CHAPTER III JINNAH'S EFFORTS AT HINDU-MUSLIM

UNITY FROM A NON-CONGRESS MUSLIM SHORE

CHAPTER III

JINNAH'S EFFORTS AT HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY

FROM A NON-CONGRESS MUSLIM SHORE

The Rowlatt Bill

The course of the World War I was marked by widespread

unrest and revolutionary activities in different parts of the country.

The Government of India introduced the Defence of India Act in

1915. This conferred on the government vast powers which allowed it

to arrest, detain, intern or expel any Indian without trial, warrant or

stated cause. In the beginning, Jinnah believed that such harsh

measures were necessary to deal with the extremist activities for he

considered that those who resort to such activities as 'misguided'. 1It

was expected that the rights and legal safeguards which were

suspended during the war, would be restored, but things turned out to

be otherwise. Notwithstanding the Indian opposition, the Government

of India appointed a sedition committee under king's Bench Justice Sir

Sidney Rowlatt to investigate and report on the nature and extent of

criminal conspiracies connected with the revolutionary movement in

India and suggest the legislative measures to deal with them.2 The

committee recommended immediate extension of the Criminal Law

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(Emergency Powers) Act for at least six months. It recommended,

among other things, that the government be given power to restrict the

movement of offenders for a period of two years after their release

from custody, and they should be prevented from addressing public

meetings. It also called for the provision of trial by a commission of

three High Court judges, without the benefit of juries, committal

proceedings or right of appeal.3 The committee also recommended to

give the government powers to restrict the movement and residence of

the suspected offenders, and demand security from them.4 The most

obnoxious recommendation, however, was that the subjects detained

under the Defence of India Act were to be brought under the new

provisions without notice. 5

The Bill, which came to be known as the ‘Black or Rowlatt Act'

gave rise to a great deal of controversy and the majority of Indians

opposed it. Jinnah warned that "this was a wrong remedy for the

disease, the revolutionary crimes..... There was no precedent or

parallel in the legal history of any civilized country to the enactment

of such laws.... If these measures were passed they will create

unprecedented discontent, agitation and will have the most disastrous

effect upon relations between the Government and the people.” 6 In

spite of the unanimous opposition of twenty - two members on the

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council, the repugnant Act was passed into law in March 1919. Jinnah

wrote to Chelmsford a few days later that the government "have

ruthlessly trampled upon the principles for which Great Britain

avowedly fought the war," and that " the fundamental principles of

justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people

have been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the State,

by an overfretful and incompetent bureaucracy which is neither

responsible to the people nor in touch with real public opinion.”7

Having found that "I can be of no use to my people in the

council" and that it was impossible to have co-operation with a

government that showed utter disregard for the opinion of the

representatives of the people, Jinnah offered his resignation to the

Viceroy. 8

Jinnah who saw the prospective reforms as a springboard to

national leadership found to his dismay that the Rowlatt Act dashed

all his hopes. It opened the floodgates of agitation, sidelined a

constitutionalist like Jinnah, and brought the advocates of agitation to

the forefront of Indian politics. Gandhi, who responded to the Black

Act by asking the people of India to suspend business on April 6 and

observe the day as one of fasting and prayer, stole the show. It marked

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Gandhi's sudden ascendance in the Indian political horizon. It marked

a new era in Indian politics: the Gandhian era.

Jinnah's opposition to the Rowlatt Act did not end with his

resignation from the Legislative Council. Jinnah joined Gandhi when

the latter organised protest marches all over India on 28 March and 6

April.9 Gandhi, it must be noted, had not been seen previously as an

opponent of the Raj, and had actively recruited for the British during

the war. Gandhiji wanted Jinnah to make an emphatic declaration

regarding recruitment and suggested to Jinnah that support to the

recruiting programme would bring political reforms for India : "Seek

ye first the Recruiting Office and everything will be added unto you...

What I ask for is an emphatic declaration, not a halting one."10 His

views underwent a sea-change with the introduction of the Rowlat

Act, and he held that, "our reforms will be practically worthless, if we

cannot repeal Rowlat agitations.”11 Gandhi now began to concentrate

his whole attention to this issue.

Jinnah's activities during this period irritated the British so

much so that Lloyd went to the extent of describing Jinnah as "one of

the worst characters; attractive to meet, fair of speech, but absolutely

dishonest in every way.... the one who has consistently said one thing

and gone straight away and done the other."12

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Gandhiji's protest against the Act was based on "humility and

prayer", a campaign of non-violent civil disobedience which he

successfully carried out in South Africa. The danger lay in involving

in the campaign millions of untutored superstitious people. It only

helped to awaken their passions he feared most. In Amritsar two of

Gandhiji's lieutenants had been arrested which led to a protest march

towards the British commissioner’s bungalow in the cantonment.

Soldiers opened fire at the crowd, killing a few of them and forcing

the crowd to retaliate. They broke all bounds, and brutal acts of

destruction followed. Military authorities, under the leadership of

Brigadier Dyer, took charge of Amritsar and proclamations were

issued giving warnings of "dire consequences if meetings were held or

processions taken out and violence indulged in."

A peaceful protest against the prohibition held in Amritsar led

to the notorious Jallian Wallah Bagh massacre in which Dyer and his

men massacred many innocent men and women who assembled there.

the irony of it all was that "while the Government in England was

announcing its intentions to train Indians for self- government through

political reforms, its agents in India were actually giving Indians

lessons in frightfulness to develop qualities of servility, cowardice,

hypocrisy and psychophancy."13 Pubjab, under martial law, returned to

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comparative calm, and the reaction to the event outside Punjab was

restricted by lack of information forthcoming from within the Punjab.

Jinnah condemned the actions of Dyer in no uncertain terms, though

the main thrust of his actions lay in the work relating to the Rowlatt

Act. In spite of all this Jinnah had faith in British justice, and he

pinned his hopes on Montagu.14 On the other hand he had no positive

opinion on Lord Chelmsford and his administration, and he said that

"the sooner he is recalled the better for all concerned.''15

The Montague- Chelmsford Reforms

Jinnah's mind now turned from the Rowlatt Act to the

impending Reforms Bill. On 20th August 1917 the British government

made the following historic announcement:

"The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which

the government of India are in complete accord, is that

of the increasing association of Indians in every branch

of the administration and the gradual development of

self- governing institutions with a view to the

progressive realization of responsible government in

India as an integral part of the British Empire... I would

add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by

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successive stages. The British government and the

government of India, on whom the responsibility lies

for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples,

must be the judges of the time and measure of each

advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation

received from those upon whom new opportunities of

service will thus be conferred and by the extent to

which it is found that the confidence can be reposed in

their sense of responsibility.’’16

The British government's announcement was a reflection of the

increasing Indian desire for political reform and Montague opined that

in considering the Indian aspirations their consciousness that war was

principally a struggle for nation's liberty and rights should not be

overlooked. With a view to preparing the reform proposals, Montague

visited India and met Indian leaders including Jinnah. Jinnah had

appealed to the Secretary of State and Viceroy to take into

consideration the various provisions laid out in the Lucknow Pact

while preparing the reforms proposals.17

When the reforms were finally announced, they did not contain

anything for which to be grateful.18 The emphasis was for a devolution

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of power to the provinces. The system, which came to be known as

Dyarchy, entrusted certain departments to Indian hands. Such

departments as defence, finance and the home department were to be

left in official hands. The executive power, however, remained with

the government. Generally speaking, Jinnah, in spite of his objections

to certain aspects of the reforms, was of the view that dyarchy was the

only way out of the problem of transfer of power in India, and he

believed that it would succeed. On the other hand, as far as the

Central legislature was concerned, lack of reforms disappointed him.

While there was transfer of power in the provinces, there were no like

changes in the Government of India. Jinnah's objections in this regard

is understandable. It was detrimental to a national level politician like

him. Apart from this personal aspect, he was opposed to any reform

which augmented provincialism in Indian politics. In spite of all this,

he was ready to work them with a view to forming a united opposition

to democratically force the government of India to make concessions.

19 Gandhi, who earlier remarked that the reforms were worthless in the

face of Rowlatt Act, and that they did “not mark a change of heart but

they were only a method of further draining India of her wealth and of

prolonging servitude,"20 agreed by the end of 1919 to Jinnah's stand

for working the reforms.

