chapter 8 european views on fofa - princeton university

Chapter 8

European Views on FOFA

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CONTENTS

PageIntroduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................111Current Positions of the Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...112

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......113United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............115France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............115The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........116Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............117Intra-European Cooperation on SOFA . . . . . . . . . ....................117The 1985 Nunn Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...118

Initial European Reaction To FOFA . ...............................118The Political Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......120The ’’Burden Sharing” Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ..+ ..121

Evolution of European Attitudes Toward FOFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..122Factors Underlying European Attitudes Toward FOFA . ...............123

The Role of NATO’s Conventional Forces . .........................124High Technology and NATO Defense. . . . . .........................126

Options for Cultivating Additional European Support for FOFA .. ......127Clarify the U.S. Priority for FOFA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........127Set Realistic Funding and Deployment Goals . ......................128Present FOFA in a More Positive Light . ..........................128Emphasize Dual-Use, Reemphasize Dual-Capable. . ..................129Accommodate European Industrial Interests . . . . . . . ........+ . ......129Clarify Unilateral Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..129Clarify the Relationship Between FOFA and AirLand Battle. . ........130Emphasize the Role of FOFA in Enhancing Deterrence and

Improving Crisis Management . . . . . . ............................130Emphasize the Role of Joint STARS, in Particular,

in Crisis Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .130FOFA and the NATO Alliance . . . . . . . . . . ...........................130

Chapter 8

European Views on FOFA

INTRODUCTIONFOFA, when first proposed, appeared to be

quite ambitious and evoked considerableskepticism—and some outright opposition—on the part of the European members ofNATO. As this report goes to press, the Euro-pean attitude has become one of cautious sup-port, tempered by concern over funding limi-tations and a great reluctance to buy U.S.weapons or even U.S. weapons technology. Thegovernments of the Federal Republic of Ger-many (FRG) and the United Kingdom (U. K.)have taken a cautious approach, emphasizingthat FOFA implementation will be slow andincremental; the opposition parties have gen-erally declared themselves against the concept.The smaller nations in the region have gener-ally followed the approach of the German Gov-ernment.

Clarification and refinement of the initialFOFA concept–particularly to answer Euro-pean concerns–led to the November 1984 ap-proval of the Long Term Planning Guidelinefor FOFA by the NATO Defense PlanningCommittee. While this provided a political-level endorsement by the Allies of FOFA asone of several key mission concepts, commit-ments did not extend further than to study howFOFA should be implemented. Much skepti-cism remained among the Europeans regard-ing its implementation and the priority itshould have within NATO’s strategy.

Over the past 2 years, the European Allieshave come to understand that some of theirearly objections were based on misunderstand-ings of FOFA, while military planners at Su-preme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe(SHAPE) and in the Pentagon have come toredefine FOFA in ways that are less techni-cally challenging and more in keeping with thecommon views of the Allies.

The staff at SHAPE has been working todefine FOFA in more specific terms as a basis

for operational and procurement planning, anddiscussions have been proceeding in the Con-ference of National Armaments Directors(CNAD) and other fora to define the systemsthe nations will procure to support FOFA. Asthese proceed and interact, there is movementtoward a consensus: the individual nations arebecoming more supportive of FOFA as a con-cept, and FOFA is being modified to take intoaccount their concerns and their existing de-fense programs.

Currently, the ability to attack follow-onforces to great depths remains part of theFOFA concept and a possible long-term goal.In the near term, however, interest has focusedon shorter ranges. Agreement is emerging todefine systems already in the developmentpipeline-e. g., artillery enhancement, MLRSand RPVs—as contributions to FOFA, andsome progress has been made toward signingagreements for cooperative development andproduction of other systems such as the mod-ular stand-off weapon. As yet, the UnitedStates has obtained no official European in-terest in what it views as two key systems:Joint STARS and ATACMS, although withinsome nations there is growing interest.

This chapter reviews the current positionsof our Allies and the evolution of those posi-tions, discussing the reasons for their early op-position and why this opposition has so greatlydiminished. It provides insights into some ofthe underlying differences in national interestsof the NATO Allies, and into the process bywhich these differences can be reconciled, givenan overriding political commitment to keepNATO working together. In particular, thechapter:

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discusses the positions of the Central Re-gion Allies regarding FOFA;presents the principal European views of

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● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

FOFA, including those of major opposi- c analyzes the factors that underlie thetion parties; European positions; anddescribes the evolution of European atti- ● identifies ways the United States mighttudes toward FOFA; gain additional support for FOFA. -

CURRENT POSITIONS OF THE ALLIESIn contrast to such issues as Pershing II de-

ployment in Europe, which required the Alliesto make sharp and clear choices, FOFA pro-vides ample room for each nation to define itscontribution in the way it chooses. FOFA couldencompass all systems that reach from justbehind the close battle to as far into easternEurope as possible, and thus could include mis-sions that have previously been considered astraditional close air support and interdictionfire support within NATO. Although theUnited States has favored an ambitious deepstrike effort, the Europeans have a pronouncedpreference for shorter range systems. Thus,European response to FOFA thus far has been

largely a re-labeling of previously plannedshort-range weapons, sensor systems, and airinterdiction improvements as contributions toFOFA, but there also appears to be growinginterest in developing and producing more ad-vanced systems.

The process of defining national positionsand arriving at a consensus within NATO onmajor initiatives such as FOFA has tradition-ally been slow, and may still be in an early stageof evolution in the case of FOFA. The conceptwas originated by SHAPE and refined by theNATO international staff; it has now passedprimarily to the CNAD to work out the means

Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 113

of implementation. The characterization of aEuropean position on FOFA is further com-plicated because the concept is still undergoingdevelopment and revision by its two originalsupporters, SHAPE and the United States.

Nonetheless, there appear to have been sig-nificant shifts in European attitudes over thepast year. Despite two major NATO studiesthat found great merit in the FOFA concept(one conducted by the SHAPE Technical Cen-tre and the other by the NATO Defence Re-search Group), early 1986 evidenced muchskepticism, particularly among the Germans,who argued that FOFA should be no greaterthan third priority, after the close battle andthe air battle. FOFA was seen as a new dimen-sion of warfare, competing with and detract-ing from the close battle. There was also skep-ticism regarding the feasibility of thetechnologies needed to implement FOFA.

More recent indications suggest that the ini-tial strongly skeptical attitude has been chang-ing. The Europeans now appear willing to dis-cuss possible development of FOFA systemswith ranges up to 150 kilometers beyond theFLOT, in distinction to their previous positionwhich would limit consideration of FOFA sys-tems to a range of about 30 kilometers. Con-cern for diverting resources from the first eche-lon battle, and insistence on setting a relativelylow priority for FOFA have become muted.Emphasis is on cost, cost-effectiveness, com-parisons of U.S. and European systems, andhow to produce the necessary systems. Workis now under way to agree on the systems thatwould be candidates to fill the various needsthat fall under FOFA.

These developments were paralleled during1986 in the activities of the FOFA II workinggroup, a quasi-official body created by the U.S.Department of Defense (DoD) Defense ScienceBoard to explore strategies for cooperation onFOFA systems with the Allies on a bilateralbasis. Participation of European governmentaland industrial representatives in the meetingsof the FOFA II working group has broadened.It is expected that the working group will beable to offer recommendations on five to seven

FOFA-related programs when it reports toNATO in the spring of 1987.

West Germany

The FRG, as the major European contribu-tor to NATO and the country most likely tobe affected by FOFA deployments, wields con-siderable influence on the Allies’ views concern-ing FOFA. While affirming support for FOFAin principle, the FRG has thus far underlinedthat FOFA ranks behind first echelon defenseand counter-air in its military priorities, al-though the Germans appear to have droppedan effort to get NATO to assign prioritiesamong the key missions.1 The German Gov-ernment views FOFA as a supplement or sup-porting function for the main mission of for-ward defense and preventing a breakthrough.

This arises, at least in part, from fundamen-tal political considerations: forward defense isa cornerstone of membership in NATO for theFRG with one-third of its population and one-fourth of its industry within 60 miles of theWarsaw Pact. Early German concerns thatFOFA was too aggressive for NATO, and thatrapid advances by the stronger nations woulddiscourage the weaker nations and put strainson NATO—although still present—appear tobe waning.

