CHAPTER IV

REGIONAL ISSUES

Bilateral relations and inter-state behaviour can exhibit

three types of group relations, namely, conflict,

competition and cooperation. 1 While the majority of

situations reflect 'competition', it is remarkable that Iran's

relationship with the Indian subcontinent has had a steady

undertone of cooperation and cordiality.

It would be useful to look at the bilateral relations

between Iran and the Indian subcontinent in the context of

certain local and regional issues such as the hostage crisis,

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979, Iraqi invasion of Iran

1.980, Kashmir issue and NPT (Nuclear non-Proliferation

Treaty). In the midst of changed regional environment and

demands of politics as well as revival of the Cold War in the

South West Asia, both Iran and the Indian Sub:-contirren·t faced a

challenge and threat perception. Indian ,subcontinent was the

only immediate neighbour with whom Iran's interest did not

clash seriously from the beginning.

The Hostage Crisis _

The hostage crisis in Iran put Pakistan, Banglades_l]._ and, ·

India into an uncomfortable position. This was because the

1. Joseph Frankel, International Rela:tions (University Press, London, 1969), p.71

168

hostage crisis raised two important questions. First the

question of commitment to International Law and Conventions and,

second, the anti-US sentiment. Khorneini considered the USA as

the master mind behind all exploitation, sorrows and tragedies

in Iran and the Shah as a mere pup~et in the hands of the

USA. One writer pointed out that "the United States had

itself been the cause of the hostage crisis. ·It conspired to

destabilise Iran. Apart from successive tactics, the USA

annoyed the Iranian Government and people when it allowed

·Muhammad Raza Shah into the United States. Consequently, the

Iranians had to find a means of preventing it. Taking Americans

in t~e Embassy in Tehran as hostage secured an effective means

to counter US moves." 2 On 4th November 1979 some agitated

Iranian students occupied the US embassy in Tehran and held

fifty two Americans as hostages. "The Islamic reg~m~ .... Q.~manded . ,,_ . ~.· ~ .... :: -, -- . . .

,_.,_tb,e.,return of Muhammad Raza Shah to stand trial ·f<?.r. his crimes I

,as-well as the return of Iranian funds deposited in US banks." 3

Pakif;ltan, Bangladesh and India adopted a correct and

balanced position following the seizure of the United States

Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and holding of American hostages for

444 days and economic sa~ctions against Iran by the west.

2. Asaf Hussain, Islamic Iran. Revolution and Counter Revolution (London, 1985), p.173

3 . Ibid, p. 17 7

169

Pakistan emphasized on a peaceful solution of the crisis and

for quiet diplomacy. 4 It advised the United States to

refrain from issuing threats of using force against Iran. At

the same time, it announced that it would not be a party to

any economic sanctions. Pakistan also called for observation of

international diplomatic conventions. 5

In the crisis, the Bangladesh government expressed its deep

concern for Iran when in December 1979 the Security Council met

for solving the stalement in Iran. Bangladesi;t did face an

unusual and complex situation and approached it with utmost

restraint and patience in the larger interest of peace and

stability. While supporting the unanimous resolution of the

Security Council for the release of the American diplomatic

personnel, Bangladesh also advocated a fair and. j~~-:.

consideration of the Iranian allegations unde.r the International '•!f

Law and Conventions. Meanwhile, Bangladesh did not support the

US proposal to impose economic sanctions age1inst Iran. 6

India expressed its deep concern over the hostage crisis in

4. See for details, Year Book of the United' Nati.on·s 1979 v.oJ. 33 (Department of Public Information, United Nations New York, 1982), P.307

5. Dawn, 21 December 1979.

6. See statement made by Bangladesh at the Security Council Meeting on 31 December 1979, Bangladesh Document, vol. 3, no. 3, October-December, 1979.

170

Iran. It also urged Iran to release diplomatic personnel held in

Iran according to the principles of International Law and

Convention. India'~ view was expressed in the UN Security

Council that "continued occupation of the United States

Embassy in Tehran and detention of its personnel constituted a

serious violation of the fundamental principles of

International Law and diplomatic practice." 7 India also did

not support the West sponsored economic sanctions against Iran.

The Afghanistan Problem

With regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,

Iran, Pakistan and Bangladesh cooperated with each other in

strengthening Afghan resistance to the leftist-oriented ~egime

in Afghanistan. But, India did not take a hostile stand

against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The

objective of these countries .. ~ - ..

India policies was to evolve

Pakistan, .. . Bangladesh, Iran and

sound pat tern of relationship a

with their neighbouring countries, taking_ii1to account certain

factors like geographical location and strategic

considerations, past linkage, social, political, economic and

cultural compulsions. The neighbours of Afghanistan,

likewise, evolved t~eir indivi~ual pattern of relationship with

Afghanistan taking into consideration a set of factors to guide

7. Yearbook of the United Nations 1979, no. 4, P.309; Times of India. December 1979

171

their policy formulations. which are unique in themselves and,

thus, differed from eac::. other. However, in general,

geographical proximity anc close historical links acted as the

permanent inputs in artic~lating the policies of its n~ighbours

towards ;._~ ::;hani stan. Thus, the policy of the regional

countries in the wake of the Soviet invasion largely

reflected various struggles and tactics that each sought to

adopt from its own perception of national interest. 8 The Iranian

policy was guided by poli:ico-economic interests with anti-

Soviet and pro-Pakistan biases. Pakistan's policy was dictated

by the Pakhtoonistan issue coupled with anti-1ndia and anti-

Soviet underpinnings. 9 India's pol icy was determined by

historical legacy, geo-strategic and political considerations,

economic interest, and the existence of pro-Soviet and pro-

Marxist government in Afghanistan. Bangladesh's policy was

moulded by politico-economic interests, and pro-Pakistan and

anti-Communist sentiments.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan constituted a watershed

in the political history of this region. Afghanistan, a land-

locked country in Central Asia, covering an area of 250,000

8. Abdul Kalam Azad, "Afghanistan and the Neighbours", Bliss (Dhaka), vol. 10, no 4, 477.

Policy of the October 1989, p.

9. .Syed Abul Quddus, Afghanistan and Pakistan: .7::;,.

Geographical Study (Printed and Published by Abdus Salam at Feroz Sons Ltd., 1982), pp. 4-5.

172

square miles and sharing international frontiers with some of

the important countries of the region. 10 It borders with US'SR

and China, the two Communist giants in the North West and North

East respectively, and is flanked by Iran, one of ·the

st~ategically important areas of the world in the West, and

Pakistan in the East. Geographically, the USSR, China, Iran and

Pakistan are the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan. However,

beyond this perimeter are also to be included the potential

countries like India11 in the East and the Islamic countries in

the West as second-door neighbours of Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that all the neighbours

recognized Afghanistan as a viable entity with its own values

and dynamics that exerted its own influence on them through

ages. Afghanistan's peculiar location and its strategic

importance bore special significance for her neighbours.

Throughout its cheque red history, Afghanistan has continued to·

survive as an independent state interacting vigorously with

. her neighbours. The interaction of the neighbours also goes

back to centuries revealing continuity and consistency in each

of the neighbouring country's policy towards Afghanistan.

10. S.V. Nair, Afghanistan Perspectives for Reconciliation and Peace (Panchsheel Publishers, New Delhi, 1988), pp. 1-2.

11. H.S.A. Jafri, Indo-Afqhan Relations, 1947-67 (Sterling Pvt., New Delhi, 1976), p.1.

173

Lying at the confluence of many ethnic and cultural movements,

Afghanistan had often been at the cross-roads of Central

Asia. 12 Numerous races inhabited this land whose contribution

to civilization in and around Afghanistan is unique. Another

factor ¥Jas the Islamic sentiments of its people which acted

as a catalyst in linking Afghanistan with· countries like,

Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 worsened the

security predicament ·of the region. Iran and Pakistan became

frontline states. This external threat was compounded by

internal ethnic politics which aggravated Iran's and·Pakistan's

security concerns. In Pakistan, those concerned· about ethnic

tensions "were wary of Soviet and Afghan efforts to promote

Baluchi dissidence. These elements were resentful that

Baluchi identity was not .being given due and

they demanded full-fledged status for this province of

Pakistan. 13 Besides, the influx of refugees in Pakistan and

Iran in the aftermath of the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan was considerably numerous. The presenc:e of. a

large number of Afghan refugees iq Iran became a cause of

---------~-~--------12.· Azad, n~S~ p. 477.

13. For an analysis emphasizing ethnic divisions within Pakistan, see Selig Harrison, The Afghan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation (Carnegi Endowment for Inter-national Peace, New York, 1981).

174

additional concern for the already overoccupied Iranian

Government with matters of 'New Iran' . It is estimated that

there were about 2 million Afghan refugees in Iran and 3 million

refugees in Pakistan.

Iran,· Pakistan and Bangladesh voiced strong protests

through the United Nati~ns and gathered support from virtually

all non-aligned members and major powers. More significantly for

Pakistan, the Islamic conference meeting in Islamabad in January

1980, protested with almost one voice, against Soviet presence

in Afghanistan. Only Syria, Libya and South Yemen dissented. 14

The bogey of Soviet threat was expeditiously used by the

Pakistani leaders to justify Pakistan's direct involvement in

the crisis. At last two conferences of foreign ministers cf

Islamic countries were held

discuss the situation created

in

by

January and May 1980 to

the Soviet action in

Afghanistan in December 1979. The extraordinary

the islamic Foreign Minister's conference held

1980 at the instance of Pakistan decided to suspend

session of

in January

Afghanistan

from the membership of the Organization of Islamic Conferenc~

(OIC) and asked member-states to withhold recognition to the

Babrak Karmal Government and suspend diplomatic relations Hith

14. Keesing's Contemporary Archives. May, 1980, P. 30241.

175

Afghanistan till complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops from

that country. It also called upon member- states to extend

economic aid to the countries neighbouring Afghanistan. It

supported the US call for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. The

second conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held in May 1980

in Islamabad decided, at the initiative of Pakistan, to appoint

a panel to explore ways and means of implementing the resolution

passed by the extraordinary session of the Islamic Foreign

Ministers Conference in January 1980. 15 It wanted to talk to

Afghanistan without recognizing the Babrak Karmal government ..