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When the reforms were on the anvil, there arose divergent

views regarding the quantum of responsibility to be transferred to

Indian hands. Leaders like Tilak and Annie Besant believed that India

was fit for full responsible government, while others held that such a

stand was too revolutionary. In the Congress session of Amritsar,

Gandhi by rejecting the extremist stand said:" The King Emperor has

extended a hand of friendship. Do not reject the advance. The Indian

culture demands trust and full trust and if you are sufficiently manly

we shall not be afraid of the future."21 The Congress passed a

resolution to "work the Reforms so as to secure an early establishment

of full Responsible government.”22 Jinnah was full of praise for

Montague for his labour in connection with the reforms. In the

Muslim League session, held concurrently in Amritsar, Jinnah was

elected as permanent president of the Muslim League for the next

three years, and there he was able to carry the Muslim League to

accept a resolution paralleling that passed by Congress. " The league

calls upon the Indians to demonstrate their capacity for complete self-

government by availing themselves of such opportunity as is now

offered to them in the reforms recently enacted, which the League

recognized to be a defenite step towards the goal of full responsible

government."23

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The Hunter Committee Report

The success of Gandhi and Jinnah at the Amritsar Congress of

1919 was a success for those who supported the moderate politics.

But its spirit was not destined to last long. The true story of

Jallianwala Bagh massacre was not known at the time of its

occurrence, and the formation of the Hunter committee to investigate

the events in the Punjab effected a speedy and startling change in the

situation and a reaction of horror set in both in England and India. The

Duke of Connaught, who inaugurated the new constitution, found the

"shadow of Amritsar lengthened over the fair face of India.24 Gandhi,

who stood for reforms, found that they did not mark a change of heart

and they were intended only to prolong India's servitude.25

Dyer's evidence before the Hunter Committee was proof of his

arrogance and radicalism. There he boasted that he "fired and fired

well" for "little firing was bad"26 His revelations that he had intended

to fire upon the crowd even before he arrived at the spot to set a moral

example and that it was the narrow entrances to the Bagh which

prevented him from using armoured cars and machine guns on the

assembled crowd, astounded the listeners beyond measure.27 Jinnah

believed that Montague would see that the wrongs of the Punjab

would be avenged to the fullest.28

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Political India was, however, prepared to wait till the Hunter

Committee's enquires were made known. The Report was published in

two forms- the Majority Report of the European members and the

Minority Report of the Indian Members. The Congress alleged that the

Hunter Report showed that British counted Indian life as of no serious

consequence.29 To Jinnah the report was a means to justify the

officials of the country. The Parliamentary debates on the issue added

to his disappointment, and he said of the debates that "the blue and

brainless blood of England, to their crowning glory, carried the

infamous resolution of Lord Finlay."31

All this led Gandhiji to reintroduce his policy of

non-co-operation. The special session of the Indian National Congress

held in September 20 condemned the Hunter Report as being tainted

by race prejudice, and added that the debate in the House of Lords

betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India.32 The

same session, in the face of doubts expressed by Jinnah, expressed the

opinion that "there is no course left open for the people of India but to

approve of and adopt the policy of progressive non- violent Non- co-

operation inaugurated by Gandhi."33 In the Muslim League session

held at the same time, Jinnah said that if the government was dragging

people to desperation, there would be no other course left open to the

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people except to inaugurate the policy of non- co-operation, "though

not necessarily the programme of Gandhi." However, he left the

decision to the conscience of the individual members: "It is now for

you to consider whether or not you approve of its principle; and

approving of its principle, whether or not you approve of its details....

it rests with you alone to measure your strength and weigh the pros

and cons of the question before you arrive at a decision.” 34 Here also

Jinnah's views did not prevail.

Jinnah Resigns from the Home Rule League as well as from the

Congress

Sooner than later Gandhi chaired a Home Rule League meeting

in Bombay. There he proposed that League's name be changed to

Swaraj Sabha and its constitution changed to bring it fully into line

with his Satyagraha campaign: "To secure complete swaraj for India

according to the wishes of the Indian people."35 Jinnah, who opposed

the change, argued that the old goal of " self- government within the

British Common wealth" should remain as such, and that the new goal

of "swaraj for India according to the wishes of the Indian people"

seemed to him neither clear nor politically practical. When Gandhi's

amendments were carried by the meeting, Jinnah resigned from the

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League "with great sorrow".36 Gandhiji urged him to reconsider his

decision and share the new life that had opened up before the

country.37 Jinnah's reply to this brought out his misgivings about

Gandhi's methods and programmes:

"If by 'new life' you mean your methods and

programmes, I am afraid I cannot accept them; for I

am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster... your

methods have already caused split and division in

almost every institution that you have approached

hitherto, and in the public life of the country not only

amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus

and Hindus, and Muslims and Muslims, and even

between fathers and sons; people are desperate all

over the country and your extreme programme has for

the moment struck the imagination mostly of the

inexperienced youth and the ignorant and the

illiterate. All this means complete disorganisation and

chaos."38

,

In 1920 both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim

League held their regular sessions at Nagpur. At the Congress session

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Gandhiji moved the resolution that "the object of the Indian National

Congress is the attainment of swaraj by the people of India by all

legitimate and peaceful means."39 Gandhiji added that there was no

point in keeping the British connections as long as the British refused

to redress the grievances of the Indian people. Jinnah at once objected

that it was impractical and dangerous to dissolve the British

connection without proper preparation for independence. Thereupon

Gandhiji argued that " I do not for one moment suggest that we want

to end the British connection at all costs unconditionally. If the British

connection is for the advancement of India we do not want to destroy

it. But if it is inconsistent with our national self- respect, then it is our

bounden duty to destroy it... the British people will have to beware

that if they do not want to do justice it will be the bounden duty of

every Indian to destroy that Empire."40 Jinnah tried his best to present

his views but was voted down and howled down with cries of "shame"

and " political impostor ". 41Jinnah, deeply humiliated, resigned from

the Congress.

The Khilafat Non- co-operation Movement

The years from his resignation from the Congress to his re-

election to the Legislative Assembly in 1923 saw Jinnah totally

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preoccupied with legal profession.42 It did not mean that he stepped

out of Indian politics completely. He was active in the backrooms of

politics, trying to realise his political goals through negotiations and

manipulations. Jinnah’s political career either avoided these years or

centred on Jinnah's political differences with Gandhiji rather than his

attitudes towards the Khilafat movement. Some scholars like M.

Naeem Qureshi try to place Jinnah in the Khilafat camp.44 A close

analysis would prove that this is far from true.

When Turkey entered the war on the side of Germany, the

Indian Muslims lost no time in expressing their staunch loyalty to the

colonial administration.45 Britain, in the circumstances, formally

assured the Muslims of the safety of the Holy Places.46 But the

publication of the Treaty of Sevres in May 1920 revealed the allies’

intention to dismember the Khilafat, despite the British Prime

Minister, Lloyd George's assurances to the contrary. Mahomed Ali

saw in this an attack on the very basis of Islam. 47 The Treaty of

Sevres could bring together Muslims on a common platform against

the government.

Jinnah had not been a staunch Pan-Islamist. He was a politician

committed to secular politics and opposed to the mixing of religion

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and politics. Jinnah's support for the Muslim community's concern for

Turkey came out of sheer political expediency. His mind was full of

political reform and political unity in India rather than the fate of the

Turkish Sultan. At the Eleventh session of the Muslim League in

Delhi in 1918 it was resolved that " the All Indian Muslim League

considers it be its duty to place before the government of India and

His Majesty's Government the true sentiments of the Muslim

community... and requests that the British representatives at the Peace

Conference will use their influence and see that in the territorial and

political redistribution to be made, the fullest consideration should be

paid to the requirements of the Islamic law with regard to the full and

independent control by the Sultan of Turkey, Khalifa of the Prophet,

over the holy places and over the Jazirat-ul-Arab as delimitated in the

Muslim books".48 Jinnah opposed this resolution saying that the

League should not dabble in the foreign politics of the government

which led to a heated response from the delegates assembled there,

and Jinnah had to withdraw his statement and support the resolution.49

Thus by 1919 when the question of the Khilafat became the foremost

concern of the Muslim community in India, he had to become more

active on the issue.

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Thus when the All- India Muslim Conference formed the All-

India Khilafat Committee with Seth Chotani as its President, Jinnah

kept aloof from it. Jinnah, not steeped in the tenets of Islam and not

sensitive to the spiritual significance of the Kaaba, took a legislative

view and refused to join the massive protest against the British. 50

Jinnah also found to his dismay that the Khilafat issue reduced the

relevance of the Muslim League as a political organisation. The

monopoly of Muslim politics went to the Khilafatists during the

period.

