chapter 6 relationships between the civilian and national

—

Chapter 6

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THECIVILIAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY

SPACE PROGRAMS

Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145Access to Classified Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145Summary Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Separate Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147Technology Transfer.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Asymmetrical Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Status of National Security Space Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148Current System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148Future Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151Civilian-National Security Relationships in Space: 1957-81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Early Policy Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152Program Relationships in the Early Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Current Policy and Policy Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154Policy Formulation and Program Stresses in the Post-Apollo Period . . . . . . . . 154Recent Policy Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155Current Administration Policy Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Current Institutional and Programmatic Characteristics of Civilian andNational Security Space Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Mission Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156Openness v. Need for Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157Differences in the Institutional Support Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158International Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159Common Civilian-National Security Needs and Cooperative Activities . . . . . 159

Issues and Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160Technology Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160Security Classification Barriers . 162Interagency Review Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163Future of the Space Shuttle System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164Man-in-Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Common-Use Systems (Unmanned). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166Civilian Use of Data From DOD-Operated Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167Institutional Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169The Original Rationale Reconsidered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Options for Future Civilian-National Security Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

FIGURE

Figure No. Page

10. Historical Budget Summary–Budget Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Chapter 6

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN ANDNATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

INTRODUCTION

Over the years, the National Aeronautics andSpace Administration (NASA), the Department ofDefense (DOD), and other Federal agencies haveevolved a set of interlocking responsibilities forU.S. space activities. NASA is designated as thelead agency for most U.S. civilian space efforts.DOD, in accordance with the National Aeronau-tics and Space (NAS) Act of 1958, undertakes “ac-tivities peculiar to or primarily associated with thedevelopment of weapons systems, military opera-tions, or the defense of the United States (includ-ing the research and development (R&D) neces-sary to make effective provision for the defenseof the United States). ” Responsibility for coordi-nating the efforts of the civilian and the militaryprograms was initially vested in the National Aer-onautics and Space Council (see ch. 10) and aCivilian-Military Liaison Committee, althoughboth were later abolished under Presidential re-organization plans. It was explicitly recognizedthat the President was ultimately responsible fordividing specific responsibilities between DODand NASA.

The premise that there is a need for separatecivilian and national security space programs hasbeen examined and reaffirmed by several high-Ievel policy reviews in the intervening years–each concluding that the characteristics of theprimary missions of each program justified thedistinct institutional structures that had been de-veloped. These reviews also affirmed that rela-tions between the two programs should be con-tinually scrutinized and that opportunities forcooperation or better coordination should besought.

Now that NASA and DOD have been conduct-ing space programs for nearly 25 years, underseparate charters but with overlapping interests,it is appropriate to consider the current status andprobable future of their relationships in light of

overall U.S. civilian space policy. The recent rapidgrowth and projections of even more rapid futureincreases in military space programs and budgetsmake such a reconsideration essential.

Access to Classified Information

Any analysis of the relationships between thecivilian and the national security programs thatis intended for public dissemination has to con-front the problem of access to classified informa-tion. Information is classified and placed underrestrictive security controls if its unrestrictedpublication is deemed to harm the national secu-rity. Classified data were not used in the prepara-tion of this report. Though discussion of the im-plications of classified-unclassified program rela-tionships at an unclassified level is necessarily in-complete and sometimes unconvincing, it is nev-ertheless the only available approach to presen-tation of such matters to the general public. Thematerial that follows has been written in such away as to provide sufficient insight into the typesof issues the classified programs generate and toensure that the analyses and discussion of optionsare reasonable. Inevitably, there will be conclu-sions or observations that could be evaluatedmore completely in a classified document.

It must also be recognized that there are dif-ferent degrees of classification within the military/intelligence programs. The most highly classifiedare the so-called “National Technical Means”and related systems; information about thesesystems is very closely kept, even within the na-tional security community. These systems aremostly involved in strategic reconnaissance.Many military systems, on the other hand, suchas communications and navigation satellites, arenot themselves classified, though certain detailsof the technologies involved are kept secret.

145

146 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Cooperation Between DOD and NASA in U.S.