This amounted to asking the Karmal government and the Soviet

Union to appear before it in sackcloth and ashes, especially

after the Islamic Foreign Ministers conference had. rejected

package of proposals made by the Afghan government on 14 May

1980, on the eve of the conference. This package included

proposals for regional normalization and for bilateral

agreements on border security with Iran and Pakistan to be

jointly underwritten by the Soviet Union and the United States. 16

The broad features of Pakistan's policy towards the Afghan

crisis were: (1) to repel the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan;

15. Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Islamabad, 1980), p.20.

16. Link, 13 July 1980.

176

( i i) to keep Pakistan's strong commitment to its Afghan

policy;· (iii) to keep its involvement indirect, discreet and

limited. 17 Later on, Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan

proved similar to those of the US and most of the Western

countries. This policy was based on the four points contained

in successive UN General Assembly resolutions as envisaging (i)

immediate and total withdrawal of Soviet forces, ( i i)

independence and non~alignment for Afghanistan and (iii) self-

determination for the Afghan people, and ( i v) creation of

political conditions necessary for the voluntary return

Afghan refugees.18

of the

The Pakistanis want~d the Afghan crisis to serve them well

by generating a massive flow of aid from Washington whose

anxiety over th~ issue coincided with that of Pakistan. General

Zia wanted the United States to take increasing interest in

South-West Asia, Where he pointed out, Pakistan occupies a

strategic position. He stated:

"But if you visualize the map of the region and if you extend the hammer and sickle over Afghanistan and then see from there onwards, which are the areas that are likely to come under influence. Where is Iran, where is the Gulf and where is the ·Strait of Hormuz and where is Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Muslim

.......... - ..... .,_ .... - - _ .... -- .... -17. Uma Singh, Pakistan's Perception about Afghanistan

V.D.Chopra (ed), Afghanistan: Geneva Accord and After Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1988), p. 120.

in (New

18. Tahir Amin, Afghan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan (Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, 1982), pp. 147-151.

177

world ... and if the recent events in Afghanistan, because of the Soviet intervention, have chanf9ed the environment, then Pakistan deserves attention."

The US aid to Pakistan had been severed, restored and

severed again. The $ 3.5 billion aid package from the Reagan

administration boosted the morale of the army.

Pakistan recognized the Iranian role in the settlement of

Afghan crisis. Abdul Sattar on his visit to Tehran in February,

1988, while reporting the latest situation at the Geneva

talks, said that for the future settlement of Afghanistan,

Pakistan and Iran are the countries which carry the burden of the

Afghan refugees ~nd migrants.n20 The Pakistani government

started to consult Iran in all seriousness when it was ·rather

late in ~he affairs of fast moving events.

The importance of Iran cannot be underestimated in the

context of Afghan resistance and its aftermath. There could be

little possibility of a "complete success" of· the Muj ahideen

after the Russian withdrawal unless the support of the Iranians

was .achieved. The Afghans based in Pakistan and other parts

of the world began to realize this reality. Professor

19. Pakistan Times, 16 January 1980; World Report, September 5, 1988.

20. See for details, Tahir Amin, n. 18, pp. 145-51.

178

Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Pakistan-based Afghan Leader, visited

Iran from February 26 to March 9,1988, at the invitation of

the Iranian Government. Professor Rabbani was assured in Iran

of its help and assistance. Iran supported the role of

Mujahideen in any future governmental set up. 21 The Iranian

Government emphasized "T:qe unity of all Mujahideen and all the

Afghan Muslim people regardless of their religious

denomination or their ethnic and regional associations." 22

On his part, the Pakistan based Muj ahideen leader had a

series of discussions with the Mujahideen organizations based

in Iran. It was reported that he "spoke to several gatherings

of the Afghan refugees in Tehran, Mashhad and Turbat-e-Jam.

Rabbani's visit to Iran at the crucial juncture of the Afghan

destiny reflected certain tendencies in the political

situation of the region. 23 ~he degree of understanding which he

was able to achieve with the Iranian government as well as the

Mujahideen organizations was a testimony of the fact that a

broad-based consensus did exist between the Afghans living in

21. Afghan News. vol. IV, no. 6,15 March 1988, p.2.

22. See for details, Speech of Syed Ali Khamenei published Iranian Journal of International Affairs (Institute Political and International Studies, Tehran), vol. 1, 2&3, Summer Fall 1989, pp. 261-62.

23. Afghan News, vol. IV, no. 6 , 15 March, 1988, p. 2.

179

by for no.

Iran as well as in Pakistan. Rabbani was impressed by the

response that he received from the Iranian and their Afghan

allies. He praised the Iranian government by saying that

"Iran's foreign policy is based on Islamic principles and that

it does not retreat from its principles on the Afghanistan

issue. n 24

It was alleged by the Western quarters that Iran's

interests in Afghanistan were confined to the Shi' ite Afghans

which comprise roughly 15 percent of the total population. 25 The

Shiite Afghans reside in the Central and Western regions of

Hazarajat. The tribes have been suffering throughout the

modern Afghan history. They were deprived of their belongings

"as a result of Abdur Rahman's policies of the

1890s ... (and) had suffered subsequently at the hands of

successive Pashtun-dominated .... Kabul Governments .. 26 The Hazara

tribes were against the people's Democratic Party of

Afghanistan (PDPA) because of their anti-Kabul Pashtun

sentiments in general and their love for Islam in particular.

As a consequence, they "were easily manipulated by t;.he ag-

24. Tehran Times, March 8, 1988

25. John Fullerton, ·"The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan" Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong) ,1983, p.43.

26. Beverly Male, Revolutionary Afghanistan (Croom Helm, London, 1982) 1 p. 61.

180

gressive Shi'ite sect of Islam, religious oligarchy which came

to power in Iran, (February 1979) and by the resistance groups

present in Peshwar. 27

The assessment of the Western scholars and commentators

while passing judgement on the Iranian support of a particular

ethnic and religious sect is not accurate. Perhaps they did not

realize that practical help can only be provided with ease to

those groups which reside near Iran's borders. Same is true of

Pakistan, where the ·bulk of ·refugees and freedom fighters are

from the geographical region near the Pakistani-border. It was

because of the particular US attitude towards I ran which

hindered the Iranian Government to coordinate assistance

programmes with· the American-supported Afghans.

Nevertheless, the Iranians provided all necessary assistance

to the freedom fighters near the Iran-Afghan border. Peregrine

Hodson, a freelance reporter for the Sunday Times, quoted in

his book, an interesting dialogue with an Afghan Mujahid

inside Afghanistan. After noting the wall posters of

Ayatollah Khomeini, Rabbani and other leaders of Jamiat Islami

when the Muj ahid was asked about Khomeini, his replay was as

follows:

" Ayatollah Khomeini is a new force in the Third World. He is neither capitalist nor communist. He uses the language of religion' to speak to the hearts of men.

27. Ibid, p. 173.

181

That is why he is so important. He is raising the consciousness of the Third World, not by political ideol~~y or machines or money, but by the word of God."

The above sentiments of freedom fighters give an

impression that Iran's ptance on the Russian invasion in

Afghanistan and its help to those opposing the occupation was

regarded with respect and gratitude. 29 The difference of opinion

between the Shi' is and the Sunnis "are linked or separated by

numerous agreements and conflicts." 30 These Rifts are

political in nature and the religious elements have been

overemphasized, especially by those who desired to isolate Iran

from its neighbours.

Both Iran and Pakistan were deeply involved in the supply,

training and support to the counter revolutionary guerrilla

movement against the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan. In

November 1981, Tehran Radio announced a plan, proposed by

the foreign ministry, which was based on the principles of the

unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan,

28. Peregrine Hodson, Uner a sickle moon: A Journey Through Afghanistan (Hutchinson, London, 1986), p. 64; See Kayhan International. March 12, 1988.

29. Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance in (Cambridge UP London, 1986), p. 147.

30. Ibid.

Afghanistan

and the recognition of the people's right to decide their

political destiny. The plan proposed the formation of a

peace-keeping force drawn from Pakistan, Iran and other

Islamic countries which had "demonstrated their clear opposition

in fighting against world arrogance led by America and Zionism. 11

It supported the return of the Afghan Mujahid refugees to

Afghanistan. It also proposed the· formation of an Islamic

Constituent Council, Command Council, a Revolutionary Council and

Constituent Assembly. 3l In late July 1982, Iran and Pakistan

helped to create the United Front headed by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar

for the liberation of Afghanistan. The front committed itself

to getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan and establishing an

Islamic regime there.3 2

Like Pakistan, Iran denounced the Babrak Karmal government

and did not recognize it. The newly established Islamic

Revolutionary regime in Iran openly opposed the pro-communist

·government in Afghanistan. The Iranian policy made no secret of

its sympathy for those elements who had waged a war of resistance

against· the Kabul regime. The Iranian government, on 19th

September 1979, issued a statement in which President Hafez Amin

was warned for his close links with the Soviet Union. The

31. Tehran Radio, 12 November 1981.

32. Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollah (Routledge & Kegan Paul PLC, London, 1985), p. 355

183

statement further said that if the Government of Afghanistan

continued to fight against "Islam and the Islamic Revolution"

they were bound to be overthrown. 33

The Iranian government condemned the 0

Russian invasion

in the strongest possible terms. The Iranian President while

condemning the Soviet prese.nce in Afghanistan said that the

Soviet invasion is a "brutal intervention by looters and

occupiers and a threat to Iran. n 34 In 1980 Iran withdrew from

the Moscow Olympics.35

In its first major political initiative on Afghanistan

Iran proposed a four-point plan in ~ovember 1981. The Iranian

government convened a major international conference on "the

future of Afghanistan" in miq-January in Tehran. Preceding the

conference, the Iranians, on 4 January, sent five plane loads

of humanitarian assistance to Peshawar. The consignment was

the Muj ahideen for then passed on to the 7-party-alliance of

distribution to the Afghan refugees. 3 6 The conference was

33. Keesing' s Contemporary Achieves, January 11, 1980 ,, p. 39032.

34. The Guardian, March 22,1980

35. Shire en T. Hunter, "Soviet- Iranian Relations Revolution Period", in R.K. Ramazani, Revolution: The search for Consensus Washington D.C., 1984), p. 87.

