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ARMENIAN MILITANCY AGAINST TURKEY
The release of the perpetrators of genocide signaled a major shift in the
political winds. The former Allied Powers, having become bitter rivals over
the spoils of war, failed to act in unison in imposing peace or in dealing with
the stiff resistance of a Turkish nationalist movement. They concurred that the
Armenians should be freed and rehabilitated but took no effective measures to
achieve that objective. They hoped that the United States would extend a
protectorate over the devastated Armenian regions, but the United States was
recoiling from its involvement in the world war and turning its back on the
League of Nations. Unable to quell the Turkish nationalist movement, which
rejected the award of any territory for an Armenian state or even unrestricted
return of the Armenian refugees, the Allied Powers in 1923 made their peace
with the new Turkey. No provision was made for the rehabilitation, restitution,
or compensation of the Armenian survivors. Western abandonment of the
Armenians was so complete that the revised peace treaties included no
mention whatsoever of"Armenians" or "Armenia". It was as if the Armenians
had never existed in the Ottoman Empire. All Armenians who had returned to
their homes after the war were again uprooted and driven into exile. The
3,000-year presence of the Armenians in Asia Minor came to a violent end.
Armenian place-names were changed, and Armenian cultural monuments
were obliterated or allowed to fall into disrepair. Attempts to eliminate the
memory of Armenia included change of the geographical expression
"Armenian plateau" to "Eastern Anatolia". The Armenian survivors were
condemned to a life of exile and dispersion, being subjected to inevitable
acculturation and assimilation on five continents and facing an increasingly
indifferent world. With the consolidation of totalitarian regimes in Europe
during the 1920s and 1930s, memory of the Armenian cataclysm gradually
faded, and in the aftermath of the horrors and havoc of World War 11, it
virtually became the "forgotten genocide."'
1 David Marshall Lang, The Armenians: A People in Exile (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 10.
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The Armenians were scattered all over the world from the United
States, the Soviet Union, Europe, Australia, to the Middle East and even South
America. For the next fifty years, the survivors kept trying to grapple with the
enormity of what had happened to them, unable to fathom the reasons for the
inhuman treatment, the denials of the Turks, and the silence of the world. All
that they had been promised by the guardians of justice, the Western powers,
now belonged to Turkey. The ghosts of the past refused to be exorcised. In
their struggle for survival, trying to adapt to foreign lands and culture, their
personal hells remained buried deep within them. Their political parties and
cultural organizations were too preoccupied with resisting assimilation, paying
their dues to the victims of the genocide through mourning and prayers, and
expecting the world to understand and sympathize with the plight of the
Armenians to do anything more than write petitions and submit memoranda to
the international organizations, and governments which had anyway deserted
the Armenian cause to the demands of realpolitik .
Although there was some respite from the heavy burden of the past in
knowing that the Dashnaks had at least eliminated the chief perpetrators of the
genocide, there was no attempt on the part of the Armenians at understanding
their situation in a global context and redefining their identity and place in a
changed scenario. The political parties were too busy vying for the role of the
spokesperson of the Diaspora, of trying to position themselves vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union, of chasing power for power's sake. But all this changed in 1965.
24 April 1965 marked a turning point in the post-genocide history of the
Armenians. There was a spontaneous outburst of emotion as Armenians all
over the world came out of their homes in huge numbers to publicly
commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Genocide. The second generation
of survivors had grown up and was ready to demand their rightful place under
the sun. Agonized over the personal hells and repression of memory of their
parents and grandparents, refusing to silently suffer their fate unlike these
elderly loved ones, they demanded justice, they demanded from Turkey, not
only the recognition of the Genocide but also the return of their ancestral
lands, their homeland.
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The changing world situation where the ThirdWorld was affirming its
place in the world made the Diaspora Armenians revaluate their position in
global affairs. They realized that in allying themselves with the Western world
on the basis of the common denominator of religion, they had been barking up
the wrong tree. They discovered that they belonged to the Third World and
had similar national aspirations as those of the newly independent nations.
They realized the importance of ending the inaction and their political
marginalization. In the words of Yves Ternon, "The 1968 c~sis led the new
generation to break off the passivity of the second generation, the 'generation
of the desert.' The search for their roots and the appropriation of their
patrimony included a reflection on their future. "2
While the political parties could not provide an alternative, the younger
generation was eager for a dynamic solution to their future. This could be
found in two contradictory and antagonistic means: education or violence.
They questioned the intellectuals on the concept of being an Armenian. The
fetishistic notion of an eternal Armenia was rejected by them and they opted
for a global, political, psychoanalytic, and cultural-consciousness raising,
active and enlightened integration as a realistic alternative to the assimilation
terrorism alternative.3 However, there were those who could not see a political
solution through this cultural reasoning and demanded action, resistance, and
armed struggle. This alternative was found in Lebanon. The radical tendencies
of the Armenians were also nurtured by the deterioration of the economic
conditions of the Armenians in the Middle East, the political situation in
Lebanon, and to the growth ofthe economic crisis in the West.
In the face of Turkish intransigence and a lack of hope of political
settlement Armenian terrorism emerged as the only alternative to despair and
abandonment. According to Ternon, "Every act of terrorism against the Turks
involved a little bit of each Armenian for whom terrorism was thus a
2 Yves Temon, The Armenian Cause, (Translated from the French by Anahid Apelian Mangouni) (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1985), p.165. 3 H. Kurkjian, "De !'integration," Haistan, no. 374 (1976), pp. 13-16. Reference in Temon, n.2, p. 167.
97
projection of himself. He was doing what he had always dreamed of doing.
Following the initial effect of surprise, the first terrorist actions were met with
relie£ Whenever the leaders of an organization or a party condemned the
actions officially, they nevertheless shaded their statements, and one could
read between the lines: 'It was not a good thing to do, but it had to be done. "'4
As a result of the treatment meted out to them in the Ottoman Empire
and the role of the Western Powers in increasing their vulnerability in a
regime that was already negatively predisposed towards them, it comes as no
surprise that many Armenians see themselves as a uniquely martyred Christian
nation ignored by the West and crucified by the Turks. 5 Outraged over the
situation, two small groups of Armenian terrorist began assassinating Turkish
diplomats in the 1970s: the anti Dashnak and Marxist ASALA and the
Dashnak Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), succeeded
in 1983 by the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA).6 When a few of the
terrorists were apprehended, some Armenians argued that the terrorists had
had a right to murder and should not be persecuted. While Armenian
extremists have carried out tasks under 19 operational names, the core terrorist
groups are the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) and the
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)7• On the
surface these two groups appear to be united by a common cause, however, a
closer look at their techniques, and targeting, reveals that their methods and
objectives are very different.
4 Ternan, n. 2 , p. 193. 5 On this imagery see Khachig Tololyan, "Martyrdom as Legitimacy: Terrorism, Religion and Symbolic Appropriation in the Armenian Diaspora," in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart (ed.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism, (Great Britain: The Aberdeen University Press, 1987), p. 93. 6 For a scholarly analysis see Michael M. Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People: A study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986). 7 By operating under many different names, the terrorists hope to give the impression of the existence of numerous groups, implying a broader base of support within the woildwide Armenian community.
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Early History
With the rise of nationalism throughout Europe, the decaying and
corrupt Ottoman regime, which resorted to brutal measures in order to
suppress the Armenian Question, was faced by a reaction from a section of the
Armenians. Following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the Armenian
Patriarch in Constantinople, Megerdich Khrimian (Known by the affectionate
term, Hyrig or "Little Father") argued that the Armenians must hence use the
yergateh sherep (iron ladle) or armed force if they were ever to achieve their
demands. To illustrate his point, Hyrig told a parable. At the Berlin
Conference the European great powers had permitted him to meet with them
around a large kettle of herisa (Armenian festive food). But while the others
had iron ladles, Hyrig had only a paper one. Thus he could not partake of the
meal or achieve Armenian demands. 8
Seeking protection for the terribly oppressed Armenian peasant, a few
political organizations came up in the intellectual circles of the Armenian
Diaspora asking for greater autonomy for Armenia. One such organization
was the Dashnak Party (Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun or the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation) founded in 1890 in Tiflis, Georgia, as an umbrella
group of parties but failing that purpose, became a distinct party in 1892. It
was chiefly active in the Russian Empire at first, and then it established
branches in the Ottoman Empire. Three men are said to be its founding
fathers: Kristapor Mikaelian, Rostom Zorian, and Simon Zavarian.9 The
Hunchaks were founded in 1887 in Geneva, among the Russian radicals in
exile as the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party (Sotsial Demokrat Hnchakean
Kusaktsutiun ). Both of these parties were strongly influenced by Russian
8 All Armenians know this story ofHyrig and the iron ladle that represents the need to employ armed force. Interestingly, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), one of the later day Armenian terrorist groups, used this image as the logo for one of its support groups, the Armenian Popular Movement of Lebanon. The journal this group published was called Yergateh Sherep. Its symbol is a kettle of stew from which a Kalashnikov rifle twisted into the form of an iron ladle is extracting a piece of food shaped like the map of a greater Armenia. Tololyan, n. 6, p. 96. 9 Michael M Gunter, Transnational Armenian Activism (London: Research Institute for the Study of the Conflict and Terrorism 229,1990), p. 16.
99
radical populism and the Russian "to the people" movement of the 1870s. The
Armenian word "Hunchak" is, in fact, a translation of the Russian word
Kolkol, or Bell, the title ofHerzen's underground populist publication. The "to
the people" of these Armenian groups was not to the Russian peasants but
rather the downtrodden Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. These two parties
were later joined in 1903 by the Constitutional Democratic (Sahmanadrakan
Ramgavar) Party, which later became the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party
(Ramgavar Azatakan Miutiun), to be the major Armenian political parties at
the time of the Armenian Genocide. Io
In a multiethnic state, such as the Ottoman Empire, nationalism was
viewed by the Turks as a serious internal threat. I I The result was harsher
repression by Sultan Abdul Hamid's regime, manifested in a large-scale
massacre of Armenians in 1895. The militant Pan-Turanism of the Young
Turks who aided by the Dashnaks, seized power in 1908, made matters worse.
In 1909, over 30,000 Armenians were massacred in Adana and other villages
along the Cilician plains in order to stifle the Armenian voices asking for
reforms to alleviate their miserable conditions. From its inception in 1890, the
ARF resorted to violent means because of what it perceived as the necessity of
self-defense in the absence of any legal means of protection. However, this
only seemed to intensify the oppression of the Ottoman regime. (This factor
must also be seen in light of the fact that the Armenians were not permitted to
p·ossess any arms, thus making them even more vulnerable to greater
depredations by the zapityes, the frequent attacks of bandits and the nomadic
Kurds. It also exposed them to the willful excesses of the Ottoman regime.)
