Chapter 8: The Legislative DepartmentOrganization and Membership; Composition/Apportionment

MACIAS VS COMELECGR. L-18684 (Sept. 14, 1961)(Constitutional Law Apportionment, Proportional Representation)

FACTS:Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of a law (Republic Act 3040) that apportions representative districts in this country on the ground that it is unconstitutional and void because it apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. Respondents aver they were merely complying with their duties under the statute, which they presume and allege to be constitutional.ISSUE: Whether or not an apportionment law that is disproportion in representation is unconstitutional.HELD:Yes, a law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more representative districts than those with bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution. Such law is arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of equality.

MARIANO vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 211)FACTS:1.Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City) as unconstitutional.2.GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, and assailing the statute as unconstitutional on the following grounds: a.Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code .b.Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the three-consecutive term limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.c. Section 52:i.Increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter) violates the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three years following the return of every census ii. The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the bill title iii.The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accordance with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution the population of Makati is 450,0003.GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as a fore stated.ISSUE:Whether or not the questioned provisions are constitutional.HELD:Yes. Petitions dismissed.RATIO:a.D: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local government unit cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.D: The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati.b. D: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events (i.e. Mayor Binay will run again, etc.)Petitioners merely posed a hypothetical issues. Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.c. D: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law.This is exactly what the Congress did in enacting RA No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district.D: The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule so as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.D: Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since It has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, Dec. 8, 1994As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Art. VI, Sec. 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by RA 7675 is not unconstitutional.As to the contention that Sec. 49 of RA 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Sec. 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on RA 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.Similarly, petitioners additional argument that the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering, which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamoras constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.Party-list System: Inviolable parameters to determine the winners; Computation

Election, term and contests-qualifications; residence

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC248 SCRA 300FACTS:Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.ISSUE:Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.HELD:Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

AQUINO VS. COMELEC(248 SCRA 400)FACTS:Agapito A. Aquino files his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati. (Note: he stated his residency period as 0 years and 10months)Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) files petition to disqualify Aquino for lacking residence qualification.COMELEC dismissed petition to disqualifyMove Makati and Mateo files a motion for reconsideration.On the election Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto Syjuco, with 35,910votes.COMELEC grants motion for reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate and determine the winner from the remaining legible candidates.ISSUE: WON Aquino is legible to run for the said position WON Declaring the winner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutionalHELD:NO to both issues.RATIO :Sec 6 Art VI of the Constitution provides that a candidate must be a resident of the district he is representing for at least one year before the elections. Aquino has always been a resident of Conception, Tarlac prior to the elections. Although he leased a condominium unit within the district he will be representing, mere leasing instead of buying the unit is not evident of a strong intention to establish a domicile. Declaring the person who garnered the second highest number of votes as the winner because the choice of the majority is disqualified is against the sovereign will of the people

Compensation and privileges-freedom from arrest; privilege of speech and debate

PHILCONSA v. GimenezG.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994Regala, J.

Facts:

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes selfish class legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute forbidden compensation within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

Issue:

whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which reads as follows:

The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

Held:

Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term other emoluments.

Emolumentis defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.

Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863)FACTS:In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to investigate the allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months.ISSUES: WON his suspension was constitutionalHELD: Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed

RATIO:Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof. The question of whether Osmenas speech constitutes disorderly conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic. Because n opreliminary injunction was issued, the special committee performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the suspension order.

JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG (17 SCRA 87)The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the Congress.FACTS:Respondent was a member of the House who wrote an open letter to the President of the Philippines, and caused this to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. The contents of the letter were mainly to inform the president of the so-called three operational plans under serious study of some officers of the AFP and aided by some civilians. It also describes these plans as an insidious plan or a massive political build-up of then Secretary of Defense Vargas. It also details the various means that has already been mopped out to ensure the success of these operational plans. The letter also suggested that the planners already have in their control several officers of the AFP, included are the petitioners. It was mentioned however in the letter that those mentioned above as already in control of the planners may be unwillingly be only tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge. An ordinary civil action for damages was instituted by petitioners against respondent for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter. The trial court dismissed this complaint.