36. Tribune, 12 November 1981.

184

in the Post­(ed), Iran's (Indiana UP,

unique in that it was probably the most representative

gathering of leaders and numbers of both the .7-party alliance

based in Peshawar and the 8-Party alliance based in Tehran,

plus prominent Afghan intellectuals living in Europe.

Inaugurating the conference, President Khamenei set the pace by

focussing on four essential themes of the ·current Iranian

approach to the Afghan issue. · First, he welcomed the direct

talks between the Mujahideen and the Soviet Union as a "positive

development" and urged the Muj ahideen leaders, who had

subsequently developed some re.servations on the efficacy of

such a dialogue, . that "continuation of the dialogue will be

useful." Second, President Khamenei underlined the need for

sectarian unity, saying that "sowing discord among the Mujahi-

deen and Afghan people under. religious, ·cultural and ethnic

pretexts is one of the objectives of foreign pow'ers". Third, he

urged the Mujahideen "not to allow any foreign power to penetrate

the country so that Afghanistan will start the new era with its

Islamic identity and non-aligned character." Finally,. the

Iranian president stressed that "from now on Iran, with all

its power, will remain on the side of the Afghan Muslims and

will aid them in different fields." 37

37. Mushahid Hussain, "The Afghan Issue, " Middle East International (Washington D.C.), no. 344, 17 February 1989, p. 17.

185

The conference helped to achieve three key Iranian political

.objectives . First, it provided a meeting ground between the 7-

party alliance based in Peshawar and the 8-party alliance based

in Tehran, the latter comprising predominantly Shi'ite groups

of the Afghan Mujahideen. Till then, there was little rapport

oamong the two alliances and infact when the 28-man "provisional

government" of Afghan Mujahideen was announced in Peshawar in

1980, the Tehran-based 8-party alliance were totally ignored.

Second, the Tehran Conference helped to develop a dialogue and a

new political and military relationship between Iran and the

three "moderate" parties of the Peshawar based 7 -party

alliance which had previously been dismissed as being "pro-

imperialist." 38 These included the current head .of the

Peshawar 7-party alliance, Pir Sibghatullah Muj addedi and

Maul vi Nabi Mohammadi, both of whom were present in Tehran.

The leader of Hizb-e-Islami; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was not

present at the Tehran conference. 39

What is equally significant is the ideological linkage

that Iran drew between its own revolution and the Mujahideen

resistance ·in Afghanistan. At the concluding session of the

Afghanistan Conference, Hojjatoleslam Ibrahimi, special

representative of Presid~nt Khamenei, underlined this linkage

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

186

when he said that 11 the nature of the Afghan revolution is 100

percent Islamic. The ground is now laid for an extensive

Islamic movement. Yesterday it was Iran, today it is ....

Afghanistan and tomorrow it will be others.n40

Iran's policy makers visualized the Afghanistan situation

from a different perspective than that of Pakistan. There had

been no generous flow of aid and assistance to the guerrillas

from Iran like that from Pakistan. It is relevant here to

mention that Iran from time to time made many statements

supportive of the resistance and even refused to become

involved in the UN-sponsored negotiations conducted by Diego

Cordovez so long as the Afghan guerrillas were absent. 41 Actual

Iranian material support, that too at extremely low level, was

restricted to those Shi'i factions of the guerrillas who

operated from Iran. The parties based at Peshawar were not

allowed to transport weapons and ammunition into Afghanistan via

Iran. 42

Main reason was that Iran's complicated relations with the

United States made them suspicious of the American involvement

40. Ibid.

41. See, Asia year Book 1983, p. 222.

42. J. Bruce Amstutz, Soviet Occupation 1986) 1 P• 358.

Afghanistan : The First Five Years of (National Defense UP., Washington D.C.,

187

in the affairs of Afghanistan. Although the Iranians

regarded the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as a source of

security threat to their country, at the same time, the American

supported resistance movement operating from Pakistan could

not be fully trusted. Furthermore, its war with Iraq

compelled the policy makers of Iran to adjust their policies

i:=1 such a manner which might not ·alienate the Russians

beyond certain limits. As mentioned earlier, inspite of the

delicate foreign policy stance on the matter of Afghanistan,

the Iranian government condemned the Russian invasion in the

strongest possible terms and the policy to do so had been

consistent. 43 As the events unfolded in Afghanistan, the

worsening of Iran's relations with the United States did not

become an obstacle in Iranian support to the Afghan people and

their cause. Iran, being an important factor in the re9.ional

political system, took. a force·ful and principled stand,

advocating the inclusion of the Muj ahideen in the United

Nation's sponsored peace initiative. Such acts were responsible

for the "dampened Soviet hopes of forming a workable rela-

tionship with Tehranw, atleast concerning the Afghan affairs. 44

43. The Guardian. March 22, 1980.

44. See, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati's Address to the 39th Session of UN General Assembly, New York, October 1,.1984, on Global Perspectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran, October 1984, pp 6-7.

188

Iran's policy of curtailing or directing the activities

of ·the Mujahideen in Iran was a reflection of a certain policy

strategy which the compulsions of the circumstance demanded. In

Iran, there was an "eight-fold coalition. -c~nsisting o~ eight

divergent guerrilla groups present in Afghanistan. The main job

of these resistance groups, as the Iraniqn Government expected,

was to fight for their country either inside Afghanistan or

provide material and other support ·from their territory. The

Iranian Government, being revolutionary in nature, would not

allow certain elements in the Afghan refugees camps to exploit

the situation in their favour by indulging in illegal trade or

other illegal activities. In this background, some permit

restrictions by the Iranian Government became relevant.

Nevertheless, the Afghan representatives residing in Iran

had been openly reflecting: their sentiments on a number of

occasions.

The head of the Central council of Afghanistan Islamic

Movement, Hojjatoleslam Syed Mohammad Ali Javid, during an

interview, said that serious measures were being taken for

achieving or strengthening the cooperation for the purpose

of solving the common problems between the "eight-fold"

coalition in Tehran and "seven-fold" coalition groups

Peshawar. Hojjatoleslam Javid said:-

We approve the (future) government (in Afghanistan) which takes into consideration the rights of all walks of Afghan people (including, Shi' ite and Sunni

189

in

Muslims) who have had outstanding activity and role in Islamic struggles in Afghanistan. . . We believe that Zahir. Shah is incapable of even setti~ up a national Government, let alone an Islamic one."

The Iranians regarded the Geneva Accord as a "US-Soviet

Connivance· on Afghanistan". 46 On April 14, 1988 four accords

were signee in Geneva. They were as follows: (1) between the

Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan and Af'ghanistan on

the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan: (2) between

the United States and the Soviet Union, to guarantee the

above; (3) between Pakistan and Afghanistan on non-interference

and non-intervention; and (4) between Pakistan and Afghanistan

on the return of the refugees. Besides, there was a separate

Memorandum of understanding on arrangements for.maintaining the \

Soviet· withdrawal under United Nation' s (UN) auspices. These

accords were the result of the proximity talks between

Pakistan and Afghanistan that had been conducted by the UN

mediator, Diego Cordovez and of bilateral talks between the

United States and the Soviet union. 47

The rejection of the Geneva Accords by Iran was

predictable. The Iranians had taken a consistent policy

45. Tehran Times, March 13,1988.

46. Ibid. (Editorial), April 11, 1988.

47. Asian Security 1988-89 (Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, 1989), p 56.

190

position that without the inclusion of all the Muj ahideen

groups presen~ in Iran and Pakistan the consequence were

going to be far from satisfactory. The statement issued by

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 12, 1988 party read as

follows:-

"The Islamic Republic of Iran since the very beginning has considered the Geneva indirect talks un­acceptable, because the Afghan Muj ahideen who are · practically involved in this matter have be~n ignored. And secondly, the Afghan regime which is a party to these talks, . has come to power during occupation, therefore, it has no legitimacy for negotiations ... On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that publicity for and recognition of US interference in the Afghan issue contravene the interests of the Afghan Muslim people.n4B

Iran's verbal criticism of· the Naj ibullah regime and the

Soviet invasion were more vituperative and critical than

Pakistani public remarks. The Soviets were described as

"Satanic" and their armed intervention as " a flagrant

violation of International Law carried out in total disregard

for the sovereignty of. Afghanistan." . The resistance was

described as a "sacred holy war" Jihad. 49 Its policy was well

manifested in the statement of the Iranian Minister of

48. Statement· of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Developments in the· Settlement of Afghan issue, April 12, 1988, Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, New Delhi.

49. Amstutz, n. 42, p. 359.

191

Foreign Affairs in late December. As it announced frequently,

the Islamic Republic of Iran considered the unconditional.

departure of all the occupying forces, without being

replaced by any other oppressive force, giving the right of self­

rule to the people and the honorable return of the Afghan·

refugees to their country as the only essential solution to the·

problem of Afghanistan.50

Despite all the above stated difference over the Afghanistan_

issue between Pakistan and Iran, both sides seemed anxious to

extend cooperation in the establishment of a broad-based interim

government in Afghanistan to stop further blpodshed. 51 The

identity of views between Iran and Pakistan was highlighted in

February 1989 when Velayati met President Gulam Ishaq Khan.

Velayati disclosed that Pakistan and Iran agreed on finding a

comprehensive and political solution of the Afghan problem

acceptable to the Afghan people. In this regard, Ishaq Khan also

said: " Iran and Pakistan should stand together and withstand

all pressures to achieve their common objectives of restoration

of peaceful conditions in Afghanistan and its reconstruction.