Nevertheless, Germany is procuring somesystems for FOFA, is developing others, andis at least exploring cooperative efforts on stillothers. The Germans believe that killing deepis more expensive than killing at shorterranges, and that therefore only a limited FOFAcapability will be affordable. This cannot beapplied in a “hose” approach, but must ratherbe related to finding and blunting the "schwer-punkt, ” or focus of an attack.

——IFRG officials have consistently emphasized the first eche-

lon threat in commenting on FOFA. FRG Defense MinisterWoerner stated: “It (FOFA) is a concept we support, but theremust not be the slightest doubt that stopping the first echelonhas first priority for the FRG and the Alliance as a whole, be-cause it would make little sense to fight the second echelon oncethe first one has reached the Rhine. ” Quoted in Wehrtechnik,February 1984.

114 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit Messerschm/tt.Bo/kow. B/ohm GmbH

West German Tornado aircraft dispensing KB-44 submunitions.

The Bundeswehr is interested in improving155mm artillery and buying the Multiple LaunchRocket System (MLRS), as well as in improv-ing reconnaissance through the CL289 andother RPVs. For longer ranges, they see bal-listic missiles, like ATACMS, as primarilysuited to stationary soft targets, and are de-veloping combat drones to attack tanks.2 Forair interdiction, the Luftwaffe wants to up-grade the combat role of the Tornado fighteraircraft, which it produces jointly with theUnited Kingdom and Italy. The Germans be-lieve that the KB-44 submunition dropped bythe Tornado is the best anti-armor submuni-tion currently available. For the future, theyare investigating the “vertical ballistic weap-o n , a sophisticated dispenser for a submuni-tion of greater lethality than the KB-44, andare participating in the Modular Stand-OffWeapon (MSOW) program.

The Germans may be slowly developing aninterest in Joint STARS, but they appear tobe very cautious about it. Although they rec-ognize the value of continuous broad area sur-veillance, they see Joint STARS as going be-yond the Army’s needs (out to 75 kilometers),but not satisfying the Air Force’s needs forsurveillance out to as much as 500 kilometers.

‘The FRG Ministry of Defense has budgeted DM 650 millionfor reconnaissance RPVs during 1989-97. Antitank combatdrones are not budgeted until 1997. See Karl Schnell; “Pilot-less Small Air Vehicles for the Army, ” W’ehrtechnik, May 1985.

The FRG position appears to be evolving.Some U.S. observers have linked this to a re-cently heightened West German concern, fre-quently enunciated by Defense Minister Man-fred Woerner, about the need for defenseagainst the threat posed by Warsaw Pact con-ventionally armed theater ballistic missiles(TBMs). Although TBM defense could involvea wide variety of active and passive measuresoutside the scope of FOFA, an important ele-ment might be the development of a conven-tional missile that could strike Warsaw PactTBM launchers beyond present artillery range.It should be noted, however, that thus far theFRG has not indicated an interest in the de-velopment or deployment of such a missile.

The Germans are great believers in cooper-ative ventures; roughly 70 percent of their cap-ital expenditures are for cooperative programs.However, unlike the British and French, theirfocus is almost exclusively on systems for usein the Central Region and they tend to shyaway from exporting military equipment. Con-sequently, their defense industries are notnearly as large as the British or French. Theybelieve that successful development programsought to stimulate technology developmentamong all the partners, but that the partnersought to be on comparable technological levels.They see themselves as being advanced in mu-nitions, delivery sensors, and attack drones.

Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA . 115

United Kingdom

While maintaining some reservations aboutwhether the concept and technology can actu-ally be made to work, the British are quitereceptive to FOFA. From a pragmatic perspec-tive, however, neither the Army nor the RoyalAir Force (RAF) is confident about getting theresources to implement it. Continued economicproblems in the United Kingdom will sharplylimit Britain’s ability to invest in expensivenew systems. The U.K. defense budget willlikely decline in real terms over the next sev-eral years,3 and heavy commitments for theTrident II program will make it very difficultfor the United Kingdom to undertake any ma-jor initiative in conventional defense im-provements.

Like the other Europeans, the British areplanning to improve their artillery and buy theMLRS. Investment in any longer range groundsystems would occur farther in the future, ifat all. The British are concerned about havingthe targeting systems to employ even MLRSin their corps sector. Beginning in 1988, theywill procure the Phoenix Remotely Piloted Ve-hicle (RPV) for this purpose. They are devel-oping the ASTOR system and keeping an openmind on the possibility y of a jointly funded JointSTARS for the entire Central Region. For in-terdiction, the British are planning to improvethe BL755 anti-armor cluster weapon and pro-cure an improved Harrier aircraft with longerrange. The mainstay of their interdiction ca-pability will remain the Tornado.

The British believe that they have strongdefense industries that can contribute to co-operative programs in important ways. How-ever, they point to difficulties of cooperatingwith the United States, particularly on highlyclassified (so-called black) programs.

France

Although France is not a member of theNATO integrated command, it exerts consider-

3For 1987, the British defense budget is scheduled to remainflat in cash terms, with a forecast real decline of 3 to 4 percent.See “Pay Up or Cut Up, ” The Econom”st, Mar. 29, 1986.

able influence on European thinking about con-ventional defense issues. The French have nodirect involvement in a SHAPE concept; theFrench military has expressed some interest,however, in equipping its forces stationed inFrance and the FRG with deep strike conven-tional weapons. Budget constraints, however,and a lack of strong interest in such systemsby the French armaments industry will serveto limit French options. The French take it asa general principle that their forces should belight and mobile; they are hesitant to burdentheir ground forces with cumbersome systemsfor deep attack, and they build small aircraftthat are less capable than those of other na-tions of carrying the larger ordnance loads nec-essary for FOFA.

In general, the French are not enthusiasticabout major conventional defense enhance-ments in NATO, which they see as diluting thethreat of nuclear retaliation on which Francebases its defense strategy. The trend, however,is toward greater French interest in participa-tion in NATO’s conventional defense, and theFrench have been active in technological de-velopments. This may reflect recent efforts atimproving coordination with the FRG on con-ventional defense matters as well as the de-sire of the French armaments industry to keepup with developments that may affect theNATO arms market.

Because France exports about half of its ar-maments production, it is extremely sensitiveto the economic and commercial aspects of U.S.defense initiatives such as the “EmergingTechnologies” program, SDI and FOFA, andthus has tended to crystallize European dis-content with what is perceived to be an unfairimbalance in U.S. high-technology defensetrade with Europe.’ The recent decline in Mid-dle East oil revenues has sharply affectedFrench arms exports, and has increased French

‘The threat to French industry from FOFA was noted by aleading French journal: “. . . it is impossible to ignore the Amer-ican pressure to sell this new generation of IFOFA] weaponsto its European Allies. The future of the French armamentsindustry—No. 3 in the world—and hundreds of thousands ofFrench jobs are at stake. “ “Can France Defend Herself?” LeNouve] Observateur, January 1984.

116 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

Photo credft, Messerschmitf-60/kow. Blohm GmbH

Developmental French-German Apache dispensing submunitions.

interest in the NATO market and intra-European cooperative production arrange-ments, including some short-range FOFA sys-tems. The French are very interested in coop-erative ventures, but view them as complexaffairs and are skeptical about their potentialsuccess. Protection of French cash flow, de-fense industries, and technology base will allbe factors in joining cooperative programs.

The Netherlands

The Dutch fully support FOFA as a key mis-sion concept, but within their own forces, placehigher priority on defeat of the lead echelon,air defense, and air support of the Army. Theysupport NATO’s current focus on the regionwithin 150 kilometers of the FLOT, but will

focus their own efforts on ranges out to about30 kilometers, and on improvements in the abil-ity of the Royal Netherlands Air Force to per-form battlefield air interdiction.

The Royal Netherlands Army believes thatgreatest effect can be obtained by attackingground combat units, particular those regi-ments of the second tactical echelon that aremoving to join the battle. These can best beidentified when they are 25 to 30 kilometersbeyond the FLOT. To satisfy these require-ments, they look to improved 155mm artillery,MLRS, and improved RPVs with real-time ca-pabilities. The Dutch are buying MLRS direct-ly from the United States to avoid delays inthe European cooperative MLRS program.They believe that the systems necessary fordeeper attack are beyond their means, al-


though they might be interested in NATO–as distinct from national-procurement of sys-tems like Joint STARS.

