chapters 10, 14, 15 concentration, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly

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CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

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CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly. Varieties of Market Structure. We have studied the two extremes of market structure — perfect competition and monopoly. Most industries fall somewhere between those two, differing along two significant scales: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15Concentration,Monopolistic

Competition, and Oligopoly

Page 2: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Varieties of Market Structure We have studied the two extremes of

market structure — perfect competition and monopoly.

Most industries fall somewhere between those two, differing along two significant scales: Number of suppliers of output The degree of product differentiation

Page 3: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Monopolistic Competition Monopolistic competition is a market

structure in which a large number of firms compete with each other by making similar but slightly different products.

Making a product slightly different from the product of a competing firm is called product differentiation.

Page 4: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Oligopoly Oligopoly is a market structure in

which a small number of producers compete with each other.

Some oligopolies (aluminum can manufacturing) produce identical products.

Others (automobiles) produce differentiated products.

Page 5: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Measures of Concentration Industries in which only a few firms

supply all the output are said to be concentrated.

Economists have developed two measures of concentration: The four-firm concentration ratio The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

Page 6: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

The Four-Firm Concentration Ratio

The four-firm concentration ratio is the percentage of total industry sales (in dollars) made by the four largest firms.

The range of this measure is from 0 to 100. 0 is perfect competition 100 means there are four or fewer firms

in the industry Ratio < 60 considered competitive

Page 7: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Concentration Ratio CalculationsSmartphone OS Market Share

Percentage of Industry SalesFirm 2009 2010 2011 Jan 2012

RIM Blackberry 37% 27% 23% 6%Apple iPhone 21% 28% 26% 43%Microsoft Windows Mobile 27% 14% 9% 2%Android 1% 23% 36% 47%Palm 8% 2% 1% 0%Linux 3% 3% 3% 1%Symbian 3% 3% 2% 1%

Top 4 sales 85% 92% 94% 98%

Other firms 15% 8% 6% 2%

Page 8: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Concentration Ratio CalculationsPCs (Excluding Tablets)

Worldwide Market ShareFirm 2006 2009 2013

Dell 15.9% 12.1% 11.6%HP 15.9% 19.1% 16.2%Acer 7.6% 12.9% 8.1%Lenovo 7.0% 8.0% 16.9%Toshiba 3.8% 5.0% 3.4%Asus 1.2% 2.3% 6.3%Others 48.6% 40.6% 37.5%

Top 4 46.4% 52.1% 52.8%

Page 9: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Concentration Ratio CalculationsPrinters

SalesFirm (millions of dollars)

Fran’s 2.5Ned’s 2.0Tom’s 1.8Jill’s 1.7Top 4 sales 8.0Other 1,000 firm’s sales 1,592.0Industry sales 1,600.0Four-firm concentration ratios:

Printers: 8/1,600 100 = 0.5%

Page 10: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the sum of the squared market shares of the largest 50 firms in an industry.

For example, if there are four firms in an industry with market shares of 50%, 25%, 15%, and 10%, the HHI is:

502+252+152+102 = 3,450

Page 11: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Using the HHI A monopoly will have an HHI of 10,000 (1002). The Justice Department defines a competitive

market as one with an HHI less than 1,000 (<100 is regarded as highly competitive).

Markets with HHI values between 1,000 and 1,800 are regarded as moderately competitive.

Markets with HHI values above 1,800 are regarded as uncompetitive.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) uses the HHI to evaluate potential mergers. If the original HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800, any

merger that raises the HHI by 100 or more is challenged. If the original HHI is greater than 1,800, any merger that

raises the HHI by more than 50 is challenged.

Page 12: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Antitrust LawAntitrust law provides an alternative way in which the government may influence the marketplace.Antitrust law is the law that regulates oligopolies and prevents them from becoming monopolies or behaving like monopolies.The Antitrust LawsThe two main antitrust laws are The Sherman Act, 1890 The Clayton Act, 1914

Page 13: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Antitrust LawThe Sherman Act outlawed any “combination, trust, or conspiracy that restricts interstate trade,” and prohibited the “attempt to monopolize.”

Page 14: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Antitrust LawA wave of merger activities at the beginning of the 20th century produced a stronger antitrust law, the Clayton Act, and created the Federal Trade Commission.The Clayton Act made illegal specific business practices such as price discrimination, interlocking directorships, and acquisition of a competitor’s shares if the practices “substantially lessen competition or create monopoly.”

Page 15: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Antitrust LawTable 15.6 (next slide) summarizes the Clayton Act and its amendments, the Robinson-Patman Act passed in 1936 and the Cellar-Kefauver Act passed in 1950.The Federal Trade Commission, formed in 1914, looks for cases of “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive business practices.”

