53

CHAPTER - Ill

GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC POLICIES OF ERSHAD

In this chapter various policies of Ershad and his style of

governance has been discussed. This is necessary to analyse the

impact of his policies on the civil society and its various groups and

further to study the growing dissatisfaction of the people against the

Ershad regime leading to the movement to dislodge him from power

and democratization of the polity.

After the assassination of General Zia, Justice Abdus Sattar,

the Vice-President was nominated by the Bangladesh Nationalist

Party (BNP) as a compromise candidate for the Presidential election to be

held within six months of the vacancy. The sixth amendment was adopted

in the Parliament on 8 July 1981 to enable Justice Sattar to contest the

Presidential election without resigning his office, by excluding the offices of

President and Vice-President or Acting President from being "office of

Profit". Most of the opposition parties boycotted the Parliamentary Se~sion

in which the amendment was adopted.,

Coming of Ershad to Power : Justice Sattar won the

Presidential elections held in November 1981. But he failed to resolve

the factional quarrels within the BNP, escalating inflation and decline

, Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and the Challenge of Development - A Study of Politics and Military Intervention in Bangladesh (New Delhi, 1995), p. 189.

54

in law and order situation. In such circumstances Lt. Gen. H.M.

Ershad led a peaceful coup against the BNP regime on 24 March

1982. President Sattar was removed and his cabinet was dissolved.

Martial law was declared and many provisions of the 1972 constitution

was suspended, especially those relating to human rights. Political

parties, including the Awami League (AL) and the BNP were banned.

The press was restricted, and arrests of dissidents were common.

Trials were held in military courts, if they took place at all. 2

The coup, however, did not generate mass resistance. Few

reasons have been attributed to this. First, Bangladesh does not have

the tradition of popular resistance to military takeovers, rather

recurring coups have been common phenomenon of the political

system of Bangladesh. Second, internal bickering in the ruling party

'over distribution of positions, patronage and power destroyed its

resistance capability. There was none commanding stature akin to Zia,

to give the party an image of a cohesive entity. Finally, mass apathy

towards politics and politicians had developed due to the gap between

promises and performances of the ruling politicians and also because

of frequent change of party affiliations on part of politicians. 3

2 Craig Baxter, "Bangladesh : A Parliamentary Democracy, if They Can Keep It", Current History, 91 (563), March 1992, p. 132.

3 Muhammad A. Hakim, Bangladesh Politics : The Shahabuddin Interregnum (Dhaka, 1993), p. 12.

55

From the very beginning since Ershad assumed power, he

suffered from a variety of disabilities and his regime's legitimacy was

questioned. First, Ershad had toppled an elected President. Second,

Ershad had not played any role in the liberation war during which he

was in Pakistan. Moreover, he neither had a charismatic personality

nor the status of a national hero. Third, his government was under

constant pressure from different groups like the students, urban

middle class and the political parties to hold free and fair elections and

to restore democracy. Fourth, Ershad's civilianization efforts were

never very successful. His Jatiyo Party (JP) was the product of the

cantonment to which were drawn disgruntled politicians of varied party

affiliations. It was through favours and patronage that he held together

its members. Finally his efforts to use religion to muster popular

support was also not successful. 4

Nature of Decision Making : The government under Ershad

was highly centralized and dominated by the military. The executive

authority rested in the hands of the president and was exercised by

him either directly or through officers subordinate to him. Under

Ershad the Presidential Secretariat became the most powerful organ

of government. In theory the Council of Ministers was the highest

decision-making body in Bangladesh. It was composed of the Prime

Minister, one or more Deputy Prime Ministers, and all senior Ministers.

4 Stanley A. Kochanek, Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh (New Delhi, 1993), p. 60.

56

The Prime Minister was appointed by the President from among the

members of the Parliament and was responsible to him. The Council of

Ministers was responsible for advising and assisting the President in

exercise of his functions.

In practice, the Council of Ministers was not the center of decision-

making. Its meetings were used largely to make announcements and

receive reports from ministers. Decision-making was actually done by

Ershad and a group of generals or minister close to him.5

Reshuffling of Cabinets was done frequently during the time of

Ershad. From 1982 to July 1990, Ershad reshuffled his cabinet sixty-

three times. The size of the Cabinet began to reflect its role as a forum

for building support through patronage. It grew from 11 members in

June 1982 to 38 members in 1989.6

Under Ershad, the government of Bangladesh grew to some

30 ministries. The government employed over one million people.

The size of the government work force doubled since 1971, making

the government the largest employer in the country. By May 1985,

the strength of the civil servants in Bangladesh had gone up to

1,194,130.

5 ibid., p. 64. 6 Dhaka Courier, 4-10 May 1990, p. 28.

;

57

Implementation of plans were impossible without the

cooperation of the bureaucracy. The press, the public, and organised

interests grew increasingly critical of the massive gap that was

obvious between the declared policy of the government and its actual

implementation at the ground level.

