CHAPTER I

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Introduction

The expression “epistemology” is derived from the Greek root

episteme, which means knowledge. It is also known as gnoseology.

The expression “gnoseology” is derived from the Greek word

gnosis, which is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge.

Epistemology becomes inevitable to substantiate the metaphysical

or ontological presuppositions of any philosophy. The fundamental

task of any philosophy in general is to understand the reality as a

whole. In the process, philosophy aims at understanding the nature

of man, and man‟s place and role in reality. In an attempt to

interpret the nature of man, of reality and man‟s place and role in

reality, philosophers advanced several theories. The diversity of

these interpretations resulted in the construction of various

metaphysical and epistemological theories. For any kind of

philosophical or metaphysical investigation, epistemology is

necessary. If philosophical investigation aims at understanding the

reality as a whole, it must see that the means and methods it

employs for understanding it are valid. A philosopher is not merely

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satisfied with knowing something but knowing that something

rightly. Thus epistemology has to be an integral part of philosophy.

Although epistemological issues have been more or less the same in

Western and Indian philosophical traditions, their approaches

towards the issues of epistemology have been sometimes different.

Aristotle believed that knowledge started with wonder. This

is so because men are endowed with rationality, and it is this

essential feature of humans that arouses inquisitiveness in them.

This unique feature distinguishes humans from other living

creatures. This is the reason the expression “know” in its epistemic

sense is exclusively reserved for humans but not to other living

creatures. The earliest thinkers whom we regard as philosophers

wondered about the nature of knowledge and advanced various

theories concerning the nature and genesis of knowledge. Our

interest in knowledge begins when there is a doubt or uncertainty

about the fundamental aspects of reality. The ancient Greek

philosophers encountered such a problem and in their sincere

efforts to resolve this they were led to reflect on the ultimate nature

of knowledge. In the process, they invented the subject of

epistemology.

Any reflection upon the nature of knowledge gives rise to a

number of interesting philosophical issues. One of these issues is to

determine the very subject-matter of epistemology. As a theory of

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knowledge, epistemology is also concerned both with cognitive acts

and cognitive results. The former are certain mental activities such

as perception, remembering, judging, reasoning, reflecting,

inferring and so on. Scientific assertions can serve as the best

example for cognitive results. Scientific results cannot be equated

with mental activities; therefore, they cannot be part of cognitive

acts. For instance, the law of gravity or the Pythagorean Theorem

cannot be treated as mental phenomena, but are the meaning of the

statements in which these laws are formulated. It is clear from the

history of the theory of knowledge that both cognitive acts and

cognitive results constitute the subject-matter of epistemology, for

they are the subject of epistemic investigation.

If epistemology is merely concerned with cognitive acts, then

it becomes a part of psychology, for psychology is concerned with

mental phenomena and consequently with cognitive acts. Although

psychology and epistemology overlap to some extent, there exists a

fundamental difference between them. The main objective of

psychology is to inquire into the very genesis of cognitive acts,

while epistemology is concerned with the justification of the results

of these cognitive acts. Of course, both cognitive acts and their

results are the subjects of evaluation. An epistemologist evaluates

them from the point of view of their truth claims and the degree of

justification associated with those claims. The very occurrence of

cognitive processes is of no interest to an epistemologist. An

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epistemologist is basically concerned with the standards of

evaluation of our cognitive contents in terms of truth or falsity.

Then the question arises: What is truth? This is the most

fundamental problem of epistemology. Epistemologists have

advanced several theories of truth such as correspondence theory,

coherence theory, pragmatic theory, homophonic theory,

subjectivist theory, redundant theory, and so on. Both the classical

and modern theories of truth have their own advantages as well as

disadvantages. The philosophers like Alfred Tarski held that truth

can never be defined in any natural language, and any attempt to

define it results in a liar paradox. The classical and modern theories

of truth only laid down the criteria or conditions under which a

statement is said to be true, but never defined what truth is. The

second important problem is the problem of the sources of

cognition. Philosophers in the West as well as in the East recognized

the various sources of cognition. By and large, perception and

reason, especially inferential reason, are accepted by both the

traditions. But in the Indian tradition there are as many as six

important sources of cognition. Of course, each source is thoroughly

examined to establish its legitimacy in producing valid cognition

that ultimately led to the knowledge of reality. The third problem is

the problem of the limits of cognition. It calls for an answer to the

question: “What can be the subject of cognition?” It is followed by

another interesting question: “Does reality exist independent of the

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subject of cognition?” If it were so, “Is it possible to cognize (know)

it”? These classical problems in epistemology constantly haunt an

epistemologist.

Further, it is also discussed by epistemologists whether there

exists any distinction between knowledge and true belief. For

instance, a person has made a lucky guess, but does not really

know, and another person knows but does not say. In other words,

he need not guess. In that case, what is that the second person has

which the first one does not have? One may say that the second

person has evidence and the first person does not have it. But, what

is it to have evidence? This is another interesting issue in

epistemology. This issue assumes more importance when we deal

with the distinction between a priori and a posteriori forms of

knowledge. Do we dispense with the notion of “evidence” in the

first case, for it is not possible to advance evidence? This issue

would be taken up later.

A large portion of Western epistemological tradition can be

covered by dealing with the fundamental problems of

epistemology, analysis of knowledge, skepticism, and possibility of

knowledge and also some major epistemic traditions like

rationalism, empiricism and transcendentalism.