At the same time, both Iran and Pakistan empnasized the need

for forming a broad-based interim government in Afghanistan to

50. Ibid.

51. Patriot. October 3, 1984.

192

stop bloodshed following the withdrawal of Soviet troops. 52

In this context, it was reported that Iran pursued a

policy of uniting force of Afghan Mujahideen groups operating in

Iran and Pakistan. . Ali Akbar Velayati, the Foreign Minister,

.appealed to the Mujahideen to forge unity in their ranks to form

a strong Government in Afghanistan. He said that. the eight

groups of the Mujahideen should have a consensus on the

issue. 5 3 As regards the formation of Government in Kabul,

Velayati said that: 11 no interference from any quarter would be

entertained. 11 But Velayati failed to remove difference

between Afghan Mujahideen alliance in Pakistan and Iran over

the composition of the Shoora. Although he met the Muj ahideen

leaders but appar~ntly he did not succeed in convincing the

Peshawar-based Afghan groups. 54 In early 1989, Iran made it

quite clear that it was not particularly interested in

supporting the establishment of an Afghan regime depending

mainly on Pakistan and then having special links with the

latter. The Shi'ite resistance parties, backed by Tehran, had

been practically excluded from taking part in the Afghan Interim

Government (AIG) supported by Islamabad.

52. Times of India. 30 January 1984.

53. Times of India, 30 January 1984.

54. Frontier Post, February 3, 1989.

193

The Iranian Government continuously emphasized the

necessity of politically solving the intra-Afghan conflict. In

1989, however, another important aspect began to increasingly

influence Iranian foreign policy decision, i.e., the opening of

a new chapter of Iran'.s ·relations with the Soviet Union. 55

There had been a considerable exchange of ideas ·between Tehran

and Moscow on the one hand and Islamabad and Tehran on the

other in order to find a suitable way to end the conflict as

early as possible. Apparently, a real breakthrough could

not be achieved. Iran declared that the "solution of the

conflict should be considered an essentially internal Afghan

affair which third states should not try to influence." He

implied specially the superpowers, "the future Afghan regime

should rest on a broad social base and be Islamic in nature." 56

It has already been mentioned that the Iranian concept of a

broad-based Afghan coalition government might even include

certain elements of the PDPA. According to the perception of a

Pakistani analyst "with Iran progressively drawing closer to

Moscow, the Shia Mujahideen are

settlement with the PDPA regim~

not averse

in Kabul"

55. Kayhan International, December 23, 1989.

56. Ibid.

57. See for details Dawn, 16 September 1989.

194

to a peace

any longer. 57

The view, however, was not supported by Yaqub Khan, Pakistan's

Foreign Minister, who declared_ the same day that his discussions

' with the Iranians had not given the impression that they had

moved away from their traditional position ·on Afghanistan.

The Iranian Foreign Minister claimed that the Iranians "are

still supporting the Mujahideen to whom the power in Kabul should

be transferred".5 8

Iran's new overture was facilitated by the end of the Iran

Iraq war and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from

Afghanistan. its fresh policy towards Afghanistan has to be

viewed in this changed context. The interests of Tehran and

Moscow coincided not only in Afghanistan but also in the Caucasus

·and Central Asia. 59 During their meeting in Moscow in June

1989, Rafsanjani who was to become President of Iran the

following months made an informal deal to ensure territorfal

stability in Central Asia. 60 The press release issued by Tass

on 20 and 22 June and Rafsanjani' s interview with Tehran Radio

in July indicated that the visit was most successful. At the

political level, both sides agreed- that foreign powers'

presence in the Indian Ocean in general and the Persian Gulf

59. See for details Sreedhar, "Rafsanjani' s Visit' to Moscow" The Chronicle (Bhopal), 28 July 1989.

60. Oliver Roy, " The Lessons of the Soviet and Afghan War" Adelphi Papers 259 (Brassey's !ISS), Summer 1991, p.38.

195

in particular should be stopped. On Afghanistan, both sides

agreed that 11 the people of that county should forge their

destiny ... The immediate question·that arises is why Rafsanjani

was in such a great hurry to sign a wide range of

agreements. The proposal for large scale economic cooperation

was mooted after ·Iran reached an agreement with the Soviet

Union a major arms supplier. In April 1989 both the

countries entered into a defence cooperation agreement under

which the Soviet Union agreed to supply Iran fairly large

consignment of arms including 300 T-72 and 150T-54 and T-55

tanks I 200, 130 mm artillery pieces and 200 military vehicles.

Recent reports in the · media· indicate that Iran was also

planning to buy T-82 tanks and MIG-29 aircraft. 61

Apparently, Moscow and Tehran agreed to have a coalition

government in Kabul, including the Mujahideen groups and the

PDPA. Iran obtained from Moscow the recognition of Islamic

identity of Afghanistan. Until 1986 Ayatollah Montazeri's

office in Qom was in charge of dealing with the Afghan

resistance in the framework of the world Islamic

revolutionary movements .62 Montazeri chose to support

exclusively the pro-Iranian Shi' i groups (mainly Nasr and Seph) 1

61. Sreedhar, No. 59.

62. Oliver Roy: "The Lessons of the Soviet af!d Afghan war", Adelphi Papers 259 (Brassey's, IISS), Summer, 1991, p.38.

196

to whom some meager arms shipments were sent. The Shi'i parties

supported by Iran were united in the eight-party alliance and

kept under tight contro1. 63

1.. ••• ··~ • ,.. •• ""' • ... .).· .. . ~-..... .f ~~:· . ...

Iran had two options. It could either play the ethnic card,

uniting the Shi'is and the Persian-speaking Afghans against the

Pashtuns who were influenced by the Pakistani's and Saudis or

preside over .a reshuffling of the alliance. It opted for the

latter. At two conferences held in January and October

1989, 64 Tehran tried to merge the Sunnis and the Shi' i

alliances into one entity which could deal directly with the

Soviets and the PDPA. Their efforts were thwarted by the

Saudis and ISI, who convinced the Peshawar-based parties not to

include the Shi'i Afghans in the February 1989 Shoora.

Paradoxically, Iran had better relations with moderate Sunni

parties than with the radi.cal ones {Hekmatyar) who are strongly

anti-Shi' i and in fact strategic {Saudi Arabia verses Iran)

ethnic (Push tun versus Persia speakers) and religious {Sunni

versus Shi'i) factors play a bigger role than the ideological

dimension. 65

Iran's attitude today in Afghanistan is narrow because it

has no means of building a strong base in the country. Even it

63. Ibid.

64. Kayhan International, Octobet 7,1989.

65. Roy, n. 62, p.43.

197

has no interest in a Lebanonizaion of Afghanistan, and is more

of a stabilizing factor than a trouble maker. It made no

breakthrough with the Sunni Persian speakers, and the Shi' is

distanced themselves·from Tehran by creating the Hezb-i-Wahdat

(Unity Party) in July 1990, which is· ethnically based on the

Hazaras, who make up 90 percent of the·Afghan Shi'is. 66

Bangladesh was also deeply concerned about the Soviet

activities in Afghanistan. From the very beginning the Soviet

presence in Afghanistan, Bangladesh persistently condemned the

Soviet military interference in Afghanistan. The then

Bangladesi Prime Minister, Shah A Ziaur Rahman, in 1979, had

charged the Soviet Union with flagrant violation of

International laws for this inte~ention in Afghanistan. He said

"the crimson horiz.on of Afghanistan posed a ·threat to world

peace and security and called ·for the withdrawal of all

~oreign troops from that country." 67

Bangladesh cooperated with Pakistan in strengthening Afghan

resistance to the left oriented regime in Afghanistan.

Besides, it made a few initiatives on its own. First, the

convening of the extraordinary session of the OIC shortly after

the Soviet· invasion and suspension of Afghan membership was

sponsored by Bangladesh. Secondly, in the Security council and

66. Ibid.

67. Bangladesh Times. 20 February 1979.

198

the General Assembly, Bangladesh along with other non-aligned

countries, piloted a resolution calling for an immediate with-

drawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Hussain Mohammad

Ershad, the President of Bangladesh said: "Our brothers in

Afghanistan continue to remain in a tragic plight, being

deprived of their rights of self-determination, national

independence and basic ·human dignity by

force. n 68 .

a foreign occupation

Bangladesh welcomed the Geneva Accord which was signed on 14

April 1988 between the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan

and Afghanistan on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from

Afghanistan. Ershad Bangladesh had adopted a

principled stand on the Afghan. issue. Speaking at the

banquet hosted in honour of the visiting Chinese Prime Minister,

Li Peng, at President Palace he said: "We welcome a sovereign

independent Islami·c and non-aligned Afghanistan." He also

called for implementation of 1988 Geneva accord$,both in letter

and spirit, so that the Afghan refugees may return home·in honour

and dignity.

Indian policy towards Afghanistan remained re~atively

vague. The Indian foreign policy makers have always desired a

major role for India in international and regional affairs.

68. POT - January 29, 1987; Tehran Times, March 19, 1989.

199

The Afghan crisis put in India a very difficult and perplexing

situation in view of· its special relationship with the USSR and

antagonistic relations with both China and Pakis.tan. The crisis

had great significance for India's strategic environment and

impinged on its relations with the superpowers as well.

In this context an evaluation of India's foreign policy

after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on

December 26, 1979 is an interesting exercise. At the time of

Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, Indian Prime

Minster Charan Singh,. s care taker Government was involved in the

campaign for General Election to be held in January 1980. In

a surprising move and confused state, the Indian Foreign

Ministry issued a statement on December 28,1979 saying that

"Consistent with the Gdvernment·of India's commitment to principles of non-alignment, it supports the sovereign right of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny free from foreign interference. The Government of India's attitude to such situation is well known. India has always opposed any outside interference in the internal affairs of one country

·by another. It is also the Government of India's earnest hope that no country or external power would ·take steps which might aggravate the sit~~tion and that normalcy would be restored there early". ·

69. Foreign Affairs Record December 1979, p. 217.

200

(New Delhi), vol. XXV, no. 12

However, on December 30, 1979 an Indian Foreign Ministry

spokesman further explained the Indian stand to reporters thus:

11 We are not supporting or opposing anyone. We are still observing the situation. · We are assessing whether the Soviet assumption that they extended their help and ·assistance on the request of the du?c constituted authorities in Kabul, is right or wrong. 11

What appears is that Indian policy sharply contrasted with

the policies of other neighbours as discussed above. Mrs. Indira

Gandhi was the real architect of Indian Policy towards

Afghanistan after 1979, Immediately, after winning the

elections in January 1980, she brought back Indian diplomatic

activity on the traditional line of maintaining an independent

stand but not condemning the Soviet action. Similar policy

was adopted by Jawaharlal Nehru during the Soviet intervention in

r Hungary in 1956 and by Mrs: Gandhi on the occasion of Soviet

intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 71 It was under the

instructions that, during the debate in the UN General Assembly

session on January 11,1980 on the Afghan question, India refused

to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Indian

Representative at the UN, Brajesh Mishra, justified the

~-------------------

70. Ibid.

71. Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome : How to Live with Soviets (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982), p 109.