According to M. V arandian, an early ARF party historian, "Perhaps there has
never been a revolutionary party - not even the Russian Narodovoletz, or the
Italian Carbo naris - with such rich experiences in the road of terrorist acts, as
the AR Federation, which in its difficult environment, has developed the most
1° For an excellent analysis see Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1963). 11 Gunter, n. 9, p. 2.
100
frenzied types of terrorists, and given hundreds of masters of the pistol, the
bomb and the dagger, for acts ofrevenge."12
The ARF's Manifesto issued in 1891 "sounded like a declaration of
war against the Turkish authorities," declared a modern Dashnak writer. 13 "To
attain its aims by means of revolution, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation
shall organize revolutionary bands which shall wage an incessant fight against
the Government," wrote Simon Vratzian, the Dashnak leader who briefly
became the Premier of the independent Republic of Armenia after the First
World War14 The resulting fedayeen movement, claims another Armenian
writer, "was a forerunner of the freedom fighters from Iran to Algeria in the
20th century Muslim world."15 This terrorism, which was well developed by
the dawn of the 20th Century, was used not only against Turkish officials, but
also other Armenians who had run foul ofthe Party's interests.16 However, as
many historians point out, the Dashnaks did not find favor with the Church
because of their reliance on violence to achieve their ends, and also did not
have popular support. 17
After the massacres of 1915, the Armenians were left homeless,
stateless and relegated to the status of the "starving Armenians". The Turkish
Military Tribunal established to punish the perpetrators of these massacres of
the Armenians declared the Young Turk leaders accused of perpetrating this
crime guilty, and handed out death sentences to a few of them. But as the
12 M. Varandian, as cited inK. S. Papazian, Patriotism Perverted: Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Boston: 1918), p. 18. 13 Manuel S. Hassassian, ARF as a Revolutionary Party, 1890-21 (Jerusalem: Hai Tad Publications, 1983). p.4. 14 Simon Vratzian, "The Armenian Revolution and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation," TheArmenian Review, (Boston) 3, Autumn 1950, p. 19. 15 Anaide Ter Minassian, Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary moment (1887-1912) (Cambridge, Mass.: The Zoryan Institute, 1984), p. 19. Also see James G Mandalian, Armenian Freedom Fighters: The Memoirs of Rouben Der Minasian (Boston: Hairenik Association, 1963). The term "fedayee" refers to freedom fighters in the Middle East organized as irregulars or guerrillas and comes from an Arab word meaning "those who sacrifice themselves." Thus the term has almost mystical ring to it redolent of the original meaning of the term "martyr." 16 See Papazian, n. 14, pp. 17-18 and 68-70. 17 Stanford J. Shaw and Eze1 K Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 201-2.
101
world situation changed, the forces of Mustafa Kemal freed themselves of the
obligation of respecting the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres by renegotiating
a new Treaty of Lausanne. The Armenian Question and the Armenians were
soon a forgotten entity. Although the Armenians were scattered around the
world with only their tragedy to tie them together, the Dashnaks, by virtue of
having an organizational structure in place and their tradition of revolutionary
activity decided to execute the decision of the Turkish Military Tribunal that
lay buried in the annals of history.
After 1921, the leaders of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation
sought refuge in Persia, and then moved to the major centers of the Armenian
Diaspora. Seeking justice for the genocide, the ARF decided at its Ninth
World Congress to carry out the death sentences of the Turkish Military
Tribunals. The American delegate to the Congress, Shahan Natali, (whose real
name was Hagop Der Hagopian) was designated to supervise the project,
codenamed Operation Nemesis. 18 An initial unit of five men was assigned the
mission of executing Talaat. Finally on 15 March 1921, Soghomon
Tehelerian, the executioner designate, shot dead the former Ottoman Minister
of Interior Talaat Bey-who was living in Berlin under the pseudonym Ali Sayi
Bey. Tehelerian was subsequently declared not guilty by a Berlin court, a
judgment which was considered tantamount to acknowledging Talaat's role in
the Armenian Genocide of 1915.19 Illustrating the continuing depth of the
Armenian hatred, years later the author of a National Geographic article on
Armenians met an Armenian in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, who claimed that his
father had killed Talaat. When the author asked what the Armenian thought
about his father's actions, the simple reply was: "I am proud."20
Cemal Pasha was shot to death in front of the Cheka headquarters in
Tiflis, Georgia, on 25 July 1922, by two Armenians, Bedros Der Boghossian
18 Christopher J Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation, (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 344. Shahan Natali is the pseudonym ofHagop Der Hagopian, an Armenian from Turkey, for many years the editor of Hairenik in Boston. 19 Temon, n. 2, p. 100. 20 Gunter, n. 9,p. 7. Even the orders for Operation Nemesis cannot be found in the minutes of the ARF's Ninth World Congress.20 See Temon, n. 2, p. 194.
102
and Ardashes Kevorkian. Said Halim, the former Ottoman grand vizier, was
assassinated in Rome on 6 December 1921, by Arshavir Shiragian, an
Armenian who also claimed to have murdered, along with an accomplice
Aram Erganian, two other Ottoman officials in Berlin, Behaeddin Shakir and
Cerna! Azmi on 17118 April 1922. Enver Pasha was killed while leading the
Turkic rebels against the Red Army near Bukhara in Central Asia on August 4,
1992. There is an unverified account that the Soviet soldier who fired the gun
was an Armenian.21 The last one Dr. Nazim was implicated in a plot against
Mustafa Kemal and hanged following the Smyrna trial in 1926.22 By the mid-
1920s, however, unable to make a foothold in Soviet Armenia, the Dashnaks
decided that the Soviet Union was the main enemy (although they certainly
bore no love for Turkey), and Natali was expelled from the Party. Nemesis
disappeared following these incidents in the early 1920s, and after this there
was a lull in the violent activities of the Dashnaks against Turkey. The goals
of the Dashnaks -to reclaim their lost homeland, as specified in the Treaty of
Sevres and to seek reparation and recognition of the crimes committed upon
their people by Turkey; a solution similar to Germany's admission of guilt and
reparations to Israel after World War II- was sought to be achieved through
petitions and memoranda to international organizations and governments of
various countries.
But in the period following Operation Nemesis till after the fiftieth
anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, the Dashnaks concentrated their
energies mostly on working within the Armenian Diaspora communities,
keeping the Armenian identity and issue alive, denouncing Soviet Armenia,
vying with the other political parties (the Hunchaks and Ramgavars) to have a
greater influence in the Diaspora, and in challenging the authority of the
Catholicosate of Echmiadzin. Their hatred of the Soviet Union was so strong
that their violence was even turned against fellow Armenians. While leading a
Christmas Eve procession down the aisle ofthe Armenian Church of the Holy
Cross in New York in 1933, Archbishop's Ghevond Tourian was murdered by
21 Michael M Gunter, "The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey," Orient, 24:4, 1983, p. 457. 22 For a detailed description see Temon, n. 2, pp. 96-101.
103
Dashnak 'hit men' in the full presence of his congregation.23 The apparent
reason was the Archbishop's support of Soviet Armenia, a concept the
nationalist Dashnaks did not accept.
The year 1965 marked a watershed in the history of the Armenian
Genocide issue. The commemorations of the fiftieth anniversary opened the
floodgates of years of repressed Armenian memories and demands and also
marked the maturation of a politically aware and confident second generation
of survivors. While this event and the changing world situation influenced the
Armenian Diaspora, surprisingly it was an individual act of outrage of a first
generation survivor that was to mark the beginning of the Armenians'
organized armed struggle against Turkish obduracy and denial. Despite its
hoary antecedents, the Armenian terrorist campaign against Turkey began only
in the 1970s. In 1972, Jean-Marie Cazoni, son of an Armenian-French painter,
gave a speech in Marseilles calling for coordinated acts against Turkey. Then,
in an individual act of revenge not connected to any organized effort, an eighty
four-year-old Californian of Armenian descent, Kourken Y anikian,
assassinated Mehmet Baydar and Bahadir Demir, the Turkish consul general
and vice consul, respectively, in Los Angeles on January 27, 1973. Yanikian, a
survivor of the Armenian Genocide, frustrated by the indifference to the plight
of the Armenians had 'brooded quietly until he could bear it no longer. '24
Although the ARF and the majority of the Armenians repudiated his act, and
some even tried to make him appear as a madman, 25 he was not insane. His
was an act of desperation, a release for the years of despair, from the future
that too showed no signs of responding. It was cathartic.
Justice Commandos Of The Armenian Genocide (JCAG)
During the massacres of 1915, many Armenians fled to Lebanon,
which had long been regarded as a refuge for dispossessed minorities. It was
here that the terrorist alternative would find its beginnings. As the Western
23 Gunter, n. 9,op. cit., p.7. 24 Temon, n. 2, p. 171. 25 Sentenced to life imprisonment, Yanikian was paroled in 198l.ibid.
104
Diaspora became increasingly threatened with assimilation, the Armenian
community in Lebanon, boasting of the presence of the major organs of the
three political parties, the Catholicosate of Cilicia, cultural and benevolent
organizations, schools, churches, newspapers, sports centers - came to
symbolize the preservation of ethnic identity. In its retention of the old feudal
structures, had inadvertently immunized itself to the effects of integration,
urbanization, and industrialization.
But this situation too changed in 1967 with the arrival of the
Palestinian fedayeens. So far content to stand by the government so long as it
represented the real power and kept the fifteen religious communities in peace
with one another, the Armenians were forced to take sides as the Lebanese
Muslim parties became more radicalized and divided. Although the political
parties and the church collectively opted for neutrality, there were many
Armenians who chose to migrate to the West. When the Phalangists (Catholic
Christian Rightists) decided to use the Armenian section of east Beirut, known
as Bourj Hammoud, to launch their attacks against the adjacent Muslim
section called Naba'a, a split resulted within the Armenian community. The
right-wing Dashnaks felt that they had a duty to take up arms on behalf of
their Christian brothers, while others, mainly left-wing Armenian youth drew
closer to their Palestinian counterparts (with whom they had close contacts via
the universities and due to the proximity of their neighborhoods). These left
wing Armenians believed that Palestinians were in a similar situation as the
Armenians and began to perceive them as their role models. "Like them, they
were refugees; like them they had been pushed around from one country to the
another; like them, they wanted a land that was denied them; like them, they
had met with the indifference of nations. But the Palestinians organized
themselves, took up arms, and fought back."26 Disillusioned with their leaders
whose sole reliance on words had brought them nothing these youth were
enticed by the armed struggle and began to form their own groups (e.g.
