chapter 7 encouraging good natural resource management · 2016. 6. 22. · chapter 7 encouraging...

Chapter 7

Encouraging good natural resource management

Previous chapters have examined social characteristics that have the potential to influence people’s NRM practices and/or their receptiveness to change45. Along with landholder awareness of NRM issues and the resources available to address them, Chapter 4 explored aspects of landholder motivation, such as attachment to their rural property, land use imperatives, and particular NRM values. Extension officers can use such insights about landholders’ attitudes and circumstances to engage with landholders more effectively. Also, government agencies such as state departments, regional NRM bodies and local councils can use these insights to inform broader strategic decisions about achieving NRM objectives on private rural land. So how can government agencies make use of these insights to improve private rural landholders’ NRM practices in the PPW region, particularly in the green wedges?

This chapter reviews the kinds of policy instruments that can be used to positively influence private landholders’ NRM practices. It also develops a framework for selecting the most appropriate instruments, in view of the social characteristics examined in previous sections. In particular, this section focuses on how different landholder motivations for NRM can influence the selection of policy instrument.

This chapter consists of four main parts. Section 7.1 provides an overview of the five broad categories of NRM policy tools, and outlines the type of change each type of tool can accomplish. Section 7.2 introduces a framework that guides the selection of policy tools according to the balance of private and public benefits that could result from a prospective NRM project. This framework has been popular with policy researchers since Western Australian economist David Pannell first introduced it (Pannell 2006; Kaine et al. 2007; Wilkinson 2007). Section 7.3 also adapts Pannell’s framework to account for the diversity of landholder motivations for land management that characterise the green wedges and other peri‐urban areas. Section 7.4 to Section 7.7 illustrate the application of the modified framework using four case studies, comparing the responses of four different types of landholders (similar but not identical to the real estate advertisement examples introduced in

45 The research and conceptual development for this chapter was conducted by Peter Parbery and Tereso Morph. The early drafts were written by Tereso Morph.

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Section 4.3.3), using two NRM project proposals: one aimed at controlling weeds, and the other at protecting and restoring native vegetation. Section 7.8 draws together the main conclusions for this chapter.

7.1 NRM policy tools

As discussed in Chapter 3, government agencies use a variety of NRM policy tools—also known as policy instruments or mechanisms—to influence the way landholders manage their natural resources, with a view to encouraging ‘good’ NRM practices and discouraging ‘poor’ ones. Pannell (2006) distinguishes five types of policy tools: positive incentives, negative incentives, extension, technology development and informed inaction (‘no action’). Table 35 defines and summarises the applications of Pannell’s five categories of policy tools. These categorisations are used in this chapter, although there are other ways of categorising policy instruments (e.g. the voluntary, compulsory, market driven and support tools of Lewis 2007). Other reviews of policy mechanisms include Pannell (2005), Parminter (2003), ABARE (2001), Coutts et al. (2005), James (1997), Kaine et al. (2006) and Robinson and Ryan (2002). The ‘Policy Choice Framework’ developed by Kaine et al. (2006) builds on Pannell’s framework and could be usefully applied in the context of this project, as discussed briefly in Section 7.8.

Table 35. Main types of NRM policy tools (adapted from Pannell 2006)

Main type Examples What they can achieve (or, desired effect)

Positive incentive Grants/targeted subsidies, rate rebates, auction

Encourage landholders to change to better NRM practice

Negative incentive

Regulatory permit system (command and control), penalties, fines, performance bond

Discourage landholders from poor NRM practice

Extension Training, information communication, demonstration, support for community network

Increase the rate of uptake of better NRM practices where these are ‘adoptable’, and increase awareness and use of other NRM policy tools

Technology development

Research on bio‐control, more productive perennial‐based systems

Raise the level of project benefits for private owners, the general public or both, thereby making it potentially adoptable

No action Informed inaction

Accept projects with a net benefit to society, while avoiding spending public funds unnecessarily

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ENCOURAGING GOOD NRM

The desired behavioural change will influence which of the five policy tools should be used. For example, a pollution tax is a negative incentive used to discourage damaging practices; whereas a subsidy that encourages landholders to adopt practices that will benefit the environment, such as the creation of a safe habitat for rare or endangered wildlife, is a form of positive incentive. It is important to be mindful of the NRM context, the desired effect and the target audience46 when designing these tools (Hazell & Williams 2003; Kaine et al. 2006).

As with positive incentives, the primary motivation for using extension (i.e. training and information) is to encourage landholders to change their existing practices towards improved NRM practices. Technology development creates new solutions where gaps have been identified, for example if some green landholders are concerned about the use of conventional weed sprays, technology might be employed to develop organic alternatives. As the name implies, the ‘no action’ category is about maintaining the status quo in situations where the current practices of private landholders are viewed, on balance, as beneficial to the community, or where the public cost of intervention would outweigh any public benefit. These five policy instruments are described in greater detail below.

7.1.1 Positive incentives

A positive incentive is effectively a motivational tool used to encourage ‘good’ or desirable behaviour among landholders. Monetary incentives, such as one‐off grants, subsidies and rate rebates tend to be the most commonly employed means of changing existing practices, although in certain circumstances non‐financial incentives are used, such as the distribution of free seedlings to encourage revegetation.

Market‐based instruments (MBIs)47 are another form of incentive (positive or negative) that is increasingly being applied to solve NRM issues. These instruments combine old and new and voluntary and compulsory approaches to practice change (RMCG 2007). According to RMCG (2007), there are three categories of MBIs, including price‐based, quantity‐based and market‐friction instruments, all of which have been successfully applied to NRM issues in Australia.

For example, Coggan and Whitten (2005) report that MBIs proved very effective when used to implement water reforms. These reforms established water entitlements and rules for water trading that led to increased efficiency of water use, the transfer of water to higher value uses and increased water security for irrigators and the environment (Thompson & Heffer 2000). The literature on applying MBIs to NRM issues suggests that the NRM policy tool kit currently available to governments is quite narrow (ABARE 2001; James 1997; Robinson & Ryan 2002; Stoneham 2000). In particular, the suite of negative incentive tools could be expanded if the potential of some MBIs were tapped, for example, tradeable permits to allocate pollution control burden among individuals and biodiversity offset schemes (Stoneham 2000). 46 This is the section of the community that is the target of the policy. It could be an individual landholder (e.g. commercial farmer, lifestyle property owner, land speculator), a defined group of landholders (e.g. Landcare group), the suppliers of polluting inputs (e.g. the fertiliser industry), the producers of pollution‐control equipment, etc. 47 MBIs are broadly defined as instruments that encourage behaviour through market signals rather than through explicit directives (Whitten et al. 2006). The focus in applying MBIs is on achieving outcomes through the self‐interest of the firms and individuals. They appear to have cost advantages over more traditional command‐and‐control type policy instruments. However, MBIs are not a one‐size‐fits‐all panacea for every NRM issue (Hazell & Williams 2003).