The Dutch have an all F-16 Air Force whichthey are interested in upgrading with bettermunitions, self-protection, reconnaissancepods, and equipment to allow them to operateat night. Both the Army and the Air Force areinterested in smart anti-armor submunitions.

The Dutch are interested in cooperative pro-grams as preferable to simple purchase ofmilitary equipment abroad, but tend to be cau-tious. They have withdrawn from some pro-grams which did not meet their needs–e.g.,the MLRS program because it was too slow,and some air-delivered weapons because theybecame incompatible with single-seat F-16s.While recognizing the success of the F-16 pro-gram, they are uncomfortable with co-produc-tion of systems designed elsewhere, becausethese do not stimulate Dutch technological de-velopment.

Belgium

The Belgians have never doubted the sound-ness of the military principles behind, or theneed for, FOFA, but their ability to contrib-ute is limited both by funding and by a prob-lem common among small nations–the ineffi-ciency inherent in a small force maintaininga large variety of systems.

The Belgian Army falls far short of what itbelieves it needs to defend with high confidenceagainst the lead echelon. Future funding istherefore likely to be directed primarily towardthe close battle. Belgium would like to buy theMLRS, but that would be at least 10 years intothe future and would require timely RSTA andC3 that the Belgian corps currently does nothave. The Belgians are looking toward im-provements to their Epervier drone system,first fielded in 1964, to make it more compati-ble with MLRS and to programs such as Lim-ited Operational Capability-Europe (LOC-E)and Battlefield Information Collection and Ex-ploitation System (B ICES). Belgium has theconventionally armed Lance missile which,

when targeted by Epervier, could be usedagainst soft targets that do not move often(although its accuracy is not high). In consid-ering a replacement for Lance, first prioritywould be on the nuclear mission. They wouldbe unlikely to buy a conventional tactical mis-sile system, such as ATACMS.

The Air Force is not likely to invest in high-tech, special-purpose weapons anytime soon.They consider themselves to be too small tomaintain a variety of weapons and support-ing systems. Instead, they will concentrate ongeneral-purpose bombs—including some laserguidance kits—that can be used to support avariety of missions. They see themselves ascontributing to delay and disruption, and arewilling to accept a large degree of specializa-tion among the various national air forces.

Intra-European Cooperation on FOFA

While FOFA has contributed to intensify-ing intra-European discussion of independentarmaments production, it appears that costconsiderations, among other factors, will tendto limit the range of cooperative interest toshallow strike weapons and sensors. The In-dependent European Programme Group cur-rently lists 31 cooperative projects, only 5 ofwhich have direct FOFA application: RPVs;Surveillance and Target Acquisition; 155mmartillery; Maverick D; and third-generationAnti-Tank Guided Weapons. Most of thesesystems are for attack at ranges of less than50 kilometers. Further, intra-European coop-eration on weapons production has been ham-pered due to divergent national interests andpriorities. Long-range FOFA systems are notlikely to be of priority cooperative interest dueto their high cost and specificity to the Cen-tral Front threat, which makes them unlikelycandidates for export to third countries.5

‘The relationship between range, cost and export potentialwhich influence European thinking about FOFA systems pro-duction is evidenced in an article by Emile Blanc, then FrenchDelegate General for Armaments:

M’hat is involved in the case of emerging technologies thatare repeatedly mentioned are terminal guidance, microelec-tronics, highly sensitive sensors and the like. These are relativelydifficult to solve, but not unsolvable, As for the danger to ex-

118 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

The 1985 Nunn Amendment

In an effort to respond to European indus-trial concerns, reduce duplication of effort, andimprove the climate for U.S./European arma-ments cooperation, the 1985 Nunn Amend-ment authorized DoD funding of cooperativeresearch and development projects and side-by-side comparative tests of U.S. and Euro-pean weapons systems. The appropriation forthese purposes for fiscal year 1986 was $145million, which was increased to $185 millionin fiscal year 1987. To qualify for funding,proposals must have at least one Europeanpartner. The forum for discussion of NunnAmendment proposals has been the CNAD,in which national armaments directors may in-dicate initial interest in participating in a co-operative venture by issuing “statements ofintent, which may result in signing of con-tracts among armaments firms in the inter-ested countries. The first such contracts areexpected to be signed in the fall of 1987.

Although the Nunn Amendment was notspecifically designed to foster cooperation onFOFA, five of the ten proposals for which“statements of intent” have been issued thusfar have a FOFA application. These are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

MSOW–Modular Stand-off Weapon (air-launched, short and long range for fixedand moving targets, independentguidance);APGM—155mm Autonomous PrecisionGuided Munition;ARDS–Air Radar Demonstration Sys-tem (ground based data systems to dem-onstrate the interoperability of the U.S.Joint STARS, the French ORCHIDEEand the U.K. ASTOR sensors);NIS–NATO Identification system (Iden-tification Friend or Foe); and

port, I would like to differentiate between medium range andlong range types. Medium range types are unlikely to becometoo expensive. For the long ranges it appears that the techno-logical goals have been set very high, Therefore the whole thingcan look expensive.

See, “High Priorities to French-German Arms Development, ”Wehrtechm”k, February 1984.

5. BICES–Battlefield Intelligence andCommunications Exploitation System(C’ I and data fusion)

All except ARDS predated FOFA.

European reaction to the Nunn Amendmentinitiative has been quite positive but it is notevident that the positions of the Allies in thisregard have been influenced much by FOFA.Of the five proposals noted above, only ARDSappears to have directly resulted from NATO’sadoption of FOFA as a key mission concept,and here the concern is to ameliorate what maybe an undesirable duplication of effort on na-tional sensor systems. European North Atlan-tic Assembly parliamentarians have com-mented that none of the agreed proposalswould commit the Alliance to a “deep strike”posture.

The United States withdrew a proposal forcooperation on ATACMS because no Euro-pean partner could be found. There has alsobeen a fair amount of criticism from Europeanacademics about the economic and politicaljustification for cooperative projects with theUnited States, on the grounds that this is adistraction from essential intra-European tech-nology cooperation, and that Europe is in dan-ger of giving away its technology too cheaplyto the United States. Thus far the Europeansseem to prefer European-produced systems,even if that eventually means paying more forless capability.

Initial European Reaction to FOFA

The concept of striking behind the enemy’slines to blunt an attack has been a standardpart of warfare for centuries and an agreed ele-ment of NATO defensive strategy since thefounding of the Alliance. Over the years, sig-nificant improvements in NATO’s ability toaccomplish this mission with conventional ar-tillery weapons and air forces—including thecapability for deep strike at Warsaw Pact (WP)airfields and other fixed targets-have beenintroduced as a matter of course. Moreover,the idea of employing NATO’s superior tech-nological capacity for producing advanced

Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA 119

deep strike weapons and thereby offsetting theWP advantage in ground forces received en-thusiastic endorsement from distinguishedmilitary experts on both sides of the Atlantic.6

Nevertheless, when FOFA was formally in-troduced for NATO-wide consideration in 1982—in the form of a SHAPE recommendationto the Defence Planning Committee—the con-cept aroused considerable controversy amongthe Allies.’ The following concerns and objec-tions were noted among the Europeans; we donot know how widespread or strongly held theywere:

The WP first echelon is by far the great-est threat to NATO. In concentrating onthe defeat or disruption of the follow-onforces, FOFA sets the wrong priorities andmay siphon off resources needed to re-spond to the more urgent threat.FOFA presupposes a deep echeloning ofWP forces to achieve overwhelming localforce superiority and breakthroughs bystandard attrition warfare. However, re-cently observed developments in WP doc-trine suggests a greater emphasis on afirst echelon attack, with the creation ofOperational Maneuver Groups (OMGs)designed to penetrate quickly intoNATO’s rear. FOFA also assumes thata WP attack can be repulsed by delaying

‘The 1983 and 1985 reports of the privately funded EuropeanSecurity Study (ESECS 1 and 2) which figured prominently inthe evolution of the FOFA concept had extensive participationof European military experts, including retired Bundeswehr Gen-eral Franz-Joseph Schulze and retired UK Chief Air MarshalSir Alistair Steedrnan. It should be noted, however, that as earlyas 1983 General Schulze cautioned:

the strengthening of our conventional deterrence anyway canonly be implemented gradually’, not only for reasons of limitedbudgetary funds, established armed forces and armaments plans,available equipment and weapons, but also for reasons of differ-ences in the national interest situation, For the United States,the solutions will possibly look quite different simply becauseof its obligations outside the ,NATO area.