AS ALA) with the aid of the Palestinians. 27
26 Temon, n. 2, p. 169. 27 For a detailed analysis see ibid, pp. 167-70, 203-5.
105
With the death of the former ARF leaders of the Armenian Republic by
the early 1970s, the priority given the anti-Soviet line began to alter. While
still maintaining that Soviet Armenia had the right to become independent, the
Dashnaks moved closer to identifying their organization with that of the third
world national liberation movements, and 'fascist' Turkey became the main
enemy.28 The 'political platform' ratified by the 23rd World Congress of the
ARF in 1985 made the ultimate goal of the Party explicit: "The principal
political aim of the ARF remains the realization of a free, independent and
integral Armenia encompassing the Wilsonian boundaries, N akhichevan,
Gharabagh and Akhalkalak. "29 The Platform also declared: "On the road to the
resolution of the Armenian Cause, our enemy is Turkey."
Most sources claim that the Dashnaks decided to create a new terrorist
arm, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) -called the
Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) since July 1983- because they were
losing their young activist members to what was perceived as the new, more
dynamic terrorist organization, AS ALA. 30 The radical shift in ARF strategy
took place at the Twentieth Congress of the Party held at Vienna in 1972 with
the decision to launch the JCAG.31 However, there are no documented sources
to prove that the JCAG was the fighting arm of the ARF; this decision was
probably 'suggested by coded words or dotted lines. ' 32 The Dashnak militants
were aware that they received their orders from the party Bureau but refused
to be trapped by written documents. If the decision was made by the
executive, it was never officially communicated to the membership of ARF.
Although the communiques of the central committees the world over exhibited
support for the JCAG, the central committee of the Eastern USA strongly
2s G unter, n. 21, p. 457. 29 This and the following citations were taken from "Political Platform of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation ratified by the 23'd World Congress," The Armenian Weekly, 16 August 1986, pp. 1, 7; and 30 August 1986, p.1. 30 On this point see The Armenian Reporter, 18 August 1983, p. 10; 29 September 1983, p.1; and 2 February 1984, p. 2. 31 P. Terzian, "La Question armenienne aujourd'hui," Critique socialiste 44 (Fall1982), p. 62. Reference in Temon, n. 2, p. 194, fn. 4. 32 Temon, n. 2, p. 194.
106
rejected any suggestions of the ARF having any links with the 'current wave
of Armenian terrorism. '33
The goals of the JCAG were- to reestablish an independent Armenia as
specified in the Treaty of Sevres and to seek compensation from Turkey for its
evils of 1915 that had destroyed an entire community of Armenians, their
homes and their cultural symbols. JCAG in its communiques appears to strive
for these goals. Following the assassination of the Turkish ambassador to
Vienna and Paris in October and December, JCAG in a follow-up
communique entitled "To all the Peoples Governments" wrote: "May the
world realize that we will lay down our arms only when the Turkish
government publicly denounces the genocide perpetrated by Turkey in 1915
against the Armenian people and agrees top negotiate with Armenian
representatives in order to reinstate justice." 34After a series of bombings in
Paris in July 1979, it further proclaimed, "We demand that the Turkish
government -which is occupying our country and is an extension of the
Ottoman Empire- stand by its responsibilities and return the Armenian lands to
their true owners."35
The JCAG was not seeking revenge against the Turks for the atrocities
committed by them against the Armenians during the Ottoman regime, but
was motivated by the desire for recognition of the Genocide, and reparations.
Following the bombings in New York City and Los Angeles on October 12,
1980, JCAG stated: "We make clear that our struggle today against the
Turkish government is not to be regarded as revenge for the 1915 genocide in
which 1.5 million Armenian men, women and children were massacred. Our
struggle today is directed to have the Turkish government to admit to its
responsibility for that murderous act, as well as to return to the Armenian
people the lands taken forcibly and today occupied by the imperialistic
33 Nishan Saroyan, "Radical Armenian Movements in the 1980's," Paper presented in 1981 at Berkeley Symposium, California, pp.2-3. ibid, fn 3. 34 Andrew Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile," Department of State Bulletin, August 1982, p.34. 35 Cited in Edward Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-79 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1980), p. 856.
107
Turkish government since the genocide. We demand once again that the
Turkish government admit its responsibility for the genocide of 1915 and
make appropriate territorial and financial reparations to the long suffering
Armenian people."36 This theme remains constant in all their communiques till
February 1982 with the assassination of the honorary Turkish consul to
Boston, Orhan Gunduz. In Paris JCAG stated that: "The shooting was to
reaffirm the permanence of our demand. The Turkish government must
recognize the responsibility of its predecessors in 1915 in the execution and
genocide perpetrated against the Armenian people, and it must clearly
condemn it. Secondly, the Turkish government must recognize the right of the
Armenian people to constitute a free and independent state of Armenian land
which Turkey illegally occupies."37
Through these acts, the JCAG was, like any other tet:rorist group,
seeking publicity for their cause and also to rekindle a sense of Armenian
identity or nationalism. The indifference of the world for over half a century
was a cause of great frustration to them and their eye on publicity is expressed
through these words, "With these explosions we are keeping the world aware
of the existence of the Armenian people."38 The resort to violence was a
means to shake the international community, which refused to consider the
peaceful appeal of the Armenians, out of this indifference, " Armenian
frustration and indignation- especially in the face of Turkish distortions and
denials- have led to renewed determination to struggle to regain Armenian
territorial and national rights .... Some Armenians have apparently lost faith in
the willingness or capacity of the world's governments to listen to, or act on,
peaceful appeals. "39
The failure of the recourse to legal means, all the memoranda and
petitions to gain recognition of the Armenian Genocide, especially due to the
vigilance of the Turkish diplomats, delimited the target of the JCAG. It was to
36 Corsun, n. 34, p. 34. 371bid. 38 Mickolus, n. 35, p. 856. 39 Cited in The New York Times, May 30, 1977.
108
be these guardians of denial; the Turkish diplomats. Unlike ASALA, the
JCAG shunned other international terrorist connections and struck only at
Turkish targets. After it murdered the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles
in 1982, for example, JCAG announced: "Our sole targets are Turkish
diplomats and Turkish institutions.'740 In pointed contrast to ASALA, ARA
also made clear its intention to campaign against only the Turkish enemy,
while leaving others alone: "Our target is the Turkish reactionary government
through all its official representatives.''41 In another "Communique" ARA
noted that its activities "will conclude when, taking note of the legality of the
Armenian Cause, the Turkish government begins negotiations with the
representatives of the Armenian people,"42 a demand similar to that of its
predecessor the JCAG.
As avowed, and in keeping with their intention to address the western
world through their acts, the "Justice Seekers" appeared to be specialists in the
murder of Turkish diplomats assigned to embassies and consulates in the
western world. The first operation of JCAG was carried out when three
unknown persons assassinated the Turkish Ambassador to Austria, Danis
Tunaligil, in Vienna on 22 October 1975. A mysterious "Boldikian Group"
attached to the "Justice Commandoes of the Armenian Genocide" claimed
responsibility for it. Two days later the same commando group assassinated
the Turkish ambassador to France, Ismail Erez, and his chauffeur. The
organization was shrouded in mystery until27 May 1976, when an accidental
explosion destroyed the Armenian Cultural Center, an ARF headquarters, on
Rue Bleue in Paris. The police found the body of a Lebanese Armenian who
had been manipulating explosives and arrested another Armenian, Kevork
Papazian and found various brochures signed by the "Justice Commandoes of
the Armenian Genocide" claiming responsibility for the murder of the Turkish
ambassadors in Vienna and Paris and announcing a third operation which was
4° Cited in Robert Lindsey, "Turkish Diplomat is Slain on Coast: Armenian Terror Group takes Responsibility in Shooting," The New York Times, 29 January 1982, p A12. 41 "Communique," dated 12 October 1984, and published in The Armenian Weekly, 3 November 1984, p.2. 42 "Communique," dated 19 November 1984, published in The Armenian Weekly, 29 December 1984, p.2.
109
to take place in Turkey.43 Sure enough one year later, on 29 May 1972, bomb
explosions at the airport at Y esilkoy and the Sirkeci train station in Istanbul
left five dead and 64 injured. A branch of the JCAG, the "Group of 28 May" -
based on the day of independence of the Armenian Republic- claimed
responsibility.44
However, contrary to its avowed a1ms of carrymg out the
assassinations of Turkish diplomats only, the JCAG attacked civilian targets
too. Turkey was rocked by explosions and there was an anti-terrorist backlash
against the Armenians of Istanbul. The JCAG killed the son of a Turkish
diplomat in Netherlands, Ahmet Benler, the director of the Turkish Tourist
Office in Paris, Yilmaz Kolpan, and placed bombs in the Turkish Airlines
office and the Turkish Tourist Office in France. On these civilian killings,
Temon opines, "That the bombers and the killers of diplomats never had the
intention to spread terror is a credit they can be granted. On several occasions,
however, actions exceeded intentions.'.45
JCAG concentrated its operation solely on Turkish interests. The one
possible exception was the January 1980 triple bombing of the offices of
Swiss Air, TWA, and British Airlines in Madrid. At first JCAG claimed credit
for the bombing, but in a later phone call to the local press, the caller said that
JCAG was not responsible for the bombing, and in fact, condemned it. As the
group name implies, of the 22 operations carried out by JCAG, ten of the
operations were assassinations (resulting in 12 deaths), six were attempted
assassinations, and six were bombings. The activities of JCAG, which began
from 1975 continued upto 1985, in the later phase as ARA, after which there
was no more terrorist activity from this group.
43 Ternan, n. 2, p. 196. 44 For a detailed list of operations of the JCAG, see Ternon, n. 2, pp. 196-200 and Esat Uras, The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question, (Istanbul: Documentary Publications,1988), p. 183-216. 45 Ternan, n. 2, p. 200.
110
The deep divisions in the Diaspora due to ideological differences were
to manifest themselves in the armed struggle too. In December 1982, Apo
Ashjian, the head of JCAG and a member of the ARF's Central Committee in
Lebanon was apparently killed by his Dashnak associates because he
advocated Dashnak co-operation with ASALA and sought to disregard a
reputed deal with the United States. With Ashjian's death, the Dashnaks
created ARA which was active until shortly before its head, Sarkis
Azanavourian, also a member of the ARF Central Committee in Lebanon, was
gunned down in Beirut, apparently by AS ALA. 46 Throughout 1984, when the
diplomatic assassinations stopped, JCAG-ARA killed 20 Turkish diplomats or
members of their immediate families, while ASALA, in spite of its much
greater claims, was responsible for only eight diplomatic murders.47 ARA
made one last attack. In March 1985 it killed a Canadian security guard during
an attack on the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa and then disappeared. Later it
became apparent that the leaders of the two Dashnak terrorist groups had
themselves been assassinated during internecine violence of Armenians in
Lebanon.
