on  whether  the  Senate  or  the  House  of  Representatives   is  being  referred  to,  but  that,   in  either  

case,   only   a   singular   representative  may   be   allowed   to   sit   in   the   JBC.   The   foregoing   declaration   is   but  sensible,  since,  as  pointed  out  by  an  esteemed  former  member  of  the  Court  and  consultant  of  the  JBC  in  his  memorandum,[40]  “from  the  enumeration  of  the  membership  of  the  JBC,  it  is  patent  that  each  category  of  members  pertained  to  a  single  individual  only.”[41]    Indeed,  the  spirit  and  reason  of  the  statute  may  be  passed  upon  where  a   literal  meaning  would   lead  to  absurdity,   contradiction,   injustice,   or   defeat   the   clear   purpose   of   the   lawmakers.[42]   Not   any   of   these  instances,   however,   is   present   in   the   case   at   bench.   Considering   that   the   language   of   the   subject  constitutional  provision  is  plain  and  unambiguous,  there  is  no  need  to  resort  extrinsic  aids  such  as  records  of  the  Constitutional  Commission.    Nevertheless,   even   if   the   Court   should   proceed   to   look   into   the   minds   of   the   members   of   the  Constitutional  Commission,  it  is  undeniable  from  the  records  thereof  that  it  was  intended  that  the  JBC  be  composed  of  seven  (7)  members  only.  Thus:    MR.  RODRIGO:  Let  me  go  to  another  point  then.    On   page   2,   Section   5,   there   is   a   novel   provision   about   the   appointments   of  members   of   the   Supreme  Court   and   judges   of   the   lower   courts.   At   present   it   is   the   President   who   appoints   them.   If   there   is   a  Commission   on   Appointments,   then   it   is   the   President   with   the   confirmation   of   the   Commission   on  Appointment.   In   this   proposal,  we  would   like   to   establish   a  new  office,   a   sort   of   a   board   composed   of  seven  members  called  the  Judicial  and  Bar  Council.  And  while  the  President  will  still  appoint  the  member  of  the  judiciary,  he  will  be  limited  to  the  recommendees  of  this  Council.    

xxx  xxx  xxx    MR.  RODRIGO.  Of  the  seven  members  of  the  Judicial  and  Bar  Council,  the  President  appoints  four  of  them  who  are  regular    members.    

xxx  xxx  xxx    MR.  CONCEPCION.  The  only  purpose  of  the  Committee  is  to  eliminate  partisan  politics.[43]    

xxx  xxx  xxx    MR.  RODRIGO.  If  my  amendment  is  approved,  then  the  provision  will  be  exactly  the  same  as  the  provision  in  the  1935  Constitution,  Article  VIII,  Section  5.    

xxx  xxx  xxx    If  we  do  not  remove  the  proposed  amendment  on  the  creation  of  the  Judicial  and  Bar  Council,  this  will  be  a   diminution   of   the   appointing   power   of   the   highest   magistrate   of   the   land,   of   the   President   of   the  Philippines  elected  by  all   the  Filipino  people.  The  appointing  power  will  be   limited  by  a  group  of   seven  people  who  are  not  elected  by  the  people  but  only  appointed.    Mr.  Presiding  Officer,  if  this  Council  is  created,  there  will  be  no  uniformity  in  our  constitutional  provisions  on  appointments.  The  members  of  the  Judiciary  will  be  segregated  from  the  rest  of  the  government.  Even  a  municipal  judge  cannot  be  appointed  by  the  President  except  upon  recommendation  or  nomination  of  the  three  names  by  this  Committee  of  seven  people,  commissioners  of  the  Commission  on  Elections,  the  COA  and  the  Commission  on  Civil  Service…even  ambassadors,  generals  of  the  Army  will  not  come  under  this   restriction.  Why   are   we   going   to   segregate   the   Judiciary   from   the   rest   of   our   government   in   the  appointment  of  high-­‐ranking  officials?    

