CHAPTERV

CLOSING DOWN OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER'S HEADQUARTERS

When Auchinleck accepted the task of presiding over the division of the

Armed Forces, he had relied on support from the senior army officers and

political leaders of the new Dominions of India and Pakistan. In his letter to

the Commanders-in-Chief of the two countries he wrote, 'If reconstitution of

the Armed Forces is to be carried out rapidly and efficiently and without

friction, we shall all of us, in your Headquarters and mine, have to work

together in the closest co-operation and with the firm intention of doing all we

can to ·help each other in our common task.'1 However, he was soon

disillusioned with increasing attacks on his office and his impartiality being

questioned. The division of ordnance factories and military stores had not yet

begun when India accused Auchinleck of being biased towards Pakistan.

Although it was originally planned that the Supreme Commander's

Headquarters would continue up to 15 August 1948, there was demand for its

early closure.

1John Connell, Auchinleck: A Biography of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (London, 1959), pp.896-7.

144

On 15 August 1947, both India and Pakistan had operational control

over their respective Armed Forces. From 15 August Auchinleck was called

Supreme Commander in order to avoid confusion with the new

Commanders-in-Chief of the two Dominions. He was entrusted with the

administrative task of supervising the transfers of individuals, military stores

and equipments between the two Dominions. Under the Joint Defence Council

Order of 11 August 1947, Auchinleck was vested with limited authority. He

had no responsibility for law and order or operational control over any units

except those in transit from one Dominion to another. Even in the exercise of

his limited authority he was dependent on co-operation of the two

Dominions.Although he represented a legally constituted authority, his

biographer mentions the anomalies of his position which had been forced upon

him by the speed at which the transfer of political power had been effected:

Had the original time-table been adhered to, it might have been just possible to divide and reconstitute the Armed Forces for the two Dominions and to withdraw all British troops before the given date. There would then have been no need for a British Supreme Commander, and Auchinleck would have gone in peace. As it was, he had to stay and strive to exercise his allotted responsibility in the midst of civil war and administrative chaos which ... it was no part ofhis right or duty to try to control.. .. He now had to endure the bitter experience of holding responsibility without power. 2

2ibid, p.900.

145

DEMAND FOR AUCHINLECK'S REMOVAL

The outbreak of civil disturbances undermined the Supreme

Commander's authority and made the task of division of the Forces

extremely difficult. Auchinleck was particularly critical of the Iridian

Government's failure to check the riots against the Muslims. He blamed the

Sikh extremists for taking a major part in the riots "under some central

direction" and alleged:

Today, there is an organized system of information and control which enables Muslim refugee trains to be attacked with impunity. A few days ago, 1,500 helpless refugees are said to have been massacred in one such train alone at Amritsar, the escort, including the British officer in command, being killed or wounded. On the other hand, military trains carrying troops and stores in the furtherance of reconstitution are unmolested.

Delhi is quiet now, but there is no guarantee that the killings will not start again at any moment. The country round is in a thoroughly disturbed state ...

On the other side, too, in Pakistan, there have been equally horrible occurrences, though the general impression is that these are more spontaneous and less organised than those in East Punjab. 3

3'Part II for the personal information of the Prime Minister, the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Chief of Air Staff only', September 1947, Auchinleck Papers (John Rylands University Library,

''Manchester), File LXXXI, MUL 1262.

146

The organised rioting was not one sided and was of equal ferocity in both

countries, although Auchinleck assumed that the occurrences in Pakistan were

more spontaneous.4 This bias was partly due to the fact that since his

Headquarters was at Delhi he only saw the atrocities against the Muslims and

not Hindus. As far as failure to check the riots was concerned, the British

were equally if not more at fault. The hasty manner in which the transfer of

power had been affected had made the communal carnage inevitable.