201

Russian intervention in Afghanistan referring .to the attempts

of interference by outside powers in the internal affairs of

Afghanistan by training, arming and encouraging subversive

elements. He brought out the following points: (a) The Soviets

sent troops to Afghanistan on December 26, at the request of the

Afghan government; (b) while India was against the presence of

foreign troops and bases in any country, it had no reason to

disbelieve a friendly country like the Soviet Union when it

said that it would wfthdraw troops from Afghanistan when asked to

do so by the government in Kabul; (c). Ind~a hoped that the Soviet

Union would not violate the independence of Afghanistan and would

not keep troops in that country a day long~r than necessary and;

(d) India was gravely concerned over the response of the

United States, China, Pakistan and others to the Soviet action.

The arming and training of Afghan rebels and encouragement given

to subversive activities in Afghanistan amounted to e-?Ct~rnal

interference in Afghan affairs. Building bases, pumping arms

to small and medium countries_ and expanding naval activities

in the Indian Ocean might lead to intensification of the Cold

War and threaten the peace and security of the region.

activities "pose a threat even to our own nation. 72

These

72. Arundhati Roy, The Soviet Intervention in causes, Consequence and India's Response Publishers House, New Delhi, 1987) .

202

Afghanistan (Associated

This Indian stand in the General Assembly caused shock and

surprise among a large number of a non-aligned countries and

exposed it to the. charge of repaying its debt to Moscow by

abandoning a small nation struggling against a superior force.

It was alleged that India's low-key and compromising position

was suggestive of Moscow's influence over New Delhi's support,

atleast, not to oppose the Soviet action in Afghanistan. 73

India justified its dissociation with member states of

the UN General Assembly to discuss withdrawal of USSR from

Afghanistan. This was done through a statement in the Lok Sabha

during the Question Hour. The then Minister for External

Affairs, P.V. Narasimha Rao, said, " ... Government is not

convinced raising this issue at the UN would be conducive to

defusing the situation in our neighbourhood .. 74

This was the new major Indian response to the Afghan crisis

an international forum. This statement was a virtual

endorsement of the Sovie.t intervention which was not at all in

tune with the reaction of a large majority of nations. One

aspect of the stand taken by India was that it was not

73. Ibid.

74. "India's Dissociation with Members State of UN General Assembly to Discuss withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan 7 August 1980)' Lok Sabha Debate (New Delhi), vol. VIII, no. 45- 48, August 1980, p. 120.

203

prepared to condemn the Soviet Union's action in an

international forum.· The other aspect was that it abstained from

voting in the General Assembly on the issue. The purpose was to

avoid taking sides. On October 3, Narasimha Rao made a

statement at 35th session of the General Assembly. Regarding

Afghanistan he stressed the need for a dialogue among the

parties concerned, ·without pre-conditioning. 75 Besides, on

September 28,1981, speaking in the General Assembly, Narasimha

Rao , in his address, pointed to the emerging threat of Cold War

that would exert pressure on the Non-Aligned Movement. He

expressed India's "disapproval of all kinds of outside

intervention in any country" and mentioned that India always

avoided 11 condemnatory polemics" and preferred a political

solution. 76 On November 17, R.D. Sathe, Secretary in India's

External Affairs Ministry, in his speech in the General

Assembly said that the effort of Kurt Waldheim, U.N. Secretary-

General, to bring about a dialogue between Pakistan and

Afghanistan had been set back by contrived technicalities

presumably because of Pakistan's intransigence to recognize the

regime in Kabul. 77 He advocated a peaceful solution in

75. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, India's Views on the Afghanistan Situation (External Publici·ty · Division, New Delhi, 1980), p. 35.

76. Foreign Affairs Record. (New Delhi), vol. XXVII, no. 9, September 1981, .P. 252.

77. Ibid, vol. XXVII, no . 11, November 1981, pp. 311-12.

204

accordance with the. formulation adopted in the New Delhi

Declaration in February by the Foreign Ministers of non-aligned

countries. It was ~lso at the New Delhi conference, he said,

that the Secretary-General had designated his personal

representative to engage in efforts aimed at facilitating

negotiation among the parties concerned so as to achieve

political solution.

Speaking at the Common wealth Heads of Government meeting

at Melbourne on September 30,1981, Indira Gandhi expressed

India' s grave concern "at the use of Afghanistan as a pretext

for a massive externally funded and encouraged militarization in

our neighbourhood" and remarked that Afghanistan had become

embroiled in a trial of strength between the super powers. 78

She, therefore, advised regional cooperation among the countries

concerned without the intrusion of outside interests. In

fact, as time passed, the Afghan crisis grew intractable.

India's effort towards crisis defusion. did not make headway.

Narasimha Rao's speech at the plenary meeting of the Ministers

of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of Non-aligned

countries to the 37th session of

October 4, 1982, reflected this.

the General

There was

Assembly

no mention

the Afghan question but he stated that interference

78. Ibid, vol. XXVII, n. 10, October, p. 276.

205

on

of

and

intervention in the internal affairs of Non-aligned

had increased. The Non-aligned countries had countries

realized that military alliance and interlocking arrangements

did not guarantee peace but served as a potential invitation to

invol vernent in strategic conflict. 79 These utterance were

mainly purported against the US-Pakistan military linkage .. As

the various peace proposals sponsored at various times did not

make a headway, India pinned its faith on UN initiative to

solve the Afghan problem. On October 10, 1982, in his address to

the 37th session of UN General Assembly,

the UN Secretary General' s search for a

Narasimha Rao welcomed

political solution,

which in fact vindicated India's policy of defusing the Afghan

crisis. 80

Indian initiative at NAM Summit held' in Delhi in March

1983, too did not achieve any breakthrough w4atsoever. India

only reiterated its basic policy on Afghanistan. In the keynote

address at the conference, Indira Gandhi said that the non-

aligned movement regarded

intervention -as basic laws

non-interference

of international

and non-

behaviour.

Different types of interference and intervention, overt or

covert, take place. No single power or group of powers has

79. Ibid, vol. XXVII, no. 10, October 1982, pp. 270-71.

80. Ibid, p. 263

206

the justification or moral authority to interfere or

intervene. She said: "you cannot condemn one instance but

condone another. Such situation has its own origins." The

main approach to the conference, initiated by India, as usual

was to arrive at a consensus on all contentious declaration was,

prepared by India as the host country, after consultations with.

at least 40 other member countries. India would have liked

the final formulation to follow the one adopted by non-aligned

Foreign Ministers in February 1982, which called upon the

concerned countries - Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan to negotiate

a political solution, while at the same time, demanding

simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops from that country.

India made significant departure from the policy and

response of other nations by recognizing the Babrak Karmal

Government as legal one and

relations with the regime. In May

maintained full diplomatic

1982, the Indo-Afghan Joint

Ecc:momic · Commission, dormant since the 1978 Marxist coup in

Afghanistan, met in Kab';ll. At this meeting India pledged

economic aid to expand hospital facilities in the Afghan capital

and to assist in developing small scale industries. 81 .

India's tacit pro-Soviet policy in the case of Afghanistan

after 1979 has been justified by Bhaban1 Sen Gupta

81 . Amstutz , n . 41, . p . 16 5 .

207

(Journalist) in these words:-

"In no conceivable circumstances could India line-up with Pakistan, China and the United states against Soviet Union, this would have gone ag~~st the grain of India's foreign policy independence."

Rajiv Gandhi also pursued the policy of Mrs. Gandhi

towards the Afghan problem after her death in 1984. India

welcomed Geneva Accord which was signed on 14th April, 1988. In

a statement the official spokesman of the Ministry of External

Affairs said:

r1As a country of the region, India feels that the accords will lead to a lessening of tensions in the region and the removal of the raison d'etr.e for the induction of sophisticated weapons into the area. The settlement should thus create a favourable climate for peace and cooperation. India will make every effort to promote these objectives. The people of Afghanistan and the refugees can now devote their efforts towards the · social and economic reconstruction of their country. We will fully support them in these endeavours. The Governments ·of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USA, and the USSR, as well as the personal Representative of the UN Secretary General, deserve our appreciation for bringing to fruition the Geneva settlement ~83

Indian position did not alter even after the Soviet

withdrawal of its combat troops by 15 February 1989. As Soviets

sought to sustain the PDPA regime through massive non-combat

82. Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 69, p. 108.

83. "Geneva Accord on Afghanistan;' Foreign Affairs Record (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi), vol XXXIV, no. 4, April 1988.

208

support, India increased its effort to aid the Soviets in

whatever way feasible to boost the position of the regime. The

Soviet Government announced the start of its troops withdrawal

from mid-May 1988 under the terms of the Afghan Geneva Accords

of a month earlier. The Accords, however, qid not provide a . ~·I,

politic~l settlement of the A_fghan· p~em on the basis of right

of the Afghan people to self-determination. Rajiv Gandhi, the

Prime Minister of India denounced the Afghan Muj ahideen as

"Islamic fanatics." 84 He invited Afghan President Naj ibullah

to make an official visit to New Delhi, his first outside

Warsaw Pact countries. The objective was to reassure

Najibullah and to reassert the role that New Delhi could play in

the Non-aligned movement in boosting the international

credibility of hi_s Government . Reportedly, despite India's

public denials there was since the Soviet withdrawal been a . -

substantial increase in India's economic and logistic support

for the Naj ib Government. 85 India also supported Kabuls

candidacy in the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation

84. Elaine Sciolino "Gandhi Faults Islamic Rule for Kabul", The New York Times, June 1, 1988,

85. See for details "Indo-Afghanistan Cooperation in Civil··· Aviation "Foreign Affairs Record Ministry of External Affairs,--- ··Government of India, New Delhi). vol. XXXIV, no. 4, April 1968, p. 101. Also see, Yossef Bodansky, "New Pressures on Key Indian Borderlands" Janes Weekly, 30 April 1988, pp. 840-4.