Ih Vehicle

1

Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs . 147

Summary Assessment

Separate Programs

Space systems provide an increasing numberof vital services to support a variety of militaryand intelligence missions. Continued technolog-ical advances, along with the need to counter anincreasing level of military space activities by theSoviet Union, will expand the range of desirablenational security programs. Similarly, on the civil-ian side advancing technology will make possi-ble space activities that could contribute signifi-cantly to a number of high-priority national objec-tives. These include: 1 ) to enhance the image andprestige of the United States through continuingman-in-space activities; 2) to provide a base forcommercial space services, most notably for com-munications; 3) to conduct research; 4) to extendthe technology base for space and launchingsystems; and 5) to perform valuable public serv-ices such as meteorological observations, stormwarning, and other Earth observation or commu-nication tasks.

In today’s environment of growth in expendi-tures for national security combined with reduc-tions in civilian activities, it is necessary to con-sider the continued appropriateness of separateprograms and separate institutions. This isespecially important with the advent of the spacetransportation system, which represents a largenew area of common interest and new opportu-nities for technology sharing. Three basic optionsseem possible: 1 ) separate civilian and militaryprograms; 2) independent space R&D agency forall Federal space programs, civilian and military;and 3) absorption of NASA by DOD and otherFederal agencies. These options are discussedunder the heading “Institutional Change. ”

Technology Transfer

Classification barriers necessarily protect sensi-tive national security information, but their ex-istence disposes many in the civilian communityto attribute unknown but vastly superior capa-bilities to classified systems. This leads to theclaim that if military technology could be trans-ferred more rapidly and more thoroughly to thecivilian sector, civilian programs would benefitgreatly from these superior capabilities. This view

is, for the most part, oversimplified and fails torecognize important differences in agency mis-sions and the resulting needs for space systems.Different mission objectives entail different em-phases on performance characteristics and otherdesign considerations in the development andadaptation of advanced technology. For exam-ple, a military system may have to be able tooperate in a hostile environment, so that militaryspecifications are frequently more stringent thanthose for civilian purposes.

Nevertheless, the adequacy of technologytransfer between civilian and national securityprograms remains an important issue that will beexamined in some detail in this chapter, The fol-lowing observations summarize this analysis:

●

●

●

●

Technology flows in both directions, andboth sectors have benefited from such trans-fers. General-use space technology is trans-ferred with relativ ease; mission-specifictechnology only with great difficulty.There are few incentives and, frequently,practical penalties for either a national secu-rity or a civilian program manager to entercooperative technology sharing arrange-ments with other programs.The need to protect certain information andtechnology for national security purposeslimits its accessibility to civilian users.Procedures exist to enable selected individ-uals from civilian agencies to gain access toclassified systems and information, but thisaccess is imperfect for a variety of reasons;continued management attention is neededto keep these procedures functioning effec-tively.

Asymmetrical Relationships

The need to protect national security space ac-tivities and products results in a continuing asym-metry in the relationships between the two pro-grams. In general, systems operated by DOD areof high national priority; they are established inresponse to needs that are not easily questionedby those outside of the national security decision-making structure. Similarly, the determination ofthe boundary between classified and unclassifiedtechnology is made within the national securitycommunity. As a result, limitations have been set


on the allowable performance of civilian systems.These limitations tend to persist and act as con-tinuing constraints on civilian users; in somecases, the civilian user community does not knowthe details of the restrictions that exist. There arefew opportunities for the civilian community toquestion these restrictions, except within forumssuch as the National security Council (NW,where civilian agency interests are inevitably ofsecondary importance. These asymmetries sug-gest the need for a forum in which the civilianand national security space relationships can be

equitably reviewed from a disinterested perspec-tive, as discussed in chapters 3 and 10.

National security concerns affect most, if notall, civilian space applications programs; there-fore, a discussion of the relationships betweenthe two sectors is especially pertinent to thisassessment. An outline of the DOD-operated pro-grams is given in the following section, but thelimitations that result from describing them onthe basis of unclassified data must be kept inmind.

STATUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

The national security uses of space technologyare quite varied; however, they are all “applica-tions” in that space technology is one means toachieve various national security objectives. TheUnited States depends heavily on space-basedsystems: 1 ) to conduct continuing surveillance ofactivities in many areas of the world, particular-ly those controlled by its potential adversaries,and to monitor compliance with internationalagreements; 2) to provide timely warning of at-tacks on the United States and allied territory; and3) to communicate with U.S. military forcesaround the world and at sea. The U.S. nationalsecurity community is also actively exploringother space activities, including: 1 ) the need toprotect both civilian and security assets alreadyin orbit from Soviet antisatellite systems; 2) theability to assure “freedom of the roads” for U.S.spacecraft and launch vehicles by developing adeterrent in the form of an antisatellite intercep-tor; 3) and the long-range potential of space-based weapons for defending the United Statesand its allies against hostile actions. The sum totalof these activities comprises a fast growing na-tional security space program; many military ana-lysts see space technology as having a revolution-ary impact on national strategy and national pow-er in coming years. ’

‘A recent study of the potentials of armed conflict in space is G.Harry Stine, Confrontation in Space (Prentice-Hall, 1981); see alsothe recently published report High Frontier, from the HeritageFoundation.

Current Systems

Precise figures regarding expenditures forDOD-supported space efforts are unavailablebecause many of them are classified. Figure 10compared published data on spending for civilian(NASA) and military (DOD) space activities. Overthe past several years, the national securitybudget has been growing at a much faster ratethan the civilian one, and is now larger in abso-lute terms than the civilian budget. When onerecognizes that the single major item in the NASAbudget, the shuttle, will have DOD as its singlelargest user, the emphasis on national security ap-plications of space becomes even more marked.

Current national security space systems per-form (although in a very different context) func-tions similar to those performed by civilian spacesystems. Classification of these systems prohibitsa full description of them in this analysis;2 thefollowing brief descriptions are thus intended on-ly to emphasize the support role played by cur-rently operational national security space sys-tems:

zFUrther information on intelligence and defense activities in spaceis contained in, for example, Trudy E. Bell, “America’s Other SpaceProgram,” The Sciences, December “1979; Eberhard Rechtin,“Future Milita~ Applications in Space,” Speech to InternationalAerospace Symposium, Paris, June 1981; Thomas H. Karas, /rnp/ica-tions of Space Technology for Strategic Nuclear Competition, Oc-casional Paper 25, The Stanley Foundation; j. Preston Layton, “Mil-itary Space in Transition, ” Aeronautics and Astronautics, October1981; the annual Aeronautics and Space Report of the Presidentcontains an approved description of naticmal security space efforts.

Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs • 149

Figure 10.—Historical Budget Summary-Budget Authority

6

5

It- /

/ ~ Defense.

1 . . . . I i 1 1 1 I 1 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 1 I I I 11959 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

Year

aT, Q. - Transitional Quarter.

SOURCE Of f!ce of Management and Budgel

● Earth observation. —It was only in October1978 that the existence of strategic surveil-lance satellites was officially acknowledgedby an American President,3 although themedia and general public had assumed theirexistence for many years. Earth observationsatellites are used to perform several differentnational security-related functions, including:

1. early warning of missile attack;2. verification of compliance in related in-

ternational arms-control agreementssuch as nuclear testing and strategic mis-sile deployment; and

3. surveillance of various areas of theworld to gather data required for U.S.strategic and tactical planning.

Miiitary systems require degrees and kindsof performance not required for civilian pur-poses. Many different kinds of satellites andsensors are used to satisfy specific require-ments. To the degree that military systems

JPresident Carter gave public recognition to the existence of in-telligence satellites during an Oct. 1, 1978 speech at the KennedySpace Center.

●

73 74 75 76 T.Q.a 77 78 79 80 81 1982

are more specialized and provide advancedperformance, transfer of this technology tothe civilian sector will continue to be anissue, especially as civilian needs becomemore specialized in turn.4

Communications. –Although the bulk ofroutine military messages are carried overcivilian-operated communication circuits,both terrestrial and satellite, there is also avariety of satellite communications systemsavailable for the exclusive use of the militaryservices and national command authorities.These military satellites are crucial links inthe Nation’s command, control, and com-munications systems; approximately one-third of U.S. long-distance military trafficgoes by dedicated DOD satellites.