Regarding the division of military stores and assets, Auchinleck was

convinced India was not willing to give Pakistan its due share. In his report

of 28 September 1947, he wrote:

I have no hesitation whatever in affirming that the present India Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis. In this I am supported by the unanimous opinion of my senior officers, and indeed by all responsible British officers... I and my officers have been continuously and virulently accused of being pro-Pakistan ... the authors of it are too strongly imbued with the implacable determination to remove anything which is likely to prevent their gaining their own ends, which are to prevent Pakistan receiving her just share, or indeed anything of

4Regarding Indian Government's efforts to check the riots, General Sir R.Bucher, the C-in-C of the Indian Army wrote, 'We were caught unprepared as the result of the hand-over, but the Government and the Army soon prevailed.... This Government is doing its best, its members are going flat out to put down wrong. It realises India is a polygot country of all castes and creeds, and must remain so ... the Army has to endeavour to run everything. We try our best but we are too unorganised and only at our beginnings .. .' General Sir R. Bucher's Jetter to Elizabeth Bucher, 6 October 1947, Bucher Papers (National Army Museum, London).

147

the large stocks of reserve arms, equipment, stores etc. held in the arsenals and depots in India.... If we are removed, there is no hope at all of any just division of assets .... 5

The Indian Government concluded that Auchinleck was taking a pro-Pakistan

stand in the Joint Defence Council. Auchinleck himself admitted 'Pakistan

representation on the Council has undoubtedly suffered from the fact that her

Government is at Karachi and not in Delhi and this has resulted on mon~ than

one occasion in my having to suggest or present the case for Pakistan .... .'6 In

the prevailing politically volatile atmosphere, this merely added fuel to the fire.

Nehru and Defence Minister Baldev Singh had lost all confidence in

Auchinleck, to the extent that they were on the point of refusing to accept him

as Supreme Commander.7 Patel, in particular, described the Supreme

Commander and his Headquarters as 'throttling the initiative of Headquarters

5'Part II for the personal information of the Prime Minister, the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Chief of Air Staff only', September 1947, Auchinleck Papers (John Rylands University Library, Manchester), File LXXXI, MUL 1262.

6'Part I, Report on the situation in India and Pakistan', September 1947, Auchinleck Papers (John Rylands Univc rsity Library, Manchester), File LXXXI, MUL 1262.

7Viceroy's Personal Report No.l6, 8 August 1947 in N.Mansergh and P.Moon, eds., Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-47 (London, 1981), vol.XII, p.600.

148

Indian Army, and acting as the advanced outpost of Pakistan.'8 When

Mountbatten protested that Auchinleck's integrity was beyond dispute, Patel

replied: 'They may think that they are acting impartially, but as they are all

mentally pro-Pakistan they are in fact out to help Pakistan at every turn.'9

In view of the mounting criticism of Auchinleck Montgomery wrote to

Mountbatten:

It is my opmwn that Auchinleck's usefulness in India has finished. He is 63; he has spent all his life in India under a previous regime; he is too old to readjust himself to new ideas which he dislikes in his heart.

He is viewed with suspicion by the senior officers of the Indian army ....

I personally consider that if you want military matters to run smoothly and efficiently in India you will have to remove Auchinleck; I further consider that if you do not do so you will have trouble ....

I would tell Auchinleck to retire and recommend him for a G.C.S.I., nothing more. 10

The termination of Auchinleck's service in India appeared inevitable. It was

the best solution to the prevailing political impasse.

8Quoted in H.V.Hodson, The Great Divide: Britian-India-Pakistan (London, 1969), p.507.

9ibid, p.508.

10Quoted in A.Greenwood, Field Marshal Auchinleck (Durham, 1990), p.284.

149

SUPREME COMMANDER'S HEADQUARTERS TO CLOSE DOWN

On 26 September Auchinleck received a letter from Mountbatten:

This is probably the most difficult letter that I have ever had to write in my life ... I am well aware that you did not ask for the title of Supreme Commander ... It is not, however, only the title to which exception is taken. There is no doubt in my mind that Indian Ministers resent the fact that at the head of the Supreme Headquarters there should be a man of your very high rank and great personal prestige and reputation - so immeasurably superior in these respects to their own Commander-in-Chief. I should be a poor friend if I did not admit that this resentment, which was initially directed against your position, has inevitably turned against yourself. One of the most balanced and level headed Ministers complained recently that you seemed to regard yourself as the champion of Pakistan's interests; such is the reward of strict impartiality!. ... 11

Mountbatten further pointed out that since he had failed to persuade the

Indian leaders that their suspicions about Auchinleck's impartiality were

unjustified, he could not prevent them from putting up an official proposal for

the abolition of the Supreme Headquarters. As the issue was about to be

raised in the Joint Defence Council, he suggested that Auchinleck should

himself write a letter to the Joint Defence Council proposing the winding up

of Supreme Headquarters as soon as the major units were transferred to their

respective Dominicms. Lord Ismay in his letter to Achinleck also supported

Mountbatten's advice. 'I feel as strongly as I have ever felt anything in my life

11Mountbatten's to Auchinlec~ 26 September 1947, Auchinleck Papers (John Rylands University Library, Manchester), File XXXI, MUL 1260.