In a further theoretical justification of terrorism, the Dashnak press
declared that "the acts of the Armenian Revolutionary Army and the Justice
Commandos against Turkish officials are supported by a mass of the
Armenian people since the Oppressor [Turkey] is being defied."48 Armenians
"could only be excited by these acts of violence, as 'acts of creation' since the
destruction of any representative of the Oppressor, Turkey, means the
assertion of Armenian dignity." In yet another apology the Dashnaks argued
that "our Cause-no matter how militant at times - is not and never was part of
46 For an analysis of this Dashnak-ASALA fratricide in Lebanon during the early and especially the mid-1980s, see Michael M. Gunter, "The Armenian Dashnak Party in Crisis," Crossroads (Washington, D.C.), no. 26, 1987, pp 75-88. 47 For a list of the assassinations and who was responsible also see Gunter, n.6, pp. 68-69. ASALA was responsible, however, for a number of civilian deaths, particularly during bloody airport attacks in Ankara (1982) and Paris (1983). · 48 Aram Khaligian, "The Necessities of Violence and National Culture in the Liberation Struggle," The Armenian Weekly, 31 December 1986, p.l, it was reported that on "27 July 1986 ... Requiem services for the five heroes of the Armenian revolutionary Army ... [were] held at the St. Hagop Church of Montreal by request of the Montreal Lev on Shant Chapter of the ARF Youth Organization of Canada."
111
'International terrorism.".49 To assert otherwise was a "heavy-handed attempt
to intimidate the Armenian nation and force our people to deny its support
of ... the ARF." Despite this defence of violence, there have been no more
terrorist activities by the Dashnaks since 1985. The reason for this is
apparently that these actions had served their purpose of preventing ASALA
from winning over the Armenian youth, helped to bring the Armenian cause to
the attention of the world, but were later on creating negative publicity.50
Indeed the Political Platform of the Party's 23rd world congress even offered a
hope for eventual conciliation: "Because of geographical and historical
circumstances ... the Armenian nation and the Turkish nation are bound to live
side by side, to coexist and to cultivate neighborly relations based on
reciprocal understanding and sincere cooperation."51
Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation Of Armenia
(AS ALA)
ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) was a
product of the post-1965 political thinking of young Lebanese Armenians who
came from the left of traditional parties such as the ARF's Zavarian Group. It
emerged in contact with the Palestinian terrorism and acquired its military and
political lessons from it. The civil war in Lebanon in 1975 saw savage fighting
between the Christian Phalangists and the Muslims. The Armenians, caught in
the crossfire, vehemently maintained neutrality. But the ARF delegates met
Yasir Arafat and agreed to recognize the Palestinian's rights but stuck to its
stand on neutrality and even refused offers of financial and military aid.
However, it sent a small group of young men to the Palestinian camps for
training. This was to mark the beginning of the contest between ASALA and
ARF for influence among the young militant youth of the Armenian Diaspora
in Lebanon. Despite great provocations, the Armenians refused to be drawn
into the battle between the conservative Phalangists and the progressive
49 This and the following citations were taken from Tatul Sonentz-Papazian, "The ARF Legacy- Are We Ready?" The Armenian Weekly, 31 December 1986, p.3. 50 Gunter, n. 9, p.l9. 51 ibid.
112
Palestinian militia. But the deteriorating situation saw large-scale migrations
of Armenians to Western Europe, Canada, and the United States. Finally in
1979, the break between ASALA and the Dashnaks was accomplished. The
forty thousand Armenian migrants from Lebanon from 1975 to 1980, carried
with them 'a memory of violence which transformed the host Armenian
societies and injected a real element of terrorism into the European
communities. '52
ASALA, which already existed when the civil war began in Lebanon
in1975, emerged as an alternative to the traditional Armenian political parties,
especially the Dashnaks. ASALA explains its genesis in its journal Armenia:
"International imperialism had almost completely spread its dominance on our
people in the Diaspora through the rightist Dashnag Party which is a tool in
the hands of imperialism and Zionism."53 So the main aim of the ''New
National Liberation Struggle launched in 1975 by ASALA is the liberation of
the Turkish occupied Armenian lands ... another main aim of the .... Struggle is
the political and national awakening of the Armenian people which has led to
a dangerous 'deep sleep' by the treacherous policy of the Dashnag party."54
. They declared that "even the name given to their armed group 'Justice
Commandoes of the Armenian Genocide' reveals the deliberate indifference
of the Dashnag leadership vis-a-vis the Armenian Territorial Question."55
ASALA was strengthened by the ideological crisis in ARF wherein a
huge chasm had developed between the conservative and radical elements. It
had certain advantages over ARF that added to its appeal to the Armenian
youth. It was more flexible and adaptable than the ARF because it did not
have to operate within the narrow confines of a political program. It was more
radical than ARF because unlike the latter, it believed that armed struggle was
the only means to achieve its goals. Its terrorism was more diversified and
intensive and through its 'more extensive use of violence, it helped the
52 Temon, n. 2, p. 205. 53 Armenia, no. 131/13, 1986, p.lO. 54Moush (Organ of the Armenian Popular Movement or political arm of ASALA in Greece) No. 13, Autumn 1987, p.3. 55 Armenia, no. 127-128/11-12, 1986, p. 18.
113
Armenians vent their hatreds and disappointments more completely and
showed an impatient youth the allure of extremism. '56 The dream of the
establishment of an Armenian State offered by ASALA was lapped up by the
Armenians living all over the world who suffered from "unemployment,
exploitation by their compatriots and others, and were deprived of their
fundamental social, economic, political and national rights."57
At the end of 1981, ASALA published an eight-point political program
that was described as "the political line that the Popular Movement of ASALA
will support."111 The program was apparently the result of long discussions
with the leaders of various 'popular movements' with a view to forming
eventually a united organization covering a broad spectrum from left to right.
However, there was little deviation in this from its first public declaration on
10 July 1978. In the program ASALA identified its enemies as 'Turkish
imperialism' supported by 'Local reaction' and 'International imperialism.'
Revolutionary violence was said to be 'the principal means' to achieve the
liberation of Armenian territories. Its only enemy was the Turkish
government, which occupied nine-tenths of the Armenian territory. It was the
main goal of ASALA to recover these territories. The allies of the Turkish
State were its enemies: this included American imperialism and the members
ofNATO, the Western powers which abandoned the Armenian Cause for their
own selfish interests, such as France and Switzerland. ASALA was a Marxist
revolutionary organization which wanted to liberate Armenia from the
clutches of their main enemy; the "reactionary and chauvinistic Turkish
state ... For no people whatsoever can abandon and give up its land and
country, no matter how long its occupation lasts and in spite of the strong
means at the disposal of the oppressive enemy."58 It justified its use of
violence as a means to achieve its objectives by stating that, "The errors and
bankruptcy of the conventional Armenian political parties which shouldered
the responsibility of defending the national rights of pour people, which
56 Temon, n. 2, p. 212. 57 Saroyan, n. 33, p.13. 58 First Press Interview, 10 July 1978, ASALA Interview (Britain: Popular Movement for the ASALA, April1982), p.2.
114
naturally did not succeed in securing any gains" and "the intransigence of our
enemy ... was enough proof to convince us that our enemies, especially those
who adhere to policies of chauvinism and terror and are strongly connected
with the ·centers of world oppression and tyranny will never give up what they
have usurped, except by force of arms. So we can regain our rights only by
force of arms. And this cannot be done except by continuous and escalating
attacks against the enemy until he is forced to acknowledge our national
rights. "59
It considered the revolutionary movements opposing Turkey and the
USA, such as the PKK, its friends. ASALA proclaimed its solidarity with the
Cypriot people, the Palestinians, other Arab peoples and Iranians (who
complete the geographical encirclement of Turkey}, but not their leaders. As
part of the international revolutionary movement, ASALA would support
those who 'reject the authority of the oppressing classes' and would endeavor
to 'strengthen and expand' coalitions within the 'International revolutionary
movement.' Those countries which recognized the Armenian Genocide were
considered the friends of the Armenians, those who continued to deny it, the
enemies. They believed that the leaders of Armenian political parties had
failed the people. The ARF was considered obsolete and criticized on grounds
of its past failures; by allying with American imperialism, and thus with the
Turks, it had condemned the Armenians to assimilation. By 1980, Hagop
Hagopian boasted, "In five years we managed to win for ourselves the support
of the Armenian masses and the democratic and revolutionary forces
throughout the world. "60 He even claimed that "some of the leaders of
Tashnag and Henshang (Hunchaks) have secretly joined ELA ( ASALA)."
ASALA was convinced that it fulfilled the needs of all Armenians and
was thus admired. It headed the struggle for national liberation and aimed to
bring all Armenians, irrespective of their class, or political leanings, under one
59 ibid, p. 6. 60 Hagop Hagopian was the main interpreter of the political line of ASALA- who denied being its leader. According to Temon, Hagopian 'appeared as an armed prophet, a man who mustered the nationalistic faith. He was both a war chief who insured his gains and practiced strategic withdrawal, and a player who did not show his hand.' See Temon, n. 2, p. 206.
115
banner. ASALA first and foremost was created in its own words, to become
"today the representing power of the Armenian people."61 In its attempt to
appropriate the leadership of Armenian Diaspora, ASALA tried to co-opt
historical Armenian heroes and deeds. Gourgen Yanikian, whose murder of
two Turkish consuls in California in 1973 anticipated the terrorism that began
in 1975, was adopted as 'the spiritual leader' of the organization and
operations named for him and such other historical Armenian heroes and
places as Andranik, Shahan Natali, Erzurum and, Van among other.
Andranik's portrait appeared with a fictional one representing ASALA's
leader, Hagop Hagopian, alongside the masthead of the organization's organ,
Armenia. Even Vatche Daghlian, the leader of Dashnak's "Lisbon Five," was
usurped as an ASALA martyr ''who had been killed during a mission in
Lisbon, following a Dashnag- international conspiracy."62 Further tapping the
Armenian historical ~oots, the words of the (Soviet Armenian) poet Y eghishe
Charentz, "0 Armenian people I Your sole salvation is I in your collective
force,"63 were cited as a call for unity under ASALA.