A continuing problem in national secur-ity communications via satellite is how to

4A Pionwring analysis of the use of space SYStETTIS for surveillance

and warning is Philip Klass, Secret Sentries in Space (Random House,1971 ); see also, “Study on the Implications of Establishing an in-ternational Satellite Monitoring Agency,” prepared for the 2d U.N.Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, Aug. 6, 1981, pp. 15-18.

— —

150 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

combine various existing and future systemsinto a coherent “architecture” which wouldallow the integrated use of communicationscapability by both civilian and militaryauthorities under various crisis and conflictsituations. At issue here is how dependentthe military should be on nonmilitary com-munications channels and how much invest-ment the military should make to ensurethat civilian channels are survivable and ●

secure under various conditions. For exam-ple, there has been substantial attentiongiven to protecting the tracking and datarelay satellites so that they can be used fordefense as well as civilian purposes.Navigation. –There has been a long traditionin the United States of providing navigationservices for both military and civilian uses;that tradition has been extended into the ●

joint use of operational Navy navigation sat-

ellites. DOD’s global positioning satellite(GPS) system, now in an advanced stage ofdevelopment, will provide navigation assist-ance and position location for all militaryservices, and will also be available for civilianuse, albeit with somewhat degraded capa-bilities. Six Navstar satellites are now in orbit,with a total of 18 envisaged for the completesystem.Meteorology. —The military operates its ownweather satellites using technology rathersimilar to the National Oceanic and Atmo-spheric Administration (NOAA) satellites thatserve civilian needs. There have been severalanalyses of the potential for combining civii-ian and military meteorological satellite oper-ations into a single system, but no suchmerger has been approved.Transportation. -The national security com-munity has used the same launch vehicles,

Cooperation Between DOD and NASA in Meteorological Satellites

.

9

DOD (Air Force)

tv

Common Technology Production

Exchange of Data

NOAA Air Weatherm - 9 w - - - 0 - - - wNavy

4 *t L

v

W l l cSOURCE: OffIce of Technology Assessment.

,

Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 151

with certain variations, (except for theSaturn-class boosters used exclusively formanned Apollo launches) to boost its satel-lites into orbit as has the civilian space pro-gram (e.g., Atlas-Agena, Titan 11, Atlas-Cen-taur, Titan Ill). This pattern will continue withthe shuttle. However, the military has sepa-rate checkout and launch facilities, both atCape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air ForceBase, for expendable launch vehicles, andis building a shuttle launch complex atVandenberg. joint use of the shuttle impliesjoint use of mission control facilities atJohnson Space Center, though the Air Forceis hoping to construct its own ConsolidatedSpace Operations Center in ColoradoSprings. There has been some suggestion oftwo separate shuttle fleets, one for civilianand one for national security use.

Future Developments

For the most part the systems discussed abovesupport ground-, sea-, and air-based militaryoperations and extend or enhance existing logis-tical capabilities. Under consideration now, how-ever, are weapons systems that couId operate inspace. There is a vigorous science and technologydevelopment program oriented toward a widerange of future applications, including antisatellitesystems and directed energy weapons. If theUnited States should decide to develop and de-ploy some sort of space-based, antisatellite or bal-listic missile defense system, such an effort wouldrequire a major expansion of our space infrastruc-ture, including the development of space plat-forms, space power systems, and space construc-tion facilities. Pursuing such a course would im-ply major changes in strategic thinking, and thusa decision to develop space weapons systems isas much an issue of national policy as it is of tech-nological potentials

Another area of future development is mannedmilitary space operations. Some see a need formanned observation, inspection, command andcontrol, servicing, or other operations in Earthorbit. Military use of the shuttle will provide expe-

5Rechtin, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

rience on which to base future decisions on themilitary role of man in space.