Jinnah, however, tried his best to increase the League's role in

the Khilafat movement. With this end in view, he led a delegation to

London and placed a memorial before the British government,

emphasising the significance of the Khilafat to Indian Muslims and

requesting leniency for Turkey.51 His main concern, however,

remained the forthcoming government of India Bill, and in London he

gave evidence before the Select Committee on the bill. On his return,

he found the more radical Khilafatists well- entrenched in the Indian

Muslim politics. In order to answer the criticism that the Muslim

League was not attaching importance to the Khilafat issue, Jinnah

actively campaigned for the Khilafat. He severely criticised the British

government for its Punjab atrocities and the spoilation of the Khilafat:

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"The one attacks our liberty, the other our faith."52 In spite of all these

attempts by Jinnah, the Muslim League came to be dominated by the

Khilafat Committee until 1923-4.

Though Gandhiji showed concerns for the issues related to the

Khilafat earlier, his active involvement with it could be dated from

1919. He told the Muslims that it was his duty to share their sorrows.53

Though his feelings in this regard were genuine and he was motivated

by the justness of their cause, he was, in fact, trying hard to establish

his position as a political leader after his Rowlatt satyagraha turned

out to be a dismal failure.54 This gave Gandhiji the much- needed

Muslim support for his political programme, undermining the stand of

constitutionalists like Jinnah. The Khilafatists at the same time

thought that their alliance with Gandhiji would fetch them Hindu

support for the Khilafat. They therefore offered him unreserved

loyalty and complete obedience. The meeting of the All-India Khilafat

Committee held in May 1920 endorsed Gandhi's non-co-operation

compaign.55 In the subsequent Congress session, Gandhi's non- co-

operation resolution was passed, with the overwhelming support of the

Muslims. Khilafat trainloads of delegates had been shipped cross-

country to pack the Congress Pandal and vote for their hero's

resolution, transforming Congress into a populist political party.56

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Jinnah was not amused by Gandhi's ascendance on the Indian

political horizon. He now thought that by gaining limited concessions

for Turkey from the British government, he could keep off the

Muslims from lending support for non- co-operation. He proposed to

Reading, the Viceroy, a scheme to end the non-co-operation

agitation.57 Though desired to end the non - co-operation, he was not

ready to encourage Jinnah who had a strong anti- British feeling.

Thus Jinnah, in the face of the Viceroy's unwillingness to make

concessions on the Turkish issue, tried to arrange a round table

conference on India's problems. In the annual session of the Congress

held at Ahmadabad Gandhi accepted the offer, but later he reversed

the decision thanks to the influence of extremists within the non- co-

operation movement. 58 Although Reading was unwilling to commit to

the idea of a Round Table Conference, he encouraged Jinnah and

Jayakar to continue the threads of reconciliation. 59 Jinnah then took

up the initiative in organising a representative conference, inviting all

the major political leaders of the nationalist movement. Gandhiji

suspended the Civil Disobedience Movement until 31 January so as to

help in conducting negotiations with the government. Gandhiji's

insistence on the release of all internees for attending the Round Table

Conference stood in the way of the settlement of the dispute. The

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government was not ready to concede such a demand.60 Jinnah and

Jayakar personally approached Gandhiji to avoid the immediate

resumption of non-co-operation but their efforts proved to be fruitless.

Gandhiji warned Reading that unless the internees were freed, he

would relaunch his non- co-operation campaign. The government was

unbending for it already knew that Gandhi's non-co-operation

campaign had been in its last stages.61 No sooner had the non - co

operation campaign relaunched than it came to an end. Gandhiji had to

call off the agitation when the protesters had burnt a police chowki

with twelve policemen inside in Chauri Chaura. The campaign was

also punctuated by sporadic communal violence in various places.

Then there was the terror unleashed by the Mappilas of Malabar who

revolted not only against the British authorities but also against the

Hindu landlords who oppressed them. Though the British attributed

the violence solely to the Khilafat agitators, the oppression and

exploitation of the Muslim tenants by their Hindu landlords was the

main driving force.62 The Mappila revolt contributed to a series of

Hindu- Muslim riots in various parts of the country. This was all due

to the notorious British policy of "divide and rule". Jinnah, however,

put the whole blame on Gandhiji's shoulders for the tragic turn the

politics had taken.63

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Gandhiji's withdrawal of the non-co-operation movement left

his Muslim supporters with a feeling of having been deserted.

However the Khilafat committee tried to continue the campaign of

non-co-operation, irrespective of Gandhi or the Congress decision,

until satisfactory settlement of the Khilafat question was secured. But

the movement had already lost its momentum.64 The movement was

further undermined by the publication of Reading's plea for revision of

the Treaty of Sevres. It convinced many Muslims, particularly the

conservatives, of the futility of continuing the protest against the

government and the wisdom of switching their allegiance from

Congress to the government. When the Turkish National Assembly

voted to remove Caliph's secular powers, it turned out to be a severe

blow to the Indian Khilafat Movement.65 The Khilafat Movement got

a final deathblow when Attaturk abolished the Caliphate and expelled

the Caliph. As a result, the Muslim interest now turned to more

domestic politics.

Jinnah heaved a sigh of relief when the Non-co-operation

Movement came to a naught. The failure of the movement led to an

acrimonious break-up of the Hindu-Muslim alliance and an extended

period of communal rioting and rivalry. Though Jinnah's assessment

of the result of the movement proved to be correct, Jinnah drew little

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satisfaction from this as it paved the way for the revival of

communalism. Jinnah's absence from the non-co-operation campaign

projected Azad and Ansari as leaders of Congress Muslims. Gandhi

overshadowed Jinnah so much so that the latter was marginalised from

mainstream politics. Jinnah felt that a Muslim politician might even

become the President of the Indian National Congress but would never

lead the Congress as Gandhi did. When he failed to win over the

Congress, he became more and more aware of his role as a Muslim

politician, and he slowly drifted towards the Muslim League as the

vehicle of his political career. In the build-up to the 1920 Nagpur

Congress, his relations with the Ali brothers worsened to such an

extent that dislike between them spilled over into the post-Khilafat

period.66

The Nationalist Party

Gandhi's withdrawal of the Non-co-operation campaign brought

to the fore the issue of council entry in the Congress. Two groups

emerged in the Congress, one group which advocated a change of

approach and the other group which did not want to waver from the

path of Non-co-operation. Prominent among the first group was C.R.

Das and Motilal Nehru. They formed the Swaraj party with Das as

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President and Motilal as one of the secretaries.67 The Swaraj party's

attitude on the Assembly and the councils would depend upon the

action taken by the Government on the demand formulated by them. If

the Government refused to entertain the said demand, the party would

resort to "a policy of uniform, continuous and consistent obstruction

with a view to make government through the Assembly and Councils

impossible."68 In order to avoid a split in the Congress, Gandhi

conceded the Swarajists the right to stand for election to the

legislatures.

Jinnah got himself elected to the Central Legislative Assembly

from his old reserved Muslim constituency in Bombay. In the

Assembly Jinnah along with seventeen other members who had no

affiliation to any political party formed the Independent Party under

his leadership. This group evolved a working relationship with the

Swarajists there and this led to the formation of what came to be

called the Nationalist Party. The alliance, however, proved short-lived,

thanks to the differences in policy between the two groups and the

efforts of the British to create a rift between the two parties. The

alliance began to crumble by the end of 1924. The disintegration of

the Nationalist Party came about mainly over the question of Non-co-

operation. The Independent Party which was not in favour of a policy

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of continued obstruction, advocated a policy of 'parliamentary

obstruction' if necessary and treatment of issues based only on their

merit. On the other hand, with the re-emergence of the non- co-

operation as a dominant force in the Congress, the Swarajists came

under the increasing compulsion to adopt a policy of obstruction

within the Assembly. Jinnah firmly believed that the policy of

wholesale obstruction and wrecking would only result in failure.69

Jinnah thus found himself in an unenviable position of "having to

choose between the agitational methods advocated by Congress and

the Swarajists allied to a policy of Hindu-Muslim unity or adopting a

purely constitutional approach and risk being seen as a communalist.