209

(SAARC) in 1988.86

The Iran-Iraq War

This was an issue in which Iran itself was a party l.n

conflict. Therefore, the issue had peculiar ramifications. As

members of the Islamic Peace committed to end the Iran-Iraq War

and in their individual capacity, Islamabad and Dhaka continued

to support an end to hostilities. India did so at the· unilateral

level as well as through the forum of the UN and NAM.

The outbreak of war between Iran- Iraq put Pakistan and

Bangladesh into a very uncomfortable and delicate position as

both bell-igerent were members of ore as well as NAM.

Pakistan had been consistent and active in mediation

effort for ending the conflict since the very first days of the

war. The Government of Pakistan agreed with the Libyan

Government's move for special session of the Islamic minister's

conference and it made ~ a number of moves bilaterally as well

as internationally. These included seeking to defuse the

situation and helping the two sides to resolve the dispute

peacefully. Being the Chairman of the Islamic Fo·reign Minister's

Conference, Pakistan started seeking consensus among. the member

countries and special session was convened in Islamabad not only

through their Ambassadors but also through Pakistani envoys in

86. Roy, n. 59, p 37.

210

the two countries. 87 In this regard, Pakistani Ambassador in

Tehran had a meeting with President Ban Sadr. He was learnt

to have been given· a fresh brief instructing him to seek

another interview with the Iranian President. A.t the same time,

Foreign Minister Agha Shahi who was in New ;lork leading the

country's delegation at the General Assembly, .sought to defuse

the situation. He also held detailed discussions with the UN

Secretary General. Besides, he also held discussions with Habib~

Chatti, OIC Secretary General, and Foreign Ministers of Islamic

countries who were at that time at the United Nations.

An editorial in Pakistan's largest circulation English

language daily Dawn, perceptively noted that in the climate

generated by the extremist measures of the tw.o states against

each other "was not surprising that. appeals to end the

confrontation or accept mediation by third party had fallen

on deaf ears." 88

Pakistan expressed grave concern over the escalation of

border clashes between Iran and Iraq as early as April 1980,

well over five months before the outbreak of all-out war. By

September 16,1980 Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries had

volunteered to establish a team of foreign ministers to mediate

with a view to arresting the escalating tension between Iran

87. Dawn, 26 September 1980.

88. Ibid, April 18, 1980.

211

and Iraq. Their aim was to effect an immediate halt to

skirmishes and initiate negotiations between the two belliger­

ent.89 On September 23, 1980 one day after full scale war had

broken out between the two countries, Pakistan supported the UN

Security

ceasefire.

Council resolution calling for an immediate

Following ·this, President Zia accepted the

request by Islamic countries to attempt bringing about a

negotiated settlement of the war. Before the war had entered

its second week, President Zia led the Islamic Ummah Committee

to Tehran and Baghdad. However, after meeting Abolhasan Bani

Sadr. The then President of Iran, Zia remarked that Iran was in

a phase "where mediation will lead to nothing". Zia's visit

to Tehran and Baghdad was considered in New York as a welcome

sign· of progress in the peace mission undertaken by him on

behalf of the Islamic Conference. 90

On October 1, 1980, while addres"sing the UN General

· Assembly on behalf of the world's Muslims, President Z ia

expressed grave concern on the continuation of the war and called

for strict. neutrality and non-interference "in the internal

affairs of the belligerent by outside powers." In the

meantime, President Zia-ul-Haq addressed an appeal to Iran and

89. Ibid, September 17, 1980

90. Business Recorder, 1 October 1980.

212

Iraq to order suspension of hostilities during the period of

Haj (between 9th to 13th of Zilhaj), 18 October t6 22 October.9 1

On 30 October, Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi arrived in

Baghdad after a short-stay in Amman in his effort to resolve the

dispute between Iran and Iraq. Shahi told newsmen in Amman

that l).e was carrying a message from Presid.ent General Zia

for the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussain. Iraqi news agency

said that Shahi's visit to Baghdad was in connection with the

Non-aligned countries' initiatives for a goodwill mission to the

two countries.9 2

Pakistan sincerely tried to bring to an end the hostilities

in the Gulf through various peaceful means but it was thwarted

in its effort. Continuous spilling of blood in the prolonged

Gulf war distressed Pakistan. It was pained to find that

inspite of the professed fraternal bonds of faith, the Islamic

world did not present any constructive homogeneity.

Pakistan shared the thought that the Organization of Islamic

Conference should focus its attention towards the problem and

exert in bringing the protract.ed war to an end. Finally,

Pakistan's strict neutrality, was, however, given up in · 1986

91. Dawn, 31 October 1980.

92. Ibid., 31 October 1980.

213

when Zia said:·· "Iraq attacked Iran and occupied its territory.

Iran took back its lands after forcing the invading troops to

withdraw." He further said that " it is not important who

started the war A time will come when according to the

evidence available we will be able to say, he was the aggressor

and, therefore, this is the punishment that should be given to

him. 93

The gee-strategic realities and economic considerations

determined Pakistan's adoption of a partisan stance· in the Iran-

Iraq war. Moreover, given the turbulent situation on

Pakistan's northern border with Afghanistan and the uneasy

state of affairs on. the eastern side with India, it is

conceivable to imagine Pakistan staking the stability on its

western borders with Iran for whatever reason. 94

Pakistan's coastline is.contiguous to the Gulf the strategic

Strait of Hormuz being barely a 350-mile stretch away from the

Makran Coastal range in . Baluchistan. It also shares well over

four hundred miles of common border with Iran along the

Baluchistan landmass as well as a 400-mile railway track. on a

93. Patriot. 15 January 1986.

94. Suroosh Irfani, 'Pakistan and the Iran-Iraq War" Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Villanova), vol IX no. 2 Winter 1985, p. 65

214

road connecting Quetta, capital of Pakistani's Baluchistan

province, to Zahedan, the provincial capital on the

side. n 95

Iranian

With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War and its

continuation some political observers \olere convinced that the

war would destroy

would be forced to

other. In July 1987

this "idyllic situation" because Pakistan

overly enter the war on one side or the

Abdul Sattar gave two visits to the Gulf

countries including the two warring countries. He said. that

Pakistan believed that the dangerous momentum of the war should

be arrested as an expansion of the conflict would not only

further disturb and destabilise the region but: also transform

the regional environment.96

Pakistan provided surface transport facilities to Iran

during the Iran- Ira.q War. 97 Meanwhile, Pakistan played a key

role in enabling Iran in getting large scale Chinese arms.

Pakistan also condemned Iraq using chemical weapons which was

appreciated by the Iranian leaders. M. M. Mousavi, the Iranian

Ambassador to Pakistan, said that his c0untry was appreciative of

Pakistan's "definite and positive position on the Iran-Iraq

95. Ibid.

96. The Hindu, August 5, 1987.

97. Hindustan Times. 12 February 1990.

215

War" 98

Bangladesh on its part tried to bring about an immediate

cessation of hostilities and just and honor~ble settlement

through different peace keeping forums (such as Organization of

Islamic Conference, Islamic Peace Committee, United Nations and

Non-Jl.ligned Movement) in accordance with International Law.

From the very beginning of the wa-r, Bangladesh persistently made

all efforts to defuse the conflagration and solve the dispute

through peaceful negotiations. Apparently, the devastating

effect of the Gulf War stirred up all Bangladesh as well as

newspapers and the government so much that they condemned the

meaningless bloodshed in the Gulf in unison. ·criticizing the

sole negative outcome of the Gulf War, one newspaper which

generally reflected the official attitude and thinking commented

thus : "The whole things look like an organized self butchery

without precedent. The devastating effect of it on the economy

of both countries will work out to billions of dollars on either

side." 99

Bangladesh, being a Muslim country, took active initiative

through the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Islamic

Peace Committee in order to extinguish the burning rage. More

98. Irfani, n. 91, p. 65; Dawn. 25 May 1985.

99. Bangladesh Observer, 19 January 1987.

216

specifically, Bangladesh made desperate efforts to stop the

Gulf war through the Islamic Peace Committee (IPC). At the

third Islamic conference in Taif (Saudi Arabia), 23-28 January

19811 Bangladesh proposed concrete measures to bring about an

immediate cessation of hostilities and honorable settlement of

the dispute in accordance with International Law. The then

Bangladesh President, Ziaur-Rahman, addressed the conference and

earnestly requested the belligerent states to solve the dispute

through peaceful negotiations. It was decided at the conference,

on the insistence of Bangladesh, that priority should be given to

the issue of the Iran-Iraq war. A committee of five nations was

constituted to visit the warring States. The conference also

proposed a simultaneous ceasefire from mid-night of March 12,

1981, to be followed·by Iraqi withdrawal of troops in a week's

time. A committee to assist both states in negotiating a

comprehensive settlement was to be set up. A special Islamic

court was to be set up for working out a reasonable

with regard to the Shatt-al-Arab. The truce

settlement

and Iraqi

withdrawal were to be supervised by observers drawn from the ore

States with the approval of both.the states. Since the outbreak

of the war, President Zia-Ur-Rahman made various attempts to

bring about ceasefire between Iran and Iraq and, on several

occasions, he expressed his deep concern about the war. He

saw this as an obstacle in the path of Islam;i..c unity. He

appealed to the "brotherly Iran-Iraq to stop their senseless war

217

immediately" and said that the war would not only destroy the

t . b 1 d . . t. 100 wo countr1es, ut a so estroy the un1ty of Musl1m na 1ons. .