There was also provision for a number of Councils and

committees meant for consultation with organised groups in society.

They could at best serve as forums for discussion. They were too

large and did not meet regularly. Some important councils were the

National Economic Council (NEC), the Executive Committee of the

National Economic Council (ECNEC), the National Committee for

industrial Development (NNCID), and the Standing Committee of the

National Committee for Industrial Development (SCNCID).

During the Ershad period, most policy decisions were subject to

manipulation. Even the annual budget was treated with utter

disregard. Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) were frequently used

to raise or lower excise tax, import duty or export benefit. Ershad had

little respect for institutions. He had a patrimonial style of decision

making. Data, plans, budgets and foreign investment guarantees had

little meaning for him. For Ershad, distributing presidential largess and

patronage was decision making. 7

7 Bangladesh Observer (Dhaka), 13 December 1988.

58

Apart from the executive, other institutions played only a

minimal role. The parliament, the courts, and the press were subjected

to repeated assaults by the executive whenever they dared to

question or criticize executive authority. As a result, there was hardly

any mechanism for maintaining accountability. All the powers were

concentrated in the executive. Therefore, in order to initiate, alter,

influence or hinder any government action, groups had to focus almost

their entire effort on the executive. Since only a small elite had access

to Ershad~ most groups were forced to take to direct action in the form

of strikes, demonstrations, and hartals to attract attention. 8

Military in Politics : Historical facts demonstrate that the Third

World countries have been largely susceptible to military intervention

in politics and resulted in the emergence of what Lasswell has termed

- a "garrison state". 9 However, even the most developed countries of

the western world cannot be treated as an exception. Whether it is the

rule of the military leaders tor a short time and tor a specific purpose

just to correct or consolidate the Constitutional government, or it is a

long-range arrangement born out of a coup, it is the rule of the elite

unbound by constitutional restrains. As such, it is a clear violation of

the principles of a democratic system, no matter the leaders in power

!oudly declare their commitment to the cause of protection and

8 Kochanek, n. 4, p. 70. 9 Harrold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison - State Hypothesis Today", in S.P. Huntigton (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York, 1962), pp. 51, 53.

59

promotion of the legitimate interests of the governed by saving them

from the imminent disasters of a crisis. 10

There are three major views on the role of the armed forces in

the modernization and development of Third-World countries. The first

view holds that the military is, by definition and tradition, an apolitical,

institutionally conservative force, untrained in the tactics and

strategies ua civilian rule and political management. It further asserts

that the military has an indirect institutional desire to serve its

corporate interest, and is thus incapable of leading the modernizing

nations to advancement.

Huntington also supports this position. He holds the view that

the military is incapable of making real efforts towards building

political institutions even though they are modernisers. Huntington's

emphasis thus centres around the distinction between modernisation

on the one hand and development on the other. Development,

according to him, is a phenomenon which involves the building of

political institutions that will far outlast military rule. 11

A second view asserts that the revolution is the only mechanism by

which development and reform can be brought about and that the regular

military is the principal obstacle to this process in developing nations.

~o J.J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, 1962), p. 21. 11 S.P. Huntington (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York, 1962).

60

This view is, in part, relatHd to the first in its emphasis on

military conservatism, although the main thrust differs. Stressing a

neo-Marxist viewpoint, it rejects the notion that the Third World

military is capable of any real development due to its dependence on

the 'big powers' for hardware, training and other procurements. On the

Latin American Scene, this school of thought is exemplified by the

works of Nun (1967), Petras (1970) and Cockcroft (1972).

The third view asserts that military values, skills and ideologies

are the antithesis of the first two positions - that the military politicians

In the Third World make the best, the most thorough-going and

perhaps the only reliable managers of social change.

Implicit in the last point of view is the argument that the military

in Third-world nations is the most effective supervisory agency for

directed change. This, it is argued, is because the military is itself, the

most modernised and highly disciplined nationwide institution capable

of guaranteeing the political stability necessary for economic

development. Pye (1962), Shils (1962) and Johnson (1964) are

prominent among the supporters of military rule in the Third-world

countries. 12

The former President and Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Z.A.

Bhutto, later deposed by martial law proclaimed by General Ziaul

12 Alfred Stephan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, 1971 ), p. 64.

61

Haque, wrote : "One of the fundamental realities of 1978 is that the

people have realized that Martial Law is not law, a regime that can

suspend or abrogate the constitution and run the country on its whims

and caprice should be ashamed of bringing on its lips the word 'law'. I

do not want anyone to escape from the law. But I definitely want to

escape from the lawlessness of Martial Law ..... Civilization means

civilian supremacy. Military coup d'etas are a disaster". 13

Imposition of Martial Law in many countries have led

academicians, jurists, statesmen and political thinkers to define it.