Speech to the Clausewitz Society, Hamburg, August 1983.7SACE UR General Bernard Rogers wrote an extensive rebut-

tal of European criticisms of FOFA: “Follow-on Forces Attack:Myths and Realities, ” NATO Review, December 1984. How-ever, the major European objections to FOFA are reiteratedin a report of the North Atlantic Assembly, a group of Euro-pean parliamentarians considered pro-NATO. See ConventionalL)efense in I+;urope: A Comprehensive Evaluation, NAA Sub-Committee on Conventional Defense in Europe, Karsten Voigt,Rapporteur, I)ecember 19R5.

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the arrival of follow-on forces, but obser-vations of WP maneuvers indicate thereis considerable slack time planned in themovement of forces, and delays occa-sioned by FOFA deep strikes can berecouped. FOFA is thus not applicable toNATO’s current understanding of the WPthreat.8

The FOFA concept, in particular the ideaof deep strikes against moving armoredtargets, relies too much on the develop-ment of unproven technologies. Deepstrike systems would be costly and vul-nerable to WP countermeasures. Even ifindividual components of FOFA systemscould be demonstrated to work under idealtest conditions, there is no guarantee thathighly complex FOFA systems wouldfunction as supposed in a battle envi-ronment.9

The deployment of highly lethal deep at-tack systems on the Central Front is tooaggressive a stance for a defensive alliancesuch as NATO. Conventional weaponsthat could reach hundreds of kilometersinto eastern Europe are not consonantwith NATO’s goals, and change the char-acter of the Alliance from defense to thatof offense.10

‘One European analyst writes:{The WP Operational Maneuver Group) is a means to an end,

the end being the rapid collapse of NATO and the limiting ofthe war to the battlefield, and the means being a surprise attackon a broad front with several axes, I f the offensive is in one oper-ational echelon, NATO’s plans for interdiction against a secondoperational echelon wilf be in vain. There may be no such secondechelon within Eastern Euro e for several days.

Christopher Donnelly, quote: in NAA Con~rentional Defensein Europe, pg. 25.

‘Farooq Hussain, Director of Studies at the U.K. Royal UnitedServices Institute for Defense Studies, commented on the ap-plication of “emerging technologies” for FOFA:

,.. vulnerability would considerably reduce the predicted effec-tiveness of the weapons, requiring that they be bought in largenumbers or expensively re-designed to reduce their vulnerabil-ity. These considerations would seem to accord FOFA a far lowerpriority than other conventional defense weapons whose char-acteristics and costs are more familim and predictable.

See, “NATO’s Conceptual Military Framework, ” Armed Forces,September 1985.

l~The ch~ge that FOFA is an aggressive strategy was therallying point of European leftist criticism during 1984 and early1985. “Concealed behind the name IFOFA) is the further devel-opment of a military doctrine which in the years ahead couldsaddle the Alliance with a new arms race—thus making the al-ready precarious balance of terror even shakier, opined theWrest German mass circulation weekly Der Spiegel, Nov. 26,1984.


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The presence of FOFA systems on theCentral Front would be destabilizing ina crisis. Faced with a “use or lose” situa-tion, field commanders may be temptedto launch preemptive deep strikes withweapons that may be dual capable. TheWP would be unable to distinguish be-tween a conventional FOFA deep strikeand a tactical nuclear attack during thetime of flight of the initial missiles, andmay respond immediately with a nuclearbarrage.FOFA would set back prospects for armscontrol. The WP response would be to fielda new generation of conventional weap-ons, for both defense and offense, and fuela new round of the arms race. It wouldalso be likely to make the Soviets moreintransigent on Mutual and BalancedForce Reduction (MBFR) negotiations,and cause them to further front-load theWP forces.The basis of NATO’s defense is the threatof nuclear retaliation. FOFA is designedto make a conventional defense of Europemore calculable, and thereby signalswrongly to the WP that a conventionalattack might not be met with a nuclearresponse.

To some extent, these and other Europeanobjections to FOFA represented differences ofexpert opinion, and reflected views of someU.S. critics of FOFA.11 However, there wereother more general political and economic fac-tors that may serve to explain the Allies’largely negative reaction during the time theendorsement of FOFA was under considera-tion in NATO.

The Political Background

During the early 1980s all of the EuropeanAllies were deeply embroiled in domestic po-litical debates concerning Intermediate-rangeNuclear Forces (INF) deployments. Evenstrongly pro-NATO governments, such as theConservatives in the United Kingdom and the

“See, for example, The New Technologies: Technological Bril-liance or Military Folly? by Steven L. Canby, November 1983.

Christian Democrats in West Germany, feltthe INF issue left little room for maneuverwithin their political constituencies for majornew defense efforts, however meritorious. As-sociated with the INF issue was the rise—forthe first time since the 1950s–of anti-NATO“peace” movements in most European coun-tries as significant political forces. Having loston the INF issue, some of these political move-ments, such as the Greens and the left-wingSocial Democrats in West Germany, believedthey had found a new avenue of attack inFOFA. They were aided in this regard by acommonly held view in Europe that FOFA—while ostensibly an independent SHAPE rec-ommendation to NATO—was in fact of U.S.origin, and closely associated with on-goingconventional deep-strike weapons develop-ments of the U.S. Army and Air Force.

Particular emphasis was placed on the al-leged relationship between FOFA and the“AirLand Battle” doctrine recently adoptedby the U.S. Army.12 The charge that FOFAwas a thinly disguised attempt to impose anew, more aggressive and unpredictable strat-egy on NATO found considerable resonancein the FRG that for domestic political reasonscannot adhere to a declaratory defense policywhich envisages either strategic advances orwithdrawals much beyond the inner-Germanborder. The West German opposition partiesformally condemned FOFA, and put forwardalternative conventional defense concepts,such as small and lightly armored anti-tankunits, which they claimed would make NATOphysically incapable of aggressive action.These ideas were shared in large measure bythe U.K. Labor Party and other European so-cialist parties.

IZAirLand Battle was promulgated by the U.S. Army in FieldManual 100-5: Operations in 1982. In envisaging the integrateduse of chemical, nuclear and conventional forces in “rapid, vio-lent and disorienting” operations, AirLand Battle became aprime target for the European left. The specific charge was thatthe U. S., through the “Rogers Plan” (i.e., AirLand Battle andFOFA), wants to ready NATO for an attack on the WP in theevent of a U. S,-Soviet clash in the third world. See, for exam-ple, Angriff als Vertei&”gung: Airhmd Battle, Airl-and Battle2000, Rogers-Plan, a major study published in 1984 by the WestGerman Greens which focuses on U.S. plans for “lateral esca-lation. ”

Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA 121.——

Protest against deployment in Europe of nuclear weapons, such as the ground-launched cruise missile shownbelow, formed a backdrop to the initial FOFA debate.

The European left was able to dominate thepublic discussion of FOFA, due in part to thereluctance of pro-NATO governments to en-gage in polemics on a NATO issue. In the viewof many European political leaders, any pub-licity about NATO initiatives was undesira-ble, because it enabled the opposition to drawon latent anti-NATO and anti-American sen-timent. For these leaders, what NATO neededmost was a period of relative calm. As a newand potentially major departure for NATO,FOFA thus found few political advocates inEurope.

The “Burden Sharing” Issue

A further constraint on European accept-ance of FOFA was the ongoing debate withthe United States over equitable sharing of

NATO’s defense costs. Due to continued highunemployment and lagging economic growth,most European Allies felt it increasingly dif-ficult to meet previous defense commitmentsto NATO. Their 1978 pledges to strive for in-creases in real defense spending of 3 percentper year had in most cases not been fulfilled.Likewise, none of the conventional force defi-ciencies identified in the 1978 NATO LongTerm Defense Program had been adequatelyaddressed. While the Europeans were unableto meet past obligations, newer studies—largely of U.S. origin-pointed to the need foreven greater defense efforts. In addition toFOFA, other ideas–SDI, Emerging Technol-ogies, Counter-Air 90, chemical weapons andthe 1984 Nunn-Roth Amendment—appearedas politically difficult and potentially costlynew issues.