Another   reason   is   that   this   Council   will   be   ineffective.   It  will   just   besmirch   the   honor   of   our   President  without  being  effective  at  all  because  this  Council  will  be  under  the  influence  of  the  President.  Four  out  of  seven  are  appointees  of  the  President  and  they  can  be  reappointed  when  their  term  ends.  Therefore,  they  would  be  kowtow  the  President.  A  fifth  member  is  the  Minister  of  Justice,  an  alter  ego  of  the  President.  Another   member   represents   the   Legislature.   In   all   probability,   the   controlling   part   in   the   legislature  belongs  to  the  President  and,  therefore,  this  representative  form  the  National  Assembly  is  also  under  the  influence   of   the   President.   And   may   I   say,   Mr.   Presiding   Officer,   that   event   the   Chief   Justice   of   the  Supreme   Court   is   an   appointee   of   the   President.   So   it   is   futile   he   will   be   influence   anyway   by   the  President.[44]  [Emphases  supplied]    At   this   juncture,   it   is  worthy   to   note   that   the   seven-­‐member   composition   of   the   JBC   serves   a   practical  purpose,  that  is,  to  provide  a  solution  should  there  be  a  stalemate  in  voting.  This  underlying  reason  leads  the  Court  to  conclude  that  a  single  vote  may  not  be  divided  into  half  (1/2),  between  two  representatives  of  Congress,  or  among  any  of  the  sitting  members  of  the  JBC  for  that  matter.  This  unsanctioned  practice  can  possibly  cause  disorder  and  eventually  muddle  the  JBC’s  voting  process,  especially  in  the  event  a  tie  is  reached.  The  aforesaid  purpose  would  then  be  rendered  illusory,  defeating  the  precise  mechanism  which  the  Constitution   itself   created.  While   it  would  be  unreasonable   to   expect   that   the   Framers   provide   for  every   possible   scenario,   it   is   sensible   to   presume   that   they   knew   that   an   odd   composition   is   the   best  means  to  break  a  voting  deadlock.    The   respondents   insist   that  owing   to   the  bicameral  nature  of  Congress,   the  word  “Congress”   in  Section  8(1),   Article   VIII   of   the   Constitution   should   be   read   as   including   both   the   Senate   and   the   House   of  Representatives.  They   theorize   that   it  was  so  worded  because  at   the   time   the  said  provision  was  being  drafted,   the   Framers   initially   intended   a   unicameral   form   of   Congress.   Then,   when   the   Constitutional  Commission  eventually  adopted  a  bicameral   form  of  Congress,  the  Framers,  through  oversight,   failed  to  amend  Article  VIII,  Section  8  of  the  Constitution.[45]  On  this  score,  the  Court  cites  the  insightful  analysis  of  another  member  of  the  Court  and  JBC  consultant,  retired  Justice  Consuelo  Ynares-­‐Santiago.[46]  Thus:    A  perusal  of  the  records  of  the  Constitutional  Commission  reveals  that  the  composition  of  the  JBC  reflects  the   Commission’s   desire   “to   have   in   the   Council   a   representation   for   the   major   elements   of   the  community.”  xxx  The  ex-­‐officio  members  of   the  Council   consist  of   representatives   from   the   three  main  branches   of   government   while   the   regular   members   are   composed   of   various   stakeholders   in   the  judiciary.  The  unmistakeable   tenor  of  Article  VIII,  Section  8(1)  was   to   treat  each  ex-­‐officio  member  as  representing  one  co-­‐equal  branch  of  government.  xxx  Thus,  the  JBC  was  designed  to  have  seven  voting  members  with  the  three  ex-­‐officio  members  having  equal  say  in  the  choice  of  judicial  nominees.    xxx    No  parallelism   can  be  drawn  between   the   representative  of   Congress   in   the   JBC   and   the   exercise  by  Congress   of   its   legislative   powers   under   Article   VI   and   constituent   powers   under   Article   XVII   of   the  Constitution.   Congress,   in   relation   to   the   executive   and   judicial   branches   of   government,   is  constitutionally  treated  as  another  coequal  branch  of  in  the  matter  of  its  representative  in  the  JBC.  On  the  other   hand,   the   exercise   of   legislative   and   constituent   powers   requires   the   Senate   and   House   of  Representatives   to   coordinate   and   act   as   distinct   bodies   in   furtherance   of   Congress’   role   under   our  constitutional  scheme.  While   the   latter   justifies  and,   in   fact,  necessitates   the  separateness  of   the   two  houses  of  Congress  as  they  relate   inter  se,  no  such  dichotomy  need  be  made  when  Congress  interacts  with  the  other  two  co-­‐equal  branches  of  government.    It  is  more  in  keeping  with  the  co-­‐equal  nature  of  the  three  governmental  branches  to  assign  the  same  weight  to  considerations  that  any  of   its  representatives  may  have  regarding  aspiring  nominees  to  the  judiciary.   The   representatives   of   the   Senate   and   the   House   of   Representatives   act   as   such   for   one  branch  and  should  not  have  any  more  quantitative   influence  as  the  other  branches   in  the  exercise  of  prerogatives  evenly  bestowed  upon  the  three.  Sound  reason  and  principle  of  equality  among  the  three  