Martial law has been defined as- 'the union of legislative, judicial and

executive power in one person'; 'the law of the soldier applied to the

civilian'; 'the will of the general of the army'; 'military rule exercised by

a state over its citizens in an emergency which justifies such action,

either in time of war or any occasion when the civil authorities

because of public disorder or natural catastrophe, are unable to

preserve order or enforce their laws'; 'sway exercised by a military

commander over all persons, whether civil or military, within the precincts

of his command in places whether there is either no civil jud:cature or the

civil judicature has ceased to exist' or 'stage intermediate between law and

anarchy in which the normal administration of the law having broken down,

the authority appointed in accordance with law maintains order by

h d '14 summary met o s .

13 Z.A. Bhutto, If 1 am Assassinnated ("'~w)elhi,1~19), pp. 112, 113, 132. 14 Stephan, n. 11, p. 75.

62

In the case of Bangladesh, the military directly intervened in

politics in August 1975. Zia rebuilt and expanded the size of the

military, and centralized power in his hands. Despite his attempt to

rebuild and professionalize the armed forces, General Zia was never

able to re-establish complete cohesion or effective discipline in a

military whose officers and men had become highly politicized. Zia's

attempt to civilianize his regime was not very successful. There were

as many as 26 coup attempts to topple his government. 15

Following Zia's assassination, Justice Sattar became the Acting

President. With Sattar's help, General Ershad removed a large

number of such officers from the military who were opposed to him.

Ershad took calculated measures to wipe out the syndrome of

insurrection within the armed forces. This was an imperative to ensure

his consolidation of and continuation in power. 16

One of the most important divisions in the post 1971

Bangladeshi military was that between the radical, politicized freedom

fighters who fought the civil war and the large professional units that

had been stranded in Pakistan. Resentment between these two

factions was further aggravated by the special benefits and

accelerated promotions granted to freedom fighters by the Awami

15 Azizul Huque, "Bangladesh in 1980 : Strains and Stresses - Opposition in Doldrums", Asian Survey, 21 : 2 (February, 1981 ).

16 Hakim, n. 3, p. 13.

63

League. Since most of the almost two dozen coups during the Zia

years were led by the highly politicized freedom fighters, their ranks

became gradually thinned with each purge that followed an

unsuccessful coup. As a result, by 1981 only 15 percent of the

Bangladeshi armed forces were freedom fighters, 25 percent were

repatriates, and 60 percent had been recruited since 1971 as Zia

increased the size of the army from five divisions in 1975 to nine in

,1981. The officer corps increased from 1000 in 1975 to 4,000 by the

1980s. Most of the 400 officers above the rank of Major belonged to

the repatriated faction led by General H.M. Ershad. These officers

were mostly middle and lower middle class and had family ties with

urban bureaucrats, business groups and professionals. They were

comfortable with the idea of a military government. 17

Ershad publicly demanded a share for the military in the country's

politics and government. Ershad stressed that the military had to intervene

to root out corruption and restore law and order. After Sattar won

Presidential election on 15 November 1981, Army Chief General Ershad

convened a press conference on 29 November and demanded the

participation of the armed forces in administering the country. 18

17 Kochanek, n. 4, p. 61.

is Quoted in the editorial essay by Yusuf Muhammad, in Yusuf Muhammad (ed.), Album To/par: Gono Andolan {1982-90), Vol. 1 (Chittagong, 1993).

64

By 1982, the developments in Bangladesh reached a

watershed. On 24 March 1982, Ershad violated the Constitution,

ousted President Abdus Sattar and his Government and captured

power by martial law proclamation. The President was forced to

announce over the radio and the television that he voluntarily

abdicated power in favour of Ershad. 19

Ershad's seizure of power was totally undemocratic,

unconstitutional and illegitimate. According to the Bangladesh

Constitution, in case the President is unable to discharge his

responsibilities, he can tender his resignation to the Vice-President. In

case both the position of the President and the Vice-President are

vacant, the Speaker of the Jatiyo Sangsad is to discharge the

responsibilities of the President - till a new President or Vice-President

gets elected. 20 Ershad did not permit Sattar, in case he wanted to relieve

himself from the post of Presidency, to utilize the aforesaid provisions of

the Constitution. Ershad captured power by naked display of force.

Ershad's power rested on the military. Therefore, he took every

care for the enhancement of facilities, pay and patronage of this

group. The size of the armed forces was increased. The military

budget was greatly enhanced. Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 show the

19 Dainik tttefaq, 25 March 1982. 20 S.R. Chakravarty, Bangladesh Under Mujib, Zia and Ershad (New Delhi, 1995), p. 283.

65

Table 1.1

Growth of Bangladesh Army, Navy, Air Force and Paramilitary Forces, 1972-90

Source:

Year Armed Forces

1972 10,000

1975-76 52,000*

1976-77 63,000

1977-78 71,000

1978-79 71,500

1979-80 72,000

1980-81 77,000

1981-82 77,000

1982-83 77,000

1983-84 81,300

1984-85 81,300

1985-86 91,300

1988-89 101,500

1989-90 103,000

1990-91 110,000

International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), 1972-91, The Military Balance.

* Includes the incorporation of the National Defense Force into the Army.