150

that you in a big way, and I in a much smaller way, are now in a completely

impossible position, by reason of our lack of power.'12

Auchinleck was convinced that it would not be right or safe to close his

Headquarters earlier than the end of December 1947.13 He was aware that

the Viceroy had succumbed to pressure from Indian leaders to effect his

removal. However, he maintained that since his Headquarters served not only

India but also Pakistan, the prior agreement of the Government of Pakistan

was necessary for the closing down of his Headquarters. 14 On 7 October

Mountbatten convinced Auchinleck that the early closure of his Headquarters

was the best possible solution:

After a very long discussion in which he was most friendly and reiterated his complete trust in my friendship, he finally said: 'I will go and close down my Headquarters whenever you think is right; I leave it to you.' I said: 'How about the 15th November?' At this he looked very sad and said: 'The last reunion of my old Regiment takes place on the 20th November, it will be sad missing that ... .' I am afraid my heart melted towards him, and I said: 'All right, make it the 30th November, and I'll support you

12Ismay to Auchinleck, 26 September 1947, Auchinleck Papers (John Rylands University Library, Manchester), File XXXI, MUL 1261.

13Auchinleck's to Mountbatten, 6 October 1947, Auchinleck Papers (John Rylands University Library, Manchester), File LXXXII, MUL 1264.

14ibid.

151

to the best of my ability.'15

On 16 October 1947, the Joint Defence Council (J.D.C.) Meeting held at

Lahore considered Auchinleck's paper recommending the closure of his

Headquarters. 16 The main recommendations of Auchinleck's paper were

summarised as follows: 17

(a) That the Supreme Commander and his Headquarters should disappear on the 30th November, being replaced by a Commander British Forces, India and Pakistan, who would be responsible only for the control and repatriation of the British Forces and individual British officers and other ranks, their families in India and Pakistan, excluding such officers and other ranks as may remain in the services of the two Dominions, under terms to be arranged.

(b) That the existing Military Movement Control Directorate shall remain as part of the headquarters of the Commander British Forces in India and Pakistan until it closes down.

(c) That the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee shall be dissolved on 30th November 1947.

(d) That Headquarters British Forces in India and Pakistan shall cease to exist on 31st December 1947.

15Quoted in Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London, 1985), p.464.

16See Appendix for the complete text of Auchinleck's paper recommending the closing down of the Supreme Commander's Headquarters.

17Note for Joint Defence Council by the Supreme Commander, Auchinleck Papers (John Rylands University Library, Manchester), File LXXXII, MUL

'1266.

152

(e) That as soon as possible after the 31st December 1947, all British Forces and individual British officers and other ranks due for repatriation shall be concentrated at Deolali and Kalyan in India, or at Karachi in Pakistan, under the control of two British Commanders, who shall be responsible respectively, in direct communication with HMG in the UK and the Defence Ministries of India and Pakistan as the case may be, for their welfare and embarkation in accordance with a pre-arranged programme ....

Liaquat Ali Khan did not agree with this proposal. He proposed that the

Supreme Headquarters should only be closed down when its assigned task was

complete. 18 Mountbatten, as the Chairman of the J.D.C., pointed out that,

with the exception of the distribution of stores, the Supreme Commander's

Headquarters' task had been completed to a very large extent. Therefore, the

paper proposed that a much smaller Headquarters should take its place after

30th November to look after the interests of British officers and men.

Auchinleck stated that, in the prevailing situation, it had become impossible

for him and his officers to carry on with their task. 'He was not prepared to

maintain his officers in an impossible situation. Continual innuendoes and

accusations were being made against his Headquarters, and it was apparent

that he and his officers could not continue, in these circumstances, to carry out

18For the complete text of the discussion of the Joint Defence Council, see minutes of the Meeting in Auchinleck Papers (John Rylands University Library, Manchester), File LXXXII, MUL 1267.