Page 16: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Antitrust Law

Page 17: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Antitrust LawPrice Fixing Always Illegal

Price fixing is always a violation of the antitrust law.If the Justice Department can prove the existence of price fixing, there is no defense.

Page 18: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Antitrust LawThree Antitrust Policy Debates

But some practices are more controversial and generate debate. Three of them are

Resale price maintenance Tying arrangements Predatory pricing

Page 19: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Antitrust LawResale Price Maintenance

Most manufacturers sell their product to the final consumer through a wholesale and retail distribution chain.Resale price maintenance occurs when a manufacturer agrees with a distributor on the price at which the product will be resold.Resale price maintenance is inefficient if it promotes monopoly pricing.But resale price maintenance can be efficient if it provides retailers with an incentive to provide an efficient level of retail service in selling a product.

Page 20: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Antitrust LawTying Arrangements

A tying arrangement is an agreement to sell one product only if the buyer agrees to buy another different product as well.Some people argue that by tying, a firm can make a larger profit.Where buyers have a differing willingness to pay for the separate items, a firm can price discriminate and take a larger amount of the consumer surplus by tying.

Page 21: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Antitrust LawPredatory Pricing

Predatory pricing is setting a low price to drive competitors out of business with the intention of then setting the monopoly price.Economists are skeptical that predatory pricing actually occurs.A high, certain, and immediate loss is a poor exchange for a temporary, uncertain, and future gain.No case of predatory pricing has been definitively found.

Page 22: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Antitrust LawMergers and Acquisitions

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) uses guidelines to determine which mergers to examine and possibly block. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is one of those guidelines.

As indicated earlier If the original HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800, any merger that raises the HHI by 100 or more is challenged. If the original HHI is greater than 1,800, any merger that raises the HHI by more than 50 is challenged.

Page 23: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Historical Example of Using the HHI to Evaluate MergersCarbonated Soft Drink Merger Proposals in 1986

Market Share

Firm No Mergers Pepsi/7-Up Coke/Dr. Pepper Both Mergers

Coca Cola 39% 39% 46% 46%Pepsi Cola 28% 34% 28% 34%Dr. Pepper 7% 7% - -7-Up 6% - 6% -RJR 5% 5% 5% 5%Others (assume 15 15% 15% 15% 15% equal share firms)

HHI 2,430 2,766 2,976 3,312

Page 24: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Market Structure

Characteristic Perfect

Competition Monopolistic Competition

Oligopoly

Monopoly

# Firms in Industry

Many

Many

Few

One

Product

Identical

Differentiated

Identical or Differentiated

No Close Substitutes

Barriers to

Entry

None

(Free Enty)

None

(Free Entry)

Considerable

Considerable

or Legal Barriers

Firm’s Control over Price

None

Some

Considerable

Considerable or Regulated

Concentration Ratio

0 Low (<50)

High (>50)

100

HHI

<100

100 to 1,000

>1,000

10,000

(cont.)

Page 25: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Market Structure (Cont.)

Characteristic Perfect

Competition Monopolistic Competition

Oligopoly

Monopoly

Long Run Profits

No (P=ATC)

No (P=ATC)

Yes (P>ATC)

Yes (P>ATC)

Allocative Efficiency

Yes

(P=MC)

No

(P>MC)

No

(P>MC)

No

(P>MC)

Examples

Wheat, Corn

Food, Clothing, Restaurants,

Shoes, Computers

Autos (Domestic),

Cereals

Local Phone

Service, CableTV,

Electric and Gas Utilities

Page 26: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Limitations of Concentration Measures

There are three main reasons why concentration ratios may be misleading as measures of market structure: The geographical scope of the market Barriers to entry and firm turnover The correspondence between a market

and an industry

Page 27: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Geographical Scopeof Market

Concentration ratio calculations are based on national market data.

Some goods (such as newspapers) are sold in regional markets.

Other goods and services (automobiles) are sold in global markets.

In either case, concentration ratios are misleading.

Page 28: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Limitations of Concentration Measures

Market and Industry Markets are narrower than industries Firms make many different products Firms switch from one market to

another

Page 29: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Market and Industry Concentration ratios are calculated

using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Markets often do not correspond neatly to industries.

Westinghouse is classified as an electrical goods and equipment producer. They actually produce many other non-electrical items.

Page 30: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Barriers to Entryand Turnover

Measures of concentration do not tell us anything about the extent and severity of barriers to entry in an industry.

Even in markets that are highly concentrated, there may be competition if entry and exit cause a large amount of turnover.