66

Table 1.2

Growth of Defence Budgets in Bangladesh, 1972-73 to 1986-87

Year

1972-73

1973-74

1974-75

1975-76

1976-77

1977-78

1978-79*

1979-80

1980-81

1981-82

1982-83

1983-84

1984-85

1985-86

1986-87

Source:

Defense Budget Defense Budget Percentage (Tk. Millions) as percentage of increase in

total revenue Defense budget budget

400 14.00

470 12.56 17.09

710* 15.09 51.06

1350* 17.87 46.81

1552 16.06 14.96

1624 14.05 4.64

2427 13.47

2525 11.51 4.03

3470 12.54 37.42

3820 13.80 10.09

4184 12.31 9.53

4651 13.42 11.16

5012 13.35 7.82

6592 14.75 31.52

Maniruzzaman, 1988. 'Politics: Bangladesh', Unpublished manuscript, p. 16.

67

growth of Bangladesh military between 1972-1990. Table 1.2 shows the

growth of the defence budget during the same period.

The process of militarization of the administration was purs_ued

relentlessly by Ershad. A large number of military officers were awarded

responsible positions in civilian institutions. Of 22 large corporations, 14

were headed by serving or retired members of the armed forces, and of

48 heads of missions abroad, one third were drawn from the defense

forces. 21 Military personnel were appointed to the high echelons of

police administration. Police administration at the district level was so

thoroughly militarized that at one time in as many as 53 out of 64

districts, the Superintendents of Police were former military officers. 22 In

1987 about 1,500 members of armed forces were appointed in civilian

positions in the government.23 The Civil Aviation Authority and the

Bangladesh Biman, the national airline had 25 military officers. To

enhance the control of the military over the civil administration, a Zila

Parishad bill was passed in 1987 to include military officers in local

level administration. The government, however, had to back out in the

face of massive popular protests. 24 At the political level, 40 percent of

21 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "The Fall of the Military Dictator : 1991 Elections and the Prospect of Civilian Rule in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs, March 1992.

22 Ahmed Shafiqul Huque and Muhammad Yeahia Akhter, "Militarization and Opposition in Bangladesh " Parliamentary Approval and Public Reaction", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 27 : 2 (July 1989), p. 177.

23 Hassanuzzaman, Bangladesh : Rashtra 0 Sarkarer Shamarikaran (Militarization of State andn Government) (Dhaka, 1991 ), p. 41.

24 Ali Riaz, State, Class and Military Rule : Political Economy of Martial Law in Bangladesh (Dhaka, 1994), p. 257.

68

Ershad's ministers were military or former military officers and senior

generals. Ershad hoped to create a government led by the military and

to organize society in a way that would enable him to bypass the

traditional political parties. 25 Ershad attempted militarization in order to

exercise his control over the entire administrative machinery through

his military officers. 26 Table 1.3 and 1.4 shows the occupational

background of the members of the Cabinet formed after the coup in

1982 and of the Council of Ministers in 1986.

Table 1.3

Occupational background of the members of the cabinet formed after the coup in 1982

Armed forces personnel Civil servants Lawyers Technocrats

8 4 2 3

Source: GOB (1982), Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh, p. 8.

Table 1.4

Top management positions of the autonomous and semi­autonomous bodies as of 1986

Occupation Number Percentage

Civil servants 18 33.0 Military personnel 20 37.0 Professionals 16 29.0

Total 54 100.00

25 Tawfiq E. Chowdhury, Privatization of State Enterprises in Bangladesh - 1976-1984, Korea Development I nnstitute, 1987, p. 11 .

26 Hakim, n. 3, p. 13.

69

It becomes amply clear that the army which was the source of

Ershad's power was being nurtured through patronage and privileges

and had become central to the decision making process.

Economic Policy of the Ershad Regime : Ershad assumed power

in March 1982, the economy had stagnated and foreign aid support had

declined. Ziaur Rahman abolished socialist principles and eliminated

the constitutional barriers to the development of the capitt.. .. "'t system.

The Ershad regime "accelerated that process by implementing the

disinvestment and privatization policies at a wider scale". 27

The New Industrial Policy (NIP) was adopted in June 1982. Its

goal was to improve the investment climate and to accelerate the rate

of industrial development in Bangladesh, so as to increase employment

opportunities and raise iiving standards.

In the agricultural sector, the regime withdrew subsidies from the

agricultural inputs. This weakened the poor and the middle class

farmers, but strengthened the economic base of the rich peasants who

received the dealership in the distribution of development inputs. These

policies siphoned off capital from agricultural productions for investment

in urban service and trade sectors. 28

27 A.M. Quamrul Alam, The nature of the Bangladesh State in the post-1975 period, Contemporary South Aisa, 2(3), (1993), p. 319.

28 ibid., p. 319.

