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41
Copyrighted Material Chapter One ONTHECURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE 1. Introduction In his Tanner Lectureof1979called“EqualityofWhat?”Amartya Senaskedwhatmetricegalitariansshouldusetoestablishtheextentto whichtheiridealisrealizedinagivensociety.Whataspect(s)ofaper- son’sconditionshouldcountinafundamentalwayforegalitarians,and notmerelyascauseoforevidenceoforproxyforwhattheyregardas fundamental? In this study I examine answers to that question, and discussions bearing on that question, in recent philosophical literature. I take for granted that there is something which justice requires people to have equalamountsof,notnomatterwhat,buttowhateverextentisallowed byvalueswhichcompetewithdistributiveequality;andIstudywhata numberofauthorswhosharethategalitarianviewhavesaidaboutthe dimension(s)orrespect(s)inwhichpeopleshouldbemademoreequal, whenthepriceinothervaluesofmovingtowardgreaterequalityisnot intolerable. I also advance an answer of my own to Sen’s question. My answer is the product of an immanent critique of Ronald Dworkin, one, that is, which rejects Dworkin’s declared position because it is not congru- ent with its own underlying motivation. My response to Dworkin has beeninfluencedbyRichardArneson’sworkinadvocacyof“equalityof opportunity for welfare,” but my answer to Sen’s question is not that Arnesonianone,norismyansweraswellformulatedasArneson’sis. 1 Itneedsmuchfurtherrefinement,butIneverthelesspresentithere,ina rough-and-readyform,becauseofitsassociationwithrelativelyfinished criticismsofotherswhichIthinkaretelling.Ifthisstudycontributesto understanding,itdoessomorebecauseofthosecriticismsthanbecause ofthepositivedoctrineitaffi rms. “OntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJustice.” Ethics99(1989):906–44.Bypermissionof TheUniversityofChicagoPress. 1 SeeArneson,“EqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfare.”MycriticismsofDworkin were conceived without knowledge of Arneson’s partly parallel ones, but it was reading Arnesonwhichcausedmetoseewhatpositiveviewmycriticismsimplied,eventhoughthat viewisnotthesameasArneson’s.

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Page 1: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

Copyrighted Material

Chapter One

ONTHECURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

1 Introduction

In his Tanner Lectureof1979calledldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoAmartyaSenaskedwhatmetricegalitariansshouldusetoestablishtheextenttowhichtheiridealisrealizedinagivensocietyWhataspect(s)ofaper-sonrsquosconditionshouldcountinafundamentalwayforegalitariansandnotmerelyascauseoforevidenceoforproxyforwhattheyregardasfundamental

In this study I examine answers to that question and discussionsbearing on that question in recent philosophical literature I take forgranted that there is something which justice requires people to haveequalamountsofnotnomatterwhatbuttowhateverextentisallowedbyvalueswhichcompetewithdistributiveequalityandIstudywhatanumberofauthorswhosharethategalitarianviewhavesaidaboutthedimension(s)orrespect(s)inwhichpeopleshouldbemademoreequalwhenthepriceinothervaluesofmovingtowardgreaterequalityisnotintolerable

I also advance ananswerofmyown to SenrsquosquestionMyansweris theproductof an immanent critiqueofRonaldDworkinone thatiswhichrejectsDworkinrsquosdeclaredpositionbecause it isnotcongru-entwith itsownunderlyingmotivationMyresponse toDworkinhasbeeninfluencedbyRichardArnesonrsquosworkinadvocacyofldquoequalityofopportunity forwelfarerdquobutmyanswer toSenrsquosquestion isnot thatArnesonianonenorismyansweraswellformulatedasArnesonrsquosis1

ItneedsmuchfurtherrefinementbutIneverthelesspresentithereinarough-and-readyformbecauseofitsassociationwithrelativelyfinishedcriticismsofotherswhichIthinkaretellingIfthisstudycontributestounderstandingitdoessomorebecauseofthosecriticismsthanbecauseofthepositivedoctrineitaffirms

ldquoOntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJusticerdquoEthics99(1989)906ndash44BypermissionofTheUniversityofChicagoPress

1 SeeArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquoMycriticismsofDworkinwereconceivedwithoutknowledgeofArnesonrsquospartlyparallelonesbut itwasreadingArnesonwhichcausedmetoseewhatpositiveviewmycriticismsimpliedeventhoughthatviewisnotthesameasArnesonrsquos