Large-scale development and deployment ofmanned and unmanned military systems inspace, beyond those currently required for sup-port purposes, will be based on decisions, notyet made, concerning military doctrine and na-tional policy. The notion that space is a fourththeater of war which can supplement or supplantair, sea, and ground operations is not fully ac-cepted by either the civilian or the military leader-ship of the national security community. Exten-sive manned military operations and/or weaponsin space are still very much in the exploratorystage. In addition, current international treaties,such as the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty withthe Soviet Union, as well as hopes for future arms-control agreements, may prevent or delay the de-ployment of space weaponry. There is a substan-tial degree of international concern, expressedat the United Nations (U. N.) and elsewhere,about any expansion of the arms race into outerspace.

Civilian-National SecurityRelationships in Space: 1957-81

The decision to house defense-related spaceoperations and the R&D leading to them withinDOD and to create a new civilian agency for non-defense space research were made in the imme-diate wake of Sputnik, as the Eisenhower adminis-tration began to organize the U.S. space effort.These decisions were controversial; individualsboth in and outside Government, particularly inCongress, the defense industry, and the militaryservices, believed that the Nation should under-take a single integrated space program under mil-itary management.G However, President Eisen-hower and the majority of Congress believed thatthere were significant advantages for the coun-try in separating the national space effort intoseparate elements and in creating a separate man-

- —bThe following account of the origins and early evolution of U.S.

space policy and institutions is drawn from a number of sourcesincluding: John Logsdon, The Future of the U.S. Space Program(Praeger Publishers, 1975); Robert L. RoshIt, An Administrative His-tory of NASA, /953-1963, NASA, 1966, and Enid Bok Schoettle,“The Establishment of NASA, ” in Know/edge of Power: Essays onScience and Government, The Free Press, 1966.


agement and institutional structure for eachelement.

Similarly, President Kennedy rejected the no-tion, raised early in his administration, of com-bining NASA and Air Force space programs undermilitary auspices. Like Eisenhower, Kennedyviewed the national space effort as having distinctcivilian and military components, and decidedto use the civilian space program as one of themajor arenas for competition with the SovietUnion.

Early Policy Choices

Several factors influenced the decision by theEisenhower administration and by Congress toestablish a separate civilian space agency. Onereason was the view of the scientific communitythat the major objectives of the civilian space pro-gram should be scientific in character, and thatthese objectives could best be met by a separateagency not linked to DOD programs. A more tell-ing concern was Eisenhower’s view that therewere specific and positive benefits for the UnitedStates, in terms of both foreign policy anddomestic politics, in creating an open space pro-gram under civilian control. These benefits wereparticularly evident, given that the Soviet spaceprogram was closed. The United States couldclaim that its civilian space program was an accu-rate reflection of the open, achievement-orientedcharacter of American society, while at the sametime developing whatever national security spacesystems were deemed necessary through a sec-ond, much less open program. Cooperation withother countries, desirable both to meet specificneeds for access to sites for tracking stations, andto further general foreign policy goals, would begreatly facilitated by such a separation.

At the policy level, Eisenhower and his top ad-visors did not deal with military and civilian spaceefforts in isolation, but rather viewed them asparts of a single national space program. Eisen-hower authorized DOD to undertake whatevermilitary space efforts could be justified by existingand future military requirements, but he did notapprove the futuristic plans generated within theAir Force (such as a manned Moon-base) and theArmy. Nor did he approve ambitious NASA plans

for the 1960’s. There were attempts to developa comprehensive national space policy underNSC auspices. The objective of such a policy wasthe development and exploitation of U.S. outerspace capabilities to achieve scientific, military,and political goals, and to establish the UnitedStates as a recognized leader in this field. How-ever, Eisenhower and his advisors did not believethat the political returns from space achievementwere large enough to merit a major investmentof resources, and thus were unwilling to approvean aggressive civilian space program aimed at po-litical objectives.