Despite initially attacking the Armenian Church, ASALA later on
came to believe that the pride of place of the Church must be restored because
it was the beacon of hope and guidance to the Armenian people. The AS ALA
fighter was a pure revolutionary, unsiezable and invulnerable, who placed the
Armenian Cause before his family and his life, and was not a terrorist. Further
ASALA was independent and proud, and claimed that it owed nothing to
either any government or any other Revolutionary party. It also claimed that
there was no force in the world which could tarnish the name of their
'organization,' confine their 'struggle', and exhaust their 'will.' ASALA
projected Soviet Armenia as the unique and irreplaceable basis of the
Armenian people as they believed that it was a free country, and the Soviet
Union was considered a friendly country, but not an ally, since it refused to
61 Armenia, (Boston) no. 105-106/7-8, 1985, p.29. For further analyses of ASALA see Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause, especially pp. 40-54; Anat Kurz and Ariel Memari, ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1986); and Ternon, n. 2, pp. 203-225. 62 Armenia, no. 127-128/ 11-12, 1986, p.7. 63 Armenia, no. 131/13, 1986, p. 7.
116
serve as a revolutionary base. The final goal of ASALA was a united Armenia
with a 'democratic socialist and revolutionary government.' The Soviet Union
and other socialist governments were to be called upon for help and Soviet
Annenia itself turned in to a base for 'the long people's war.'
ASALA was thus a Marxist revolutionary and Armenian nationalist
group claiming to be the spokesperson of all Armenians. It was also a secret
army, and in the absence of any territorial base it was driven to underground
activity. However, in order to recruit members, it relied on propaganda which
it conducted through press conferences, interviews and its own periodical,
Armenia. Armenia was edited in several languages: Armenian, English,
French, Arabic, and Russian. There was a remarkable amount of secrecy about
the organization. Even in Beirut, they were invisible, had no headquarters, and
could not be contacted by mail or telephone. During public appearances and at
the press conferences and interviews that they held, the ASALA members
were always masked and used pseudonyms which 'following frequent practice
in Armenia were alliterative doubles ( eg., Hagop Hagopian, Mihran
Mihranian, V ahram Vahramian). '64 These measures which were undertaken
more to avoid recognition of the members in their neighborhoods than police
identification ensured that there was a sufficient recruitment of determined
militants.65
The craftiness of the ASALA militants can be gauged by the fact that
until 3 October 1980, almost three years during which they carried out more
than a hundred claimed attentats, none of the security agencies of the world
knew anything more about them than what the ASALA wanted them to know
through its communiques and three press conferences. To the extent that none
of its members had ever been spotted, it seemed like a phantom organization.66
In the words of Yves Temon these militants with an "extraordinary amount of
conviction... confounded the investigators by engaging in cymctsm,
provocation, bluff and lies with a rare talent. .. Their remarks were not
MTernon,n.2,p.216. 65 ibid. . 66 ibid., p. 215.
117
improvised ... Their reasoning had the coherence of granite. Immoderation and
reason, presumption and caution, impetuosity and modernism, vivid hatred
and cool anger were artfully proportioned in their official declarations. Where
one could see frenzy, there was actually guile."67 It had a collegial leadership,
yet neither its membership nor its mode of election was known. It was divided
into two branches, a political one, which handled recruitment and
indoctrination, and a military one, which carried out its operations.68
The targets of ASALA were not limited to Turkey or its allies, or those
who had denied the Armenian Genocide, but even some Armenian
organizations. ANCHA (the Armenian National Committee for Homeless
Armenians),69 along with the World Council of Churches which had been
organizing the migration of Armenians from the Soviet Union or the Middle
East mainly to the United States, Canada and, Australia was a major target of
ASALA. All political parties condemned ANCHA for pursuing an agenda
which hurt the Armenian presence in the Middle East and facilitated
assimilation and the ASALA accused it of 'playing a prime role in the
liquidation of the Armenian Question' a policy encouraged by the Western
countries to 'ease the pressure on Turkey.' 70 Italy, with its 16 ANCHA centers
was identified as a major accomplice. ASALA threatened to strike any country
which gave asylum to ANCHA, including the Vatican and the Pope. 71
It is noteworthy, therefore, that ASALA's birth was announced by a
bombing attack against the headquarters of the World Council of Churches
situated in Beirut on 3 January 1975. Hagop Hagopian, the founder and leader
of AS ALA, later wrote about the selection of this as the first target, "I chose it
because the above mentioned organization was conspiring with the United
States, with the Tashnag's co-operation to send the Armenian youth away from
67 ibid., p. 206. 68 ibid., p. 209. 69 ANCHA was founded by San Francisco restaurateur George Mardikian at the end of World War II to aid the emigration to the United States of "Displaced Persons," Armenian refugees who were then in Germany. 70 Interview with Hagop Hagopian (in Swiss and Italian Newspapers), ASALA Interview, p. 32-33. 71Armenia, no. 0, interview ofHagop Hagopian, pp. 34-35.
118
the Middle East and socialist countries."72 ASALA was going to challenge the
existing Armenian elites led by the Dashnaks who were allowing the
emigration and thus assimilation to occur.
In 1980, in a communique published by it, ASALA revealed the
number of operations it had carried out every year without further details and
subsuming those of other organizations. For 1975 it claimed six operations
against Turkish interests in Beirut and two against American representatives in
the Middle East, and an explosion on 5 January in front of the headquarters of
the United Nations delegation in Ankara. In 1976, the strikes were largely
limited to Lebanon. On 16 February, the Antranik Group claimed
responsibility for the assassination of the first secretary of the Turkish
Embassy in Beirut. Keeping under wraps most of its operations, ASALA
revealed the attacks it had made on a military base and a Turkish army vehicle
in Ankara and Istanbul. Initially the press simply reported these attentats
without interpreting them. In fact it assigned the blame to Cypriots and
disdainfully ignored the Armenian claims to these operations. In 1978 and the
first half of 1979, AS ALA's major activities were carried out on Turkish soil.
But even foreign governments, such as France, Switzerland, Italy, and
Canada, were threatened by ASALA because they attempted to apprehend
Armenian terrorists within their jurisdiction. After Kani Gungor, the Turkish
commercial attache in Ottawa, Canada, was seriously wounded, a message
from ASALA menacingly declared: "We warn the Canadian authorities
against all initiatives against our compatriots as well as the utilization of any
kind of force or violence against them."73 ASALA also threatened to attack
"all Swiss diplomats throughout the world" unless that government released
two Armenians held because a bomb they were prepanng exploded
prematurely in their hotel room in Geneva. 74 AS ALA carried out more
72 Armenia, no. 89-9015-6, 1984, p. 5. 73 Cited in The New York Times, April10, 1982. 74 John Kifner, "Armenians Assert Suicide Squads are Ready," New York Times, January 5, 198l.Some forty bombings were carried out against Swiss interests. See corsun, n. 34, p.34. Following its deadly raid on the Ankara (Esenboga) airport on August 7, 1982, ASALA threatened a number of Western countries with new terrorist acts unless these countries released within seven days some Armenian terrorists they were currently holding in prison. See "ASALA threatens U.S.A., France, Canada, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Sweden," NewSpot: Turkish Digest (Directorate General of Press and information Ankara, Turkey}, August 13, 1982, p.l
119
international attacks during 1981 than any other terrorist organization. Its
primary targets in the initial phase were Turkish, but later, under cover names,
ASALA attacked Swiss interests in retaliation for the arrest of ASALA
members and, using the name Orly Organization, it attacked French interests
in retaliation for arrest of an ASALA member, Monte Melkonian (accused of
an attentat against a Turkish diplomat in Rome on 25 October 1981) carrying a
false passport at Orly Airport on 11 November 1981. ASALA carried out 40
attacks in 11 countries during the year. Switzerland and France were not the
only countries which were targeted by ASALA. In 1979, it claimed
responsibility for two explosions in Paris against the offices of KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines and Lufthansa in order to condemn the preferential ties uniting
the Netherlands and Germany to Turkey. This was the first time that the
French press commented in some detail about the operations of ASALA.75
Italy and Canada too were victims of ASALA's wrath. On 31 May 1982, three
alleged group members were arrested for attempting to bomb the Air Canada
Cargo bay at Los Angeles International Airport. It is suspected that this
bombing was in retaliation to the May 18 and 20 arrests of the alleged ASALA
members/sympathizers by the Toronto police for the same. Furthermore, non
Turkish airlines of their offices, such as Air-France, Alitalia, British Airways,
El AI, KLM, Lufthansa, Pan Am, Sabena, Swissair, and TWA were hit
because of their commercial relations with Turkey.76
ASALA's operations were extensively spread throughout the world.
The maximum number of actions took place in Western Europe, and a
substantial number in the Middle East and a few in the USA. Turkey,
Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany,
Denmark, and the USA were all witness to ASALA's operations on their soil.
Although most of the attacks were bombings against French and Swiss
property, the most serious were attacks against Turkish targets. These included
75 Temon, n. 2, p. 215. 76 The above lists of Armenian terrorist targets were largely gleaned from Russel Howe, "Death in Westwood: One More Battle in a 67-Year-Old Armenian War," Los Angeles Herald Examiner, January 31, 1982. See also, the lengthy communique issued by ASALA in the The New York Times, March 1, 1980. See ibid, September 25 and September 27, 1981, for further claims concerning some 200 bombings, takeovers, assassinations, and other such acts perpetrated by Armenian terrorists.
120
the seizure of the Turkish consulate in Paris. On 24 September 1981, four
ASALA militants on a suicide mission, in the first 'overt' operation of the
organization, seized the Turkish Consulate in Paris. In this operation, the
Turkish vice-Consul was seriously wounded, his bodyguard killed, and fifteen
people held hostage. It was broadcast live on television and for a brief period,
the Armenian Cause topped the television viewer ratings in France.77
According to Monte Melkonian, a member of AS ALA, this so called "Van
Operation" by the "Y eghia Keshishian Suicidal Commando" marked
"ASALA's historic peak. It became the greatest single military/propagandist
success ever achieved in the history of the Diaspora. Summed up this was a
tremendous achievement which created a previously unequalled atmosphere of
patriotic enthusiasm which made ASALA the hope in the eyes of a vast
number of Armenians for the realization of our national aspirations."78 In an
overt threat to French authorities, ASALA warned that unless political asylum
were granted to the four terrorists who had occupied the consulate and finally
surrendered (upon the assurance that their demands would be complied with),
"there is no doubt there will be a confrontation between them and us"79.