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Fundamental Problems of Epistemology

There are three fundamental problems of epistemology. They are: 1)

nature of knowledge, 2) sources of knowledge, and 3) limitations of

knowledge. Under the first problem we study different conditions

that are essential for any knowledge claim. The objective behind

this is to differentiate knowledge from belief. Epistemologists have

debated on this issue threadbare. If knowledge is certain and

universal, then belief, on the contrary, leaves scope for doubt or

uncertainty. There is always a fundamental distinction between

knowing something and believing something. Although it is

admitted by the epistemologists that knowledge presupposes belief,

the former is not identical with the latter. Plato in his Theaetetus

tried to show that a jury truly believes that a defendant is guilty, but

he lacks evidence to convert his true belief into a knowledge claim.

Therefore, true belief can never be equated with knowledge.1

Interestingly; A.P. Griffiths identifies belief with a state of mind that

is appropriate to truth. And Peter Geach calls belief a mental or

inner saying.2

The second problem is concerned with the valid means of

knowledge. There is much controversy among the epistemologists

regarding the sources of knowledge and this gave way to different

epistemological schools such as rationalism, empiricism, realism,

naïve realism, transcendentalism and so on. The genetic or

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Continental rationalists hold the view that reason is the only

legitimate and genuine source of knowledge. This view is

foreshadowed in the epistemological doctrines of Plato. While

giving importance to mathematical knowledge, Plato held that

knowledge obtained by reason alone qualifies as knowledge for it is

impeccable. What is obtained by means of sense-experience is mere

opinion and belief, for there is no consistency in what we perceive.

Thus he suspected the testimony of the senses. Similar view is also

expressed by Descartes. According to him, the ideas that are clear

and distinct to human mind alone are true ideas. Such ideas are

either innate or obtained by means of reason. Although one finds

some deviations in the epistemological doctrines of Spinoza and

Leibniz from those of Descartes, by and large, the continental

rationalists are unanimous in giving due credit to the knowledge

obtained by reason for all three are well-acknowledged

mathematicians of their respective periods. It is in the

epistemological doctrines of the Continental or genetic rationalists

the a priori form of knowledge found its strong locus, although the

seeds of a priorism were sown by Plato in his theory of knowledge

long before the Continental rationalists. Thus they relied more on a

priori cognition for their claims to knowledge. On the contrary, the

British empiricist tradition did not accept the role of a priori

cognition as the sole or ultimate base for our knowledge claims.

Both the classical and modern empiricists have given priority to

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sense-experience and held that it is the only legitimate and genuine

source of knowledge of reality. The classical empiricists like Locke,

Berkeley and Hume, the modern empiricists such as logical atomists

and logical positivists have given top priority to the knowledge that

is obtained by means of sense-experience. However, Hume and the

modern empiricists admitted the a priori form of knowledge too as

valid. According to empiricists, sense–experience informs about

objects and events of the external world (the physical world). Thus

the content of our sense-experience consists of the knowledge of the

external word. Also, there are sensory experiences which we owe to

introspection inform us of our own mental states. In other words

“empiricism might be said to be the thesis that all knowledge of

substantial kind about the world is derived from experience.”3

The transcendental idealists like Immanuel Kant held that

knowledge is the combination of both rational (formal) and

empirical (material) elements. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant

clearly stated that his problem in this Critique is the problem of

knowledge. According to him, rationalism on its own cannot

provide us the knowledge of reality for it is confined to reason

alone. There is no apparent contact between thought and reality. If

this were true, then thought cannot represent the reality. Similarly,

empiricism has its own shortcomings. Our sense-experience

provides us with the percepts, but these percepts cannot be

conceptualized without the proper conceptual schema, which he

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calls the categories of understanding, namely, quantity, quality,

relation, and modality. And each of these categories is further

divided into three sub-categories resulting in twelve categories of

understanding which remain the a priori precondition for the

possibility of any knowledge for Kant. This a priori precondition is

known as the transcendental element in Kant‟s philosophy. Thus

both rationalism and empiricism have their own defects. Therefore,

Kant thought it would be necessary to bring them together to arrive

at the genuine knowledge of the reality which exists in judgmental

form. Kant held that all knowledge necessarily starts with sense-

experience, but does not necessarily arise out of sense-experience.4

Kant did not want to undermine the role of reason as well as sense-

experience in epistemology. This is very clear from his statement

that concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without

concepts are blind.5 Thus, he gave equal importance to reason and

sense-experience.

The realists in general are of the opinion that there is an

external world independent of the perceiving subject. In the absence

of the external world and the objects in the external world there

would not be any perceptual activity at all. There is always a

contact between senses and the external objects. Thus there is

always a distinction between the idea of an object and the object

itself. The idea is a representation of the object in question through

sense-perception. The naïve or direct realists hold the view that

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whenever we perceive an object we perceive only the external

features of it. Such a view was advocated by the commonsense-

realists like G.E. Moore. In recent times one of the most important

representatives of this position is D.M. Armstrong. According to

direct realists, what we are directly aware of in our perceptual

experience is the physical reality that exists independent of our

awareness of it. Most of these doctrines aim at substantiating the

view that there are certain valid sources of knowledge and anything

obtained other than from these sources cannot be considered

knowledge at all.

The third important problem is the limitation of knowledge.