In the event, he chose the latter course, becoming more closely tied to

Muslim India and moving further away from his nationalist roots. This

is not to suggest that he became a communalist at this point, but rather

that he moved away from Congress and consequently was seen as

such by his former colleagues.70

Jinnah thereafter moved closer to the Muslim community, and

he endeavoured to win greater Muslim support. With this end in view,

he made concessions to the Punjab Muslims, whose influence

increased tremendously because of the Montagu - Chelmsford

Reforms. Thus he had to find a balance between his goals at the centre

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and the demands of the provinces. In the fifteenth session of the

League held in March 1924 at Lahore, Jinnah accepted some of the

issues which were important to the Punjab in order to get the Punjabi

support for his programmes. One important resolution in this related

to provincial autonomy which stated: "the existing province of India

shall be united under a common government on a fedaral basis so that

each province shall have full and complete autonomy, the functions of

the central government being confined to such matters only as of

general and common concern."71 Jinnah also lent his support to a

resolution which made the 1916 Lucknow Pact obsolete." The basis of

representation in the Legislature and in all other elected bodies should

be population, except that very small minorities might be given

representation in excess of their numerical proportion in those cases in

which they would remain unrepresented in the absence of such

exceptional treatment, subject however to the essential proviso that no

majority should be reduced to a minority or even to an equality.72 It

was at this session the full provincial status of the NWFP was first

raised. To Jinnah it would serve two purposes : one, it would augment

the bargaining position of Muslim India and two, it would break the

domination of Punjab and Bengal in Muslim politics. Naturally, it

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formed one of the four main demands he was later to ask in return for

the dropping of the Muslim demand for separate electorates.73

Though Jinnah left the Congress for good, he continued to nurs

the dream of uniting the Indian National Congress and the Muslim

League on a constitutional platform. In the Lahore session he argued

for such a unity:"... ... ... one essential requisite condition to achieve

swaraj is political unity between the Hindus and the Mohammedans....

India will get Dominion Responsible Government the day the Hindus

and Mohammadans are united. Swaraj is an almost interchangeable

term with Hindu-Muslim unity. If we wish to free people, let us unite;

but if we wish to continue slaves of bureaucracy, let us fight amongst

ourselves and gratify petty vanity over petty matters, Englishmen

being our arbiters."74 To fulfil the same he would re-establish the

Muslim League as the sole representative of Muslim India and then

negotiate with Congress on a basis of equality.

The All-Parties Conference in Bombay during December 1924

and in Delhi during January 1925 would have become venues for such

an agreement had it not been for the opposition by Mahasabha. In the

January meeting there arose a dispute between Jinnah clamouring for

majorities in Bengal and Pubjab, and communal Hindus such as Lala

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Lajpat Rai and Chintamani stoutly opposing it. The committee divided

into two groups - one to deal with the Hindu-Muslim question, and the

other to outline a scheme of swaraj which should establish India as a

self - governing dominion free from interference with her internal

affairs Jinnah, who presented the Muslims' viewpoint with

disingenuous cleverness, claimed for the Muslims special electorates

in Councils, Local bodies and even the University.75 His demands met

with severe hostility. "It appeared that the apetite had grown by what

it had fed on."76 It was crystal clear that the Mahasabha had no

intention of entering into any kind of compromise with the Muslim

India. Thus the committee could not arrive at any agreement on the

Hindu-Muslim question, and after the committee adjourned sine die,

Jinnah thought of making direct negotiations with the Congress.77

At the fifteenth session of the Muslim League at Lahore, Jinnah

proposed the working together of the Muslim League and the Indian

National Congress : "With a view to better the economic and political

conditions of the workers and peasants of India, the All - India

Muslim League considers it most essential that the organisation of the

workers and peasants be taken in hand, and a movement be

immediately started on the lines chalked out by the All - India

Congress Committee in this connection, in order to achieve these

115

objects; the League therefore resolves that a committee of five

members be appointed by the council of the League to meet the

committee for the purpose to draw up a practical programme for the

organisation of workers and peasants of India."78 The work of the

committee could not be carried on, thanks to the machinations of the

Ali brothers who had been out to destroy the Muslim League and

prevent Jinnah's prominence in Muslim politics. Though he was not

successful in this, he was able to torpedo Jinnah's attempts to negotiate

with Congress. Those elements in the Congress who were opposed to

an alliance with the League used Mohammed Ali for their purpose.

Mohamed Ali was trying his best to avert the possibility of a joint

session of the League and the Congress. Though Motilal and Gandhi

were enthusiastic about an agreement with the League, Jinnah's

attempts to create a new Lucknow Pact remained just a dream.79

However, Jinnah did not lose his faith in Hindu - Muslim unity and he

continued to remind people about its urgency. "We desire nothing but

justice and fairness, and I assure you that if we, the two communities,

can settle our differences, it will be more than half the battle for

responsible government won".80

In response to the Congress President, Srinivasa Iyengar's call

for Muslims and the Congress to involve joint reform proposals and

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also to appease the Hindu Mahasabha, which accused him of as a

communalist in the garb of a nationalist, he went to the extent of

abandoning the claim for separate electorate. This was done when he

was presiding over a representative conference of the Muslim leaders

in Delhi on March 20, 1920. The conference came out with certain

proposals which came to be known as the Delhi proposals. They

included (1) separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency (2)

Treatment of NWFP and Baluchistan on the same footing as the other

provinces (3) electoral representation in the Punjab and Bengal in

accordance with population and (4) one - third representation in the

central legislature.81 Thus Jinnah waived the right to separate

electorates, the most controversial of the Muslim demands from the

Hindu viewpoint, by demanding the four aspects mentioned above, for

he knew that the Muslims would not surrender this right without

getting something which would provide them with a sense of security.

His demand for the creation of three new Muslim majority provinces

was clearly intended to increase the bargaining power of Muslim India

in regard to both Hindus and the Government of India. Moreover,

addition of three Muslim majority provinces would provide him with

an effective counterbalance to the Punjab dominance in the Muslim

political scene. His final demand would enable him to play a

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significant role in the government of an independent India. It would

also not be possible for the Hindus to dominate the Government of

India at the cost of Muslims. Jinnah wanted to ensure that the Muslims

"should be made to feel that they are secure and safeguarded against

any act of oppression on the part of the majority."82

The Congress Working Committee subsequently formed a sub-

committee to examine the implications of these proposals. The sub-

committee accepted the Delhi proposals which were accepted later

that year by the All Indian Congress Committee with minor changes.83

No sooner had the Congress accepted the proposals than other

influential groups came out in opposition to them. The Hindu

Mahasabha attacked Jinnah as being unrepresentative of Muslim India

and as such inconsequential as far as any negotiation between the two

communities were concerned. Jinnah had no authority to bind anyone

except himself and a few persons to his way of thinking.84 Many

Muslim leaders felt that in such an atmosphere of communal distrust,

the Delhi proposals were not at all workable.85 Shafi and Sir Abdul

Quaiyum joined the Punjab Muslim League in the rejection of the

Delhi proposals. Jinnah would have become irrelevant in the Indian

political scene, but for the intervention of the British Government in

the form of Simon Commission.

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By 1927, the Tory government, anticipating that the Labour

Party would form a government, appointed a commission before the

due date.86 The prospect of an early commission was greeted by most

Indians. When it became known in India that it was an all-white

Commission, Jinnah, along with the Congress, opposed its

appointment.' It, however, brought about a kind of unity in the

nationalist movement, which had been in some disarray. Jinnah, who

found himself at the centre of protest, lobbied most of the prominent

Indian leaders for a telegram of protest to the British government.87

Jinnah thanked Lord Birkenhead and his lily - white list for boosting

the nationalist movement: "A constitutional war has been declared on

Great Britain. Negotiations for a settlement are not to come from our

side. Let the government sue for peace. We are denied equal

partnership. We will resist the new doctrine to the best of our power.

Jallianwalla Bagh was a physical butchery, the Simon Commission is

a butchery of our souls. By appointing an exclusively White

Commission, Lord Birkenhead has declared our unfitness for self-

government. I welcome Pandit Malavia, and I welcome hand of

fellowship extended to us by Hindu leaders from the platform of the

Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. For to me, this offer is more

valuable than any concession which the British government can make.

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Let us grasp the hand of fellowship. This is indeed a bright day; and

for achieving this unity, thanks are due to Lord Birkenhead." 88

However, within the Muslim League, a small group, mostly from

Punjab, welcomed the appointment of the Commission. This in the

long run led to the splitting up of the League into two.

The Punjab Muslim response proved to be a welcome relief to

the British. They cleverly used this as a weapon to break up the

nationalist unity. Jinnah, however, tried to use the issue of the Simon

Commission to bring Muslim League closer to the Congress. The

League held its annual session at Calcutta which was also the venue of

the Congress session. The League resolved to boycott the commission

and proclaimed that it would accept joint electorates with reservation

of seats on a population basis if the Congress accepted the recognition

of Baluchistan, the NWFP and Sind as full provinces. The Congress

meeting resolved in favour of joint electorates with reservation of

seats on a population basis in each provinces, provided each

community made reciprocal provisions for weightage to minorities. It

also agreed to treat the NWFP and Baluchistan on equal terms with

other provinces and the separation of Sind from Bombay.