Faced with what some European parliamen-tarians called an “acronym avalanche,” the Al-lies were uncertain where FOFA stood in U.S.priorities. ” The 1984 Nunn-Roth Amend-ment, 14 while it failed to pass the Senate, senta strong signal of U.S. displeasure about lag-ging European conventional defense efforts,but was mainly directed at improving firstechelon sustainability. It thus appeared to theAllies that, whatever priority the UnitedStates attached to FOFA, increased Europeanspending for FOFA could not be offset by re-duced attention to other NATO missions.

“The reaction of many Europeans to U.S. defense activismin 1984 may be reflected in the following quote from a U.K.member of Parliament at the time of the November 1984 DefencePlanning Committee meeting: “Governments can’t even meettheir existing commitments. When you add the cost of SDI tothe cost of FOFA and all the other things, it is mind-boggling.”Bruce George, rapporteur to the North Atlantic Assembly’sPolitical Committee; cited in Aviation Week and Space Tech-IIO]Ofl, Mar. 18, 1985.

“The 1984 Nunn-Roth Amendment called for the phased with-drawal of U.S. forces if the European Allies failed to increasetheir conventional defense efforts to:

1. meet the annual 3 percent real defense expenditure increase,2. meet the NATO sustainability goal,3. raise infrastructure funding for aircraft shelters and support

facilities for U.S. tactical air reinforcement, and4. make progress in raising the nuclear threshold.

Although SACEUR General Rogers andother FOFA advocates initially claimed thatFOFA deployment could be covered by an ad-ditional 1 percent real increase over the 3 per-cent spending pledge, a later study by theDefence Research Group (DRG)15 reached sig-nificantly higher estimates: i.e., $40 billion to$50 billion over a 10-year period. Assumingthat FOFA implementation would be sharedby the Allies in rough proportion to their over-all financial contributions to NATO, this wouldhave required the major Allies to achieve be-tween two to three times the rates of defensespending increases they had been able to makein recent years. Initial European reluctance toendorse FOFA can thus be understood, in part,as an unwillingness to make or imply a fur-ther financial commitment the Allies would beunable to fulfill, and thereby exacerbate the“burden sharing” issue.”

“The Defence Research Group is an advisory body to NATO’sDefence P1arming Committee. The DRG study of FOFA, Rela-tive Value of Attack on Follow-on Forces, was issued July 10,1985.

16 FinaI 1984 NATO statistics indicate that, without the UnitedStates, the Alliance failed to meet its 3 percent spending goal,and that in 1985 fewer NATO Allies met this goal than in 1984.AP Wire, May 13, 1986.

EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOFA

Despite the Allies’ political and economic res-ervations about FOFA, they had little desireto act divisively on an issue which appearedof high interest to the United States, particu-larly at a time when the INF debate had takenon the overtones of a test of Alliance solidar-ity. The 1984 decision by the Defence PlanningCommittee (DPC) can be seen as somethingof a compromise solution, in that it provideda general endorsement of the FOFA concept,but without an indication of its priority or afinancial commitment regarding its implemen-tation.17 As an additional precaution, on WestGerman initiative, NATO agreed to undertakesimultaneously a Conceptual Military Frame-——— —..

“During the DPC debate, some of the European allies report-edly insisted that they could endorse FOFA only on the condi-tion that no additional defense spending be required. See. A via-tion Week, Mar. 18, 1985.

work study, to place FOFA in the context ofoverall NATO defense priorities.

Since the DPC decision, some of the sharpedges have worn off the transatlantic discus-sion of FOFA. The successful resolution of theINF issue has given European governmentssome additional political scope to concentrateon other defense priorities, although budgetsfor most of the Allies continue to remain verytight.

Public pronouncements by NATO headquar-ters and allied governments have been low key,emphasizing that NATO would concentratefirst on the shallow strike systems in whicha present capability exists; decisions on deepstrike systems —which aroused particularEuropean concerns—could be deferred wellinto the next decade. The European left, which

—Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 123

—

had controlled the public debate on FOFA in1984, has also markedly abated its criticisms.

Opposition parties have found that FOFAis too complex and abstract an issue to raisemuch public attention. Moreover, the rise inpopularity of many of the “peace” movementswas based largely on the scare of nuclear war;to be now perceived as attacking too stronglyNATO’s conventional alternative would losethe centrist votes they had attracted. The in-trusion of SDI and arms control issues havealso contributed to keeping FOFA off the frontpages.

In contrast to the previous year, the Alliesalso sensed during 1985 that there was someeasing of the U.S. posture on FOFA and otherconventional defense issues. European pledgesto increase ammunition stocks and infrastruc-ture spending have responded in some meas-ure to U.S. concerns reflected in the 1984 Nunn-Roth Amendment,18 and have added weight tothe European argument that financial limita-tions will necessitate slow FOFA implemen-tation. Another favorable development lay inthe 1985 Nunn Amendment, which provideda financial incentive for greater U.S.-Euro-pean cooperation on FOFA systems research.FOFA was again routinely endorsed at theMay 1985 conference of NATO Defense Minis-ters, which pledged “special and coordinatedefforts to strengthen conventional defense withthe means available, but without designationof FOFA as a priority.19

‘“For example, in May 1985, the Defence Planning Commit-tee pledged $3 billion to construct 665 aircraft shelters by 1990.At the same time, the FRG indicated expenditures for muni-tions would be 13 percent higher than initially planned for theperiod 1984-87. See, Reserves, Reinforcements Stressed atNATO Defense Conference; Suddeutsche Zeitung, Mar. 18, 1985.

19At tfis ~wting, FRG Defense Minister Woerner reporttilyemphasized: “special efforts do not mean special programs.Quoted in Suddeutsche Zeitung, May 23, 1985.

The European Allies thus appear comforta-ble with the present trend. Criticism by theopposition parties has been muted. Allied gov-ernments view the on-going studies and con-sultations within NATO as tending to confirmtheir preference for concentrating effort on airinterdiction, reconnaissance and short-range firesupport improvements, which accord withstandard NATO conceptions regarding ar-tillery and air interdiction missions, and whichwere well under way before NATO’s endorse-ment of FOFA.20 There is also the perceptionthat the United States has scaled back its ex-pectations for FOFA in the light of the Gramm-Rudman spending cap and the present empha-sis on SDI. Some European analysts have goneas far as to state that FOFA, as a definableinitiative, is already over.21

During 1986, the focus of FOFA activitymoved “indoors” to expert military fora suchas the CNAD ad hoc FOFA working group,the FOFA II working group and the Independ-ent European Program Group (IEPG). Al-though recent developments within thesegroups offer some basis for encouragement, itwill ultimately be the parliaments of the NATOcountries that will decide how, and at whatpace, FOFA will be implemented. Whether cur-rent political and economic conditions in Eur-ope will permit the type of broad consensusneeded for a significant FOFA deployment isstill at best questionable.

—20In early 1986, for example, senior Dutch Ministry of De-

fense officials indicated in a briefing to OTA staff that NATO’sendorsement of FOFA had not at that time affected defenseprocurement planning in the Netherlands.

2*’’FOFA has lost much of the political attention that wasonce focused on it to the Strategic Defense Initiative . . Thehigh technology all-conventional defense of Europe is back onthe drawing boards. ” Farooq Hussain, “Conventional Weap-ons Have a Long Way to Go, ” New Scientist, July 18, 1985.

FACTORS UNDERLYING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOFA

A common view is that European reluctance to increase their overall defense spending. Thisto go as far or as fast on a conventional de- is true up to a point, but is hardly the wholefense initiative such as FOFA is due largely story. Although the Allies’ ability to raise de-to the unwillingness or inability of the Allies fense budgets will vary with general economic

conditions (which at present are not favora-ble) the divergence of U.S. and European opin-ion about FOFA also reflects fundamentaltransatlantic tensions on two key issues in theAlliance: i.e., the degree to which NATO de-fense should rely on conventional forces, andthe role of high technology in force modern-ization. How these more general issues are re-solved will strongly affect the future courseof FOFA.

The Role of NATO’s ConventionalForces

Since the founding of the Alliance, the linch-pin of NATO defense has been the deterrentthreat of a U.S. strategic nuclear strike in theevent of a WP attack on Europe. During theperiod in which the United States possessedstrategic nuclear superiority over the Soviets,the task of defending Europe through thethreat of massive retaliation was relatively

straightforward and did not pose an undueeconomic burden. However, beginning in the1960s, as the Soviets built up their nuclearforces and attained strategic parity, the situ-ation became considerably more complicated.In the European view, ensuring that theUnited States remained strategically coupledto the defense of Europe–despite the risk ofannihilation of American cities by a Soviet nu-clear response—and convincing the Soviets ofthis coupling became of paramount im-portance.