4

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CHAPTERONE

InSection2of thearticle IdistinguishbetweenegalitarianthesesofdifferentstrengthsandIindicatethatcertain(notall)counterexamplestostrongersortsofthesesfailtodisturbcorrelativeweakerones

Section3scrutinizestwoRawlsiancriticismsofequalityofwelfareThefirstsaysthatanuncorrectedwelfaremetricwronglyequatespleasuresandpreferenceswhichdifferinmoralcharacterItputsthepleasureofdomi-nation for exampleonaparwithpleasure froman innocentpastimewherethetwoareequal in intensityAndthesecondcriticismsaysthatthewelfaremetriccatersunjustifiablytoexpensivetasteswhicharegener-atedbyforexampletheirbearerrsquoslackofself-disciplineThosecriticismsdefeatequalityofwelfarebutsoIclaimtheydonotasRawlsthinksalsoinducesupportforaprimarygoodsmetricandthesecondcriticismismoreoverhardtoreconcilewithRawlsrsquosviewsoneffortanddesert

Ronald Dworkin refines and extends both Rawlsian criticisms ofequalityofwelfarealthoughprimarygoodsarereplacedbyresourcesintheDworkiniandevelopmentoftheRawlsianviewInSection4Ishowthat much of Dworkinrsquos critique of equality of welfare will be met ifegalitariansallowdeviationsfromequalityofwelfarewhichreflectpeo-plersquoschoicesthatisArnesonrsquosequal opportunity for welfaretheoryButsomeofDworkinrsquosobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecannotbehandledinArnesonrsquoswayandtherightresponsetothemistoaffirmwhatIcallequal access to advantagewhereldquoadvantagerdquoisunderstoodtoincludebuttobewiderthanwelfareUnderequalaccesstoadvantagethefun-damentaldistinctionforanegalitarianisbetweenchoiceandluckintheshapingofpeoplersquosfatesIarguethatDworkinrsquosdifferentmasterdistinc-tionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesislesstruetothemotivationofhisownphilosophythantheoneIfavoris

ThomasScanlonargueshoweverthatthefactthatapersonchosetodevelopacertaintasteisonlysuperficiallysignificantfordistributivejus-ticeThereasonhesayswhyegalitariansdonotcompensatepeopleforchosenexpensivetastesisthatthosetastesbeingchosenareoneswhichtheymightnothavehadAccordingtoScanlonitisnottheirchosenbuttheirperipheraloridiosyncraticcharacterwhichexplainswhyexpensivetasteshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedInSection5IdefendmyemphasisonchoiceagainstScanlonrsquosskepticismbutIalsosignificantlyamendthechoice-centeredegalitarianproposaltocatertowhatseemsundeniableinScanlonrsquoscaseagainstit

FinallyinSection6IclaimthatAmartyaSenrsquoswritingsonldquocapabil-ityrdquointroducetwoanswerstohisldquoEqualityofwhatrdquoquestioneachofwhichhas itsattractionsbutwhichdiffersubstantially incontentasIshallshowatlengthelsewhere2

2 SeemyldquoEqualityofWhatrdquo[reprintedasChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]

5

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

2 Methodological Preliminaries

Apersonisexploitedwhenunfairadvantageistakenofhimandhesuf-fersfrom(bad)brute luckwhenhisbadluckisnottheresultofagambleorriskwhichhecouldhaveavoided3Ibelievethattheprimaryegalitar-ianimpulseistoextinguishtheinfluenceondistributionofbothexploi-tationandbrute luckTobesureprinciplednon-andantiegalitariansalsocondemn(whattheyconsidertobe)exploitationbuttheydonothavethesameviewofexploitationasegalitarianshavepartlybecausetheyarelessdisturbedbybrute-luck-derivedassetdifferenceswhichskewdistributiveoutcomes

On the foregoing sketchof theprimaryegalitarian impulsea state-mentwhichpurportstoexpressandassertitisexposedtotwokindsofchallengeFirstsuchastatementmightbecriticizedformisidentifyingwhatshouldinthelightofthefundamentalegalitarianaimbeequal-izedIshallmyselfsocriticizeDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesproposalsinceIthinkthat(amongotherthings)itpenalizespeoplewhohavetastesforwhichtheycannotbeheldresponsiblebutwhichunluckilyforthemcostalottosatisfyButonemightalsorejectequalityofresourcesonthequitedifferentgroundthatitconflictswithsomeimportantnonegalitar-ianvaluesOnemightsayforexamplethatwhileitisindeedbruteluckwhichdistributeschildrenintorichandpoorfamiliesitwouldbewrongtoseekrectificationoftheresultsofthatlucksincethatwouldunder-minetheinstitutionofthefamily