ISSUES:1.) Whether or not the letter was privileged communication?2.)Whether or not the letter could be considered libelous?HELD:No. It is not privileged communication. Although the Constitution provides for any member of Congress not to be questioned for any speech or debate therein, in the halls of Congress or elsewhere, this publication doesnt fall into this category. The said expression refers to utterances made by legislators in the performance of their functions, while Congress is in session. In the case a quo, the letter was made while Congress was presumably not in session. Furthermore, he caused the letter to be published in newspapers of general circulation, thus ipso facto he wasnt performing his official duty either as a member of Congress or any officer of any committee. No. The fact that the letter suggested that the plaintiffs may be unwilling tools of the plan without having knowledge thereof already in a way exculpate the responsibility of the plaintiffs in the said plans if ever they have any part in the same. This is not derogatory to the petitioners to entitle them to damages, especially that the planners of the operational plans were already clearly suggested.

PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689)FACTS:The accused was a member of the lower House when he was convicted of rape. He was confined in theNational Penitentiary while his appeal was pending. He was re-elected. He argued that he should be allowed to attend legislative sessions and committee hearings; because his confinement was depriving the electorate of his district of their voice in Congress and that he has a duty to attend the sessions in Congress.ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in Congress?HELD: No. Election to high government offices doesnt free the accused from the common restraints of general law. The constitution provides that a member of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if the offense is punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment. The accused has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of this provision. Section 11, Article 6 of the Constitution states that a the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions especially if the reason if a legitimate one. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of imprisonment has constitutional foundations. Allowing the accused to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a free man. When the voters of his district reelected him, they had full awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The accused is only one of the members of the House of Representatives. Congress continues to function despite the absence of one or a few of its members. The issue in this case boils down to the question of equal protection. Election to the position isnt reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.Instant motion is denied.

Disqualifications and Disabilities- Incompatible vs Forbidden Offices; duty to disclose in conflicts of interests; sec 12 and 13 Art VI, sec 14 Art VI

PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 31)FACTS:On May 14, 1979, an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation was held. Petitioner Puyat was among those elected. On May 25, 1979, the other group of directors, led by Acero, instituted a proceeding questioning the said election on the ground that the votes were not properly counted. Thereafter, Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of Interim Batasang Pambansa,entered his appearance as counsel for Acero to which Puyat objected due to Constitutional Gorunds which provides that:SEC 11. ART VIII No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel . or before any administrative body.Neither shall he, directly, or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called on account of his office.Assemblyman Esatnislao Fernandez did not continue his appearance as counsel but instead filed a Motion for Intervention. SEC granted the motion on account that Fernandez had 10 shares on the corporation. Thereafter, the Court en banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining SEC from allowing the participation as intervener of Assemblyman Fernandez. Solicitor General supported the allowing of the intervention. Hence this petition.ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, may intervene in the SEC Case without violating the Constitution.HELD: The Order granting Fernandez to intervene in SEC Case is reversed and set aside.RATIO:Fernandez acquired a mere 10 shares out of 262, 843 shares. He acquired said shares after the institution of the contested election, after the suit has been filed and a day before he filed a motion to intervene. Realizing that the objection of petitioner Puyat as valid, Fernadez decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and circumstances, the Court found that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before and administrative body and it is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. A ruling upholding the intervention would make the Constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need to do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the interest of the client and then intervene in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done in indirection which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. In brief, the Court held that the intervention of Assemblyman in SEC case falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11.Art. VIII of the Constitution.