Page 31: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Concentration Measures for the U.S. Economy

Motor vehicles, light bulbs, household laundry equipment, chewing gum, and breakfast cereals are highly concentrated oligopolies.

Pet food, computers, and soft drinks, are moderately competitive

Women’s clothing, ice cream, concrete blocks and bricks, and commercial printing are highly competitive.

Page 32: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Concentration Measures inthe United States

Page 33: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Market Structures in the U.S. Economy

Between 1939 and 1980, the U.S. economy became increasingly competitive. In 1980, three-fourths of the value of goods

and services produced in the U.S. was sold in markets that are highly competitive.

Monopolies accounted for only about 5% of total sales.

Since 1980, there has been even more competition (due to global trading), but there have also been many mergers of oligopolies leading to greater concentration in certain oligopolistic industries (such as telecommunications)

Page 34: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly
Page 35: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Monopolistic Competition Monopolistic competition is a market with

the following characteristics: A large number of firms. Each firm produces a differentiated

product. Firms compete on product quality, price,

and marketing. Firms are free to enter and exit the

industry.

Page 36: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Monopolistic Competition Large Number of Firms

The presence of a large number of firms in the market implies:

Each firm has only a small market share and therefore has limited market power to influence the price of its product.

Each firm is sensitive to the average market price, but no firm pays attention to the actions of the other, and no one firm’s actions directly affect the actions of other firms.

Collusion, or conspiring to fix prices, is impossible.

Page 37: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Monopolistic Competition Product Differentiation

Firms in monopolistic competition practice product differentiation, which means that each firm makes a product that is slightly different from the products of competing firms.

Page 38: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Monopolistic CompetitionCompeting on Quality, Price, and Marketing

Product differentiation enables firms to compete in three areas: quality, price, and marketing.

Quality includes design, reliability, and service.Because firms produce differentiated products,

each firm has a downward-sloping demand curve for its own product.

But there is a tradeoff between price and quality.Differentiated products must be marketed using

advertising and packaging.

Page 39: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Monopolistic Competition Entry and Exit

There are no barriers to entry in monopolistic competition, so firms cannot earn an economic profit in the long run.

Examples of Monopolistic Competition Figure 13.1 on the next slide shows market

share of the largest four firms and the HHI for each of ten industries that operate in monopolistic competition.

Page 40: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Monopolistic Competition

The red bars refer to the 4 largest firms.

Green is the next 4.

Blue is the next 12.

The numbers are the HHI.

Page 41: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition

Short-Run Economic Profit A firm that has decided the quality of its

product and its marketing program produces the profit maximizing quantity at which its marginal revenue equals its marginal cost

(MR = MC). Price is determined from the demand curve for

the firm’s product and is the highest price the firm can charge for the profit-maximizing quantity.

Page 42: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition Figure 13.2(a)

shows a short-run equilibrium for a firm in monopolistic competition.

It operates much like a single-price monopolist.

Page 43: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition The firm produces

the quantity at which price equals marginal cost and sells that quantity for the highest possible price.

It earns an economic profit (as in this example) when P > ATC.

Page 44: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition

Long Run: Zero Economic Profit In the long run, economic profit induces entry. And entry continues as long as firms in the

industry earn an economic profit—as long as (P > ATC).

In the long run, a firm in monopolistic competition maximizes its profit by producing the quantity at which its marginal revenue equals its marginal cost, MR = MC.

Page 45: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition As firms enter the industry, each existing firm

loses some of its market share. The demand for its product decreases and the demand curve for its product shifts leftward.

The decrease in demand decreases the quantity at which MR = MC and lowers the maximum price that the firm can charge to sell this quantity.

Price and quantity fall with firm entry until P = ATC and firms earn zero economic profit.

Page 46: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition This figure shows a

firm in monopolistic competition moving from short-run equilibrium to long-run equilibrium.

If firms incur an economic loss, firms exit to restore the long-run equilibrium just described.

Page 47: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition

Monopolistic Competition and Efficiency Firms in monopolistic competition are

inefficient and operate with excess capacity.

Figure 13.3 on the next slide illustrates these propositions.

Page 48: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition

Because they product- differentiate and face a downward-sloping demand curve for their products, firms in monopolistic competition receive a marginal revenue that is less than price for all levels of output.

Page 49: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition

Firms maximize profit by setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, so with marginal revenue less than price, marginal cost is also less than price.

Page 50: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition Because price

equals the marginal benefit, marginal cost is less than marginal benefit.

Underproduction in monopolistic competition creates deadweight loss.