InthisarticleIshallnotdiscussproblemsforegalitarianproposalsofthat secondkindproblems that is of trade-offbetween equality andothervaluesThatisbecauseIshalltreatthevariousegalitarianpropos-alstobereviewedbelowasweak equalisandum claims

An equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalizedwhat that is people should be rendered equal in An unqualified orstrong equalisandum claimwhich is the sort thatanuncompromisingegalitarianassertssaysthatpeopleshouldbeasequalaspossibleinthedimensionitspecifiesAqualifiedorweak equalisandumclaimsaysthatthey should be as equal as possible in some dimension but subject towhatever limitationsneed tobe imposed indeference toother valuesthoselimitationsarenotspecifiedbytheclaiminquestion

Nowstrongequalisandumclaimsfaceobjectionsofthetwokindsdis-tinguishedaboveandwhichIshallnowcallegalitarianandnonegalitar-ianobjectionsAnegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallywhichdiffersfromtheoneembodiedinthe

3 Thelatterkindofluckisoption luckThedistinctionbetweenbruteandoptionluckcomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293

6

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CHAPTERONE

strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme

Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger

4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone

7

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave

ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint

(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities

NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal

Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6

Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable

5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive

6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 2: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

4

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CHAPTERONE

InSection2of thearticle IdistinguishbetweenegalitarianthesesofdifferentstrengthsandIindicatethatcertain(notall)counterexamplestostrongersortsofthesesfailtodisturbcorrelativeweakerones

Section3scrutinizestwoRawlsiancriticismsofequalityofwelfareThefirstsaysthatanuncorrectedwelfaremetricwronglyequatespleasuresandpreferenceswhichdifferinmoralcharacterItputsthepleasureofdomi-nation for exampleonaparwithpleasure froman innocentpastimewherethetwoareequal in intensityAndthesecondcriticismsaysthatthewelfaremetriccatersunjustifiablytoexpensivetasteswhicharegener-atedbyforexampletheirbearerrsquoslackofself-disciplineThosecriticismsdefeatequalityofwelfarebutsoIclaimtheydonotasRawlsthinksalsoinducesupportforaprimarygoodsmetricandthesecondcriticismismoreoverhardtoreconcilewithRawlsrsquosviewsoneffortanddesert

Ronald Dworkin refines and extends both Rawlsian criticisms ofequalityofwelfarealthoughprimarygoodsarereplacedbyresourcesintheDworkiniandevelopmentoftheRawlsianviewInSection4Ishowthat much of Dworkinrsquos critique of equality of welfare will be met ifegalitariansallowdeviationsfromequalityofwelfarewhichreflectpeo-plersquoschoicesthatisArnesonrsquosequal opportunity for welfaretheoryButsomeofDworkinrsquosobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecannotbehandledinArnesonrsquoswayandtherightresponsetothemistoaffirmwhatIcallequal access to advantagewhereldquoadvantagerdquoisunderstoodtoincludebuttobewiderthanwelfareUnderequalaccesstoadvantagethefun-damentaldistinctionforanegalitarianisbetweenchoiceandluckintheshapingofpeoplersquosfatesIarguethatDworkinrsquosdifferentmasterdistinc-tionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesislesstruetothemotivationofhisownphilosophythantheoneIfavoris

ThomasScanlonargueshoweverthatthefactthatapersonchosetodevelopacertaintasteisonlysuperficiallysignificantfordistributivejus-ticeThereasonhesayswhyegalitariansdonotcompensatepeopleforchosenexpensivetastesisthatthosetastesbeingchosenareoneswhichtheymightnothavehadAccordingtoScanlonitisnottheirchosenbuttheirperipheraloridiosyncraticcharacterwhichexplainswhyexpensivetasteshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedInSection5IdefendmyemphasisonchoiceagainstScanlonrsquosskepticismbutIalsosignificantlyamendthechoice-centeredegalitarianproposaltocatertowhatseemsundeniableinScanlonrsquoscaseagainstit

FinallyinSection6IclaimthatAmartyaSenrsquoswritingsonldquocapabil-ityrdquointroducetwoanswerstohisldquoEqualityofwhatrdquoquestioneachofwhichhas itsattractionsbutwhichdiffersubstantially incontentasIshallshowatlengthelsewhere2