153

a task for which co-operation was necessary.'19 However, the Supreme

Commander made it clear that he had not completed the task which he had set

out to do.

Liaquat Ali Khan considered the presence of neutral machinery essential

to complete the task of reconstitution. He argued that the division of stores

was not a minor but a major matter. 'An Army without equipment was as

much use as tin soldiers'.20 The Supreme Commander pointed out that after

the dissolution of his Headquarters, the stores would be handed over to the

care of the Armed Forces of the Dominion in which they were situated. The

Defence Minister of India pledged himself, on behalf of his Government, to

deliver to Pakistan its share of stores in accordance with the decision of the

J.D.C. However, no agreement could be reached at the meeting, and the

Governments of India and Pakistan were requested to consider the future of

the Supreme Commander's Headquarters in their respective Cabinets.

Both India and Pakistan, after deliberations in their respective Cabinets

reiterated their earlier stand. On 7 November 1947, the British Government

stated in a telegram that it had no option but to withdraw British officers and

19·b"d 1 1 .

20ibid.

154

other Ranks, including the Supreme Commander himself. 21 Consequently,

the Supreme Commander's Headquarters was to close down on 30

November.22 On 1st December Auchinleck left India after relinquishing his

appointment as Supreme Commander. The press communique issued by the

Supreme Commander's Secretariat stated:

... As C-in-C in India, he laboured unceasingly to produce a National Army worthy of the then undivided country; and also to foster the smaller and less well established RIN and RIAF. Then, with his plans approaching fruition he was faced with the partition of the Armed Forces. As Chairman of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee and as a member of the Joint Defence Council, he has been largely instrumental during the last 5 months, in the carrying out of this delicate and difficult task. A task, it may be added, that has never before been attempted in the history of the World.23

21A.L.Venkateswaran, Defence Organisation in India (New Delhi, 1988), p.54.

22Although the Supreme Commander's Headquarters closed down, the Joint Defence Council however, continued even after 30th November 1947. Thereafter, the J.D.C. consisted of the Governor-General of India as the Independent Chairman, the Defence Ministers of India and Pakistan and two more Ministers from India and Pakistan respectively. It still had exclusive control of division of the Armed Forces and the allocation, transfer, and movement of plant, machinery, equipment and stores. The closure of the Supreme Commander's Headquarters had also resulted in the abolition of the AFRC and its three Sub-Committees. However, Inter-Dominion Committees were set up such as the Ordnance Stores Sub-Committee (O.S.S.R.). The O.S.S.R. made proposals for the division of the Ordnance Stores and the Joint Engineer Stores.

231 December 1947, Auchinleck Papers {John Rylands University Library, _,;Manchester), File LXXXVI, "MUL 1300.

155

At the J.D.C. Meeting held at Lahore on 8th December, Ministers of both India

and Pakistan paid their tributes to Auchinleck.24 Whatever might have been

his failings, Auchinleck, more than any British officer, had been devoted to the

development of the Indian Army. He was 'a lone voice among senior British

Officers that resisted the Indianisation fiasco' and in his evidence to various

Committees always refuted the policy of segregation.25 He was sympathetic

to the Indian-Nationalist upsurge and at the time of the I.N.A. trials wrote

'every Indian worthy of the name is today a N ationalist.'26 However,. as

Supreme Commander, he forfeited the confidence of Indian leaders for his

alleged partiality to Pakistan.

Before Auchinleck's departure from India, the Pakistani backed tribal

24See Mountbatten's letter to Auchinleck, 12 December 1947, Auchinleck Papers (John Rylands University Library), File LXXXVI, MUL 1363. Mountbatten in his earlier letter dated 2 December 1947 wrote to Auchinleck, 'I always felt that the Indians would recover their sense of proportion about you, but did not hope that they would recover it so quickly. I can assure you I have heard nothing but expressions of regret at your departure and admiration of the work you did ... .' , Auchinleck Papers, File LXXXVI, MUL 1301.

25D.K.Palit, "Indianisation of the Army's Officer Cadre, 1920-47", in Indo-British Review: A Journal of History (Madras), vol.16, no.1, March 1989, pp.55-58.

26Auchinleck's circular of12February 1947, Auchinleck Papers (John Rylands University Library, Manchester), File LXVII, MUL 1137.