After his release from a French prison in the summer of 1986, Kevork
Guzelian, one of the four participants in the Van operation discussed it at
length. 80 According to him, "The essential aim ... was to gain on political
ground and to tum the attention of international public opinion on Turkey" In
addition ASALA wanted to "shake the Armenian community in France, which
until 1981 was in a slumber." During the hostage drama, said Guzelian, "we
immediately made an appeal to the Armenians through a phone call.... to
organize a demonstration around the Consulate and back us up." Since about
77 Temon, n. 2, p. 221. 78 "Booklet Giving History of ASALA 's Existence Gives New Insight into the Revolutionary Movement," The Armenian Reporter, 10 January 1985, pp. 3, 5; and subsequent issues until 7 March 1985. hereafter cited as "ASALA-RM History." This booklet was originally published in France by the dissident ASALA-Revolutionary Movement (the anti-Hagopian faction of ASALA) under the title "The Reality," in response to charges and allegations made against it by Hagopian's ASALA group in the Middle East. Most knowledgeable observers believe that the American-born, anti-Hagopian leader Monte Melkonian wrote it. 79 Cited in John Kifner, "Armenians Assert Suicide Squads are Ready", The New York Times, September 27, 1981. 8° Cited in Armenia, no. 131113, 1986, pp.18-19.
121
3,000 Turks had surrounded the Consulate in a demonstration ... clashes took
place between the Turks and Armenians in the streets. The leader of the
"Yeghia Keshishian" group was V azken Sislian; the other members were
Kevork Guzelian, Aram Basmadjian, and Hagop Tjoulfayan. One was a
former Dashllak, the other two were former Hunchaks, proving that Armenian
youth were abandoning traditional parties.81 Guzelian claimed, "In one word,
after our operation we noticed an awakening of national awareness in the
Armenians in France." French Armenians who did not speak Armenian started
to learn the language. Before 1981, the 24 April demonstrations in France
brought out no more than 150 Armenians, but after the Van operation the
figure rose to 10000. He was convinced that, "This was not due to the
activities of the organizations ... found in France but came as a result of
ASALA's national and revolutionary sacrifices."
ASALA and the JCAG targeted the Embassies of Turkey in Athens,
Beirut, Bern, Brussels, Madrid, Paris, The Hague, and Vienna, as well as the
Turkish delegations to OECD and the Turkish Center at the United Nations.
The Turkish consulate in Geneva was bombed on two separate occasions; the
ones in Los Angeles and Lyons, once; and the Paris consulate, seized and
occupied. The Turkish Airlines (THY) offices in Amsterdam, Copenhagen,
Frankfurt, Geneva, London, Milan, Paris and Rome were bombed too. Foreign
governments were cautioned to "lift the protection thus far accorded" to Turks
and Turkish property or else be "held responsible for the innocent victims
within their own personnel (sic)," while travelers were advised against using
any form of Turkish transportation "because they might become the innocent
victims of our rage. "82
As for international connections with other groups, ASALA itself
confirmed such links. As a spokesman for it said in an interview, "We
sympathize and exchange assistance and services with the Baader-Meinhof
81 Temon, n. 2, p. 221. 82 Communique issued by the "General Revolutionary Command, Armenia, of the Armenian Secret Am1y for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)," one of the two main Armenian terrorist groups, as cited in Sulzberger, "Deadline for More terror" The New York Times, Apri19, 1977.
122
group. We have relations with all the European revolutionary movements
except the Basques of Spain (ETA), and do not ask me why."83 ASALA
received training and logistical support from the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP). When asked if Palestinians used to train Turkish terrorists
in their camps, Mr. Abu Firas, the chief PLO representative in Turkey replied,
"In our camps, we train them to be terrorists in their countries but to fight
against Israel. For this reason we cannot be held responsible for training them.
Since Armenians are citizens of Lebanon, we also train them to fight for the
liberation of Palestine."84In 1980, PFLP held a conference for ASALA and a
"Kurdistan Workers' Party" at a hideout in the ancient Casbah of Sidon,
Lebanon. The members of ASALA at this conference were protected by
Palestinian gunmen, and the former "emphasized their links with Marxist
Palestinian formations. "85
Some authors believe that the triple bombings of the offices of KLM,
Lufthansa, and Turkish Airlines on 13 November 1979 in Paris were
influenced by ASALA's close cooperation with the Palestinians. In a follow
up communique to this attack, ASALA set its theme for future operation. After
these attacks, it released a statement: "Let imperialism and its collaborators of
the world know that their institutions are targets for our heroes and will be
destroyed. We will kill and destroy because that is the only language
understood by imperialists."86 Although there have been reports of links
between Armenian terrorists and Greek Cypriots, Greeks, and even the
Soviets, there is no evidence to prove this. The Soviet Union was more
concerned with maintaining cordial relations with Turkey. Soviet Armenian
foreign affairs officials in fact, declared that, "(Soviet) foreign policy must be
made in Moscow, not in Armenia. Steps against Turkey, a NATO member,
83 ASALA spokesman cited in "Nadim Nasir Report: Al-Maja/lah visits an Armenian Secret Army Base in Lebanon," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report (Middle East and Africa), September I, 1982, p. G8. Henceforth referred to as the "Nadim Nasir Report." 84 Andrew Corsun, n. 34, p. 35. 85 Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981) p. 243. 86 Andrew Corsun, n. 34, p. 34.
123
would involve our overall relations with NATO." In the words of an ASALA
representative, "It (Soviet Armenia) should be a springboard for liberation, but
this is not happening, apparently because they (the Soviets) believe only in
what they call 'democratic struggle' as far as Turkey is concerned."87
ASALA's hope to become the leader of a broad, united front ofall
Armenian groups, however, foundered upon the general Armenian tendency
toward divisive factionalism. After ASALA began to indulge in extensive
attacks on civilian targets of foreign nations that arrested ASALA members, it
created a dilemma for the Armenian Diaspora too. So far proud of ASALA's
acts, they found it difficult to justify these innocent deaths and condemned
them. Hagop Hagopian's willingness to employ indiscriminate terrorism
against innocent civilians and non-Turkish targets as in the Ankara and Paris
Orly airports in 1982 and 1983 respectively and the Istanbul Covered Bazaar
in 1983, was to prove an important factor in creating a rift within the ranks of
ASALA too. "In the name of the Armenian revolution, inhuman operations
(i.e., atrocities) were being committed due to which dozens of innocent people
were dying and hundreds of others had been wounded," declared Monte
Melkonian. 88 He further stated, "Orly claimed innocent lives. It debases our
struggle."89 Another reason for the splintering of ASALA can be traced to the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 which resulted in the organization's
being forced to flee west Beirut to the Bekaa Valley. The internecine quarrels
led to the assassination of Khachig Havarian and Vicken Ayvazian, two of
Hagopian's leading allies by Monte Melkonian and David Davidian on 15-16
July 1983 in the Bekaa Valley. Following even more bitter mutual
recriminations, Hagopian's ASALA quickly lost its previous effectiveness and
influence. ASALA lost its allies and contacts outside Lebanon and retained its
influence only in The Armenian Popular Movement in Greece, but it fell
increasingly under Syrian contro1.90 With the exception of a vicious spate of
87 "Nadim Nasir Report," n. 83. 88 "ASALA-RM History." n. 78. 89 "Monte Melkonian Explains His Break with ASALA: Interview," The Armenian Reporter, 12 January 1984, p. 4. 90 By the end of the decade, a partial rapprochement between Syria and Turkey was to prove disastrous for ASALA. Gunter, n. 21, p. 466.
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bloodletting in Lebanon between it and the Dashnaks in 1985 and early 1986,
ASALA ceased to carry out any more operations and became increasingly
moribund.
After the arrest and imprisonment of Monte Melkonian in Paris at the
end of 1985, there were a series of deadly bombings in Paris in September
1986. Although these were initially thought to have been the handiwork of
ASALA to secure the release of Varoujan Garabedian, the perpetrator of the
deadly Orly bombing in 1983, these apprehensions were laid to rest with the
arrest ofthe actual perpetrators in March 1987. Then on 28 April1988, Hagop
Hagopian himself was apparently assassinated in Athens, Greece. It was said
that he had been expelled from AS ALA at the end of 1987. It was later
disclosed that the Syrians had been behind both events partly because of
Hagopian's refusal to toe their line, which involved driving booby- trapped
trucks into Christian east Beirut for later explosion,91 and partly because of
improved relations between Syria and Turkey. The Syrians also resented
Hagopian's close relations with such Palestinians as Abu Cherif, Abu Ayyad,
and Fouad Bitar who operated independently of Syrian influence. Khatchadour
Khoshudian, an ASALA militant who was killed in Beirut on 24 February
1987 was said to have been the first victim of the Syrians. Indeed Armenia
itself cryptically admitted that Khorshudian "did not fall where he had dreamt
to fall ... and his martyrdom did not answer but brought forth torturing
questions."92 The Syrian-controlled remnant of ASALA was reduced to
merely issuing proclamations and threats.
Modus-operandi of JCAG and ASALA
Most reports about Armenian terrorist groups mention numerous
different groups. Edward F. Mickolus, mentions some eleven Armenian
organizations. The number cited by different sources varies from four to
nineteen.93 Many sources avoid the figures altogether by labeling them under
91 Gunter, n. 9, p. 25. 92Armenia, No. 135/15, 1987, p.l. 93 Corsun states that Armenian extremists have carried out attacks under 19 operational names. See Andrew Corsun, n. 34, p. 33.
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the term 'several'. However the fact of the matter is that despite all these
organizational titles, there appeared to be only two main Armenian militant
groups: ASALA and JCAG. All these other organizations were merely a cover
used by these two organizations (especially AS ALA, since the JCAG groups
clearly referred to being associated with the organization) to carry out their
activities without leaving a trail and to probably 'give a bandwagon
impression of a wide range of involvement within the international Armenian
community to impress both the general international public and also their
Armenian compatriots. ' 94 While the JCAG carried out its operations under the
names of the "Boldikian Group," "Group of 28 May," "Ohannes Kazandjian
Group," "Kevork Tchavouche Group" etc., ASALA used names such as the "3
October Group," "Swiss 15 Group," "Yeghia Keshishian," "September
France," "Orly Group," "Khrimian Hairik Group" etc. It would be interesting
to mention here the origins of adoption of this tactic of using various names by
ASALA, and a few references to its notorious groups.
On 3 October 1980, the secret phase of ASALA was over with the
arrest of Alec Yenikomshian and Suzy Masseredjian. The two were injured by
explosives in a hotel room in Geneva. Their arrest marked the beginning of a
fighting process for ASALA against the Western Powers. While the militants
were to be judged by the laws of the country they were arrested in, ASALA
had only one way to protect its members -by resorting to terrorism. A
terrorism which was self-supporting could not be tolerated for long and risked
robbing the organization of all its influence. In order to avoid this trap, it
decided to ascribe its activities to those of independent groups which had
appeared spontaneously. The group, operating under various commando
names, took it upon itself to carry out "military operations against any country
which attempts to jail or try any of its commandos". ASALA, using the name
"3 October Group," in a four month period carried out 18 bombings against
Swiss interests worldwide in an effort to exert pressure on the Swiss to release
their comrades. The two extremists received 18-month suspended sentences
and were exiled from Switz~rland for 15 years.