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Auctioning is a positive incentive market‐based mechanism that governments can use to achieve good NRM or practice change (Stoneham 2000). The DPI’s ‘EcoTender’ scheme is an example of such a mechanism to achieve NRM. Auctions use market mechanisms to enable open trade between landholders (sellers of environmental services, such as native habitat) and the buyers of such services (e.g. government agencies). They create a market where none existed previously, and this can enable more environmental or production benefits for the same budget, or the same level of benefits at a lower cost to government (the buyer of NRM benefits on behalf of society).

A review of local government incentives48 for sustainable land management in 2001 revealed that there are a number of ‘models’ operating throughout Victoria. For example, Cardinia Shire Council uses grants, including its biodiversity incentive grant and its weed grant program to address regional preservation and control issues. Instead, the Shire of Melton relies on a rate rebate scheme to encourage and assist landholders to control pest animals and plants.

Some policy makers argue that governments might need to extend ‘targeted’ financial incentives in order to engage landholders who are lacking the financial capacity (or security) and/or personal motivation to change their existing practices. This argument is borne out in the literature, which shows that positive incentives are an effective way of fostering practice change. For example, one of the conclusions of DPI’s TWoPL project was that positive incentives for weed control were needed in cases where motivation or financial resources are lacking (DPI 2007).

Landholders’ existing financial capacity can have a strong impact on whether positive incentives will effectively induce change at a rate and on a scale that meets policy needs (BRS 2002). For example, in a scenario where a local council is trying to encourage landholders to grow native vegetation it might encounter three landholders; one who is lacking both the financial resources and the personal motivation to act, another who is personally motivated but lacks the financial resources, and a third who has the financial resources but not the motivation to act. In the first two scenarios a financial incentive might be sufficient to entice these landholders to become involved in a particular NRM project. However, in the third instance even financial incentives may not be sufficient to influence the landholder’s behaviour due to their lack of a financial need. This is often the case for horse lifestylers—at least according to one service provider—who suggested they are often sufficiently well‐off that the positives incentives offered are not effective (service provider interview).

48 Although not an exhaustive list, Victorian councils known to have experience in implementing NRM programs that provide positive incentives include: Strathbogie (Rural Land Rebate), Surf Coast (Biodiversity Incentives Program), Bendigo City (Bushcare Incentive Program), Mitchell (Land Management Rebate Scheme), Nillumbik (Land Management Incentives Program), Murrindindi (Revegetation and Protection of Native Bush). This list is sampled from Bateson (2001).

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In the absence of any incentive schemes, farmers who are not personally motivated are unlikely to act beyond their ‘duty of care’ responsibilities49 (Comerford & Clouston 2005; Farmar‐Bowers & Lane 2006; Marsh 1998; Pannell et al. 2006). For example, if a farmer suffering from soil runoff believes that the cost of soil retention outweighs the potential benefit of sustaining crop production they are unlikely to actively address this issue. This is particularly problematic with regards to long‐term issues, such as the restoration of soil, water quality and native biodiversity (Farmar‐Bowers & Lane 2006).

7.1.2 Negative incentives

A negative incentive or disincentive is used to discourage undesirable behaviour among landholders. Put another way, negative incentives are tools used to encourage landholders to comply with local and state government guidelines, with non‐compliance attracting penalties or fines from violators. Examples of negative incentives include ‘command‐and‐control’ style regulations (including the planning scheme), tradeable permits, input tax, pollution charges, performance bond, offset schemes and industry self‐regulation.

Negative incentives can be used to enforce government regulations that restrict certain land use activities (e.g. clearing of remnant native vegetation), or to impose specific management practices that all landholders must adhere to (e.g. avoid herbicide spraying near waterways or residential areas to avoid chemical drift).

These regulations have been identified as cost‐effective in particular circumstances, such as, when natural assets and values are under serious threat and any further damage could result in irreversible losses, and preventing these losses has considerable benefits (Whitten et al. 2006). Negative incentives can prevent unregulated private actions that generate either a net loss in beneficial outcome (e.g. biodiversity loss due to unrestricted vegetation clearing) or a net increase in undesirable outcome (e.g. water quality reduction due to uncontrolled aquatic weed infestations).

As with positive incentives, the effectiveness of financial negative incentives depends on a landholder’s pre‐existing financial situation (i.e. whether they need the money). Also, financial negative incentives are not effective where these are smaller than the potential benefit to be gained, as some landholders in the Western GWRegion appear to perceive is the case in relation to the clearing of native vegetation to facilitate development.

7.1.3 Extension

Across Australia, various levels of government often employ extension to influence landholder behaviour. The aim of extension programs is to assist landholders in their decision making through one of the three extension ‘models’: facilitation, training and information access (Coutts et al. 2005). Landcare Australia is a working example of the facilitation (or empowerment) model, which emphasises ownership and responsibility at a community level. Using this model, Landcare group members are given a framework to

49 General duties of a land owner include those identified in s20 (1) of the CaLP Act 1994. In relation to his or her land, a land owner must take all reasonable steps (a duty of care) not to cause foreseeable harm to other people or their property e.g., by controlling weeds on their property to prevent weeds spreading to adjoining areas. Source: www.legalaid.qld.gov.au/.../Living+in+the+community/Duty+of+care/ Negligence+duty+of+care+and+loss.htm

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define and directly address their own needs. Some extension programs have undertaken facilitation projects that focus on sustainable and profitable primary industries, such as BestWool 2010 and BeefCheque, while others attempt to integrate all aspects of farm business planning with NRM, such as ‘FarmBis’ (DSE undated).

Local councils often employ extension methods that focus on training and information access. Councils will generally develop training programs for far‐reaching issues that are relevant to a large and diverse group of its constituents. The Surf Coast Shire (outside of the study area for this project), for example, provides training programs focussing on local community sustainability issues (such as its Eco‐Casuarina Project). The Yarra Ranges Shire provides community members with a variety of educational materials that are in keeping with the information access model, such as an environmental weeds brochure, a weed action calendar, a sustainable gardening booklet and a community weed display. The information access model recognises that people require different information at various stages of the decision‐making process. However, the rates of return to investments in extension programs in Australia have not been generally been as high as might be wished (Marsh, Pannell & Lindner 2004), prompting Pannell et al. (2006) to suggest that extension has been overly relied on, and has had unrealistic expectations placed upon it (discussed below).

Pannell (2006) argues that extension as a main policy tool essentially aims to accelerate the rate of widespread adoption only of those ‘adoptable’ NRM practices50. This form of extension should be differentiated from other extension‐type activities which serve a support function to the main policy tool. An example of extension operating in support of another policy tool would be the provision of information about a positive incentive available to landholders, for example, competitive auctions and stewardship schemes. As well as raising awareness, such extension can enable potential participants to develop more confidence in, or ownership of, the process (Comerford & Binney 2005; Parminter 2003).