In 1967, the Alliance responded to thechanged situation by adopting the Flexible Re-sponse strategy, based on a triad of forces—conventional, theater nuclear, and strategicnuclear-to deter and frustrate the WP acrossthe broad spectrum of threat scenarios. Thecontinued presence of large numbers of U.S.forces on the Central Front constituted the vis-ible guarantee of the coupling of U.S. strate-gic deterrence to the defense of Europe. While


Flexible Response does not require NATO tomatch the WP tank for tank or division for di-vision (which the Allies maintain is not eco-nomically or politically possible), the credibil-ity of the strategic deterrent became linked toa robust NATO conventional force posture.The presence of U.S. troops in NATO’s con-ventional force structure is not only to serveas a “nuclear trip wire, ” but to aid in deter-ring an all-conventional WP attack and, if de-terrence fails, to ensure NATO’s ability to es-calate to a nuclear response if necessary.

Since the promulgation of Flexible Response,the question of how much conventional defenseis enough has become the source of consider-able transatlantic friction. Successive U.S. ad-ministrations have urged the Europeans togreater conventional defense efforts to counterthe rapid rise in WP conventional force capa-bilities. The lackluster European reaction hasbeen due, in part, to the greater costs of up-grading conventional rather than nuclearforces, especially when the latter is paid forlargely by the United States. However, to asubstantial number of Europeans, U.S. pres-sure for increasing NATO’s conventionaldefenses on the Central Front is perceived aspartly motivated by the desire to reduce U.S.nuclear exposure in Europe, by making a con-ventional war fought solely in Europe more cal-culable and thinkable.22

SACEUR General Rogers, in advocatingFOFA, has attempted to bridge the gap be-tween the U.S. and European perceptions bydramatizing that the credibility of nuclear de-terrence has been eroded through the WP con-ventional force build-up.23 His argument is that

“European fears of the U.S. nuclear decoupling from the de-fense of Europe has led some Europeans to adopt what theycall the doctrine of “conventional insufficiency. ” This is basedon the assumption that what deters the Soviets is the threatof nuclear destruction of the Soviet homeland, a consequenceall out of proportion to what the Soviets could hope to gain byan attack on Europe. Deterrence would actually weaken if NATOconventional forces became too robust, because this would un-dermine the certainty of a NATO nuclear strike in the eventof a WP conventional attack. “In the view of some Europeans,should conventional forces become too strong, deterrence wouldbe undermined as the risks of war become more calculable. ”North Atlantic Assembly: Conventional Defense in Europe, p. 6.

““If war breaks out today, it would only be a matter of daysbefore I would have to turn to our political authorities and re-

FOFA and other conventional force improve-ments are needed because the ability of NATOto exercise its nuclear option is put in doubtif the WP has the ability to overrun the Cen-tral Front in a matter of days. Yet none of theEuropean Allies have publicly seconded Gen-eral Rogers’ assessment, reflecting the gener-ally skeptical reaction to U.S. efforts to gainmore public support in Europe for defense in-creases, such as the DoD annual Soviet Mili-tary Power and other public reports. SomeEuropean defense experts have questioned thefactual basis for General Rogers’ scenario,24

while others indicate that U.S. emphasis onthe precariousness of NATO’s Central Frontposture—even if accepted—tends to weakenpolitical support for NATO.25

The psychological impact of the issue of therole of conventional defense is most stronglyfelt in West Germany, in which one-third ofthe population lives within 100 kilometers ofWP forces. To many West Germans, the dev-astation caused by the outbreak of conven-tional war on their-soil would be equivalent todefeat, no matter which side technically“wins.” The INF issue has so sensitized theWest German populace to the nuclear threatthat many now believe that any change inNATO’s posture somehow increases the

quest the initial release of nuclear weapons. ” General Rogers,cited in Conventional Defense Improvements; “Where Is theAlliance Going, ” James Moray Stewart, IVato Review, 1985.

*’See, for example, Extended Deterrence; implications forArms IJnu”tation and Reduction, by Eckhard Lubkemeier,Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn:

. . . the conventional force balance in Europe is not nearly asbleak as NATO’s estimates would have it. For many years now,the International Institute for Strategic Studies has been stat-ing that “there would still appem to be insufficient overallstrength on eithei- side to guarantee victory. (3iven this situa-tion, conventional force improvements are not superfluous un-dertakings; however, NATO can do without those massive rear-mament proposals advanced by SACUER and the ESECS group,entailing spending increases which NATO governments wouldnot be able to sustain anyhow.

“The distinguished British historian, Michael Howard, de-scribes the situation as follows:

A certain American tendency to hyperbole, an attachment toworst-case analysis and some unfortunate attempts to make ourflesh creep with official publications in gorgeous Technicolorwhose statistics have been questioned by our defense specialists,have not improved matters. Such propagandistic efforts arewidely discounted, and even when they are believed they arelikely to engender not so much resolution as despair.

‘‘Deterrence, Consensus and Reassurance in the Defense of Eur-ope; published in The Domestic Aspects of Western Security,Christoph Bertram (cd.), IISS, 1983.

126 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

chances of war. In addition, the special rela-tionship the FRG has assiduously cultivatedwith the GDR has considerable influence onattitudes regarding the types of weapons andforces NATO should have that are capable ofstriking into eastern Europe. These concernsare codified in the doctrine of Forward Defense,which in theory at least envisages that a WPconventional attack could be repulsed at theinner-German border, and that NATO incur-sions into eastern Europe could be limited totactical and operational counter-attacks nearthe border.

FRG official policy tries to achieve a diffi-cult balance between the need to providedeclaratory support for FOFA in the interestsof Alliance solidarity, and the requirement toaffirm Forward Defense for domestic con-sumption.” U.S. actions that might upset thedelicate balance required by the politics of For-ward Defense would likely be met with resis-tance. A senior Bundeswehr General indicated,for example, that the FRG would reject theunilateral deployment of deep strike FOFAsystems in the U.S. sectors, on the groundsthat this would demoralize the Allies in the sec-tors that were less well-equipped, and wouldtend to funnel a WP attack into these weakersectors.” This argument, which ignores the al-ready great imbalances among the CentralFront corps and the cross-corps support roleFOFA might serve, maybe judged on its ownmerits. It is, however, indicative of the differ-ence in U.S. and West German expectationsregarding conventional force improvements.

—— — —.—‘The compatibility of AirLand Battle and FOFA deep strikes

with the doctrine of Forward Defense seems to trouble the FRGmilitary. The difficulties in presentation can be discerned in theFRG 1985 Ministry of Defense White Paper:

In the future, other long-range conventional weapons will beavailable to the Alliance, permitting effective operations againstthe Warsaw Pact follow-on forces before they can join the battleonce the WP attack gets started. These operations have noth-ing to do with offensive operations. (p. 29)

. . . the Bundeswehr and the allied forces are not equipped,organized, trained or prepared for a strategic offensive in theCentral Region. (p. 79)

AirLand Battle . . . is only applicable in Europe in so far asit is reconcilable with the underlying principles of NATO de-fense. There can be no question of any intention of the U.S. torevise the principles of NATO strategy by national operatiomddoctrines. (p. 30)

271n a 1986 briefing to OTA staff.

High Technology and NATO Defense

The balance of NATO’s nuclear and conven-tional forces is largely the concern of militaryexperts and academics; of much more imme-diate concern to allied governments is the rela-tionship between NATO defense, employment,high technology, and national economic advan-tage. The Europeans seem to have, in general,less enthusiasm than the United States aboutthe potential for high technology to correctNATO’s deficiencies. In the broadest sense,this may reflect the more pervasive view inEurope that high-technology “fixes” seldomwork as advertised, and almost always costmore than planned. Contributing to this differ-ence in expectations is the European view thatadvanced U.S. systems are frequently devel-oped and tested under ideal conditions, suchas the U.S. desert, which would bear little rela-tionship to a warfighting situation on the Cen-tral Front.

