chapter chinese air- and space-based isr · pdf filec hina’s progressively more potent...
TRANSCRIPT
Chinarsquos progressively more potent naval platforms aircraft and missiles are increas-
ingly capable of holding US Navy platforms and their supporting assets at risk
in the near seas and their approaches Central to maximizing Chinese ability to employ
these systemsmdashand hence to consolidating Chinarsquos aerospace combat capabilities over
the near seasmdashare its emerging command control communications computers intel-
ligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities These systems will enable
the Chinese military to strengthen coordination cueing reconnaissance communica-
tions and data relay for maritime monitoring and targeting as well as to coordinate
Chinese platforms systems and personnel engaged in these roles Particularly important
will be effective utilization of ISR the collection and processing of information concern-
ing potential military targets Many platforms and systems can support such operations
this chapter focuses on those dedicated to such purposes with the exception of un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters both of which are growing in impor-
tance but on which data are more difficult to verify at this time
The successful achievement of high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-
locating data and fusion as well as of reliable indigenous satellite positioning naviga-
tion and timing (PNT) would facilitate holding enemy vessels at risk via devastating
multiaxis strikes involving precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles launched from
a variety of land- sea- undersea- and air-based platforms in coordinated sequence
Emerging space-based C4ISR capabilities could thus greatly increase Chinarsquos capacity to
assert its interests militarily in over and beneath the near seas Beijing has a clear stra-
tegic rationale and corresponding set of programs to master the relevant components
particularly for ldquocounterinterventionrdquo operations in and around its near seas Doing so
could finally enable the Peoplersquos Liberation Army (PLA) to translate its traditional ap-
proach of achieving military superiority in specific times and areas even in a context of
overall inferiority (ԕ㜌Ո) into the maritime dimension
Andrew S Erickson
Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas
Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR CH
AP
TE
R S
EV
EN
Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISRIntegrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near SeasAndrew S Erickson
C h i n a s progressively more potent naval platforms aircraft and missiles are increas-ingly capable of holding US Navy platforms and their supporting assets at riskin the near seas and their approaches Central to maximizing Chinese ability to employthese systemsmdashand hence to consolidating Chinas aerospace combat capabilities overthe near seasmdashare its emerging command control communications computers intel-ligence surveillance and reconnaissance (CLIISR) capabilities These systems will enablethe Chinese military to strengthen coordination cueing reconnaissance communica-tions and data relay for maritime monitoring and targeting as well as to coordinateChinese platforms systems and personnel engaged in these roles Particularly importantwill be effective utilization of ISR the collection and processing of information concern-ing potential military targets Many platforms and systems can support such operationsthis chapter focuses on those dedicated to such purposes with the exception of un-manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters both of which are growing in impor-tance but on which data are more difficult to verify at this time
The successful achievement of high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data and fusion as well as of reliable indigenous satellite positioning naviga-tion and timing (PNT) would facilitate holding enemy vessels at risk via devastatingmultiaxis strikes involving precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles launched froma variety of land- sea- undersea- and air-based platforms in coordinated sequenceEmerging space-based CLIISR capabilities could thus greatly increase Chinas capacity toassert its interests militarily in over and beneath the near seas Beijing has a clear stra-tegic rationale and corresponding set of programs to master the relevant componentsparticularly for counterintervention operations in and around its near seas Doing socould finally enable the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to translate its traditional ap-proach of achieving military superiority in specific times and areas even in a context ofoverall inferiority ( Os ) I t l t ) into the maritime dimension
CHAPTER SEVEN
88 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
China has many ways to mitigate its limitations in C4ISR and target deconfliction for
kinetic operations within the near seas and their immediate approaches and potentially
also for nonkinetic peacetime operations farther afield Conducting high-intensity
wartime operations in contested environments beyond the near seas by contrast would
require major qualitative and quantitative improvements particularly in aerospace and
impose corresponding vulnerabilities
This chapter reviews dedicated Chinese air- and space-based ISR systems examines
one relevant operational scenario (tracking hostile surface ships in and around the near
seas) considers Chinarsquos remaining limitations and concludes by assessing strategic
implications for Chinarsquos military and the US Navy
Chinarsquos C4ISR Foundation and Emphasis
The PLA decided that it was necessary to develop ldquoan integrated C4ISR systemrdquo in the
early 1990s1 This was motivated by observations of US prowess in Operation DESERT
STORM the US role in the 1995ndash96 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 7 May 1999 Belgrade
embassy bombing The subsequent development of network-centric warfare added
further impetus In addition to the cumulative impact of these events it was perhaps
physical destruction and damage to sovereignty by the Belgrade bombing that most
strongly reinforced Jiang Zeminrsquos visionary thinking concerning the future of warfare
and catalyzed the support of other top leaders for decisive investment to realize this
goal Accordingly in May 1999 China initiated the 995 Program (995 ᐕ〻) to support
megaprojects for the development of ldquoassassinrsquos macerdquo weapons which promised dispro-
portionate effectiveness vis-agrave-vis a top military power such as the United States despite
Chinarsquos overall technological inferiority2
Essential to the integration and employment of the assassinrsquos mace weapons thus devel-
oped since the late 1990s Chinese C4ISR capabilities have improved markedly in paral-
lel This has occurred as part of a larger effort at ldquoinformatizationrdquo facilitated in part by
development in civilian information technology and the telecommunications industry
As of Chinarsquos 2008 defense white paper the PLA aspired to establish a foundation for
informatization by 2010 achieve major progress by 2020 and realize informatization
by 20503 In 2000 the PLA issued a manual or outline (㓢㾱) detailing the construc-
tion of ldquocommand automation systemsrdquo or ldquomilitary information systems that possess
command and control intelligence and reconnaissance early warning and surveillance
communications electronic countermeasures and other operational and information
support capabilities with computers as the corerdquo4
Over the next decade ldquothe PLA began to develop and field airborne and space-based
ISR technologies and it was during this time that Chinese military analysts began to
88 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
China has many ways to mitigate its limitations in CLIISR and target deconfliction forkinetic operations within the near seas and their immediate approaches and potentiallyalso for nonkinetic peacetime operations farther afield Conducting high-intensitywartime operations in contested environments beyond the near seas by contrast wouldrequire major qualitative and quantitative improvements particularly in aerospace andimpose corresponding vulnerabilities
This chapter reviews dedicated Chinese air- and space-based ISR systems examinesone relevant operational scenario (tracking hostile surface ships in and around the nearseas) considers Chinas remaining limitations and concludes by assessing strategicimplications for Chinas military and the US Navy
Chinas CLIISR Foundation and Emphasis
The PLA decided that it was necessary to develop an integrated CLIISR system in theearly 1990s This was motivated by observations of US prowess in Operation DESERTSTORM the US role in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 7 May 1999 Belgradeembassy bombing The subsequent development of network-centric warfare addedfurther impetus In addition to the cumulative impact of these events it was perhapsphysical destruction and damage to sovereignty by the Belgrade bombing that moststrongly reinforced Jiang Zemins visionary thinking concerning the future of warfareand catalyzed the support of other top leaders for decisive investment to realize thisgoal Accordingly in May 1999 China initiated the 995 Program (995 I f V ) to supportmegaprojects for the development of assassins mace weapons which promised dispro-portionate effectiveness vis-agrave-vis a top military power such as the United States despiteChinas overall technological inferiority
Essential to the integration and employment of the assassins mace weapons thus devel-oped since the late 1990s Chinese CLIISR capabilities have improved markedly in paral-lel This has occurred as part of a larger effort at informatization facilitated in part bydevelopment in civilian information technology and the telecommunications industryAs of Chinas 2008 defense white paper the PLA aspired to establish a foundation forinformatization by 2010 achieve major progress by 2020 and realize informatizationby 20503 In 2000 the PLA issued a manual or outline (ff iV) detailing the construc-tion of command automation systems or military information systems that possesscommand and control intelligence and reconnaissance early warning and surveillancecommunications electronic countermeasures and other operational and informationsupport capabilities with computers as the core
Over the next decade the PLA began to develop and field airborne and space-basedISR technologies and it was during this time that Chinese military analysts began to
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 89
consider the requirements and applications of C4ISR systems to be used by the PLArdquo5
Today in Larry Wortzelrsquos assessment ldquoChinarsquos military reconnaissance capability is
probably similar to the capabilities of Western sensor systems of the 1990s a location
to about ten meters in accuracy clock geosynchronous signals to within 50 nanosec-
onds and velocity to within 02 meters per secondrdquo6 The Central Military Commission
(CMC) and the General Staff Department (GSD) command center are linked redun-
dantly with alternate command posts military region headquarters and subordinate
units operating up to and in some cases beyond the ldquoFirst Island Chainrdquo7 While the
PLA has not achieved the level of situational awareness of its American counterpart
which can extend data-sharing to the individuals in many respects all the PLA Navyrsquos
(PLANrsquos) ldquomajor combat ships are networked and can share data In the PLA Air Force
a majority of newer fighter aircraft are able to share data and be part of an informa-
tion system managed by the PLArsquos own airborne early-warning aircraft For the ground
forces it looks like automation and information age systems have penetrated down to
the regimental levelrdquo8
According to the US Department of Defense as of 2012 ldquothe PLA [was] focused on
developing C4ISR systems that will allow the military to share information and intel-
ligence data enhance battlefield awareness and integrate and command military forces
across the strategic campaign and tactical levels A fully integrated C4ISR system as
envisioned by PLA leaders would enable the PLA to respond to complex battlefield
conditions with a high level of agility and synchronizationrdquo9
More broadly developing a ldquohigh-resolution earth observation systemrdquo to include an
ldquoairborne remote sensing systemrdquo and a ldquonational satellite remote sensing (ground)
network systemrdquo is among sixteen national megaprojects prioritized in Chinarsquos Eleventh
Five-Year Plan (2006ndash10) and the ldquoOutline of National Medium- and Long-Term Sci-
ence and Technology Developmentrdquo (2006ndash20)10 This priority guarantees top leadership
support and tremendous institutional financial and human resources
Near-realreal-time C4ISR is facilitated increasingly by Chinarsquos integrated Qu Dian (४)
military C4ISR system which enables civilian and military leaders to communicate with
forces in-theater using secure fiber-optic cables and both high-frequency and very-high-
frequency communications and microwave systems as well as related wireless networks
and data links These latter include airborne radio and communications relay and secure
PLA voicedata communications provided by FenghuoZhongxingShentong communi-
cations satellites According to Chinarsquos 2010 defense white paper ldquoThe total length of the
national defense optical fiber communication network has increased by a large margin
forming a new generation information transmission network with optical fiber commu-
nication as the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications as assistancerdquo11
This system may be the equivalent of the US Joint Tactical Information Distribution
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 8 9
consider the requirements and applications of CLIISR systems to be used by the PLA5Today in Larry Wortzels assessment Chinas military reconnaissance capability isprobably similar to the capabilities of Western sensor systems of the 1990s a locationto about ten meters in accuracy clock geosynchronous signals to within 50 nanosec-onds and velocity to within 02 meters per second The Central Military Commission(CMC) and the General Staff Department (GSD) command center are linked redun-dantly with alternate command posts military region headquarters and subordinateunits operating up to and in some cases beyond the First Island Chain While thePLA has not achieved the level of situational awareness of its American counterpartwhich can extend data-sharing to the individuals in many respects all the PLA Navys(PLANs) major combat ships are networked and can share data In the PLA Air Forcea majority of newer fighter aircraft are able to share data and be part of an informa-tion system managed by the PLAs own airborne early-warning aircraft For the groundforces it looks like automation and information age systems have penetrated down tothe regimental level
According to the US Department of Defense as of 2012 the PLA [was] focused ondeveloping CLIISR systems that will allow the military to share information and intel-ligence data enhance battlefield awareness and integrate and command military forcesacross the strategic campaign and tactical levels A fully integrated CLIISR system asenvisioned by PLA leaders would enable the PLA to respond to complex battlefieldconditions with a high level of agility and synchronization
More broadly developing a high-resolution earth observation system to include anairborne remote sensing system and a national satellite remote sensing (ground)network system is among sixteen national megaprojects prioritized in Chinas EleventhFive-Year Plan (2006-10) and the Outline of National Medium- and Long-Term Sci-ence and Technology Development (2006-20) This priority guarantees top leadershipsupport and tremendous institutional financial and human resources
Near-realreal-time CLIISR is facilitated increasingly by Chinas integrated Qu Dian ( Eb)military CLIISR system which enables civilian and military leaders to communicate withforces in-theater using secure fiber-optic cables and both high-frequency and very-high-frequency communications and microwave systems as well as related wireless networksand data links These latter include airborne radio and communications relay and securePLA voicedata communications provided by FenghuoZhongxingShentong communi-cations satellites According to Chinas 2010 defense white paper The total length of thenational defense optical fiber communication network has increased by a large marginforming a new generation information transmission network with optical fiber commu-nication as the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications as assistanceThis system may be the equivalent of the US Joint Tactical Information Distribution
90 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
System China has developed and possibly deployed a related Triservice Tactical
Information Distributed Network (йߋᡈᵟᮠᦞ㔏)12 These capabilities are
currently structured to support near-seas operations Extending high-intensity coverage
much beyond the near seas however would be far more difficult in many respects
Airborne ISR
Aircraft play an essential role in maritime reconnaissance because they are typically eas-
ier and cheaper to acquire than satellites and also because they can be rapidly redirected
to new areas of priority in a fluid tactical environment Chinarsquos fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and com-
munications intelligence (COMINT) in wartime they would support air defense and
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) Breakthroughs in the BeidouCompass satellite system
(discussed later) and high-speed data links as demonstrated by Chinarsquos airborne early-
warning aircraft systems are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress13 Table 1 details
major dedicated manned aerial C4ISR platforms Sources for details on UAVs may be
found in endnote 14 below14
China employs a growing variety of aircraft as dedicated ISR platforms If developed
successfully they could give China important aerial battle-management capacity While
the role of rotary-wing aircraft is limited fixed-wing ISR aircraft as indicated in table 1
are numerous and diverse hence they are covered in detail below
To support the effective use of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation China
is attempting to improve its airborne ISR capabilities in part by developing several
variants of airborne early-warning (オѝᰙᵏ AEW) aircraft These include two major
indigenous platforms meant to build on previous efforts
Following cancellation of Israelrsquos Phalcon sale amid mounting American pressure in
2000 China purchased A-50 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft a
modified Ilyushin Il-76 from Russia China has been developing the KJ-2000 indigenous
AWACS-type aircraft based on the Russian A-50 airframe to conduct surveillance
perform long-range air patrol and thereby coordinate naval air operations The KJ-2000
has phased-array radar data processing Identification Friend-or-Foe (distinguishing
friendly hostile and unknown tracks) C3I (command control communications and
intelligence systems) and data-link capabilitymdashall Chinese developed15 According to
Carlo Kopp ldquothis system employs radar technology two generations ahead of that used
by the US Air Forcersquos E-3C AWACSrdquo16 A mid-November 2007 exercise held jointly by the
South Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet in the South China Sea reportedly included em-
ployment of one or more KJ-2000s17 Four or more KJ-2000s are reportedly operational
with the PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division18
90 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
System China has developed and possibly deployed a related Triservice TacticalInformation Distributed Network(El- Va tfg-1)-R - A) These capabilities arecurrently structured to support near-seas operations Extending high-intensity coveragemuch beyond the near seas however would be far more difficult in many respects
Airborne SR
Aircraft play an essential role in maritime reconnaissance because they are typically eas-ier and cheaper to acquire than satellites and also because they can be rapidly redirectedto new areas of priority in a fluid tactical environment Chinas fixed- and rotary-wingaircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and com-munications intelligence (COMINT) in wartime they would support air defense andantisubmarine warfare (ASW) Breakthroughs in the BeidouCompass satellite system(discussed later) and high-speed data links as demonstrated by Chinas airborne early-warning aircraft systems are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress Table 1 detailsmajor dedicated manned aerial C4ISR platforms Sources for details on UAVs may befound in endnote 14 below
China employs a growing variety of aircraft as dedicated ISR platforms If developedsuccessfully they could give China important aerial battle-management capacity Whilethe role of rotary-wing aircraft is limited fixed-wing ISR aircraft as indicated in table 1are numerous and diverse hence they are covered in detail below
To support the effective use of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation Chinais attempting to improve its airborne ISR capabilities in part by developing severalvariants of airborne early-warning (911111 -Y11 AEW) aircraft These include two majorindigenous platforms meant to build on previous efforts
Following cancellation of Israels Phalcon sale amid mounting American pressure in2000 China purchased A-50 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft amodified Ilyushin 11-76 from Russia China has been developing the KJ-2000 indigenousAWACS-type aircraft based on the Russian A-50 airframe to conduct surveillanceperform long-range air patrol and thereby coordinate naval air operations The KJ-2000has phased-array radar data processing Identification Friend-or-Foe (distinguishingfriendly hostile and unknown tracks) C3I (command control communications andintelligence systems) and data-link capabilitymdashall Chinese developed5According toCarlo Kopp this system employs radar technology two generations ahead of that usedby the US Air Forces E-3C AWACS6 A mid-November 2007 exercise held jointly by theSouth Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet in the South China Sea reportedly included em-ployment of one or more KI-2000s Four or more KJ-2000s are reportedly operationalwith the PLAAFs 26th Air Division
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 91
Table 1 Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
fi xed wing
PLAAF Y8T Gaoxin 4 Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Corporation(SAC [Sharsquoanxi])
command post (C3I)
3 Nanjing Military Region (MR) 76th Air Regiment 26th Air Divi-sion Wuxi-Shuofang
2007
B-4052737-300 Boeing US Xirsquoan Aircraft Company Limited (XAC) modifi ed
command post (C3I)
2
KJ-2000 (A-50 Mainstay Il-76MD)
Beriev Russia XAC-modifi ed
airborne early warning and control (AEWampC)
4ndash5 Nanjing MR 76th Air Regi-ment 26th Air Division Wuxi-Shuofang
2004
Y-8WKJ-200 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash5 Nanjing MR 76th Air Regi-ment 26th Air Division Wuxi-Shuofang
2007
H-6BHZ-6 XAC reconnais-sanceELINT
1+ 1979
H-5HZ-5 Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (HAMC)
ISR 7 1966ndash82
Su-30MKK Flanker
Sukhoi Russia reconnais-sancesurveil-lance (SAR capability on one airframe demonstrat-ed 2003)
73 2000
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
83 2004
Y-8H XAC reconnais-sancesurveillance
2
Y-8CB Gaoxin 1 Karakoram Eagle
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) reconnais-sancesurveillance COMINT
6 Nanjing MR EW Flight Regiment 10th Air Division Nanjing-Dajianchang
2005ndash2009
Table 1 Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 1
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
fixed P L A A F Y 8 T Gaoxin 4 S h a a n x i Aircraft command 3 N a n j i n g 2 0 0 7wing C o r p o r a t i o n p o s t (C3I) M i l i t a r y Region
(SAC [Shaanxi]) ( M R ) 76thAir Regiment26th Air Divi-sion Wuxi-Shuofang
B-4052737-300 B o e i n g US c o m m a n d 2Xian Aircraft p o s t (C3I)CompanyLimited (XAC)modified
KJ-2000 (A-50 B e r i e v Russia a i r b o r n e 4 - 5 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 4Mainstay X A C - m o d i f i e d e a r l y 7 6 t h Air Regi-II-76MD) w a r n i n g m e n t 26th Air
and control D i v i s i o n Wuxi-(AEWampC) S h u o f a n g
Y-8WKI-200 S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 5 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 776th Air Regi-ment 26th AirDivision Wuxi-Shuofang
H-6BHZ-6 X A C r e c o n n a i s - 1 + 1 9 7 9sanceELINT
H-5HZ-5 H a r b i n Aircraft I S R 7 1 9 6 6 - 8 2ManufacturingCorporation(HAMC)
Su-30MKK S u k h o i Russia r e c o n n a i s - 7 3 2 0 0 0Flanker s a n c e
surveil-lance (SARcapability onone airframedemonstrat-ed 2003)
XAC s t r i k e fighter 8 3 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-8H X A C r e c o n n a i s - 2 sancesurveillance
Y-8CB Gaoxin 1 S A C (Shaanxi) r e c o n n a i s - 6 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 5 mdashKarakoram Eagle s a n c e E W Flight 2 0 0 9
surveillance R e g i m e n t 10thCOMINT A i r Division
Nanjing-Dajianchang
92 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
J-8FJZ-8FR Shenyang Aircraft Corporation(SAC [Shenyang])
tactical reconnais-sancesurveillance
24 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor 78th Reconnais-sance Regi-ment Suzhou andor Jinan MR 1st Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 31st Fighter Division Wendeng
J-8IJZ-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
J-8JZ-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 Guangzhou MR 2nd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 42nd Fighter Division Taihe and Nanjing MR 3rd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 29th Fighter Division Suzhou
1976
Y-8G Gaoxin 3 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT andor communica-tions relay
10 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North
before 2011
Table 1 (continued)
92 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
1-811Z-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
1-81Z-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 GuangzhouMR 2ndIndependent
1976
Fighter Recon-naissanceRegiment42nd FighterDivision Taiheand NanjingMR 3rdIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment29th FighterDivisionSuzhou
Y-80 Gaoxin 3 SAC (Shaanxi) SIGINTandorcommunica-tions relay
10 ShenyangMR 3rd4thIndependentFighter Recon-naissance
before2011
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th AirRegiment10th Air Divi-sion AmlingNorth
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
1-8FJZ-8FR S h e n y a n g t a c t i c a l 2 4 S h e n y a n gAircraft r e c o n n a i s - M R 3rd4thCorporation s a n c e I n d e p e n d e n t(SAC s u r v e i l l a n c e F i g h t e r Recon-[Shenyang]) n a i s s a n c e
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor 78thReconnais-sance Regi-ment SuzhouandorJinan MR 1stIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment31st FighterDivisionWendeng
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 93
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
Y-8EW Gaoxin 8 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) dorsal satellite communica-tions dome + antennas ELINT
NA At China Flight Test Establish-ment April 2011
Tu-154MD Careless
Tupolev Russia EWELINTSIGINT
4 102nd Air Regiment 34th Transpor-tation Division Beijing-Nanyuan
1998
HD-6 XAC EW 1+
Y-8XZECM Gaoxin 7
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) EW 2 Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North andor Shenyang MR 4th Independent Electronic War-fare Regiment Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Elec-tronic Warfare Regiment 10th Bomber Division Nanjing Dajiaocang
2007
PLAN Y-8JWWH KJ-200Gaoxin 5
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash6 North Sea Fleet (NSF) 1st Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Division Liaoyang
1998
H-5HZ-5 (Il-28 Beagle)
HAMC ISR 7ndash24 NSF 5th Bomber Avia-tion Regiment 2nd Bomber Aviation Division
1966ndash82
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
75 2004
Table 1 (continued)Table 1 (continued)
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 3
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
Y-8EW Gamin 8 S A C (Shaanxi) d o r s a l N A A t Chinasatellite F l i g h t Testcommunica- E s t a b l i s h -tions dome m e n t + antennas A p r i l 2011ELINT
Tu-154MD T u p o l e v Russia E W E L I N T 4 1 0 2 n d Air 1 9 9 8Careless S I G I N T R e g i m e n t
34th Transpor-tation DivisionBeijing-Nanyuan
HD-6 X A C E W 1 +
Y-8XZECM S A C (Shaanxi) E W 2 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 7Gaoxin 7 3 0 t h Air
Regiment10th Air Divi-sion AngingNorth andor ShenyangMR 4thIndependentElectronic War-fare RegimentShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th Elec-tronic WarfareRegiment10th BomberDivisionNanjingDajiaocang
PLAN Y - 8 1 W W H S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 6 N o r t h Sea 1 9 9 8KJ-200 F l e e t (NSF) 1stGamin 5 I n d e p e n d e n t
Air Regiment5th FighterAviationDivisionLiaoyang
H-5HZ-5 H A M C I S R 7 - 2 4 N S F 5th 1 9 6 6 - 8 2(11-28 Beagle) B o m b e r Avia-
tion Regiment2nd BomberAviationDivision
JH-7A X A C s t r i k e fighter 7 5 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
94 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
JH-7 XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
50ndash65 1998
Y-8JBDZ Gaoxin 2
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT reconnais-sancesurveillance andorELINT
5 NSF 1st3rd Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Divi-sion Liaoyang 1 in South Sea Fleet 7th Independent Air Regiment SanyaYaxian
2004
Sh-5 HAMC maritime patrol surveillance
4 NSF 3rd In-dependent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Tuandao
1986
Y-8X SAC (Sharsquoanxi) maritime patrol ASW
5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
1985
Y-8Q Gaoxin 6
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) ASW 1ndash5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
rotary wing
PLAN Ka-31B Kamov Russia AEW 8
Zhi (Z)-8YJSA-321 Super Frelon
Changhe Air-craft Industries Group French technol-ogy license production
AEW 2
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
Owing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashas well as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this table must be interpreted with particular caution
Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequipped
Sources ldquoChinese SIGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehiclesrdquo Command Information Systems China IHS Janersquos 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom Institute for International Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286ndash95 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 www janescom ldquoAir Force Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoWorld Navies Chinardquo Janersquos World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC KJ-2000rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC H-6rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoKamov Ka-31 Helix Brdquo Janersquos Fighting Ships 11 February 2013 wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83ndash87 110ndash12 219 And see Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo pp 114ndash15 117 120
Table 1 (continued)
94 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r Locat ion F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
JH-7 X A C s t r i k e fighter 5 0 - 6 5 1 9 9 8bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-81BDZ S A C (Shaanxi) S I G I N T 5 N S F 1 st3rd 2 0 0 4Gaoxin 2 r e c o n n a i s - I n d e p e n d e n t
sance A i r Regimentsurveillance 5 t h Fighterandor A v i a t i o n Divi-ELINT s i o n Liaoyang
1 in SouthSea Fleet 7thIndependentAir RegimentSanyaYaxian
Sh-5 H A M C m a r i t i m e 4 N S F 3rd In- 1 9 8 6patrol d e p e n d e n t Airsurveillance R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionTuandao
Y-8X S A C (Shaanxi) m a r i t i m e 5 N S F 1st Inde- 1 9 8 5patrol p e n d e n t AirASW R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
Y-8Q S A C (Shaanxi) A S W 1 - 5 N S F 1st Inde-Gaoxin 6 p e n d e n t Air
Regiment 5thFighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
rotary P L A N K a - 3 1 B K a m o v Russia A E W 8wing
Zhi (Z)-8YISA- C h a n g h e Air- A E W 2321 Super Frelon c r a f t Industries
GroupFrench technol-ogy licenseproduction
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesOwing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashaswell as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this tablemust be interpreted with particular caution Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequippedSources Chinese SiGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehicles Command Information Systems China HSJanes 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom institute for international Strategic Studies The Military Balance2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286-95 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom Air Force China Janes Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom World Navies China Janes World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescomXAC KJ-2000 Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi SAC Y-8 (Special MissionVersions) Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescomi XAC H-6 Janes All the WorldsAircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi Kamov Ka-31 Helix B Janes Fighting Ships 11 February 2013wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83-87110-12219 And seeErickson Chinas Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities pp 114-15117120
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 95
Chinarsquos Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russiarsquos Antonov An-12
Cub transport and produced under license by the Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)
Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions as
electronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT
(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare
electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning
(variant five) and ASW (variant six)20 Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinarsquos smaller KJ-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-
early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-array
radar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedenrsquos Ericsson Erieye active phased-
array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more
economically21 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-
ing forty people and possibly setting back the program22 But the program appears to be
back on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KJ-200rsquos technology is ldquotwo generations
ahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the USrdquo23 On 12 March 2010 a
PLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force near
the Miyako Strait24 Like the KJ-2000 the KJ-200 is reported to be in service with the
PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division25 the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200s
as well26
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8
Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regiments
with a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include a
number of H-6s derivatives of Russiarsquos Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-
sance and ELINT27 As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a new
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan28 A portion of the PLAN
and PLAAFrsquos JH-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant still
employed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods29
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-
enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State Oceanic
Administration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March
2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve f ly-bys of USNS
Victorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-
tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-
ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international waters
in the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between a
hundred and three hundred feet30
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 5
Chinas Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russias Antonov An-12Cub transport and produced under license by the Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions aselectronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning(variant five) and ASW (variant six)2deg Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinas smaller KI-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-arrayradar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedens Ericsson Erieye active phased-array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT moreeconomically Various sources report that a KI-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-ing forty people and possibly setting back the program But the program appears to beback on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KI-200s technology is two generationsahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the US On 12 March 2010 aPLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force nearthe Miyako Strait Like the KJ-2000 the KI-200 is reported to be in service with thePLAAFs 26th Air Division the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200sas wel126
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regimentswith a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include anumber of H-6s derivatives of Russias Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-sance and ELINT As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a newsynthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan A portion of the PLANand PLAAFs J1-1-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant stillemployed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State OceanicAdministration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve fly-bys of USNSVictorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international watersin the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between ahundred and three hundred feet
96 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based ISR
Space capabilities underpin Chinarsquos current naval and other military capabilities for the
near seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and
high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen
PLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combining
foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-
cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of various
mission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span
these systems are improving rapidly31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors
to shooters and to support related network functions Chinarsquos second data-relay satel-
lite Tianlian-1-02B provides ldquonear real-time transfer of data to ground stations from
manned space capsules or orbiting satellitesrdquo32 Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012
further extends and strengthens this capacity33 Chinarsquos ground stations and Yuanwang-
class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-
ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but
plans by 2030 to have established ldquonetwork nodesrdquo at the North Pole at the South Pole
and in Brazil as part of a ldquoDigital Earth Scientific Platformrdquo34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-
cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-
tions35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites under
five hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The
93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinarsquos
shipborne Automatic Identification System36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites
is testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a
variety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly
combat-relevant ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite
Surveying and Mappingrdquo37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinarsquos reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-
spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)
the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-
ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellites
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain as
orbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-station
module launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance38 Fengyun weather satellites
provide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
96 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based SR
Space capabilities underpin Chinas current naval and other military capabilities for thenear seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation andhigh-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthenPLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combiningforeign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of variousmission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life spanthese systems are improving rapidly China uses a variety of satellites to link sensorsto shooters and to support related network functions Chinas second data-relay satel-lite Tianlian-1-02B provides near real-time transfer of data to ground stations frommanned space capsules or orbiting satellites Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012further extends and strengthens this capacity Chinas ground stations and Yuanwang-class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations butplans by 2030 to have established network nodes at the North Pole at the South Poleand in Brazil as part of a Digital Earth Scientific Platform34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-tions China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites underfive hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinasshipborne Automatic Identification System The Shijian series of experimental satellitesis testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by avariety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedlycombat-relevant Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized SatelliteSurveying and Mapping37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinas reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellitesChinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain asorbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-stationmodule launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance Fengyun weather satellitesprovide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 97
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 O at an unspecified date FY-2H
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satellite
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-time
electro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observation
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX
optical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has been
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology
Development Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen further
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade with
HY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in
2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecified
dates40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinarsquos Huanjing visible-
IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additional
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible ELINT Satellites Yaogan
Chinarsquos Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits ldquomay provide multiwavelength
overlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targetsrdquo42 The
series was reportedly ldquoimplementedrdquo (ᇎ) by China National Space Administration
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration43 With its high-resolution (five-meter)
L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinarsquos first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogans
are optimized for monitoring ldquoocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastal
zonesrdquo (⎧ ⎧㺘ᖱ ⎧የᑖ) as well as ldquoobserving sea-surface targets and
shallow-water bathymetryrdquo (⎧䶒ⴞḷ ⎧ൠᖒㅹ㿲)44 EO Yaogans which appear
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)ndash2000 small-satellite
ldquobusrdquo (that is standardized ldquobackbonerdquo platform on which the satellite is built) moni-
tor land and sea areas including ldquocoastal zonesrdquo (⎧የᑖ) with resolution as fine as a
half-meter45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a variety
of orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nationrsquos remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are ldquovery
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 7
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 0 at an unspecified date FY-2Hand FY-4 0 and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satelliteseries are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-timeelectro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observationCBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUXoptical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has beenprioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-TechnologyDevelopment Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen furtherHaiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade withHY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecifieddates Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinas Huanjing visible-IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additionalsatellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-plete image of China every twelve hours Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible EOM- Satellites Yaogan
Chinas Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits may provide multiwavelengthoverlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targets Theseries was reportedly implemented ( ) by China National Space Administrationthough this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the USNational Aeronautics and Space Administration With its high-resolution (five-meter)L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinas first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogansare optimized for monitoring ocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastalzones Cs44MA sikOlVT74M) as well as observing sea-surface targets andshallow-water bathymetry C4-E A M ) 44 EO Yaogans which appearto be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)-2000 small-satellitebus (that is standardized backbone platform on which the satellite is built) moni-tor land and sea areas including coastal zones C(4)T) with resolution as fine as ahalf-meter4 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a varietyof orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution A major Chi-nese study on the nations remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are very
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
88 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
China has many ways to mitigate its limitations in C4ISR and target deconfliction for
kinetic operations within the near seas and their immediate approaches and potentially
also for nonkinetic peacetime operations farther afield Conducting high-intensity
wartime operations in contested environments beyond the near seas by contrast would
require major qualitative and quantitative improvements particularly in aerospace and
impose corresponding vulnerabilities
This chapter reviews dedicated Chinese air- and space-based ISR systems examines
one relevant operational scenario (tracking hostile surface ships in and around the near
seas) considers Chinarsquos remaining limitations and concludes by assessing strategic
implications for Chinarsquos military and the US Navy
Chinarsquos C4ISR Foundation and Emphasis
The PLA decided that it was necessary to develop ldquoan integrated C4ISR systemrdquo in the
early 1990s1 This was motivated by observations of US prowess in Operation DESERT