94 Gunter, n. 21, p. 463
126
On 9 June 1981, Mardiros Jamgotchian was caught for assassinating a
Turkish diplomat Mehmet-Savas Yorguz- outside the Turkish consulate in
Geneva. From the time of his arrest on June 9 to December 19 (he was
sentenced to imprisonment), ASALA under the name "June 9 Organization,"
perpetrated 15 bombings against Swiss targets worldwide. After
Jamgotchian's release, ASALA, again using the name "Armenian Group 15",
carried out bombings against the targets. However, it was the "Orly Group"
founded to pressurize the French government to release an ASALA member,
Monte Melkonian, arrested at the Orly airport in France on 11 November
1981, for traveling with a forged passport under the name ofDimitriu Giorgiu,
that acquired notoriety for its targeting of French establishments. Incidentally
it was this group through which the police found a direct link to ASALA. The
accidental death of an ASALA militant, Pierre Gulumian, on 30 July 1982, in
a pavilion in Gagny put the French police on the track of the "Orly Group"
and finally led them to conclusive links between this group and ASALA.95
Besides this form of subterfuge it would be interesting to understand
the technical or strategic aspects of the Armenian militant operations. Between
1975 and 1983 Armenian terrorists claimed responsibility of over 200
incidents, including the assassination of twenty-six Turkish diplomats and/or
their family members. Although the tactic of assassination had been used
repeatedly, the majority of their operations were bombings, which were simple
in conception and design. Unlike the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which
favors remote control devices, Armenian terrorists were partial to a
Czechoslovakian manufactured plastic called Semtex-H.96In the
overwhelming majority of attacks, this device is set at such an hour as to cause
property damage and not take lives. Operationally Armenian terrorists must be
viewed as unsophisticated in comparison to other groups and never displayed
the ability or inclination to hit a hard target.97 The exceptions were the seizure
of the Consulate in Paris on September 1981, and the attempted assassination
of the Turkish consul General in Rotterdam on 21 July 1982, both of which
95 Temon, n. 2, p. 224. 96 Gunter, n. 21, p. 467. 97 Ibid, pp. 467-468.
127
failed. Compared to other groups, their bombings and assassinations required
the minimum of logistical planning. Of the 21 Turkish diplomats/ family
members slain between 1975-1982, 14 were killed while in their car which
was stopped at a light, slowing before entering a busy intersection, or parked.
Out of the ten attempted assassinations of Turkish diplomats, eight took place
while the diplomat was in his vehicle, which was parked or slowing down for
a traffic light or at an intersection. These attacks were carried out by
assassination teams armed primarily with automatic 8mm weapons. The group
varied in size from a lone gunman in eight attacks to two assailants with a
third member in a waiting car. With the exception of the July 21 attack in
Rotterdam, the diplomatic vehicles that were involved in these attacks were
not armored and the only protective cover (if any) was a driver/bodyguard.98
An important factor in the operations of ASALA was also their use of
media to further their cause. As mentioned earlier ASALA had its own
periodical 'Armenia,' that was used for propaganda purposes, that published
interviews and articles along the lines of its political ideology. Interestingly, in
1976, a group of about ten leftist Armenian youth had found a sub-group
"Armenian Struggle" and began publishing Hay Baykar. This publication
which was against the AGBU 'aristocracy', the Church and political parties
and had displayed its solidarity to the Turkish and Kurdish people,
aggressively propagated the cause of 'everyday' being 'April 24; the struggle
must be held on two fields, in the Diaspora against Turkey and American
imperialism, and in Soviet Armenia by supporting the contestation. '99
Increasingly it found itself displaying its affinity to ASALA. In 1980, it
published interviews with Abu Ayyad, the PLO number two man and a major
mediator between Palestinians and ASALA. After 1980, it openly adopted
ASALAS's political line and "Armenian Struggle" organized a "Committee of
support to Armenian political prisoners," which held meetings and press
conferences for the release of prisoners. In March 1982, "Armenian Struggle"
had become the French section of a "National Armenian Movement for
98 Corsun, n. 34, p. 32. 99 Hay Baykar 2 (April1977). For details see Ternon, n. 2, p. 230.
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ASALA," which has seven other organizations m the Diaspora: Canada,
United States, Iran, Great Britain, India, Greece, and Cyprus. However, it
limited itself to peaceful publicity-seeking actions such as the peaceful
occupations of the offices of Turkish Airlines on 11 June 1981 and, Swissair
on 15 December 1981. 100 Besides the print media, ASALA also used the very
powerful medium of the radio to gain publicity. ASALA's first radio
broadcasts began in 1981 in Beirut with a daily one-hour program "The Voice
ofthe Armenians in Lebanon".
Responses to Armenian Militancy
Outraged over their tragedy, when the two small groups of Armenian
terrorists began assassinating Turkish diplomats in the 1970s: the anti Dashnak
and Marxist ASALA and the Dashnak Justice Commandos of the Armenian
Genocide (JCAG), succeeded in 1983 by the Armenian Revolutionary Army
(ARA), 101 a few of the terrorists were apprehended. At this time some
Armenians argued that the terrorists had had a right to murder and should not
be persecuted. After Hampartzoum 'Harry' Sassounian, a nineteen year old
Lebanese Armenian (who had migrated to the USA in 19'77), a member of the
.Armenian Youth Federation (AYF)102, was found guilty of assassinating
Kemal Arikan, the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles in 1982, for
example, some Armenians in Boston announced: "What occurred throughout
Hampig's trial was a mockery of justice, an attempt to stop the Armenian
people from actively pursuing their cause ... We are outraged by the .... guilty
verdict."103 ARF groups throughout the world came out strongly in support of
Sassounian. Similar sentiments were expressed concerning other terrorist acts.
The support continued in the form of writing letters to Sassounian in prison104
and frequent appeals to release him and others similarly convicted. 105 A very
100 For a detailed exposition see ibid, p. 231. 101 For a scholarly analysis see Gunter, n. 6 .. 102 A YF is the youth wing of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and is very active in the Diaspora, trying to instill 'Armenianness' in the Armenian youth. 103 Cited in The Armenian Weekly, (Washington) 14 January 1984, pp.7, 6. 104 See, for example, ibid, 11 July 1987, p. 9, where almost an entire page is devoted to such an appeal. 105 See, for example, ibid, 17 October 1987, p. 16.
129
successful 'Solidarity Day' dinner for Sassounian was held on 6 February
1987, at the Pasadena Armenian Center in Califomia. 106 Via an audio
recording, Sassounian told the 650 guests that he received many letters from
Armenians throughout the world. Hasmig Derderian, a member of the
Sassounian Defense Committee, reminded the audience that Sassounian's
imprisonment 'was aimed at the entire Armenian people and its cause, in a
vicious attempt to silence the collective struggle to restore the national rights
of Armenians in a free homeland.' An 'evening-long songfest of national and
revolutionary songs' followed. One of the singers remarked 'on the great
popular support Sassounian' s case elicits.'
The trial of Max Kilndjian in France elicited a spectacular support
from the Armenian communities. Accused of conducting an assassination
attempt on the Turkish ambassador to Switzerland, Dogan Turkmen, on 6
February 1980, there was an unconditional support for Klindjian in the
committee formed for his defense, the "Committee for Defense of the
Armenian Cause." The tracts of this committee pledged: "Guilty or not, we
shall defend Max Klindjian." The trial was held on 22 and 23 January 1982, in
the courthouse of Aix-en-Provence, 107 which was swarming with Armenian
supporters from Marseille, Lyon, Valence, Grenoble, and Paris. Like
Soghomon Tehlirian's trial had become a trial of Talaat Pasha, that of
Klindjian became the trial of the Turkish government which pushed the
accused to take to militancy due to its denialist policy. While Henri Nogueres,
president of the League of Human Rights, and French policemen testified in
favor of Klindjian, the members of the socialist government defended the
Armenian Cause. 108 Klindjian was set free to the cries of Armenians, "We
have won, we have won!" the case of Klindjian was significant because for
106 The following information and citations are taken from Serge Samoniantz, "Banquet Raises $30,000 for Hampig Sassounian," The California Courier, 19 February 1987, p.S. 107 Stenographic transcript of the trial in Les Armeniens en cour d'Assises (Roqm!vaire: Parentheses, 1983). Reference in Temon, n. 2, p. 199. 108
' Shortly before the trial, Hurriyet, the Istanbul daily newspaper published on its front page under the caption "Here are the French Quintuplets, Enemies of Turkey," the photographs of Louis Mermaz, Charles Hemu, Gaston Defferre, Joseph Franceschi-currently assigned to combat terrorism-and Jean Poperen.' Temon, n. 2, fn 19.
130
once it united the Armenians of France "behind one member in whom it
projected itself and through whom it achieved catharsis."109
The Armenians looked upon these terrorist activities with some
measure of relief and pride. Armand Arabian, a superior court judge in
California, declared: "It is the right of Armenians to seek redress ... Some seek
it in street corners."110 George Mason, the former, moderate publisher of The
[Armenian] California Courier, concluded: "There are many Armenian
Americans in California who feel great sympathy and support for the
Armenian terrorists. I have talked to numerous peaceful, fair and thoughtful
men who have expressed support for the terrorists."111 Levon Marashlian, a
Glendale College professor of history, said Armenian terrorists are "patriots
who have been waiting for 70 years."112 Dennis Papazian, the professor of
history at the University of Michigan in Dearborn, was quoted as saying: "In a
way I'm kind of proud of the terrorists."113
In the United States, the Turkish State Folk Dance Ensemble
performances in California were canceled because of threats and a bombing,
the Ataturk Centennial night organized by the American-Turkish Association
of Houston was disruptedl1 4 and at the University of California, Los Angeles,
the classes of Professor Stanford J. Shaw115 were disrupted on many
occasions by Armenian students. Professor Shaw, who had also received
anonymous threats, opted for sabbatical leave in January 1982. Replying to an
109 ibid, p. 200. 11° Cited in Michael Leahy, "LA Armenian Community Grows Fastest in State," The California Courier, 25 August 1983, p. 7. 111 Cited in George Mason, "This & That," The California Courier, 7 February 1985, p. 8. 112 Cited in Dave Smith, "Terrorism Mars Armenian Image," The California Courier, 4 August 1983, p. 2. 113 Cited in Pete Stine, "A Silent Plea for Lost Memory," The Armenian Reporter, 8 September 1983, p. 8. 114 'Introduction,' Setting the Record Straight on Armenian Propaganda Against Turkey (booklet published by the Assembly of the Turkish American Associations, 1982). 115 Professor Stanford J Shaw had along with his Turkish wife Ezel Kurel Shaw authored the two volume- History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, and had keenly defended their version of the facts of the 1915 massacres, had attempted to block, whenever possible, the publication of works dealing with the Armenian Question, by turning in negative evaluations to publishers soliciting their advice as manuscript readers. See Ternon, n. 2, p. 226.