Our limitations of knowledge are ultimately dependent upon the

limitations of the sources of knowledge. For instance, both reason

and sense-experience have their own limitations. What cannot be

reached by reason or sense-experience does not form part of our

knowledge of the reality. In his An Essay Concerning Human

Understanding Locke held that even if the primary and secondary

qualities of an object are known, yet the nature of the substratum is

unknown and unknowable. In other words, the qualities are

dependent on the substratum, but they do not represent its nature.

Kant debated on the limitations of pure reason in his Critique of Pure

Reason. It is not necessary that everything can be brought under the

purview of reason. There are certain elements of reality which

cannot be apprehended by pure reason. When reason tries to

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venture into a domain which is not its domain, it gets completely

lost. Thus Kant held that things-in-themselves are unknowable. The

result is we have antinomies and paralogisms. Similarly, sense-

experience too has its limitations. An eye has a visual field. It cannot

perceive anything beyond this visual field. By and large, the scope

and limitation of our knowledge of the reality is determined by the

kind of sources of knowledge that we entertain. For instance, in the

Indian epistemology, Śruti as a pramāņa has a distinctive role to

play. What cannot be obtained by other pramāņas is apprehended by

Śruti. At times it may be the case that epistemologists are so rigid

not to accept unconventional sources of knowledge like intuition,

verbal testimony, and revelation. What cannot be obtained by the

conventional sources of knowledge may be obtained by the

unconventional ones. But the problem is with the justification of

knowledge that is obtained by unconventional sources. A consistent

epistemologist believes that all our epistemological endeavours are

amply supported by proper logical reasoning. Thus logic and

epistemology are complementary to each other. Especially, the

modern Western epistemologists are unanimous in their view that

all forms of knowing must by reduced to logical reasoning. Such an

approach to epistemology is quite conspicuous in the writings of

twentieth-century epistemologists in general and analytical

philosophers in particular. Even in the Indian tradition, the

epistemology developed by Gautama in his Nyāya-sūtra shows the

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inter-connectedness between epistemology and logic. This does not

mean that knowledge derived from every source must be subjected

to logical scrutiny. This issue would be discussed in the subsequent

chapters. Further, it is necessary to discuss the following issues that

fall under epistemology. They are: analysis of knowledge, truth

condition, justification condition, and skepticism and possibility of

knowledge.

Analysis of knowledge

Progress in our knowledge is chiefly dependent on our doubting the

validity or sufficiency of what is already known. To realize our

ignorance is the first step to knowledge. Not only that, even if we

possess knowledge we must possess that “right to be sure” about what

we possessed. This right to be sure about what we possessed counts as

evidence or justification in general. A rigorous exercise has been done

by the epistemologists in recent times to provide sufficient conditions

for any knowledge claim. They hold the view that any piece of

information in order to obtain the status of knowledge must fulfill

certain conditions so that knowledge can be distinguished from mere

belief. Also, it must be kept in mind that all knowledge is informative,

but all information may not really count as knowledge. The central

objective behind the analysis of knowledge is to evaluate the claims of

the metaphysical dogmatists and the epistemological skeptics.

Analysis of knowledge in its rudimentary form first appeared in

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Plato‟s dialogues Meno and Theatetus. Plato in his Meno holds the view

that all forms of knowledge are a case of being acquainted with

something in this or in some previous existence. Knowledge, Plato

held, is recollection or reminiscence. The state of mind produced by

mere collection of previous knowledge is only a form of belief, which

must be subject to repeated questioning for reinforcing it; and this in

turn enables the person concerned to provide a rationale for his belief;

this belief attains the status of knowledge. In his Theatetus Plato

argued against the identification of knowledge with true belief. This

point is already analyzed in the beginning. In recent times Bertrand

Russell, G.E. Moore, Wittgenstein, A.J.Ayer, Brand Blanshard, and

Edmund Gettier are concerned with this problem. In general we can

say that, until the time of Gettier, the epistemologists have accepted

three conditions of knowledge. They are: 1. Truth conditions, 2.

Acceptance condition (which in turn includes belief condition), and 3.

Justification. Let us take a look at these conditions

Truth Condition

Any piece of information in order to gain the status of knowledge,

in the first instance, must be true. If it is not true, then it turns out be

false and in turn cannot be regarded as knowledge. For example, if I

know that my friend has a bank balance of rupees one crore, then it

must be true that my friend has a bank balance of rupees one crore.

If it is not true that my friend has a bank balance of rupees one

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crore, then I do not know that my friend has a bank balance of

rupees one crore. In that case if I claim to know, my knowledge is

wrong. It is essential to understand the meaning of truth. There are

four important approaches to truth. There may be many more, but

these are the approaches discussed by the Western epistemologists.

They are as follows: correspondence theory, coherence theory,

pragmatic theory, and redundant theory.

Correspondence Theory

This classical theory of truth advances the view that the truth of a

thought consists in its agreement with reality. According to this

theory, a proposition is considered to be true if it corresponds to a

fact or a state of affairs. For example, if it is a fact that I have a car

and if I say that I have a car, my statement is true because it

corresponds with the fact or some existing situation. But what is

this agreement of thought and reality that results in the definition of

truth? Is thought identical with reality that it depicts? Certainly not.