STORM the US role in the 1995ndash96 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 7 May 1999 Belgrade
embassy bombing The subsequent development of network-centric warfare added
further impetus In addition to the cumulative impact of these events it was perhaps
physical destruction and damage to sovereignty by the Belgrade bombing that most
strongly reinforced Jiang Zeminrsquos visionary thinking concerning the future of warfare
and catalyzed the support of other top leaders for decisive investment to realize this
goal Accordingly in May 1999 China initiated the 995 Program (995 ᐕ〻) to support
megaprojects for the development of ldquoassassinrsquos macerdquo weapons which promised dispro-
portionate effectiveness vis-agrave-vis a top military power such as the United States despite
Chinarsquos overall technological inferiority2
Essential to the integration and employment of the assassinrsquos mace weapons thus devel-
oped since the late 1990s Chinese C4ISR capabilities have improved markedly in paral-
lel This has occurred as part of a larger effort at ldquoinformatizationrdquo facilitated in part by
development in civilian information technology and the telecommunications industry
As of Chinarsquos 2008 defense white paper the PLA aspired to establish a foundation for
informatization by 2010 achieve major progress by 2020 and realize informatization
by 20503 In 2000 the PLA issued a manual or outline (㓢㾱) detailing the construc-
tion of ldquocommand automation systemsrdquo or ldquomilitary information systems that possess
command and control intelligence and reconnaissance early warning and surveillance
communications electronic countermeasures and other operational and information
support capabilities with computers as the corerdquo4
Over the next decade ldquothe PLA began to develop and field airborne and space-based
ISR technologies and it was during this time that Chinese military analysts began to
88 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
China has many ways to mitigate its limitations in CLIISR and target deconfliction forkinetic operations within the near seas and their immediate approaches and potentiallyalso for nonkinetic peacetime operations farther afield Conducting high-intensitywartime operations in contested environments beyond the near seas by contrast wouldrequire major qualitative and quantitative improvements particularly in aerospace andimpose corresponding vulnerabilities
This chapter reviews dedicated Chinese air- and space-based ISR systems examinesone relevant operational scenario (tracking hostile surface ships in and around the nearseas) considers Chinas remaining limitations and concludes by assessing strategicimplications for Chinas military and the US Navy
Chinas CLIISR Foundation and Emphasis
The PLA decided that it was necessary to develop an integrated CLIISR system in theearly 1990s This was motivated by observations of US prowess in Operation DESERTSTORM the US role in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 7 May 1999 Belgradeembassy bombing The subsequent development of network-centric warfare addedfurther impetus In addition to the cumulative impact of these events it was perhapsphysical destruction and damage to sovereignty by the Belgrade bombing that moststrongly reinforced Jiang Zemins visionary thinking concerning the future of warfareand catalyzed the support of other top leaders for decisive investment to realize thisgoal Accordingly in May 1999 China initiated the 995 Program (995 I f V ) to supportmegaprojects for the development of assassins mace weapons which promised dispro-portionate effectiveness vis-agrave-vis a top military power such as the United States despiteChinas overall technological inferiority
Essential to the integration and employment of the assassins mace weapons thus devel-oped since the late 1990s Chinese CLIISR capabilities have improved markedly in paral-lel This has occurred as part of a larger effort at informatization facilitated in part bydevelopment in civilian information technology and the telecommunications industryAs of Chinas 2008 defense white paper the PLA aspired to establish a foundation forinformatization by 2010 achieve major progress by 2020 and realize informatizationby 20503 In 2000 the PLA issued a manual or outline (ff iV) detailing the construc-tion of command automation systems or military information systems that possesscommand and control intelligence and reconnaissance early warning and surveillancecommunications electronic countermeasures and other operational and informationsupport capabilities with computers as the core
Over the next decade the PLA began to develop and field airborne and space-basedISR technologies and it was during this time that Chinese military analysts began to
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 89
consider the requirements and applications of C4ISR systems to be used by the PLArdquo5
Today in Larry Wortzelrsquos assessment ldquoChinarsquos military reconnaissance capability is
probably similar to the capabilities of Western sensor systems of the 1990s a location
to about ten meters in accuracy clock geosynchronous signals to within 50 nanosec-
onds and velocity to within 02 meters per secondrdquo6 The Central Military Commission
(CMC) and the General Staff Department (GSD) command center are linked redun-
dantly with alternate command posts military region headquarters and subordinate
units operating up to and in some cases beyond the ldquoFirst Island Chainrdquo7 While the
PLA has not achieved the level of situational awareness of its American counterpart
which can extend data-sharing to the individuals in many respects all the PLA Navyrsquos
(PLANrsquos) ldquomajor combat ships are networked and can share data In the PLA Air Force
a majority of newer fighter aircraft are able to share data and be part of an informa-
tion system managed by the PLArsquos own airborne early-warning aircraft For the ground
forces it looks like automation and information age systems have penetrated down to
the regimental levelrdquo8
According to the US Department of Defense as of 2012 ldquothe PLA [was] focused on
developing C4ISR systems that will allow the military to share information and intel-
ligence data enhance battlefield awareness and integrate and command military forces
across the strategic campaign and tactical levels A fully integrated C4ISR system as
envisioned by PLA leaders would enable the PLA to respond to complex battlefield
conditions with a high level of agility and synchronizationrdquo9
More broadly developing a ldquohigh-resolution earth observation systemrdquo to include an
ldquoairborne remote sensing systemrdquo and a ldquonational satellite remote sensing (ground)
network systemrdquo is among sixteen national megaprojects prioritized in Chinarsquos Eleventh
Five-Year Plan (2006ndash10) and the ldquoOutline of National Medium- and Long-Term Sci-
ence and Technology Developmentrdquo (2006ndash20)10 This priority guarantees top leadership
support and tremendous institutional financial and human resources
Near-realreal-time C4ISR is facilitated increasingly by Chinarsquos integrated Qu Dian (४)
military C4ISR system which enables civilian and military leaders to communicate with
forces in-theater using secure fiber-optic cables and both high-frequency and very-high-
frequency communications and microwave systems as well as related wireless networks
and data links These latter include airborne radio and communications relay and secure
PLA voicedata communications provided by FenghuoZhongxingShentong communi-
cations satellites According to Chinarsquos 2010 defense white paper ldquoThe total length of the
national defense optical fiber communication network has increased by a large margin
forming a new generation information transmission network with optical fiber commu-
nication as the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications as assistancerdquo11
This system may be the equivalent of the US Joint Tactical Information Distribution
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 8 9
consider the requirements and applications of CLIISR systems to be used by the PLA5Today in Larry Wortzels assessment Chinas military reconnaissance capability isprobably similar to the capabilities of Western sensor systems of the 1990s a locationto about ten meters in accuracy clock geosynchronous signals to within 50 nanosec-onds and velocity to within 02 meters per second The Central Military Commission(CMC) and the General Staff Department (GSD) command center are linked redun-dantly with alternate command posts military region headquarters and subordinateunits operating up to and in some cases beyond the First Island Chain While thePLA has not achieved the level of situational awareness of its American counterpartwhich can extend data-sharing to the individuals in many respects all the PLA Navys(PLANs) major combat ships are networked and can share data In the PLA Air Forcea majority of newer fighter aircraft are able to share data and be part of an informa-tion system managed by the PLAs own airborne early-warning aircraft For the groundforces it looks like automation and information age systems have penetrated down tothe regimental level
According to the US Department of Defense as of 2012 the PLA [was] focused ondeveloping CLIISR systems that will allow the military to share information and intel-ligence data enhance battlefield awareness and integrate and command military forcesacross the strategic campaign and tactical levels A fully integrated CLIISR system asenvisioned by PLA leaders would enable the PLA to respond to complex battlefieldconditions with a high level of agility and synchronization
More broadly developing a high-resolution earth observation system to include anairborne remote sensing system and a national satellite remote sensing (ground)network system is among sixteen national megaprojects prioritized in Chinas EleventhFive-Year Plan (2006-10) and the Outline of National Medium- and Long-Term Sci-ence and Technology Development (2006-20) This priority guarantees top leadershipsupport and tremendous institutional financial and human resources
Near-realreal-time CLIISR is facilitated increasingly by Chinas integrated Qu Dian ( Eb)military CLIISR system which enables civilian and military leaders to communicate withforces in-theater using secure fiber-optic cables and both high-frequency and very-high-frequency communications and microwave systems as well as related wireless networksand data links These latter include airborne radio and communications relay and securePLA voicedata communications provided by FenghuoZhongxingShentong communi-cations satellites According to Chinas 2010 defense white paper The total length of thenational defense optical fiber communication network has increased by a large marginforming a new generation information transmission network with optical fiber commu-nication as the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications as assistanceThis system may be the equivalent of the US Joint Tactical Information Distribution
90 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
System China has developed and possibly deployed a related Triservice Tactical
Information Distributed Network (йߋᡈᵟᮠᦞ㔏)12 These capabilities are
currently structured to support near-seas operations Extending high-intensity coverage
much beyond the near seas however would be far more difficult in many respects
Airborne ISR
Aircraft play an essential role in maritime reconnaissance because they are typically eas-
ier and cheaper to acquire than satellites and also because they can be rapidly redirected
to new areas of priority in a fluid tactical environment Chinarsquos fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and com-
munications intelligence (COMINT) in wartime they would support air defense and
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) Breakthroughs in the BeidouCompass satellite system
(discussed later) and high-speed data links as demonstrated by Chinarsquos airborne early-
warning aircraft systems are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress13 Table 1 details
major dedicated manned aerial C4ISR platforms Sources for details on UAVs may be
found in endnote 14 below14
China employs a growing variety of aircraft as dedicated ISR platforms If developed
successfully they could give China important aerial battle-management capacity While
the role of rotary-wing aircraft is limited fixed-wing ISR aircraft as indicated in table 1
are numerous and diverse hence they are covered in detail below
To support the effective use of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation China
is attempting to improve its airborne ISR capabilities in part by developing several
variants of airborne early-warning (オѝᰙᵏ AEW) aircraft These include two major
indigenous platforms meant to build on previous efforts
Following cancellation of Israelrsquos Phalcon sale amid mounting American pressure in
2000 China purchased A-50 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft a
modified Ilyushin Il-76 from Russia China has been developing the KJ-2000 indigenous
AWACS-type aircraft based on the Russian A-50 airframe to conduct surveillance
perform long-range air patrol and thereby coordinate naval air operations The KJ-2000
has phased-array radar data processing Identification Friend-or-Foe (distinguishing
friendly hostile and unknown tracks) C3I (command control communications and
intelligence systems) and data-link capabilitymdashall Chinese developed15 According to
Carlo Kopp ldquothis system employs radar technology two generations ahead of that used
by the US Air Forcersquos E-3C AWACSrdquo16 A mid-November 2007 exercise held jointly by the
South Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet in the South China Sea reportedly included em-
ployment of one or more KJ-2000s17 Four or more KJ-2000s are reportedly operational
with the PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division18
90 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
System China has developed and possibly deployed a related Triservice TacticalInformation Distributed Network(El- Va tfg-1)-R - A) These capabilities arecurrently structured to support near-seas operations Extending high-intensity coveragemuch beyond the near seas however would be far more difficult in many respects
Airborne SR
Aircraft play an essential role in maritime reconnaissance because they are typically eas-ier and cheaper to acquire than satellites and also because they can be rapidly redirectedto new areas of priority in a fluid tactical environment Chinas fixed- and rotary-wingaircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and com-munications intelligence (COMINT) in wartime they would support air defense andantisubmarine warfare (ASW) Breakthroughs in the BeidouCompass satellite system(discussed later) and high-speed data links as demonstrated by Chinas airborne early-warning aircraft systems are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress Table 1 detailsmajor dedicated manned aerial C4ISR platforms Sources for details on UAVs may befound in endnote 14 below
China employs a growing variety of aircraft as dedicated ISR platforms If developedsuccessfully they could give China important aerial battle-management capacity Whilethe role of rotary-wing aircraft is limited fixed-wing ISR aircraft as indicated in table 1are numerous and diverse hence they are covered in detail below
To support the effective use of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation Chinais attempting to improve its airborne ISR capabilities in part by developing severalvariants of airborne early-warning (911111 -Y11 AEW) aircraft These include two majorindigenous platforms meant to build on previous efforts
Following cancellation of Israels Phalcon sale amid mounting American pressure in2000 China purchased A-50 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft amodified Ilyushin 11-76 from Russia China has been developing the KJ-2000 indigenousAWACS-type aircraft based on the Russian A-50 airframe to conduct surveillanceperform long-range air patrol and thereby coordinate naval air operations The KJ-2000has phased-array radar data processing Identification Friend-or-Foe (distinguishingfriendly hostile and unknown tracks) C3I (command control communications andintelligence systems) and data-link capabilitymdashall Chinese developed5According toCarlo Kopp this system employs radar technology two generations ahead of that usedby the US Air Forces E-3C AWACS6 A mid-November 2007 exercise held jointly by theSouth Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet in the South China Sea reportedly included em-ployment of one or more KI-2000s Four or more KJ-2000s are reportedly operationalwith the PLAAFs 26th Air Division
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 91
Table 1 Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
fi xed wing
PLAAF Y8T Gaoxin 4 Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Corporation(SAC [Sharsquoanxi])
command post (C3I)
3 Nanjing Military Region (MR) 76th Air Regiment 26th Air Divi-sion Wuxi-Shuofang
2007
B-4052737-300 Boeing US Xirsquoan Aircraft Company Limited (XAC) modifi ed
command post (C3I)
2
KJ-2000 (A-50 Mainstay Il-76MD)
Beriev Russia XAC-modifi ed
airborne early warning and control (AEWampC)
4ndash5 Nanjing MR 76th Air Regi-ment 26th Air Division Wuxi-Shuofang
2004
Y-8WKJ-200 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash5 Nanjing MR 76th Air Regi-ment 26th Air Division Wuxi-Shuofang
2007
H-6BHZ-6 XAC reconnais-sanceELINT
1+ 1979
H-5HZ-5 Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (HAMC)
ISR 7 1966ndash82
Su-30MKK Flanker
Sukhoi Russia reconnais-sancesurveil-lance (SAR capability on one airframe demonstrat-ed 2003)
73 2000
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
83 2004
Y-8H XAC reconnais-sancesurveillance
2
Y-8CB Gaoxin 1 Karakoram Eagle
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) reconnais-sancesurveillance COMINT
6 Nanjing MR EW Flight Regiment 10th Air Division Nanjing-Dajianchang
2005ndash2009
Table 1 Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 1
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
fixed P L A A F Y 8 T Gaoxin 4 S h a a n x i Aircraft command 3 N a n j i n g 2 0 0 7wing C o r p o r a t i o n p o s t (C3I) M i l i t a r y Region
(SAC [Shaanxi]) ( M R ) 76thAir Regiment26th Air Divi-sion Wuxi-Shuofang
B-4052737-300 B o e i n g US c o m m a n d 2Xian Aircraft p o s t (C3I)CompanyLimited (XAC)modified
KJ-2000 (A-50 B e r i e v Russia a i r b o r n e 4 - 5 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 4Mainstay X A C - m o d i f i e d e a r l y 7 6 t h Air Regi-II-76MD) w a r n i n g m e n t 26th Air
and control D i v i s i o n Wuxi-(AEWampC) S h u o f a n g
Y-8WKI-200 S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 5 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 776th Air Regi-ment 26th AirDivision Wuxi-Shuofang
H-6BHZ-6 X A C r e c o n n a i s - 1 + 1 9 7 9sanceELINT
H-5HZ-5 H a r b i n Aircraft I S R 7 1 9 6 6 - 8 2ManufacturingCorporation(HAMC)
Su-30MKK S u k h o i Russia r e c o n n a i s - 7 3 2 0 0 0Flanker s a n c e
surveil-lance (SARcapability onone airframedemonstrat-ed 2003)
XAC s t r i k e fighter 8 3 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-8H X A C r e c o n n a i s - 2 sancesurveillance
Y-8CB Gaoxin 1 S A C (Shaanxi) r e c o n n a i s - 6 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 5 mdashKarakoram Eagle s a n c e E W Flight 2 0 0 9
surveillance R e g i m e n t 10thCOMINT A i r Division
Nanjing-Dajianchang
92 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
J-8FJZ-8FR Shenyang Aircraft Corporation(SAC [Shenyang])
tactical reconnais-sancesurveillance
24 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor 78th Reconnais-sance Regi-ment Suzhou andor Jinan MR 1st Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 31st Fighter Division Wendeng
J-8IJZ-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
J-8JZ-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 Guangzhou MR 2nd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 42nd Fighter Division Taihe and Nanjing MR 3rd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 29th Fighter Division Suzhou
1976
Y-8G Gaoxin 3 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT andor communica-tions relay
10 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North
before 2011
Table 1 (continued)
92 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
1-811Z-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
1-81Z-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 GuangzhouMR 2ndIndependent
1976
Fighter Recon-naissanceRegiment42nd FighterDivision Taiheand NanjingMR 3rdIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment29th FighterDivisionSuzhou
Y-80 Gaoxin 3 SAC (Shaanxi) SIGINTandorcommunica-tions relay
10 ShenyangMR 3rd4thIndependentFighter Recon-naissance
before2011
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th AirRegiment10th Air Divi-sion AmlingNorth
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
1-8FJZ-8FR S h e n y a n g t a c t i c a l 2 4 S h e n y a n gAircraft r e c o n n a i s - M R 3rd4thCorporation s a n c e I n d e p e n d e n t(SAC s u r v e i l l a n c e F i g h t e r Recon-[Shenyang]) n a i s s a n c e
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor 78thReconnais-sance Regi-ment SuzhouandorJinan MR 1stIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment31st FighterDivisionWendeng
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 93
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
Y-8EW Gaoxin 8 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) dorsal satellite communica-tions dome + antennas ELINT
NA At China Flight Test Establish-ment April 2011
Tu-154MD Careless
Tupolev Russia EWELINTSIGINT
4 102nd Air Regiment 34th Transpor-tation Division Beijing-Nanyuan
1998
HD-6 XAC EW 1+
Y-8XZECM Gaoxin 7
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) EW 2 Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North andor Shenyang MR 4th Independent Electronic War-fare Regiment Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Elec-tronic Warfare Regiment 10th Bomber Division Nanjing Dajiaocang
2007
PLAN Y-8JWWH KJ-200Gaoxin 5
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash6 North Sea Fleet (NSF) 1st Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Division Liaoyang
1998
H-5HZ-5 (Il-28 Beagle)
HAMC ISR 7ndash24 NSF 5th Bomber Avia-tion Regiment 2nd Bomber Aviation Division
1966ndash82
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
75 2004
Table 1 (continued)Table 1 (continued)
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 3
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
Y-8EW Gamin 8 S A C (Shaanxi) d o r s a l N A A t Chinasatellite F l i g h t Testcommunica- E s t a b l i s h -tions dome m e n t + antennas A p r i l 2011ELINT
Tu-154MD T u p o l e v Russia E W E L I N T 4 1 0 2 n d Air 1 9 9 8Careless S I G I N T R e g i m e n t
34th Transpor-tation DivisionBeijing-Nanyuan
HD-6 X A C E W 1 +
Y-8XZECM S A C (Shaanxi) E W 2 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 7Gaoxin 7 3 0 t h Air
Regiment10th Air Divi-sion AngingNorth andor ShenyangMR 4thIndependentElectronic War-fare RegimentShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th Elec-tronic WarfareRegiment10th BomberDivisionNanjingDajiaocang
PLAN Y - 8 1 W W H S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 6 N o r t h Sea 1 9 9 8KJ-200 F l e e t (NSF) 1stGamin 5 I n d e p e n d e n t
Air Regiment5th FighterAviationDivisionLiaoyang
H-5HZ-5 H A M C I S R 7 - 2 4 N S F 5th 1 9 6 6 - 8 2(11-28 Beagle) B o m b e r Avia-
tion Regiment2nd BomberAviationDivision
JH-7A X A C s t r i k e fighter 7 5 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
94 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
JH-7 XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
50ndash65 1998
Y-8JBDZ Gaoxin 2
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT reconnais-sancesurveillance andorELINT
5 NSF 1st3rd Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Divi-sion Liaoyang 1 in South Sea Fleet 7th Independent Air Regiment SanyaYaxian
2004
Sh-5 HAMC maritime patrol surveillance
4 NSF 3rd In-dependent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Tuandao
1986
Y-8X SAC (Sharsquoanxi) maritime patrol ASW
5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
1985
Y-8Q Gaoxin 6
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) ASW 1ndash5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
rotary wing
PLAN Ka-31B Kamov Russia AEW 8
Zhi (Z)-8YJSA-321 Super Frelon
Changhe Air-craft Industries Group French technol-ogy license production
AEW 2
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
Owing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashas well as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this table must be interpreted with particular caution
Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequipped
Sources ldquoChinese SIGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehiclesrdquo Command Information Systems China IHS Janersquos 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom Institute for International Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286ndash95 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 www janescom ldquoAir Force Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoWorld Navies Chinardquo Janersquos World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC KJ-2000rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC H-6rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoKamov Ka-31 Helix Brdquo Janersquos Fighting Ships 11 February 2013 wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83ndash87 110ndash12 219 And see Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo pp 114ndash15 117 120
Table 1 (continued)
94 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r Locat ion F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
JH-7 X A C s t r i k e fighter 5 0 - 6 5 1 9 9 8bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-81BDZ S A C (Shaanxi) S I G I N T 5 N S F 1 st3rd 2 0 0 4Gaoxin 2 r e c o n n a i s - I n d e p e n d e n t
sance A i r Regimentsurveillance 5 t h Fighterandor A v i a t i o n Divi-ELINT s i o n Liaoyang
1 in SouthSea Fleet 7thIndependentAir RegimentSanyaYaxian
Sh-5 H A M C m a r i t i m e 4 N S F 3rd In- 1 9 8 6patrol d e p e n d e n t Airsurveillance R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionTuandao
Y-8X S A C (Shaanxi) m a r i t i m e 5 N S F 1st Inde- 1 9 8 5patrol p e n d e n t AirASW R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
Y-8Q S A C (Shaanxi) A S W 1 - 5 N S F 1st Inde-Gaoxin 6 p e n d e n t Air
Regiment 5thFighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
rotary P L A N K a - 3 1 B K a m o v Russia A E W 8wing
Zhi (Z)-8YISA- C h a n g h e Air- A E W 2321 Super Frelon c r a f t Industries
GroupFrench technol-ogy licenseproduction
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesOwing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashaswell as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this tablemust be interpreted with particular caution Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequippedSources Chinese SiGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehicles Command Information Systems China HSJanes 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom institute for international Strategic Studies The Military Balance2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286-95 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom Air Force China Janes Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom World Navies China Janes World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescomXAC KJ-2000 Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi SAC Y-8 (Special MissionVersions) Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescomi XAC H-6 Janes All the WorldsAircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi Kamov Ka-31 Helix B Janes Fighting Ships 11 February 2013wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83-87110-12219 And seeErickson Chinas Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities pp 114-15117120
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 95
Chinarsquos Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russiarsquos Antonov An-12
Cub transport and produced under license by the Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)
Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions as
electronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT
(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare
electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning
(variant five) and ASW (variant six)20 Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinarsquos smaller KJ-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-
early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-array
radar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedenrsquos Ericsson Erieye active phased-
array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more
economically21 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-
ing forty people and possibly setting back the program22 But the program appears to be
back on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KJ-200rsquos technology is ldquotwo generations
ahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the USrdquo23 On 12 March 2010 a
PLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force near
the Miyako Strait24 Like the KJ-2000 the KJ-200 is reported to be in service with the
PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division25 the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200s
as well26
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8
Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regiments
with a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include a
number of H-6s derivatives of Russiarsquos Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-
sance and ELINT27 As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a new
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan28 A portion of the PLAN
and PLAAFrsquos JH-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant still
employed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods29
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-
enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State Oceanic
Administration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March
2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve f ly-bys of USNS
Victorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-
tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-
ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international waters
in the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between a
hundred and three hundred feet30
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 5
Chinas Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russias Antonov An-12Cub transport and produced under license by the Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions aselectronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning(variant five) and ASW (variant six)2deg Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinas smaller KI-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-arrayradar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedens Ericsson Erieye active phased-array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT moreeconomically Various sources report that a KI-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-ing forty people and possibly setting back the program But the program appears to beback on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KI-200s technology is two generationsahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the US On 12 March 2010 aPLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force nearthe Miyako Strait Like the KJ-2000 the KI-200 is reported to be in service with thePLAAFs 26th Air Division the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200sas wel126
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regimentswith a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include anumber of H-6s derivatives of Russias Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-sance and ELINT As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a newsynthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan A portion of the PLANand PLAAFs J1-1-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant stillemployed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State OceanicAdministration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve fly-bys of USNSVictorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international watersin the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between ahundred and three hundred feet
96 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based ISR
Space capabilities underpin Chinarsquos current naval and other military capabilities for the
near seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and
high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen
PLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combining
foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-
cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of various
mission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span
these systems are improving rapidly31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors
to shooters and to support related network functions Chinarsquos second data-relay satel-
lite Tianlian-1-02B provides ldquonear real-time transfer of data to ground stations from
manned space capsules or orbiting satellitesrdquo32 Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012
further extends and strengthens this capacity33 Chinarsquos ground stations and Yuanwang-
class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-
ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but
plans by 2030 to have established ldquonetwork nodesrdquo at the North Pole at the South Pole
and in Brazil as part of a ldquoDigital Earth Scientific Platformrdquo34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-
cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-
tions35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites under
five hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The
93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinarsquos
shipborne Automatic Identification System36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites
is testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a
variety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly
combat-relevant ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite
Surveying and Mappingrdquo37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinarsquos reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-
spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)
the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-
ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellites
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain as
orbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-station
module launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance38 Fengyun weather satellites
provide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
96 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based SR
Space capabilities underpin Chinas current naval and other military capabilities for thenear seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation andhigh-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthenPLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combiningforeign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of variousmission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life spanthese systems are improving rapidly China uses a variety of satellites to link sensorsto shooters and to support related network functions Chinas second data-relay satel-lite Tianlian-1-02B provides near real-time transfer of data to ground stations frommanned space capsules or orbiting satellites Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012further extends and strengthens this capacity Chinas ground stations and Yuanwang-class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations butplans by 2030 to have established network nodes at the North Pole at the South Poleand in Brazil as part of a Digital Earth Scientific Platform34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-tions China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites underfive hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinasshipborne Automatic Identification System The Shijian series of experimental satellitesis testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by avariety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedlycombat-relevant Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized SatelliteSurveying and Mapping37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinas reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellitesChinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain asorbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-stationmodule launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance Fengyun weather satellitesprovide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 97
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 O at an unspecified date FY-2H
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satellite
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-time
electro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observation
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX
optical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has been
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology
Development Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen further
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade with
HY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in
2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecified
dates40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinarsquos Huanjing visible-
IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additional
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible ELINT Satellites Yaogan
Chinarsquos Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits ldquomay provide multiwavelength
overlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targetsrdquo42 The
series was reportedly ldquoimplementedrdquo (ᇎ) by China National Space Administration
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration43 With its high-resolution (five-meter)
L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinarsquos first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogans
are optimized for monitoring ldquoocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastal
zonesrdquo (⎧ ⎧㺘ᖱ ⎧የᑖ) as well as ldquoobserving sea-surface targets and
shallow-water bathymetryrdquo (⎧䶒ⴞḷ ⎧ൠᖒㅹ㿲)44 EO Yaogans which appear
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)ndash2000 small-satellite
ldquobusrdquo (that is standardized ldquobackbonerdquo platform on which the satellite is built) moni-
tor land and sea areas including ldquocoastal zonesrdquo (⎧የᑖ) with resolution as fine as a
half-meter45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a variety
of orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nationrsquos remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are ldquovery
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 7
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 0 at an unspecified date FY-2Hand FY-4 0 and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satelliteseries are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-timeelectro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observationCBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUXoptical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has beenprioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-TechnologyDevelopment Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen furtherHaiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade withHY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecifieddates Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinas Huanjing visible-IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additionalsatellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-plete image of China every twelve hours Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible EOM- Satellites Yaogan
Chinas Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits may provide multiwavelengthoverlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targets Theseries was reportedly implemented ( ) by China National Space Administrationthough this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the USNational Aeronautics and Space Administration With its high-resolution (five-meter)L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinas first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogansare optimized for monitoring ocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastalzones Cs44MA sikOlVT74M) as well as observing sea-surface targets andshallow-water bathymetry C4-E A M ) 44 EO Yaogans which appearto be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)-2000 small-satellitebus (that is standardized backbone platform on which the satellite is built) moni-tor land and sea areas including coastal zones C(4)T) with resolution as fine as ahalf-meter4 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a varietyof orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution A major Chi-nese study on the nations remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are very
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 89
consider the requirements and applications of C4ISR systems to be used by the PLArdquo5
Today in Larry Wortzelrsquos assessment ldquoChinarsquos military reconnaissance capability is
probably similar to the capabilities of Western sensor systems of the 1990s a location
to about ten meters in accuracy clock geosynchronous signals to within 50 nanosec-
onds and velocity to within 02 meters per secondrdquo6 The Central Military Commission
(CMC) and the General Staff Department (GSD) command center are linked redun-
dantly with alternate command posts military region headquarters and subordinate
units operating up to and in some cases beyond the ldquoFirst Island Chainrdquo7 While the
PLA has not achieved the level of situational awareness of its American counterpart
which can extend data-sharing to the individuals in many respects all the PLA Navyrsquos
(PLANrsquos) ldquomajor combat ships are networked and can share data In the PLA Air Force
a majority of newer fighter aircraft are able to share data and be part of an informa-
tion system managed by the PLArsquos own airborne early-warning aircraft For the ground
forces it looks like automation and information age systems have penetrated down to
the regimental levelrdquo8
According to the US Department of Defense as of 2012 ldquothe PLA [was] focused on
developing C4ISR systems that will allow the military to share information and intel-
ligence data enhance battlefield awareness and integrate and command military forces
across the strategic campaign and tactical levels A fully integrated C4ISR system as
envisioned by PLA leaders would enable the PLA to respond to complex battlefield
conditions with a high level of agility and synchronizationrdquo9
More broadly developing a ldquohigh-resolution earth observation systemrdquo to include an
ldquoairborne remote sensing systemrdquo and a ldquonational satellite remote sensing (ground)
network systemrdquo is among sixteen national megaprojects prioritized in Chinarsquos Eleventh
Five-Year Plan (2006ndash10) and the ldquoOutline of National Medium- and Long-Term Sci-
ence and Technology Developmentrdquo (2006ndash20)10 This priority guarantees top leadership
support and tremendous institutional financial and human resources
Near-realreal-time C4ISR is facilitated increasingly by Chinarsquos integrated Qu Dian (४)
military C4ISR system which enables civilian and military leaders to communicate with
forces in-theater using secure fiber-optic cables and both high-frequency and very-high-
frequency communications and microwave systems as well as related wireless networks
and data links These latter include airborne radio and communications relay and secure
PLA voicedata communications provided by FenghuoZhongxingShentong communi-
cations satellites According to Chinarsquos 2010 defense white paper ldquoThe total length of the
national defense optical fiber communication network has increased by a large margin
forming a new generation information transmission network with optical fiber commu-
nication as the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications as assistancerdquo11
This system may be the equivalent of the US Joint Tactical Information Distribution
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 8 9
consider the requirements and applications of CLIISR systems to be used by the PLA5Today in Larry Wortzels assessment Chinas military reconnaissance capability isprobably similar to the capabilities of Western sensor systems of the 1990s a locationto about ten meters in accuracy clock geosynchronous signals to within 50 nanosec-onds and velocity to within 02 meters per second The Central Military Commission(CMC) and the General Staff Department (GSD) command center are linked redun-dantly with alternate command posts military region headquarters and subordinateunits operating up to and in some cases beyond the First Island Chain While thePLA has not achieved the level of situational awareness of its American counterpartwhich can extend data-sharing to the individuals in many respects all the PLA Navys(PLANs) major combat ships are networked and can share data In the PLA Air Forcea majority of newer fighter aircraft are able to share data and be part of an informa-tion system managed by the PLAs own airborne early-warning aircraft For the groundforces it looks like automation and information age systems have penetrated down tothe regimental level
According to the US Department of Defense as of 2012 the PLA [was] focused ondeveloping CLIISR systems that will allow the military to share information and intel-ligence data enhance battlefield awareness and integrate and command military forcesacross the strategic campaign and tactical levels A fully integrated CLIISR system asenvisioned by PLA leaders would enable the PLA to respond to complex battlefieldconditions with a high level of agility and synchronization
More broadly developing a high-resolution earth observation system to include anairborne remote sensing system and a national satellite remote sensing (ground)network system is among sixteen national megaprojects prioritized in Chinas EleventhFive-Year Plan (2006-10) and the Outline of National Medium- and Long-Term Sci-ence and Technology Development (2006-20) This priority guarantees top leadershipsupport and tremendous institutional financial and human resources
Near-realreal-time CLIISR is facilitated increasingly by Chinas integrated Qu Dian ( Eb)military CLIISR system which enables civilian and military leaders to communicate withforces in-theater using secure fiber-optic cables and both high-frequency and very-high-frequency communications and microwave systems as well as related wireless networksand data links These latter include airborne radio and communications relay and securePLA voicedata communications provided by FenghuoZhongxingShentong communi-cations satellites According to Chinas 2010 defense white paper The total length of thenational defense optical fiber communication network has increased by a large marginforming a new generation information transmission network with optical fiber commu-nication as the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications as assistanceThis system may be the equivalent of the US Joint Tactical Information Distribution
90 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
System China has developed and possibly deployed a related Triservice Tactical
Information Distributed Network (йߋᡈᵟᮠᦞ㔏)12 These capabilities are
currently structured to support near-seas operations Extending high-intensity coverage
much beyond the near seas however would be far more difficult in many respects
Airborne ISR
Aircraft play an essential role in maritime reconnaissance because they are typically eas-
ier and cheaper to acquire than satellites and also because they can be rapidly redirected
to new areas of priority in a fluid tactical environment Chinarsquos fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and com-