Villegas vs LegaspiPolitical Law Appearance in Court by a CongressmanFACTS:On 27 Sept 1979, Villegas filed a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, an assemblyman and a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction. The presiding Judge however overruled Villegas challenged and proceeded with the trial. Judge said that Courts of First Instance have appellate jurisdiction. Villegas appealed the decision.ISSUE:Whether or not CFIs are appellate courts resolving this is essential in determining if Legaspi indeed violated a constitutional provision?HELD:CFIs have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the case at bar, CFI Cebu acted as a court of general original jurisdiction since the case filed by Villegas was not elevated from any lower court. It is then clearly resolved that this CFI in the case at bar is a court without appellate jurisdiction. Legaspi then has violated a constitutional provision and is hereby barred to appear as counsel before the said court of first instance.

Adaza vs PacanaSingularity of Office/PositionFACTS:Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.ISSUE:Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

HELD:Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office. Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

Internal Government- officers; quorum; sessions; discipline of members; journal

ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268)FACTS:Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmien to was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (DeputySpeaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion? MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.(Gavel)MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.(It was 3:01 p.m.)(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next week. On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and/or challenging the validity of RA 8240.ISSUES:Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which will therefore be a violation of the Constitution. Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceeding of the House.HELD:It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No.8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved. But what happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the bill to a law in accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of the bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was shown. In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House as long as no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown.

AVELINO VS. CUENCO (83. PHIL. 17)FACTS:Petition of quo warran to. Petitioner, Jose Avelino, asks the court to declare him the rightful senate president and oust the respondent, Mariano Jesus Cuenco.Feb 18, 1949; the request of senator Lorenzo Tanada to speak on the floor on Feb 21, 1949 was granted to formulate charges against the then senate president Avelino. On the day that Tanada was supposed to speak on the floor, Avelino delayed his appearance, did not immediately openthe session, and read slowly the resolution of senator Sanidad and Tanada. When the session finally started, Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with but senator Tirona, Avelinos follower, opposed the motion because of the plan of Avelinos group to delay the session to prevent Tanada from delivering his privilege speech. Suddenly, a disorderly conduct broke out in the senate gallery. Senator Pablo David, Avelinos follower, moved for adjournment of session perhaps consistent with their ploy to prevent Tanadas privilege speech. Sanidad opposed the motion and moved that it be submitted to a vote. Suddenly, Avelino banged the gavel, abandonedthe chair, and walked out of the session hall followed by senator Francisco, Torres, Magalona,Clarin, David, and Tirona. Cuenco was designated to chair the session. Tanada was finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Sanidads resolution no. 68 was read and approved. Tanada yielded the chair to senate president pro-tempore Arranz. Then, Sanidad introduced resolution no. 67 entitled Resolution declaring vacant the position of the president of the senate and designating the honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president of the senate. Resolution no. 67 was approved.ISSUES: Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it has, were resolutions nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?DECISION: Petition dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.RATIO:The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of powers and the constitutional grant to the senate of the power to elect its own president. The selection of the presiding officer affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change, or reinstate them. The petition to put back the petitioner to preside is only acceptable if the majority of the senators want to, such remedy lies in the senate session hall and not in the supreme court.Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and presided by Arranz was a continuation of the session. Thus, the departure of the minority senators does not prevent the remaining majority senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.

OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863)FACTS:In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to investigate the allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months.ISSUES: WON his suspension was constitutionalHELD: Court has no Jurisdiction. DismissedRATIO: Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof. The question of whether Osmenas speech constitutes disorderly conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic. Because n opreliminary injunction was issued, the special committee performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the suspension order.

Mabanag vs Lopez VitoPolitical Law Amendment to the ConstitutionFACTS:Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution)* which has been considered as an **enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. Petitioners pray that the said resolution be prevented. Respondents argue that the same can no longer be prevented as entered in the Journals. The Journal of each house is conclusive to the courts.*this is in contrast to Art 15 of the Constitution as wellISSUE:Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.HELD:If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification. There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification. On the other hand, as far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.Philippine Judges Association Versus PradoDirect Filing

Facts:Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them.

In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming a law.

Issues;WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in thetitlethereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passedthreereadings onseparatedays, and printedcopiesthereof in its final form have been distributed to itsMembersthree days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and thevotethereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

- Violative of the Equal protection clause

Ruling:The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Electoral tribunals and the Commision on Appintments

[G.R. No. L-10520 | February 28, 1957]TAADA vs. CUENCO

FACTS:Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Respondents allege that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators."