President Kennedy was willing to approve sucha program, however, and, in Apollo, the UnitedStates undertook an enterprise justified primar-ily by national prestige and political payoff.7 Thepolicy that Ied to the Apollo commitment was for-mulated in the context of developing an inte-grated national space policy. Apollo was the cen-terpiece of an across-the-board acceleration ofboth civilian and military space programs, aimedat achieving U.S. preeminence in all areas ofspace technology. Kennedy was told that “thenonmilitary, noncommercial, nonscientific butcivilian projects such as lunar and planetary ex-ploration are . . . part of the battle along the fluidfront of the Cold War.”B

While Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedyboth desired a national space program in con-sonance with overall national policy objectives,one which maximized returns on both the civilianand military investments of national resources,coordination of the two programs was not astraightforward matter. During the 1960’s thecivilian space program, and particularly its cen-tral activity, Apollo, developed in ways that madeclose interactions with major defense space appli-cations difficult. Although NASA did maintainEarth-oriented science and applications pro-grams, its major manned and unmanned effortssuch as Apollo and planetary exploration wereoriented outward, away from Earth. Though therewere attempts to undertake joint planning fortracking stations, meteorological satellites, and

7A full account of the Apollo decision is contained in Logsdon,op. cit.

Blbid., p. 126.


geodetic satellites, none of these resulted in close-ly integrated civilian-military activities. The ex-ception was in the area of launch vehicles. NASAused the Atlas, developed by the Air Force, forits Mercury program and the Air Force developedTitan for the Gemini program. In fact, with theexception of Saturn, which was used only forNASA’s Apollo program, launch vehicles for allthese manned satellites were shared; DOD hadno use for such a large and expensive launchvehicle as Saturn. As DOD requirements for somelaunch vechicles, such as the Thor and Atlas,decreased, these were transferred to NASA.

In particular, the decision to accomplish Apolloby means of lunar-orbit rendezvous (LOR) wasa watershed in separating civilian and militarymanned space flight programs for almost a dec-ade.9 There was extensive controversy precedingthe decision for LOR. Many argued that if Earth-orbit rendezvous were used to accomplishApollo, the knowledge gained from rendezvousof spacecraft and assembly of structurs in low-Earth orbit would be valuable not only for thelunar program, but also for national security activ-ities. However, NASA, driven by a desire to meetthe lunar landing goal before 1970, chose LORas the method most likely to make this achieve-ment possible. This choice, in addition to NASA’semphasis on planetary exploration in its un-manned scientific programs, to a large degreeseparated the central element of the NASA pro-gram from national security space efforts duringthe 1960’s and early 1970’s.

Program Relationships in the Early Years

The NAS Act, which provided for separate civil-ian and national security space programs, alsocalled for “close cooperation among all interestedagencies of the United States in order to avoidunnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, andequipment. ” As this directive was carried out,there were substantial interactions between civil-ian and national security space efforts during thefirst decade of the national space program, even

gjohn M. Logsdon, “Selecting the Way to the Moon: the Choiceof the Lunar Orbital Rendezvous Mode, ” Aerospace Historian, June1971, contains an account of this decision.

though NASA had set its sights on the Moon. Atthe project and program levels, these interactionswere on balance cooperative and productive.However, at the policy and institutional levelthere were, perhaps inevitably, stresses betweenseparate programs in the same technologicalarena. It is beyond the scope of this assessmentto detail these interactions, but the following briefsummary may provide some sense of their char-acter. 1°

MANNED SPACE FLIGHT

It was the armed services that during the 1950’sdid the first detailed planning for manned spaceflight, but NASA was assigned the U.S. mannedmission in 1958. Project Mercury was based onAir Force plans, and the Air Force was left withonly a modest, and never fully funded, spaceglider program (Dyna-Soar), which was eventual-ly canceled. At one point the Air Force contem-plated a “Blue Gemini” program using NASA’sGemini vehicles; when NASA balked, DOD set-tled for a modest series of experiments on Geminiflights. Late in 1963, Defense Secretary Mc-Namara approved the Manned Orbital Labora-tory program for the Air Force. This program wasterminated in 1969 because foreseeable militaryrequirements were inadequate to justify it, despitethe $1.3 billion already spent. Since that timeNASA has had complete responsibility for themanned flight portion of the national space pro-gram, although this situation will change whenthe shuttle begins to fly missions dedicated to na-tional security.

LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT

Immediately after the acceleration of the U.S.space program in 1961, there was an intensiveattempt to integrate future launch vehicle devel-opments. This attempt was not successful, andNASA went on to develop Saturn boosters forApollo missions while DOD added the Titan Illas the heavy-duty launcher for military andintelligence programs. When it came time to con-sider whether to continue to use Saturn as theworkhorse for the post-Apollo civilian space pro-

IOAn account of early INA!jA-DOD relationships is contained inW. Fred Boone, NASA Office of Defense Affairs: The First Five Years,NASA Historical Note HHR-32, 1970.


gram or to develop a new type of reusable launchvehicle, the policy was made in an explicit con-text of joint civilian-national security require-ments, although the development task was as-signed to NASA. That the shuttle would be a mul-tiuse launch vehicle with its design suited to meetdefense and intelligence requirements as well ascivilian needs was essential to the program’sapproval. ’ 1 ,

COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES

Originally, NASA was assigned responsibility fordeveloping passive communications satellitetechnology (e.g., Echo), whereas DOD devel-oped active communications satellites. There wasan early shift in this division of labor, and NASAby 1960 had begun to develop active communi-cations satellites for civilian use. With the cancel-lation of the Army’s ADVENT geosynchronoussatellite program due to technical and manage-ment problems, it was left to NASA to developgeosynchronous communications satellites,which have proved to be the key to both civilianand military satellite communications efforts. Dur-ing the 1960’s and 1970’s both NASA and DODhad active R&D programs investigating commu-nications satellite technology appropriate to dif-fering civilian and military requirements.

lljerw Grey, Enterprise (Morrow, 1979), PP. 66-68.

METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES

DOD sponsored the initial research on meteor-ological satellites; this work led to the TIROS pro-gram, which was transferred to NASA and thenbecame the basis for the first operational civilianweather satellite. DOD used the same contrac-tor to develop weather satellites dedicated tomilitary uses. The result has been the existenceof two systems which, while using the same“bus” contain different sensors and fly in differentorbits, and a continuing controversy over theneed for separate weather satellite systems.

EARTH OBSERVATION PROGRAMS

The advantages of the view from outer spacefor strategic surveillance were obvious from thebeginning, and DOD and various intelligenceagencies began highly classified Earth observa-tion programs. As the sensors developed for theseearly national security programs (e.g., the ReturnBeam Vidicon) were supplanted by more ad-vanced models, some of them were declassifiedand became part of NASA’s civilian remote sens-ing experiments in the late 1960’s. There hasbeen a continuing tension between the desire tomaintain maximum secrecy about the capabilitiesof U.S. surveillance systems and the desire to useboth the products of those systems and the com-ponents developed for them for operational civil-ian applications systems.

CURRENT POLICY AND POLICY REVIEW PROCESS

Policy Formulation and ProgramStresses in the Post-Apollo Period

Carrying out the Apollo commitment keptNASA fully occupied during the 1960’s, and forthe most part relations between the civilian andnational security space programs were conductedon a case-by-case basis, mainly at the project andtechnology level. Only occasionally, as in thecontroversy over control of Gemini and post-Apollo manned programs, did the tensions riseto the policy and institutional level. The majorchannel for interaction was the Aeronautics andAstronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), a jointNASA-DOD body. NASA also established an

Office of Defense Affairs, which was active inmaintaining liaison with defense and intelligencespace efforts. Tensions rarely escalated to a levelat which White House policy offices such as theNational Aeronautics and Space Council and theOffice of Science and Technology got involvedin their resolution.

During the past decade, however, there havebeen several Presidential-level policy reviews ofthe national space effort that have dealt withcivilian and national security programs in a com-mon framework. Perhaps the basic point to bemade about these reviews is that each examinedand revalidated the policy that civilian, military,

Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs . 155

and intelligence programs should be carried outin separate institutional frameworks, althougheach review also recognized opportunities forcloser cooperation and coordination amongthese separate programs.