Then what does one mean by “correspondence”? May be “that this

thought is a likeness of something real, is a reflection of a reality.”5

The demerit of this theory lies in the ambiguity of the word

“correspondence”. The agreement of thought with reality seems to

be absurd to some philosophers for there cannot be any

correspondence between the entities belonging to two different

categories. Thus we are not clear in what sense the word

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“correspondence” is used between a non-empirical proposition and

an actual state of affairs. Thought has mere time-dimension but not

others, and it cannot be likeness of something that is spatial. The

defenders of the correspondence theory hold that one has to

distinguish between a process and its contents. The process is the

act of thought and it does not resemble reality, but the content of

the process resembles reality. This is what they mean by the

expression “correspondence”. But this explanation does not really

satisfy the critics, for they hold that the expression “likeness” is

ambiguous. Also, it is not clear how far this likeness between

thought and reality must extend for a thought to be true. Therefore,

the view that truth consists in the agreement between thought and

reality must be given up. This is an unattainable ideal. In spite of

these short-comings, correspondence theory of truth has been given

its due importance in epistemology.

Like any other British empiricist, Austin has his own way of

defending truth as correspondence between thought and reality. To

put it in the words of Austin: “A statement is said to be true when

the historic sate of affairs to which it is correlated by the

demonstrative conventions (the one to which it „refers‟) is of a type

with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the

descriptive conventions.”6 Austin maintains that the

correspondence between thought and reality is often misconstrued

by the critics. There is nothing wrong in holding the view that there

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is correspondence between thought and facts (reality). Thought

represents a fact. The true representation of a fact makes a thought

true. And a true thought finds its expression in language

(proposition). And a proposition is significantly said to be either

true or false. As held by Diogenes, all theories are highly

pretentious. Therefore, a theory is always subject to alteration.

Coherence Theory

Unlike correspondence, this theory holds that a proposition is

considered to be true only when it coheres with a proposition or set

of well established system of propositions. Thus “the coherence

theory of truth defines truth as an agreement of thoughts among

themselves.”7 By coherence we understand a relation among

propositions and not a relation between proposition and something

else which is not a proposition. This sort of view was suggested by

Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel and explicitly formulated by F.H.

Bradley and Brand Blandshard. The adherents of this theory hold

the view that the criterion that determines whether a given

statement is held to be true or false is completely dependent upon

its agreement with other propositions which are already accepted as

true. The agreement between a proposition and a set of propositions

consists in this, that the statement in question does not contradict

the set of propositions but harmonizes with the rest of the system. It

may seem that the verdict of experience is the final criterion, but it

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is not really so. Above the verdict of experience, there is something

higher which is the criterion of agreement. Let us, for the sake of

argument, assume a small ten paise coin is submerged in a glass of

water. The visual experience tells us that the coin is big in size, and

the tactile sense tells us that the coin is small. Why do we believe in

the sense of touch here rather than in the sense of sight? This is

because the statement generated on the basis of the sense of sight

does not go well with our commonsense view. It is a well-known

fact that the ten paise coin cannot be bigger than its actual size. On

the other hand, the statement generated by the tactile sense

perfectly harmonizes with our commonsense view of the size of the

coin. Now the question arises: How do we arrive at initial truths at

all?

The critics of this theory say that in coherence theory the truth

of proposition either guarantees or is generated by the truth of a

member or members of the set. This seems to be circular, for the

critics, since coherence theory defines truth in terms of coherence

when truth is already presupposed. Also the expression

“coherence” is vague like the expression “correspondence”.

Pragmatic Theory

Pragmatic theory finds fault with correspondence theory as well as

with coherence theory. Apart from the objection that the notion of

“correspondence” is vague, the correspondence theory can at best

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be called a copy-view theory of truth, for it mainly relies on the

structural aspects of reality but not with its functional aspects.

Similarly, the expression “coherence” is also vague. Pragmatic

theory was developed in the writings of William James and John

Dewey. However, it cannot be treated as a homogenous doctrine,

for its adherents define truth in different ways. But in its radical

form, as a point of departure, pragmatism contends that the truth of

any statement consists in its final criteria. These final criteria are to

be the utility of a given statement for action. In other words, the

truth of a proposition is to be found in its practical consequences.

William James extended the application of pragmatic analysis to

religious phenomena. He is of view that the criterion of religious

truth is in no way inferior to that of truth in other spheres. And this

is to be based on satisfactoriness of a religious belief to the believer.

If it is asked, in what sense can the proposition that “god exists” be

verified? James response will be that this proposition may be

considered true in so far as it provides the individual with “vital

benefits” that is, it may satisfy the individual‟s religious and

spiritual needs. Broadly speaking the pragmatist argument is as

follows: “Our intellectual functions, and thus for example our

convictions, are not independent of our practical activity. Our

convictions influence our action; give it a direction point out to the

agent means leading to his intended aim.”8 To put it in a crude

manner, the influence of our convictions on our actions makes our

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actions fruitful. An action is regarded as fruitful when it achieves

the intended aim. It amounts to saying that our conviction is true.

Therefore, convictions (ideas) are not true but truth happens to a

conviction (idea).

There are few objections against this theory. They are as

follows: First of all, the notion of “working” is something

ambiguous. Secondly, if ideas are held to be true just because they

work in one‟s own life, then truth becomes purely subjective or

personal. Thirdly, pragmatic theory of truth involves relativism

since what works for one individual may not work for another.