munications intelligence (COMINT) in wartime they would support air defense and
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) Breakthroughs in the BeidouCompass satellite system
(discussed later) and high-speed data links as demonstrated by Chinarsquos airborne early-
warning aircraft systems are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress13 Table 1 details
major dedicated manned aerial C4ISR platforms Sources for details on UAVs may be
found in endnote 14 below14
China employs a growing variety of aircraft as dedicated ISR platforms If developed
successfully they could give China important aerial battle-management capacity While
the role of rotary-wing aircraft is limited fixed-wing ISR aircraft as indicated in table 1
are numerous and diverse hence they are covered in detail below
To support the effective use of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation China
is attempting to improve its airborne ISR capabilities in part by developing several
variants of airborne early-warning (オѝᰙᵏ AEW) aircraft These include two major
indigenous platforms meant to build on previous efforts
Following cancellation of Israelrsquos Phalcon sale amid mounting American pressure in
2000 China purchased A-50 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft a
modified Ilyushin Il-76 from Russia China has been developing the KJ-2000 indigenous
AWACS-type aircraft based on the Russian A-50 airframe to conduct surveillance
perform long-range air patrol and thereby coordinate naval air operations The KJ-2000
has phased-array radar data processing Identification Friend-or-Foe (distinguishing
friendly hostile and unknown tracks) C3I (command control communications and
intelligence systems) and data-link capabilitymdashall Chinese developed15 According to
Carlo Kopp ldquothis system employs radar technology two generations ahead of that used
by the US Air Forcersquos E-3C AWACSrdquo16 A mid-November 2007 exercise held jointly by the
South Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet in the South China Sea reportedly included em-
ployment of one or more KJ-2000s17 Four or more KJ-2000s are reportedly operational
with the PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division18
90 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
System China has developed and possibly deployed a related Triservice TacticalInformation Distributed Network(El- Va tfg-1)-R - A) These capabilities arecurrently structured to support near-seas operations Extending high-intensity coveragemuch beyond the near seas however would be far more difficult in many respects
Airborne SR
Aircraft play an essential role in maritime reconnaissance because they are typically eas-ier and cheaper to acquire than satellites and also because they can be rapidly redirectedto new areas of priority in a fluid tactical environment Chinas fixed- and rotary-wingaircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and com-munications intelligence (COMINT) in wartime they would support air defense andantisubmarine warfare (ASW) Breakthroughs in the BeidouCompass satellite system(discussed later) and high-speed data links as demonstrated by Chinas airborne early-warning aircraft systems are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress Table 1 detailsmajor dedicated manned aerial C4ISR platforms Sources for details on UAVs may befound in endnote 14 below
China employs a growing variety of aircraft as dedicated ISR platforms If developedsuccessfully they could give China important aerial battle-management capacity Whilethe role of rotary-wing aircraft is limited fixed-wing ISR aircraft as indicated in table 1are numerous and diverse hence they are covered in detail below
To support the effective use of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation Chinais attempting to improve its airborne ISR capabilities in part by developing severalvariants of airborne early-warning (911111 -Y11 AEW) aircraft These include two majorindigenous platforms meant to build on previous efforts
Following cancellation of Israels Phalcon sale amid mounting American pressure in2000 China purchased A-50 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft amodified Ilyushin 11-76 from Russia China has been developing the KJ-2000 indigenousAWACS-type aircraft based on the Russian A-50 airframe to conduct surveillanceperform long-range air patrol and thereby coordinate naval air operations The KJ-2000has phased-array radar data processing Identification Friend-or-Foe (distinguishingfriendly hostile and unknown tracks) C3I (command control communications andintelligence systems) and data-link capabilitymdashall Chinese developed5According toCarlo Kopp this system employs radar technology two generations ahead of that usedby the US Air Forces E-3C AWACS6 A mid-November 2007 exercise held jointly by theSouth Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet in the South China Sea reportedly included em-ployment of one or more KI-2000s Four or more KJ-2000s are reportedly operationalwith the PLAAFs 26th Air Division
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 91
Table 1 Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
fi xed wing
PLAAF Y8T Gaoxin 4 Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Corporation(SAC [Sharsquoanxi])
command post (C3I)
3 Nanjing Military Region (MR) 76th Air Regiment 26th Air Divi-sion Wuxi-Shuofang
2007
B-4052737-300 Boeing US Xirsquoan Aircraft Company Limited (XAC) modifi ed
command post (C3I)
2
KJ-2000 (A-50 Mainstay Il-76MD)
Beriev Russia XAC-modifi ed
airborne early warning and control (AEWampC)
4ndash5 Nanjing MR 76th Air Regi-ment 26th Air Division Wuxi-Shuofang
2004
Y-8WKJ-200 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash5 Nanjing MR 76th Air Regi-ment 26th Air Division Wuxi-Shuofang
2007
H-6BHZ-6 XAC reconnais-sanceELINT
1+ 1979
H-5HZ-5 Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (HAMC)
ISR 7 1966ndash82
Su-30MKK Flanker
Sukhoi Russia reconnais-sancesurveil-lance (SAR capability on one airframe demonstrat-ed 2003)
73 2000
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
83 2004
Y-8H XAC reconnais-sancesurveillance
2
Y-8CB Gaoxin 1 Karakoram Eagle
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) reconnais-sancesurveillance COMINT
6 Nanjing MR EW Flight Regiment 10th Air Division Nanjing-Dajianchang
2005ndash2009
Table 1 Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 1
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
fixed P L A A F Y 8 T Gaoxin 4 S h a a n x i Aircraft command 3 N a n j i n g 2 0 0 7wing C o r p o r a t i o n p o s t (C3I) M i l i t a r y Region
(SAC [Shaanxi]) ( M R ) 76thAir Regiment26th Air Divi-sion Wuxi-Shuofang
B-4052737-300 B o e i n g US c o m m a n d 2Xian Aircraft p o s t (C3I)CompanyLimited (XAC)modified
KJ-2000 (A-50 B e r i e v Russia a i r b o r n e 4 - 5 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 4Mainstay X A C - m o d i f i e d e a r l y 7 6 t h Air Regi-II-76MD) w a r n i n g m e n t 26th Air
and control D i v i s i o n Wuxi-(AEWampC) S h u o f a n g
Y-8WKI-200 S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 5 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 776th Air Regi-ment 26th AirDivision Wuxi-Shuofang
H-6BHZ-6 X A C r e c o n n a i s - 1 + 1 9 7 9sanceELINT
H-5HZ-5 H a r b i n Aircraft I S R 7 1 9 6 6 - 8 2ManufacturingCorporation(HAMC)
Su-30MKK S u k h o i Russia r e c o n n a i s - 7 3 2 0 0 0Flanker s a n c e
surveil-lance (SARcapability onone airframedemonstrat-ed 2003)
XAC s t r i k e fighter 8 3 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-8H X A C r e c o n n a i s - 2 sancesurveillance
Y-8CB Gaoxin 1 S A C (Shaanxi) r e c o n n a i s - 6 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 5 mdashKarakoram Eagle s a n c e E W Flight 2 0 0 9
surveillance R e g i m e n t 10thCOMINT A i r Division
Nanjing-Dajianchang
92 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
J-8FJZ-8FR Shenyang Aircraft Corporation(SAC [Shenyang])
tactical reconnais-sancesurveillance
24 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor 78th Reconnais-sance Regi-ment Suzhou andor Jinan MR 1st Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 31st Fighter Division Wendeng
J-8IJZ-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
J-8JZ-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 Guangzhou MR 2nd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 42nd Fighter Division Taihe and Nanjing MR 3rd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 29th Fighter Division Suzhou
1976
Y-8G Gaoxin 3 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT andor communica-tions relay
10 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North
before 2011
Table 1 (continued)
92 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
1-811Z-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
1-81Z-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 GuangzhouMR 2ndIndependent
1976
Fighter Recon-naissanceRegiment42nd FighterDivision Taiheand NanjingMR 3rdIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment29th FighterDivisionSuzhou
Y-80 Gaoxin 3 SAC (Shaanxi) SIGINTandorcommunica-tions relay
10 ShenyangMR 3rd4thIndependentFighter Recon-naissance
before2011
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th AirRegiment10th Air Divi-sion AmlingNorth
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
1-8FJZ-8FR S h e n y a n g t a c t i c a l 2 4 S h e n y a n gAircraft r e c o n n a i s - M R 3rd4thCorporation s a n c e I n d e p e n d e n t(SAC s u r v e i l l a n c e F i g h t e r Recon-[Shenyang]) n a i s s a n c e
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor 78thReconnais-sance Regi-ment SuzhouandorJinan MR 1stIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment31st FighterDivisionWendeng
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 93
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
Y-8EW Gaoxin 8 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) dorsal satellite communica-tions dome + antennas ELINT
NA At China Flight Test Establish-ment April 2011
Tu-154MD Careless
Tupolev Russia EWELINTSIGINT
4 102nd Air Regiment 34th Transpor-tation Division Beijing-Nanyuan
1998
HD-6 XAC EW 1+
Y-8XZECM Gaoxin 7
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) EW 2 Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North andor Shenyang MR 4th Independent Electronic War-fare Regiment Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Elec-tronic Warfare Regiment 10th Bomber Division Nanjing Dajiaocang
2007
PLAN Y-8JWWH KJ-200Gaoxin 5
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash6 North Sea Fleet (NSF) 1st Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Division Liaoyang
1998
H-5HZ-5 (Il-28 Beagle)
HAMC ISR 7ndash24 NSF 5th Bomber Avia-tion Regiment 2nd Bomber Aviation Division
1966ndash82
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
75 2004
Table 1 (continued)Table 1 (continued)
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 3
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
Y-8EW Gamin 8 S A C (Shaanxi) d o r s a l N A A t Chinasatellite F l i g h t Testcommunica- E s t a b l i s h -tions dome m e n t + antennas A p r i l 2011ELINT
Tu-154MD T u p o l e v Russia E W E L I N T 4 1 0 2 n d Air 1 9 9 8Careless S I G I N T R e g i m e n t
34th Transpor-tation DivisionBeijing-Nanyuan
HD-6 X A C E W 1 +
Y-8XZECM S A C (Shaanxi) E W 2 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 7Gaoxin 7 3 0 t h Air
Regiment10th Air Divi-sion AngingNorth andor ShenyangMR 4thIndependentElectronic War-fare RegimentShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th Elec-tronic WarfareRegiment10th BomberDivisionNanjingDajiaocang
PLAN Y - 8 1 W W H S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 6 N o r t h Sea 1 9 9 8KJ-200 F l e e t (NSF) 1stGamin 5 I n d e p e n d e n t
Air Regiment5th FighterAviationDivisionLiaoyang
H-5HZ-5 H A M C I S R 7 - 2 4 N S F 5th 1 9 6 6 - 8 2(11-28 Beagle) B o m b e r Avia-
tion Regiment2nd BomberAviationDivision
JH-7A X A C s t r i k e fighter 7 5 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
94 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
JH-7 XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
50ndash65 1998
Y-8JBDZ Gaoxin 2
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT reconnais-sancesurveillance andorELINT
5 NSF 1st3rd Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Divi-sion Liaoyang 1 in South Sea Fleet 7th Independent Air Regiment SanyaYaxian
2004
Sh-5 HAMC maritime patrol surveillance
4 NSF 3rd In-dependent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Tuandao
1986
Y-8X SAC (Sharsquoanxi) maritime patrol ASW
5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
1985
Y-8Q Gaoxin 6
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) ASW 1ndash5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
rotary wing
PLAN Ka-31B Kamov Russia AEW 8
Zhi (Z)-8YJSA-321 Super Frelon
Changhe Air-craft Industries Group French technol-ogy license production
AEW 2
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
Owing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashas well as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this table must be interpreted with particular caution
Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequipped
Sources ldquoChinese SIGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehiclesrdquo Command Information Systems China IHS Janersquos 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom Institute for International Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286ndash95 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 www janescom ldquoAir Force Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoWorld Navies Chinardquo Janersquos World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC KJ-2000rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC H-6rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoKamov Ka-31 Helix Brdquo Janersquos Fighting Ships 11 February 2013 wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83ndash87 110ndash12 219 And see Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo pp 114ndash15 117 120
Table 1 (continued)
94 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r Locat ion F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
JH-7 X A C s t r i k e fighter 5 0 - 6 5 1 9 9 8bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-81BDZ S A C (Shaanxi) S I G I N T 5 N S F 1 st3rd 2 0 0 4Gaoxin 2 r e c o n n a i s - I n d e p e n d e n t
sance A i r Regimentsurveillance 5 t h Fighterandor A v i a t i o n Divi-ELINT s i o n Liaoyang
1 in SouthSea Fleet 7thIndependentAir RegimentSanyaYaxian
Sh-5 H A M C m a r i t i m e 4 N S F 3rd In- 1 9 8 6patrol d e p e n d e n t Airsurveillance R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionTuandao
Y-8X S A C (Shaanxi) m a r i t i m e 5 N S F 1st Inde- 1 9 8 5patrol p e n d e n t AirASW R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
Y-8Q S A C (Shaanxi) A S W 1 - 5 N S F 1st Inde-Gaoxin 6 p e n d e n t Air
Regiment 5thFighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
rotary P L A N K a - 3 1 B K a m o v Russia A E W 8wing
Zhi (Z)-8YISA- C h a n g h e Air- A E W 2321 Super Frelon c r a f t Industries
GroupFrench technol-ogy licenseproduction
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesOwing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashaswell as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this tablemust be interpreted with particular caution Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequippedSources Chinese SiGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehicles Command Information Systems China HSJanes 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom institute for international Strategic Studies The Military Balance2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286-95 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom Air Force China Janes Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom World Navies China Janes World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescomXAC KJ-2000 Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi SAC Y-8 (Special MissionVersions) Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescomi XAC H-6 Janes All the WorldsAircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi Kamov Ka-31 Helix B Janes Fighting Ships 11 February 2013wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83-87110-12219 And seeErickson Chinas Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities pp 114-15117120
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 95
Chinarsquos Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russiarsquos Antonov An-12
Cub transport and produced under license by the Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)
Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions as
electronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT
(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare
electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning
(variant five) and ASW (variant six)20 Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinarsquos smaller KJ-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-
early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-array
radar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedenrsquos Ericsson Erieye active phased-
array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more
economically21 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-
ing forty people and possibly setting back the program22 But the program appears to be
back on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KJ-200rsquos technology is ldquotwo generations
ahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the USrdquo23 On 12 March 2010 a
PLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force near
the Miyako Strait24 Like the KJ-2000 the KJ-200 is reported to be in service with the
PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division25 the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200s
as well26
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8
Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regiments
with a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include a
number of H-6s derivatives of Russiarsquos Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-
sance and ELINT27 As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a new
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan28 A portion of the PLAN
and PLAAFrsquos JH-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant still
employed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods29
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-
enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State Oceanic
Administration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March
2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve f ly-bys of USNS
Victorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-
tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-
ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international waters
in the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between a
hundred and three hundred feet30
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 5
Chinas Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russias Antonov An-12Cub transport and produced under license by the Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions aselectronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning(variant five) and ASW (variant six)2deg Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinas smaller KI-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-arrayradar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedens Ericsson Erieye active phased-array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT moreeconomically Various sources report that a KI-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-ing forty people and possibly setting back the program But the program appears to beback on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KI-200s technology is two generationsahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the US On 12 March 2010 aPLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force nearthe Miyako Strait Like the KJ-2000 the KI-200 is reported to be in service with thePLAAFs 26th Air Division the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200sas wel126
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regimentswith a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include anumber of H-6s derivatives of Russias Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-sance and ELINT As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a newsynthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan A portion of the PLANand PLAAFs J1-1-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant stillemployed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State OceanicAdministration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve fly-bys of USNSVictorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international watersin the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between ahundred and three hundred feet
96 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based ISR
Space capabilities underpin Chinarsquos current naval and other military capabilities for the
near seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and
high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen
PLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combining
foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-
cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of various
mission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span
these systems are improving rapidly31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors
to shooters and to support related network functions Chinarsquos second data-relay satel-
lite Tianlian-1-02B provides ldquonear real-time transfer of data to ground stations from
manned space capsules or orbiting satellitesrdquo32 Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012
further extends and strengthens this capacity33 Chinarsquos ground stations and Yuanwang-
class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-
ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but
plans by 2030 to have established ldquonetwork nodesrdquo at the North Pole at the South Pole
and in Brazil as part of a ldquoDigital Earth Scientific Platformrdquo34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-
cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-
tions35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites under
five hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The
93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinarsquos
shipborne Automatic Identification System36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites
is testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a
variety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly
combat-relevant ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite
Surveying and Mappingrdquo37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinarsquos reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-
spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)
the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-
ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellites
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain as
orbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-station
module launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance38 Fengyun weather satellites
provide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
96 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based SR
Space capabilities underpin Chinas current naval and other military capabilities for thenear seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation andhigh-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthenPLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combiningforeign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of variousmission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life spanthese systems are improving rapidly China uses a variety of satellites to link sensorsto shooters and to support related network functions Chinas second data-relay satel-lite Tianlian-1-02B provides near real-time transfer of data to ground stations frommanned space capsules or orbiting satellites Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012further extends and strengthens this capacity Chinas ground stations and Yuanwang-class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations butplans by 2030 to have established network nodes at the North Pole at the South Poleand in Brazil as part of a Digital Earth Scientific Platform34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-tions China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites underfive hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinasshipborne Automatic Identification System The Shijian series of experimental satellitesis testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by avariety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedlycombat-relevant Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized SatelliteSurveying and Mapping37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinas reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellitesChinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain asorbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-stationmodule launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance Fengyun weather satellitesprovide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 97
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 O at an unspecified date FY-2H
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satellite
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-time
electro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observation
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX
optical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has been
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology
Development Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen further
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade with
HY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in
2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecified
dates40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinarsquos Huanjing visible-
IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additional
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible ELINT Satellites Yaogan
Chinarsquos Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits ldquomay provide multiwavelength
overlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targetsrdquo42 The
series was reportedly ldquoimplementedrdquo (ᇎ) by China National Space Administration
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration43 With its high-resolution (five-meter)
L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinarsquos first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogans
are optimized for monitoring ldquoocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastal
zonesrdquo (⎧ ⎧㺘ᖱ ⎧የᑖ) as well as ldquoobserving sea-surface targets and
shallow-water bathymetryrdquo (⎧䶒ⴞḷ ⎧ൠᖒㅹ㿲)44 EO Yaogans which appear
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)ndash2000 small-satellite
ldquobusrdquo (that is standardized ldquobackbonerdquo platform on which the satellite is built) moni-
tor land and sea areas including ldquocoastal zonesrdquo (⎧የᑖ) with resolution as fine as a
half-meter45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a variety
of orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nationrsquos remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are ldquovery
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 7
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 0 at an unspecified date FY-2Hand FY-4 0 and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satelliteseries are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-timeelectro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observationCBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUXoptical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has beenprioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-TechnologyDevelopment Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen furtherHaiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade withHY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecifieddates Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinas Huanjing visible-IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additionalsatellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-plete image of China every twelve hours Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible EOM- Satellites Yaogan
Chinas Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits may provide multiwavelengthoverlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targets Theseries was reportedly implemented ( ) by China National Space Administrationthough this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the USNational Aeronautics and Space Administration With its high-resolution (five-meter)L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinas first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogansare optimized for monitoring ocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastalzones Cs44MA sikOlVT74M) as well as observing sea-surface targets andshallow-water bathymetry C4-E A M ) 44 EO Yaogans which appearto be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)-2000 small-satellitebus (that is standardized backbone platform on which the satellite is built) moni-tor land and sea areas including coastal zones C(4)T) with resolution as fine as ahalf-meter4 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a varietyof orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution A major Chi-nese study on the nations remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are very
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
90 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
System China has developed and possibly deployed a related Triservice Tactical
Information Distributed Network (йߋᡈᵟᮠᦞ㔏)12 These capabilities are
currently structured to support near-seas operations Extending high-intensity coverage
much beyond the near seas however would be far more difficult in many respects
Airborne ISR
Aircraft play an essential role in maritime reconnaissance because they are typically eas-
ier and cheaper to acquire than satellites and also because they can be rapidly redirected
to new areas of priority in a fluid tactical environment Chinarsquos fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and com-
munications intelligence (COMINT) in wartime they would support air defense and
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) Breakthroughs in the BeidouCompass satellite system
(discussed later) and high-speed data links as demonstrated by Chinarsquos airborne early-
warning aircraft systems are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress13 Table 1 details
major dedicated manned aerial C4ISR platforms Sources for details on UAVs may be
found in endnote 14 below14
China employs a growing variety of aircraft as dedicated ISR platforms If developed
successfully they could give China important aerial battle-management capacity While
the role of rotary-wing aircraft is limited fixed-wing ISR aircraft as indicated in table 1
are numerous and diverse hence they are covered in detail below
To support the effective use of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation China
is attempting to improve its airborne ISR capabilities in part by developing several
variants of airborne early-warning (オѝᰙᵏ AEW) aircraft These include two major
indigenous platforms meant to build on previous efforts
Following cancellation of Israelrsquos Phalcon sale amid mounting American pressure in
2000 China purchased A-50 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft a
modified Ilyushin Il-76 from Russia China has been developing the KJ-2000 indigenous
AWACS-type aircraft based on the Russian A-50 airframe to conduct surveillance
perform long-range air patrol and thereby coordinate naval air operations The KJ-2000
has phased-array radar data processing Identification Friend-or-Foe (distinguishing
friendly hostile and unknown tracks) C3I (command control communications and
intelligence systems) and data-link capabilitymdashall Chinese developed15 According to
Carlo Kopp ldquothis system employs radar technology two generations ahead of that used
by the US Air Forcersquos E-3C AWACSrdquo16 A mid-November 2007 exercise held jointly by the
South Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet in the South China Sea reportedly included em-
ployment of one or more KJ-2000s17 Four or more KJ-2000s are reportedly operational
with the PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division18
90 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
System China has developed and possibly deployed a related Triservice TacticalInformation Distributed Network(El- Va tfg-1)-R - A) These capabilities arecurrently structured to support near-seas operations Extending high-intensity coveragemuch beyond the near seas however would be far more difficult in many respects
Airborne SR
Aircraft play an essential role in maritime reconnaissance because they are typically eas-ier and cheaper to acquire than satellites and also because they can be rapidly redirectedto new areas of priority in a fluid tactical environment Chinas fixed- and rotary-wingaircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and com-munications intelligence (COMINT) in wartime they would support air defense andantisubmarine warfare (ASW) Breakthroughs in the BeidouCompass satellite system(discussed later) and high-speed data links as demonstrated by Chinas airborne early-warning aircraft systems are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress Table 1 detailsmajor dedicated manned aerial C4ISR platforms Sources for details on UAVs may befound in endnote 14 below
China employs a growing variety of aircraft as dedicated ISR platforms If developedsuccessfully they could give China important aerial battle-management capacity Whilethe role of rotary-wing aircraft is limited fixed-wing ISR aircraft as indicated in table 1are numerous and diverse hence they are covered in detail below
To support the effective use of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation Chinais attempting to improve its airborne ISR capabilities in part by developing severalvariants of airborne early-warning (911111 -Y11 AEW) aircraft These include two majorindigenous platforms meant to build on previous efforts
Following cancellation of Israels Phalcon sale amid mounting American pressure in2000 China purchased A-50 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft amodified Ilyushin 11-76 from Russia China has been developing the KJ-2000 indigenousAWACS-type aircraft based on the Russian A-50 airframe to conduct surveillanceperform long-range air patrol and thereby coordinate naval air operations The KJ-2000has phased-array radar data processing Identification Friend-or-Foe (distinguishingfriendly hostile and unknown tracks) C3I (command control communications andintelligence systems) and data-link capabilitymdashall Chinese developed5According toCarlo Kopp this system employs radar technology two generations ahead of that usedby the US Air Forces E-3C AWACS6 A mid-November 2007 exercise held jointly by theSouth Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet in the South China Sea reportedly included em-ployment of one or more KI-2000s Four or more KJ-2000s are reportedly operationalwith the PLAAFs 26th Air Division
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 91
Table 1 Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
fi xed wing
PLAAF Y8T Gaoxin 4 Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Corporation(SAC [Sharsquoanxi])
command post (C3I)
3 Nanjing Military Region (MR) 76th Air Regiment 26th Air Divi-sion Wuxi-Shuofang
2007
B-4052737-300 Boeing US Xirsquoan Aircraft Company Limited (XAC) modifi ed
command post (C3I)
2
KJ-2000 (A-50 Mainstay Il-76MD)
Beriev Russia XAC-modifi ed
airborne early warning and control (AEWampC)
4ndash5 Nanjing MR 76th Air Regi-ment 26th Air Division Wuxi-Shuofang
2004
Y-8WKJ-200 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash5 Nanjing MR 76th Air Regi-ment 26th Air Division Wuxi-Shuofang
2007
H-6BHZ-6 XAC reconnais-sanceELINT
1+ 1979
H-5HZ-5 Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (HAMC)
ISR 7 1966ndash82
Su-30MKK Flanker
Sukhoi Russia reconnais-sancesurveil-lance (SAR capability on one airframe demonstrat-ed 2003)
73 2000
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
83 2004
Y-8H XAC reconnais-sancesurveillance
2
Y-8CB Gaoxin 1 Karakoram Eagle
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) reconnais-sancesurveillance COMINT
6 Nanjing MR EW Flight Regiment 10th Air Division Nanjing-Dajianchang
2005ndash2009
Table 1 Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 1
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
fixed P L A A F Y 8 T Gaoxin 4 S h a a n x i Aircraft command 3 N a n j i n g 2 0 0 7wing C o r p o r a t i o n p o s t (C3I) M i l i t a r y Region
(SAC [Shaanxi]) ( M R ) 76thAir Regiment26th Air Divi-sion Wuxi-Shuofang
B-4052737-300 B o e i n g US c o m m a n d 2Xian Aircraft p o s t (C3I)CompanyLimited (XAC)modified
KJ-2000 (A-50 B e r i e v Russia a i r b o r n e 4 - 5 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 4Mainstay X A C - m o d i f i e d e a r l y 7 6 t h Air Regi-II-76MD) w a r n i n g m e n t 26th Air
and control D i v i s i o n Wuxi-(AEWampC) S h u o f a n g
Y-8WKI-200 S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 5 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 776th Air Regi-ment 26th AirDivision Wuxi-Shuofang
H-6BHZ-6 X A C r e c o n n a i s - 1 + 1 9 7 9sanceELINT
H-5HZ-5 H a r b i n Aircraft I S R 7 1 9 6 6 - 8 2ManufacturingCorporation(HAMC)
Su-30MKK S u k h o i Russia r e c o n n a i s - 7 3 2 0 0 0Flanker s a n c e
surveil-lance (SARcapability onone airframedemonstrat-ed 2003)
XAC s t r i k e fighter 8 3 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-8H X A C r e c o n n a i s - 2 sancesurveillance
Y-8CB Gaoxin 1 S A C (Shaanxi) r e c o n n a i s - 6 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 5 mdashKarakoram Eagle s a n c e E W Flight 2 0 0 9
surveillance R e g i m e n t 10thCOMINT A i r Division
Nanjing-Dajianchang
92 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
J-8FJZ-8FR Shenyang Aircraft Corporation(SAC [Shenyang])
tactical reconnais-sancesurveillance
24 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor 78th Reconnais-sance Regi-ment Suzhou andor Jinan MR 1st Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 31st Fighter Division Wendeng
J-8IJZ-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
J-8JZ-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 Guangzhou MR 2nd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 42nd Fighter Division Taihe and Nanjing MR 3rd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 29th Fighter Division Suzhou
1976
Y-8G Gaoxin 3 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT andor communica-tions relay
10 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North
before 2011
Table 1 (continued)
92 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
1-811Z-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
1-81Z-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 GuangzhouMR 2ndIndependent
1976
Fighter Recon-naissanceRegiment42nd FighterDivision Taiheand NanjingMR 3rdIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment29th FighterDivisionSuzhou
Y-80 Gaoxin 3 SAC (Shaanxi) SIGINTandorcommunica-tions relay
10 ShenyangMR 3rd4thIndependentFighter Recon-naissance
before2011
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th AirRegiment10th Air Divi-sion AmlingNorth
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
1-8FJZ-8FR S h e n y a n g t a c t i c a l 2 4 S h e n y a n gAircraft r e c o n n a i s - M R 3rd4thCorporation s a n c e I n d e p e n d e n t(SAC s u r v e i l l a n c e F i g h t e r Recon-[Shenyang]) n a i s s a n c e
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor 78thReconnais-sance Regi-ment SuzhouandorJinan MR 1stIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment31st FighterDivisionWendeng
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 93
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
Y-8EW Gaoxin 8 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) dorsal satellite communica-tions dome + antennas ELINT
NA At China Flight Test Establish-ment April 2011
Tu-154MD Careless
Tupolev Russia EWELINTSIGINT
4 102nd Air Regiment 34th Transpor-tation Division Beijing-Nanyuan
1998
HD-6 XAC EW 1+
Y-8XZECM Gaoxin 7
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) EW 2 Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North andor Shenyang MR 4th Independent Electronic War-fare Regiment Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Elec-tronic Warfare Regiment 10th Bomber Division Nanjing Dajiaocang
2007
PLAN Y-8JWWH KJ-200Gaoxin 5
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash6 North Sea Fleet (NSF) 1st Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Division Liaoyang
1998
H-5HZ-5 (Il-28 Beagle)
HAMC ISR 7ndash24 NSF 5th Bomber Avia-tion Regiment 2nd Bomber Aviation Division
1966ndash82
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
75 2004
Table 1 (continued)Table 1 (continued)
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 3
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
Y-8EW Gamin 8 S A C (Shaanxi) d o r s a l N A A t Chinasatellite F l i g h t Testcommunica- E s t a b l i s h -tions dome m e n t + antennas A p r i l 2011ELINT
Tu-154MD T u p o l e v Russia E W E L I N T 4 1 0 2 n d Air 1 9 9 8Careless S I G I N T R e g i m e n t
34th Transpor-tation DivisionBeijing-Nanyuan
HD-6 X A C E W 1 +
Y-8XZECM S A C (Shaanxi) E W 2 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 7Gaoxin 7 3 0 t h Air
Regiment10th Air Divi-sion AngingNorth andor ShenyangMR 4thIndependentElectronic War-fare RegimentShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th Elec-tronic WarfareRegiment10th BomberDivisionNanjingDajiaocang
PLAN Y - 8 1 W W H S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 6 N o r t h Sea 1 9 9 8KJ-200 F l e e t (NSF) 1stGamin 5 I n d e p e n d e n t
Air Regiment5th FighterAviationDivisionLiaoyang
H-5HZ-5 H A M C I S R 7 - 2 4 N S F 5th 1 9 6 6 - 8 2(11-28 Beagle) B o m b e r Avia-
tion Regiment2nd BomberAviationDivision
JH-7A X A C s t r i k e fighter 7 5 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
94 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
JH-7 XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
50ndash65 1998
Y-8JBDZ Gaoxin 2
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT reconnais-sancesurveillance andorELINT
5 NSF 1st3rd Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Divi-sion Liaoyang 1 in South Sea Fleet 7th Independent Air Regiment SanyaYaxian
2004
Sh-5 HAMC maritime patrol surveillance
4 NSF 3rd In-dependent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Tuandao
1986
Y-8X SAC (Sharsquoanxi) maritime patrol ASW
5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
1985
Y-8Q Gaoxin 6
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) ASW 1ndash5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
rotary wing
PLAN Ka-31B Kamov Russia AEW 8
Zhi (Z)-8YJSA-321 Super Frelon
Changhe Air-craft Industries Group French technol-ogy license production
AEW 2
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
Owing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashas well as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this table must be interpreted with particular caution
Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequipped
Sources ldquoChinese SIGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehiclesrdquo Command Information Systems China IHS Janersquos 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom Institute for International Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286ndash95 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 www janescom ldquoAir Force Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoWorld Navies Chinardquo Janersquos World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC KJ-2000rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC H-6rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoKamov Ka-31 Helix Brdquo Janersquos Fighting Ships 11 February 2013 wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83ndash87 110ndash12 219 And see Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo pp 114ndash15 117 120
Table 1 (continued)
94 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r Locat ion F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
JH-7 X A C s t r i k e fighter 5 0 - 6 5 1 9 9 8bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-81BDZ S A C (Shaanxi) S I G I N T 5 N S F 1 st3rd 2 0 0 4Gaoxin 2 r e c o n n a i s - I n d e p e n d e n t
sance A i r Regimentsurveillance 5 t h Fighterandor A v i a t i o n Divi-ELINT s i o n Liaoyang
1 in SouthSea Fleet 7thIndependentAir RegimentSanyaYaxian
Sh-5 H A M C m a r i t i m e 4 N S F 3rd In- 1 9 8 6patrol d e p e n d e n t Airsurveillance R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionTuandao
Y-8X S A C (Shaanxi) m a r i t i m e 5 N S F 1st Inde- 1 9 8 5patrol p e n d e n t AirASW R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
Y-8Q S A C (Shaanxi) A S W 1 - 5 N S F 1st Inde-Gaoxin 6 p e n d e n t Air
Regiment 5thFighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
rotary P L A N K a - 3 1 B K a m o v Russia A E W 8wing
Zhi (Z)-8YISA- C h a n g h e Air- A E W 2321 Super Frelon c r a f t Industries
GroupFrench technol-ogy licenseproduction
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesOwing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashaswell as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this tablemust be interpreted with particular caution Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequippedSources Chinese SiGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehicles Command Information Systems China HSJanes 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom institute for international Strategic Studies The Military Balance2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286-95 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom Air Force China Janes Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom World Navies China Janes World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescomXAC KJ-2000 Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi SAC Y-8 (Special MissionVersions) Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescomi XAC H-6 Janes All the WorldsAircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi Kamov Ka-31 Helix B Janes Fighting Ships 11 February 2013wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83-87110-12219 And seeErickson Chinas Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities pp 114-15117120
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 95
Chinarsquos Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russiarsquos Antonov An-12
Cub transport and produced under license by the Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)
Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions as
electronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT
(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare
electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning
(variant five) and ASW (variant six)20 Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinarsquos smaller KJ-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-
early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-array
radar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedenrsquos Ericsson Erieye active phased-
array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more
economically21 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-
ing forty people and possibly setting back the program22 But the program appears to be
back on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KJ-200rsquos technology is ldquotwo generations
ahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the USrdquo23 On 12 March 2010 a
PLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force near
the Miyako Strait24 Like the KJ-2000 the KJ-200 is reported to be in service with the
PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division25 the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200s
as well26
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8
Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regiments
with a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include a
number of H-6s derivatives of Russiarsquos Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-
sance and ELINT27 As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a new
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan28 A portion of the PLAN
and PLAAFrsquos JH-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant still
employed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods29
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-
enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State Oceanic
Administration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March
2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve f ly-bys of USNS
Victorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-
tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-
ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international waters
in the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between a
hundred and three hundred feet30
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 5
Chinas Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russias Antonov An-12Cub transport and produced under license by the Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions aselectronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning(variant five) and ASW (variant six)2deg Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinas smaller KI-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-arrayradar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedens Ericsson Erieye active phased-array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT moreeconomically Various sources report that a KI-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-ing forty people and possibly setting back the program But the program appears to beback on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KI-200s technology is two generationsahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the US On 12 March 2010 aPLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force nearthe Miyako Strait Like the KJ-2000 the KI-200 is reported to be in service with thePLAAFs 26th Air Division the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200sas wel126
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regimentswith a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include anumber of H-6s derivatives of Russias Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-sance and ELINT As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a newsynthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan A portion of the PLANand PLAAFs J1-1-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant stillemployed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State OceanicAdministration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve fly-bys of USNSVictorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international watersin the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between ahundred and three hundred feet
96 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based ISR
Space capabilities underpin Chinarsquos current naval and other military capabilities for the
near seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and
high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen
PLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combining
foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-
cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of various
mission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span
these systems are improving rapidly31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors
to shooters and to support related network functions Chinarsquos second data-relay satel-
lite Tianlian-1-02B provides ldquonear real-time transfer of data to ground stations from
manned space capsules or orbiting satellitesrdquo32 Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012
further extends and strengthens this capacity33 Chinarsquos ground stations and Yuanwang-
class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-
ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but
plans by 2030 to have established ldquonetwork nodesrdquo at the North Pole at the South Pole
and in Brazil as part of a ldquoDigital Earth Scientific Platformrdquo34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-
cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-
tions35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites under
five hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The
93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinarsquos
shipborne Automatic Identification System36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites
is testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a
variety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly
combat-relevant ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite
Surveying and Mappingrdquo37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinarsquos reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-
spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)
the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-
ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellites
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain as
orbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-station
module launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance38 Fengyun weather satellites
provide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
96 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based SR
Space capabilities underpin Chinas current naval and other military capabilities for thenear seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation andhigh-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthenPLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combiningforeign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of variousmission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life spanthese systems are improving rapidly China uses a variety of satellites to link sensorsto shooters and to support related network functions Chinas second data-relay satel-lite Tianlian-1-02B provides near real-time transfer of data to ground stations frommanned space capsules or orbiting satellites Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012further extends and strengthens this capacity Chinas ground stations and Yuanwang-class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations butplans by 2030 to have established network nodes at the North Pole at the South Poleand in Brazil as part of a Digital Earth Scientific Platform34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-tions China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites underfive hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinasshipborne Automatic Identification System The Shijian series of experimental satellitesis testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by avariety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedlycombat-relevant Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized SatelliteSurveying and Mapping37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinas reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellitesChinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain asorbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-stationmodule launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance Fengyun weather satellitesprovide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 97
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 O at an unspecified date FY-2H
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satellite
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-time
electro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observation
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX
optical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has been
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology
Development Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen further
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade with
HY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in
2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecified
dates40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinarsquos Huanjing visible-
IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additional
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible ELINT Satellites Yaogan
Chinarsquos Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits ldquomay provide multiwavelength
overlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targetsrdquo42 The
series was reportedly ldquoimplementedrdquo (ᇎ) by China National Space Administration
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration43 With its high-resolution (five-meter)
L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinarsquos first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogans
are optimized for monitoring ldquoocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastal
zonesrdquo (⎧ ⎧㺘ᖱ ⎧የᑖ) as well as ldquoobserving sea-surface targets and
shallow-water bathymetryrdquo (⎧䶒ⴞḷ ⎧ൠᖒㅹ㿲)44 EO Yaogans which appear
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)ndash2000 small-satellite
ldquobusrdquo (that is standardized ldquobackbonerdquo platform on which the satellite is built) moni-
tor land and sea areas including ldquocoastal zonesrdquo (⎧የᑖ) with resolution as fine as a
half-meter45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a variety
of orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nationrsquos remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are ldquovery
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 7
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 0 at an unspecified date FY-2Hand FY-4 0 and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satelliteseries are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-timeelectro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observationCBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUXoptical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has beenprioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-TechnologyDevelopment Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen furtherHaiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade withHY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecifieddates Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinas Huanjing visible-IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additionalsatellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-plete image of China every twelve hours Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible EOM- Satellites Yaogan
Chinas Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits may provide multiwavelengthoverlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targets Theseries was reportedly implemented ( ) by China National Space Administrationthough this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the USNational Aeronautics and Space Administration With its high-resolution (five-meter)L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinas first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogansare optimized for monitoring ocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastalzones Cs44MA sikOlVT74M) as well as observing sea-surface targets andshallow-water bathymetry C4-E A M ) 44 EO Yaogans which appearto be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)-2000 small-satellitebus (that is standardized backbone platform on which the satellite is built) moni-tor land and sea areas including coastal zones C(4)T) with resolution as fine as ahalf-meter4 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a varietyof orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution A major Chi-nese study on the nations remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are very
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 91
Table 1 Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
fi xed wing
PLAAF Y8T Gaoxin 4 Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Corporation(SAC [Sharsquoanxi])
command post (C3I)
3 Nanjing Military Region (MR) 76th Air Regiment 26th Air Divi-sion Wuxi-Shuofang
2007
B-4052737-300 Boeing US Xirsquoan Aircraft Company Limited (XAC) modifi ed
command post (C3I)
2
KJ-2000 (A-50 Mainstay Il-76MD)
Beriev Russia XAC-modifi ed
airborne early warning and control (AEWampC)
4ndash5 Nanjing MR 76th Air Regi-ment 26th Air Division Wuxi-Shuofang
2004
Y-8WKJ-200 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash5 Nanjing MR 76th Air Regi-ment 26th Air Division Wuxi-Shuofang
2007
H-6BHZ-6 XAC reconnais-sanceELINT
1+ 1979
H-5HZ-5 Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (HAMC)
ISR 7 1966ndash82
Su-30MKK Flanker
Sukhoi Russia reconnais-sancesurveil-lance (SAR capability on one airframe demonstrat-ed 2003)
73 2000
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
83 2004
Y-8H XAC reconnais-sancesurveillance
2
Y-8CB Gaoxin 1 Karakoram Eagle
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) reconnais-sancesurveillance COMINT
6 Nanjing MR EW Flight Regiment 10th Air Division Nanjing-Dajianchang
2005ndash2009
Table 1 Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 1
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
fixed P L A A F Y 8 T Gaoxin 4 S h a a n x i Aircraft command 3 N a n j i n g 2 0 0 7wing C o r p o r a t i o n p o s t (C3I) M i l i t a r y Region
(SAC [Shaanxi]) ( M R ) 76thAir Regiment26th Air Divi-sion Wuxi-Shuofang
B-4052737-300 B o e i n g US c o m m a n d 2Xian Aircraft p o s t (C3I)CompanyLimited (XAC)modified
KJ-2000 (A-50 B e r i e v Russia a i r b o r n e 4 - 5 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 4Mainstay X A C - m o d i f i e d e a r l y 7 6 t h Air Regi-II-76MD) w a r n i n g m e n t 26th Air
and control D i v i s i o n Wuxi-(AEWampC) S h u o f a n g
Y-8WKI-200 S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 5 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 776th Air Regi-ment 26th AirDivision Wuxi-Shuofang
H-6BHZ-6 X A C r e c o n n a i s - 1 + 1 9 7 9sanceELINT
H-5HZ-5 H a r b i n Aircraft I S R 7 1 9 6 6 - 8 2ManufacturingCorporation(HAMC)
Su-30MKK S u k h o i Russia r e c o n n a i s - 7 3 2 0 0 0Flanker s a n c e
surveil-lance (SARcapability onone airframedemonstrat-ed 2003)
XAC s t r i k e fighter 8 3 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-8H X A C r e c o n n a i s - 2 sancesurveillance
Y-8CB Gaoxin 1 S A C (Shaanxi) r e c o n n a i s - 6 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 5 mdashKarakoram Eagle s a n c e E W Flight 2 0 0 9
surveillance R e g i m e n t 10thCOMINT A i r Division
Nanjing-Dajianchang
92 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
J-8FJZ-8FR Shenyang Aircraft Corporation(SAC [Shenyang])
tactical reconnais-sancesurveillance
24 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor 78th Reconnais-sance Regi-ment Suzhou andor Jinan MR 1st Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 31st Fighter Division Wendeng
J-8IJZ-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
J-8JZ-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 Guangzhou MR 2nd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 42nd Fighter Division Taihe and Nanjing MR 3rd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 29th Fighter Division Suzhou
1976
Y-8G Gaoxin 3 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT andor communica-tions relay
10 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North
before 2011
Table 1 (continued)
92 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
1-811Z-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
1-81Z-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 GuangzhouMR 2ndIndependent
1976
Fighter Recon-naissanceRegiment42nd FighterDivision Taiheand NanjingMR 3rdIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment29th FighterDivisionSuzhou
Y-80 Gaoxin 3 SAC (Shaanxi) SIGINTandorcommunica-tions relay
10 ShenyangMR 3rd4thIndependentFighter Recon-naissance
before2011
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th AirRegiment10th Air Divi-sion AmlingNorth
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
1-8FJZ-8FR S h e n y a n g t a c t i c a l 2 4 S h e n y a n gAircraft r e c o n n a i s - M R 3rd4thCorporation s a n c e I n d e p e n d e n t(SAC s u r v e i l l a n c e F i g h t e r Recon-[Shenyang]) n a i s s a n c e
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor 78thReconnais-sance Regi-ment SuzhouandorJinan MR 1stIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment31st FighterDivisionWendeng
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 93
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
Y-8EW Gaoxin 8 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) dorsal satellite communica-tions dome + antennas ELINT
NA At China Flight Test Establish-ment April 2011
Tu-154MD Careless
Tupolev Russia EWELINTSIGINT
4 102nd Air Regiment 34th Transpor-tation Division Beijing-Nanyuan
1998
HD-6 XAC EW 1+
Y-8XZECM Gaoxin 7
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) EW 2 Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North andor Shenyang MR 4th Independent Electronic War-fare Regiment Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Elec-tronic Warfare Regiment 10th Bomber Division Nanjing Dajiaocang
2007
PLAN Y-8JWWH KJ-200Gaoxin 5
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash6 North Sea Fleet (NSF) 1st Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Division Liaoyang
1998
H-5HZ-5 (Il-28 Beagle)
HAMC ISR 7ndash24 NSF 5th Bomber Avia-tion Regiment 2nd Bomber Aviation Division
1966ndash82
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
75 2004
Table 1 (continued)Table 1 (continued)
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 3
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
Y-8EW Gamin 8 S A C (Shaanxi) d o r s a l N A A t Chinasatellite F l i g h t Testcommunica- E s t a b l i s h -tions dome m e n t + antennas A p r i l 2011ELINT
Tu-154MD T u p o l e v Russia E W E L I N T 4 1 0 2 n d Air 1 9 9 8Careless S I G I N T R e g i m e n t
34th Transpor-tation DivisionBeijing-Nanyuan
HD-6 X A C E W 1 +
Y-8XZECM S A C (Shaanxi) E W 2 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 7Gaoxin 7 3 0 t h Air
Regiment10th Air Divi-sion AngingNorth andor ShenyangMR 4thIndependentElectronic War-fare RegimentShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th Elec-tronic WarfareRegiment10th BomberDivisionNanjingDajiaocang
PLAN Y - 8 1 W W H S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 6 N o r t h Sea 1 9 9 8KJ-200 F l e e t (NSF) 1stGamin 5 I n d e p e n d e n t
Air Regiment5th FighterAviationDivisionLiaoyang
H-5HZ-5 H A M C I S R 7 - 2 4 N S F 5th 1 9 6 6 - 8 2(11-28 Beagle) B o m b e r Avia-
tion Regiment2nd BomberAviationDivision
JH-7A X A C s t r i k e fighter 7 5 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
94 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
JH-7 XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
50ndash65 1998
Y-8JBDZ Gaoxin 2
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT reconnais-sancesurveillance andorELINT
5 NSF 1st3rd Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Divi-sion Liaoyang 1 in South Sea Fleet 7th Independent Air Regiment SanyaYaxian
2004
Sh-5 HAMC maritime patrol surveillance
4 NSF 3rd In-dependent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Tuandao
1986
Y-8X SAC (Sharsquoanxi) maritime patrol ASW
5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
1985
Y-8Q Gaoxin 6
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) ASW 1ndash5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
rotary wing
PLAN Ka-31B Kamov Russia AEW 8
Zhi (Z)-8YJSA-321 Super Frelon
Changhe Air-craft Industries Group French technol-ogy license production
AEW 2
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
Owing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashas well as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this table must be interpreted with particular caution
Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequipped
Sources ldquoChinese SIGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehiclesrdquo Command Information Systems China IHS Janersquos 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom Institute for International Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286ndash95 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 www janescom ldquoAir Force Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoWorld Navies Chinardquo Janersquos World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC KJ-2000rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC H-6rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoKamov Ka-31 Helix Brdquo Janersquos Fighting Ships 11 February 2013 wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83ndash87 110ndash12 219 And see Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo pp 114ndash15 117 120
Table 1 (continued)
94 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r Locat ion F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
JH-7 X A C s t r i k e fighter 5 0 - 6 5 1 9 9 8bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-81BDZ S A C (Shaanxi) S I G I N T 5 N S F 1 st3rd 2 0 0 4Gaoxin 2 r e c o n n a i s - I n d e p e n d e n t
sance A i r Regimentsurveillance 5 t h Fighterandor A v i a t i o n Divi-ELINT s i o n Liaoyang
1 in SouthSea Fleet 7thIndependentAir RegimentSanyaYaxian
Sh-5 H A M C m a r i t i m e 4 N S F 3rd In- 1 9 8 6patrol d e p e n d e n t Airsurveillance R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionTuandao
Y-8X S A C (Shaanxi) m a r i t i m e 5 N S F 1st Inde- 1 9 8 5patrol p e n d e n t AirASW R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
Y-8Q S A C (Shaanxi) A S W 1 - 5 N S F 1st Inde-Gaoxin 6 p e n d e n t Air
Regiment 5thFighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
rotary P L A N K a - 3 1 B K a m o v Russia A E W 8wing
Zhi (Z)-8YISA- C h a n g h e Air- A E W 2321 Super Frelon c r a f t Industries
GroupFrench technol-ogy licenseproduction
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesOwing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashaswell as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this tablemust be interpreted with particular caution Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequippedSources Chinese SiGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehicles Command Information Systems China HSJanes 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom institute for international Strategic Studies The Military Balance2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286-95 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom Air Force China Janes Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom World Navies China Janes World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescomXAC KJ-2000 Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi SAC Y-8 (Special MissionVersions) Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescomi XAC H-6 Janes All the WorldsAircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi Kamov Ka-31 Helix B Janes Fighting Ships 11 February 2013wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83-87110-12219 And seeErickson Chinas Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities pp 114-15117120
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 95
Chinarsquos Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russiarsquos Antonov An-12
Cub transport and produced under license by the Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)
Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions as
electronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT
(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare
electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning
(variant five) and ASW (variant six)20 Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinarsquos smaller KJ-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-
early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-array
radar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedenrsquos Ericsson Erieye active phased-
array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more
economically21 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-
ing forty people and possibly setting back the program22 But the program appears to be
back on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KJ-200rsquos technology is ldquotwo generations
ahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the USrdquo23 On 12 March 2010 a
PLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force near
the Miyako Strait24 Like the KJ-2000 the KJ-200 is reported to be in service with the
PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division25 the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200s
as well26
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8
Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regiments
with a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include a
number of H-6s derivatives of Russiarsquos Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-
sance and ELINT27 As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a new
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan28 A portion of the PLAN
and PLAAFrsquos JH-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant still
employed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods29
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-
enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State Oceanic
Administration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March
2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve f ly-bys of USNS
Victorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-
tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-
ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international waters
in the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between a
hundred and three hundred feet30
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 5
Chinas Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russias Antonov An-12Cub transport and produced under license by the Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions aselectronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning(variant five) and ASW (variant six)2deg Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinas smaller KI-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-arrayradar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedens Ericsson Erieye active phased-array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT moreeconomically Various sources report that a KI-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-ing forty people and possibly setting back the program But the program appears to beback on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KI-200s technology is two generationsahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the US On 12 March 2010 aPLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force nearthe Miyako Strait Like the KJ-2000 the KI-200 is reported to be in service with thePLAAFs 26th Air Division the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200sas wel126
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regimentswith a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include anumber of H-6s derivatives of Russias Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-sance and ELINT As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a newsynthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan A portion of the PLANand PLAAFs J1-1-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant stillemployed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State OceanicAdministration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve fly-bys of USNSVictorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international watersin the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between ahundred and three hundred feet
96 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based ISR
Space capabilities underpin Chinarsquos current naval and other military capabilities for the
near seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and
high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen
PLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combining
foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-
cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of various
mission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span
these systems are improving rapidly31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors
to shooters and to support related network functions Chinarsquos second data-relay satel-
lite Tianlian-1-02B provides ldquonear real-time transfer of data to ground stations from
manned space capsules or orbiting satellitesrdquo32 Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012
further extends and strengthens this capacity33 Chinarsquos ground stations and Yuanwang-
class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-
ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but
plans by 2030 to have established ldquonetwork nodesrdquo at the North Pole at the South Pole
and in Brazil as part of a ldquoDigital Earth Scientific Platformrdquo34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-
cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-
tions35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites under
five hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The
93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinarsquos
shipborne Automatic Identification System36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites
is testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a
variety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly
combat-relevant ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite
Surveying and Mappingrdquo37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinarsquos reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-
spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)
the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-
ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellites
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain as
orbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-station
module launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance38 Fengyun weather satellites
provide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
96 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based SR
Space capabilities underpin Chinas current naval and other military capabilities for thenear seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation andhigh-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthenPLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combiningforeign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of variousmission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life spanthese systems are improving rapidly China uses a variety of satellites to link sensorsto shooters and to support related network functions Chinas second data-relay satel-lite Tianlian-1-02B provides near real-time transfer of data to ground stations frommanned space capsules or orbiting satellites Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012further extends and strengthens this capacity Chinas ground stations and Yuanwang-class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations butplans by 2030 to have established network nodes at the North Pole at the South Poleand in Brazil as part of a Digital Earth Scientific Platform34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-tions China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites underfive hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinasshipborne Automatic Identification System The Shijian series of experimental satellitesis testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by avariety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedlycombat-relevant Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized SatelliteSurveying and Mapping37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinas reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellitesChinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain asorbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-stationmodule launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance Fengyun weather satellitesprovide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 97
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 O at an unspecified date FY-2H
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satellite
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-time
electro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observation
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX
optical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has been
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology
Development Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen further
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade with
HY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in
2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecified
dates40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinarsquos Huanjing visible-
IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additional
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible ELINT Satellites Yaogan
Chinarsquos Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits ldquomay provide multiwavelength
overlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targetsrdquo42 The
series was reportedly ldquoimplementedrdquo (ᇎ) by China National Space Administration
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration43 With its high-resolution (five-meter)
L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinarsquos first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogans
are optimized for monitoring ldquoocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastal
zonesrdquo (⎧ ⎧㺘ᖱ ⎧የᑖ) as well as ldquoobserving sea-surface targets and
shallow-water bathymetryrdquo (⎧䶒ⴞḷ ⎧ൠᖒㅹ㿲)44 EO Yaogans which appear
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)ndash2000 small-satellite
ldquobusrdquo (that is standardized ldquobackbonerdquo platform on which the satellite is built) moni-
tor land and sea areas including ldquocoastal zonesrdquo (⎧የᑖ) with resolution as fine as a
half-meter45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a variety
of orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nationrsquos remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are ldquovery
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 7
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 0 at an unspecified date FY-2Hand FY-4 0 and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satelliteseries are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-timeelectro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observationCBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUXoptical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has beenprioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-TechnologyDevelopment Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen furtherHaiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade withHY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecifieddates Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinas Huanjing visible-IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additionalsatellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-plete image of China every twelve hours Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible EOM- Satellites Yaogan
Chinas Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits may provide multiwavelengthoverlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targets Theseries was reportedly implemented ( ) by China National Space Administrationthough this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the USNational Aeronautics and Space Administration With its high-resolution (five-meter)L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinas first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogansare optimized for monitoring ocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastalzones Cs44MA sikOlVT74M) as well as observing sea-surface targets andshallow-water bathymetry C4-E A M ) 44 EO Yaogans which appearto be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)-2000 small-satellitebus (that is standardized backbone platform on which the satellite is built) moni-tor land and sea areas including coastal zones C(4)T) with resolution as fine as ahalf-meter4 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a varietyof orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution A major Chi-nese study on the nations remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are very
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
92 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
J-8FJZ-8FR Shenyang Aircraft Corporation(SAC [Shenyang])
tactical reconnais-sancesurveillance
24 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor 78th Reconnais-sance Regi-ment Suzhou andor Jinan MR 1st Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 31st Fighter Division Wendeng
J-8IJZ-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
J-8JZ-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 Guangzhou MR 2nd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 42nd Fighter Division Taihe and Nanjing MR 3rd Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 29th Fighter Division Suzhou
1976
Y-8G Gaoxin 3 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT andor communica-tions relay
10 Shenyang MR 3rd4th Independent Fighter Recon-naissance Regiment 30th Fighter Division Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North
before 2011
Table 1 (continued)
92 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
1-811Z-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
24
1-81Z-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-sancesurveillance
48 GuangzhouMR 2ndIndependent
1976
Fighter Recon-naissanceRegiment42nd FighterDivision Taiheand NanjingMR 3rdIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment29th FighterDivisionSuzhou
Y-80 Gaoxin 3 SAC (Shaanxi) SIGINTandorcommunica-tions relay
10 ShenyangMR 3rd4thIndependentFighter Recon-naissance
before2011
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th AirRegiment10th Air Divi-sion AmlingNorth
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
1-8FJZ-8FR S h e n y a n g t a c t i c a l 2 4 S h e n y a n gAircraft r e c o n n a i s - M R 3rd4thCorporation s a n c e I n d e p e n d e n t(SAC s u r v e i l l a n c e F i g h t e r Recon-[Shenyang]) n a i s s a n c e
Regiment30th FighterDivisionShenyangYuhuntunandor 78thReconnais-sance Regi-ment SuzhouandorJinan MR 1stIndependentFighter Recon-naissanceRegiment31st FighterDivisionWendeng
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 93
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
Y-8EW Gaoxin 8 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) dorsal satellite communica-tions dome + antennas ELINT
NA At China Flight Test Establish-ment April 2011
Tu-154MD Careless
Tupolev Russia EWELINTSIGINT
4 102nd Air Regiment 34th Transpor-tation Division Beijing-Nanyuan
1998
HD-6 XAC EW 1+
Y-8XZECM Gaoxin 7
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) EW 2 Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North andor Shenyang MR 4th Independent Electronic War-fare Regiment Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Elec-tronic Warfare Regiment 10th Bomber Division Nanjing Dajiaocang
2007
PLAN Y-8JWWH KJ-200Gaoxin 5
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash6 North Sea Fleet (NSF) 1st Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Division Liaoyang
1998
H-5HZ-5 (Il-28 Beagle)
HAMC ISR 7ndash24 NSF 5th Bomber Avia-tion Regiment 2nd Bomber Aviation Division
1966ndash82
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
75 2004
Table 1 (continued)Table 1 (continued)
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 3
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
Y-8EW Gamin 8 S A C (Shaanxi) d o r s a l N A A t Chinasatellite F l i g h t Testcommunica- E s t a b l i s h -tions dome m e n t + antennas A p r i l 2011ELINT
Tu-154MD T u p o l e v Russia E W E L I N T 4 1 0 2 n d Air 1 9 9 8Careless S I G I N T R e g i m e n t
34th Transpor-tation DivisionBeijing-Nanyuan
HD-6 X A C E W 1 +
Y-8XZECM S A C (Shaanxi) E W 2 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 7Gaoxin 7 3 0 t h Air
Regiment10th Air Divi-sion AngingNorth andor ShenyangMR 4thIndependentElectronic War-fare RegimentShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th Elec-tronic WarfareRegiment10th BomberDivisionNanjingDajiaocang
PLAN Y - 8 1 W W H S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 6 N o r t h Sea 1 9 9 8KJ-200 F l e e t (NSF) 1stGamin 5 I n d e p e n d e n t
Air Regiment5th FighterAviationDivisionLiaoyang
H-5HZ-5 H A M C I S R 7 - 2 4 N S F 5th 1 9 6 6 - 8 2(11-28 Beagle) B o m b e r Avia-
tion Regiment2nd BomberAviationDivision
JH-7A X A C s t r i k e fighter 7 5 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
94 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
JH-7 XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
50ndash65 1998
Y-8JBDZ Gaoxin 2
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT reconnais-sancesurveillance andorELINT
5 NSF 1st3rd Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Divi-sion Liaoyang 1 in South Sea Fleet 7th Independent Air Regiment SanyaYaxian
2004
Sh-5 HAMC maritime patrol surveillance
4 NSF 3rd In-dependent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Tuandao
1986
Y-8X SAC (Sharsquoanxi) maritime patrol ASW
5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
1985
Y-8Q Gaoxin 6
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) ASW 1ndash5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
rotary wing
PLAN Ka-31B Kamov Russia AEW 8
Zhi (Z)-8YJSA-321 Super Frelon
Changhe Air-craft Industries Group French technol-ogy license production
AEW 2
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
Owing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashas well as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this table must be interpreted with particular caution
Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequipped
Sources ldquoChinese SIGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehiclesrdquo Command Information Systems China IHS Janersquos 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom Institute for International Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286ndash95 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 www janescom ldquoAir Force Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoWorld Navies Chinardquo Janersquos World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC KJ-2000rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC H-6rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoKamov Ka-31 Helix Brdquo Janersquos Fighting Ships 11 February 2013 wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83ndash87 110ndash12 219 And see Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo pp 114ndash15 117 120
Table 1 (continued)
94 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r Locat ion F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
JH-7 X A C s t r i k e fighter 5 0 - 6 5 1 9 9 8bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-81BDZ S A C (Shaanxi) S I G I N T 5 N S F 1 st3rd 2 0 0 4Gaoxin 2 r e c o n n a i s - I n d e p e n d e n t
sance A i r Regimentsurveillance 5 t h Fighterandor A v i a t i o n Divi-ELINT s i o n Liaoyang
1 in SouthSea Fleet 7thIndependentAir RegimentSanyaYaxian
Sh-5 H A M C m a r i t i m e 4 N S F 3rd In- 1 9 8 6patrol d e p e n d e n t Airsurveillance R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionTuandao
Y-8X S A C (Shaanxi) m a r i t i m e 5 N S F 1st Inde- 1 9 8 5patrol p e n d e n t AirASW R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
Y-8Q S A C (Shaanxi) A S W 1 - 5 N S F 1st Inde-Gaoxin 6 p e n d e n t Air
Regiment 5thFighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
rotary P L A N K a - 3 1 B K a m o v Russia A E W 8wing
Zhi (Z)-8YISA- C h a n g h e Air- A E W 2321 Super Frelon c r a f t Industries
GroupFrench technol-ogy licenseproduction
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesOwing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashaswell as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this tablemust be interpreted with particular caution Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequippedSources Chinese SiGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehicles Command Information Systems China HSJanes 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom institute for international Strategic Studies The Military Balance2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286-95 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom Air Force China Janes Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom World Navies China Janes World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescomXAC KJ-2000 Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi SAC Y-8 (Special MissionVersions) Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescomi XAC H-6 Janes All the WorldsAircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi Kamov Ka-31 Helix B Janes Fighting Ships 11 February 2013wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83-87110-12219 And seeErickson Chinas Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities pp 114-15117120
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 95
Chinarsquos Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russiarsquos Antonov An-12
Cub transport and produced under license by the Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)
Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions as
electronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT
(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare
electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning
(variant five) and ASW (variant six)20 Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinarsquos smaller KJ-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-
early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-array
radar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedenrsquos Ericsson Erieye active phased-
array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more
economically21 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-
ing forty people and possibly setting back the program22 But the program appears to be
back on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KJ-200rsquos technology is ldquotwo generations
ahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the USrdquo23 On 12 March 2010 a
PLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force near
the Miyako Strait24 Like the KJ-2000 the KJ-200 is reported to be in service with the
PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division25 the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200s
as well26
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8
Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regiments
with a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include a
number of H-6s derivatives of Russiarsquos Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-
sance and ELINT27 As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a new
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan28 A portion of the PLAN
and PLAAFrsquos JH-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant still
employed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods29
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-
enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State Oceanic
Administration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March
2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve f ly-bys of USNS
Victorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-
tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-
ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international waters
in the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between a
hundred and three hundred feet30
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 5