70

In the industrial sector liberal policies were adopted by the

regime. The nationalized industries were facing the problem of capital

generation. Ershad's policies were aimed at transferring nationalized

units to private hands, and efforts were made to encourage the private

sector to play an accelerated role in the country's economy. Decision

was taken to denationalize jute and textile mills and to privatize the

public sector through the formation nf P-Ublic-private mixed units. Public

sector was restricted to six basic and strategic industries. These related

to steel, fertilizer and heavy industries. 29

In order to increase the flow of capital to the private sector, the

regime approved the operation of nine private banks, six insurance

companies and two financial institutions. Moreover, the financial

institutions controlled by the government were given directives to lend

money to the private sectors. Control ad regulations on the private

sector were liberalized. A variety of incentives and concessions were

designed to enhance and protect new industries. The regime took steps

to encourage the transfer of black money into productive investment.

The import-export policies were liberalized. The government introduced

an export financing system, an import quota system and revised the

tariff structure. 30

The new economic policy of Ershad enjoyed the support of the

business elite, the World Bank and a section of bureaucracy. Students,

29 Kochanek, n. 4, p. 95.

30 The World Bank Report, Washington DC., 1986, pp. 110-117.

71

middle class intellectuals, academicians, Awami League and leftist

parties, key elements in bureaucracy, and especially public sector

labour unions supported public ownership of the means of production. 31

Ershad's government also alienated the major federation of

Trade Unions, Sramik Karamchari Oikkay Parishad' (SKOP) or the

United Front of Workers and Employees. The government accepted and

the later went back on its promise to accept the demands of the

workers and employees which included a demand for a minimum

national wage, amendments of repressive laws on trade unions,

stoppage of privatization of public industries and the reopening of

closed industries.

The denationalization and disinvestment policies proved far more

difficult and painful for implementation. Business community charged

that the bureaucracy attempted to sabotage the process by establishing

unfair asset values and forcing on the owners out dated equipments,

unpaid liabilities and bloated workforce. On the other hand, there were

counter charges of financial manipulation and irregularity on part of the

buyers. A number of factories did eventually close. But a large number

of denationalized jute and cotton textile mills faced major difficulties due

to weak demand and accumulated liabilities. 32

31 Kochanek, n. 4, p. 96.

32 ibid., pp. 97, 98.

72

The entire momentum of Ershad's NIP began to slow down by

mid 1984 as opposition grew against the regime and its new policies.

Decentralization of Administration : In Bangladesh about 85

per cent of the population live in the rural areas and are directly

dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. 33

During the P~'~istani period Ayub Khan experimented with Basic

Democracies at the rural level. Ayub's approach to rural development

was predominantly bureaucratic in which the elected representatives

had to operate under tight official control. With the independence of

Bangladesh, Mujib abolished Basic Democracies but could not design

alternative form of rural administration. In June 1980, the Bangladesh

Nationalist Party (BNP) led government of General Zia passed a bill

proposing the establishment of Gram Sarkar. The opposition raised

objection to it since it did provide for a democratically elected village

body which enjoyed full autonomy from official domination.

In July 1982, Gram Sarkar was abolished. Ershad appointed the

Committee tor Administrative Reorganisation I Reformation (CARR).

The committee was asked to design "an effective administrative system

based on the spirit of devolution and the objective of taking the

administration nearer to the people". 34

33 Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistical Research, 1983-84, Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh.

34 Government of People's Republic of Bangladesh, Report of the Committee for Administrative Reorganization I Reform (June 1982), Preface.

73

The CARR recommended the . devolution of developmental,

administrative and financial powers to the Thana, later renamed Upazila

(UZ) or subdistrict. The government announced its intention of using

the Thanas as the "focal point of all administrative activities". 35

On the basis of the recommendation of the CARR, the Chairmen

of 460 Upazilas were elected on the basis of universal adult franchise

between May 16 and 20, 1985. In each UZ an average of five

candidates contested for the Chairmanship on non-partisan basis.

Reportedly, however, about 500 candidates were the representatives of

the AL and the BN P who earlier refused to participate in national

elections. 36 About 40% of the eligible voters cast their votes; but the

election resulted in massive violence, stabbings, ballot-box snatching,

bombings and the like causing several deaths and injuries. The election

helped in the process of legitimization of the regime as it created a

support base for the regime at the grass root level.

The other members of the Upazila Parishad were the chairman of

the Union Parishads within the UZ, three nominated women, one

nominated person, and officials to be nominated by the government. 37

The UZ Chairman was to hold his post for five years and was given the

35 The Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary, October 23, 1982.

36 Peter J. Bertocci, "Bangladesh in 1985; Resolute Against the Storms", Asian

Survey, Vol. 26, No.2, p. 227.

37 Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Local Government

(Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganization) (Third Amendment), Ordinance.

74

status of a deputy secretary of government. It was obvious from the

Upazila Parishad that the nominated and official members who formed

the majority of Parishad membership would owe their allegiance to the

government- their nominating authority. 38

The government devised a large number of mechanisms through

which it could exercise its control over the activities of the UZ Parishad.