7.1.4 Technology development

Technology development is another instrument that governments can use to affect practice change. This instrument focuses on developing new solutions to existing problems, with the aim of finding a solution that will mutually benefit individual landholders and the broader community. A research and development project that identifies effective biological control agents against specific weed species, such as bridal creeper, is one example of this type of instrument. The resulting technology (biological control in the case of bridal creeper) will benefit landholders due to the reduced cost of weed control per unit of area treated. Another example is the development of ‘Bush Broker’ in Victoria as a new ‘enterprise’ or source of income for landholders who provide biodiversity outcomes by protecting and restoring native vegetation.

7.1.5 No action

In some cases, no action may be the best option available, providing it does not result in an under‐supply of beneficial NRM outcomes (such as improved biodiversity) or a net increase

50 The practice should be sufficiently financially attractive to landholders for it to be ‘adoptable’ once the extension program ceases (Pannell 2006).

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in undesirable outcome (such as salinity). An informed ‘no action’ policy helps governments avoid spending public funds unnecessarily. It also encourages society to accept private projects that generate relatively low levels of undesirable outcomes (such as low‐nutrient farm effluents) but provide a net benefit to society overall due to their high level of productivity (such as dairy farms which generate low‐nutrient farm effluents). Informed inaction is also appropriate where the cost of intervention would exceed any benefit.

7.2 Selecting suitable tools

What determines the suitability of particular policy instruments in different situations and how is the optimal mix of instruments achieved? The literature indicates that a number of factors determine the appropriateness of different policy instruments. These include the institutional capacities of the government agency that wields the policy instrument, the nature of the particular NRM issue being addressed, the characteristics of the landholders that the policy instrument targets, and whether the policy objective is to change landholders’ behaviour to more desirable practices, or to prevent it from changing to less desirable practices (Lewis 2007).

In terms of institutional capacity, only local governments can offer rate rebates and only the federal and state governments can introduce or modify taxes. Local councils can influence NRM policy making through land use planning, development approvals, rates, and a variety of services such as fire management, water supply and the disposal of waste (Smith & Pritchard 2002). However, local governments do not always have adequate staffing or rate bases (Hazell & Williams 2003), which can limit their capacity to invest in NRM practice change. Regional NRM bodies, on the other hand, are in a position to influence the control of the degradation of natural resources through agricultural activity (Parminter 2003). They are well‐placed to guide and catalyse the development of best practice NRM systems and to promote their widespread adoption in their regions (GNPL & URSAL 2006). Questions of institutional capacity are certainly relevant within the PPW region and have been examined by Kaine et al. (2007) and Lewis (2007) among others, although they are outside of the scope of the present study. Overall, to apply many of the policy tools successfully, collaboration at various levels of government is often necessary.

The remainder of this section focuses on understanding the interaction between different types of NRM issues and different types of landholders, along with the implications for choosing appropriate policy instruments. A number of research studies in Australia have developed and/or tested frameworks that strategically guide the selection of policy tools for encouraging good NRM on private rural land (Comerford & Binney 2005; Pannell 2006; Stoneham 2000). This study uses the framework developed by Western Australian resource economist David Pannell, which has been used and expanded on by a number of policy researchers (Wilkinson 2007, Kaine et al. 2007).

7.1.1 Pannell’s framework for assessing private and public projects

Pannell’s framework prescribes particular policy tools depending on the mix of public and private benefits that are likely to accrue from a particular NRM ‘project’ (Pannell 2006).

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Pannell’s framework is applied to understanding a particular project that involves a specific activity (such a spraying regime for a particular weed, or clearing land of native vegetation) on a single property or group of similar properties. This project might be initiated by governments or by the private landholder. In the first instance, public benefits would be taken for granted (at least by the government agent who initiated the project); however, landholder benefits would not necessarily follow. Conversely, if a private landholder initiates a project, it can be assumed to be of private benefit (at least as perceived by the landholder), but public benefits would not be guaranteed. Pannell’s approach involves estimating and weighing the net private and public benefits (i.e. benefits minus costs) of a particular project, and using the results to prescribe the most appropriate policy instrument or combination of instruments. The objective is to achieve the best NRM policy outcome at the least cost.

Pannell’s framework is useful, in part, because it helps to explain the failure—or only partial success—of many government extension programs aimed at changing private landholders’ behaviour (Pannell et al. 2006). In accounting for the private net benefits of proposed government projects, the framework facilitates a realistic appraisal of what will be needed to induce landholders to participate. Pannell suggests that when private net benefits are negative (i.e. there is an overall cost to the landholder), no amount of extension will induce a landholder to participate. Pannell describes such a program as being ‘not adoptable’, and suggests that policy instruments other than extension must be considered to encourage landholder uptake.

Figure 64 shows the basic version of the Pannell’s framework used in the present study (for more sophisticated versions, see Pannell 2006). Within this framework, the private and public net benefits of the project are indicated in the x and y axes, respectively. Net benefits—both private and public—are measured in monetary terms for the purpose of comparison. In the case of public net benefits, it is assumed that the value of non‐monetary benefits (for example, the conservation value of protecting native habitat) can be quantified using standard economic techniques (such as the hedonic pricing method). When measuring private benefits, Pannell assumes that the private landholder is a commercial farmer, and that net benefits can, therefore, be estimated in monetary terms, by gains or losses in levels of production. This assumption is clearly not appropriate in the study area of this project, where landholders exhibit a diverse range of motivations as explored in Chapter 4. The implications of applying Pannell’s framework in such situations are explored in the Section 7.4 to Section 7.7.

Quantifying the net public and private benefits of a particular project (following Pannell’s assumption that the private landholder is a commercial farmer) dictates the position of the proposed project within Pannell’s framework. If a project’s public net benefit is positive, it maps to the upper half of the grid; if its public net benefit is negative it maps to the lower half. Similarly, if a project’s private net benefit is positive, it maps to the right‐hand side of the grid; if its private net benefit is negative it maps to the left. Thus, in a project where net public and private benefits are both positive (i.e. of mutual benefit) it would map to Area B; if the result is negative for both parties (i.e. a mutual cost) it would map to Area E. More complex mixes of private and public net benefits map to the other areas of the grid.

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In Pannell’s scheme, a project’s placement within the grid will dictate which policy instrument is appropriate, as shown in Figure 64. Pannell’s rationale for assigning policy instruments within the various segments of the public–private benefits grid are explained in the series of principles below. These principles dictate when it is inappropriate to use each of the five broad categories of policy instruments (positive incentives, negative incentives, extension, technology development, no action). This enables the most appropriate instrument to be selected through a process of elimination.

Private net benefit

Publ

ic n

et b

enef

it

0

Positive incentives Extension

No action

Negative incentives

No action

Technology development

A B

C D E

F

Figure 64. Pannell’s framework for using net public and private benefits to guide NRM policy instrument selection (simple version)

Projects with a public net benefit

These are projects that are perceived as providing a positive public net benefit, and which governments would ideally wish to promote. In such cases, Pannell suggests that three policy instruments might be appropriate, depending on the level of private net benefit. These instruments are extension, positive incentives and technology development.