branches  support  this  conclusion.  [Emphases  and  underscoring  supplied]    More  than  the  reasoning  provided  in  the  above  discussed  rules  of  constitutional  construction,  the  Court  finds   the   above   thesis   as   the   paramount   justification   of   the   Court’s   conclusion   that   “Congress,”   in   the  context   of   JBC   representation,   should   be   considered   as   one   body.   It   is   evident   that   the   definition   of  “Congress”  as  a  bicameral  body  refers  to  its  primary  function  in  government  -­‐  to  legislate.[47]  In  the  passage  of   laws,  the  Constitution   is  explicit   in  the  distinction  of  the  role  of  each  house   in  the  process.  The  same  holds   true   in   Congress’   non-­‐legislative   powers   such   as,   inter   alia,   the   power   of   appropriation,[48]   the  declaration  of  an  existence  of  a  state  of  war,[49]  canvassing  of  electoral  returns  for  the  President  and  Vice-­‐President,[50]   and   impeachment.[51]   In   the   exercise   of   these   powers,   the   Constitution   employs   precise  language  in   laying  down  the  roles  which  a  particular  house  plays,  regardless  of  whether  the  two  houses  consummate   an   official   act   by   voting   jointly   or   separately.   An   inter-­‐play   between   the   two   houses   is  necessary   in   the   realization   of   these   powers   causing   a   vivid   dichotomy   that   the   Court   cannot   simply  discount.  Verily,  each  house   is  constitutionally  granted  with  powers  and   functions  peculiar   to   its  nature  and  with  keen  consideration  to  1)  its  relationship  with  the  other  chamber;  and  2)  in  consonance  with  the  principle  of  checks  and  balances,  to  the  other  branches  of  government.    This,   however,   cannot   be   said   in   the   case   of   JBC   representation   because   no   liaison   between   the   two  houses  exists  in  the  workings  of  the  JBC.  No  mechanism  is  required  between  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives  in  the  screening  and  nomination  of  judicial  officers.  Hence,  the  term  “Congress”  must  be  taken  to  mean  the  entire  legislative  department.  A  fortiori,  a  pretext  of  oversight  cannot  prevail  over  the  more  pragmatic  scheme  which  the  Constitution   laid  with   firmness,   that   is,   that   the   JBC  has  a  seat   for  a  single  representative  of  Congress,  as  one  of  the  co-­‐equal  branches  of  government.    Doubtless,  the  Framers  of  our  Constitution  intended  to  create  a  JBC  as  an  innovative  solution  in  response  to  the  public  clamor  in  favor  of  eliminating  politics  in  the  appointment  of  members  of  the  Judiciary.[52]  To  ensure   judicial   independence,   they   adopted   a   holistic   approach   and   hoped   that,   in   creating   a   JBC,   the  private   sector  and   the   three  branches  of  government  would  have  an  active   role  and  equal   voice   in   the  selection  of  the  members  of  the  Judiciary.    Therefore,   to  allow  the  Legislature   to  have  more  quantitative   influence   in   the   JBC  by  having  more   than  one   voice   speak,   whether   with   one   full   vote   or   one-­‐half   (1/2)   a   vote   each,   would,   as   one   former  congressman  and  member  of  the  JBC  put  it,  “negate  the  principle  of  equality  among  the  three  branches  of  government  which  is  enshrined  in  the  Constitution.”[53]    To  quote  one  former  Secretary  of  Justice:    The  present  imbalance  in  voting  power  between  the  Legislative  and  the  other  sectors  represented  in  the  JBC  must  be  corrected  especially  when  considered  vis-­‐à-­‐vis   the  avowed  purpose   for   its  creation,   i.e.,   to  insulate   the   appointments   in   the   Judiciary   against   political   influence.   By   allowing   both   houses   of  Congress   to   have   a   representative   in   the   JBC   and   by   giving   each   representative   one   (1)   vote   in   the  Council,  Congress,  as  compared  to  the  other  members  of  the  JBC,  is  accorded  greater  and  unwarranted  influence  in  the  appointment  of  judges.[54]  [Emphasis  supplied]    It   is   clear,   therefore,   that   the   Constitution  mandates   that   the   JBC   be   composed   of   seven   (7)  members  only.  Thus,  any  inclusion  of  another  member,  whether  with  one  whole  vote  or  half  (1/2)  of  it,  goes  against  that  mandate.  Section  8(1),  Article  VIII  of   the  Constitution,  providing  Congress  with  an  equal  voice  with  other  members  of  the  JBC  in  recommending  appointees  to  the  Judiciary  is  explicit.  Any  circumvention  of  the  constitutional  mandate  should  not  be  countenanced   for   the  Constitution   is   the  supreme   law  of   the  land.  The  Constitution  is  the  basic  and  paramount  law  to  which  all  other  laws  must  conform  and  to  which  all  persons,   including   the  highest  officials  of   the   land,  must  defer.  Constitutional  doctrines  must   remain  steadfast  no  matter  what  may  be  the  tides  of  time.  It  cannot  be  simply  made  to  sway  and  accommodate  the  call  of  situations  and  much  more  tailor   itself   to   the  whims  and  caprices  of   the  government  and  the  