For most of the past decade, the Europeanshave been troubled by high unemploymentrates and sluggish economic growth, coupledwith the perception that European high tech-nology is falling rapidly behind that of Japanand the United States.28 It has also been aperiod of increasing transatlantic disputes overgeneral trade issues and the economic aspectsof NATO defense, including ‘burden sharing,sanctions and export trade controls. The extra-ordinary sensitivity of European governmentsto U.S. influence in the defense sector was dem-onstrated in 1985 by the near collapse of theThatcher government over the proposed pur-chase of the Westland helicopter company bya U.S. firm. In this environment, suspicion ofU.S. defense policies and initiatives runs high.

‘aEuropean perceptions of U.S. high-technology dominanceappear to be considerably exaggerated. In 1955, for example,the U.S. export share of the world high-technology market was35 percent. In 1980, the U.S. share dropped to 18 percent, whilethe combined shares of the FRG and France alone accountedfor 30 percent of world high-technology export trade. See Sci-ence 1n&”cators, The National Science Board, 1983, p. 23. Asof 1986, the United States became a net importer of high tech-nology.


For example, in February, 1986 the Euro-pean Parliament voted a unanimous resolutionrebuking the United States for alleged manipu-lation of COCOM trade controls to obtain com-mercial economic advantage.29 Recent U.S. de-fense initiatives such as FOFA, SDI, andEmerging Technologies have been perceivedas threatening the European technology base(in part by luring away engineers) and costingjobs, and have resulted in calls for greaterintra-European armaments development coop-eration and demands that the United Statesreduce alleged protectionist practices.30

There is also a widespread belief that theUnited States enjoys a very large defense tradebalance, on the order of 10 to 1, while U.S.claims that the difference in the “two-waystreet” has grown much narrower in recentyears have not been received with much cre-

‘The European Parliament resolution states that U.S. uni-lateral defense related export controls:

. . can only be assumed to be intended to restrict Western llu-rope’s access to American technology on normal commercialterms and is contrary to good neighborly policy among allies .A common view in Europe is that U.S. provisions which exceedthose agreed by COCOM are in part motivated by general na-tional commercial practices emanating form political rather thanbusiness circles.

Quoted in Journal of Commerce, Feb. 24, 1986.30 Francois de Rose, a former French representative to the At-

lantic Council and an advocate of stronger European conven-tional defense, stated:

It is obviously inconceivable that a modernization effort wouldbe limited to Europe’s purchasing massive quantities of Amer-ican weapons incorporating new technologies . The UnitedStates should thus face this problem at both the governmental(Administration and Congress) and industrial levels with abreadth of vision we are unaccustomed to in this area.

Politique International, summer 1984.

dence. 31 U.S. overtures to allay European con-cerns, such as funding SD I research contractsin Europe and the 1985 Nunn Amendment,have been criticized by some Europeans as at-tempts to obtain European expertise at bar-gain prices and interfere with the developmentof intra-European high-technology coop-eration.

The sensitivities of European governmentsto high-technology defense issues have tendedto dampen the desire for the introduction ofadvanced armaments in European military cir-cles. European military leaders are acutelyaware that national economic policies make itrisky to request the procurement of foreign-produced, high-technology systems, particu-larly because the long-term outlook for staticdefense budgets implies that expensive newprocurements would divert funds from currentmilitary readiness. This situation may serveto reinforce an intrinsic conservatism in Euro-pean military circles about the deployment ofadvanced armaments.32

“see, “Two Way Street Balance Falls to 2:1, Most EquitableRatio Ever, ” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1986.

“In an article which pleads for more competitive Europeanbuying of weapons as a means to reduce costs, an influentialEuropean journal nevertheless concludes:

Politically astute generals and admirals know the moneysaved would probably not come to them: they might not get evenas much as they do now, It is one thing to ask for a ship to bebuilt in a national shipyard. It is quite another to ask for one tobe built abroad, never mind that it might be better and cheaper.That is why they tend to cling to the do-it-at-home approach.

“Cheaper Weapons: Europe Does It the Second Best Way, ”The Economist, June 21, 1986.

OPTIONS FOR CULTIVATING ADDITIONAL EUROPEANSUPPORT FOR FOFA

SACEUR General Rogers and other U.S.military leaders are well aware of Europeanreservations about FOFA and a number of use-ful remedial steps already have been taken. Inaddition, the following options for further stim-ulating European support for FOFA have beensuggested. If the U.S. Congress believes thatthe United States should try to stimulategreater European support, it might want toconsider some or all of them.

Clarify the U.S. Priority for FOFA

The Europeans profess to some confusionas to where FOFA stands in U.S. military pri-orities. They note, among other signals, thefirst echelon priority signaled by the 1984Nunn Amendment, and question how FOFAwill compete with SDI for scarce U.S. R&Dfunds under the Gramm-Rudman spendingcap. Some also seem to believe that FOFA may


be a “pet project” of SACEUR GeneralRogers, and that U.S. attention may wane un-der his successor. The United States shouldagain clearly state its intentions regardingFOFA and, to respond to specific Europeanobjections and concerns, indicate the relativeimportance it attaches to shallow strike (i.e.,up to 50 kilometers) versus deep strike sys-tems. To avoid making FOFA a public issueagain, U.S. views should be communicatedlargely through nonpublic NATO channels,such as the Conceptual Military Frameworkstudy.

Set Realistic Funding andDeployment Goals

Currently available studies of FOFA, suchas ESECS and DRG, estimate costs for fullFOFA deployment at between $20 billion and$50 billion over a 10-year period. Some criticsclaim these figures are gross underestimations.But even if they were accepted, it is unrealis-tic to expect the Allies to cover their propor-tionate share of the cost through increased de-fense spending at a time when Europeandefense budgets are static or heading down-wards. If trade-offs are acceptable, the UnitedStates should specify what other NATO mis-sions could take a lesser priority to balance in-creased European spending for FOFA. The 10-year deployment goal, including systems thatare now in the research phase, seems too op-timistic in light of NATO’s national R&D plan-ning cycles and its track record on force mod-ernization. It might be useful at first to narrowthe focus to a few shallow strike weapons andsensor systems— such as improved MLRS andRPVs–which are relatively inexpensive andare at or close to the production stage, andwhich would not require complex data fusionsystems. A demonstration that FOFA is ef-fective at the shallow ranges, and with systemsthat could be produced in Europe, could boostallied support for the more ambitious FOFAgoals.

Present FOFA in a MorePositive Light

The major argument for FOFA by theUnited States and SACEUR until now hasbeen that it is needed to raise the nuclearthreshold to preserve the deterrent credibilityof NATO’s triad of conventional, theater nu-clear, and strategic nuclear forces. Howevernecessary this appears to military strategists,the prospect of spending large sums of moneymerely to stave off the collapse of the CentralFront for a few more days is not a strong sell-ing point from the European perspective. Amore appealing approach might be to linkFOFA to crisis stability and deterrence.

A major question mark for NATO has al-ways been the length of time which the War-saw Pact would need for mobilization beforelaunching an attack: while obviously the So-viet commanders would need at least a fewdays for mobilization and would prefer a fewweeks, short Pact mobilization might wellmake it difficult for NATO to decide upon andimplement its own mobilization before the at-tack commenced. Furthermore, longer Pactmobilization would provide time for NATO todemonstrate its resolve (by counter-mobiliza-tion) and then negotiate a satisfactory settle-ment of the crisis.

A strong NATO FOFA capability would callinto question the ability of the Soviets to bringtheir forces forward after a war had started,and therefore increase their need for pre-attackmobilization. FOFA can therefore be seen asa means of deterring the Soviets from rushingto attack before NATO is ready. Increasingdeterrence and negotiating time in a crisis isa far more popular objective in Europe thanincreasing NATO’s staying power in a conven-tional war.

FOFA might also usefully be linked in thefuture to negotiations for withdrawal ofintermediate-range nuclear forces from Eur-ope. The immediate reaction of European


leaders to reports that INF withdrawals hadbeen discussed by President Reagan and So-viet Premier Gorbachev at their October 1986meeting in Reykjavik was sharply negative,due in part to the realization that the currentconventional force imbalance would pose aneven greater threat to European security inthe absence of INF missiles. Focusing Euro-pean public attention on the need to redressthis imbalance as a necessary precondition forsuch withdrawals might gain additional sup-port for conventional force improvements suchas FOFA.