Chinas Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russias Antonov An-12Cub transport and produced under license by the Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions aselectronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning(variant five) and ASW (variant six)2deg Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinas smaller KI-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-arrayradar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedens Ericsson Erieye active phased-array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT moreeconomically Various sources report that a KI-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-ing forty people and possibly setting back the program But the program appears to beback on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KI-200s technology is two generationsahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the US On 12 March 2010 aPLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force nearthe Miyako Strait Like the KJ-2000 the KI-200 is reported to be in service with thePLAAFs 26th Air Division the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200sas wel126
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regimentswith a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include anumber of H-6s derivatives of Russias Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-sance and ELINT As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a newsynthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan A portion of the PLANand PLAAFs J1-1-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant stillemployed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State OceanicAdministration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve fly-bys of USNSVictorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international watersin the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between ahundred and three hundred feet
96 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based ISR
Space capabilities underpin Chinarsquos current naval and other military capabilities for the
near seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and
high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen
PLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combining
foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-
cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of various
mission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span
these systems are improving rapidly31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors
to shooters and to support related network functions Chinarsquos second data-relay satel-
lite Tianlian-1-02B provides ldquonear real-time transfer of data to ground stations from
manned space capsules or orbiting satellitesrdquo32 Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012
further extends and strengthens this capacity33 Chinarsquos ground stations and Yuanwang-
class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-
ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but
plans by 2030 to have established ldquonetwork nodesrdquo at the North Pole at the South Pole
and in Brazil as part of a ldquoDigital Earth Scientific Platformrdquo34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-
cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-
tions35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites under
five hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The
93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinarsquos
shipborne Automatic Identification System36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites
is testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a
variety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly
combat-relevant ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite
Surveying and Mappingrdquo37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinarsquos reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-
spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)
the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-
ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellites
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain as
orbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-station
module launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance38 Fengyun weather satellites
provide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
96 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based SR
Space capabilities underpin Chinas current naval and other military capabilities for thenear seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation andhigh-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthenPLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combiningforeign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of variousmission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life spanthese systems are improving rapidly China uses a variety of satellites to link sensorsto shooters and to support related network functions Chinas second data-relay satel-lite Tianlian-1-02B provides near real-time transfer of data to ground stations frommanned space capsules or orbiting satellites Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012further extends and strengthens this capacity Chinas ground stations and Yuanwang-class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations butplans by 2030 to have established network nodes at the North Pole at the South Poleand in Brazil as part of a Digital Earth Scientific Platform34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-tions China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites underfive hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinasshipborne Automatic Identification System The Shijian series of experimental satellitesis testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by avariety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedlycombat-relevant Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized SatelliteSurveying and Mapping37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinas reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellitesChinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain asorbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-stationmodule launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance Fengyun weather satellitesprovide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 97
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 O at an unspecified date FY-2H
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satellite
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-time
electro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observation
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX
optical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has been
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology
Development Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen further
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade with
HY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in
2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecified
dates40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinarsquos Huanjing visible-
IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additional
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible ELINT Satellites Yaogan
Chinarsquos Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits ldquomay provide multiwavelength
overlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targetsrdquo42 The
series was reportedly ldquoimplementedrdquo (ᇎ) by China National Space Administration
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration43 With its high-resolution (five-meter)
L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinarsquos first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogans
are optimized for monitoring ldquoocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastal
zonesrdquo (⎧ ⎧㺘ᖱ ⎧የᑖ) as well as ldquoobserving sea-surface targets and
shallow-water bathymetryrdquo (⎧䶒ⴞḷ ⎧ൠᖒㅹ㿲)44 EO Yaogans which appear
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)ndash2000 small-satellite
ldquobusrdquo (that is standardized ldquobackbonerdquo platform on which the satellite is built) moni-
tor land and sea areas including ldquocoastal zonesrdquo (⎧የᑖ) with resolution as fine as a
half-meter45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a variety
of orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nationrsquos remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are ldquovery
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 7
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 0 at an unspecified date FY-2Hand FY-4 0 and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satelliteseries are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-timeelectro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observationCBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUXoptical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has beenprioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-TechnologyDevelopment Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen furtherHaiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade withHY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecifieddates Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinas Huanjing visible-IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additionalsatellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-plete image of China every twelve hours Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible EOM- Satellites Yaogan
Chinas Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits may provide multiwavelengthoverlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targets Theseries was reportedly implemented ( ) by China National Space Administrationthough this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the USNational Aeronautics and Space Administration With its high-resolution (five-meter)L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinas first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogansare optimized for monitoring ocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastalzones Cs44MA sikOlVT74M) as well as observing sea-surface targets andshallow-water bathymetry C4-E A M ) 44 EO Yaogans which appearto be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)-2000 small-satellitebus (that is standardized backbone platform on which the satellite is built) moni-tor land and sea areas including coastal zones C(4)T) with resolution as fine as ahalf-meter4 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a varietyof orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution A major Chi-nese study on the nations remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are very
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 93
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
Y-8EW Gaoxin 8 SAC (Sharsquoanxi) dorsal satellite communica-tions dome + antennas ELINT
NA At China Flight Test Establish-ment April 2011
Tu-154MD Careless
Tupolev Russia EWELINTSIGINT
4 102nd Air Regiment 34th Transpor-tation Division Beijing-Nanyuan
1998
HD-6 XAC EW 1+
Y-8XZECM Gaoxin 7
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) EW 2 Nanjing MR 30th Air Regiment 10th Air Divi-sion Anqing North andor Shenyang MR 4th Independent Electronic War-fare Regiment Shenyang Yuhuntun andor Nanjing MR 30th Elec-tronic Warfare Regiment 10th Bomber Division Nanjing Dajiaocang
2007
PLAN Y-8JWWH KJ-200Gaoxin 5
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) AEWampC 4ndash6 North Sea Fleet (NSF) 1st Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Division Liaoyang
1998
H-5HZ-5 (Il-28 Beagle)
HAMC ISR 7ndash24 NSF 5th Bomber Avia-tion Regiment 2nd Bomber Aviation Division
1966ndash82
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
75 2004
Table 1 (continued)Table 1 (continued)
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 3
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r L o c a t i o n F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
Y-8EW Gamin 8 S A C (Shaanxi) d o r s a l N A A t Chinasatellite F l i g h t Testcommunica- E s t a b l i s h -tions dome m e n t + antennas A p r i l 2011ELINT
Tu-154MD T u p o l e v Russia E W E L I N T 4 1 0 2 n d Air 1 9 9 8Careless S I G I N T R e g i m e n t
34th Transpor-tation DivisionBeijing-Nanyuan
HD-6 X A C E W 1 +
Y-8XZECM S A C (Shaanxi) E W 2 N a n j i n g MR 2 0 0 7Gaoxin 7 3 0 t h Air
Regiment10th Air Divi-sion AngingNorth andor ShenyangMR 4thIndependentElectronic War-fare RegimentShenyangYuhuntunandor NanjingMR 30th Elec-tronic WarfareRegiment10th BomberDivisionNanjingDajiaocang
PLAN Y - 8 1 W W H S A C (Shaanxi) A E W amp C 4 - 6 N o r t h Sea 1 9 9 8KJ-200 F l e e t (NSF) 1stGamin 5 I n d e p e n d e n t
Air Regiment5th FighterAviationDivisionLiaoyang
H-5HZ-5 H A M C I S R 7 - 2 4 N S F 5th 1 9 6 6 - 8 2(11-28 Beagle) B o m b e r Avia-
tion Regiment2nd BomberAviationDivision
JH-7A X A C s t r i k e fighter 7 5 2 0 0 4bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
94 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
JH-7 XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
50ndash65 1998
Y-8JBDZ Gaoxin 2
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT reconnais-sancesurveillance andorELINT
5 NSF 1st3rd Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Divi-sion Liaoyang 1 in South Sea Fleet 7th Independent Air Regiment SanyaYaxian
2004
Sh-5 HAMC maritime patrol surveillance
4 NSF 3rd In-dependent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Tuandao
1986
Y-8X SAC (Sharsquoanxi) maritime patrol ASW
5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
1985
Y-8Q Gaoxin 6
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) ASW 1ndash5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
rotary wing
PLAN Ka-31B Kamov Russia AEW 8
Zhi (Z)-8YJSA-321 Super Frelon
Changhe Air-craft Industries Group French technol-ogy license production
AEW 2
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
Owing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashas well as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this table must be interpreted with particular caution
Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequipped
Sources ldquoChinese SIGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehiclesrdquo Command Information Systems China IHS Janersquos 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom Institute for International Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286ndash95 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 www janescom ldquoAir Force Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoWorld Navies Chinardquo Janersquos World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC KJ-2000rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC H-6rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoKamov Ka-31 Helix Brdquo Janersquos Fighting Ships 11 February 2013 wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83ndash87 110ndash12 219 And see Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo pp 114ndash15 117 120
Table 1 (continued)
94 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r Locat ion F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
JH-7 X A C s t r i k e fighter 5 0 - 6 5 1 9 9 8bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-81BDZ S A C (Shaanxi) S I G I N T 5 N S F 1 st3rd 2 0 0 4Gaoxin 2 r e c o n n a i s - I n d e p e n d e n t
sance A i r Regimentsurveillance 5 t h Fighterandor A v i a t i o n Divi-ELINT s i o n Liaoyang
1 in SouthSea Fleet 7thIndependentAir RegimentSanyaYaxian
Sh-5 H A M C m a r i t i m e 4 N S F 3rd In- 1 9 8 6patrol d e p e n d e n t Airsurveillance R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionTuandao
Y-8X S A C (Shaanxi) m a r i t i m e 5 N S F 1st Inde- 1 9 8 5patrol p e n d e n t AirASW R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
Y-8Q S A C (Shaanxi) A S W 1 - 5 N S F 1st Inde-Gaoxin 6 p e n d e n t Air
Regiment 5thFighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
rotary P L A N K a - 3 1 B K a m o v Russia A E W 8wing
Zhi (Z)-8YISA- C h a n g h e Air- A E W 2321 Super Frelon c r a f t Industries
GroupFrench technol-ogy licenseproduction
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesOwing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashaswell as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this tablemust be interpreted with particular caution Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequippedSources Chinese SiGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehicles Command Information Systems China HSJanes 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom institute for international Strategic Studies The Military Balance2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286-95 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom Air Force China Janes Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom World Navies China Janes World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescomXAC KJ-2000 Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi SAC Y-8 (Special MissionVersions) Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescomi XAC H-6 Janes All the WorldsAircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi Kamov Ka-31 Helix B Janes Fighting Ships 11 February 2013wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83-87110-12219 And seeErickson Chinas Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities pp 114-15117120
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 95
Chinarsquos Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russiarsquos Antonov An-12
Cub transport and produced under license by the Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)
Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions as
electronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT
(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare
electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning
(variant five) and ASW (variant six)20 Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinarsquos smaller KJ-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-
early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-array
radar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedenrsquos Ericsson Erieye active phased-
array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more
economically21 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-
ing forty people and possibly setting back the program22 But the program appears to be
back on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KJ-200rsquos technology is ldquotwo generations
ahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the USrdquo23 On 12 March 2010 a
PLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force near
the Miyako Strait24 Like the KJ-2000 the KJ-200 is reported to be in service with the
PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division25 the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200s
as well26
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8
Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regiments
with a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include a
number of H-6s derivatives of Russiarsquos Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-
sance and ELINT27 As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a new
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan28 A portion of the PLAN
and PLAAFrsquos JH-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant still
employed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods29
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-
enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State Oceanic
Administration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March
2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve f ly-bys of USNS
Victorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-
tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-
ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international waters
in the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between a
hundred and three hundred feet30
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 5
Chinas Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russias Antonov An-12Cub transport and produced under license by the Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions aselectronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning(variant five) and ASW (variant six)2deg Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinas smaller KI-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-arrayradar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedens Ericsson Erieye active phased-array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT moreeconomically Various sources report that a KI-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-ing forty people and possibly setting back the program But the program appears to beback on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KI-200s technology is two generationsahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the US On 12 March 2010 aPLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force nearthe Miyako Strait Like the KJ-2000 the KI-200 is reported to be in service with thePLAAFs 26th Air Division the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200sas wel126
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regimentswith a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include anumber of H-6s derivatives of Russias Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-sance and ELINT As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a newsynthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan A portion of the PLANand PLAAFs J1-1-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant stillemployed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State OceanicAdministration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve fly-bys of USNSVictorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international watersin the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between ahundred and three hundred feet
96 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based ISR
Space capabilities underpin Chinarsquos current naval and other military capabilities for the
near seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and
high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen
PLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combining
foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-
cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of various
mission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span
these systems are improving rapidly31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors
to shooters and to support related network functions Chinarsquos second data-relay satel-
lite Tianlian-1-02B provides ldquonear real-time transfer of data to ground stations from
manned space capsules or orbiting satellitesrdquo32 Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012
further extends and strengthens this capacity33 Chinarsquos ground stations and Yuanwang-
class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-
ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but
plans by 2030 to have established ldquonetwork nodesrdquo at the North Pole at the South Pole
and in Brazil as part of a ldquoDigital Earth Scientific Platformrdquo34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-
cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-
tions35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites under
five hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The
93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinarsquos
shipborne Automatic Identification System36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites
is testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a
variety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly
combat-relevant ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite
Surveying and Mappingrdquo37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinarsquos reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-
spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)
the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-
ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellites
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain as
orbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-station
module launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance38 Fengyun weather satellites
provide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
96 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based SR
Space capabilities underpin Chinas current naval and other military capabilities for thenear seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation andhigh-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthenPLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combiningforeign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of variousmission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life spanthese systems are improving rapidly China uses a variety of satellites to link sensorsto shooters and to support related network functions Chinas second data-relay satel-lite Tianlian-1-02B provides near real-time transfer of data to ground stations frommanned space capsules or orbiting satellites Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012further extends and strengthens this capacity Chinas ground stations and Yuanwang-class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations butplans by 2030 to have established network nodes at the North Pole at the South Poleand in Brazil as part of a Digital Earth Scientific Platform34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-tions China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites underfive hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinasshipborne Automatic Identification System The Shijian series of experimental satellitesis testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by avariety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedlycombat-relevant Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized SatelliteSurveying and Mapping37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinas reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellitesChinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain asorbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-stationmodule launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance Fengyun weather satellitesprovide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 97
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 O at an unspecified date FY-2H
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satellite
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-time
electro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observation
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX
optical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has been
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology
Development Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen further
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade with
HY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in
2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecified
dates40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinarsquos Huanjing visible-
IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additional
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible ELINT Satellites Yaogan
Chinarsquos Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits ldquomay provide multiwavelength
overlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targetsrdquo42 The
series was reportedly ldquoimplementedrdquo (ᇎ) by China National Space Administration
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration43 With its high-resolution (five-meter)
L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinarsquos first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogans
are optimized for monitoring ldquoocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastal
zonesrdquo (⎧ ⎧㺘ᖱ ⎧የᑖ) as well as ldquoobserving sea-surface targets and
shallow-water bathymetryrdquo (⎧䶒ⴞḷ ⎧ൠᖒㅹ㿲)44 EO Yaogans which appear
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)ndash2000 small-satellite
ldquobusrdquo (that is standardized ldquobackbonerdquo platform on which the satellite is built) moni-
tor land and sea areas including ldquocoastal zonesrdquo (⎧የᑖ) with resolution as fine as a
half-meter45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a variety
of orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nationrsquos remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are ldquovery
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 7
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 0 at an unspecified date FY-2Hand FY-4 0 and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satelliteseries are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-timeelectro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observationCBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUXoptical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has beenprioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-TechnologyDevelopment Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen furtherHaiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade withHY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecifieddates Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinas Huanjing visible-IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additionalsatellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-plete image of China every twelve hours Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible EOM- Satellites Yaogan
Chinas Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits may provide multiwavelengthoverlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targets Theseries was reportedly implemented ( ) by China National Space Administrationthough this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the USNational Aeronautics and Space Administration With its high-resolution (five-meter)L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinas first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogansare optimized for monitoring ocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastalzones Cs44MA sikOlVT74M) as well as observing sea-surface targets andshallow-water bathymetry C4-E A M ) 44 EO Yaogans which appearto be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)-2000 small-satellitebus (that is standardized backbone platform on which the satellite is built) moni-tor land and sea areas including coastal zones C(4)T) with resolution as fine as ahalf-meter4 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a varietyof orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution A major Chi-nese study on the nations remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are very
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
94 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Type Manufacturer Role Number in Service
Location First Delivery
JH-7 XAC strike fi ghter bomber (confi gura-tion variant eg with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pod)
50ndash65 1998
Y-8JBDZ Gaoxin 2
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) SIGINT reconnais-sancesurveillance andorELINT
5 NSF 1st3rd Independent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Aviation Divi-sion Liaoyang 1 in South Sea Fleet 7th Independent Air Regiment SanyaYaxian
2004
Sh-5 HAMC maritime patrol surveillance
4 NSF 3rd In-dependent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Tuandao
1986
Y-8X SAC (Sharsquoanxi) maritime patrol ASW
5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
1985
Y-8Q Gaoxin 6
SAC (Sharsquoanxi) ASW 1ndash5 NSF 1st Inde-pendent Air Regiment 5th Fighter Avia-tion Division Liaoyang
rotary wing
PLAN Ka-31B Kamov Russia AEW 8
Zhi (Z)-8YJSA-321 Super Frelon
Changhe Air-craft Industries Group French technol-ogy license production
AEW 2
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
Owing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashas well as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this table must be interpreted with particular caution
Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequipped
Sources ldquoChinese SIGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehiclesrdquo Command Information Systems China IHS Janersquos 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom Institute for International Strategic Studies The Military Balance 2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286ndash95 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 www janescom ldquoAir Force Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoWorld Navies Chinardquo Janersquos World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC KJ-2000rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoXAC H-6rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescom ldquoKamov Ka-31 Helix Brdquo Janersquos Fighting Ships 11 February 2013 wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83ndash87 110ndash12 219 And see Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo pp 114ndash15 117 120
Table 1 (continued)
94 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Table 1 (continued)
Type M a n u f a c t u r e r R o l e N u m b e r Locat ion F i r s tin Service D e l i v e r y
JH-7 X A C s t r i k e fighter 5 0 - 6 5 1 9 9 8bomber(configura-tion varianteg withBMKZ-900SIGINT pod)
Y-81BDZ S A C (Shaanxi) S I G I N T 5 N S F 1 st3rd 2 0 0 4Gaoxin 2 r e c o n n a i s - I n d e p e n d e n t
sance A i r Regimentsurveillance 5 t h Fighterandor A v i a t i o n Divi-ELINT s i o n Liaoyang
1 in SouthSea Fleet 7thIndependentAir RegimentSanyaYaxian
Sh-5 H A M C m a r i t i m e 4 N S F 3rd In- 1 9 8 6patrol d e p e n d e n t Airsurveillance R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionTuandao
Y-8X S A C (Shaanxi) m a r i t i m e 5 N S F 1st Inde- 1 9 8 5patrol p e n d e n t AirASW R e g i m e n t 5th
Fighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
Y-8Q S A C (Shaanxi) A S W 1 - 5 N S F 1st Inde-Gaoxin 6 p e n d e n t Air
Regiment 5thFighter Avia-tion DivisionLiaoyang
rotary P L A N K a - 3 1 B K a m o v Russia A E W 8wing
Zhi (Z)-8YISA- C h a n g h e Air- A E W 2321 Super Frelon c r a f t Industries
GroupFrench technol-ogy licenseproduction
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesOwing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8Gaoxin variantsmdashmany of which overlap in functionmdashaswell as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time data in this tablemust be interpreted with particular caution Many of these may not be ISR-focusedequippedSources Chinese SiGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehicles Command Information Systems China HSJanes 23 December 2013 wwwjanescom institute for international Strategic Studies The Military Balance2013 (London Routledge 2013) pp 286-95 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom Air Force China Janes Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia 17 Septem-ber 2013 wwwjanescom World Navies China Janes World Navies 4 October 2013 wwwjanescomXAC KJ-2000 Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi SAC Y-8 (Special MissionVersions) Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 7 July 2013 wwwjanescomi XAC H-6 Janes All the WorldsAircraft 8 July 2013 wwwjanescomi Kamov Ka-31 Helix B Janes Fighting Ships 11 February 2013wwwjanescom Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 83-87110-12219 And seeErickson Chinas Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities pp 114-15117120
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 95
Chinarsquos Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russiarsquos Antonov An-12
Cub transport and produced under license by the Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)
Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions as
electronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT
(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare
electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning
(variant five) and ASW (variant six)20 Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinarsquos smaller KJ-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-
early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-array
radar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedenrsquos Ericsson Erieye active phased-
array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more
economically21 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-
ing forty people and possibly setting back the program22 But the program appears to be
back on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KJ-200rsquos technology is ldquotwo generations
ahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the USrdquo23 On 12 March 2010 a
PLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force near
the Miyako Strait24 Like the KJ-2000 the KJ-200 is reported to be in service with the
PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division25 the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200s
as well26
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8
Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regiments
with a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include a
number of H-6s derivatives of Russiarsquos Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-
sance and ELINT27 As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a new
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan28 A portion of the PLAN
and PLAAFrsquos JH-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant still
employed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods29
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-
enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State Oceanic
Administration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March
2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve f ly-bys of USNS
Victorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-
tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-
ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international waters
in the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between a
hundred and three hundred feet30
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 5
Chinas Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russias Antonov An-12Cub transport and produced under license by the Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions aselectronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning(variant five) and ASW (variant six)2deg Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinas smaller KI-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-arrayradar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedens Ericsson Erieye active phased-array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT moreeconomically Various sources report that a KI-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-ing forty people and possibly setting back the program But the program appears to beback on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KI-200s technology is two generationsahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the US On 12 March 2010 aPLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force nearthe Miyako Strait Like the KJ-2000 the KI-200 is reported to be in service with thePLAAFs 26th Air Division the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200sas wel126
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regimentswith a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include anumber of H-6s derivatives of Russias Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-sance and ELINT As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a newsynthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan A portion of the PLANand PLAAFs J1-1-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant stillemployed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State OceanicAdministration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve fly-bys of USNSVictorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international watersin the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between ahundred and three hundred feet
96 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based ISR
Space capabilities underpin Chinarsquos current naval and other military capabilities for the
near seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and
high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen
PLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combining
foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-
cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of various
mission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span
these systems are improving rapidly31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors
to shooters and to support related network functions Chinarsquos second data-relay satel-
lite Tianlian-1-02B provides ldquonear real-time transfer of data to ground stations from
manned space capsules or orbiting satellitesrdquo32 Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012
further extends and strengthens this capacity33 Chinarsquos ground stations and Yuanwang-
class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-
ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but
plans by 2030 to have established ldquonetwork nodesrdquo at the North Pole at the South Pole
and in Brazil as part of a ldquoDigital Earth Scientific Platformrdquo34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-
cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-
tions35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites under
five hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The
93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinarsquos
shipborne Automatic Identification System36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites
is testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a
variety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly
combat-relevant ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite
Surveying and Mappingrdquo37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinarsquos reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-
spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)
the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-
ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellites
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain as
orbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-station
module launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance38 Fengyun weather satellites
provide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
96 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based SR
Space capabilities underpin Chinas current naval and other military capabilities for thenear seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation andhigh-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthenPLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combiningforeign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of variousmission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life spanthese systems are improving rapidly China uses a variety of satellites to link sensorsto shooters and to support related network functions Chinas second data-relay satel-lite Tianlian-1-02B provides near real-time transfer of data to ground stations frommanned space capsules or orbiting satellites Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012further extends and strengthens this capacity Chinas ground stations and Yuanwang-class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations butplans by 2030 to have established network nodes at the North Pole at the South Poleand in Brazil as part of a Digital Earth Scientific Platform34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-tions China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites underfive hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinasshipborne Automatic Identification System The Shijian series of experimental satellitesis testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by avariety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedlycombat-relevant Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized SatelliteSurveying and Mapping37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinas reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellitesChinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain asorbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-stationmodule launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance Fengyun weather satellitesprovide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 97
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 O at an unspecified date FY-2H
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satellite
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-time
electro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observation
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX
optical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has been
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology
Development Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen further
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade with
HY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in
2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecified
dates40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinarsquos Huanjing visible-
IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additional
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible ELINT Satellites Yaogan
Chinarsquos Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits ldquomay provide multiwavelength
overlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targetsrdquo42 The
series was reportedly ldquoimplementedrdquo (ᇎ) by China National Space Administration
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration43 With its high-resolution (five-meter)
L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinarsquos first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogans
are optimized for monitoring ldquoocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastal
zonesrdquo (⎧ ⎧㺘ᖱ ⎧የᑖ) as well as ldquoobserving sea-surface targets and
shallow-water bathymetryrdquo (⎧䶒ⴞḷ ⎧ൠᖒㅹ㿲)44 EO Yaogans which appear
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)ndash2000 small-satellite
ldquobusrdquo (that is standardized ldquobackbonerdquo platform on which the satellite is built) moni-
tor land and sea areas including ldquocoastal zonesrdquo (⎧የᑖ) with resolution as fine as a
half-meter45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a variety
of orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nationrsquos remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are ldquovery
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 7
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 0 at an unspecified date FY-2Hand FY-4 0 and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satelliteseries are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-timeelectro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observationCBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUXoptical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has beenprioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-TechnologyDevelopment Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen furtherHaiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade withHY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecifieddates Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinas Huanjing visible-IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additionalsatellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-plete image of China every twelve hours Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible EOM- Satellites Yaogan