Bangladesh expressed great hope in the success of the OIC's

peace initiatives on January 26, 1987. Bangladesh again joined

the ore summit which was held in Kuwait. It had an optimistic

attitude towards the Iran-Iraq war and hoped that the summit

"under the auspices of a world Islamic body could provide the

only opportunity to · sort out the problem of the Gulf

War." 101 At the same time, President Mohammad Ershad appealed

to Iran and Iraq to " open a dialogue through the good offices

of the Islamic Peace Committee (IPC) to end the tragic war

between the brotherly countries." He urged both Iran and Iraq

that if they had difficulties in speaking their mind formally,

they were welcome to speak "to any of us, privately and tell us

how this bloodshed can be stopped honourably for both parties .

.. 102

Bangladesh also endorsed the UN' s peace initiative

regarding the Gulf war. Bangladesh's permanent representative

in the UN, Justice B.A. Siddiky, expressed Bangladesh's trust in

100. Bangladesh Times, 3 March , 1981,

101. Bangladesh Observer, January 19, 1987.

102. POT, January 29, 1987.

218

UN' s effort to end the war. He appreciated the UN Secretary

General Perez de Cuellar's and the Security council's efforts to

bring peace in the region. When Iraq started to use poisonous

gas in the battle field, Bangladesh expressed its deep concern

and condemned in UN the "use of chemical weapons in Gulf War

" 103 Talking to BSS on May 6, 1985 on return from Jedda'after

attending the 7th !PC session, Foreign Affairs Adviser, Humayun

Rasheed Choudhury, said that Bangladesh played a "

constructive and moderate· role in the deliberations of the

Jedda meeting. " He also said that the Committee condemned the

violation of international humanitarian law applicable to

armed conflict particularly to Geneva conventions on the laws of

war and the treatment of prisoners of war. The session, he

pointed out, had called for strict observance of the Geneva

Protocol of 1925 and the Chicago Convention

Aviation. 104

on Civil

Bangladesh saw the UN Charter as a fine document that

should be implemented under proper guidance. The UN' s

prescription to the belligerent states was that the warring

parties should ".implement all Security Council resolutions for

a total ceasefire, withdraw forces from each other's

103. Bangladesh Observer, April 27, 1985.

104. Pot. May 8, 1985.

219

territories, exchange prisoners of war and start comprehensive

negotiations." 105 Since the outbreak of the Gulf War the UN

had adopted a number of .resolutions aimed at stopping the war

and bringing peace . These resolutions were as follows 479

(1980); 514 (1982); 540 (1983), 522 (1984); 552 (1984); 582 &

586 (1986) and 598 (1987). When the UN came out with its peace

plans for the mutual and peaceful solutions in the Gulf War,

Bangladesh expressed its confidence over their peace plans.

The handling of the Iran-Iraq War provided another example

of how Bangladesh preferred peaceful resolution of all

conflicts in West Asia and solidarity among the Islamic

countries. As Bangladesh was overwhelmingly dependent on

external aid, it could not afford to annoy or dissatisfy any of

its donors. A peaceful, politically stable and viable West Asia

could promote and guarantee Bangladesh Is interests both in

maintaining peace and security and in accelerating the peace of

socio-economic development.

The rational for the efforts of Bangladesh's commitment

to the causes of· the Islamic Ummah could very well be understood

if one takes a closer look at the resources of Islamic World ... ··.

Since about the mid- 1 70s the Islamic countries of the Middle

East became an important source of aid for Bangladesh. During

105. The Hindu. 18 March 1987.

220

the initial years Bangladesh received $ 200 million Saudi aid,

and one billion dollars in 1978. During the Second Five-Year

Plan period (1980-85) total expected aid from Saudi Arabia was 7

or 8 billion dollars. 106 In November 1974 Kuwait signed an

accord for long-term economic cooperation. The fields of

cooperation included joint ventures in cement, fertilizer,

shipping, gas pipeline expansion, transmission and

distribution of electricity in rural areas. 107 In May 1981

Kuwait provided a loan of $ 29 million for eight rural

electrification projects.108 Saudi A~abia and Kuwait proved to

be the major donors of petro dollars. Besides, ·the Middle East

is also the only source of Bangladesh's crude 9il import 109

In the wake of Iran-Iraq War, India was put ~n an unenviable

and delicate position on issues like naming and condemning the

aggressor. The first official reaction was pronounced by

106. Bangladesh Observer, 21 December 1978.

107. Ibid, 12 December 1979.

108. Bangladesh in International Affairs 5, May 1981.

(Dhaka), vol. 4, no.

109. The aid includes grant and loan elements: of food aid, project aid and non-project aid. For details of ·aid received by Bangladesh from Arab and Western. source:::··see Ministry of Finance, External Resource Division, Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh (as of June 30, 1981), pp. 20-22 and 26-27. Also see Syed Anwar Hussain, 11 Bangladesh And the Organization of Islamic Conference 11

Asian Affairs (Dhaka), vol 9, no. 2, April- June 1987, p. 22.

221

the Government spokesman when he described the conflict as "an

unfortunate development" on two counts - it was between two

countries with whom Ihdia had very friendly relations and both

of them were non-aligned. An Indian scholar pointed out

"India's dilemma at this time was in a sense comparable to the

Soviet predicament way back in 1962 on the India China

border War. 11110 India was the oniy country to which the emis-

saries of the two Government rushed. It was a measure of trust

and faith in India that both Iran and Iraq turned to her to

seek support for their position111 Special envoys of both Iran

and Iraq visited India on 28 September 1980 and 8 October 1980

respectively. 112

Although India· expressed its deep conce~n over the Iran-

Iraq conflict, it avoided spel.ling out its ·judgement. P. V.

Narasimha Rao, the then Minister for External Affairs, said

11 ••••• India made it clear that it has not taken and will not

take sides and has expressed its anguish at the loss of life and

property being, suffered by both sides. 11 He also said that

110. A. H. H. Abidi, 11 Iran-:- Iraq war And India: Some Key · Factors·•i, · · Mainstream ·;(New: n·elhi)"·, vol. 3 7, no. 3 7, May 16, 1981, P. 23- 24.

111. Ibid.

112. 11 Iran- Iraq Conflict, Statement by Minister for External Affairs, P. V. Narsimha Rao 11 , Rajya Salbha Debate, (New Delhi), vol. CXVI, no. 1-7, 18 November JI.98;0, pp. 293-302.

222

prolongation or escalation of the present conflict could have

grave implications on both regional and global peace and

security. 113 Besides, at the UN General Assembly on 3 October

1980, P. V. Narasimha Rao said that the continuing conflict

between the two countries would "only weaken tfie solidarity

of the non-aligned and developing countries. 114

India's policy and attitude were indicated through a

collective forum the joint communique issued by the

conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Non-aligned states

in February 19 81. India reiterated and· emphasized the

implementation of the principles of non-aligned countries as

outlined in para 26 of the Final Declaration which dealt with

the Iran-Iraq issue. During the Question Hour in Rajya Sabha

the Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Shiv Shankar

said:

"No state should acquire or occupy territories by the use of force, and whatever territories have been acquired in this way should be returned, that no act of aggression should be committed against any state, that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states should be respected, that no state should try to interfere or intervene in the internal affairs of.other states, that all differences or claims which may exist between states should be settled by

113. Ibid, p. 294.

114. Ibid, p. 295.

223

peaceful means with a view that peacelul relations should prevail among members of states~ 11

India also tried its best to end this war through peaceful

means. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, urged King Fahd

of Saudi Arabia to intensify efforts to end the Iran-Iraq War.

In a letter to the Saudi monarch, which was delivered by a three-

member Indian Good-will delegation to the·Kingdom, Mrs. Indira

Gandhi said that the prolonged war between the non-aligned

countries had threatened the security of Asia as some forces were

keen to take advantage of the situation. 116

On March 29, 19?5 India's new Prime Minister, Rajiv -Gandhi,

in one of the biggest diplomatic offensives, sent the Minister

of State for Foreign Affairs, Khurshid Al am khan, and

Foreign Secretary, Romesh Bhandari to Iran. They tried to

persuade the two adversaries not to bombard the civilian areas.

The Indian peac·e team returned on March 31, . 1985 and Khurshid

Alam Khan described his discussions in Tehran as useful and said

that India's approach to bring the Gulf War to an end was very

. 117 much appreciated by Iran.

115. "India's role in lessening Te;:nsion arising out ot .-Iran.:.. :r.raq · war",. Rajya· ·s·a:bha Debate (New Delhi), vol. CXVII, no. 1-7, 20 February 1989, pp. 87-88.

116. Amrita Bazar Patrika. September 27, 1984

117. Tulsi Two 124.

Ram, Persia to Iran One Step Forward Steps Backward (Mahajan Pub., New Delhi 1988~ p.

224

As the chairman of NAM, India made considerable efforts to

stop the tragic war. On 18 February 1986 the official spokesman

of the Government of India issued a statement on behalf of the

Chairman expressing concern and anguish at the renewed

escalation of the conflict. It noted that as Chairman of the

NAM, India had consistently endeavored through manY. initiatives

to bring about an end to the Iran-Iraq conflict and to promote

peaceful settlement in the interests of both countries as well

as for stability and peace in the region. The statement

stated that "· .. India was ready to assist them in a sincere and

constructive manner in evolving a phased programme of de-

escalation leading to a just, comprehensive and honorable

solution of the differences that had divided the two

countries." 118

Regarding the devastating Gulf War, India's concern was

genuine. But it could not use the NAM as an exclusive platform

for sorting out the dispute. In fact both Iran-Iraq were f~rm

on their decision not to budge an inch from their rigid

positions. Prof. A.H.H. Abidi rightly pointed out:

"The Gulf War presents an interesting spectacle of

118. Non-Aligned under India's Chairmanship (Published under the auspices of Indian Institute for Non-Aligned Studies, New Delhi, 1986) pp 32-33.

225

international diplomatic demarches as regards issues and mediation. . . This was the first occasion when the international community made diplomatic efforts at three different levels-UN, non-aligned and ore to bring about · peace. However, although the decision in these forums ranged from occupied territories, the aggressor was not named. The. belligerent themselves adopted rigid positions." 119

India's stand on the war was seen by Iranians as partisan

and pro-Arab. The mediation efforts in the Iran-Iraq conflict

had been hampered for various reasons. India had also

cultivated close relations with Iraq since the mid-sixties.