Emphasize Dual-Use, ReemphasizeDual-Capable

The Europeans give highest priority to con-ventional weapons and surveillance improve-ments against the first echelon threat. TheUnited States might clarify to the Europeansthat deep strike weapons and sensor systemswould enhance NATO’s capabilities againstboth the first and follow-on echelons. On theother hand, proposals that tend to blur the dis-tinction between FOFA and tactical nuclearweapons cause Europeans a great deal of anxi-ety. An idea tentatively advanced in 1984, forexample, to modify Minuteman missiles tocarry conventional warheads and base themin Europe to perform conventional missions,was emphatically denounced.33 Likewise, pro-posals for conventional versions of the Persh-ing II or the successor to the Lance missilehave been questioned by the Europeans on thegrounds that they would decrease crisis sta-bility.

Accommodate European IndustrialInterests

The Europeans have made it amply clearthat FOFA implementation cannot be prem-ised on their purchasing U.S.-produced weap-ons systems. Discussions in NATO have cor-

rectly focused on the need to standardizeFOFA systems and reduce overall R&D costsin the Alliance by eliminating duplication ofeffort through cooperative industrial projectsamong the NATO partners. In this regard thefinancial incentive offered by the 1985 NunnAmendment has proved particularly promis-ing in fostering U.S./European cooperativeventures. Congress may wish to consider con-tinuing Nunn Amendment funding at a levelof $200 million per year to maintain the mo-mentum of cooperative projects now understudy and allow for a number of new startseach year.

Special emphasis might be placed on reach-ing agreement on a NATO-wide IFF34 systemin the Nunn Amendment context, becauseNATO’s present capacity to carry out deepstrike interdiction relies exclusively on airforces. If no agreement can be reached on IFF,which all Alliance partners agree is urgentlynecessary and which has been under discus-sion for the last 20 years, the likelihood of U. S.-European cooperation on the more controver-sial elements of FOFA would appear dim.

Clarify Unilateral Deployments

There seems to be some opposition in theFRG to a unilateral U.S. deployment of deepstrike FOFA missile systems in the U.S. sec-tors of the Central Front, on the grounds thatthis would concentrate the WP thrust into theother sectors. To counter this argument, theUnited States could attempt to provide theFRG with a better appreciation of the roleFOFA could play in cross-corps support whichwould tend to level rather than heighten thecurrent inequalities among the Central Frontsectors. If, nevertheless, the FRG positionwere not to change, the United States mightconsider an offer to consult formally with theFRG on deployments when the deeper strikesystems become available.

SSI n a 1985 pre9s conference, FRG Defense Minister Woernerrejected stationing of Minuteman missiles in Europe for con-ventional defense purposes. He reportedly labeled the missiles“incredible hulks” at the press conference. See, Interview withDr. Manfred Woerner, Armed Forces Journal, August 1985.

“Identification, Friend or Foe, A system for identifying air-craft so that NATO’s air defenses do not kill NATO’s aircraft.Also called the NATO Identification System (NIS).

130 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Clarify the Relationship BetweenFOFA and AirLand Battle

While the United States has affirmed thatelements of AirLand Battle are appropriate inthe Central Region only to the extent that theyare compatible with NATO doctrine, the Euro-peans evince some confusion and concern abouthow FOFA would be integrated under this ar-rangement. One major difficulty is thatAirLand Battle envisages counter-attack byground forces up to 150 kilometers beyond theclose battle, which seems incompatible withthe doctrine of Forward Defense, and has beenquestioned by the Europeans on political andmilitary grounds. Another issue is the alloca-tion of air resources for deep strike missions,since AirLand Battle appears to center con-trol at Corps level or lower, while FOFA wouldrequire multi-corps and multinational coordi-nation.

Emphasize the Role of FOFA inEnhancing Deterrence and Improving

Crisis Management

One of NATO’s widely recognized weak-nesses is that it must mobilize for at least sev-eral days before it can put up a credible de-fense. In particular, the period during whichtroops would arrive from the United States byair, take equipment out of storage sites in theFRG, and organize themselves into battle-ready divisions would be a period of vulnera-

bility which might tempt the Soviet Union toattack preemptively. The possibility of suchan early Soviet attack would not only be threat-ening in a military sense, but would reduce thetime available for negotiations to resolve thecrisis short of war. FOFA, by threatening theSoviet forces moving up from rear areas oncea war has started, would give the Soviets anincentive to defer any attack until after exten-sive Warsaw Pact mobilization, which in turnwould buy time for NATO mobilization andfor crisis management efforts.

Emphasize the Role of Joint STARS,in Particular, in Crisis Management

Apart from all the questions and issuesabout the survivability and value of JointSTARS in battle, nobody doubts that it wouldgreatly enhance NATO’s ability to monitorWarsaw Pact troop movements during a cri-sis. Accurate and extremely timely informa-tion about such troop movements during a cri-sis could be invaluable to NATO for crisismanagement. Such information would facili-tate NATO decisionmaking, thus enhancingdeterrence by discouraging Soviet hopes ofdividing the Allies; it would also facilitate de-ployment of NATO forces to meet the evolv-ing threat, thus enhancing deterrence by dis-couraging Soviet hopes of victory by quicklybreaking through maldeployed and unpreparedNATO forces.

FOFA AND THE NATO ALLIANCEIn the light of the history of the FOFA ini-

tiative, it is not currently possible to predictwith any certainty its future course in NATO.There have been a number of plusses andminuses. On the positive side, it has helped fo-cus attention on recent developments in WPdoctrine, such as the Operational ManeuverGroups, and contributed to the discussion ofwhat should be the appropriate NATO re-sponse. It has also highlighted current NATOdeficiencies in air and ground fire support,reconnaissance and C2, and may ease the in-

troduction of advanced sensors such as JointSTARS, even if the Allies remain uncertainconcerning the deep strike elements of FOFA.At the very least, FOFA could add cogencyto U.S. arguments for increased European at-tention to the first echelon threat, which theAllies claim FOFA underestimates.

FOFA has also been the object of consider-able criticism by the Allies, although this doesnot mean that the concept itself is inherentlydevisive. FOFA, like any major initiative in


NATO, has brought to the surface the long-standing underlying transatlantic frictionsconcerning burden sharing, the nuclear thresh-old and defense trade. The Allies, as a group,have a fundamental resistance to any majorchange in NATO strategy, which, whatever itsdefects, has preserved peace in Europe for twogenerations. This resistance is manifest in theirskepticism of U.S. “bean counts’ of WP forces,and in their arguments that substantial changein NATO force structure would necessarilyweaken the political cohesion of the Alliance.

This conservatism, however, also has its pos-itive points with regard to the future of FOFA.Now that the Alliance has given FOFA its po-litical blessing, it would be unlikely that theEuropeans would be moved to renounce theDPC decision, even if the opposition partieswhich are now on record as condemning FOFAwin in forthcoming elections, but this is nota certainty. This does not mean that FOFAwill be implemented as originally conceived orcould not again become a devisive issue if, forexample, the United States decides on unilat-eral deployment of deep strike missiles in theU.S. corps sectors.

At the most basic level, the differences inthe U.S. and European views on FOFA, andall its associated issues, will tend to narrowor widen depending on the degree to which the

NATO partners can achieve a common percep-tion of the political and military aspects of theWP threat. In a 1986 discussion with OTAstaff on FOFA, European parliamentarianmembers of the North Atlantic Assembly de-scribed the current difference in threat percep-tion as follows: “You Americans believe thesituation on the Central Front is like 1938; webelieve it is more like 1914’’–i.e., the greatestthreat to peace is an uncontrolled escalationof belligerency, not the failure to deter a de-termined aggressor. This view has historicalmerit if the sole criterion of NATO’s successis to deter the WP from a direct attack on Eur-ope; it has been a long time since the Euro-peans had to consider this seriously as an im-minent possibility. Judged by other factors,such as denying the Soviets the ability to co-erce Europe economically and politically throughthe growing imbalance between NATO and theWP in conventional forces, the record of theAlliance is not as certain.

The history of the FOFA initiative thus farsuggests there is still some variance betweenU.S. and European understanding of some ofthe basic purposes of the Alliance. It also sug-gests that it is possible for the United Statesand its Allies to work together, given time anda willingness to accommodate each other’sviews.

chapter 8 european views on fofa - princeton university

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