A close examination of the rules regulating the operation of the

Parishad would reveal that its autonomy from government interference

was more in appearance than in reality. 39 The functions transferred to

the Parishad were not permanent in nature. At any time any institution

. and service maintained by a Parish ad could be transferred to the

management and control of the government. The government retained

the right to modify the annual budget of the Parishad. 40

The democratic and autonomous appearance of the Upazila

Parishad, it has been pointed out, was an attempt to camouflage the

fact that control by national government persisted as before. It was the

political interests of the rulers which was the primary motive behind the

38 Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, "The Illusion of Decentralization : Local Administration in Bangladesh", lnternnational Review of Administrative Sciences, 20: 1 (1986), p. 89.

39 Hakim, n. 3, p. 17.

40 Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Local Government (Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganization), Third Amendment Ordinance, 1983, Section 36(3).

75

creation of the Upazila Parishad. 41 The government's plan for

decentralized administration, however, could not be effective and

meaningful beyond a certain limit.

Decentralization of Judiciary : In Bangladesh the lower courts are

located at the district level. The magistrates deal only with criminal

cases, whereas the judges at the district and upper levels, deal with

both criminal (including appeals) and civil cases. The Supreme Court at

Dhaka has two divisions, namely the High Court Division which hears

appeal from the district courts and may also judge original cases and

the Appellate Division which reviews appeals of judgements by the High

Court Division. The judges of both the divisions are appointed by the

President on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Law.

The powers of the judiciary were severely curtailed during the

autocratic regime.

After coming to power Ershad resorted to decentralization of the

higher judiciary. The Martial Law government established High Court

Divisions outside Dhaka. On 8 May 1982, by a Martial Law

Proclamation (2nd Amendment) Order, Ershad initially set up seven

permanent benches of the High Court Division in various district towns

of the country. Later, when the Constitution was revived, the permanent

benches were dissolved. But under the revived Article 100, the Chief

., Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Implementation of Decentralization Policy and the Role of Public Bureacracy in Bangladesh", Phillipine Journal of Public Administration, 34 : 1 (1990), p. 39.

76

Justice, in consultation with the President, proceeded to implement the

provision of six sessions benches in other towns, namely Barisal,

Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Rangpur and Sylhet. In 1988, by the

Eighth Amendment, Ershad again changed Article 100 to incorporate

the provision for permanent benches of the High Court Division in the

same places, with the power to transfer judges from one bench to

another. Moreover, the permanent benches were to have independent

jurisdiction, power and functions of the High Court Division under the

Constitution, in areas to be assigned to the President in consultation

with the Chief Justice. The remaining powers or the residuary powers

would be exercised by the High Court Division at Dhaka. The entire

character of the Judiciary was changed, particularly that of the High

Court Division as provided in the original Constitution of 1972. The

provision to have permanent benches with power to transfer judges and

assuming independent jurisdiction, implied for all practical purposes

seven High Court Divisions in the country. 42

The decentralization of the judiciary was not demanded by the

civil society. Ershad argued that through the decentralization of the

judiciary pending cases would be cleared up and justice shall be

expediated. This argument was fallacious. Cases accumulated at all

levels of the judiciary - what was required was drastic overhauling of

legal procedures as also increase in the number of judges at all levels

and improve facilities in general. Moreover the finance and personnel

42 Ahmed, n. 1, p. 272.

77

required to implement a reform of this nature could not possibly justify

the end result. Such decentralization of judiciary, the Supreme Court

Bar Association argued, would encourage villagers to enter into

unnecessary litigation and that the new judges and magistrates were far

from the control or supervision of any higher authority and were

therefore likely to take the job more as executive agents than

dispensers of justice and equity. 43

The lawyers of Dhaka strongly protested against the

decentralization of higher judiciary. The Supreme Court Bar Association

which had opposed military rule now took a more political role. The

move affected the Dhaka based lawyers most. They boycotted the

courts for several months. They continued their agitation against the

autocratic regime.

Drug Policy : The principal aim of the reform in the Drug Policy

was to stop the manufacturing, import and sale of non-essential drugs

and make cheaper medicine available to the people. It sought to

concentrate on the manufacture of life saving drugs, limit the marketing

of pharmaceuticals to the published list of essential medicines and

make them readily available. 44 The policy reserved the production of a

category of simple products for small local, Bangladeshi producers.

43 ibid., pp. 272, 273 .

.~.Ahmed, ibid.

78

Ershad enacted a Drug Ordinance on 12 June, 1982. It brought the

entire drug regime under the umbrella of a statute in order to regulate the

manufacture, import, distribution and sale of drugs. The administration of

the ordinance was placed under the control of the Drug Administration of

the Ministry of Health and Officers under it. Two government testing

laboratories, one in Dhaka and the other in Chittagong were to provide

necessary support. The entire machinery would have to supervise over

150 manufacturers, 14,000 retailers and 1,200 wholesalers of drugs.45

The policy was developed and implemented in less than two

months with little or no consultation with any of the key groups affected

- the doctors, the chemists, or the drug manufacturers. The secrecy

was made possible by the existence of martial law. 46

The initial reaction· to this major policy reform among the

manufacturers and importers of non-essential drugs was not

favourable. Public debate on the drug ordinance took place in the major

leading English newspapers and magazines, the vernacular press and

publications of various NGOs. While the doctors, the chemists, the

industry, and the urban middle class were opposed to the new policy, it

was welcomed by local NGOs, health activists, consumer groups and

the smaller local companies.