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Principles for using extension include:

• It would be futile for governments to promote a project using extension alone, if the project does not provide some benefit to the private landholder. Such a project, which has a negative private net benefit, would be classified as not adoptable (excludes left‐hand side: Areas A, E and F).

• It would obviously be against the public interest to use extension to promote a project where the public net benefit is negative (i.e. public cost) (excludes lower half: Areas C and D).

This leaves Area B as the only space where extension is appropriate. While projects with this profile can occur without any government intervention, extension can accelerate adoption rates and bring forward the project’s mutual benefits. For example, landholders may not be aware of potential benefits available to them through the project, or may lack the skills to implement the project.

Principles for using positive incentives include:

• It is counter‐productive for governments to provide positive incentives to promote a project with a cost to society (i.e. a negative public net benefit) (excludes Areas C, D and E).

• It is unnecessary to provide positive incentives if the private landholder is already motivated to adopt the project, because the private net benefit is already positive (excludes Area B). In general, positive incentives should only be provided to those landholders who do not already perceive a personal benefit from the proposed project, and who are unlikely to undertake it in the absence of positive incentives (i.e. those projects which fall into the not adoptable category).

• Providing positive incentives is not economical when the cost of the incentive used to induce the landholder’s participation exceeds any public net benefit. This occurs whenever the private net cost of the proposed project is larger than the public net benefit (Area F). The diagonal line that runs through Figure 64 indicates the points where any net costs are equalled by net benefits. In the upper left quadrant, the private landholder bears the net costs, while the public accrues the benefits. The opposite is the case in the lower right quadrant. These are the two quadrants where conflict between private and public good arises.

This framework dictates that positive incentives are only suitable in Area A. In this area, an incentive is necessary to induce a private landholder to participate in the project, because without it the project will impose a net cost on the landholder. Also, the cost of the incentive is less than the overall benefit being sought, and so the incentive can be deemed worthwhile.

In terms of available options in Area F, where extension is ineffective and positive incentives are too expensive to be worthwhile, the first thing to consider is that resources should not be wasted attempting to achieve the impossible in the short term. In the longer term, Pannell suggests that governments should attempt to develop new technologies or systems (i.e. ‘technology development’) that would increase the public benefits associated with the

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project, or decrease the private costs (thereby moving the project into Area A or B). An example of the successful implementation of technological improvement was the development of biological control for the weed bridal creeper, which has implications for production levels among citrus growers (AECgroup 2005).

Projects with a public net cost

As with projects that provide a public net benefit, Pannell indicates that the most appropriate policy response to projects that could generate a public net cost will depend on the relative level of private net benefit. Cases where both the private net benefit and the public net benefit are negative are lose‐lose situations (Area E); it is unlikely that projects would ever be initiated in this space, so no response is necessary. Projects that benefit the private landholder while imposing a public net cost are presumably only initiated by private landholders. Common examples include the clearing of native vegetation, or the construction of new private dwellings or other infrastructure.

If governments become aware of such projects—through effective monitoring—they might wish to prevent them. However, Pannell suggests that prevention is only worthwhile when the public net cost of the project exceeds the private net benefit (Area D). For these projects, negative incentives, such as regulations, taxes and permits should be used to deter private landholders’ detrimental activities. It should be noted, however, that these disincentives will not be effective if they impose a cost smaller than any benefit the landholder would gain by proceeding with the project and accepting the penalty. Some service providers suggested that this is often the case in the Western GWRegion, where the potential financial gains through the urban development of a rural property far exceed the fine imposed for clearing native vegetation ($1,000 in some cases) in order to make way for such development.

Yet the imposition of a public net cost is not always a sufficient reason for governments to attempt to prevent a project that would benefit a private landholder. Pannell suggests that projects where the private net benefits are so high that they exceed the public net cost should be permitted to proceed (Area C). The rationale is that such projects are likely to generate a net benefit to society through ‘trickle down’ effects in the economy, for example by providing employment or generating tax revenue.

For example, government may judge that the low‐nutrient farm effluents of a particular farm are only mildly negative (for example because it occurs in an area that is not highly ecologically sensitive). This might be tolerated from an economic viewpoint if the private net benefit of the farm activity is very high (e.g. the farm is very profitable), and so the total net benefit (public plus private) is judged to be positive overall. Such a view is indicated in Area C, where the no action option is chosen.

7.3 Adapting Pannell’s framework to accommodate landholder diversity

As stated in Section 7.2, Pannell’s framework assumes that the private landholder in each case is a commercial farmer, and that the private net benefit can, therefore, be understood as changing productivity and profitability. Pannell has acknowledged that this assumption is

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not always appropriate, and it certainly is not applicable in the green wedges and many other parts of the PPW region51.

Understanding what may count as a cost or benefit for a particular landholder (or type of landholder) depends on the landholder’s motivations for owning and managing rural land. These motivations were examined in detail in Section 4.3.3 of this report, where they were described in terms of a landholder’s attachment, land use imperatives (home or business) and NRM values. In the remainder of this section, Pannell’s framework is adapted to account for the wide variation in landholders’ motivation in the PPW region, focussing in particular on the implications of different NRM values.

In the terms developed in the present study, Pannell’s default private landholder—a commercial farmer—can be understood as having brown NRM values (they are production oriented), a commercial land use imperative (they rely on their farm income), and a reasonably high attachment to their property (they want to remain on the farm). These factors combined, help to define what constitutes a private net benefit—changes in the level of farm productivity and profitability (for the purpose of analysis, Pannell ignores the non‐monetary private costs and benefits that a project often generates, or estimates a monetary value for them). What are the implications of using Pannell’s framework when analysing landholders with very different kinds of motivations, particularly motivations that cannot easily be ascribed a monetary value? What if the landholder has a low level of attachment to the land, different land use imperatives, or other NRM values?

Section 4.3.3 of this report introduced six kinds of NRM values that describe a landholder’s broad orientation to the natural resources on their property. This encompasses the ways in which they value and use the natural features of their property, and whether they value them at all. The six values are:

• brown (interested in primary production)

• green (interested in nature conservation)

• aesthetic (interested in natural beauty)

• recreation (interested in sports and active play)

• zero (not interested in the outdoors at all)

• developer (interested in increasing property values).

We now consider four landholders with different NRM values: brown, green, recreation and development in terms of the effects on Pannell’s framework and its policy prescriptions52. To simplify this process, it has been assumed that in each of the four cases, the NRM value in question completely dominates any others the individual may hold (in reality, most

51 Pannell is presently working with the one of the authors of this report (R Wilkinson) to develop a version of the framework for lifestyle landholders. 52 These four cases were initially presented in a workshop held in November 2007 which brought together the experience and insights of specialists from DPI and DSE, representatives from three local councils, and senior staff of the PPWCMA. Harnessing the knowledge and experience of workshop participants, in terms of on‐ground extension, and strategic selection of NRM policy instruments has helped to expand the analysis of the cases.