2 SeemyldquoEqualityofWhatrdquo[reprintedasChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]

5

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

2 Methodological Preliminaries

Apersonisexploitedwhenunfairadvantageistakenofhimandhesuf-fersfrom(bad)brute luckwhenhisbadluckisnottheresultofagambleorriskwhichhecouldhaveavoided3Ibelievethattheprimaryegalitar-ianimpulseistoextinguishtheinfluenceondistributionofbothexploi-tationandbrute luckTobesureprinciplednon-andantiegalitariansalsocondemn(whattheyconsidertobe)exploitationbuttheydonothavethesameviewofexploitationasegalitarianshavepartlybecausetheyarelessdisturbedbybrute-luck-derivedassetdifferenceswhichskewdistributiveoutcomes

On the foregoing sketchof theprimaryegalitarian impulsea state-mentwhichpurportstoexpressandassertitisexposedtotwokindsofchallengeFirstsuchastatementmightbecriticizedformisidentifyingwhatshouldinthelightofthefundamentalegalitarianaimbeequal-izedIshallmyselfsocriticizeDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesproposalsinceIthinkthat(amongotherthings)itpenalizespeoplewhohavetastesforwhichtheycannotbeheldresponsiblebutwhichunluckilyforthemcostalottosatisfyButonemightalsorejectequalityofresourcesonthequitedifferentgroundthatitconflictswithsomeimportantnonegalitar-ianvaluesOnemightsayforexamplethatwhileitisindeedbruteluckwhichdistributeschildrenintorichandpoorfamiliesitwouldbewrongtoseekrectificationoftheresultsofthatlucksincethatwouldunder-minetheinstitutionofthefamily

InthisarticleIshallnotdiscussproblemsforegalitarianproposalsofthat secondkindproblems that is of trade-offbetween equality andothervaluesThatisbecauseIshalltreatthevariousegalitarianpropos-alstobereviewedbelowasweak equalisandum claims

An equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalizedwhat that is people should be rendered equal in An unqualified orstrong equalisandum claimwhich is the sort thatanuncompromisingegalitarianassertssaysthatpeopleshouldbeasequalaspossibleinthedimensionitspecifiesAqualifiedorweak equalisandumclaimsaysthatthey should be as equal as possible in some dimension but subject towhatever limitationsneed tobe imposed indeference toother valuesthoselimitationsarenotspecifiedbytheclaiminquestion

Nowstrongequalisandumclaimsfaceobjectionsofthetwokindsdis-tinguishedaboveandwhichIshallnowcallegalitarianandnonegalitar-ianobjectionsAnegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallywhichdiffersfromtheoneembodiedinthe

3 Thelatterkindofluckisoption luckThedistinctionbetweenbruteandoptionluckcomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293

6

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CHAPTERONE

strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme

Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger

4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone

7

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave

ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint

(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities

NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal

Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6

Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable

5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive

6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

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NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 3: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

5

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

2 Methodological Preliminaries

Apersonisexploitedwhenunfairadvantageistakenofhimandhesuf-fersfrom(bad)brute luckwhenhisbadluckisnottheresultofagambleorriskwhichhecouldhaveavoided3Ibelievethattheprimaryegalitar-ianimpulseistoextinguishtheinfluenceondistributionofbothexploi-tationandbrute luckTobesureprinciplednon-andantiegalitariansalsocondemn(whattheyconsidertobe)exploitationbuttheydonothavethesameviewofexploitationasegalitarianshavepartlybecausetheyarelessdisturbedbybrute-luck-derivedassetdifferenceswhichskewdistributiveoutcomes

On the foregoing sketchof theprimaryegalitarian impulsea state-mentwhichpurportstoexpressandassertitisexposedtotwokindsofchallengeFirstsuchastatementmightbecriticizedformisidentifyingwhatshouldinthelightofthefundamentalegalitarianaimbeequal-izedIshallmyselfsocriticizeDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesproposalsinceIthinkthat(amongotherthings)itpenalizespeoplewhohavetastesforwhichtheycannotbeheldresponsiblebutwhichunluckilyforthemcostalottosatisfyButonemightalsorejectequalityofresourcesonthequitedifferentgroundthatitconflictswithsomeimportantnonegalitar-ianvaluesOnemightsayforexamplethatwhileitisindeedbruteluckwhichdistributeschildrenintorichandpoorfamiliesitwouldbewrongtoseekrectificationoftheresultsofthatlucksincethatwouldunder-minetheinstitutionofthefamily