Redundancy theory

This theory was propounded by F.P. Ramsay who is of view that

one can always eliminate the predicates like “true” and “false”

without any loss of meaning since they are semantically redundant.

Thus, when it is said that “it is true that p” means the same thing as

“p” and when it is said that “it is false that p” means the same thing

as “not p”. In his interesting paper “Facts and Propositions”

Ramsey argues that the word “true” as a prefix or as a suffix of a

statement is always redundant. What difference does it really make

to a statement when “true” is added as a suffix or prefix to a

statement? According to Ramsey, “It is evident that „It is true that

Caesar was murdered‟ means no more than Caesar was

murdered.”9 Tarski claims that his semantic theory of truth is akin

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to the correspondence theory. Both Ramsey and Tarski view that

their theories of truth are extended versions of the correspondence

theory. Tarski‟s main objective is to solve the paradox of the liar by

distinguishing between what is said in the object language and

what could be said about this in the meta-language or second order

language.

From the above discussion regarding the various theory of

truth, it appears to us that it is not very easy to go beyond what

Aristotle had stated regarding truth in his metaphysics: “to say of

what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say

of what is that, that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true”10. In

other words, we can say that knowledge requires truth, but it is

very difficult to say whether it is truth derived from correspondence

or from coherence or from sheer utility or from some other means.

What John Mackie suggested regarding truth is apt.11 To say that a

proposition is true is to say that things are as they are stated to be

by that proposition”.

Acceptance Condition

The next necessary condition for knowledge is acceptance. For

example, if I claim that my professor had been to U.S.A. in 2000, but at

the same time I do not accept it, then it amounts to saying that I do not

know that my professor had been to U.S.A. at that time, even if he had

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been to U.S.A. then, hence, if I do not accept P, then it is tantamount to

my not knowing P. if S knows that P, then S accepts that P. This

acceptance condition automatically includes belief condition of

knowledge. Thus the formula is S accepts that P, if and only if S

believes that P. This amounts to saying that all knowledge

presupposes belief, but not vice-versa. Keith Lehrer is of the view that

it is better to accept acceptance condition than belief condition since it

is true that an appropriate kind of acceptance is a kind of belief, but it

is not true and appropriate to say that all kinds of beliefs are the

requisite sort of acceptance. 12

Justification Condition

As discussed elsewhere, knowledge is not simply true belief, since true

beliefs are sometimes the outcome of some lucky guess-work, and

hence they cannot be considered knowledge. There are cases where a

groundless conjecture might be true. It may be believed by a person,

but still it does not constitute knowledge. Satisfaction of belief

condition has to be appropriately related to the satisfaction of truth

condition; and this gives way for the justification condition of

knowledge. A true belief can be considered justified, if and only if it is

based on good justifying reasons.

This way of thinking first appeared in Plato‟s Theaetetus. A

jury may truly believe truly that a defendant is guilty, but he has no

sufficient evidence to prove the belief and hence, his claim cannot

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be a knowledge-claim. In short, it cannot be said that knowledge is

completely justified true belief or acceptance. Hence the formula

can be, “S knows that P”, if and only if it is true that P, and S is

completely justified in accepting that P. But the above argument has

been disputed by Edmund Gettier. He gives a counter example to

establish his standpoint. Suppose a teacher wonders if any member

of her class possesses a car. She gets proper evidence from one of

her students namely, X, and that X possess a car and she has no

evidence from any of her other student possessing a car. So, her

statement, that one of her students possesses a car is true. But the

truth is X does not really possess a car though he showed all kinds

of evidences either to deceive his teacher or raise his social status.

On the other hand, it is Y who actually possesses a car though he

does not have any evidence to prove. Here, says Gettier, even

though X does not possess a car still the statement of the teacher

that one of her students possesses a car holds good since Y, her

student possesses a car, but the statement is based on false

justification since it is only her good luck that Y statement is based

on false justification, since it is only her good luck that Y possesses a

car so, actually the teacher has no knowledge of her students

possessing a car.

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In order to avoid the above difficulty a fourth condition has

been added by him: “justification without falsity”. It means that our

justification should not be based on any false statement. So, our

final analysis of knowledge runs like this: S knows that P if and

only if,

1. It is true that p

2. S accepts that p

3. S is completely justified in accepting that P

Therefore, S is completely justified in accepting P in some way that

does not depend on any falsity. This is where the problem crops up.

It would be difficult for a person to judge whether justification is

based on truth or falsity.

Skepticism and Possibility of Knowledge

Epistemologists have taken it for granted that there is knowledge;

and having accepted the existence of knowledge, they have

discussed other epistemological problems from various angles.

Since knowledge involves certainty, for certainty to survive there

must also exist uncertainty or doubt. Thus skepticism becomes a

bogey to epistemology. How do epistemologists tackle skepticism?

If skepticism is entertained beyond a limit, then we cannot just

think of knowledge in any form. Therefore, it is necessary for

epistemologists to tackle the strong horns of skepticism. The

skeptics questioned the very possibility of knowledge itself. They

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describe themselves as those who search for truth-but so far they

have not found it. To a great extent, all the problems of the theory of

knowledge arise from skepticism and are discussed keeping

skepticism in the background.