•s Govemment of Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Directorate of Drug Administration, 1986.

46 Kochanek, n. 4, p. 300.

79

Open debate on the drug policy was conducted primarily through

the press. The pharmaceutical industry launched a public counter

offensive through local newspaper advertisements. Then private debate

took place in the form of contact with Ershad and his generals. There

was pressure of some multinational drug companies on their home

government to intervene on their behalf with the government of

Bangladesh. The ambassadors of America, Germany and Britain met

Ershad to urge greater consultation with the industry. Ultimately Ershad

agreed to set up a review committee on the legislation.47

On the basis of the report of the review committee, the list of

drugs that could be produced was increased but the basic outlines of

the Drug policy remained the same.

Education Policy : On 23 September 1982, a new education

policy was announced. It proposed compulsory teaching of Arabic from

Class I. Some leading academicians and as many as fourteen student

organisations firmly resisted this move. Students started a mass

signature campaign against the new education policy. On 8 November,

1982 the pro Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) Chatra League organised a

procession at the Arts Campus of Dhaka University. Police and

paramilitary forces assaulted the processionists, entered the Arts

building to beat students and manhandle teacherS. 46

47 ibid., pp. 302, 303.

48 Dainik lttefaq, 9 November 1982.

80

Process of Civilianization of the Regime : From the very

beginning since Ershad assumed power as the Chief Martial Law

Administrator on 24 March 1982, there was continuous demand for

restoration of democratic process. The opposition constantly demanded

the abolition of martial law. Since political activities were banned under

martial law the open opposition to the regime was not possible in the

beginning.

By 1983, a fifteen party alliance led by Awami League came into

existence. Other parties of this alliance were JSD, BAKSAL,

Bangladesh Communist Party, NAP Workers Party, Gono Azadi

League, etc. There also emerged a seven - party alliance, led by the

BP, and consisting of the UPP, Communist League, Jatiya League etc.

Fifteen party alliance announced the launching of a procession on 14

February 1983, which led to street battles for two days. On 15 February

1983, students of Dhaka University marched to the Secretariat Building,

the seat of national administration. This led to direct confrontation

between the police and the students in which at least five persons were

killed and many students were injured. The political parties hardened

their stand against the Ershad regime and demanded immediate

withdrawal of martial law, restoration of fundamental rights and holding

of the parliamentary elections.

Ershad had support of the armed forces. But to legitimize his rule

he required a political base. Holding power beyond a certain limit

81

requires civilianization process. Either a transfer takes place to civilian

representatives or the soldiers themselves adopt a civilian garb. In

order to perpetuate himself in power, Ershad pressed ahead with his

civilianization process.

In November 1983, he launched a new political party - Janadal

(People's Party). Awami League (AL) Mizan faction and a faction of the

BNP led by s·namsul Huda Chowdhury emerged as the nucleus of this

party. 49 Many leaders and dissidents of various parties joined the new

party.

By mid 1985, a government backed political alliance - Jatiya

(national) Front was formed. It contained within its fold, parties and

politicians of diametrically opposite ideologies. Finally, a new party,

Jatiya Party (JP) was launched on 1 January 1986.50

Ershad's Jatiya Party was composed of opportunists. Extensive

distribution of patronage attracted men of varied background to the

Jatiya party. But it never developed organizational roots and was

unable to build a loyal following. 51 The manifesto of JP advocated a

presidential system of government. It set out 1 0 goals and objectives

including the establishment of "Bangladeshi nationalism", "people's

democracy", "promotion of the private sector", "productivity oriented

49 Hakim. ri. 3, p. 20.

so Ahmed, n. 1, p. 318.

~Kochanek, n.4, p.53.

82

politics", "social and economic justice" and "implementation of land

reforms". 52 The JP became served as a platform for civilian defence of

military rule. 53

Ban on open political activities was withdrawn from November 1983.

Ershad announced the date for presidential election to be held on 24 May

1984, which would be followed by parliamentary election on 25 November

1984. But the opposition demanded the u.u0lition of martial law and the

holding of parliamentary elections prior to the presidential elections.

Stalemate between the opposition parties and Ershad continued.

After rescheduling of elections for a number of times, when the

opposition alliances refused to participate in the elections to be held in

April 1985, Ershad banned political activities and announced the

decision to hoid a pubiic referendum on his government's policies and

programmes on 21 March 1985.