RULING:We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate.

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative."

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions.

In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction.

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not.

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

Whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.

Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?

Section 11 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads:

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."

Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents.

Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void.

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution.

Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party.

Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes.

Cunanan vs TanCARLOS CUNANAN vs. JORGE TAN, JR.Facts:Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration. Cunanan was formerly appointed in the same position but was later on rejected by the Commision of Appointment prompting the President to replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent.

Filing the quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the convened Commission of Appointments citing irregularities as to the numbers of members comprising the same.Issue: WON the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid.Ruling:With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled that such is a power vested in the Congress as they deem it proper taking into consideration the proportionate numbers of the members of the Commission of Appointment members as to their political affiliations. However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right which they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn over the office in contention.

ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (166 SCRA 651)FACTS:Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court...and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be. On October 9, 1987, Petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The respondent tribunals was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)senators. On November 17, the petitioner filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the above case on the ground that all of them are interested parties, and respondents. This mass disqualification, in effect, would leave only the three Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral Tribunal. The Motion was denied and hence, this petition for certiorari.ARGUMENTS: Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and norms of fair play and due process require the mass disqualification. Further, necessity dictates that an amendment of the Tribunals Rules of procedure permitting the contest to be decided by only three Members is a practicable and unconstitutionally unobjectable solution.ISSUE: Whether or not a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three (3) Justices of the SC is a valid Electoral Tribunal under the ConstitutionHELD: NO. The suggested device is unfeasible and repugnant to the Constitution.

REASONS:Looking into the wording and intent of Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution, it is clear that in creating a Tribunal composed by Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, both judicial and legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the SET is 2 to 1 an unmistakable indication that the legislative component cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of senators. The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Refrain from participation must be distinguished from complete absence. Indeed, an individual Member of the Tribunal may recues himself from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. But a Tribunal cannot legally function as such absent its entire membership of Senators or Justices.

LAZATIN VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (168 SCRA 391)FACTS:Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga in the May 11, 1987 elections. During the canvassing of the votes, respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns and brought the case to the COMELEC. On May 19, The COMELEC ordered the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, yet on May 27, petitioner was proclaimed the winner. Respondent filed two petitions: a) to nullify the proclamation and b) prevent petitioner from taking office. However, the COMELEC did not act on the petitions. On June 30, petitioner assumed office. On September 15, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. The Supreme Court set aside the revocation on January 25, 1988.On January 28, Respondent received a copy of the Courts decision and consequently filed an election protest with the HRET on February 8.

ARGUMENTS: In moving to dismiss private respondents protest on the ground that it was filed late, petitioner cited Sec.250 of the Omnibus Election Code: A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa...shall be filed...within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election.Using the above rule, Petitioner argued that respondent had only until February 6 to file a protest. Since the protest was filed on February 8, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it. However, the HRET argued that petitioner was able to file the protest on time, citing Sec. 9 of the HRET rules: Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed... within fifteen (15)days from the effectivity of these rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen (15)days from the date of proclamation. Using the above rule, the HRET argued that respondent has up February 11 to file a protest. Since it was filed on February 8, the HRET ruled it was within the prescribed period and thus, had jurisdiction over the matter.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may conduct a Judicial Review of decisions/final resolutions of the HRETHELD:1. YES. The HRET has jurisdiction over the protest, as it was filed within the period prescribed by Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules.2. NO, except for cases requiring the exercise of the Courts extraordinary jurisdiction.