156

incursion occurred in Kashmir. Auchinleck met Jinnah and warned him of the

incalculable consequences of military violation of Kashmir which was a

territory of India following its sudden accession.27 Regarding Jinnah's order

to General Gracey to invade Kashmir on 27 October, Auchinleck pointed out

that it would have meant immediate withdrawal of all British officers from

Pakistan. Notwithstanding his warning to Jinnah, hostilities were to continue

in Kashmir. The division of ordnance factories and military stores have to be

viewed against this background.

DIVISION OF ORDNANCE FACTORIES AND MILITARY STORES

All of the sixteen ordnance factories were located in India. Their

allottment was a contentious issue and pending settlement it was decided to

place these factories under the control of the Supreme Commander. Their

division was the first issue on which the Army Sub-Committee could not arrive ·

:1t an agreed solution. Since all ordnance factories were located in India, it

.vas argued that they should be allotted to her. Each ordnance factory

·epresented a self-contained producing unit and any division of the machinery

:?Telegram to Commonwealth Relations' Office by Auchinleck, 28 October 1947, \.uchinleck Papers (John Rylands University Library, Manchester), File -'XXXIII, MUL 1275. Jinnah had ordered General Gracey, the C-in-C of >akistan Army, to send troops into Kashmir to seize Baramula, Srinagar and ~anihal pass. General Gracey maintained that he had to consult Auchinleck ,efore he took any such action.

157

and plants would destroy its efficiency.

In the J.D.C., the Indian leaders opposed the transfer of ordnance

factories to Pakistan. Sardar Patel had stated that in principle India was

opposed to any ordnance factories being moved to Pakistan as they were just

sufficient to meet India's needs. 28 He was also opposed to any technical

sub-committee examining this issue since it was possible to produce experts to

contradict experts. Therefore, their recommendation was of little value. He

said that India was prepared to compensate Pakistan financially for her share

of the ordnance factories and until Pakistan was able to establish her own

factories the Indian Government was prepared to supply an agreed proportion

of the produce of these factories to Pakistan. Pakistan did not agree to

financial compensation and insisted on dividing the machinery and equipment.

It was suggested that the ordnance factories which were not yet installed

should be provided to Pakistan.29 There were two such factories - a Bren

Gun factory and a fuse-filling factory - which could be transferred to Pakistan.

Since India had rifle factories it was suggested that the Bren gun factory

should be given to Pakistan. However, Sardar Baldev Singh pointed out that

28See Item No.1, DivisionofOrdnance Factories in Partition Proceedings, vol.V, pp.332-3.

29ibid.

158

any such measure would reduce the output of the rifle factory in India.30

Since there was no agreement in the J.D.C., the matter was referred to the

Partition Council for a decision. 31 Regarding the division of ordnance stores

a Pakistani General writes:

The anxiety of Pakistan's leaders, as shown in the various Council meetings and elsewhere, was fully justified. Their insistence on the need for an honourable decision on the crucial division of the ordnance stores and factories, came to nothing .... The Indian leaders' intransigence, the British Government's indifferent attitude, and the Supreme Commander's disgust of all who were putting obstacles in his way, had exhausted the patience of the Pakistani leaders ... they agreed to lay both issues before the Arbitral Tribunal which had still to be formed. 32

Before the matter could be referred to the Arbitral Tribunal, the Partition

Council arrived at a decision on 1st December 1947. Pakistan had finally

30·b·d 1 1 .

31Sardar Baldev Singh suggested that since an agreement had not been reached on ordnance stores: (1) Each Dominion should assume trusteeship of the stores located in its territory until a decision was given by the Arbitral Tribunal which would be binding on both parties. (2) Meanwhile, a division should be carried out in proportion of 64 percent to India and 7 percent to Pakistan. The remainder could be divided after the decision of Arbitral Tribunal. Since Pakistan was assigned a very low seven percent she rejected the offer. See I tern 10 Division of the Movable Assets of the Armed Forces in Partition Proceedings, vol.V, p.367.

32General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army (Karachi, 1963), pp.34-35.