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landholders have multiple NRM values). In this sense they are ‘one‐dimensional’ landholders, for which more realistic comparisons (but not analogues) can be found in four of the real estate advertisements shown Section 4.3.3 (Figures 17, 19, 21 and 23). The reaction of each landholder (i.e. their private net benefit) is considered in response to two different government‐initiated projects aimed at improving aspects of NRM of private rural land. The first project is aimed at controlling ragwort (a production‐relevant weed) through regular spraying. This could be part of the state government’s weed management strategy. The second project involves planting and protecting native vegetation on private land. This could be part of a regional native vegetation management plan for example. For the purpose of these case studies, it is assumed that both projects would generate a high and constant level of public benefit: the level of public benefit does not vary across examples. The implications of different land use imperatives and levels of attachment are considered for each landholder. In all cases, attachment is assumed to be high unless otherwise stated.

7.4 Case 1: Commercial dairy farmer

This hypothetical landholder is a commercial dairy farmer (not an asparagus farmer as in Figure 17), commonly found in the South East GWRegion. This landholder is an example of Pannell’s default landholder, who has brown NRM values, a commercial land use imperative and reasonably high level of attachment. To simplify the analysis, and highlight differences between cases, it is posited that this landholder does not hold any NRM values other than brown (although this is highly unlikely in reality). How will this particular landholder perceive the two proposed NRM projects—are they likely to generate a private net benefit or a private net cost?

The first project involves a program to control ragwort through a regular regime of careful spraying. Ragwort displaces productive pasture grasses and clovers and is toxic to some livestock. Overall, it reduces the productivity of dairy operations, and so controlling this weed is likely to produce a strong private net benefit for this commercial dairy farmer. This strong positive private net benefit—combined with the strong positive public net benefit—means the project maps to Area B (see red oval in Figure 65). The strong mutual benefit indicates that extension would be worthwhile in terms of accelerating project implementation. This landholder is likely to be familiar with the problem of ragwort and its control, and so appropriate extension activities might simply involve advising the landholder that the government is making a concerted effort to eliminate ragwort in their area (including public land), and that the landholder could take this opportunity to eliminate the weed from their own property (while also offering additional information and other extensive activities).

What would happen in this scenario if this farmer’s attachment to their property was low—because, for example, the farm were no longer profitable—and the farmer wanted to sell his property and move to greener pastures (i.e. a diminishing of the commercial ‘land use imperative’ as discussed in Section 5.3). In such cases, the commercial benefits described above would not accrue (assuming that the farmer believed that controlling ragwort would not restore commercial viability), and so the project would impose a net cost on the

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landholder, due to the time and money needed for spraying53. Positive incentives would then be required to induce this farmer to participate, assuming that the private net cost remained smaller than the public benefit—Area A, not Area F in Figure 64. In generalised terms, low attachment prevents any NRM values from being fully expressed, meaning that the costs and benefits which these values define will not be realised (except in the case of developer NRM values, where low attachment is inherent yet motivation to actively manage is very high: see Case 4).

weed control project

native vegetation project

Figure 65. NRM policy tools tailored to the commercial dairy farmer using Pannell’s framework

What about native vegetation? How might this hypothetical landholder (with their original level of high attachment restored), respond to the second project, directed at protecting and restoring native vegetation? For the sake of this example, consider that the revegetation project would necessitate some land being taken out of production, planted out, and fenced off to protect it from grazing—especially in sensitive riparian zones. Though the new native vegetation could potentially provide a range of production benefits (shelter for stock, control

53 In practice, the landholder may still desire to manage weeds to assist sale of the property to another commercial dairy farmer. In this case, the prospective buyer’s (assumed) brown NRM values are represented by proxy, by the retail value of the property.

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of salinity), consider that in this instance, the net effect of the native vegetation project is to moderately reduce the productivity and profitability of the farm. The private net benefit is moderately negative, putting it in Area A of Figure 64, and thereby prescribing positive incentives as the appropriate policy instrument to encourage the landholder to implement the project.

This positive incentive could be offered, for example, by an MBI such as DPI’s BushTender program (currently not offered in the PPW region). In which case, the incentive would need to be high enough to at least offset any financial loss caused by participation in the revegetation program (Area A in Figure 64)54. Accordingly, the effectiveness of a positive incentive scheme would vary across different farm sectors. On commercial grounds at least, those with relatively low levels of production per hectare (e.g. grazing) would be most likely to participate, while those with relatively high production per hectare (e.g. horticulture) would be less likely to participate. In Cardinia (in the South Eastern GWRegion) the average price per hectare of a horticultural farm ($210,526/ha) in 2005 was 12 times higher than for a dairy farm ($17,099/ha) (DSE 2006b p. 89)55. This explains one service provider’s comment that horticulturalists feel they need “every inch of soil”, and are generally uninterested in revegetation activities. One of the strengths of MBIs is that they enable purchasers (e.g. governments) of environmental services (e.g. native habitat) to not only acknowledge but also take advantage of this variation in the size of positive incentives needed to induce change, thereby spending the least amount of money to purchase the most environmental services.

As previously mentioned, only the financial benefits for the landholder have been considered in relation to the two projects in question, which is consistent with this hypothetical landholder’s brown NRM values, and their exclusively commercial orientation. The influence of alternative NRM values could work for or against the success of the two programs considered above. These alternative values are explored in the cases which follow.

7.5 Case 2: ‘Green’ lifestyler

The second case examines a green lifestyle property owner. This landholder has green NRM values, they use their land as a home (a land use imperative), and they have high levels of attachment. For the purpose of this example, consider that this particular landholder is committed to the organic philosophy of production and consumption (for a real example from the qualitative landholder interviews see Case Study 1 in Section 4.1). How might this landholder respond to the weeds and native vegetation projects under consideration?

This landholder would most likely have an interest in controlling weeds for conservation reasons (perhaps not as strong as the previous example), though it is also possible—given that they are not involved in primary production and have no livestock—that they may not be particularly aware of, or concerned with, the problem of weeds. Most importantly, the

54 Remembering that in this example, commercial brown NRM values constitute the sole value. 55 The cost of ‘grazing land’ was $26,482. This is higher than the cost of dairying land, even though its commercial potential is less (see Chapter 5). This is probably because the land price for grazing land is strongly affected by non‐commercial factors: i.e. by demand from lifestyle landholders.