Nevertheless, concurrently with Jinnah's meetings, a section of the

League, under the leadership of Shafi, met at Lahore and voted for co-

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operation with the commission. It further paved the way for the

splitting up of the League into two. Jinnah now went about with the

task of convincing the Muslim community the need for boycott and he

reiterated that co-operation with the Simon Commission amounted to

betrayal of India.89 However, Jinnah, fully aware of the importance of

the Punjabi Muslims in Muslims polities, chose to belittle the

importance of the split and not to offend Shafi's supporters too deeply

lest it would prevent an early unification of the League. In the

Calcutta session, the discussion centred on the positive aspects of the

boycott campaign and the Delhi proposals, and there was hardly any

public criticisms of the Punjabis.90 Jinnah was, however, deeply

worried about the split in the League for he feared it would undermine

his political base. Further, the opponents were in a position to allege

Jinnah's non-representative status.

The Madrass session of the Congress (1927) decided to invite a

number of political organisations, including the Muslim League, the

Hindu Mahasabha and the National Liberal Federation. Their

representatives were invited for an All Parties Conference in order to

initiate discussions for framing a new constitution for India. The first

session failed to produce any concrete result with Jinnah and the

Mahasabha taking opposite stands on the main issues. The story was

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not much different when the adjourned session of the All Parties

Conference met on 8 March 1928. In the circumstances, the

conference adjourned after appointing subcommittees to investigate

the individual elements of the Delhi proposals. Jinnah found himself

in an embarassing situation : on the one hand his hopes of reaching an

agreement with the Hindus were dashed and on the other hand he was

isolated from the great majority of Muslims on the question of the

boycott of the Commission and also on the questions of separate

electorates. He, therefore, in utter disappointment, withdrew the

League's representatives from the conference and boarded the ship for

England before its next meeting in Bombay on 19 May.

As the time for Bombay session drew near, many leaders were

not amused by the prospect of Jinnah's absence and Motilal Nehru was

particularly concerned by such a situation. However, the Bombay

session appointed a committee with Motilal Nehru as Chairman and

nine other members to consider and determine the principle of a

Constitution for India.91 The Nehru Report, as it came to be called,

laid down that there would be joint or mixed electorates throughout

India. The major recommendations of the NR included : 1) abolition

of separate representation 2) reservation of a number of seats for

Muslims in commensurate with their population in the Hindu -

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majority provinces. 3) introduction of full adult franchise which would

render the domination of Bengal and the Punjab by Muslims

inevitable and communal representation redundant 4) separation of

Sind from Bombay and full provincial status for Baluchistan and the

NWFP and 5) only one quarter of seats in the Central Legislature for

Muslims on the plea that the figure accurately reflected the proportion

of the Muslim population.

Mahasabha was greatly impressed as the report pleaded for the

end of separate representation. Introduction of adult franchise pleased

many younger nationalists, particularly Jawaharlal Nehru who

described the report as marking the end of communalism in India. He,

however, did not see eye to eye with the report’s aim of Dominion

status but instead advocated the goal of full independence outside the

empire. With regard to the majority provinces, they supported the NR

except for a small group of Punjab Muslims under the leadership of

Shafi. The minority provinces, especially the UP, opposed the NR.

The UP Muslims held that it deprived them of separate representation

and weightage they were under the Lucknow Pact. Lack of weightage

at the centre was also a reason for their opposition. It is no wonder

that the Nehru Report caused a split in the Muslim Community.

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Jinnah's return to India had been eagerly awaited by all the

political sections of the country. His support was thought to be

essential by Motilal for the Report's success and its widespread

Muslim acceptance. This time Jinnah was not ready to take the

Congress lead on the issue, thanks to the split in the Muslim League

on the issue over the boycott of the Simon Commission. When Chagla

went to receive him in Bombay, he castigated the former for having

accepted the NR on behalf of the League.92 Jinnah now concentrated

all his efforts on reuniting the Muslim League. With this end in view,

he asserted that in spite of the split in the League over the question of

boycott, they were all one, and requested Shafi to attend the next

session of the League to promote the interests of Muslims and India at

large.93 For him unity within the Muslim League was more important

than the benefits to be gained from submitting to Congress

recommendations. At the same time he found many of the

recommendations of the report unacceptable. He wanted to give the

Muslims one third representation at the centre, which alone would

prevent the domination of the central government by one religious

community. Moreover he was opposed to NR's advocacy of a strong

central government. He advocated a federal structure mainly on two

counts: one, it would guarantee him the support of the majority

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provinces, particularly Punjab, and two, the existence of autonomous

provinces would safeguard the rights of the Muslim community he

represented.

At the League's session in December, the League rejected the

NR and suggested a number of amendments. Of these the four

important points were: (1) one third representation for Muslims at

both houses of central Legislature (2) reservation of seats for Muslims

on a population basis in Punjab and Bengal for ten years subject to re-

examination after that period, in the event of adult suffrage not being

introduced; (3) the vesting of residuary powers with the provinces,

and a revision of powers assigned to the centre and the provinces, with

a view to ensuring a genuine federation; (4) separation of Sind should

not be dependent upon the implementation of the Nehru constitution.94

Point one and three reflect Jinnah's concern over Muslim

representation in the Central Legislature and the granting of residuary

powers to the provinces. The second point was aimed at getting the

support of the Punjab Khilafatists at the meeting. When at the All-

Parties Conference the amendments were rejected, a number of these

Muslims performed a volte-face on the issue, and Motilal Nehru had

lost much of the Muslim support vital for the success of the report.

The rejection of the amendments was to be expected, thanks to the

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domination of the convention by the Mahasabha and the Sikh League

and to the domination of the Congress by the views of Jawaharlal

Nehru and the younger nationalists. In the convention, majority

favoured the NR and Jinnah's point of view was rejected. While

liberals like Sapru were for conceding many of the Muslim League's

demands, particularly those relating to the reservation of seats for

Muslims, the Congress was not. Sapru suggested "to picture Jinnah,

whom I have known intimately for fifteen years. If he is a spoilt child,

a naughty child, I am prepared to say, give him what he wants and be

finished with it."95 It was Jayakar, the spokesman of the Hindu

Mahasabha, who aired the argument which dashed Jinnah's

amendments to the ground. After stating that such well-known

Muslim leaders like Abdul Kalam Azad, Dr. Ansari, Sri Ali Imam,

Raja Sahib or Mahmudabad and Dr. Kitchlew gave their full assent to

the NR, he emphasised that Jinnah represented only a small minority

of Muslims.96 Jinnah, who firmly believed that Hindu-Muslim unity

alone could usher in political advance in India, was offended by

Jayakar's remarks. In his response to these reactions he stressed the

need for Hindu - Muslim unity: "What we want is that Hindus and

Muslims should march together until our object is attained.... We are

all sons of the land. We have to live together. We have to work

126

together and whatever our differences may be, let us at any rate not

create more bad blood."97 The fact of the matter was that the Hindu

leaders were totally opposed to the amendments, and a large bulk of

Muslims, belonging to the Shafi camp, were totally opposed to joint-

electorates. Jinnah's arguments failed to move the majority of the

members of the convention. The amendments were put to vote and

rejected.

Many historians characterised the convention’s steamrolling of

Jinnah's proposals as "the parting of ways" as far as Jinnah was

concerned.98 The tenor of Jinnah's speech at the conference would

suggest such a possibility. He asked the Hindu delegates that "if we

cannot agree, let us at any rate agree to differ, but let us part as

friends." But a closer scrutiny of the future developments controverts

these and similar contentions. It can be seen that Jinnah made

strenuous efforts for a communal settlement in the post - Nehru

Report period.

After the Calcutta session debacle, Jinnah adjourned his faction

of the Muslim League and entrained for Delhi and the All Parties

Muslim Conference. Jinnah, though initially dissociated from the

conference, decided to attend the open session. The Aga Khan

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remarked of Jinnah's participation in the conference as marking "the

return of Mr. Jinnah to agreement with his fellow Muslims and that

they had at last won him over to their view.99 It was obvious that

Jinnah had reached a crossroad in his political career, but that did not

mean that he wanted himself to be inside the Muslim League camp.