159

agreed to a financial agreement. India agreed to pay Pakistan a total sum of

Rs.6 crores to meet the expenses required for setting up ordnance factories and

also certain unique institutions on the civil side such as the Agricultural

Research Institute.33

The most controversial Issue between the two Dominions was the

division of military stores. It included a vast quantity of weapons, ammunition

and equipment which were accumulated to provide for Britain's campaigns in

the Second World War. The Army Sub-Committee had unanimously

recommended that the ordnance stores should be distributed between the two

Dominions in the proportion of India 64 and Pakistan 36.34 This was based

on the average taken from nine different methods of calculating the communal

percentage of the Army as on 1st May 1947. In the A.F.R.C. meeting the

Indian representative disagreed with the unanimous recommendation of the

Army Sub-Committee. When the matter came up before the J.D.C., on the

insistence of India it was referred to the Partition Council. However, the

Partition Council once again referred the matter to the J.D.C. India argued

that since the military stocks in some cases had amounted to several years'

33A.L.Venkateswaran, n.21, p.60.

34See Item No.4, Division of Movable .Assets, Partition Proceedings, vol.V, p.245.

160

requirements, their division could not be on the basis of the strength of the two

Armed Forces. India wanted their division in the same proportion as the

general assets and uncovered debt of the Government of India. The proportion

for uncovered debt was 82% and 17% between India and Pakistan. 35

Pakistan did not accept this approach.

On 16 October 1947, the J.D.C. suggested that the Supreme

Commander's Headquarters should start making the physical division of that

portion of the stores which could be regarded as the normal maintenance

requirements of the two Armies in accordance with their respective strengths.

This decision did not apply to surplus stores. The normal maintenance

requirement was described as follows:36

(1) Maintenance stocks to cover the daily wastage of stores in daily use due

to fair wear and tear, and

(2) the reserve stocks held to cover - (a) anticipated extra issues to units in

the early stage of war, (b) the anticipated requirements of units that

must be raised during the first few months of a war, and (c) unforeseen

requirements.'

35A.L.Venkateswaran, n.21, p.60.

36Item 1, Division of Movable Assets in Partition Proceedings, vol.V, p.454.

161

The stocks divided in this manner were those which had been considered

necessary for the strength of the undivided Army before partition. The

ordnance Stores Sub-Committee was set up to implement this decision.

On 1 December 1947, the Partition Council had reached an agreement

on the division of movable stores. Pakistan's share of military stores would be

one-third of the actual stocks subject to a maximum of one-third of (M plus V2

M), M being the normal maintenance requirement, while the balance would be

India's share. A detailed formula was devised to implement this decision

which was approved by the J.D.C. at its last meeting held on 19 March

1948.37

The division of military stores had proved to be the real bone of

contention between the two Dominions. Auchinleck had supported the

Pakistani stand in the J.D.C. and had argued that the stores should be divided

according to the communal proportion of the two Armies. He also maintained

that the stores of undivided India belonged to the Armies of both the

Dominions. Consequently, Indian leaders demanded the closure of his

Headquarters and the Viceroy supported the demand. Liaquat Ali Khan had

vehemently opposed the closing down of the Supreme Commander's

37See Formula for the Division of Ordnance Stores in ibid, p. 794.

162

Headquarters.38 'Mountbatten had the matter out with him, and discovered

that he was under the impression that a British Supreme Commander was in

a position to assure the dispatch of stores to Pakistan more effectively than a

committee consisting of the Commanders-in-Chief of the two Dominions.

Mountbatten was at pains to explain that Auchinleck was only responsible for

making administrative arrangements and that the execution of these

arrangements had always been the responsibility of the Indian

Government. '39

Even after an agreement was reached on the division of military stores,

Indian leaders were blamed for 'delaying their dispatch'.40 At the eighteenth

meeting of the J.D. C. it was agreed:

1. In future, neither the Government oflndia nor the Government of Pakistan should issue unilateral orders to stop the movement

38Liaquat Ali Khan in his telegram of 24 October 1947 to the Indian Prime Minister wrote, 'The conclusion reached by Pakistan Government is that it is absolutely essential that Organisation of Supreme Commander should be continued as originally contemplated until April 1st 1948 by which time it is reasonably hoped that reconstitution of armed forces would be completed, the British officers and other ranks would have been repatriated and division and delivery to Dominion concerned of stores and equipment in, at any rate, the more important categories would have been effected', Auchinleck Papers (John Rylands University Library, Manchester), File LXXXIII, MUL 1273.

39 Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (London, 1953), p.249.

40General Fazal Muqeem Khan, n.32, p.38.