Chinas Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits may provide multiwavelengthoverlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targets Theseries was reportedly implemented ( ) by China National Space Administrationthough this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the USNational Aeronautics and Space Administration With its high-resolution (five-meter)L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinas first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogansare optimized for monitoring ocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastalzones Cs44MA sikOlVT74M) as well as observing sea-surface targets andshallow-water bathymetry C4-E A M ) 44 EO Yaogans which appearto be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)-2000 small-satellitebus (that is standardized backbone platform on which the satellite is built) moni-tor land and sea areas including coastal zones C(4)T) with resolution as fine as ahalf-meter4 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a varietyof orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution A major Chi-nese study on the nations remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are very
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 95
Chinarsquos Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russiarsquos Antonov An-12
Cub transport and produced under license by the Sharsquoanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)
Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions as
electronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT
(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare
electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning
(variant five) and ASW (variant six)20 Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinarsquos smaller KJ-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-
early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-array
radar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedenrsquos Ericsson Erieye active phased-
array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more
economically21 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-
ing forty people and possibly setting back the program22 But the program appears to be
back on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KJ-200rsquos technology is ldquotwo generations
ahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the USrdquo23 On 12 March 2010 a
PLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force near
the Miyako Strait24 Like the KJ-2000 the KJ-200 is reported to be in service with the
PLAAFrsquos 26th Air Division25 the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200s
as well26
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8
Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regiments
with a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include a
number of H-6s derivatives of Russiarsquos Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-
sance and ELINT27 As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a new
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan28 A portion of the PLAN
and PLAAFrsquos JH-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant still
employed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods29
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-
enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State Oceanic
Administration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March
2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve f ly-bys of USNS
Victorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-
tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-
ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international waters
in the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between a
hundred and three hundred feet30
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 5
Chinas Y-8 medium-range transport airframe derived from Russias Antonov An-12Cub transport and produced under license by the Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group)Corporation is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants19 They perform such missions aselectronic intelligence (or ELINTmdashvariant one and possibly an eighth variant) SIGINT(variant two) SIGINT andor communications relay (variant three) electronic warfare electronic countermeasures C3I (variants four and seven) airborne early warning(variant five) and ASW (variant six)2deg Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles
Chinas smaller KI-200Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol electronic warfare airborne-early-warning and control aircraft with its electronically steered active phased-arrayradar (similar in appearance to but larger than Swedens Ericsson Erieye active phased-array radar) complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT moreeconomically Various sources report that a KI-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006 kill-ing forty people and possibly setting back the program But the program appears to beback on track and Carlo Kopp believes that the KI-200s technology is two generationsahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the US On 12 March 2010 aPLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force nearthe Miyako Strait Like the KJ-2000 the KI-200 is reported to be in service with thePLAAFs 26th Air Division the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200sas wel126
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms and the numerous and diverse Y-8Gaoxin variants detailed above the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regimentswith a wide range of other specialized aircraft Relevant fixed-wing types include anumber of H-6s derivatives of Russias Tu-16 Badger which also conduct reconnais-sance and ELINT As part of a late-2003 exercise an Su-30MKK fighter used a newsynthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan A portion of the PLANand PLAAFs J1-1-7A strike fighter bombers together with the older JH-7 variant stillemployed by the PLAN are apparently outfitted with BMKZ-900 SIGINT pods
Beyond the strictly military dimension as China strengthens its maritime law-enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State OceanicAdministration their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace On 5 March2009 a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve fly-bys of USNSVictorious (T-AGOS 19) operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea at an alti-tude of four hundred feet range five hundred yards the following day a Y-12 conduct-ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) operating in international watersin the South China Sea at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between ahundred and three hundred feet
96 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based ISR
Space capabilities underpin Chinarsquos current naval and other military capabilities for the
near seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and
high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen
PLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combining
foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-
cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of various
mission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span
these systems are improving rapidly31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors
to shooters and to support related network functions Chinarsquos second data-relay satel-
lite Tianlian-1-02B provides ldquonear real-time transfer of data to ground stations from
manned space capsules or orbiting satellitesrdquo32 Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012
further extends and strengthens this capacity33 Chinarsquos ground stations and Yuanwang-
class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-
ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but
plans by 2030 to have established ldquonetwork nodesrdquo at the North Pole at the South Pole
and in Brazil as part of a ldquoDigital Earth Scientific Platformrdquo34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-
cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-
tions35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites under
five hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The
93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinarsquos
shipborne Automatic Identification System36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites
is testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a
variety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly
combat-relevant ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite
Surveying and Mappingrdquo37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinarsquos reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-
spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)
the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-
ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellites
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain as
orbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-station
module launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance38 Fengyun weather satellites
provide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
96 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based SR
Space capabilities underpin Chinas current naval and other military capabilities for thenear seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation andhigh-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthenPLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combiningforeign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of variousmission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life spanthese systems are improving rapidly China uses a variety of satellites to link sensorsto shooters and to support related network functions Chinas second data-relay satel-lite Tianlian-1-02B provides near real-time transfer of data to ground stations frommanned space capsules or orbiting satellites Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012further extends and strengthens this capacity Chinas ground stations and Yuanwang-class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations butplans by 2030 to have established network nodes at the North Pole at the South Poleand in Brazil as part of a Digital Earth Scientific Platform34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-tions China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites underfive hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinasshipborne Automatic Identification System The Shijian series of experimental satellitesis testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by avariety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedlycombat-relevant Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized SatelliteSurveying and Mapping37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinas reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellitesChinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain asorbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-stationmodule launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance Fengyun weather satellitesprovide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 97
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 O at an unspecified date FY-2H
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satellite
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-time
electro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observation
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX
optical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has been
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology
Development Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen further
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade with
HY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in
2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecified
dates40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinarsquos Huanjing visible-
IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additional
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible ELINT Satellites Yaogan
Chinarsquos Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits ldquomay provide multiwavelength
overlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targetsrdquo42 The
series was reportedly ldquoimplementedrdquo (ᇎ) by China National Space Administration
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration43 With its high-resolution (five-meter)
L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinarsquos first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogans
are optimized for monitoring ldquoocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastal
zonesrdquo (⎧ ⎧㺘ᖱ ⎧የᑖ) as well as ldquoobserving sea-surface targets and
shallow-water bathymetryrdquo (⎧䶒ⴞḷ ⎧ൠᖒㅹ㿲)44 EO Yaogans which appear
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)ndash2000 small-satellite
ldquobusrdquo (that is standardized ldquobackbonerdquo platform on which the satellite is built) moni-
tor land and sea areas including ldquocoastal zonesrdquo (⎧የᑖ) with resolution as fine as a
half-meter45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a variety
of orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nationrsquos remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are ldquovery
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 7
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 0 at an unspecified date FY-2Hand FY-4 0 and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satelliteseries are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-timeelectro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observationCBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUXoptical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has beenprioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-TechnologyDevelopment Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen furtherHaiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade withHY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecifieddates Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinas Huanjing visible-IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additionalsatellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-plete image of China every twelve hours Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible EOM- Satellites Yaogan
Chinas Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits may provide multiwavelengthoverlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targets Theseries was reportedly implemented ( ) by China National Space Administrationthough this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the USNational Aeronautics and Space Administration With its high-resolution (five-meter)L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinas first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogansare optimized for monitoring ocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastalzones Cs44MA sikOlVT74M) as well as observing sea-surface targets andshallow-water bathymetry C4-E A M ) 44 EO Yaogans which appearto be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)-2000 small-satellitebus (that is standardized backbone platform on which the satellite is built) moni-tor land and sea areas including coastal zones C(4)T) with resolution as fine as ahalf-meter4 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a varietyof orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution A major Chi-nese study on the nations remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are very
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
96 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based ISR
Space capabilities underpin Chinarsquos current naval and other military capabilities for the
near seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and
high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen
PLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combining
foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-
cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of various
mission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span
these systems are improving rapidly31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors
to shooters and to support related network functions Chinarsquos second data-relay satel-
lite Tianlian-1-02B provides ldquonear real-time transfer of data to ground stations from
manned space capsules or orbiting satellitesrdquo32 Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012
further extends and strengthens this capacity33 Chinarsquos ground stations and Yuanwang-
class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-
ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but
plans by 2030 to have established ldquonetwork nodesrdquo at the North Pole at the South Pole
and in Brazil as part of a ldquoDigital Earth Scientific Platformrdquo34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-
cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-
tions35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites under
five hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The
93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinarsquos
shipborne Automatic Identification System36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites
is testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a
variety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly
combat-relevant ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite
Surveying and Mappingrdquo37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinarsquos reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-
spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)
the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-
ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellites
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain as
orbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-station
module launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance38 Fengyun weather satellites
provide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and
-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
96 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Space-Based SR
Space capabilities underpin Chinas current naval and other military capabilities for thenear seas The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation andhigh-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthenPLA capabilities While still purchasing supplementary imagery Beijing is combiningforeign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-cant advances in maritime C4ISR
China has developed a full range of military civilian and dual-use satellites of variousmission areas and sizes While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life spanthese systems are improving rapidly China uses a variety of satellites to link sensorsto shooters and to support related network functions Chinas second data-relay satel-lite Tianlian-1-02B provides near real-time transfer of data to ground stations frommanned space capsules or orbiting satellites Tianlian-1-03 launched on 25 July 2012further extends and strengthens this capacity Chinas ground stations and Yuanwang-class space-event support ships add important telemetry tracking and command capac-ity China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations butplans by 2030 to have established network nodes at the North Pole at the South Poleand in Brazil as part of a Digital Earth Scientific Platform34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-tions China has made great progress in small-satellite development its satellites underfive hundred kilograms now boast high performance in addition to low weight The93 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite launched on 10 May 2012 receives signals from Chinasshipborne Automatic Identification System The Shijian series of experimental satellitesis testing new technologies Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by avariety of services including the PLAN One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedlycombat-relevant Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized SatelliteSurveying and Mapping37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
Chinas reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO) multi- and hyper-spectral and radar especially SAR Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY)the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Ziyuan (ZY) the Disaster Monitor-ing Constellation (DMC) Haiyang (HY) Huanjing (HJ) and Yaogan (YG) satellitesChinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft which remain asorbital modules after their crews return to earth and the Tiangong (TG) space-stationmodule launched in 2011 as relevant to reconnaissance Fengyun weather satellitesprovide visible IR and microwave imaging Possible future launches include FY-2G and-2H in 2014 FY-3DPM1 and FY-4 M in 2015 FY-3EAM1 in 2017 FY-3FPM2 in 2019
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 97
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 O at an unspecified date FY-2H
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satellite
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-time
electro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observation
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX
optical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has been
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology
Development Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen further
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade with
HY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in
2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecified
dates40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinarsquos Huanjing visible-
IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additional
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible ELINT Satellites Yaogan
Chinarsquos Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits ldquomay provide multiwavelength
overlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targetsrdquo42 The
series was reportedly ldquoimplementedrdquo (ᇎ) by China National Space Administration
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration43 With its high-resolution (five-meter)
L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinarsquos first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogans
are optimized for monitoring ldquoocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastal
zonesrdquo (⎧ ⎧㺘ᖱ ⎧የᑖ) as well as ldquoobserving sea-surface targets and
shallow-water bathymetryrdquo (⎧䶒ⴞḷ ⎧ൠᖒㅹ㿲)44 EO Yaogans which appear
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)ndash2000 small-satellite
ldquobusrdquo (that is standardized ldquobackbonerdquo platform on which the satellite is built) moni-
tor land and sea areas including ldquocoastal zonesrdquo (⎧የᑖ) with resolution as fine as a
half-meter45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a variety
of orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nationrsquos remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are ldquovery
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 7
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 0 at an unspecified date FY-2Hand FY-4 0 and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satelliteseries are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-timeelectro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observationCBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUXoptical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has beenprioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-TechnologyDevelopment Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen furtherHaiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade withHY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecifieddates Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinas Huanjing visible-IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additionalsatellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-plete image of China every twelve hours Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible EOM- Satellites Yaogan
Chinas Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits may provide multiwavelengthoverlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targets Theseries was reportedly implemented ( ) by China National Space Administrationthough this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the USNational Aeronautics and Space Administration With its high-resolution (five-meter)L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinas first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogansare optimized for monitoring ocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastalzones Cs44MA sikOlVT74M) as well as observing sea-surface targets andshallow-water bathymetry C4-E A M ) 44 EO Yaogans which appearto be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)-2000 small-satellitebus (that is standardized backbone platform on which the satellite is built) moni-tor land and sea areas including coastal zones C(4)T) with resolution as fine as ahalf-meter4 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a varietyof orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution A major Chi-nese study on the nations remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are very
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 97
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 O at an unspecified date FY-2H
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satellite
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-time
electro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observation
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX
optical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has been
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology
Development Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen further
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade with
HY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in
2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecified
dates40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinarsquos Huanjing visible-
IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additional
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible ELINT Satellites Yaogan
Chinarsquos Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits ldquomay provide multiwavelength
overlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targetsrdquo42 The
series was reportedly ldquoimplementedrdquo (ᇎ) by China National Space Administration
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration43 With its high-resolution (five-meter)
L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinarsquos first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogans
are optimized for monitoring ldquoocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastal
zonesrdquo (⎧ ⎧㺘ᖱ ⎧የᑖ) as well as ldquoobserving sea-surface targets and
shallow-water bathymetryrdquo (⎧䶒ⴞḷ ⎧ൠᖒㅹ㿲)44 EO Yaogans which appear
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)ndash2000 small-satellite
ldquobusrdquo (that is standardized ldquobackbonerdquo platform on which the satellite is built) moni-
tor land and sea areas including ldquocoastal zonesrdquo (⎧የᑖ) with resolution as fine as a
half-meter45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a variety
of orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nationrsquos remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are ldquovery
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 7
FY-3GAM3 in 2021 FY-3HPM3 in 2023 and FY-4 0 at an unspecified date FY-2Hand FY-4 0 and M will be geostationary all others have polar orbits Three satelliteseries are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring The CBERS polar near-real-timeelectro-optical satellites with 27-meter resolution are used for military observationCBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUXoptical sensors may be launched as early as 2013 Yaogan satellites are already so numer-ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section)
Ocean surveillance a significant focus of Chinese satellite development has beenprioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-TechnologyDevelopment Plan39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational) 2007 and 2011 Roughly a dozen furtherHaiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned in three sets over the next decade withHY-1EF possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013 HY-2C in 2015 HY-1GH in2016 HY-3B in 2017 HY-2D in 2018 and HY-1CD HY-2B and HY-3A at unspecifieddates Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution Chinas Huanjing visible-IR- multispectral- and SAR-imaging constellation is designed once eight additionalsatellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later to form a com-plete image of China every twelve hours Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-sensing satellites currently in orbit
High-Resolution Reconnaissance Possible EOM- Satellites Yaogan
Chinas Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-ellites operating in near-polar sun-synchronous orbits may provide multiwavelengthoverlapping continuous medium resolution global imagery of military targets Theseries was reportedly implemented ( ) by China National Space Administrationthough this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the USNational Aeronautics and Space Administration With its high-resolution (five-meter)L-band SAR Yaogan-1 was Chinas first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite SAR Yaogansare optimized for monitoring ocean dynamics sea surface characteristics and coastalzones Cs44MA sikOlVT74M) as well as observing sea-surface targets andshallow-water bathymetry C4-E A M ) 44 EO Yaogans which appearto be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)-2000 small-satellitebus (that is standardized backbone platform on which the satellite is built) moni-tor land and sea areas including coastal zones C(4)T) with resolution as fine as ahalf-meter4 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability Yaogans have attained a varietyof orbits some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution A major Chi-nese study on the nations remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are very
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
98 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 Chinarsquos Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering Shanghai Academy of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
20060218165300
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223005400
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 201201130056
Xichang
FY-3AAM
32958 2008-026A SAST 200805270302
Taiyuan
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104183700
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021000000
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919032600
Taiyuan
ZY-2B 20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106031000
Taiyuan
ZY-3 20120109031700
Taiyuan
DMCBJ1Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A 20051027065200
Plesetsk (Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 200704110327
Taiyuan
98 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 20060218 XichangEngineering Shanghai Academyof Spaceflight Technology (SAST)
165300
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 20081223 Xichang005400
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 20120113 Xichang0056
FY-3A 32958 2008-026A SAST 20080527 TaiyuanAM 0302
FY-3BPM 37214 2010-059A SAST 20101104 Taiyuan183700
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 20031021 Taiyuan000000
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 20070919 Taiyuan032600
ZY-2B
~
20021027 Taiyuan
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A 20041106 Taiyuan031000
ZY-3 20120109 Taiyuan031700
DMC 28890 2005-043A 20051027 Plesetsk1311 065200 (Russia)Tsinghua
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A 20070411 Taiyuan0327
Table 2 Chinas Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 99
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358054 16deg14362 42166
1380 VISSR-2 sea temperature color meteorol-ogy images every 30 min
CZ-3A geostationary357847 times358074 12deg14362 42167
1390 VISSR-2visible and infrared high-resolution cloud imagery
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-3A geostationary357741 times358065 13deg14359 42161
13690 Stretched Visible and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer
sea temperature meteorology images every 15 min
CZ-4C polar 8281 times 8412986deg 1015 7205
2295 MERSI ocean color VIRR IR sensors MWRI microwave radiometer
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4C polar 8332 times 8362988deg 1015 7205
2299 VIRR MERSI MWRI 11 instruments capable of global all-weather multispectral 3-dimensional quantitative Earth observations
sea color temperature wind speed coastal zones meteorology
CZ-4B polar7814 times 7826982deg 1003 7152
1600 CCD infrared multispectral scanner (IRMSS) WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar7466 times 7915983deg 1001 7140
1500 CCD WFI HR 20 (CCD) 2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
land coastal zones
CZ-4B polar HR PAN-MS 2 (HR) 5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
polar 2630 HR PAN-MS CC DX2 3 high-resolution panchromatic cameras IRMSS
2 cameras (frontrear-facing) 35 m (spectral) Ground-facing camera 21 m (spectral) IRMSS 60 m (spectral)
coastal zones high-resolution remote sensing stereo mapping
Cosmos (Russian)
polar PAN-MS 324 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar7874 times 8112984deg 1007 7170
COCTS CZIocean color IR temperature sensors
sea color sea temperature coastal zones
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg)x Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 8 0357847 x358054 1614362 42166
CZ-3A g e o s t a t i o n a r y 1 3 9 0357847 x358074 1214362 42167
CZ-3A
CZ-4C
CZ-4C
CZ-4B
CZ-4B
CZ-2C
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 9 9
PrimarySensors
VISSR-2
VISSR-2visible andinfrared high-resolution cloudimagery
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
sea temperaturecolor meteorol-ogy images every30 min
sea temperaturemeteorologyimages every15 min
geostationary 1 3 6 9 0 S t r e t c h e d Visible s e a temperature357741 x a n d Infrared Spin m e t e o r o l o g y 358065 13 S c a n Radiometer i m a g e s every14359 42161 1 5 min
polar 2 2 9 5 M E R S I ocean s e a color8281 x 8412 c o l o r VIRR IR t e m p e r a t u r e 986 1015 s e n s o r s MWRI w i n d speed7205 m i c r o w a v e c o a s t a l zones
radiometer m e t e o r o l o g y
polar 2 2 9 9 V I R R MERSI s e a color8332 x 8362 M W R I 11 t e m p e r a t u r e 988 1015 i n s t r u m e n t s w i n d speed7205 c a p a b l e of global c o a s t a l zones
all-weather m e t e o r o l o g ymultispectral3-dimensionalquantitative Earthobservations
polar7814 x 7826982 10037152
polar7466 x 7915983 10017140
1600 C C D infrared 2 0 c o a s t a l zonesmultispectralscanner (IRMSS)WEI
1500 CCD WEI HR 20 (CCD)2 (HR)
coastal zones
polar H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) l a n d coastal5 (PAN-MS) z o n e s
CZ-4B p o l a r H R PAN-MS 2 (HR) c o a s t a l zones5 (PAN-MS)
polar 2 6 3 0 H R PAN-MS 2 cameras (front c o a s t a l zonesCC DX2 3 r e a r - f a c i n g ) h i g h - r e s o l u t i o nhigh-resolution 3 5 m (spectral) r e m o t e sensingpanchromatic G r o u n d - f a c i n g s t e r e o mappingcameras IRMSS c a m e r a 21 m
(spectral) IRMSS60 m (spectral)
Cosmos p o l a r P A N - M S 3 2 4 c o a s t a l zones(Russian)
polar7874 x 8112984 10077170
COCTS CDocean color IRtemperaturesensors
sea color seatemperaturecoastal zones
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
100 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 20110815
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1B 20080906032500
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118225300
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 19991119223000
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109010000
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 20020325140000
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 20021229164000
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015010000
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012010000
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925131000
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 20111031215800
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616103700
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A2013-029H (orbital module)
20130611093800
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
100 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A 7 20110815
HI-1A 33320 2008-041A 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-18 20080906 Taiyuan032500
HI-1C 38997 2012-064A 20121118 Taiyuan225300
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A 7 19991119 Iluquan223000
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A 20010109 Iiuquan010000
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A 7 20020325 Iluquan140000
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A 3 20021229 Iiuquan164000
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A 20031015 Iiug u an010000
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A 20051012 Iiuquan010000
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A 20080925 Iluquan131000
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A 7 2011 1031 Iiug u an215800
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A 20120616 Iluquan103700
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A 20130611 Iiuquan2013-029H 093800(orbitalmodule)
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 101
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
polar9733 times 9737994deg 1044 7344
microwave radi-ometer altimeter scatterometer
ocean surveil-lance sea surface winds wave height and water temperatures
CZ-2C polar6328 times 6729978deg 976 7023
CCD optical infrared cameras SAR hyperspec-tral imager
30 sea color red tide veg-etation oil spills coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar CCD optical infrared cameras SAR
30 sea color coastal zones sea temperature
CZ-2C polar 890 1st radar satel-lite in Chinarsquos environment amp disaster monitor constellation operating wHJ-1A1B optical satellites
CZ-2F 195 times 315896 426deg000905
76000
CZ-2F 330 times 346913 426deg000119
orbital module conducted zero-gravity experiments
CZ-2F 332 times 337912 424deg000037
orbital module
CZ-2F 196 times 329898 424deg001001
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 342 times 3509146 424deg000059
orbital module conducted scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 times 336912 424deg0
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 78000 left orbital module
Launch Vehicle O r b i t Perigee M a s s (kg) P r i m a r yx Apogee (km) S e n s o r sInclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)a
CZ-2F 195 x 315896 426000905
76000 7 7
CZ-2F 330 x 346913 426000119
CZ-2F 332 x 337 7912 424000037
CZ-2F 196 x 329898 424001001
CZ-2F 7
CZ-2F 342 x 350 7 7 79146 424000059
CZ-2F 329 x 336 7 7 7912 4240
CZ-2F 80800
CZ-2F
CZ-2F 780000
p o l a r 7 m i c r o w a v e radi- 7 o c e a n surveil-9733 x 9737 o m e t e r altimeter l a n c e sea surface994 1044 s c a t t e r o m e t e r w i n d s wave7344 h e i g h t and water
temperatures
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color6328 x 6729 i n f r a r e d cameras r e d tide veg-978 976 7023 S A R hyperspec- e t a t i o n oil spills
tral imager c o a s t a l zones seatemperature
CZ-2C p o l a r C C D optical 3 0 s e a color coastalinfrared z o n e s seacameras SAR t e m p e r a t u r e
CZ-2C p o l a r 8 9 0 1 s t radar satel-lite in Chinasenvironment ampdisaster monitorconstellationoperating wiHI-1All B opticalsatellites
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 1
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
orbital moduleconductedzero-gravityexperiments
orbital module
orbital moduleconductedscientific research
left orbital module
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoringrdquo
(ሩҾ⎧⧟ຳ⎧ⴁ㿶ⴁॱᴹ)47
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute a
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangular
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite and possibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking of foreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They are thought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems48
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navyrsquos WHITE CLOUD Naval
Ocean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their
electronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and
transmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locate
emitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locate
emitting ships precisely The shipsrsquo locations would then be transmitted to the relevant
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented
into two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites52 China reportedly launched an
ELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatus
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne China
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chinese
experts have conducted considerable research in this area53 As Mark Stokes and Ian
Easton point out China may have long launched ldquounidentified ELINT sensors attached
to other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated
systemsrdquo54 Chinarsquos Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairs
from 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions55
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-al Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A 20110929131600
Jiuquan
Table 2 (continued)
102 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 2 (continued)
Satellite N O R A D ID Internat ion- Contractoral Code
Launch DateTime (UTC)
Launch Site
TO-1 3 7 8 2 0 2 0 11 - 0 5 3 A 2 0 1 1 0 9 2 9 J i u q u a n131600
useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring(tT-14n4J)JgC-IVIV441114111111plusmnj)-AA )
Yaogan-9 Yaogan-16A B and C and Yaogan-17A B and C constellations may constitute avital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network Flying in triangularformation in similar orbits at identical inclinations each constellation apparently contains
an electro-optical surveillance satellite a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite andpossibly an electronicsignal intelligence satellite Designed for location and tracking offoreign warships the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy They arethought to be able to find and track large Western warships providing accurate position-ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems
This is similar to the first and second generations of the US Navys WHITE CLOUD NavalOcean Surveillance System which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing theirelectronic emissions identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies andtransmission patterns and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-rival In a trio of Yaogan satellites then one satellite would monitor a wide expanse ofocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely two satellites together would locateemitting ships albeit still imperfectly and the inputs of a third satellite would locateemitting ships precisely The ships locations would then be transmitted to the relevantparts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex The Yaogan-9 system has apparentlybeen superseded by the -16 and -17 systems as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmentedinto two pieces51 See table 3
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites China reportedly launched anELINT satellite program the 701 Program in the late 1960s Following a lengthy hiatusduring which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne Chinahas redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications and Chineseexperts have conducted considerable research in this area As Mark Stokes and IanEaston point out China may have long launched unidentified ELINT sensors attachedto other satellite payloads and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicatedsystems Chinas Shijian satellites particularly the -6 series launched in four pairsfrom 2004 to 2010 are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 103
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of
electronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate the
position of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time
tracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and also
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile
salvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwanrsquos Keelung naval port in
March 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwan
independence moves ldquoIt was a great shame for the PLA an unforgettable humiliation
Thatrsquos how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and
positioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned it
the hard wayrdquo Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinarsquos Beidou and Yuanwang
systems guarantee that ldquothere is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere in
our operations at allrdquo57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been denied
access to the military mode of Europersquos nascent Galileo system China is developing its
ownmdashBeidouCompass (ᯇছᱏሬ㡚ᇊս㔏)58 The director of the China Satellite
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it ldquothe
Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) Period (min) Semimajor Axis (km)a
Mass (kg) Primary Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean Applications
CZ-2F 85060
Notes Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources
a Data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhou spacecraft data are from ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov Contrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis apoapsis period inclination and eccentricity
Sources He Mingxia et alldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 91ndash103 ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocom ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo NASA nssdcgsfcnasagov ldquoFengyun Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 2 July 2012
Launch Vehicle
CZ-2F
Orbit Perigeex Apogee (km)Inclination (1Period (min)Semimajor Axis(km)
Mass (kg)
85060
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 3
PrimarySensors
7
Resolution (m) O c e a nApplications
7
NotesQuestion marks indicate information not available in reliable open sourcesa Data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed areused by default except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft which ITPROSTAR does not include For Shenzhouspacecraft data are from National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagoviContrary to the general column heading orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsisapoapsis period inclination and eccentricitySources He Mingxia et alChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) pp 91-103 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yacomi NationalSpace Science Data Center Master Catalog NASA nssdcgsfcnasagovi Fengyun Series Janes SpaceSystems and Industry 2 July 2012
These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival ofelectronic signals received as well as other geo-location techniques to triangulate theposition of US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-timetracking and targeting56
Supporting PNT BeidouCompass Satellites
By offering reliable location signals PNT facilitates command and control and alsomonitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones The PLA regards autono-mous reliability in this area as vital A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLAanalysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptionlikely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missilesalvo fired into the East China Sea 185 kilometers from Taiwans Keelung naval port inMarch 1996 as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be prondashTaiwanindependence moves It was a great shame for the PLA a n unforgettable humiliationThats how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation andpositioning system no matter how huge the cost Beidou is a must for us We learned itthe hard way Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that Chinas Beidou and Yuanwangsystems guarantee that there is no chance now for the US to use its GPS to interfere inour operations at all57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by US GPS and Russian GLONASS(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future and having been deniedaccess to the military mode of Europes nascent Galileo system China is developing itsownmdashBeidouCompass (AL - A ) The director of the China SatelliteNavigation and Locating Applications Management Center Yang Baofeng terms it the