people  who  run  it.[55]  Hence,  any  act  of  the  government  or  of  a  public  official  or  employee  which  is  contrary  to  the  Constitution  is  illegal,  null  and  void.    As  to  the  effect  of  the  Court’s  finding  that  the  current  composition  of  the  JBC  is  unconstitutional,  it  bears  mentioning  that  as  a  general  rule,  an  unconstitutional  act  is  not  a  law;  it  confers  no  rights;  it  imposes  no  duties;   it  affords  no  protection;   it  creates  no  office;   it   is   inoperative  as   if   it  has  not  been  passed  at  all.[56]  This   rule,   however,   is   not   absolute.   In   the   interest   of   fair   play   under   the   doctrine   of   operative   facts,  actions  previous  to  the  declaration  of  unconstitutionality  are  legally  recognized.  They  are  not  nullified.  In  Planters  Products,  Inc.  v.  Fertiphil  Corporation,[57]  the  Court  explained:    The  doctrine  of  operative  fact,  as  an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  only  applies  as  a  matter  of  equity  and  fair  play.   It  nullifies   the  effects  of  an  unconstitutional   law  by  recognizing  that   the  existence  of  a  statute  prior   to   a   determination   of   unconstitutionality   is   an   operative   fact   and  may   have   consequences  which  cannot  always  be  ignored.  The  past  cannot  always  be  erased  by  a  new  judicial  declaration.    The  doctrine  is  applicable  when  a  declaration  of  unconstitutionality  will  impose  an  undue  burden  on  those  who   have   relied   on   the   invalid   law.   Thus,   it   was   applied   to   a   criminal   case   when   a   declaration   of  unconstitutionality  would  put   the  accused   in  double   jeopardy  or  would  put   in   limbo  the  acts  done  by  a  municipality  in  reliance  upon  a  law  creating  it.    Considering   the   circumstances,   the   Court   finds   the   exception   applicable   in   this   case   and   holds   that  notwithstanding  its  finding  of  unconstitutionality  in  the  current  composition  of  the  JBC,  all  its  prior  official  actions  are  nonetheless  valid.    At   this  point,   the  Court   takes   the   initiative   to   clarify   that   it   is  not   in  a  position   to  determine  as   to  who  should  remain  as  the  sole  representative  of  Congress  in  the  JBC.  This  is  a  matter  beyond  the  province  of  the  Court  and  is  best  left  to  the  determination  of  Congress.    Finally,  while  the  Court  finds  wisdom  in  respondents'  contention  that  both  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives   should   be   equally   represented   in   the   JBC,   the   Court   is   not   in   a   position   to   stamp   its  imprimatur  on  such  a  construction  at  the  risk  of  expanding  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution  as  currently  worded.  Needless  to  state,  the  remedy  lies  in  the  amendment  of  this  constitutional  provision.  The  courts  merely  give  effect  to  the  lawgiver's  intent.  The  solemn  power  and  duty  of  the  Court  to  interpret  and  apply  the  law  does  not  include  the  power  to  correct,  by  reading  into  the  law  what  is  not  written  therein.    WHEREFORE,  the  petition  is  GRANTED.  The  current  numerical  composition  of  the  Judicial  and  Bar  Council  IS  declared  UNCONSTITUTIONAL.  The  Judicial  and  Bar  Council  is  hereby  enjoined  to  reconstitute  itself  so  that  only  one  (  1)  member  of  Congress  will  sit  as  a  representative  in  its  proceedings,  in  accordance  with  Section  8(  1  ),  Article  VIII  of  the  1987  Constitution.    This  disposition  is  immediately  executory.    SO  ORDERED.