In the history of philosophy we come across two major form

of skepticism namely, (1) systematic or methodological skepticism,

and (2) philosophical or psychological skepticism. The

methodological skepticism is positive in its approach. Here, the

skeptic uses doubt as a means to arrive at certainty. Here doubt is

genuine, and it reaches the climax and comes to a point where

absolute certainty is established. So, certainty acts as a secure

foundation. The best representative of systematic skepticism is René

Descartes who successfully applied the method of doubt

extensively in order to arrive at the secure foundations of

philosophy, namely, the “cogito” or thinking, the starting point of

certainty. Thinking implies thinker. Hence, he arrives at the

formula, “I think, therefore I am” (“cogito ergo sum”).

On the other hand, in contrast to methodological skepticism,

there is philosophical skepticism which denies the very possibility

of knowledge. This kind of skepticism is based upon the ambiguous

chance of error. According to the votaries of this skepticism, we

unusually tend to overlook the possibility of error existing in our

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most trusted conviction, which we term as certain knowledge. For

them, it is possible that there is some kind of error underlying what

we call true knowledge. This is the most fundamental and primary

skeptical premise.

But the critics of skepticism are against the standpoint of

philosophical skepticism. According to them, a wholesale and

universal skepticism is untenable. They contend that we can be

skeptical about a particular claim of knowledge or knowledge

relating to particular branch but we cannot question the very

possibility of knowledge itself. We know very well that, at least in

some fields, we have certain knowledge, example mathematics.

Hence, wholesale skepticism is meaningless since there are no

grounds for its acceptance. The critics of philosophical skepticism

bring forth two important arguments to show the untenability of

the skeptical position. They are: (1) The argument from polar

concepts, and (2) The argument from paradigm case. According to

the first case, there are certain words that go on in pairs; and in such

case some word obtains meaning in contrast to its opposites e.g.,

real/unreal, knowledge/belief, doubt/certainty. In the case of

doubt and certainty, the meaning of the word “doubt” is

understood only with reference to the meaning of the word

“certainty”. Likewise, the paradigm-case argument holds that any

given concept receives its meaning only when it is applicable to a

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certain instance. In this case every claim to knowledge presupposes

what is not the case. For instance, someone may say that this

particular stone is not a diamond. In order to state that he must be

in a position to identify how a real diamond looks like. This is how

the skeptic loses his stand in accepting wholesale skepticism. Again

if it is understood that the above arguments are sound enough in

providing certain and uncertain claims to knowledge, then the

conflict between a skeptic and a non-skeptic is balanced. Gilbert

Ryle correctly argues that the question of counterfeits does not arise

unless there are some real ones. Likewise, the question of

uncertainty does not arise unless there is something called certainty.

G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein are two staunch opponents of

philosophical skepticism that questions everything. According to

them, it is impossible to have universal skepticism, but the sense in

which skepticism is impossible for Wittgenstein is quite different

from what it is for Moore. Moore in his article, “A defence of

commonsense” gives a list of truisms conveying of the truth of

certain proposition. Commonsense is not to be identified with a

body of common knowledge and propositional knowledge. But it

expresses our shared insights in recognizing what is obvious and

what is not so. Though Wittgenstein did not fully agree with

Moore‟s notion of commonsense, he appreciated the tendency

which is implicit in such a notion. According to Wittgenstein,

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commonsense understanding of the world is capable of solving, in

serious philosophical discussions, problems concerning knowledge

and certainty since it recognizes that philosophical problems are to

be posed and answered within the limits of the worked view. For

him, commonsense recognizes on the one hand the primacy of life

and the way we live it, and on the other hand it formulates the very

ways of life as the yardstick, which functions as the standard to

resolve all philosophical disputes. When we actually claim to know

or imagine something to be or not to be, there is a foundation for

such common insight which guarantees certainty. These insights are

founded upon the various ways in which we live our life, that is, the

forms of life which have their roots in our culture, in our practice of

judging and not in our reasoning or intellection.

So, what is implicit in the notion of commonsense becomes a

focal point in the forms of life in the sense that it recognizes that

human understanding and judgements are not possible in isolation.

It requires an accepted common ground which we must share with

other people. It is not reasoning or knowing, but forms of life that

guarantees certainty. It also decides whether a doubt is genuine and

reasonable or idle. It is our life in the context of which our

certainties and doubts are determined.

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If one considers the traditions of rationalists and empiricists,

one finds that certainty is seen in the first person terms as consisting

in the immediately given sense-experience (the empiricist option).

This exclusive emphasis upon the “knowing subject” made

certainty a matter of first person possession. “Certainty” is

something which is uniquely associated with the “knowing

subject”. My being certain about my having particular experience is

a unique episode in my life; and whether I am really certain in

having that very experience is to be determined by me and by none

else. Wittgenstein had already exposed this line of argument in his

Philosophical Investigations. Moore also exposes this first person

epistemological account of certainty, though in a different way. He

says that not only he knows with certainty the truth of a vast

number of commonsense propositions, but he also knows that other

human beings too, likewise, are certain about the truth of those very

propositions. Moore says that he is certain about this proposition

precisely because others too share in these judgments. It is his

participation with others that makes this proposition certain for

each other.

The above idea of shared common beliefs on which certainty

is the case finds its fuller expression in the notion of Wittgenstein‟s

form of life. According to Wittgenstein, in every situation where a

claim to knowledge is established, there stands fast a corpus of

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propositions that are taken for granted. Such propositions form a

kind of system that is presupposed. These propositions “stand fast”

for all the participants in that situation seen in this way. Certainty

becomes an attribute of the common pattern of knowing, doing and

feeling. Thus, certainty becomes a matter of sharedness.