Jinnah still saw himself as a nationalist, and wanted to bring about

Hindu - Muslim unity, the only guarantee for swaraj. However, he had

first to mend his political fences with his co-religionists, badly bruised

after his Delhi proposals. He saw unity within the Muslim community

as a sine qua non for the success of negotiations with the Hindus. This

he did by patching up with Shafi and by reuniting the divided League

in March 1929. He then parleyed with various Muslim groups and

leaders to evolve a unified response to the Nehru Report which finally

resulted in the formulation of his Fourteen Points. They are as follows:

(1) The form of the future constitution should be federal with

the residuary powers vested in the provinces.

(2) A uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all

provinces.

(3) All legislatures in the country and other elected bodies shall

be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective

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representation of minorities in every province without reducing the

majority in any province to a minority or even equality.

(4) In the Central Legislature, Mussalman representation shall

not be less than one third.

(5) Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by

means of separate electorates as at present, provided it shall be open

to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate electorate in

favour of joint electorates.

(6) Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be

necessary shall not in any way affect the Muslim majority in the

Punjab, Bengal and the NWEP.

(7) Full religious liberty, ie, liberty of belief, worship and

observance, propaganda, association and education, shall be

guaranteed to all communities.

(8) No bill or resolution or any part thereof shall be passed in

any legislature or any other elected body if three fourths of the

members of any community in that particular body oppose such a bill,

resolution or part thereof inthe ground that it would be injurious to the

interests of that community or in the alternative, such other method is

129

devised as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such

cases.

(9) Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.

(10) Reforms should be introduced in the NWEP and

Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces.

(11) Provision should be made in the Constitution giving

Muslims an adequate share, along with the other Indians, in all the

services of the State and in local self-governing bodies having due

regard to the requirements of efficiency.

(12) The Constitution should embody adequate safeguards for

the protection of Muslim culture and for the protection and promotion

of Muslim education, language, reli gion, personal laws and Muslim

charitable institutions and for their due share in the grants - in - aid

given by the State and by local self-governing bodies.

(13) No Cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be formed

without there being a proportion of at least one-third Muslim

Ministers.

(14) No change shall be made in the constitution by the Central

Legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting the

Indian Federation.100

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The first point was intended to allay Muslim fears of a Hindu-

dominated centre, and also to win provincial support for his plan. The

second point advocates equity between provinces which would ensure

that the Muslim - majority province will not be disadvantaged in any

way. The third and fourth points formed part of his Delhi proposals.

By "adequate and effective representation" he wanted to ensure the

protection of Muslim rights. At the same time it would gain him the

support of Muslims from the minority provinces. Inclusion of the

notion that the majority community within a province could not be

reduced to a minority or even equality was aimed at winning the

Punjabi - support. By arguing for one-third representation, Jinnah

hoped that he could hold the balance of power in any government that

was formed. Both the points five and six were again targeted at the

Muslim - majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal. In the Delhi

proposals Jinnah had been ready to forego separate electorates in

return for a specified number of demands, but now he could not take

such a position. Previously Jinnah had been considered too secular to

accommodate religious sentiments of the Muslim community. Point

seven was intended to change that notion and win the support of the

minority provinces and conservative Muslims. The concept of veto by

three fourths of the members of any community had formed one of the

131

aspects of the Lucknow pact of 1916, and in response to the Delhi

proposals Congress offered the right to veto to the Muslims. Jinnah

thought that inclusion of this provision would turn out to be

advantageous to his community. As for points nine and ten, they were

taken from the Delhi proposals, and Jinnah thought that creation of

three new Muslim provinces would strengthen his position vis-a-vis

the Congress and the government. Point eleven was again intended to

get the support of conservative provincial Muslims. In the past Jinnah

was not in favour of reserving a certain percentage of posts in the

bureaucracy for Indians, instead he wanted to give such posts to the

best qualified applicants. His U-turn in this regard was to get Muslim

support for his scheme. Point twelve is a reiteration of the issues he

raised in point seven. Jinnah, though wanted one-third membership to

the central cabinet, was not committed to that concept at the provincial

level. By including such a demand at the provincial level, he hoped to

get the support of the Muslim leaders in the provinces. The point

fourteen that the constitutional changes needed the concurrence of the

states was included with a view to ensuring minority protection.

The publication of Jinnah's fourteen points did not receive a

good reception from the Muslim community. Motilal Nehru advised

the Congress to ignore them as of no consequence. The Hindus

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scorned them, and Jawaharlal Nehru went to the extent of calling them

"Jinnah's ridiculous 14 points." His fourteen points were opposed by

Dr. Ansari, Tassaduq Ahmed Khan Sherwani, Dr.Mohammad Alam,

and Dr. Syed Mahmud, all of whom lending whole-hearted support to

the Nehru Report. Mohammed Ali proved to be the sole exception,

and, having totally disgusted with Congress and Gandhiji, he paid

glowing tributes to his statesmanship, calling him an "arch

compromiser."101 The fact of the matter was that Jinnah and some of

his close associates thought them to be the best solution under the

circumstances.

The Nehru Report, it must be noted, was initially approved by

Jawaharlal Nehru but sooner than later he found its acceptance of

communal representation and commitment to dominion status

unacceptable. This led at last the replacing of the dominion status

advocated by Gandhi by the purnaswaraj or complete independence of

Jawaharlal Nehru. Dominion status carried with it allegiance to the

crown, participation in imperial institutions, and engaging with British

politics and public opinion. Dominion status meant there would be

negotiations for the provisions of minority rights and representation.

133

Complete independence on the other hand carried overtones of anti

imperialism and majoritarian democracy. Congress leadership's

abandonment of dominion status signalled that it was for majority rule

and uniform citizenship rather than for minority rights and

representation. Thus it can be found that on three occasions Jinnah

put on offer various ways of sharing sovereignty: the pre- Nehru

Report ' Delhi Proposals', the six points offered by the Muslim League

as amendments to the Nehru Report and the ' Fourteen Points' offered

by Jinnah after the rejection of the ' six points' by the All Parties

Conference.102

There is no unanimity among scholars, and the data of birth of

Jinnah. His date of birth as per the school records is October 20,

1875. In the school registers he is named Mohammed Ali son of

Jinnabhai. Riaz Ahmad says that his date of birth was wrongly

entered in the school register by his uncle who dis not know the exact

date when Jinnah was admitted into the Anjuman-i- islam school,

Bombay. However Jinnah in later life would claim December 25,

1876 as his true date of birth, the birth day officially celebrated in

Pakistan.

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Inspite of the adverse criticism of Jinnah in the All Parties

Conference, Gandhiji held discussions with Jinnah with a view to

finding a solution to the communal question. This immensely helped

in strengthening his position in the Muslim political firmament. It was

the time when Gandhiji was being pressurised to embark on a new

civil disobedience campaign, for the success of which Gandhiji

needed the support of Indian Muslims. Nevertheless Gandhiji was

restrained from making concessions to Jinnah, thanks to a strong

section within the Congress opposed to Jinnah.102 Finding that his

efforts would be fruitless, Jinnah rather chose to turn to the British in

his search for a prominent political role.

Jinnah thus held a meeting with Irwin. There he demanded the

announcement by the British that Dominion status was the immediate

aim of British policy. It was intended to undermine the Congress

resolution that India be given Dominion status by 31 December 1929,

or else the Congress would adopt a demand for full independence.

Jinnah also demanded the convening of a Round Table Conference

where the Indian and British representatives would draft a constitution

in accordance with the aim of Dominion Status. Irwin took Jinnah's

proposals to England for discussions with the incoming government.

Coming back to India Irwin made an announcement that "the natural

135

issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the

attainment of Dominion Status." It reduced the value of the report of

the Simon Commission as one of the submissions to be presented to

the forthcoming Round Table Conference. The Congress accepted

Irwin's offer and asked for a release of political prisoners as a prelude

to discussions. Jinnah was also impressed by the announcement

Congress, however, placed several conditions for its participation to

the round table conference. To bring the Congress to the negotiating

table, Jinnah, along with Sapru, arranged a meeting between Irwin and

the Congress leaders such as Gandhiji, Vithalbhai Patel and Motilal.103

But Jinnah's efforts foundered on the rock of Gandhiji's surprise

demand that the British government should assure that India would

become a Dominion at the completion of the conference. It was quite

clear that Gandhiji and Motilal took an intransigent attitude under

severe pressure from the younger Congressmen and communal

elements within the Congress. Despite this rebuff, Jinnah and Sapru,

continued their work of bridging the gulf between Congress and the

government, the only difference being that this time they were joined

by Jayakar. All their efforts proved futile. This failure left Jinnah

frustrated and embittered. Thus he became less inclined to negotiate

with the Congress and instead made efforts to influence Irwin as best

as he could. However Sapru was for making one more attempt to

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bring the Congress to the negotiating table through convening an All

Parties’ Conference. Jinnah, thanks to the warm relationship he had

with Sapru, could not but agree to this proposal. He requested a

number of prominent Muslims to make the conference a success.