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
104 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan Military Designation
NORAD ID International Code
Contractor Launch DateTime (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20081215032200
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP)
20091215023100
9ABC 36413364143830336415
2010-009A2010-009BG2010-009C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100305045500
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH CAST 508 Institute Xirsquoan Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
20111109032100
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120510070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute CIOMP
20120529073100
16ABC 390113901239013
2012-066A2012-066B2012-066C
DFH CAST 508 Institute 20121125040600
104 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20070525071200
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 20071111224800
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFEI CAST 508 Institute 20081201044200
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20081215Xian Institute of Optics and 032200Precision Mechanics
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 20090422025500
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20091209084200
8 JB-7-2 36121 2009-072A SAST Changchun Institute 20091215of Optics Fine Mechanics and 023100Physics (CIOMP)
9ABC 36413 2010-009A DFH CAST 508 Institute 201003053641438303 2010-009BG 04550036415 2010-009C
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 20100809224900
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH CAST 508 Institute 20100922024200
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-0668 DFFI CAST 508 Institute 20111109Xian Institute of Optics and 032100Precision Mechanics
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 20111129185000
14 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute 20120510CIOMP 070600
15 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute 20120529CIOAAP 073100
16ABC 39011 2012-066A DFH CAST 508 Institute 2012112539012 2012-066B 04060039013 2012-066C
Table 3 Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Yaogan M i l i t a r y N O R A D ID I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con t rac to r L a u n c h DateDesignation C o d e T i m e (UTC)
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 105
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo ldquoYaogan 9Brdquo ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo and ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit Perigee times Apogee (km) Inclination (deg) SSO Time on Descending Node
Transmission Frequency (MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 times 655978 1330
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 times 629979 0600
2212809 2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 times 660979 1100
2216525 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 times 495974 1030
22205 2700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 times 513976 1000
2000 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 times 666978 1500
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 times 1211 1005 0930
22663 1040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 times 1106 634(9B) 1060 times 1076 634(9C) 1089 times 1107 634
2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) EO HR PAN-MSSARELINT
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 times 629978 0600
2700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 times 6574 9801 0900
2216527 800 EO HR PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 times 498 9741 1029
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 times 5119711 0156
2000 SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 times 479972 1414
2700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 times 1206 1001 1430
1040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 times 1089 6338 10693 min(16B) 1078 times 1090 6338 10693 min(16C) 1032 times 1081 6338 10633 min
1000 (16A) EOSARELINT
Launch Site L a u n c h Vehicle O r b i t Perigee Transmission M a s s (kg) T y p ex Apogee (km) FrequencyInclination () ( M H z )SSO Time onDescendingNode
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 x 655 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1330 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 x 629 2212809 2700 L-band SAR979 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 x 660 2216525 800 E0 HR979 1100 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 x 495 22205 2700 L-band SAR974 1030
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 x 513 7 2000 L-band SAR976 1000
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 x 666 2216527 800 E0 HR978 1500 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1200 x 1211 22663 1040 L-band SAR1005 0930
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1089 x 2218 (9B) 1000 (9A) E0 HR PAN-MS1106 634 SARELINT(9B) 1060 x1076 634(9C) 1089 x1107 634
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 x 629 2700 L-band SAR978 0600
Jiuquan CZ-2D 6273 x 6574 2216527 800 E0 HR9801 0900 PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 x 498 2700 EO9741 1029
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 x 511 2000 SAR9711 0156
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 x 479 2700 EO972 1414
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1201 x 1206 1040 EO1001 1430
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1080 x 10007 (16A) EOSARELINT71089 633810693 min(16B) 1078 x1090 633810693 min(16C) 1032 x1081 633810633 min
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 5
Note Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988mdash2025) Yaogan Series Yaogan 9B Yaogan 9B DEB Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking andPredictions and National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTARwhich are typically more detailed are used by default
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
106 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicable
space-based system in Chinese aerospace historyrdquo59 BeidouCompass provides PNT to
an accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively60
it also offers ldquodifferentialrdquo and ldquointegrityrdquo services61 Initially unlike other PNT sys-
tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a central
ground station although the PLA General Armament Departmentrsquos newspaper recently
reported that ldquoafter providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou became
more and more like the GPS systemrdquo62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes ldquoan important measure to grab and
retain favorable orbital position resources for the purpose of lsquocarving up the domain
before other competitors dorsquordquo [ҏᱟ ldquoঐսrdquo Ⲵ䴰㾱]64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initial
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such as
Pakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 201265 service
commenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclined
medium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global
coverage67 IGSO satellitesrsquo high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg at
launch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee
motor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satellites
were based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and
to the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from its
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinarsquos PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-
cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate68 The
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February
2013 ldquoBeidou provided positioning security and protectionrdquo for the destroyer Qingdao
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such as
the Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijingrsquos lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels
on Chinarsquos maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
106 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
largest scale most complex most technically demanding and most widely applicablespace-based system in Chinese aerospace history59 BeidouCompass provides PNT toan accuracy of ten meters 02 meters per second and ten nanoseconds respectively6it also offers differential and integrity servicesdeg Initially unlike other PNT sys-tems which transmit signals directly it transmitted signals indirectly through a centralground station although the PLA General Armament Departments newspaper recentlyreported that after providing passive navigation and locating service Beidou becamemore and more like the GPS systern62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-nications systemdeg A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords Chinanumerous civil and military benefits and constitutes an important measure to grab andretain favorable orbital position resources f o r the purpose of carving up the domainbefore other competitors domdash 1-L 1 1 j M ] bull 64
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far sixteen remain operational An initialtwo-satellite constellation was launched in 2000 Regional navigation and commu-nications coverage encompassing mainland China neighboring countries (such asPakistan where it has been tested) and the near seas was achieved in 20 1 265 servicecommenced in early 2013 Starting in 2014 a second series will be launched66 By 2020a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit twenty-seven inclinedmedium earth orbit and three inclined geostationary orbit jIGSOl ) will provide globalcoveragedeg IGS0 satellites high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudesSatellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST They weigh typically 2300 kg atlaunch and 1150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogeemotor They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays The initial satelliteswere based on the DFH-3 bus this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou- G2 on andto the -3B variant from -M3 on All satellites have been launched from Xichang from itsLaunch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2Compass-M3 See table 4
The PLA is already using Chinas PNT system extensively During long-distance exer-cises Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate TheNorth Sea Fleet headquarters information chief Lei Xiwei has stated that in February2013 Beidou provided positioning security and protection for the destroyer Qingdaoand frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically thetargeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate such asthe Second Artillery This critical linchpin long limited by Beijings lack of relevant sen-sor platforms promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vesselson Chinas maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 107
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-021A
20030524163400
CZ-3A geostationary (GEO) 1105degE
20 m positioning accuracy
operational
Beidou-2ACompass-M1
31115 2007-011A
20070413201100
CZ-3A medium earth orbit (MEO) experimentalperigee times apogee 21519 times 21545 km inclination 553deg period 7734 min by 201003 215247 times 215535 km 561deg period 7734 min
signal trans-mit carrier frequencies 119514ndash121914 MHz 125652ndash128052 MHz 155905ndash156315 MHz and 158769ndash159179 MHzground com-munications w1 master control sta-tion 2 upload stations 30 monitor stations
experimental 1st MEO satellite in series
Beidou-2CCompass-G1
36287 2010-001A
20100116161200
CZ-3C GEO 140degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 196 times 35620 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2DCompass-G3
36590 2010-024A
20100602155300
CZ-3C GEO 838degE initial transfer orbit perigee times apogee 205 times 35647 km inclination 205deg
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-1
36828 2010-036A
20100731213000
CZ-3A geosynchronous (GSO) perigee times apogee 356745 times 359015 km inclination 551deg period 14358 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Beidou-2ECompass-G4
37210 2010-057A
20101031162600
CZ-3C GEO 1599degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-2
37256 2010-068A
20101217202000
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35714 times 35856 km inclination 5524deg period 1436 min mean longitude of subsatellite ground point 118degE
operational
Satellite N O R A D Interna- Launch L a u n c h O r b i tID t i o n a l D a t e V e h i c l e
Code T i m e (UTC)
Beidou-2C 36287 2010- 20100116 CZ-3CCompass- 001A 161200Cl
Beidou-2D 36590 2010- 20100602 CZ-3CCompass- 024A 15530003
Beidou-2 36828 2010- 20100731 CZ-3ACompass- 036A 213000IGS0-1
Beidou-2E 37210 2010- 20101031 CZ-3CCompass- 057A 16260004
Beidou-2 37256 2010- 20101217 CZ-3ACompass- 068A 202000
GEO 838degEinitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee205 a 35647 kminclination 205
geosynchronous(GS0) perigee xapogee 356745x 359015 kminclination 551period 14358 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
GSO perigee xapogee 35714
I050-2 x 35856 kminclination 5524period 1436 minmean longitude ofsubsatellite groundpoint 118E
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 7
Table 4 BeidouCompass Satellites Currently Operational Notional Specifications
Capabilities Sta tus
Beidou-IC 2 7 8 1 3 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 0 5 2 4 C Z - 3 A geos ta t i ona ry 2 0 m o p e r a t i o n a l021A 1 6 3 4 0 0 ( C E O ) 1105degE p o s i t i o n i n g
accuracy
Beidou-2A 3 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 7 0 4 1 3 C Z - 3 A m e d i u m earth orbit s i g n a l trans- exper imenta l Compass- 0 1 1 A 2 0 1 1 0 0 ( M E O ) m i t carrier 1 s t ME0M1 e x p e r i m e n t a l f r e q u e n c i e s s a t e l l i t e in
perigee x apogee 1 1 9 5 1 4 mdash s e r i e s21519 x 21545 1 2 1 9 1 4km inclination 553 M H z period 7734 min by 125652mdash201003 215247 x 1 2 8 0 5 2215535 km 561deg M H z period 7734 min 1 5 5 9 0 5 mdash
156315MHz and158769mdash159179MHzground com-municationsw1 mastercontrol sta-tion 2 uploadstations 30monitorstations
GEO 140degE o p e r a t i o n a linitial transfer orbitperigee x apogee196 a 35620 kminclination 205
CEO 1599degE o p e r a t i o n a l
operational
operational
operational
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
108 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD ID
Interna-tionalCode
Launch Date Time (UTC)
Launch Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-3
37384 2011-013A
20110409204700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35721 times 35880 km inclination 553deg period 14359 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track centered over 118degE
completed IGSO cover-age with 3 satellites in equally spaced planes marked establishment of basic navi-gation and positioning network
operational
Beidou-2Compass- IGSO-4
37763 2011-038A
20110726214400
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35706 times 35878 km inclina-tion 552deg period 14360 min ldquofi g-ure 8rdquo ground track with intersection node over 95degE
operational
Beidou-2Compass-IGSO-5
37948 2011-073A
20111201210700
CZ-3A GSO perigee times apogee 35704 times 35866 km inclination 5518deg period 143602 min ldquofi gure 8rdquo ground track
Beidou systemrsquos basic structure established tests trial service began 20111227
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G5
38091 2012-008A
20120224161200
CZ-3C GEO 5868degE operational
Beidou-2Compass-M3
38250 2012-018A
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21460 times 21594 km inclina-tion 5516deg period 7732 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M4
38251 2012-018B
20120429205000
CZ-3B MEO perigee times apogee 21456 times 21601 km inclina-tion 5511deg period 77321 min
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M5
38774 2012-050A
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21462 times 21592 km inclina-tion 55deg period 7732 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass-M6
38775 2012-050B
20120918195000
CZ-3BE MEO perigee times apogee 21476 times 21573 km inclina-tion 551deg period 7731 min revsday 19
operational
Beidou-2Compass- G6G2R
38953 2012-059A
20121025153300
CZ-3C GEO 801degE completed regional net-work service commenced
operational
Table 4 (continued)
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources
Sources ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Other data from ldquoReal Time Satellite Trackingrdquoand ldquoNational Space Science Data Center Master Catalogrdquo data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used by default
108 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Satellite NORAD Interna- Launch LaunchID tional Date Vehicle
Code Time (UTC)Beidou-2 37384 2011- 20110409 CZ-3ACompass- 013A 204700I050-3
Beidou-2 37763 2011- 20110726 CZ-3ACompass- 038A 214400I050-4
Beidou-2 37948 2011- 20111201 CZ-3ACompass- 073A 2107001050-5
Beidou-2 38091 2012- 20120224 CZ-3CCompass- 008A 16120005
Beidou-2 38250 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 018A 205000M3
Beidou-2 38251 2012- 20120429 CZ-3BCompass- 0188 205000M4
Beidou-2 38774 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 050A 195000MS
Beidou-2 38775 2012- 20120918 CZ-3BECompass- 0508 195000M6
Beidou-2 38953 2012- 20121025 CZ-3CCompass- 059A 153300G6G2R
Table 4 (continued)
Orbit Capabilities S ta tus
GSO perigee x c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35721 I G S 0 cover-x 35880 km a g e withinclination 553 3 satellitesperiod 14359 min i n equallyfigure 8 ground s p a c e d planestrack centered over m a r k e d118E e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of basic navi-gation andpositioningnetwork
GSO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35706 x35878 km inclina-tion 552 period14360 min fig-ure 8 ground trackwith intersectionnode over 95E
GSO perigee x B e i d o u o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 35704 s y s t e m sx 35866 km b a s i c structureinclination 5518 es tab l ishedperiod 143602 t e s t s trialmin figure 8 s e r v i c e beganground track 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 7
CEO 5868E o p e r a t i o n a l
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21460 x21594 km inclina-tion 5516 period7732 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21456 x21601 km inclina-tion 5511 period77321 min
MEO perigee x o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21462 x21592 km inclina-tion 55 period7732 min revsday 19
MEO perigee a o p e r a t i o n a lapogee 21476 x21573 km inclina-tion 551 period7731 min revsday 19
CEO 801E c o m p l e t e d o p e r a t i o n a lregional net-work servicecommenced
Note Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sourcesSources BeidouCompass Other data from Real Time Satellite Tracking and National Space Science DataCenter Master Catalog data and format from ITPROSTAR which are typically more detailed are used bydefault
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 109
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturation
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed range
and precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiple
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instance
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed
roughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite data
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplying
position updates70
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision
of Chinese ballistic missiles Chinarsquos combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdash
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or
microsatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off
Chinarsquos coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic
sense of their coverage71 By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 This
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times for
specific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan
satellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of
Gaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additional
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-
tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbers
Even before 2020 Chinarsquos emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinarsquos low-cost launchers (eg the
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinarsquos fourth scheduled to open in
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process China
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian would
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 0 9
and ballistic missiles potentially in combinationmdasha devastating multiaxis saturationapproach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility speed rangeand precise coordination
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives the PLA must thus coordinate multiplesensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-tions and a common operational picture Satellite-based ISR will improve the abilityof Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets For instancea DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimedroughly at the position of a CSG as determined partly on the basis of satellite dataSatellites might also be used to track and target the CSGmdashby for instance supplyingposition updates7deg
The BeidouCompass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precisionof Chinese ballistic missiles Chinas combination of land-based radars and satellitesmdashperhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of IJAVs and launches of satellites ormicrosatellitesmdashmight be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone offChinas coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat
Examination of the orbits inclinations and periods of imaging satellites offers a basicsense of their coverage By 2009 China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG72 Thisnumber was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage in terms of revisit times forspecific ocean areas but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogansatellites of multiple types and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series ofGaofen satellites73 In 2009 civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficientsatellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites plus additionalmilitary) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian plus additional mili-tary) by 202074 these estimates may require adjustment given recent launch numbersEven before 2020 Chinas emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rocketsmay allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability Chinas low-cost launchers (eg theKaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency The develop-ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Chinas fourth scheduled to open in2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process Chinawould likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose Qu Dian wouldhave to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-sion process then transmit the result to commanders and shooters Even with complete
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
110 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to ground
stations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area
examined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays
Software and data management requirements will be complex Command and control
will likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among the
many service elements that ldquoownrdquo various ISR sensor and ground station architectures
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use and
with the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for the
weapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challenges
the US Department of Defense judges that ldquothe PLA will need to overcome deficiencies
in system integration and interservice coordinationrdquo76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress toward
surmounting them In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to
date Chinarsquos large-scale response to Sichuanrsquos 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-
vey damage77 Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters
ldquoswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troopsrdquo78 Chen Li minister of water
resources said that ldquoanalyzing satellite and other aerial imagesrdquo would allow officials
to assess flooding risks stemming from ldquodamaged reservoirs hydropower plants and
dikesrdquo79 On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected ldquowater rising to dangerous
levelsrdquo in multiple Beichuan County lakes ldquousing one of its most advanced satellitesrdquo
ordered evacuation of the area80 Chinarsquos massive resource deployment still left the PLA
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with data
transfer management processing and integration81
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLArsquos response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant ldquolessons learnedrdquo For
instance the Chinese Academy of Sciencesrsquo State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing
Science used ldquoBeijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and large
sensor ground width to analyze the environment background for the earthquakerdquo82
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went so
far as to claim that ldquoChinarsquos first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIrdquo
launched on 9 January 2012 ldquomeets international standards ridding the country of its
reliance on imports of satellite imagesrdquo83
11 0 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
coverage of relevant maritime zones data transmission (ie from satellites to groundstations) imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of areaexamined) and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delaysSoftware and data management requirements will be complex Command and controlwill likely pose particular challenges the PLA will have to coordinate both among themany service elements that own various ISR sensor and ground station architecturesand that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use andwith the release authority (CMC supreme command or campaign command) for theweapons systems that would employ their inputs75 Because of these ongoing challengesthe US Department of Defense judges that the PLA will need to overcome deficienciesin system integration and interservice coordination
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged as well as of some progress towardsurmounting them In perhaps the best test of CLIISR and data-fusion capabilities todate Chinas large-scale response to Sichuans 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquakeincluded the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imageryand ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft as well as a UAV to sur-vey damage Upon receiving these data the National Earthquake Relief Headquartersswiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops Chen Li minister of waterresources said that analyzing satellite and other aerial images would allow officialsto assess flooding risks stemming from damaged reservoirs hydropower plants anddikes On 17 May the PLA having reportedly detected water rising to dangerouslevels in multiple Beichuan County lakes using one of its most advanced satellitesordered evacuation of the area Chinas massive resource deployment still left the PLAand other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity as well as by problems with datatransfer management processing and integration
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008 the PLAs response to the less-challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant lessons learned Forinstance the Chinese Academy of Sciences State Key Laboratory of Remote SensingScience used Beijing-1 microsatellite data with moderate spatial resolution and largesensor ground width t o analyze the environment background for the earthquakeWhile China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites the large num-ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched sincetogether with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant CLIISR architecturesuggests that its capabilities are now far greater In January 2013 China Daily went sofar as to claim that Chinas first high-resolution stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan IIIlaunched on 9 January 2012 meets international standards ridding the country of itsreliance on imports of satellite images
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 111
Despite this recent progress Chinarsquos ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFrsquos efforts to assume control
over them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-
tions84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear85 Even granting the ability to
transition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinarsquos
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction86 A new
Space Force is rumored to be in development87 for now the PLAAF appears to be best
placed to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the General
Armaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN
to some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artillery
is heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsible
for satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets
(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet any
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory
doctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distribution
among the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficient
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLAN
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent to
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like
the KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how much
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typically
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty
launching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLAN
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it will
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic
processes but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 1
Despite this recent progress Chinas ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by thepresent organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAFs efforts to assume controlover them Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-tions are divided among more than a dozen government university and civil organiza-tions Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizationswartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear Even granting the ability totransition smoothly to military control in wartimemdasha significant assumptionmdashChinassatellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction A newSpace Force is rumored to be in development for now the PLAAF appears to be bestplaced to assume authority over space assets
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets Indeed the GeneralArmaments Department (GAD) the GSD and even the Second Artillery and the PLANto some extent may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF and insti-tutional rivalry may complicate matters The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-tions yet lacks a combat role The PLA already controls launch sites the Second Artilleryis heavily involved in missile programs and various technical institutes are responsiblefor satellite development so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation withinthe PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets(a process that took place earlier in the United States) Furthermore there is not yet anyclear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theorydoctrine missions or regulations so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges given their distributionamong the PLAAF PLAN aviation and even to some extent army aviation Insufficientopen-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviationwork together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios As the PLANassumes a robust deck-aviation mission a critical question arises about the extent towhich naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets likethe KJ-2000 As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers it is unclear how muchtheir air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture since ISR aircraft are typicallyunderpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficultylaunching via ski jump This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3 Even with three carriers in the fleet PLANaviation would still be a primarily land-based air force How and to what extent it willintegrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucraticprocesses but there is insufficient lateral movement Technological incompatibility re-mains a challenge owing to decentralized development and software problems are even
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
112 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a major
barrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fully
The PLArsquos joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not
penetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant
impediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and there
is no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organization
at the military region level exacerbates these problems89 Finally PLA commanders are
temptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashto
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironically
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make
decisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought ldquolocal limited wars under informatized conditionsrdquomdashan experience that
China lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and other
sensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR
system employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan
Military Region which is a logical ldquojoint reform test bedrdquo because it has all services
represented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing
and Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively90
Geostrategic Implications
Chinarsquos air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supporting
infrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incomplete
and are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes ldquoThe duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capable
of aerial refueling Most of the PLArsquos combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of the
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat datardquo91 As a result ldquoneither the
PLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated mannerrdquo92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting
so efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinarsquos space assets continues The sprawling
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the
satelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice
interlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
11 2 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
more significant than hardware problems Institutional stovepiping remains a majorbarrier to integration and joint operations neither of which has been achieved fullyThe PLAs joint organizational structure is still under development and still does notpenetrate effectively to lower levels Lingering ground-force dominance is a significantimpediment the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping toremedy this but is proceeding only slowly Training is not yet sufficiently joint and thereis no permanent joint training structure The lack of a permanent joint organizationat the military region level exacerbates these problems Finally PLA commanders aretemptedmdashand PLA theoretical writings at least are succumbing to the temptationmdashtouse technology and command automation to centralize operations further Ironicallythis is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to makedecisions in real time a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-ally fought local limited wars under informatized conditionsmdashan experience thatChina lacks entirely These factors not the technical parameters of satellites and othersensors will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISRsystem employment The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the IinanMilitary Region which is a logical joint reform test bed because it has all servicesrepresented as well as a fleet headquarters but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjingand Guangzhou Military Regions which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea respectively
Geostrategic Implications
Chinas air- and space-based surveillance platformsmdashtogether with their supportinginfrastructure human and otherwisemdashare improving rapidly but remain incompleteand are experiencing growing pains As Larry Wortzel emphasizes The duration on sta-tion of its AWACS aircraft is short their range is limited and not all of them are capableof aerial refueling Most of the PLNs combat ships and aircraft can engage in networkedoperations but can handle only a limited number of targets In addition not all of theweapons they carry can receive the networked combat data91 As a result neither thePLAAF nor the rest of the PLA can field and operate a fully digitized force that can takeadvantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-nated manner92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems increasing-ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targetingso efficiently in US allied and friendly militaries that might operate close to China
Institutional wrangling for control of Chinas space assets continues The sprawlingstovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control thesatelliteC4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interserviceinterlevel and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 113
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety of
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory it
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assurance
is more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than
that of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines
high-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-
poral segregation Chinarsquos emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power
on the nationrsquos maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinarsquos military awareness
coordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR System Informationalization and Joint Operations in the Peoplersquos Liberation Armyrdquo in The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinarsquos Military ed Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Pa US Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung ldquoScience and Technology in Chinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovation as Seen through Its Technology Development Programsrdquo (presentation at ldquoIGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationship between National Security and Technology in Chinardquo La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council January 2009) available at merln nduedu
4 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo pp 196ndash97
5 Ibid6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its Reach
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles Va Potomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 278 Ibid p 1499 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China A Roadmap to 2050 (Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoplersquos Republic of China Chinarsquos National Defense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office of the State Council 31 March 2011) available at newsxinhuanetcom
12 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 204
13 ldquoChinarsquos UAV into a Period of Fast Progressrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 7 February 2013 english peopledailycomcn
14 For details including regarding UAVs see Andrew Erickson ldquoChinarsquos Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilitiesrdquo in Strategic Asia 2012ndash13 Chinarsquos Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle Wash National Bureau of Asian Research 2012) pp 72ndash74 119ndash25 and Andrew S Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan and Samuel Septembre ldquoResearch Development and Acquisition in Chinarsquos Aviation Industry J-10 and Pterodactyl UAVrdquo in Kevin Pollpeter ed Getting to Innovation Assessing Chinarsquos Defense Research Development and Acquisition System (La Jolla CA University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation January 2014) pp 62ndash66 igccucsdedu
15 ldquoKJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control Systemrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
16 Carlo Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcom
fusion to support kinetic operations While China may be able to employ a variety ofstrategies to conduct centralized non-space-based CLIISR operations near its territory itmay find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield where information assuranceis more elusive
Despite these ongoing challenges counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier CLIISR task thanthat of the United States The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness andchallenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlineshigh-power line-of-sight communications advanced planning and geographic and tem-poral segregation Chinas emerging CLIISR capabilities are already undergirding growingcounterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military poweron the nations maritime periphery In the near seas at least Chinas military awarenesscoordination and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously
Notes
1 Kevin Pollpeter Towards an IntegrativeC4ISR System Informationalization and JointOperations in the Peoples Liberation Armyin The PLA at Home and Abroad Assessing theOperational Capabilities of Chinas Military edRoy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle PaUS Army War College and National Bureau ofAsian Research 2010) p 196
2 Tai Ming Cheung Science and Technology inChinese Thinking on Security and Develop-ment Techno-nationalism and SampT Innovationas Seen through Its Technology DevelopmentPrograms (presentation at IGCC 2012 Sum-mer Training Workshop on the Relationshipbetween National Security and Technology inChina La Jolla Calif 10 July 2012)
3 Peoples Republic of China Chinas National De-fense in 2008 (Beijing Information Office of theState Council January 2009) available at merinndthedui
4 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem pp 196-97
5 Ibid
6 Larry M Wortzel The Dragon Extends Its ReachChinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles VaPotomac Books 2013) p 41
7 Ibid p 27
8 Ibid p 149
9 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2012) p 8
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 3
10 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China A Roadmap to 2050
(Beijing Science 2010) p 37
11 Peoples Republic of China Chinas NationalDefense in 2010 (Beijing Information Office ofthe State Council 31 March 2011) available atnewsainhuanetcomi
12 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 204
13 Chinas UAV into a Period of Fast ProgressPeoples Daily Online 7 February 2013 englishpeopledailycomcni
14 For details including regarding UAVs seeAndrew Erickson Chinas Modernizationof Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities inStrategic Asia 2012-13 Chinas Military Chal-lenge ed Ashley J Tellis and Travis Tanner(Seattle Wash National Bureau of AsianResearch 2012) pp 72-74119-25 and AndrewS Erickson Hanlu Lu Kathryn Bryan andSamuel Septembre Research Development andAcquisition in Chinas Aviation Industry J-10and Pterodactyl UAV in Kevin Pollpeter edGetting to Innovation Assessing Chinas DefenseResearch Development and Acquisition System(La Jolla CA University of California Instituteon Global Conflict and Cooperation January2014) pp 62-66 igccucsdedui
15 KJ-2000 Airborne Warning amp Control SystemChinas Defence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
16 Carlo Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies Diplo-mat 11 August 2010 thediplomatcomi
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
114 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
17 ldquoNavy Chinardquo Janersquos Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December 2010 wwwjanescom
18 Carlo Kopp ldquoThe PLA-AFrsquos Airborne Early Warning amp Control Programsrdquo Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the PLA or not intended for PLA use are as follows The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006 Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement to develop a ldquomutually suitablerdquo AWACS it was demonstrated at Pakistanrsquos Chaklala Air Force Base in March 2007 Pakistanrsquos air force reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft in September 2008 with one delivery per year envisioned for 2011ndash14 two airframes have been confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally the KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for PLA use ldquoSAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)rdquo Janersquos All the Worldrsquos Aircraft 8 July 2013 www janescom
20 ldquoYun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
21 ldquoY-8 lsquoBalance Beamrsquo Airborne Early Warning Aircraftrdquo Chinarsquos Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom
22 See for example ldquoObservation Post of Military Situationrdquo Military News Phoenix TV 21 June 2006
23 Kopp ldquoChinarsquos Eyes in the Skiesrdquo24 Torbjoslashrg Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragon
Inside Chinarsquos New Model Navyrdquo Janersquos Navy International 20 April 2011 wwwjanescom
25 Coatepeque ldquoPLAAF 26th Specialized Divisionrdquo China Defense Blog 14 April 2009 china-defenseblogspotcom ldquoChina Y-8 AEW Aircraftrdquo Chinese Military Aviation 1 April 2008 cnairtop81cn
26 ldquoKJ-200 in Service with PLA Navyrdquo Alert 5 Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5 com
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China (Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 ldquoChina Air Forcerdquo Janersquos World Air Forces 4 June 2013 wwwjanescom
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper Modern Chinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110ndash12
30 Barbara Starr ldquoChinese Boats Harassed US Ship Officials Sayrdquo CNNcom 5 May 2009 This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance (ѝഭ⎧ⴁ) as opposed to a PLAN aircraft China Marine Surveillance has several Y-12s See ldquoChina Marine Surveillance Harbin Y-12-II (B-2087)rdquo wwwflickrcomphotos kentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
32 㪓㤡䳬 [Dong Yingsun] ldquoᡁѝ㔗ছᱏ㔏ࡍᇎ⧠䱶⎧オཙཊ㔤ᓄrdquo [Our Relay Sat-ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea Air Outer Space and Electronic Multidimensional Applications] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For the quotation US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 9
33 ldquoTianlian 1-03rdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space Science amp Technology in China p 76
35 ldquoFengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos Defense Today www sinodefencecom
ᨑ᮷ [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen]⦻ ࡈ 36ldquoഭ䱢བྷ൘ᗞሿছᱏࡦ亶ฏਆᗇ䟽㾱ケrdquo [National University of Defense Technology Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of Microsatellite Research and Development] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012ߋjzchinamilcomcn