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proposed method of weed control—chemical control—is profoundly at odds with their organic principles, due to possible damage to human and ecological health. Consequently, this weed control program would be entirely unacceptable to this landholder; it would generate a strongly negative private net benefit (Figure 64, Area F). This implies that positive incentives will not be effective, and the only alternative policy instrument is new technology development. In this instance, this would most likely consist of non‐chemical or organically accredited means of controlling ragwort (e.g. mechanical or biological controls). Several green landholders interviewed for this study expressed a desire to receive information on organic methods for weed control and other NRM practices. In this instance, a different level of attachment to the property would not alter the landholder’s response (i.e. their private net benefit).

weed control project native vegetation project

Figure 66. NRM policy tools tailored to the green lifestyler using Pannell’s framework

This landholder’s response to the native vegetation program is likely to be very different. In line with their strong environmental values, this landholder would inevitably strongly support the principle of re‐establishing native vegetation on private land. Depending on the amount of native vegetation already present on their property and the amount of space available for other land uses (i.e. for living, remembering that this landholder has no other NRM values, and so has no livestock or desire for active recreation), it is likely this

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landholder would enthusiastically welcome the chance to plant native vegetation on their own property. Consider then that the private net benefit of this project is strongly positive, implying that the most appropriate policy instrument is extension (Figure 66, the blue rectangle). According to Pannell’s analysis, providing this landholder with, for example, information about sourcing and planting native (or better still indigenous) vegetation should be sufficient to accelerate the planting of native vegetation, thereby realising a mutual benefit to the public and the private landholder.

Note that although this landholder is already motivated (in terms of their NRM values) to plant native vegetation, they may not have sufficient resources to do so—such as time, money, equipment or labour (recalling the tri‐part model of ‘awareness, motivation and resources’ used in this report). The successful Cardinia Environmental Coalition (CEC) provides exactly such services to landholders in parts of the South East GWRegion, particularly to encourage indigenous revegetation. Under the ‘facilitation model’ of extension (discussed above), such assistance would be limited to providing information and assistance with equipment, know how and labour. By contrast the provision of money to buy seedlings—or better still the seedlings themselves (as the CEC does provide)—could be counted as a positive incentive (though Pannell would argue that a landholder factors into their private net benefit not only ‘motivation’, as conceived in this report, but also their resources). This points to a difference in the way in which ‘motivation’ and ‘resources’ are either distinguished (in the present study) or combined (in Pannell’s framework).

In the native vegetation example, it is likely that if this landholder’s attachment to their property were low (because, for example, they were renting, or planning to move), then the private net benefit of this planting program could be substantially less, and extension might not be sufficient to induce participation.

7.6 Case 3: ‘Recreational’ lifestyler (recreational horse owner)

The third case study considers a hypothetical lifestyle property owner who uses their property as a primary residence as well as a place to keep and ride horses. Such lifestylers are common in all three of the GWRegions studied. This hypothetical landholder is defined as having high attachment but only recreational—not brown—NRM values, meaning that they are not focussed on pasture management and are happy to rely on bought feed (imagine a horse owner oriented more towards the ‘high cultural’ aspects of horses, such as dressage, than to its more agrarian dimensions). This landholder could nonetheless (be induced to) perceive a strong benefit from controlling ragwort; not because of any commercial imperative, but because ragwort in pastures can poison horses. This particular weed control program would result in a strong positive private net benefit, which indicates that extension should be sufficient to elicit participation (note the extension activities should be pitched in terms of the threat ragwort poses to the health of the horses) (Figure 67, red oval).

It is important to note that this particular landholder would not necessarily be motivated to control a weed that does not pose an active threat to the horses’ wellbeing (i.e. poisoning), even if it is less nutritious as pasture (e.g. serrated tussock). Although many horse owners are

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interested in developing good pastures for their horses (a manifestation of brown NRM values, which indeed most horse owners prioritised in the telephone survey), our service provider interviews indicated that some horse owners view pasture management as a low priority. Such properties may be overstocked and overgrazed with additional feed bought when needed using (sometimes considerable) off‐farm income (this feed often introduces additional weeds if it is sourced from weed infested areas). This recreational lifestyle landholder, therefore, shares some similarities and some differences with the commercial grazier examined in Case 1, in terms of their response to the weed program.

Figure 67. NRM policy tools tailored to the recreational horse lifestyler using Pannell’s framework

weed control project native vegetation project

What about this landholder’s response to the native revegetation project? Once again, the potential benefit of this project is evaluated exclusively in relation to this landholder’s recreational horse use. Based on this criterion, planting native vegetation could generate a mild net cost or a mild net benefit, depending on particular circumstances. Benefits could accrue due to improved shelter for the horses, while costs could include lost pasture for grazing, as well as the time, money and labour required to plant. This project could, therefore, sit on the line between Areas A and B (Figure 64), whereby extension is useful, but positive incentives might also be necessary. As in other case studies featured, additional

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NRM values are usually present (in this case often aesthetic, brown and green), and would influence the level of private net benefits, as indicated in the other two examples (especially the potential aesthetic appeal of planting native vegetation).

7.7 Case 4: Land speculator

The final hypothetical case is an absentee landholder who owns their land purely as an investment and hopes for future urban development. This landholder has developer NRM values (e.g. see Figure 23). The property is not used as the site for a commercial business or a home (therefore has no land use imperatives) and the landholder’s attachment to their land is very low. Consequently management of the property’s natural resources is largely limited to activities which increase the property’s prospects for development. As discussed in Section 4.3.3 (‘Developer NRM values’), this can mean that NRM activities are at best non‐existent and at worst involve the active degradation of the property in order to facilitate urban development. According to our landholder interviews, and to the telephone survey data, there are quite a number of such properties (to greater and lesser extremes) in the Western GWRegion, and to a lesser extent in other GWRegions near the urban growth boundary.

In this scenario, understanding the landholder’s likely response to the two NRM projects in question requires some consideration of the close interrelation between the issue of weeds, native vegetation and urban development in this area, as discussed in Section 4.3.3 in relation to developer NRM values. In summary, the existence of endangered and legally protected native grasslands on a property (especially in the Western GWRegion) can mean that a landholder is prevented from developing their property (where this would require the clearing of the native vegetation). Some service providers in the Western GWRegion indicated that landholders with development aspirations often attempt to surreptitiously destroy native grasslands on their property, frequently under the guise of spraying to destroy weeds. Since weeds are a major problem in the Western GWRegion (especially serrated tussock but also Chilean needle grass and a wide range of others, see Figure 12 in Chapter 3), and since weed control attracts a rates rebate from both of the local councils in the area, weed spraying is very common. This summary should make it fairly clear what the response of this hypothetical landholder would be to the two NRM projects in question.