Nevertheless, things did not take place as Sapru had thought. In the

weeks following Gandhiji - Irwin talks, the position of Jawaharlal

Nehru and the younger nationalists became harder than before, and

Jawaharlal Nehru declared in unequivocal terms that the Congress

goal was full independence and that Dominion status was no longer

satisfactory.104

At that time there was a general perception that Jinnah had been

a political adviser to the Viceroy and that he had tremendous influence

on the Viceroy. The truth was that Jinnah did not have much influence

on Irwin, who distrusted him as an extremist. Jinnah's worth to Irwin,

however, increased tremendously with the former's shift away from

the Congress by 1929 and with the declaration of no-co-operation by

Gandhiji. Irwin cleverly made use of Jinnah without giving him any

real say in the events.

Jinnah firmly believed that swaraj could be won at the RTC and

because of this attitude the nationalist press accused him of having the

delusion that swaraj could be won by arguing from a brief.106 Before

leaving for RTC, Jinnah told the assembled reporters that the

137

Congress, by keeping aloof from the Conference, was making a great

mistake.107 He left India, still committed to the nationalist cause,

disagreeing with the Congress unrealistic goal of complete

independence and sticking firmly to the goal of dominion status.

Except for this, he was no less dedicated to welfare of India than the

prominent leaders of INC. Jinnah, who had high expectations of the

Conference, believed that the new labour government would bring

about political reform in India. However, the absence of the largest

political organization of the country brought to light the stratification

of the Indian nationalist movement. The RTC was a desperate effort

by Jinnah to bring about a constitutional settlement and its failure

proved to be a turning point in his political career.

The Indian delegation, despite the absence of the Congress in

the conference, hoped that a settlement would emerge from the

negotiations. Jinnah's role in the RTC was seen to be crucial and

impossible to ignore.108 In spite of all this Jinnah was trusted neither

by the British nor by the Indian delegation. His own blunt manner and

emphasis on Indian and Muslim demands were not palatable to the

British representatives. He was seen to be too conciliatory by his

fellow Muslims and a communalist by the Hindu delegates.109

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Even before reaching England, negotiations were carried out on

board the P&O ship Viceroy of India and no agreement was reached,

thanks to the different approaches of the Mahasabha on the one land

and the Muslims on the other. While the former argued for the

immediate grant of Dominion Status, the latter saw Hindu-Muslim

settlement as essential for negotiations with the British. There was no

unity even within the Muslim delegation itself. The leader of the

Unionist Party in the Punjab, Fazli-Hussain did not see eye to eye

with Jinnah for many of his views. He was of the view that Jinnah was

too much conciliatory towards the Hindus and more interested in the

Muslim position at the centre. Therefore he wanted to reduce Jinnah's

influence at the RTC to the maximum level possible. To interact

Jinnah, Fazli chose Shafaat Ahmad Khan, known for his obsession

with the minority safeguards. He also included Chaudhuri Zafrullah

Khan, a protégé of his, for assisting Shafaat Ahmad Khan.

When the delegates arrived at London, informal talks took place

between the Hindu and Muslim delegates. At the meeting, acting as

the main negotiator for the Muslim delegations, Jinnah pursued the

major demands of the Fourteen Points. The liberals such as Sapru,

Shastri and Stevald agreed the creation of Sind and NWFP as separate

provinces on an equal footing with the provinces. They also agreed to

139

allow Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal, and weightage for

Muslims in the minority provinces. The Muslims would, under such

conditions, would agree to the formation of joint electorates with

reservation of seats for Muslims.110 Nevertheless, Moonje and

Jayakar, representing the Mahasabha, were so adamant that they were

reluctant to agree to the Muslim demands. In the circumstances, it

took many meetings before an agreement was eventually arrived at.

The major points of agreement included: 1) reservation of seats on a

population basis in the minority provinces. 2) Freedom to Bengal and

Punjab to negotiate their own agreement between the respective

religious communities 3) Full provincial status to Sind and NWFP 4)

Thirty percent reservation for Muslims at the Centre and 5) restriction

on legislation which directly affects any one community. When it was

presented to the Muslim delegation, it was thrown out by Shafaat and

Zafrullah Khan. They were opposed to the loss of weightage in the

minority provinces and the lack of an agreement or clear majorities in

both the Punjab and Bengal. Fazli, at the same time, made the Muslim

delegation stick onto Jinnah's Fourteen Points Separate representation

and weightage for Muslims were the two demands the Muslim

delegation stuck to. The Punjabis felt that a system which deprived

them of separate representation would stand in the way of their

140

continued dominance in the Punjab. With the Mahasabha also taking

an inflexible stand, Jinnah's efforts turned out to be an utter failure.

Even Ramsay Mac Donald's intervention to remove the deadlock on

the communal issue failed. Here the Muslim demand for a bare

majority in Punjab was vehemently opposed by the Sikhs, with the

whole - hearted support of Moonje and Jayakar. Jinnah stood

committed to the question of Muslim majority in the Punjab, and after

this meeting, even Sapru conceded that the conference would proceed

on the basis of separate representation. Jinnah throw off his Punjabi

shackles and made a final offer to the Hindus. The offer included:

Hindu-Muslim parity in the Punjab, a bare minority for Bengali

Muslims and the continuation of separate representation. This was

also turned down by the Sikhs, under heavy pressure from the

Mahasabha.

The reactionary provincial Muslims and the communal Hindu

elements frustrated the hopes of Jinnah. Jinnah, however, felt that the

Muslims needed some kind of protection in a self - governing India.

As a majority community, the Hindus had to make concessions to the

Muslims who are in a minority.Hindus should realize this.111

141

With the Hindu - Muslim accord not being reached, the British

government was not under pressure to grant dominion status to India.

Jinnah highly disappointed at the failure of the conference decided to

remain in London and establish a legal practice. Though in London,

he was kept informed of the happenings in India. While on a visit to

India on a legal business, he had a brief meeting with the Viceroy

before leaving for England to participate in the Second Round Table

Conference, and the whole attention of the conference was rivetted on

Gandhi. Even before the commencement of the Conference, the

Muslim representatives stuck to the position that they would not

discuss other issues unless and until the communal question had been

settled. With a view to arriving at a settlement, Jinnah had a

discussion with Gandhi. In that meeting he emphasized the need for

separate representation and guaranteed Muslim majorities in the

Punjab and Bengal.112 Discussions with Gandhi continued, with

Jinnah and Shafi taking the lead. Gandhi's refusal to act as anything

more than a mediator between the Muslims on the one hand and the

Mahasabha and the Sikhs on the other proved to be a deterrent to

arriving at a settlement. The second RTC only served to harden

Jinnah's attitude towards the Hindus. He reminded the Hindus and the

British that without Muslim co-operation no constitution would

142

work.113 He was not invited to the Third RTC for being too unyielding

in the first two conferences.114

Through out the period of his exile in London, Jinnah was in

constant touch with his friends in India who kept him informed of the

political events in India. The communal antagonism between the two

communities was so apparent that the Muslims kept aloof from the

non-co-operation movement. Jinnah continued to remind the Indian

Muslims the need for unity among the Muslims.115 Even Fazil -

Hussain felt that Jinnah's presence vital for the protection of Muslim

interests in India.116 As a prelude to his permanent return to India, he

was in India during March and April, and he met with the league

council and he was given an enthusiastic welcome on his arrival.117 In

an interview to the Associated press, Jinnah said that he was

immensely impressed by the speeches of various leaders. He added

that the league was perfectly sound and healthy, and that he was sure

that the Musalmans would not lag behind any other community in

serving the very best interest of India.118 He, in the meantime, was

elected unopposed in the legislative Assembly as the representative of

the Muslims of Bombay. The collapse of the Muslim Conference

together with the lack of a leader to win the confidence of the Muslim

community, raised the importance of Jinnah and the Muslim league.

143

Notes and References

1 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), Collected works, Vol.I, p.88.

2 Rowlatt Committee Report, p.1.

3 Ibid. , p.201.

4 Ibid. , p.206.

5 Ibid. , pp. 209-10.

6 Mohammad Yusuf Khan, The Glory of Quaid- i- Azam,

pp. 30-31.

7 M.H. Saiyid, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 238-39.

8 Ibid.

9 Bombay Chronicle, 6 and 7 April, 1919.

10 Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (CWMG) , Vol. XIV,

p. 470.