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping ldquolj⎧кᮠᆇൠᖒছᱏ㔈ᢰᵟ㿴〻NJ䙊䗷уᇦ䇴ᇑrdquo [ldquoStipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-pingrdquo Passes Expertsrsquo Evaluation] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from 䍪䵎 䍪ৼ仌 ⦻Ӂ伎 ᶘ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ [He Mingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and Yang Qian Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China] ୀߋ ഭᇦছᱏ⎧ᓄѝᗳ [Tang Junwu National Satellite Oceanic Application Center] and 㜑Ր≁ ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖ⎧䚕ᝏウᡰ 㖾ഭই㖇䟼䗮བྷᆖ [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute Ocean University of China and University of South Florida] ldquoѝഭছᱏ⎧㿲㔏Րᝏಘ(1988ndash2025)rdquo [Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)] ѝഭ⎧བྷᆖᆖᣕ [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93ndash95
11 4 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
17 Navy China Janes Sentinel Security Assess-ment China and Northeast Asia 9 December2010 wwwjanescomi
18 Carlo Kopp The PLA-AFs Airborne EarlyWarning amp Control Programs Air Power Aus-tralia 3 May 2011
19 Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in thePLA or not intended for PLA use are as followsThe T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly under-went testing at China Flight Test Establish-ment Yanliang in 2005 Following a 2006Sino- Pakistanjoint development agreementto develop a mutually suitable AWACS itwas demonstrated at Pakistans Chaklala AirForce Base in March 2007 Pakistans air forcereportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraftin September 2008 with one delivery per yearenvisioned for 2011-14 two airframes havebeen confirmed in Pakistan to date Finally theKZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant forPLA use SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions)Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 8 July 2013 wwwlanescomi
20 Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft ChinasDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
21 Y-8 Balance Beam Airborne EarlyWarning Aircraft Chinas Defence Todaywwwsinodefencecomi
22 See for example Observation Post of MilitarySituation Military News Phoenix TV 21 June2006
23 Kopp Chinas Eyes in the Skies
24 Torbjorg Hemmingsen Enter the DragonInside Chinas New Model Navy Janes NavyInternational 20 April 2011 wwwjanescomi
25 Coatepeque PLAAF 26th SpecializedDivision China Defense Blog 14 April 2009china-defenseblogspotcomi China Y-8 AEWAircraft Chinese Military Aviation 1 April2008 cnairtop81cni
26 KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy Alert 5Military Aviation News 18 August 2011 alert5comi
27 US Defense Dept Annual Report to CongressMilitary and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic of China (Washington DCOffice of the Secretary of Defense 2007) p 6
28 China Air Force Janes World Air Forces 4June 2013 wwwjanescomi
29 Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper ModernChinese Warplanes Combat Aircraft and Unitsof the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation(Houston Tex Harpia 2012) pp 110-12
30 Barbara Starr Chinese Boats Harassed USShip Officials Say CNNcom 5 May 2009This may have been a China Marine Surveil-lance ( IPEI) iA) as opposed to a PLANaircraft China Marine Surveillance has severalY-12s See China Marine Surveillance HarbinY-12-II (B-2087) wwwilickrcomphotoskentaroiemoto4318168187
31 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 9
32 K t [Dong Yingsunl R [P41i l ] l i f r [Our Relay Sat-
ellite System Tentatively Realizes Land Sea AirOuter Space and Electronic MultidimensionalApplications] [PL IV- 1 [China MilitaryIndustry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 For thequotation US Defense Dept Annual Report toCongress (2012) p 9
33 Tianlian 1-03 Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomsatellites=38730
34 Huadong Guo and Ji Wu eds Space ScienceTechnology in China p 76
35 FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22A) Tactical Commu-nications Satellite Chinas Defense Today wwwsinodefencecomi
36 A M [ L i u Jun and Wang Wowen]
VA [National University of Defense TechnologyGains Important Breakthroughs in the Field ofMicrosatellite Research and Development]RWIR [Liberation Army Daily] 10 May 2012jzchinamilcomcni
37 Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping I tit)f2VAMIAAlfT))[Stipulated Technical Procedure for MaritimeTerrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Map-ping Passes Experts Evaluation] A - 4 bull[Peoples Navy] 6 June 2009 p 1
38 Unless otherwise specified data in this para-graph derived from JIT
11F1Wif 4-4MT111_8fMW [HeMingxia He Shuangyan Wang Yunfei and YangQian Ocean Remote Sensing Research InstituteOcean University of China] f f i - I t J 4 n e f l ] [I1J(2 [Tang Junwu National SatelliteOceanic Application Center] and n IMKFI444-WiT)11AWV)i 111A-1AWNi t A t [Hu Chuanmin Ocean Remote SensingResearch Institute Ocean University of Chinaand University of South Florida] [PEITMjk
1)L10d --AR1418g(1988-2025) [ChineseSpaceborne Ocean Observing Systems andOnboard Sensors (1988-2025)]44- [Periodical of Ocean University of China]41 no 12 (December 2011) pp 93-95
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 115
39 For details of relevant programs see Li Deren ldquoChinese Earth Observation Missionsrdquo (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Li is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing Center of China and Laboratory for Information Engineering in Surveying Mapping and Remote Sensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan Delu ldquoPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missions for Ocean Remote Sensingrdquo (presentation ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing 15ndash20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo pp 93ndash95
41 ldquoSatellites Will Help Predict Disastersrdquo China Daily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcn
42 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescom
43 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 92
44 Ibid pp 100ndash10145 Ibid p 97 For the ldquosmall sat busrdquo ldquoYaogan
Seriesrdquo 46 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo47 He Mingxia et al ldquoChinese Spaceborne Ocean
Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988ndash2025)rdquo p 93
48 ldquoYaogan Seriesrdquo49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of White Cloud the
Soviet Cosmos satellite system and maritime monitoring satellites more broadly see 哴≹᮷ [Huang Hanwen] ldquo⎧ⴞḷཙสൠ㔬ਸᝏᢰᵟrdquo [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness Technology for Marine Targets] 㡚ཙᆀሩᣇ [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp 11ndash13 48
50 Maj A Andronov ldquoKosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA lsquoUayt Klaudrsquordquo [The US Navyrsquos ldquoWhite Cloudrdquo Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7 (1993) pp 57ndash60 Available in translation by Allen Thomson at wwwfasorg
51 ldquoYaogan 9B DEBrdquo ldquoReal Time Satellite Tracking and Predictionsrdquo ITPROSTAR wwwn2yo comsatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004 available at iipdigitalusembassygov
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and Naval Operationsrdquo Project 2049 Institute (23 February 2011) p 4 project2049net
54 Ibid p 1055 ldquoShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satelliterdquo Chinarsquos
Defence Today wwwsinodefencecom56 Hemmingsen ldquoEnter the Dragonrdquo Easton and
Stokes ldquoChinarsquos Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developmentsrdquo p 14
57 ldquoBeidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Timesrdquo Want China Times 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimes com Minnie Chan ldquolsquoUnforgettable Humili-ationrsquo Led to Development of GPS Equivalentrdquo South China Morning Post 13 November 2009 available at wwwasiafinestcom
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS Խ䖙 [Wu Xuan Academy of Space Technology China Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] ldquoᯇሬ㡚ޛབྷᡈѹ--ኅᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏 ሶ䘋а᧘㡚ཙᕪഭᔪ䇮 ҏѪѝഭ㡚ཙⲴਾ㔝ኅᨀᓄⲴᢰᵟrdquo [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development of Chinarsquos Spaceflight Industry] ⷝᵋ [Liaowang] no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8ndash10 For relevant Chinese training see ᾬߋ⦻ ߋ [Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun] ldquo⊸オ㡚オޥ䳶ഒ༽ᵲ⧟ຳл㓳rdquo [Shenyang Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] オߋᣕ [Air Force News] 26 May 2010 p 1
59 ᢜᘇ䘌 [Yang Zhiyuan] ldquoѝഭᯇ㘰ᱏオmdash߉൘ѝഭᯇሬ㡚㔏䎠䘋Ⲯဃѻ䱵rdquo [Chinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky Chinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013 p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see ᵾㆡẵ [Li Xiaomei] ldquo儈Ѫᒯ ᗳᯇнҶᛵrdquo [Gao Weiguang Forever Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 1 December 2012 p 3 For progress in related research and programs see 兿䭖᮷ [Wei Jinwen] ldquo10亩ޣ䭞ᢰᵟ lsquoᯇrsquo ছᱏሬ㡚㔏㓴㖁rdquo [10 Key Technologies Assist in ldquoBeidourdquo Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] ѝഭߋᐕᣕ [China Military Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1 and 䂩ݸ嗉 ࡈ⪎ॾ ᶘݶᆱ [Zhan Xianlong
39 For details of relevant programs see Li DerenChinese Earth Observation Missions (presen-tation Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2Kick Off Symposium Beijing 11 April 2008 Liis affiliated with the National Remote SensingCenter of China and Laboratory for InformationEngineering in Surveying Mapping and RemoteSensing [Wuhan University]) and Pan DeluPresent and Future Chinese Satellite Missionsfor Ocean Remote Sensing (presentationESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd AdvancedTraining Course in Ocean Remote Sensing15-20 October 2007 Hangzhou China)
40 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) pp 93-95
41 Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters ChinaDaily 31 March 2009 wwwchinaviewcni
42 Yaogan Series Janes Space Systems and Indus-try 12 November 2013 wwwjanescomi
43 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 92
44 Ibid pp 100-101
45 Ibid p 97 For the small sat bus YaoganSeries
46 Yaogan Series
47 He Mingxia et al Chinese Spaceborne OceanObserving Systems and Onboard Sensors(1988-2025) p 93
48 Yaogan Series
49 Ibid For Chinese analysis of WHITE CLOUD theSoviet Cosmos satellite system and maritimemonitoring satellites more broadly see bulla[Huang Hanwen] ) i fa [Space-Based Comprehensive AwarenessTechnology for Marine Targets] )ri
[Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27 no 6 pp11-1348
50 Maj A Andronov Kosmicheskaya SistemaRadiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA UaytKlaud [The US Navys White Cloud Space-borne ELINT System] Zarubezhnoye VoyennoyeObozreniye [Foreign Military Review] no 7(1993) pp 57-60 Available in translation byAllen Thomson at wwwfasorgi
51 Yaogan 9B DEB Real Time Satellite Trackingand Predictions ITPROSTAR wwwn2yocomisatellites=38303
52 Richard P Lawless Statement before the SenateForeign Relations Committee Subcommittee onEast Asian and Pacific Affairs 23 April 2004available at iipdigitaLusembassygovi
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 5
53 Ian Easton and Mark A Stokes Chinas Elec-tronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Develop-ments Implications for US Air and NavalOperations Project 2049 Institute (23 February2011) p 4 project2049neti
54 Ibid p 10
55 Shfilan 6 Scientific Research Satellite ChDefence Today wwwsinodefencecomi
56 Hemmingsen Enter the Dragon Easton andStokes Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)Satellite Developments p 14
57 Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Depen-dence on US Global Times Want ChinaTimes 1 January 2013 wwwwantchinatimescomi Minnie Chan Unforgettable Humili-ation Led to Development of GPS EquivalentSouth China Morning Post 13 November 2009available at wwwasiafinestcomi
58 For access to GPS and GLONASS 1Efl [WuXuan Academy of Space Technology ChinaAerospace Science and Technology Corpora-tion] JL11--MA1 I Z - A R A L 4 T
-Lyslrls-gr [Eight Major Strategic Significances of theBeidou Satellite Navigation System Developingthe Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will GiveGreater Impetus to Construction of China into aSpace Power and Will Prepare Relevant Techni-cal Reserves for Subsequent Development ofChinas Spaceflight Industry] bdquo T [Liaowang]no 44 (29 October 2012) pp 8-10 For relevantChinese training see 4 [ L o uYongjun and Wang Jun]
N t t I )Jhr [Shenyang Military RegionAir Force Air Regiment Practices Offense andDefense in Complex Electromagnetic Environ-ments] 9-IfK [Air Force News] 26 May 2010p 1
59 j j 3 [Yang Zhiyuan] FP F I A L 4 I N I _ bullAr lst1111L4-tE-AtAffAtaZg[Chinas Beidou Glitters in the Starry SkyChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation System En-ters the World of Ordinary People] [11114--ifK[China Military Industry News] 3 January 2013p 3 For further documentation of complexi-ties involved see bull11sq [Li Xiaomei] A]hr [ G o o Weiguang ForeverDedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou] [1111--iTK [China Military Industry News] 1 December2012 p 3 For progress in related research andprograms see 11$ [ W e i Iinwen] 10TIi1)3J2 1L4 [ l o KeyTechnologies Assist in Beidon Satellite Naviga-tion System Networking] rls FIV-TTK [ChinaMilitary Industry News] 3 November 2012 p 1and fa i f E [ Z h a n Xianlong
nas
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
116 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] ldquoᯇ㔏Ṭ㖁ቲᔦ䘏ウrdquo [A Study on the Grid Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou] 㡚ཙ᧗ࡦ [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February 2012) pp 15ndash19
60 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo Janersquos Space Systems and Industry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescom
61 ldquoThe 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent into Space by a Long Marchndash3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday from Xichang Satellite Launch Centerrdquo ߋһᣕ䚃 [Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130 GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo China Daily Online 20 February 2013 www chinadailycomcn
64 Wu Xuan ldquoEight Major Strategic Significances of the Beidou Satellite Navigation Systemrdquo p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Satellite Navigation System Goes Globalrdquo Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledailycomcn
66 Yang Zhiyuan ldquoChinarsquos Beidou Glitters in the Starry Skyrdquo p 3
67 ᆹᲞᘐ [An Puzhong] ldquo㤳䮯嗉൘䀓ߋছᱏሬ㡚ᇊսᙫㄉ㘳ሏᰦᕪ䈳 ᡯጠ䖹а㘳ሏ᧘ᯇছᱏሬ㡚㔏ᴤ儈ቲ⅑ᴤ儈leᒣኅrdquo [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite Navigation and Positioning General Station Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with Him Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite Navigation System to a Higher Standard] 䀓 ᣕ [Liberation Army Daily] 29 Decemberߋ2012 ldquoBeidouCompassrdquo
68 For tracking vehicles ᵾᗧߟ ޘ䠁 [Li Dequan and Feng Jinyuan] ldquo䖖㹼ॳ䟼 lsquoа㓯rsquordquo [ldquoTetheredrdquo on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 4 December 2012 p 3 For communicating 㪓ᘇ᮷ ߟ䠁 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan] ldquoḀᔪࡦ䘌〻ᵪ䭔ᓄᙕ㜭rdquo [Bri-gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-Distance Movement Contingency Capabilities] ޥᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 and ઘՐࡊ 䱸 䱸⎧ߋ 㪋ᶮ [Zhou Chuangang Chen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] ldquo䍤ᇎ⧠ᡈᶴᔪᒣਠ--Ҽ䜘䱏ᕪ᧘䘋䙊ᡈ㜭ᔪ䇮䇮㓚ᇎѻҼrdquo [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual Combat Part Two of Record of Second Artillery Units Forcefully Advancing Communications Combat-Readiness Capability Construction] ᣕ [Rocket Forces News] 12 Decemberޥ2012 pp 1ndash2
69 Cheng Yingqi ldquoNavigation System Set to Soarrdquo70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S Erickson
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DC Jamestown Foundation May 2013) available at wwwjamestownorg
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remain in constant motion and thus take snapshots of predesignated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but would consume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Linksrdquo Naval War College Review 62 no 4 (Autumn 2009) pp 87ndash115 appendix pp A-1 and A-2
73 ldquoѝഭ儈㿲rdquo [The China High-Resolution Earth Observation System] (Beijing Earth Observation System and Data Center China National Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102ndash10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will include the PLAAF (which controls most air assets) the Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic missiles) and the ground forces (which have apparently been given some ballistic missiles and which may face further organizational challenges if they restructure away from their present seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress (2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi ldquoProvid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation Technology Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake Rescue and Relief Effortrdquo Zhanqi Bao 21 May 2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft ᕐᖖߋ ⋉ᘇӞ [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang] ldquo㜑ᙫҖ䇠ᤷᥕᣇ䴷Ⲵ䚕ᝏമᱟԆԜⲴ ᙫ⨶䜘㖢ᣇ䴷ᐕⲴ䚕ᝏᮠᦞᱟԆԜᨀⲴ а㓴㓴ᮠᦞ аᑵᑵᲠമ ⎧㡚Ḁഒ䚕ᝏ伎ᵪѝ䱏Ѫᢃ䎒ᣇ䴷䘉൪ԇнҶmdash४кオ lsquorsquo ਧrdquo [ldquoJiangzhuangrdquo Planes Flying in the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area They Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake Rescue and Relief Effort They Provided the Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work The Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
11 6 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
Liu Ruihua and Yang Zhaoning] t - AfrKA ERA-a g amp q [ 1 1 [A Study on the GridIonospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou]MPI [Aerospace Control] 30 no 1 (February2012) pp 15-19
60 BeidouCompass Janes Space Systems andIndustry 20 November 2012 wwwjanescomi
61 The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sentinto Space by a Long March-3C [Changzheng-3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterdayfrom Xichang Satellite Launch Center - -
[Military Report] CCTV-7 (Mandarin) 1130GMT 26 October 2012
62 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
63 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to SoarChina Daily Online 20 February 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
64 Wu Xuan Eight Major Strategic Significancesof the Beidou Satellite Navigation System p 10
65 For Pakistan Jiang Lianjv and Yang BaofengChinas Beidou Satellite Navigation SystemGoes Global Liberation Army Daily 23 Novem-ber 2012 englishpeopledallycomcni
66 Yang Zhiyuan Chinas Beidou Glitters in theStarry Sky p 3
67 5 L L s [An Puzhong] -fTE-K)Erflt i MV-T)A- ON
Ift4JAL4TwEtArniIiva-E(XII1371(R [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite
Navigation and Positioning General StationFang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour withHim Call for Developing the Beidou SatelliteNavigation System to a Higher Standard]
[Liberation Army Daily] 29 December2012 BeidouCompass
68 For tracking vehiclesV i c t ]Rj-FiN [LiDequan and Feng Jinyuan]
[Tethered on the Whole of a Thousand-Mile Drive] ) (a mR [Rocket Forces News] 4December 2012 p 3 For communicating
[Dong Zhiwen and Feng Iinyuan]1 V I [Bri-
gade Tempers Its Whole-Unit Long-DistanceMovement Contingency Capabilities] )KruM]1[Rocket Forces News] 9 October 2012 p 2 andMi PI Mt WW1 t L [Zhou ChuangangChen Cai Chen Haijun and Ge Song] 910 a i h M l i t i k t f i s - - = ) M M U J I A d M
= [Building Informa-tion Platforms with Close Adherence to ActualCombat Part Two of Record of Second ArtilleryUnits Forcefully Advancing CommunicationsCombat-Readiness Capability Construction])Kafr-IB [Rocket Forces News] 12 December2012 pp 1-2
69 Cheng Yingqi Navigation System Set to Soar
70 For detailed analysis see Andrew S EricksonChinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Develop-ment Drivers Trajectories and Strategic Impli-cations Occasional Paper (Washington DCJamestown Foundation May 2013) available atwwwjamestownorgi
71 They must be based in low earth orbit remainin constant motion and thus take snapshots ofpredesignated areas at periodic and predictablerevisit times Shifting orbits could temporar-ily and slightly improve coverage but wouldconsume precious fuel
72 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin Chinas Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Developments and Miss-ing Links Naval War College Review 62 no 4(Autumn 2009) pp 87-115 appendix pp A-1and A-2
FrIFIAII-AlIll [The China High-ResolutionEarth Observation System] (Beijing EarthObservation System and Data Center ChinaNational Space Administration 2013)
74 Ibid pp 102-10375 In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea
undersea and some air assets) this will includethe PLAAF (which controls most air assets) theSecond Artillery (which controls most ballisticmissiles) and the ground forces (which haveapparently been given some ballistic missilesand which may face further organizationalchallenges if they restructure away from theirpresent seven-military-region organization)
76 US Defense Dept Annual Report to Congress(2012) p 8
77 For imagery Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi Provid-ing Remote Sensing Imagery Producing Satel-lite Cloud ImagerymdashInformation TechnologyStrengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in EarthquakeRescue and Relief Effort Zhangi Bao 21 May2008 p 5 For remote-sensing aircraft
[Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang]
1111 V I A R9A 11P i]] n it IS Iamptin Tot n
ICA MPAITICA-0-141RMTfi l tfAak9plusmn(AtEliAl- TAVA--9A
niangzhuang Planes Flying inthe Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area TheyTook the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Usedby General Secretary Hu to Direct the QuakeRescue and Relief Effort They Provided theRemote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen toDeploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work TheRemote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a NavalAviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritori-ous Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 117
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures] Ӫ≁⎧ߋ [Peoplersquos Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1 For UAV damage surveys ༿ᘇᆷ [Xia Zhiyu] ldquolsquoॾ咠rsquo 㘡㘄ᣇ䴷rdquo [ldquoGolden Eaglerdquo Seismic Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] ޥಘ䇶 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249 no 7 (July 2008) pp 20ndash21 Martin Andrew ldquoNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISRrdquo Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9 no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcn
79 ldquoDamaged Water Projects in Chinarsquos Quake Area lsquoNeed Special Carersquordquo Xinhua 15 May 2008 news xinhuanetcom
80 ldquoResolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake Tragedyrdquo editorial South China Morning Post (Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008 available at wwwscmpcom
81 ldquo15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake Relief Effortsrdquo
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litao and Wei Chengjie ldquoInvestigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial Information Technologyrdquo Disaster Advances 3 no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwslrsscn See also S Zheng et al ldquoAssessment of the Degree of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne Datardquo Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2 no 2 (2011) pp 141ndash57 wwwtandfonline com
83 ldquoChina No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image Importsrdquo Xinhua 10 January 2013 www chinadailycomcn
84 These include GAD responsible for launch facilities and on-orbit command and control GSD responsible for their military operations such nonmilitary organizations as the State Oceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee for Disaster Reduction the Ministry for Land and Resources and the Science and Technology Ministry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilian universities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin ldquoChinarsquos Antiship Ballistic Missilerdquo pp 87ndash115 appendix pages A-1 and A-2
86 Ibid pp 96ndash9887 For an apparently official Chinese denial of this
possibility see ldquoChina Grounds lsquoSpace Forcersquo Talkrdquo Peoplersquos Daily Online 6 November 2009 englishpeopledailycomcn
88 A group of five hundred Second Artillery researchers has studied ldquoouter space security strategyrdquo and ldquospace operationsrdquo according to Ҽᤷᥕᆖ䲒 [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] ldquoᯠц㓚䲒ṑᮉᆖ䶙എ亮rdquo [Looking Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and Schools in the New Century] in 䖹❼ᒤԓ എ亮൘䶙ᔰѝኅ䘋ⲴㅜҼޥ [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second Artillery Development and Advances in the Reform and Opening Period 1978ndash2008] ed ㅜҼ [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing ѝཞ᮷⥞ [Central Literature] 2008) p 578
89 Pollpeter ldquoTowards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-temrdquo p 207
90 Ibid p 21891 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 4492 Ibid p 72
Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing ManySets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures]AK444-1 [Peoples Navy] 21 May 2008 p 1For UAV damage surveysL P [ X i a Zhiyul- W V -$MAITLATCX [Golden Eagle SeismicDefense Soaring and Helping People in the Di-saster] [ O r d n a n c e Knowledge] 249no 7 (July 2008) pp 20-21 Martin AndrewNew Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospaceand ISR Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9no 2 (22 January 2009)
78 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts fiefangiun Bao [Liberation ArmyDaily] 22 May 2008 englishchinamilcomcni
79 Damaged Water Projects in Chinas Quake AreaNeed Special Care Xinhua 15 May 2008 newsAinhuanetcomi
80 Resolve Needed in Next Phase of QuakeTragedy editorial South China Morning Post(Sunday Morning Post edition) 18 May 2008available at wwwscmpcomi
81 15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with QuakeRelief Efforts
82 Wang Futao Zhou Yi Wang Shixin Wang Litaoand Wei Chengjie Investigation and Assess-ment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggeredby the Yushu Earthquake Using GeospatialInformation Technology Disaster Advances 3no 4 (October 2010) p 3 wwwsIrsscni Seealso S Zheng et al Assessment of the Degreeof Building Damage Caused by the 2010 YushuChina Earthquake Using Satellite and AirborneData Geomatics Natural Hazards and Risk 2no 2 (2011) pp 141-57 wwwtandfonlinecomi
83 China No Longer Reliant on Satellite ImageImports Xinhua 10 January 2013 wwwchinadailycomcni
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 1 7
84 These include GAD responsible for launchfacilities and on-orbit command and controlGSD responsible for their military operationssuch nonmilitary organizations as the StateOceanic Administration the China Meteoro-logical Agency the National Committee forDisaster Reduction the Ministry for Land andResources and the Science and TechnologyMinistry such state-owned enterprises as Chi-naDBsat APTgroup and Asiasat and civilianuniversities such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang
85 Hagt and Durnin Chinas Antiship BallisticMissile pp 87-115 appendix pages A-1 andA-2
86 Ibid pp 96-98
87 For an apparently official Chinese denial of thispossibility see China Grounds Space ForceTalk Peoples Daily Online 6 November 2009englishpeopledailycomcni
88 A group of five hundred Second Artilleryresearchers has studied outer space securitystrategy and space operations according to EAM I V PA [Second Artillery Command Col-lege] M g t E r t r t O A 111 0 0 [LookingBack on Reform of Teaching at Academies andSchools in the New Century] in )14111ItIfficampT)fh-A[PRRATIAIYME3NA [Glori-ous Era Looking Back on Second ArtilleryDevelopment and Advances in the Reform andOpening Period 1978-2008] ed M-ElA [Sec-ond Artillery Political Department] (Beijing [J I f ( [ C e n t r a l Literature] 2008) p578
89 Pollpeter Towards an Integrative C4ISR Sys-tem p 207
90 Ibid p 218
91 Wortzel Dragon Extends Its Reach p 44
92 Ibid p 72
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
Chinarsquos Near Seas Combat Capabilities
wwwusnwceduResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson and Ryan Martinson Editors
Chinas Near Seas Combat Capabilities
Peter Dutton Andrew S Erickson andRyan Martinson Editors
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTEUS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport Rhode Island
wwwusnwceduiResearchmdashGamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode Island Center for Naval Warfare Studies China Maritime Study No 11 February 2014
President Naval War College Rear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
Provost Amb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies Robert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series Peter Dutton
Naval War College Press
Director Dr Carnes Lord Managing Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236 Fax 4018413579 DSN exchange 841 E-mail pressusnwcedu Web wwwusnwcedupress wwwtwittercomNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects
that the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and the
President of the Naval War College consider of particular
interest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies
may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute wwwusnwceduResearch---Gaming
China-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-
ditional copies or subscription consideration please direct
inquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College
686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207
or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mail
addresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act
of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States This
document may be freely reproduced for academic or other
noncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-
tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series
and that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercial
purposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Naval War College
Newport Rhode IslandCenter for Naval Warfare StudiesChina Maritime Study No 11February 2014
President Naval War CollegeRear Admiral Walter E Carter Jr US Navy
ProvostAmb Mary Ann Peters
Dean of Naval Warfare StudiesRobert C Rubel
Director of China Maritime Studies Instituteand editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies seriesPeter Dutton
Naval War College PressDirector Dr Carnes LordManaging Editor Pelham G Boyer
Telephone 4018412236Fax 4018413579DSN exchange 841E-mail pressusnwceduWeb wwwusnwceduipresswwwtwittercomiNavalWarCollege
Printed in the United States of America
The China Maritime Studies are extended research projectsthat the editor the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and thePresident o f the Naval War College consider of particularinterest to policy makers scholars and analysts
Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studiesmay be addressed to the director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute wwwusnwceduiResearch---GamingChina-Maritime-Studies-Instituteaspx To request ad-ditional copies or subscription consideration please directinquiries to the President Code 32A Naval War College686 Cushing Road Newport Rhode Island 02841-1207or contact the Press staff at the telephone fax or e-mailaddresses given
Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Actof 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States Thisdocument may be freely reproduced for academic or othernoncommercial use however it is requested that reproduc-tions credit the author and China Maritime Studies seriesand that the Press editorial office be informed To obtain
permission to reproduce this publication for commercialpurposes contact the Press editorial office
ISSN 1943-0817
ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
Contents
CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial 1 by John Patch
CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and Chinarsquos Antisubmarine Warfare Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness 17 by William S Murray
CHAPTER THREE Chinarsquos Second Artillery Force Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas 31 by Ron Christman
CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and Chinarsquos Counterstrike Doctrine in the Near Seas 49 by Daniel J Kostecka
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas 61 by David Shlapak
CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in Chinarsquos Near Seas 75 by Eric D Pedersen
CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas 87 by Andrew S Erickson
CHAPTER EIGHT Chinarsquos Surface Fleet Trajectory Implications for the US Navy 119 by Timothy A Walton and Bryan McGrath
Abbreviations and Definitions 132
About the Contributors 136
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A2AD antiaccess area denial
AAD area air defense
AAW antiair warfare
AESA active electronically scanned array
AEW airborne early warning
AIP air-independent propulsion
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASCM antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the US
Airborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command control communications and intelligence
systems
C4ISR command control communications computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST China Academy of Space Technology
CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
CEP circular error probable
CIWS close-in weapon system
CMC Central Military Commission
Abbreviations and Definitions
A A 2 A D a n t i a c c e s s area denial
AAD a r e a air defense
AAW a n t i a i r warfare
AESA a c t i v e electronically scanned array
AEW a i r b o r n e early warning
AIP a i r - i n d e p e n d e n t propulsion
AIS A u t o m a t i c Identification System
ASBM a n t i s h i p ballistic missile
ASCM a n t i s h i p cruise missile
ASUW a n t i s u r f a c e warfare
ASW a n t i s u b m a r i n e warfare
AWACS a i r b o r n e warning and control system [or the USAirborne Warning and Control System in the E-3 Sentry]
C C 3 I c o m m a n d control communications and intelligencesystems
CLIISR c o m m a n d control communications computersintelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CAST C h i n a Academy of Space Technology
CATO BAR c a t a p u l t - a s s i s t e d takeoff but arrested recovery
CBERS C h i n a - B r a z i l Earth Resources Satellite
CDCM c o a s t a l - d e f e n s e cruise missile
CEP c i r c u l a r error probable
CIWS c l o s e - i n weapon system
CM C C e n t r a l Military Commission
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 133
COMINT communications intelligence
CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D DDG guided-missile destroyer
DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
DoD Department of Defense [US]
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO electro-optical
ESM electronic support measures
EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude long-endurance
HE high explosive
HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
IRST infrared search and track
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
I L D D G g u i d e d - m i s s i l e destroyer
DMC D i s a s t e r Monitoring Constellation
DoD D e p a r t m e n t of Defense [US]
F E E Z e x c l u s i v e economic zone
ELINT e l e c t r o n i c intelligence
EC) e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l
ESM e l e c t r o n i c support measures
EW e l e c t r o n i c warfare
F F A E f u e l - a i r explosive
FDO f l e x i b l e deterrent option
FFG g u i d e d - m i s s i l e frigate
COM INT c o m m u n i c a t i o n s intelligence
CSG [ a i r c r a f t ] carrier strike group
CSIC C h i n a Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
GAD
GLONASS
GPS
GSD
General Armaments Department
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 3
Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnayanavigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
Global Positioning System
General Staff Department
FT HALE h i g h - a l t i t u d e long-endurance
HE h i g h explosive
HFSWR h i g h - f r e q u e n c y surface-wave radar
IGS0 i n c l i n e d geostationary orbit
IRST i n f r a r e d search and track
SR i n t e l l i g e n c e surveillance and reconnaissance
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
134 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
K kgkN kilograms per kilonewton
km kilometers
KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LO low-observable
LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH over-the-horizon
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA Peoplersquos Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoplersquos Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF Peoplersquos Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT positioning navigation and timing
PRC Peoplersquos Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SS diesel-electric submarine
SSB ballistic-missile submarine
134 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
K k g k N k i l o g r a m s per kilonewton
km k i l o m e t e r s
KMT K u o m i n t a n g [Chinese Nationalist Party]
LCS L i t t o r a l Combat Ship
LO l o w - o b s e r v a b l e
LRPS l o n g - r a n g e precision strike
M MRBM m e d i u m - r a n g e ballistic missile
N n m n a u t i c a l mile
0 O N I O f f i c e o f Naval Intelligence [US]
OTH o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n
OTHR o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n radar
OTHT o v e r - t h e - h o r i z o n targeting
P P L A P e o p l e s Liberation Army
PLAAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN P e o p l e s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF P e o p l e s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PNT p o s i t i o n i n g navigation and timing
PRC P e o p l e s Republic of China
SAM s u r f a c e - t o - a i r missile
SAR s y n t h e t i c aperture radar
SIGINT s i g n a l s intelligence
SLBM s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d ballistic missile
SLOC s e a line of communication
SS d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c submarine
SSB b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e submarine
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 135
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USN US Navy
V VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
W wt weight-to-thrust
SSBN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ballistic-missile submarine
SSN n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d attack submarine
STOBAR s h o r t takeoff but arrested recovery
SWATH S m a l l Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T-AGOS
T Tk_ U A V
USN
NT V H F
tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
TEL t r a n s p o r t e r - e r e c t o r - l a u n c h e r
unmanned aerial vehicle
US Navy
very high frequency
VLF v e r y low frequency
W w i t w e i g h t - t o - t h r u s t
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 5
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation
Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 he
served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center Camp
Arena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-
ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs and
defense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on American
and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic
implications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law and
policy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the
College of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War
College and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departmentrsquos China
Maritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-
national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated
magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political
science
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of science
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in military
and diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-
rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the
National Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College
Review the Jamestown Foundationrsquos China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kostecka
served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force
Reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
About the Contributors
Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and EvaluationCell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) From December 2012 to June 2013 heserved as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center CampArena Herat Afghanistan Prior to this assignment from 1987 he served in a num-ber of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues missile force affairs anddefense resourcing and planning support
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China MaritimeStudies Institute at the Naval War College His current research focuses on Americanand Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategicimplications to the United States and the US Navy of Chinese international law andpolicy choices He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from theCollege of William and Mary a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval WarCollege and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University
Dr Andrew S Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Departmentat the Naval War College and a core founding member of the departments ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in inter-national relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduatedmagna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and politicalscience
Daniel J Kostecka is a senior analyst for the US Navy He has a bachelor of sciencedegree in mathematics from Ohio State University a master of liberal arts in militaryand diplomatic history from Harvard University a master of arts in national secu-rity policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce atthe University of Kentucky and a master of science in strategic intelligence from theNational Intelligence University Kostecka has been published in the Naval War CollegeReview the Jamestown Foundations China Brief and the US Naval Institute Proceed-ings his articles have been translated into Chinese Japanese and French Kosteckaserved as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air ForceReserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
CHINArsquoS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 137
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute He
holds a masterrsquos degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-
cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at Fudan
University Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center
He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC a
defense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG
84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 ldquoA Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey
Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War
Collegersquos Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-
diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo
with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on and
qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master of
arts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-
tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War
Collegersquos Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank of
lieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinarsquos New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinarsquos Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijingrsquos Maritime Policies both pub-
lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Security
the US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval Institute
Proceedings Janersquos Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War College
Review
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint
specialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of
the US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies for
the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty US
Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rank
of lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
CHINAS NEAR SEAS COMBAT CAPABILITIES 1 3 7
Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute Heholds a masters degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy and a bachelor of science from Union College Martinson has also studied at FudanUniversity Beijing Language and Culture University and the Hopkins-Nanjing CenterHe previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative
Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC adefense consultancy He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 A CooperativeStrategy for 21st Century Seapowerrdquo
William S Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the HalseyBravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval WarColleges Center for Naval Warfare Studies He joined the US Navy in 1983 imme-diately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalowith a bachelor of science in electrical engineering Professor Murray served on andqualified to command nuclear-powered submarines In 1994 he received a master ofarts degree from the Naval War College Professor Murray has served on the opera-tions staff at US Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval WarColleges Strategic Research Department He retired from the Navy with the rank oflieutenant commander in 2003 He is the coeditor of Chinas New Nuclear Submarine
Force and Chinas Energy Strategy The Impact on Beijings Maritime Policies both pub-lished by the Naval Institute Press He has published articles in International Securitythe US Army War College Parameters Comparative Strategy the US Naval InstituteProceedings Janes Intelligence Review Undersea Warfare and the Naval War CollegeReview
John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and jointspecialty officer He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman ofthe US Naval Institute Editorial Board He currently teaches intelligence studies forthe American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community
Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the US Navy He served as an active-duty USNavy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve with the rankof lieutenant commander Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
138 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masterrsquos in strategic intelligence from
American Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies
on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense
He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security
and US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-
izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US government
industry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planning
concept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-
sis and capture shaping
138 C H I N A MARITIME STUDIES
engineering from the US Naval Academy and a masters in strategic intelligence fromAmerican Military University
David A Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in PittsburghPennsylvania In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studieson topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defenseHe has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian securityand US defense posture in the Pacific region
Timothy A Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis Special-izing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics he provides the US governmentindustry think tanks and international partners with assistance in strategic planningconcept-of-operations development and analysis requirements and capabilities analy-sis and capture shaping
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7
i17 tc z t z T o l i
9
158N 978-1-935352-16-7i
I78 935 3521 7