This landholder would not be inconvenienced in any way by the proliferation of weeds on their property (the Western GWRegion is too dry for ragwort, so consider the example of serrated tussock instead), and so the private net benefit of the proposed weed control is likely to be negative (red oval in Figure 68) at least when considered in isolation from other issues. In this instance it is posited that the weed control would only be a mild inconvenience which could be remedied by an incentive (e.g. a rates rebate). However, two other scenarios are plausible. The service provider interviews indicated that some landholders with strong developer NRM values sometimes even see the proliferation of weeds as an advantage, since very bad infestations may encourage government to accede to development (at least in appropriately zoned locations). In this case weed control would have a strong net cost to the landholder, and incentives would no longer be sufficient. The service provider interviews suggested that some other landholders prefer the strategy of using weed control as a cover

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for destroying native grasses, in which case they therefore welcome the opportunity and spray their serrated tussock much more enthusiastically than needed (e.g. using a boom spray rather than a spot spray, which destroys all susceptible vegetation in a wide band, rather than individual plants). The private net benefit of the weeds project would therefore be high, implying that extension is the appropriate policy instrument (the public benefit of weed control being considered here in isolation from the public cost of native vegetation loss). Note however, that the landholder may not be as thorough at eliminating serrated tussock as for native vegetation, so it is still possible that stronger policy measures would be required to secure adequate weed control on this property.

weed control project

native vegetation project

Figure 68. NRM policy tools tailored to the land speculator using Pannell’s framework

For the second project, planting native vegetation, this landholder would clearly perceive a very strong cost, assuming that the native vegetation in question would be of the endangered variety which it is illegal to clear. The private net benefit is therefore highly negative, and there are no policy instruments that could induce the landholder to participate in the program (blue rectangle in Figure 68). The prescription from Pannell’s framework in this case is for ‘technology development’. In this case this does not imply new technology per se—rather it indicates a need to ‘think outside the square’ and experiment with new systems and

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approaches which might alter the context of the problem. In this instance, one approach might be to purchase the property in order to protect the grasslands, if they are judged sufficiently valuable. This may be unrealistic, based on the land price anticipated by the landowner given their aspiration for urban development. A more realistic solution may be to explore strategies for ‘de‐coupling’ the issue of native vegetation from that of development, for example by finding alternatives to an outright ban on clearing native vegetation for the purpose of development (a policy which seems to have been counterproductive at least to some degree). The use of off‐set schemes would appear to be the obvious alternative, which would have the following advantages: landholders who should be permitted to develop (based on planning decisions) can clear native vegetation on their own property while securing native vegetation in other areas, and landholders who are not permitted to develop their properties have an incentive to protect their native vegetation (so they can ‘sell’ it as an offset to those individuals who can develop). This also has the advantage of distributing the financial benefits of urban development more widely in the region, and reducing perceptions of inequity.

The results of the case analysis for each landholder and NRM project are summarised in Table 36.

Table 36. Case analysis of four landholders using Pannell’s framework

PROPOSED NRM PROJECT

Control of priority weed Restoration of native vegetation

Commercial dairy farmer (NRM value: brown)

Private net benefit Highly positive Somewhat negative

Suitable policy tool Extension Positive incentive

Green lifestyler (NRM value: green)

Private net benefit Highly negative Highly positive

Suitable policy tool Technology development Extension

Recreational (horse) lifestyler (NRM value: recreational)

Private net benefit Strongly positive Zero

Suitable policy tool Extension Extension and positive incentive

Land speculator (NRM value: speculator)

Private net benefit Moderately negative Highly negative

Suitable policy tool Positive incentive Technology development

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7.8 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates the use of a simple framework for selecting NRM policy tools suitable for encouraging improved NRM (for weed control and native vegetation) among landholders within the green wedges. It uses a version of Pannell’s framework modified as suggested by Wilkinson (2007) to accommodate different landholder motivations using a wider interpretation of the concept of private net benefit (Pannell’s horizontal axis). Introducing this kind of complexity makes the application of Pannell’s framework much more difficult, but also much more realistic (particularly given most ‘commercial farmers’ also have non‐commercial motivations). In particular, it makes the quantification of private net benefits difficult, though potentially no more difficult than quantifying non‐monetary public benefits, such as conservation value. This difficulty points to a need for further work to resolve these pragmatic questions and translate this modified framework from its present conceptual stage to one which can readily be applied by government policy makers (including local government).

The proposed adaptation of Pannell’s framework outlined in this chapter can and should be used in conjunction with other work which has built on this framework, in particular Pannell’s own research (e.g. Pannell 2006, Pannell et al. 2006) and also the Policy Choice Framework (PCF) developed by DPI’s Practice Change Research unit (Kaine et al. 2007). The PCF builds on Pannell’s basic policy prescriptions to provide detailed guidance on what kinds of positive incentives (to take one example) are appropriate in different circumstances, such as the choice in this instance between a flat incentive, matrix incentive, or auction–tender system (Kaine et al. 2007 p. 21). The approach taken in the present study is entirely compatible with that embodied in the PCF.

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Chapter 8

Conclusions and recommendations

The ‘Rural Land Use and Sustainable Green Wedges’ project arose from a recognition that more effective policies and relationships are urgently needed to improve natural resource management (NRM) on private land in Melbourne’s rural hinterland. In response to this need, this study has examined the social diversity of private rural land owners in Melbourne’s peri‐urban hinterland, and explored strategies for improving these landholders’ NRM on their rural properties.

The challenge of managing the region’s natural resources to meet diverse (and often competing) objectives is made more difficult and urgent by the serious deterioration in the condition of some of these natural resources. Commercial farming is becoming increasingly difficult due to the steady encroachment of incompatible land uses, among other reasons. Native biodiversity is in serious decline, with the region containing as much as 50% of all of Victoria’s threatened species (Buxton et al. 2006). Two of the most serious and persistent problems are the loss of native vegetation and the spread of established and new weeds (PPWCMA 2007a), and so these two issues were used as case studies in this report.

For analytic purposes, this study defined six ‘GWRegions’ which together approximate (and in some cases aggregate) the 12 official green wedges established under Melbourne 2030 (DOI 2002). Of the three GWRegions studied in detail in this report, the condition and deterioration of natural resources is most problematic in the Western GWRegion, and the least problematic in the Yarra GWRegion.

One of the key pressures on natural resources is the loss of rural land to urban development, and the increasing intensity of land use in many areas. In the six GWRegions defined for this study, CPH data indicates that, overall there was a 5.7% reduction in the area of rural land and a 2.5% increase in rural population density between 1986 and 2001—in addition to the much more substantial population increases within the areas newly converted from rural to urban land. Against this trend though, population densities decreased in three of the six GWRegions—most especially the Peninsula GWRegion but also the South East and Yarra GWRegions. This may be due to populations in these areas maturing to older and smaller households (e.g. retirees). The total rural population of the PPW region in 2001 was 133,200 with an additional 152,400 people living in non‐metropolitan urban centres. More recent 2006 CPH data (which was not available when this study was conducted) has indicated larger

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than expected population growth in Melbourne, which is exerting pressure for further urban development.

Within the green wedges, nearly 80% of rural land is privately owned, and so encouraging good management of rural land requires working closely with private landholders. Yet working with rural landholders in this region is more complex than in other parts of the state, because of the extreme social diversity and dynamism of the peri‐urban population. This report examined the social diversity of the green wedges, explored social characteristics which influence private rural landholders’ NRM behaviour, and developed a framework for selecting, tailoring and targeting appropriate NRM policy instruments to different social groups. It examined all rural land within the PPW region, with a particular focus on the green wedge areas.