11 CWG, Vol. XV, 1964-72, pp. 398-99.

12 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, p. 63

13 Tara Chand, History of Freedom Movement in India, Vol.III,

p.480.

The Jallian Wallah Bagh was an enclosed square surrounded by

buildings with only one narrow entrance through which an armoured

car could not pass. The people, variously estimated at between

fifteen thousand and twenty thousand, were peacefully listening to

speeches of their leaders when Dyer and his men moved into the

144

square and without any warning, opened fire into the crowd. In the

ensuing pandemonium, approximately 379 died and 200 were injured.

14 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 17 November, 1919.

15 Ibid.

Jinnah went to London to ask Montague to overturn the

Rowlatt Act, but his efforts in this direction met with failure as his

position with Montague was undermined by Lloyd and Willington.

16. Sir Maurice Gwyer and Appadorai, ‘ Speeches and Documents

on the Indian Constitution’, 1921-47, Vol. I, XXVII- XXVIII.

17 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 27 December, 1917.

18 Ibid., 2 September, 1919.

19 Ibid. , 26 June, 1920.

20 The Indian Annual Register (1922-3), Vol. II, p.413.

21 Ibid., Vol.I, p.382.

22 P. Sitaramayya, 'The History of the Indian National Congress,

Vol.I, pp. 179-80.

23 S.S. Pirzada, Foundations, Vol.I. , p. 538.

24 The Indian Annual Register, Vol.II, p.113.

25 Ibid. , p.413.

26 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 21 November. 1919.

27 Ibid.

The punishments imposed on Indians such as 'crawling order'

and 'floggings' further brought out his unsoldierly and barbarous

behaviour. Dyer himself ordered to flog six youths without recourse to

145

a trial. Some students were flogged by the military to maintain

discipline in the school. An entire wedding party was flogged on the

ground that it constituted a public gathering of more than ten persons.

Both the Congress and the Muslim League left no stones unturned to

condemn the activities of Dyer and O'Dwyer, and demanded their

removal from all positions of responsibility.

28 Report of the 34th Session of the Indian National Congress,

p.124.

29 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 9 June, 1920.

Though the reports severely criticised the actions of Dyer and his

fancy punishments, the Majority report justified the declaration of

Martial Law while the Minority Report felt that it was highly

unnecessary. The Government of India's acceptance of the criticism

levelled against Dyer and his forced retirement, gave rise to

condemnation by the European community in India. On the other

hand, the Majority Report was seen by Indians as an attempt to justify

British activities in Punjab.

30 Ibid. , 28 June 1920.

31 Ibid. , 9 September 1920.

32 P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p. 202.

33 Ibid.

34 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), op.cit., Vol.I , p. 543.

35 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), n.1, Vol.I, p.397.

36 M.R. Jayakar, The Story of My life, Vol.I, p.405.

37 CWMG Vol. XVIII, October 25, 1920, p. 372.

146

38 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 1 November, 1920.

39 Report of the 35th Indian National Congress, 1920, p.46.

40 Ibid.

41 Stanely Wolpert, Jinnah Pakistan, p.71.

42 Ibid. , p.73.

43 Ian Bryant Wells, Ambassador of Hindu- Muslim Unity, p.110.

44 M. Naeem Qureshi, Pan - Islam in British India: The Politics of

the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924, p.66.

45 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 7 November, 1914.

46 P.C. Bamford, Non- co- operation and Khilafat, p. 138.

47 Mahomed Ali Papers, 17 July, 1920.

48 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), n.34, Vol. I, p.500.

49 C. Khaliquzzman, Pathway to Pakistan, p.43.

50 Rafiq Zakaria, The Man Who Divided India, p.22.

The radicalism of its leaders and the mixing of religious issues

with political issues were not to Jinnah's liking. Jinnah, for whom

politics was a gentleman's game, did not believe in whipping up mass

hysteria. He wanted only the tempering of the Turkish peace terms so

that the Khilafat would not be an issue in Indian politics.

51 S.S.Pirzada (ed.), n.1, Vol.I, pp. 360-62.

52 Ibid, p.388.

53 CWMG, Vol.V., 1964-72, p.297.

54 Bombay Chronicle, 26 November, 1919

147

55 Ibid. , 29-30 May, 1920.

56 Stanley Wolpert, op.cit., p.69.

57 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 29 October, 1921.

Reading's reading of Jinnah was not far from true. Jinnah blamed

the British for the turn of events. He felt that if it had not been for the

Rowlat Act and the British government's treatment of Turkey, Gandhi

would not have risen to the centre stage of Indian politics.

58 M.R. Jayakar, op.cit., Vol.I, p.505.

59 Ibid. , p.517.

60 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), n.1, Vol.II, p.19.

61 M.R. Jayakar, op.cit., Vol.I, , p.549.

62 Bombay Chronicle, 27 September 1921.

63 Rafiq Zakaria, op.cit., p.29.

64 P.C. Bamford, Histories of the Non- Co-operation and Khilafat

Movements, p.191.

65 Ibid. , p. 209.

66 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 16 June 1924 and 19 June 1924.

67 Ibid. , 10 January, 1923.

68 The Indian Annual Register (1923), Vol. II, p.220.

69 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 13 April, 1925.

The Finance Bill, debated during March, brought about the end of

the party. Jinnah was for giving support to the Bill, whereas the

swarajists attempted to reject it in toto. Motilal, who came under

increasing pressure from the Congress elements to forcefully pursue a

148

policy of non- co-operation within the chamber, was not prepared to

compromise with the Independent Party as in the past.

70 Ian Bryant Wells, op.cit., p.140.

71 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), n.23, p. 578.

72 Ibid.

The Lucknow pact has reduced the Muslim majority in Punjab to 50

percent and in the Bengal to 70 percent. The new resolution was

intended to tie the Bombay and United Province Muslims to the

Punjabis, trying in the process to prevent a future sell- out leading to

another Lucknow Pact.

73 Ian Bryant, Wells, op.cit., p. 141.

74 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), op.cit., Vol. I, 1969, p.577.

75 M.R. Jayakar, My life, Vol. II, p. 535.

76 Ibid.

77 Indian Quarterly Register, 1925, Vol.I, pp. 66-7.

78 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), op.cit., Vol. I, 1969, 582.

79 Ian Bryant Wells, p. 144.

80 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), n.23, Vol. I1, p. 104.

81 Jaswant Singh, Jinnah, India, Partition - Independence - 2009,

p. 138.

82 Indian Quarterly Register, 1927, Vol. I, p. 37.

83 Ibid., pp. 14 - 21.

84 Bombay Chronicle, 2 May, 1927.

149

85 Indian Quarterly Register, op.cit., pp. 432-3.

86 Stanley Wolpert, op.cit., p. 89.

87 Mohamed Ali Papers, 11 November, 1927.

88 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), op.cit., p. 127.

89 Bombay Chronicle, 12 December, 1927.

90 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), op.cit., Vol. I1, pp. 107 - 127.

91 Saiyid, op.cit., p. 120.

92 M.C. Chagla, Roses in December, p. 95.

93 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), n.1, Vol. III, p. 307.

94 The Proceedings of the All Parties National Convention,

pp.76 - 77.

95 S. Wolpert, op.cit., p. 100.

96 Ibid. , pp. 100-101.

97 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 321 - 22.

98 For example see Hector Bolitho, Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan,

Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims : A Political History -1858-1947,

Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India

and The Memoirs of the Aga Khan.

99 The Aga Khan, Memoirs, p. 210.

100 The Indian Annual Register -1929, Vol.I, pp. 364 - 65.

101 Stanley Wolpert, p. 100.

150

102 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoebar Rudolph, Postmodern

Gandhi and Other Essays, Gandhi in the world and at Home,

p.65.

103 Jayakar Papers, F. 437.

104 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 24, December, 1929.

105 Civil and Military Gazette, 4 January, 1930.

106 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 17 July, 1960.

107 Ibid.

108 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 22 November, 1930.

109 Ian Bryant Wells, op.cit., p.213.

110 Chimanlal Setalvad, Recollections, p. 358.

111 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), Jinnah's Correspondence, p.21.

112 Bombay Chronicle (Daily), 26 September, 1931.

113 Ibid. , October 1931.

114 Chimanlal Setalvad, op.cit., p.381.

115 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), Jinnah's Correspondence, p. 376.

116 Ian Bryant Wells , op.cit., p.235.

117 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), op.cit., Vol. II, p. 223.

118 Ibid., p.233.

151