Moore thought that the ground for the accepted meanings

would be the common sense itself, whereas for Wittgenstein, more

adequate way for explaining the second person epistemological

certainty would be that of forms of life. Moore‟s claim of knowledge

of his truisms is still under the shadow of some doubt against such

need and arises in the case of forms of life because now what we

have (presupposed answered propositions), are neither true nor

false and again they themselves are not object of knowledge or

certainty. They provide us with a firm epistemic foundation which

is pre-epistemological or pre-theoretical in nature. It is here that the

epistemology was revolutionized. For Wittgenstein, epistemology

presupposes pre-epistemology or knowledge presupposes pre-

knowledge. The general crux behind his argument is that whenever

we claim to know or doubt, we are already equipped with a

background of propositions which are not only beyond doubt, but

even logically more fundamental than knowledge itself. They

constitute a kind of “logical receptacle” within which all other

language-games of empirical and theoretical investigation occur.

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A question may be asked: “what is that which equips these

anchor propositions, which are at the background of all epistemic

activity with certainty?” The answer is that it is the praxis. So, it is

not a case of cognitive, but practical certainty. What constitute the

basic structure of knowledge and language is a set of practices. The

contemporary critics of skepticism like D.W. Hamlyn and Keith

Lehrer bring out the untenability of wholesale skepticism in their

own way. Hamlyn strongly opposes skepticism saying that there is

no one opposition that may be called “skepticism”. He asks whether

a skeptic knows when he says “we never know anything”. If the

skeptic is positive in his reply, it leads him to self- contradiction,

and if he is negative in his reply, then it robs the initial assertion of

his point. But a skeptic may escape by not committing himself to

any position, but only questions the very possibility of knowledge.

General skepticism seems possible in a theoretical sense as long as it

remains negative, but it is difficult to maintain in practice.

According to Aristotle, it is the mark of a foolish man to demand a

proof for everything.

Lehrer solves the problems of wholesale skepticism in a

neutral manner. When skeptics justify their position by bringing in

the chance of error in all forms of knowledge, then it leads to the

most fundamental skeptical premise that is: if S accepts that p, then

there is some chance that S is incorrect. Lehrer comes forward with

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the argument that on the analysis of knowledge there is no

possibility of having such a premise. He says that even if S accepts

that p, nevertheless he may be reasonable in accepting p in addition.

He says our fallibility is an insufficient basis for skeptical victory. To

quote Lehrer: “of course, what we accept may be wrong – we are

fallible but if enough of what we accept is correct, then our

justification will be undefeated and we will have knowledge, if we

are sufficiently correct.” 13

Epistemological Traditions

There are three positions with regard to the methods of knowledge.

They are: 1. Rationalism, 2. Empiricism, and 3. Transcendentalism.

The fundamental tenets of these three important doctrines are

mentioned in the beginning. However, a very brief account of each

of the doctrines and their methods of obtaining knowledge is

presented here.

Rationalism

Rationalism holds the view that knowledge is basically a priori. It is

innate. The self is basically active and rational and sensations are

accidental to it. So, knowledge is actively produced by the self out

of its inner ideas and they in turn provide us with necessary

knowledge. Knowledge of the eternal is possible by reason which is

the essential nature of the self. Sensations and feelings cannot give

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us the knowledge of the real. The knowledge provided by sense-

experience is always contingent and variable; Socrates and Plato

were the earliest exponents of rationalism which received an

articulated form in the hands of Descartes and Wolff. Of course, the

exponents of continental rationalism may differ with each other in

some respects, but, by and large, they admit the a priori form of

knowledge as genuine.

Empiricism

Unlike rationalism, empiricism holds that if there is any knowledge

of reality, it is derived from sensory experience and empirical use of

reason. Knowledge is basically a posteriori. It asserts that any

justified assertion must be based on experience directly or

indirectly. Even the axioms of mathematics and also first principles

of logic are based on experience. For the empiricists, even the so-

called a priori principles, like that of causality, the law of non-

contradiction, the law of identity etc., are not really prior to and

independent of experience, but are generalizations from it. For

them, knowledge is always acquired and not innate. John Stuart

Mill is the chief advocate of such a position.Most empiricists are

conceptual empiricists. According to them, all concepts are acquired

through sense-experience directly or indirectly. While simple

concepts like sweet, colour, etc., are derived from direct experience,

complex concepts like electricity, beauty, government etc., are

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derived from experience indirectly. Since the empiricists totally rely

on experience for obtaining any kind of knowledge, the existence of

trans-empirical things have been rejected by them on the ground

that they are beyond any external experience. Empiricism as a

theory of knowledge can be traced back to ancient Greek thinkers

like Protagoras, Gorgias and others. In modern times it was revised

by Bacon and followed by Gasendi. Empiricism received an

articulate form only at the hands of John Locke.

The strongest form of empiricism is logical positivism. Its

central tenet is verificationist principle, according to which a non-

analytic proposition remains meaningful, if and only if it is

verifiable or falsifiable on the basis of sensory experience. David

Hume and J.S. Mill may be considered as the forerunners of the

twentieth century logical positivism, the proponents of which

include Carnap and A.J. Ayer. Unlike rationalists, empiricists admit

a posteriori form of knowledge.