About the recommendations

The remainder of this chapter summarises the key findings of this report, and makes some recommendations aimed at helping to improve NRM on private rural land in the green wedges and other rural areas of the PPW region. It also identifies issues which have an indirect bearing on NRM, for example through the successful implementation of Green Wedge Management Plans in the green wedge areas. Such success (i.e. the formulation and implementation of an appropriate green wedge vision which attracts support or cooperation from landholders, local governments and other stakeholders) can make a strong contribution to improving NRM, in the first instance by protecting rural land from urban development, and then by encouraging land uses which are both appealing to landholders and conducive to good NRM.

It must be noted that these recommendations are made specifically with a view to improving NRM. Implementation would need to take into account other relevant policy objectives, such as housing affordability, the development of key infrastructure and access to building materials such as stone and sand. Similarly, it is important to note that different policy imperatives—such as managing natural resources or facilitating structural adjustment in agriculture—can imply different roles for planning as a policy instrument. The Victorian Government’s recent ‘Future Farming’ statement announced the establishment of a Regional Strategic Planning Expert Group to examine issues relating to land use planning and structural adjustment (DPI 2008 Action 4.4). The recommendations involving planning presented below therefore need to be interpreted in the light of ongoing developments in this area.

These recommendations are made by the report authors on the basis of the research conducted in this study, and in the knowledge that not all relevant stakeholders could be included in this research. The authors therefore offer the recommendations as ideas for further discussion among all relevant stakeholders. The recommendations do not necessarily reflect the views of DPI or the PPWCMA.

The recommendations do not appear in the same order in this chapter as in the Summary for this report. Rather, each is embedded in a more extensive discussion of the key findings of the study, and includes some elaboration on the recommendations as presented in the

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Summary. Each is addressed to the most relevant stakeholders (‘audience’), and directs the reader to supporting evidence and detail in the body of the report (‘basis’). Part of the basis for some recommendations consists of unpublished findings from this study.

8.1 A framework for improving NRM on private rural land

This research suggested that the management of different kinds of NRM issues may require working with different kinds of landholders. It also confirmed that different kinds of landholders are likely to respond best to different kinds of policy instruments designed to improve their NRM behaviour. A strategic approach to improving NRM therefore requires that government agencies identify who best to target and how best to target them, for particular NRM issues.

In this study the approach taken to understanding private landholders’ NRM, and how it may be improved, is reiterated in Figure 69 (it was originally explained in the introductory chapter). The first elements involved understanding what NRM landholders are already doing (Box C), and how this influences the condition of natural resources in the region (Box D). This research indicated that private landholders’ NRM practices range from complete inactivity to very active management in a variety of styles. In order to improve such management, governments may employ a variety of policy instruments, such as extension, positive and negative incentives, or ‘informed inaction’ (Box A). The major premise of this study has been that the effective application of such policy instruments requires an understanding of the social characteristics of landholders (Box B) that influence their NRM practices (Box C).

A.

Policy instruments to improve landholders’ NRM

Focus on: • Weeds • Native vegetation

B.

Social characteristics of landholders which influence their NRM

• Awareness • Motivation • Resources

D.

Condition of natural resources in the PPW region and green wedges

• Improving or deteriorating

C.

NRM behaviour of rural landholders

• Best and worst practice, sometimes contested

OUTPUT INPUT

Figure 69. Theory of action underpinning the ‘Rural Land Use and Sustainable Green Wedges’ project

The core focus of the study has therefore been on understanding these characteristics of landholders, and on how these may themselves be influenced by government (Box A) to improve NRM practices. By doing so, policy makers can improve the condition of the region’s precious but sometimes precarious natural resources.

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Although understanding the interaction between Boxes C (NRM behaviour) and D (condition of natural resources) was not the principal purpose of this study, one of the insights which arose from this study is that a better understanding of this relationship (between Boxes C and D) is needed. Such an understanding would enable the best use to be made of the insights about Boxes A, B and C that are presented within this study. This conclusion is the basis for the study’s first two recommendations:

• Recommendation: In order to identify the landholders that need to be engaged in order to solve particular NRM problems, systematically identify the kinds of landholders who manage key natural assets (and generate threats to assets) in particular areas. Use this information—along with the landholder categories presented in this report—to help identify who best to target for improved NRM. Audience: NRM policy makers and extension officers in the PPWCMA, DPI, DSE, local government and elsewhere. Basis: Chapters 3 and 4

• Recommendation: Prioritise working with landholders who have large properties (e.g. commercially‐oriented graziers), in order to minimise the ‘transaction cost’ of engaging many small landholders. However, it may be important to engage landholders with small properties in areas where NRM issues with ‘off‐site’ impacts are especially important, or are being targeted. ‘Off‐site’ NRM impacts are where even small properties can have strong effects on neighbouring properties (e.g. as weed reservoirs) or other areas within a catchment (e.g. water pollution from intensive uses). Audience: NRM policy makers and extension officers in the PPWCMA, DPI and elsewhere. Basis: Chapter 3 and Section 7.4

For the purposes of this study, ‘good NRM’ was conceptualised as those practices defined by government agencies, programs and policies, such as the PPWCMA’s Regional Catchment Strategy. It is important to acknowledge that there is not always a clear consensus on the definition of ‘best practice’, even among different expert institutions, let alone among private landholders. Those promoting ‘good NRM’ need to be mindful of these different perspectives in order to develop effective definitions and solutions. Whether land management practices are offered to landholders or imposed on them, there will generally be opportunities for them to avoid or subvert practices that they do not perceive as being well thought out, reasonable or equitable.

In order to empirically test for social influences (Box B) on NRM behaviour (Box C), the respondents to the telephone survey in this study were categorised as having either ‘high’ or ‘low’ NRM activity, based on the number of specified NRM activities in which they engaged. Since all individuals were defined as having either high or low ‘NRM activity’, this report generally only gives the percentage within various social groupings that had high NRM activity (since the percentage with low NRM activity can be inferred as the remainder). Overall, 60% of all survey respondents had low NRM activity and 40% had high NRM activity. The most common activities were regular weed control (91%) and checking for weeds or native vegetation (80%)—though what counts as ‘regular’ was not specified—and

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the least common activities were developing property management plans (36%) and managing soil health (33%).

High NRM activity was used throughout this study as a proxy for ‘good NRM’, although its accuracy as a generic measure has definite limitations. For example, one of the specific behaviours which constituted NRM activity was whether landholders had ‘planted or protected native vegetation, by fencing or strategic grazing’. This was found to be more common on grazing properties (which are usually lifestyle properties) or if they are commercially oriented, are generally struggling to remain economically viable. These confounding factors limited the effectiveness with which this measure of a particular NRM behaviour could act as a general measure of ‘good NRM’.

The analysis of the quantitative telephone survey data was necessarily somewhat superficial, since this data was generated late in the project. Consequently the analysis was driven principally by the analytical framework developed during the qualitative phase of the project (using the principles elaborated in Chapters 3�

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