InthisarticleIshallnotdiscussproblemsforegalitarianproposalsofthat secondkindproblems that is of trade-offbetween equality andothervaluesThatisbecauseIshalltreatthevariousegalitarianpropos-alstobereviewedbelowasweak equalisandum claims

An equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalizedwhat that is people should be rendered equal in An unqualified orstrong equalisandum claimwhich is the sort thatanuncompromisingegalitarianassertssaysthatpeopleshouldbeasequalaspossibleinthedimensionitspecifiesAqualifiedorweak equalisandumclaimsaysthatthey should be as equal as possible in some dimension but subject towhatever limitationsneed tobe imposed indeference toother valuesthoselimitationsarenotspecifiedbytheclaiminquestion

Nowstrongequalisandumclaimsfaceobjectionsofthetwokindsdis-tinguishedaboveandwhichIshallnowcallegalitarianandnonegalitar-ianobjectionsAnegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallywhichdiffersfromtheoneembodiedinthe

3 Thelatterkindofluckisoption luckThedistinctionbetweenbruteandoptionluckcomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293

6

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CHAPTERONE

strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme

Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger

4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone

7

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave

ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint

(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities

NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal

Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6

Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable

5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive

6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 4: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

6

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CHAPTERONE

strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme

Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger

4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone

7

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave

ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint

(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities

NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal

Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6

Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable

5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive

6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 5: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

7

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave

ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint

(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities

NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal

Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6

Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable

5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive

6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 6: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 7: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 8: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 9: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 10: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 11: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 12: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 13: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 14: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

16

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unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 15: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 16: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 17: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 18: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 19: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

21

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 20: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 21: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 22: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 23: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 24: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 25: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 26: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 27: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 28: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 29: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 30: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 31: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 32: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 33: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 34: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

36

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 35: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

37

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 36: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

38

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 37: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 38: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 39: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 40: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

Page 41: Chapter One …assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9457.pdf · values which compete with distributive equality; and I ... moral character. It puts the pleasure of domi- ... myself

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs


Extending the Distributive Property. You already know the Distributive Property …

1 MULTIPLY WITH DISTRIBUTIVE PROPERTY: Problems 1 STANDARD 10 MULTIPLY WITH DISTRIBUTIVE PROPERTY: Problems 2 POLYNOMIALS MULTIPLY WITH DISTRIBUTIVE PROPERTY:

Distributive Categories yukita

Oculistica-Odont Assistenza Domi Ambulatori Speci ...cs.ospedali.lecco.it/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/3_in_ambulatorio.pdf · Oculistica-Odont Assistenza Domi Ambulatori Speci prenotazioni

Distributive Property Explanation of Distributive Property Distributive Property is a property of numbers that ties t he operation of addition ( Subtract)

Distributive operating system

Distributive Property

Distributive Lattices

Using mahara with moodle domi renault

The Distributive Property

Domi User Manual

Domi Collection - Articolo Lightingarticololighting.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/...articololighting.com Domi Collection Pendant Embrace the art of light with the Domi wall sconce

Distributive Justice

1.02a distributive property

7.2 Distributive Law

Negotiation DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING (CONTINUED). Distributive Bargaining (recap) This type of negotiation is called distributive bargaining. There is

1 Entering the Elite - assets.press.princeton.edu

PRESENTING DISTRIBUTIVE LAWS - arXiv · 2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: D.3.1, ... general methods for constructing distributive laws from ... PRESENTING DISTRIBUTIVE LAWS

Distributive Bargaining

Distributive multiplication

Distributive Property 7th

CATALOGO CHRIS VAN DOMI

Distributive Property 8th

Global distributive justice

Domi Photographs

4 Distributive Lattices

Relieve1 presen domi

Domi Productos del Mar

Little Domi Zine

Automotive latest - May 2012 - ultran.ruultran.ru/sites/default/files/automotive_latest_-_may_2012.pdf · Day Running Light. Exterior Illumination Application Domi Multi Domi Power

Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence ... · Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence ... Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: ... in

Distributive Property PPT

Event pluralities - Day 2 - Distributive configurationsarchive.sfl.cnrs.fr/sites/sfl/IMG/pdf/esslli_Day2_Event...The distributive relation In first order logic, a distributive reading

Visaria distributive iems_mar2017

Domi Penn Apps Accelerator Deck