Page 51: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition

A firm’s capacity output is the output at which average total cost is at its minimum.

At the long-run profit maximizing output, price equals average total cost.

But recall that MR < P, which means that MC < ATC.

Page 52: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Output and Price in Monopolistic Competition

If MC < ATC, then the ATC curve is falling.

With output in the range of falling ATC, output is less than capacity output.

Goods are not produced at the minimum unit cost of production in the long run.

Page 53: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Product Development and Marketing

Innovation and Product Development We’ve looked at a firm’s profit-maximizing

output decision in the short run and the long run of a given product and with given marketing effort.

To keep earning an economic profit, a firm in monopolistic competition must be in a state of continuous product development.

New product development allows a firm to gain a competitive edge, if only temporarily, before competitors imitate the innovation.

Page 54: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Product Development and Marketing

Innovation is costly, but it increases total revenue.

Firms pursue product development until the marginal revenue from innovation equals the marginal cost of innovation.

Production development may benefit the consumer by providing an improved product, or it may only create the appearance of a change in product quality.

Regardless of whether a product improvement is real or imagined, its value to the consumer is its marginal benefit, which is the amount the consumer is willing to pay for it.

Page 55: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Product Development and Marketing

Marketing A firm’s marketing program uses advertising

and packaging as the two principal methods to market its differentiated products to consumers.

Firms in monopolistic competition incur heavy marketing and advertising expenditures to enhance the perception of quality differences between their product and rival products. These costs make up a large portion of the price for the product.

Page 56: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Product Development and Marketing

Figure 13.4 shows estimates of the percentage of sale price for different monopolistic competition markets.

Cleaning supplies and toys top the list at almost 15 percent.

Page 57: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Product Development and Marketing

Selling Costs and Total Costs Selling costs, like advertising expenditures,

fancy retail buildings, etc. are fixed costs. Average fixed costs decrease as production

increases, so selling costs increase average total costs at any given level of output but do not affect the marginal cost of production.

Selling efforts such as advertising are successful if they increase the demand for the firm’s product.

Page 58: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Product Development and Marketing

Advertising costs might lower the average total cost by increasing equilibrium output and spreading their fixed costs over the larger quantity produced.

Here, with no advertising, the firm produces 25 units of output at an average total cost of $170.

Page 59: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Product Development and Marketing

With advertising, the firm produces 130 units of output at an average total cost of $160.

The advertising expenditure shifts the average total cost curve upward, but the firm operates at a higher output and lower ATC than it would without advertising.

Page 60: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Product Development and Marketing

Advertising might also decrease the markup.

Figure (a) shows that with no advertising, the demand for a firm’s output is not very elastic and its markup is large.

Profits are approximately (55-35)x75=1500

Page 61: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Product Development and Marketing

Figure (b) shows that if all firms advertise, the demand for a firm’s output becomes more elastic.

The firm produces a larger quantity, its price falls, and its markup shrinks.

However, its profits fall.

On the other hand, if all firms do not advertise, then demand may stay relatively inelastic and profits would most likely rise with advertising.

However, in the long run all firms will need to advertise in order to survive.

Page 62: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Product Development and Marketing

Therefore, advertising can increase a firm’s demand and profits in the short run only.

Economic profit leads to entry, which decreases the demand for each firm’s product in the long run.

And most firms advertise so each firm’s demand becomes more elastic and profits will fall in the long run, even if each firm’s output increases.

To the extent that advertising and selling costs provide consumers with information and services that they value more highly than their cost, these activities are efficient.

Page 63: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Oligopoly An oligopoly is a market in which a

small number of producers compete with each other.

The quantity sold by any one producer depends on that producer’s price and on the other producers’ prices and quantities sold.

Page 64: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

What is Oligopoly? Examples of

Oligopoly

The red bars refer to the 4 largest firms.

Green is the next 4.

Blue is the next 12.

The numbers are the HHI.

Page 65: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Models of Oligopoly A variety of models have been

developed to explain the determination of price and quantity in oligopoly markets.

No one theory explains the behavior we see in different oligopoly markets.

The most recent approach to studying oligopoly behavior is game theory

Page 66: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Oligopoly Games Game theory is a tool for studying strategic

behavior, which is behavior that takes into account the expected behavior of others and the mutual recognition of interdependence.

What Is a Game? All games share four features: Rules Strategies Payoffs Outcome

Page 67: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Oligopoly Games The Prisoners’ Dilemma

The prisoners’ dilemma game illustrates the four features of a game.

The rules describe the setting of the game, the actions the players may take, and the consequences of those actions.