Transcendentalism

Kant‟s transcendental method came into picture as a reaction to

Hume‟s extreme skepticism. Kant says that it is Hume‟s theory of

causation which woke him up from his dogmatic slumber.

According to him, all our knowledge of the world is possible. Kant

challenges this view‟s of Hume‟s.

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Kant defines genuine knowledge as universal and necessary.

But do we have such knowledge? To answer this, Kant goes on to

examine the analytic and synthetic judgement. Though knowledge

appears in the form of judgement, says Kant, not every judgment

yields knowledge. Analytic judgments are those whose truths can

be ascertained without reference to any experience or facts. They are

a priori in nature. Here, the predicate of the judgment does not give

us any new information. On the other hand, it only elucidates what

is already contained in the subject. For example, “All bodies are

extended”, “A triangle has three sides” etc. if a judgment is to

qualify as knowledge, and it must be synthetic, which adds to our

knowledge. But, says Kant, not all synthetic judgments give us

genuine knowledge though some new information. Any ordinary

kind of synthetic judgment is called by Kant synthetic a posteriori

judgement. Judgement like “My house is green”, “X is taller than Y”

etc., which gives us only probable knowledge fall under this

category. And only synthetic a priori judgments can yield such

knowledge since they possess both necessity and universality.

Hume denied the existence of or possibility of such judgements but

Kant never entertained any doubt regarding the possibility of such

judgments... But how does it happen? Kant answers this question

by applying his unique transcendental method. We can understand

this method of Kant by his theory of sense perception,

understanding and the unity of self- consciousness.

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Kant says that in order to perceive, we must have sensation, but

mere sensations cannot form any knowledge. It will be mere

modification of consciousness unless it is formed within spatio-

temporal framework. Space and time are, thus regarded by Kant a

priori preconditions for any experience by which every experience has

spatial and temporal character. Space and time are recognized as

forms of intuition. Hence, Kant contends that the “form” and “order”

experience are necessary and universal.

According to Kant, the spatio-temporal organization of our

experience is necessary, but not sufficient to form any judgement

about experience, in order to make judgement about experience,

there must be a priori preconditions which can organize the

unrelated and disconnected percepts. These a priori preconditions

are called by Kant as “the categories of understanding or pure

concepts” and logical functions of judgements. Without these pure

concepts we will be mere spectators. Knowledge would be

impossible without the cooperation of sensations and perceptions

and understanding. On the other hand these two, preconditions of

knowledge are functionally different, but supplement each other.

Kant aptly says: “percepts without concepts are blind and concepts

without percepts are empty”.

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Kant‟s transcendental method culminates in his doctrine of the

transcendental unity of apperception. This unity of self-

consciousness is presupposed by the categories the way the

categories are presupposed by experience. There could be no

knowledge and no connected world of experience without a

unifying consciousness which operates with the categories.

The essence of Kant‟s transcendental method is the argument

from experience to its necessary presuppositions. For Kant,

knowledge begins with experience, but does not arise from

experience. The whole transcendental method of Kant is confined

only to phenomena (things as they appear to us), but not noumena

or things-in-themselves. According to Kant, we cannot transcend

our experience. Knowledge involves perception, but things-in-

themselves cannot be perceived by the senses. They cannot be

intuited by the intellectual intuition since we do not possess

intellectual intuition. If we apply categories to things-in-themselves,

we cannot justify their claim to validity since perception can afford

no evidence of the application of the category. So essentially things-

in-themselves are unknowable because of the limitations of our

faculties of knowledge. But it does not imply, argues Kant that

things-in-themselves are non-existent. Unknowability of a thing

does not necessarily imply its non-existence. Kant applies the same

argument in the case of metaphysical concepts like god, soul and so

on. The reason why we are not able to discover any metaphysical

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knowledge is that we have no means of ascertaining it since the

forms of intuition (space and time), the logical functions of

judgement and categories can be applied only to the phenomenal

world or the realm of possible experience. When we attempt to

proceed from the necessary knowledge of the phenomena to the

necessary knowledge of the noumena, says Kant, either we end up

in logical fallacies or self-contradictory conclusions.

The analysis given above as regards the scope and aim of

knowledge would help us in analyzing the nature and the

fundamental distinction between the a priori and a posteriori forms of

knowledge.

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Notes

1. D. W. Hamlyn, The Theory of Knowledge, London: Macmillan,

1970, p. 79

2. ibid., p. 87.

3. ibid., p. 36.

4. N. A. Nikam, Sense, Understanding and Reason: A Digest of Kant’s

First Critique, Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1970, p. 3.

5. K. Ajdukiewicz, Problems and Theories of Philosophy, London:

Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 9.

6. J.L .Austin, Philosophical papers, J. O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock,

OUP,(ed.,) 1970, “Philosophical Papers”. 122.

7. K.Ajdukiewicz, Problems and Theories of Philosophy, London:

Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 13.

8. ibid., p. 16.

9. F.P. Ramsey, “Facts and Propositions,” Proceedings of Aristotelian

Society, Supplementary Volume, 1927.

10. P. K. Moser and A. V. Nat, Human Knowledge, Oxford University

Press, New York, 1987, p. 11.

11. ibid. 1.

12. K. Lehrer, Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, pp. 12-3

13. K. Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Ely

House, London, 1974, p. 179.