163

of military stores from one Dominion to the other, without first consulting the other government;

2.and that the movement of War Office "earmarks" and of stores from India to Pakistan should henceforth have equal priority; except when stores were being loaded into ships during strikes, when the latter should have priority above the former; and directed the Ministry of Defence, India, to inform His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of this decision.41

Notwithstanding such agreements, both sides accused each other of not

honouring undertakings regarding the movement of stores.

Since most stores were located in India, it was particularly blamed for

not having moved to Pakistan its due share of stores. Commenting on the

nature of stores received from India a Pakistani General wrote:

... Some were released in dribblets whenever India thought fit to permit it. It is impossible to compute the exact tonnage of army stores received by Pakistan out of her agreed share, as unfortunately the available figures do not indicate separately the various categories of receipts. The stores received before 1 December 194 7, when the agreement on their division was made, were purely personal equipment and unit stores and equipment. In the later arrivals too, these categories were mixed together. Then again some of the tonnages included Air Force and Naval stores.

The category of the stores received was significant. The share of tanks, guns, specialist and transport vehicles and their spares was never received. India released only items of a general nature .... 42

41See Item No.4, Movement of Stores between India and Pakistan, Partition Proceedings, vol.V, pp.777-9.

42General Fazal Muqeem Khan, n.32, p.39.

164

General Sir Roy Bucher, who was the Commander-in-Chief ofthe Indian

Army maintained that in spite of the war in Kashmir 'India has not stopped

the export of one single warlike store to Pakistan and, in fact our tonnage

deliveries have increased every month since January. 143 In his letter to the

Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army he wrote:

We will inform you of the reasons underlying the tonnage variations; I hope in convincing manner. Your D.O.S. and I agree, however, that tonnages mean little in themselves.

I will always welcome, as my guests, any of your officers who wish to come here to discuss difficulties regarding store movements, bad packing, damaged receipts, etc.

If consignments are suspect, will you please refer to us to enable me to send officers to you to view un-packing?

Future complaints should be tabled in writing under the signature of your MGO or COS. Full details are essential; every complaint will thoroughly be investigated and will be answered. All this should follow staff channels, your MGO to our QMG. We are organized differently to you, and our Ordnance Service is under the QMG.

I have already taken up such matters as letting your people know total holdings of various items and the resultant split. We will also try to abate the spate of amendments.

Goods due to Pakistan are NOT being issued to the Indian Army. You have been assured I am in control of the stores movement question, etc., and I can only ask you to trust my good faith, until

43General Sir Roy Bucher to General Sir Rob Lockhart, 2nd August 1948, Bucher Papers (National Army Museum, London).

165

you have reason not to .... 44

Thus, India's stand was that she had upheld her commitment on the division

of stores.

CONCLUSION

The decision to downgrade the Supreme Commander's Headquarters was

right since it was untenable with India's sovereignty.45 To Pakistan,

however, it was viewed as another instance of Mountbatten's pro-India bias.

The supply of stores to Pakistan continued even after the closure of the

Supreme Commander's Headquarters. Later, the Indian Government

suspended the supply Pakistan on the ground that Pakistan had not paid for

the stores received from India. The Indian decision to discontinue the supply

of stores was also influenced by the continuing war in Kashmir. India could

not be expected to supply military stores to an aggressor country.

As a result of the division of the Army, General Ayub Khan expressed

'We had to start our army with bits and pieces like a gigantic jig-saw puzzle

44General Sir Roy Bucher to General Sir Douglas Gracey, 26 May 1948, Bucher Papers (National Army Museum, London).

45Indian Army Officers who had served with the British Indian Army agree with this view. However, .most. officers believe Auchinleck was a fair person. (Personal Interviews with some retired Indian Army Officers).

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with some of the bits missing. We had men untrained, half trained, and highly

trained. They came from different units and different areas and they had all

to be welded into fighting and ancillary units, divisions and corps.'46 But, so

was the case with the Indian Army; having lost many units and training

establishments it had to start afresh.

The old Indian Army had always been viewed as an instrument of

British policy.Mter independence, the distance between the Army and the

people no longer existed. As Nehru said, 'The old idea that the Army was a

separate entity does not hold good' .47

46General A yuh Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London, 1976), p.20.

47V.Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green:.A History of the Indian Army, 1600-1974 ' {New Delhi, 1974), p.277.

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