131
inquiry concerning this matter, William D. Scheafer, executive vice chancellor
at UCLA, wrote: "Because an international terrorist organization is involved,
the university's power to remedy the situation is limited."116
While it would only be natural to expect support for this militancy
within the Armenian community, it even had supporters who were non
Armenian, often governments. The Greek Sympathy for Armenian activism,
for example, largely results from the traditional Hellenic hatred of the Turks.
The special requiem service held in Athens in December 1986 for Kamig
V ahardian, an AS ALA agent who was accidentally killed during an attempt to
bomb the Kuwait Airlines office in Athens from a motorcycle in 1982 further
illustrates the situation. At the requiem, Reverend Spiros Tsakalos of the
Greek Orthodox Church delivered a eulogy in which he declared: "The
Turkish fascist regime understands only the language of armed struggle
carried out by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia."
When the Yugoslavian authorities released Harutiun Levonian, the assassin of
the Turkish ambassador to Yugoslavia, from prison in 1987, the Greeks
quickly allowed him to enter their country and receive badly needed medical
attention. Syrian support for Armenian activism stemmed from traditional
animosities and political ambitions. The Turkish annexation of Ratay
(Alexandretta) province in 1939, problems dealing with the waters of the
Euphrates River and its long-term aspirations all encouraged the Syrians to
support anti-Turkish ends.
The situation regarding France was similar, although to a lesser extent,
since the Turks did not conquer and rule that country for 400 years as they did
Greece. In the early 1980s the Armenian National Movement in France,
known by the French abbreviation "MNA", and headed by Ara Toranian
emerged as a dynamic political force in part because of the obvious French
sympathy for the Armenians. A number of French politicians also supported
the Armenians because of their electoral power in certain areas where they
116 Letter to Professor William J. Griswold, Colorado State University, October 21, 1982.
132
were concentrated. On 24 April 1982. For example, Gaston Defferre, the
Minister of Interior and the Mayor of Marseille- which has a relatively large
Armenian population- told them, "France will assist you to triumph in the
pursuit of your just cause." Minister of Defense Hernu told a large Armenian
rally in his home city of Villeurbane on 10 October 1982, "Whenever there are
aggressions, we must raise the question as to who the real aggressor is. Are the
aggressors the people that survived a genocide committed by the Turks or the
Turks themselves?" 117
Although the rise of Armenian militancy was a desperate measure that
stemmed from the failure of the Armenians to develop sufficient political
strength to present their case in a more conventional manner, it had its
detractors within the Armenian community too. Most Armenians, claimed
Martin H. Halabian of the ARF, found the publicity gained through these
violent acts as 'repulsive.' 118 The famous Armenian-American author, Michael
J. Arlen was quoted in the New York Times as stating, "Even by current
standards of political terror, the Armenian 'hits' were reprehensible. " 119
An important point distinguishing the later day Armenian terrorists
from their predecessors of the 1920s is that their victims were not even born
when the alleged crimes for which they were being attacked were supposedly
committed. The difference between the perceptions of this generation of
militants and that of the one that was involved in operation Nemesis is obvious
in the following passages. After having assassinated several leading Ottoman
officials in Western Europe, for instance, the Dashnak agent Arshavir
Shiragian wrote, "I never thought once of using my gun against innocent
people ... not even Turkish ones ... " his answer to all those who would ask him
as to why he did not kill Azmi (the bodyguard of one ofhis victims) or others
was, "I thought the answer obvious: Azmi had no responsibility for the
planning or the execution ofthe massacres of the Armenian people ... we were
meting out punishment to persons who had been tried in absentia and who had
117 Ternon, n. 2, p. 226. 118 Christian Science Monitor, (Boston) May 6, 1982. 119 Cited in The New York Times, March 11, 1980.
133
been found guilty of mass murder."120 On the other hand during the attack on
(Esenboga) International Airport in Ankara on August 7, 1982,121 in which
nine passengers were killed and seventy-two others were wounded, 122 as he
fired at his victims, one of the gunmen, referring to the Turkish massacre of
Armenians in 1915, yelled, "More than a million of us died! What's the
difference if 25 of you die?"123 Also when police told Levon Ekmekjian, one
of the terrorists captured during the Ankara raid, how many had been killed
and wounded, his response was, "It wasn't enough."
No terrorist group is monotheistic, and neither were the Armenians.
Both groups despite their common goals took pains to dissociate themselves
from the acts of each other. JCAG did not want to be associated with the
operations of ASALA against the non-Turkish targets. On 4 April 1981,
Beirut's Rightist Christian Cell received a phone call from an alleged JCAG
member claiming that the group was not connected with ASALA and that
JCAG's attacks were logical measures for the injustice committed against
Armenians; its targets were the Turks and Turkish institutions. ASALA was
eager to avoid being mistaken for the JCAG. Hagop Hagopian in an interview
said, "The Dashnag party is trying to imitate us in order to regain lost ground.
The 1980 operation in Rome against the Turkish ambassador to the Vatican
was claimed by the Dashnags who used the name of a revolutionary group, the
Avenger Commandos of the Armenian Genocide."124
120 Arshavir Shiragian, The Legacy: Memoirs of an Armenian Patriot (Boston: Hairenik Press, 1976), pp. 135-36. 121 Shortly before the attack on the Ankara airport, the military commander of an ASALA base in Lebanon boasted: "I want to say that, over the years, we have carried out scores of military operations inside Turkey, including the assassination of some U.S. personnel," ''Nadim Nasir Report." ASALA claimed it killed twenty-five and wounded thirty-two others in an attack on Istanbul's famous covered bazaar in June 1983. See The Armenian Reporter, (Boston) June 30, 1983,p.l. 122 For further details of this attack, see "Terrorism Claims New Victims: 9 killed, 72 wounded in Airport Attack," Turkey Today, August 1982, p.l; and the press accounts in the NeW York Times, August 8, 1982; and Washington Post, August 8, 1982 and August 9, 1982. For additional details see NewSpot: Turkish Digest (Ankara) August 13, 1982, p.1, and September 10, 1982, p.3. 123 Time, (New York) August 23, 1982, p. 38. 124 Corsun, n. 34, p. 35.
134
Conclusion
As a U.S. State Department study put it, " By resorting to terrorism,
Armenian extremists were able to accomplish in seven years what legitimate
Armenian organizations have been trying to do for almost 70 years
internationalize the Armenian cause."125 However, in terms of concrete results,
the militancy has not achieved much. Certainly, Turkey, whom these militant
groups had hoped to destabilize and induce it to negotiate the Genocide issue,
embittered by the terror already committed, only became more inflexible.
While the Turkish press did begin crediting these acts of violence against its
country's establishments and nationals to the Armenian militant groups, and
gave ample coverage to these events, the general attitude of the Press and the
Turkish government has been to step up the efforts at denial. It has attempted
to support its thesis 'by clothing it with measured rebuttals, using pseudo
scientific methods.' The Turkish government has established a professorship
for the study of the Armenian Question in Istanbul which seeks to show that
during the First World War, the Armenians were the victims of their own
seditious ambitions. In May 1981, the senate of the Istanbul University issued
a circular to the students which highlighted the "crimes committed by the
Armenian terrorists" sought to be justified on the basis of a mythical story of
Genocide, and also reiterated that the Armenian Question no longer existed
since all the minorities in Turkey enjoyed total civil rights. Turkish-American
associations were formed in American universities to counter the Armenian
allegations and activities. 126
Following "Operation Van," the Turkish government launched a major
publicity drive by inviting the French television channel TFI to interview
elderly people who, pointing to the ruins of Van recounted stories of the
annihilation of one million Turks and the city at the hands of the Russians and
the Armenians. The more 'Armenian terrorism expanded, the more the
125 ibid, p. 31. 126 Levan Marashlian, "Changing Dimensions in Armenian-Kurdish Relations and Political Modernizations in the Diaspora," Paper presented in September 1981 at Berkeley, California, p. 79. Reference in Ternan, n. 2.
135
Turkish population- in Turkey as well as in the Turkish expatriate community
was mobilized by the press against the Armenians.' 127 In fact, the only
consequence of the Armenian militancy was that Turkey could no longer
ignore the existence of the Armenians, but beyond that the Turkish
government actually exploits the violence to try to tum it to its own advantage.
Armenian terrorism evoked greater interest in and awareness of the
Armenian question throughout the world, and did convince the Western
democracies of the historical fact of the Armenian Genocide, 'even if their
diplomats are cautious in their official declarations.' 128 However, by their
targeting the establishments of non-Turkish governments and its civilian
population, the Armenian terrorists managed to lose any sympathy they had
gained. The initial attacks against the Turkish targets saw the press in
Switzerland . speaking in favor of the Armenians and indignant at the
indifference of the West to the plight of the Armenians. The sympathy of the
Swiss population, which reflected in the verdict of clemency in the case of
Alec and Suzy was absent by the time of Jamgotchian's trial largely due to the
offensives of the "9 June Group" following Jamgotchian's arrest.
The instinctive, visceral reaction to the initial operations of these
terrorist groups against Turkish targets provided a catharsis to almost all
Diaspora Armenians and mobilized and transformed it. It gave back identity
and hope to a crisis-laden Diaspora, broke the seclusion of minorities and
strengthened the Armenian national feeling. However, the excesses of these
groups finally alienated the more moderate members of the Diaspora
community. In the absence of the possibility of this armed struggle ever
leading to a territorial occupation of their historic lands, and the highly
spectacular and deadly actions threatening the public perception of the
substantially integrated Armenian population in their host countries, it was
only a matter of time before the Diaspora was divided in its support for these
groups. On the other and, these acts only provided the Turkish government to
127 Ternan, n. 2, p. 227. 128 ibid.
136
fuel the nationalistic instinct of its citizens and popular passions. But in the
final analysis it cannot be denied that the Armenian militancy against Turkey
did inform the Western public opinion and its implicit recognition, and
brought the Armenian Question back on the world stage. As Ternan says,
Armenian terrorism had the possibility to 'actualize' the Armenian Cause for
'political debates' to 'be initiated on new bases.'
137