In the prisoners’ dilemma game, two prisoners (Art and Bob) have been caught committing a petty crime.

Each is held in a separate cell and cannot communicate with the other.

Page 68: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Oligopoly Games Each is told that both are suspected of

committing a more serious crime. If one of them confesses, he will get a 1-year

sentence for cooperating while his accomplice get a 10-year sentence for both crimes.

If both confess to the more serious crime, each receives 3 years in jail for both crimes.

If neither confesses, each receives a 2-year sentence for the minor crime only.

Page 69: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Oligopoly GamesIn game theory, strategies are all the possible actions of each player.Art and Bob each have two possible actions: Confess to the larger crime Deny having committed the larger crime

Because there are two players and two actions for each player, there are four possible outcomes: Both confess Both deny Art confesses and Bob denies Bob confesses and Art denies

Page 70: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Oligopoly Games Each prisoner can work out what happens to him—

can work out his payoff—in each of the four possible outcomes.

We can tabulate these outcomes in a payoff matrix. A payoff matrix is a table that shows the payoffs for

every possible action by each player for every possible action by the other player.

The next slide shows the payoff matrix for this prisoners’ dilemma game.

Page 71: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Oligopoly GamesPayoff Matrix

Page 72: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Oligopoly Games If a player makes a rational choice in pursuit of

his own best interest, he chooses the action that is best for him, given any action taken by the other player.

If both players are rational and choose their actions in this way, the outcome is an equilibrium called Nash equilibrium—first proposed by John Nash.

The following slides show how to find the Nash equilibrium.

Page 73: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Bob’s view of the world

Page 74: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Bob’s view of the world

Page 75: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Art’s view of the world

Page 76: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Art’s view of the world

Page 77: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Equilibrium

Page 78: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Another Example of The Prisoners’ Dilemma-

Advertising Decisions Two firms, A & B, are deciding whether to devote

more resources to advertising. Advertising can increase demand at both the

industry (new customers for the product) and firm specific level (consumers switching from one brand to another).

Advertising yields the following payoff matrix.

Page 79: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Prisoners’ Dilemma Payoff Payoff Matrix

Firm A’s StrategiesAdvertises Does not advertise

Firm B’Strategies

Advertises

Does notadvertise

Firm A 70

Firm B 80

Firm A 100

Firm B 100

Firm A 80

Firm B 90

Firm B 50

Firm A 40

Page 80: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Advertising Decisions In this case, the Nash equilibrium is that both

firm’s advertise. Firm A’s payoff is 70 and Firm B’s payoff is 80.

But, both firms would have been better off if neither had advertised. Firm A’s payoff would have been 80 and Firm B’s payoff would have been 90. The costs of advertising outweighed the gains for both firms.

Of course, the firms could cooperate and agree not to advertise. But there is always an incentive to cheat to increase profits. It might be possible to devise a penalty system for cheating that will lead to the desired outcome. However, cooperation between the firms might cause the Justice Department to investigate possible antitrust violations.

Page 81: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Pricing Decisions Another example of the Prisoner’s

Dilemma has to do with pricing decisions.

Suppose there are two firms and each must decide whether to charge a low price or a high price for their product.

The profit payoff matrix is as follows.

Page 82: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Pricing DecisionsProfit Payoff Matrix

Firm A’s StrategiesHigh Price Low Price

Firm B’Strategies

High Price

Low Price

Firm A 9000

Firm B 9000

Firm A 3000

Firm B 3000

Firm A 8000

Firm B 8000

Firm B 12000

Firm A 12000

Page 83: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Pricing Decisions In this case, the Nash equilibrium is that both

firm’s charge low prices. However, both firms would have been better off if

they had charged high prices. Their profits would have been 9000 instead of 8000. Fear of price cutting by their competitor leads them to a suboptimal solution.

Of course, the firms could cooperate and agree to charge high prices. But there is always an incentive to cheat to increase profits. Also, cooperation between the firms might cause the Justice Department to investigate possible antitrust violations.

It is possible to devise a pricing scheme that will lead to the desired outcome – matching lower prices of competitors.

Page 85: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Pricing DecisionsProfit Payoff Matrix

Firm A’s StrategiesHigh Price Low Price

Firm B’Strategies

High Price

Low Price

Firm A 9000

Firm B 9000

Firm A 3000

Firm B 3000

Firm A 8000

Firm B 8000

Firm B 12000

Firm A 12000

Page 86: CHAPTERS 10, 14, 15 Concentration, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly

Other Applications of Game Theory

The ideas just discussed can be used to understand a host of other real world economic situations, such as product modification price discrimination entering and leaving an industry investing in R&D (research and

development)