REASONS: Inapplicability of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code to the case at bar:Under the 1973Constitution, Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official. Under the 1987 Constitution, it has ceased to be effective. First, the Batasang Pambansa ha salready been abolished and legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the HOR and the Senate in their respective Electoral Tribunals.Exclusive character of the Electoral Tribunals Power:The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. It is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. Following this principle, the HRET, in order to fully exercise its constitutional function may implement its own rules concerning the filing of electoral protests. A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted to the legislative body itself. In the 1935 Constitution, this power was lodged to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose. Under the 1973 Constitution, this delineation between the power of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred when jurisdiction over electoral contests was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of election for all elective national and local officials. The 1987 constitution vested this jurisdiction back to the respective Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives.Scope of the Supreme Court over decisions made by the HRET:So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests related to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall as a rule, not be reviewed by the Court. Its corrective power extends only to decisions and resolutions constituting a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Electoral Tribunals.

Daza versus SingsonTribunal and its CompositionFACTS:The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.ISSUE:Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments.HELD:As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.Coseteng Versus MitraFacts:Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from diverse political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal.On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representationIssue:1. WON the question raised is political.2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Holding/Held:1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. There is no merit in the petitioners contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable.Section 21&22

Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali GonzalesHRETs Composition Rounding OffFACTS:After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.ISSUE:Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the CoA.

HELD:It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC.A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

BONDOC VS. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792)FACTS:Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Ermigidio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were rivals in the congressional elections held on May 11, 1987. Pineda was the proclaimed winner, but Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal(HRET). The said tribunal is composed of nine (9) members, 3 of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court, and the remaining six (6) are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties and party list. A decision has been reached by the HRET where Bondoc won over by Pineda; thus the LDP members in the tribunal insisted on a reappreciation of votes and recount of ballots delaying the finalization of the decision at least four months. Thereexamination resulted in increase of Bondocs lead over Pineda from 23 to 107 votes. It shall be noted that Congressman Camasura, a member LDP, voted with the Supreme Court Justices to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest; hence, HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation No. 25 declaring Bondoc as the winner. Subsequently, Congressman Cojuanco informed Camasura and Bautista that the LDP expelled them from the party on the ground of betrayal to the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP. Thereafter, Cojuanco informed the House Speaker Mitra of the ouster of the said Congressmen and their decision to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET. The Tribunal issued a Resolution canceling the previous decision on the ground that without the vote of Congressman Camasura, who was relieved from the Tribunal, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Sec. 24 of the Rules of Tribunal, and therefore, cannot be validly promulgated. A Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Bondoc seeking the following reliefs:1.) to annul the decision of HRET to withdraw the nomination of Camasura to the HRET.;2.) issue a writ of prohibition restraining whoever may be designated in place of Camasura from assuming, ossupying, and discharging functions as a member of the HRET,;3.)writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to return and discharge his functions as a member of the HRET; In his answer, Pineda asserts that the Congress being the sole authority that nominates and elects the members of the HRET; hence, it has the power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in representation of the political parties materially changed.ISSUE: Whether of not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant party, change the partys representation in the House Representatives Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the said tribunal in an election contest pending therein.DECISION: SC ruled in favor of Bondoc.RATIO: (Read Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution)The tribunal was created to function as a non partisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Tribunal was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration and to transfer to that tribunal all powers in matter pertaining to contested election of its members. The Tribunal is a body separate from and independent from the legislature.Resolution of House of Representatives violates the independence of HRET.The Resolution of House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the HRET for disloyalty to LDP, because he cast a vote in favor of Nacionalista party, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference would reduce the HRET as a mere tool for the advancement of a party in power.Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRETAs judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independenceeven independence from political party to which they belong. In expelling Camasura from HRET for that ground, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Such resolution is therefore null and void.Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.Members of the HRET, as judges, are entitled to security of tenure, just as members of judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec 2.,Art VIII, 1987 Constitution). Membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for just cause, such as, expiration of the members congressional term of office, death, permanent disability, resignation from political party which he represents, formal affiliation with another political party, and removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. The records shows that Camasura has not formally affiliated with another political group; thus, his termination from HRET was not for valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

Angara versus Electoral CommissionFACTS:In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.ISSUES:(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National AssemblyRULING: On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme CourtThe separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof.As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of government.In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be