Although the fifteen-party alliance and the seven-party alliance

decided to resist the referendum but a strong public sentiment

against it could not be created PS moratorium on political activities

was on and the universities were closed down for indefinite period.

The Election Commission claimed a voter turn out of 72.14 percent,

and 94.14 percent affirmative votes confirming Ershad's continuation

as President of the country. Independent local and foreign observers

52 Manifesto of Jatiya Party, 1986. 53 Hakim, n. 3, p. 21.

83

were of the opinion that the actual turnout was not more than 15 to

20 percent. 54

This referendum gave Ershad a sense of confidence about his

authority and worked as a milestone in his quest for legitimacy. The

opposition parties, however, claimed this referendum as a

"meaningless" exercise. 55

There was growing democratic movement in the country. The

foreign mentors of the regime also refused to advance more doles

unless the regime wore a civilian garb. 56

In a national broadcast of 2 March 1986, Ershad proclaimed that the

elections to the Jatiyo Sangsad (Parliament) would be held in the last week

of April. Following this announcement, the Election Commission

announced that elections to parliament would be held on 26 April 1986.

The weak point of the opposition's agitation against the regime

was their failure to forge a united movement. While from the beginning

the two alliances had vowed to participate in election under Martial Law,

but on 21 March 1986, the Awami alliance decided to participate in the

election after President Ershad announced a revised polling date of 7

May 1986. The AL's unilateral decision to participate in the election not

54 Peter J. Bertocci, "Bangladesh in 1985 : Resolute Against the Storms", Asian Survey, 26 : 2 (February 1986), p. 231.

55 ibid.

56 Chakravary, n. 19, p. 166.

84

only broke the unity of the grand coalition but also split the 15 Party

Alliance, which was now reduced to eight parties.

In the third parliamentary election held on 7 May 1986, no party

attained an absolute majority. The BNP did not participate in the

election. There was widespread charges of manipulation and rigging. 57

Table 1.5 illustrates the distribution of 300 seats in the Jatiyo Parishad

in the election.

Table 1.5

RESULTS OF ELECTIONS OF JATIYA SANGSAD HELD ON MAY 7, 1986

Name of the party

Jatiyo Party

Awami League

Jamaat-e-lslami

National Awami Party (U)

Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB)

Muslim League

Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (JSD-Rob)

Krishak Shramik Awami League (BAKSAL)

Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD-Siraj)

Workers Party

National Awami Party (NAP~M)

Independents

Seats obtained

153

76

10

5

5

4

4

3

3

3

2

32

Source : Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Election Commission, Report: Jatiya Sangsad Elections, 1986 (Dhaka:

. 1988).

57 Rehman Sobhan, Bangladesh : Problems of Governance (New Delhi, 1993), p. 48.

85

After the election, the Jatiyo Party's strength in the Sangsad rose

to 208 when 23 of the 32 independents joined the JP and it obtained 30

"reserved" women seats and 2 additional seats in the bye-election.

Ershad won 83.57 per cent of the vote that was said to represent

54 percent of the eligible voters. The opposition alliances, however,

condemned this election as "another farce" and claimed that less than

3% of the voters actually participated. On 28 October 1986, Ershad

took the oath of an elected President. ss

Amendments to the Constitution : The Jatiyo Sangsad passed

the Seventh Amendment in November 1986. It ratified, confirmed and

validated the Martial Law Administration of Ershad from 24 March 1982

to November 1986. 59

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution was passed in June

1988. It declared Islam to be the state religion of Bangladesh. The

parliament was debarred from amending the Islamic causes which were

inducted undemocratically.

Growing opposition to the Ershad regime : The BNP and the

AL were able to come together in November 1987 to launch a mass

movement against Ershad, which did not succeed in dislodging him but

instead resulted in the parliament's dismissal. On March 3, 1988, a new

sa Lawrence Ziring, Bangladesh From Mujib To Ershnad An Interpretive Study (Oxford, 1992), p. 199.

59 Chakravarty, n. 19, p. 180.

86

election was held, which was bycotted by the AL and the BNP as well

as Jamaat. The result was an almost complete parliamentary victory for

the Jatiya Party. 5° The JP secured 251 votes.

The fourth Jatiya Sangsad elections were marked by

unprecedented rigging. A call for general strike on the election day kept

many people and vehicles off the road. The high figure of voter turnout

(54.93 percent) claimed by the Election Commission in an almost

voterless election could only be ascribed to false balloting and

surreptious counting.

The fourth parliamentary elections further deepened the

legitimacy crisis of the Ershad government. First, the government failed

to persuade the mainline opposition parties to participate in the

elections. Second, the opposition parties accused the government of

forcible occupation of polling centres by the government-backed thugs,

hijacking of ballot boxes, vote dacoity, and "media coup". Finally, it

eliminated the scope of resolving the legitimacy crisis through elections

under Ershad. 61

so Craig Baxter, "Bangladesh : A Parliamentary Democracy, if They Can Keep It", Current History, 91 (563), March 92, p. 133.

61 Hakim, n. 3, p. 31.