In the economic terms 52 percent of all the construction

projects being executed by India in foreign countries were

located in Iraq and this significantly influenced the Indian

attitude. Besides favourable economic relations with Iraq,

other factors also determined .India's response to the Iraq-Iran

conflict. These were: the presence of a large number of Indian

workers and professionals· in Arab Gulf States; Indian

participation in civil construction in that region and the fact

that the majority of the. Arab world supported Iraq. These

constraints led to the belief that India's stand on the Iran-

Iraq War had been partisan and pro-Arab. 120

119. A.H.H. Abidi, "The Iran-Iraq War : A Balance Sheet," in R.C. Sharma, ed., Perspective on !rag- Iran Conflict (Raj esh Pub, New Delhi, 1984), p. 86

120. Year Book on India's Foreign Policy 1985-86 1985-86 (New Delhi. 1987), p 114.

226

Iran always suspected that India had a military training

team in Iraq that predated the Gulf War. On occasions Iranian

officials voiced their apprehension that some of the Indian

teams were specifically positioned in Iraq to help maintain

combat aircraft of Soviet manufacture. 121

India's policy has always been to condemn all aggressions

and to deny the fruit of aggression in any part of the world.

But India did not condemn Iraqi invasion on Iran. Secondly,

India· also did not condemn the Iraqi use of chemical weapons.

In January 1981, Iran alleged that chemical weapons had been

used by Iraq during the fighting around Ahwaz in Khuzistan.

More detailed allegations came late in 1982. India could have

examined all these developments and issued a statement

condemning the use of chemical weapons. Since India was one of

the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which outlaws the ...

use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gas and of all

analogous liquid materials and devices. 122

India lost an opportunity to win Iran's confidence when the

latter was looking for support in its criticism of Iraq's use

of chemical weapons. In April 1988, Iranian ambassador,

121. The Hindu, August 17, 1989.

122. Year Book on India's Foreign Policy no. 138, p 115.

227

Ebrahim Behnam Dehkordy, said that Iran would like India to

lead the members of the non-aligned movement in condemning Iraq

for using chemical weapons in the Gulf War. This was a

humanitarian issue. He further said that as leader of the NAM

and its Chairman, India was expected to 11 take an appropriate

position" on chemical weapons and other issues of humanitarian

nature. It is, t·nerefore, not surprising that the Indiari peace

initiative did not achieve any break-through -during the non­

aligned Summit held at New Delhi in March 1983. 123

Iran also accused the UN of having failed to take the

necessary steps to prohibit Iraq's 'aggressive act, Iran had

exhausted all appeals to reason and logic.n 124

The Kashmir issue

This issue has remained a bone of contention between India

and Pakistan in the sub-continent since the partition in 1947.

Both have fought three wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971. The first

two wars were fought over Kashmir. The issue has largely

influenced the international outlook of the two countries, and

has caused embarrassing situations for the friends and 'allies'

of the two countries. Support for Pakistan's position on the .J • - •·

123. Statesman, Apri~ 23, 1988.

124. See Velayati, n. 43, p. 9.

228

Kashmir issue was the yardstick used by

the friendship of other nations.

Pakistan

Iran extended diplomatic support to Pakistan.

to measure

The Iranian

Television carried a special programme on Jammu and Kashmir in

J_uly 1982. The programme clearly upheld Pakistan's point of

view on the Kashmir issue and referred to the Indian state

of the Kashmir as "Indian-held Kashmir". The programme traced

the history of Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir and the

Indian failure to grant them the right of self-determination.

This reflected Iran's position on Jammu and Kashmir-the first

time since the Islamic revolution in Iran that publicly

supported Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue. 125

In 1983 Ayatollah Khomeini's regime invited a Britain-based

Kashmir independence group, working for Kashmir's 'independence'

to participate in a celebration marking Iran's revolution day

in February.

According to

Independence

The group has its headquarters in Glasgow.

the Hindus tan Times, dated 6 April _1983, Kashmir

Group had been greatly encouraged by the

recognition given to it by Ayatollah Khomeini's regime.~ 26

The Iranian Parliament (Majlis) also discussed the Kashmir

125. The Muslim , August 1,1982.,

126. See for details The Hindustan Times, 6, April 1983.

229

issue. In the opening session of the Majlis on March 4,1990,

Speaker Karrubi focussed his remarks on the events in Jammu and

Kashmir and condemned the Indian Government for violent

against the Muslims of Jammu confrontation

province. 127 He termeq the Indian Government' s

and Kashmir

treatment of

the Kashmir Muslims as i~rational and injudicious· and expressed

his regr.et and sorrow._Karrubi also warned the Indian Government

to deal with the case of the Jammu and Kashmir in a rational and

judicious manner, saying that the problem could not be resolved

through killings and violence. While expressing his condolence

to the bereaved Kashmir families, the Majlis Speaker called on

the Iranian Foreign Ministry to do its utmost in order to end

the massacre of the Kashmir Muslims. 128

On· 8 March 1990, the Kashmiri Muslims residing in Iran

gathered in front of the UN mission in Tehran and ~ondemned the

massacre of Muslims by Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. In

that gathering the Muslims of Kashmir passed a resolution in

which they lent support to the liberation movement of the

people of Jammu and Kashmir, while seeking the implementation

of all resolutions ratified by the UN aimed at staging a free

and impartial referendum in Kashmir. Another part of the

127. FBIS/NES, 24 May 1980.

128. Ibid.

230

resolution stated:

"We Muslims of Kashmir residing in Iran demand the speedy and unconditional withdrawal of Indian forces from the territory of our beloved land. Further, we urge the UN, the Islamic countries Conference, the Non-aligned movement, all liberation movements, and all freedom-seeking leaders of the world, as well as the Islamic world in particular the dear revolutionary brothers. and sisters and the martyr-nurt1.:1ring ummah of Iran to lend support to the Jihad of Muslims of Kashmir against the Indian Government. 11129

The Iranian media also took note of prevailing developments

in Jammu and Kashmir. A morning daily Jomhuri -e-Eslami stressd

that the aggressive attitude of the Indian government towards

Muslims in Kashmir would have no outcome but increase scope of

furious protest of Muslims. In a weekly commentary on recent

bloody clashes in Kashmir, the Persian language Jomhuri -e-

Eslami noted that the attitude of the Indian government would ...

also make .. the Muslims in Kashmir more determined to settle

their dispute with the Government once and for all. "Demands of

Muslims in Kashmir are clear to the government'_, the commentary

said, adqipg that 'they were determined to regain their

rights". It also noted that "irrational reactions by the Indian

government further indicate that authorities and local forces

have not realized {the ) gravity of the situation." 130

129. Ibid, March 15, 1990

130. Quoted in FBIS/NES, March 8, 1990.

231

The Iranian concern on the Kashmir issue should be seen

in the light

solidarity with

of· Iran's

the oppressed

consistent

Muslims

policy of expressing

everywhere be they in

Palestine, Eritrea, southern Philippines or Western Sahara.

President Hashemi Rafsanjani said" ... We will continue our

eiforts to eliminate this oppression, and we believe that time

when Muslims were crushed and pressured and their request

ignored throughout the world, has ended and that the policy

of iron fists regarding Islamic beliefs will not be

effective". A statement issued by the Foreign Ministry

spokesman in Tehran · on April 15, 1990 said that the Indian

Government not only hurts religious and humanitarian sentiments

of the World Muslims but also wipes out the possibility of

resolving the issue through wise and rational means.

Meanwhile, the Central Secretariat of Friday Prayer Leaders

throughout Iran also issued a statement condemning the

massacre, while urging resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir

issue through peaceful means. The statement further expressed

condolence on the martyrdom of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir.

to world leaders and ·the people of India. 131 .

At the same time, the Iranian government offered to mediate

between India. and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. The Iranian

131. FBIS/NES, May 6, 1990,

232

ambassador in Islamabad, Javed Mansuri, on April 14, disclosed

that the Islamic Republic and other countries had offered to

mediate on the issue, had yet to receive the Indian

Government's reply. He expressed hope that the Indian

government would forgo its use of force in Jammu and Kashmir, and

work towards a peaceful solution of the issue. 132

The Kashmir issue became an irritant in the Indo-Iranian

relations particularly after 1990. The Foreign Minister T. K.

Gujral's visit to Iran scheduled from January 19,1990, was

called off by Tehran. The Iranian decision was seen in New

Delhi as a demonstration of its critical stand on the then

current developments in Kashmir. Iran reaffirmed its

solidarity with Pakistan on· the question of Jammu and

Kashmir. Accepting the credentials of Pakistan's ambassador

designate in May 6, 1990, President Hashemi

Rafsanj ani said that the peaceful settlement of the Kashnd.r

problem and Afghan issue would contribute to the cause of

peace and stability in the area. In the meantime, the

ambassador said that Pakistan highly appreciated Iran's right and

principled support on the Kashmir.issue. 133

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid, April 16, 1990.

233

The NPT Issue

Iran was concerned about. "nuclear race" in the Indian

subcontinent. It supported the stand of Pakistan and Bangladesh

on a draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a Nuclear-

Free Zone in South Asia" in UN. Apparently the intentions of

Iran, Pakistan and Bangladesh were not secret. On the

nuclear race, Pakistan and Bangladesh always expressed their

reservation and in a subtle manner, inspite of India's

objection, they pledged to make the. subcontinent a "nuclear free

zone". 134

India voted against the draft resolution, maintaining

that the nuclear disarmament was a global, not a regional issue

and that lasting World peace could be built only on the basis

of general ·and complete ·disarmament under effective

international control. It believed that the security provided by

a nuclear- weapon-f~ee-zone was illusory, given the global search

of nuclear weapons and the fact the such zones did nothing to

reduce the level of existing nuclear stock-pile~. Nevertheless,

India did not object to certain proposals· for the establishment

of such zones because, in the first place, the proposal enjoyed

consensus among the states of the region concerned. 135

134. "General Assembly ·and D-isarmament", (Department of Disarmament Affairs, Disarmament, New York 1990), pp. 91-92.

135. Ibid.

234

United Nations Department of