The first such comprehensive review was car-ried out during the summer of 1969 under theauspices of a Space Task Group (STG), createdad hoc and chaired by the Vice President. (Thedeliberations of the STG are described in somedetail inch. 5.) President Nixon charged STG withproviding him a “definitive recommendation onthe direction the national space program shouldtake in the post-Apollo period. ”12 The reviewconsidered future directions of both the civilianand military space programs, but its focus wason the future for the civilian manned program.A major and lasting result of STG’S review wasthe concept of a reusable space shuttle to servealmost all national launch vehicle requirements,from commercial uses to intelligence missions.To realize this concept, technical characteristics,as well as managerial and funding patterns, werenegotiated by NASA and DOD (represented pri-marily by the Air Force). As has become evidentsince the 1969-72 period, the interagency plan-ning did not resolve all of the program issues thathave subsequently caused continuing NASA-DOD tension over the shuttle program.13

By 1977, enough stresses had built up amongthe civilian, military, and intelligence space pro-grams that president Carter authorized a Presi-dential-level space policy review. The stated pur-pose of the review was “to resolve potential con-flicts among the various space program sectorsand to recommend coherent space principles andnational space policy.”14

Recent Policy Reviews

The Carter administration adopted the NSC pol-icy review process as the primary mechanism forconsidering and developing space policy, both

IZTlle space TaSk Group was established by a Feb. 13, 1969,memorandum from the President.

1 JEdgar U Isamer, “Space Shuttle Mired in Bureaucratic Feud,”Air Force, September 1980.

14Th e unclassified version of the results of the review of SPace

policy was issued in the form of a White House press release onJune 20, 1978.

civilian and military. The initial review was car-ried out under the guidance of Presidential Re-view Memorandum 23, which considered ques-tions about civilian-military relationships andresulted in Presidential Directive 37 (PD/NSC-37).This review was followed by further interagencyreview requested by the president in June 1978,which led to a second Presidential Directive(PD/NSC-42) and a public announcement on U.S.civilian space policy in October 1978. In thisstatement, President Carter identified decisionsthat were designed to set the direction of U.S.efforts in space over the next decade. Amongother things, the announced civilian space policywas to promote a balance of applications, sci-ence, and technology development that would“increase benefits for resources expendedthrough better integration and technology trans-fer among the national space programs and byusing more joint projects when appropriate. ”

As part of the Presidential review several deci-sions were made in specific applications areas,either as program guidance or for the conductof further studies.

●

●

●

NASA was to chair an interagency task forceto examine options for incorporating currentand future remote-sensing systems into anintegrated national system, with emphasis ondefining and meeting user requirements.The Defense community, NASA, and NOAAwere to conduct a review of meteorologicalprograms to determine the degree to whichthese programs might be consolidated in the1980’s and the extent to which separate pro-grams supporting specialized defense needsshould be maintained. The possibility for in-tegrated systems for ocean observations fromspace was also to be examined.With respect to technology sharing, stepswere to “be taken to facilitate technologytransfer between the space sectors. The ob-jective was to maximize efficient utilizationof the technologies while maintaining nec-essary security and management relation-ships.

In November 1979, president Carter approvedfurther civilian space policy that amplified thepolicies established in PDs 37 and 42. The new

156 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

policies were contained in Presidential Direc-tive/NSC-54.

The policy decisions in PD-54 were the resultof extended interagency debate, and were based,in part, on the results of the various studies andreviews mandated by PD-42.

PD-54 directed that DOD and the Departmentof Commerce (DOC) maintain and coordinatedual polar-orbiting meteorological programs, witheach continuing to procure systems and operateseparate satellites to meet the differing needs ofthe military and civilian sectors. When new polar-orbiting satellites became justifiable they were tobe jointly developed and procured by DOD,DOC, and NASA in order to maximize tech-nology sharing and minimize cost. An “ap-propriate” coordination mechanism was to beestablished to assure effective cooperation andto prevent duplication.

For oceanic programs, PD-54 further stated thatif oceanographic satellites were to be developed,DOD, DOC, and NASA were to pursue joint de-velopment, acquisition, and management. Acommittee was to be established with expandedrepresentation to forward recommendations onpolicy issues to the policy review committees inNSC for consideration and actions.

The classified character of the basic documents,accentuated by the use of NSC as the forum fordiscussion, has made congressional and public

discussion difficult. This has been a continuingproblem in raising and resolving many issues ofcivilian-military relationships.

Current Administration Policy ReviewThe various policy reviews of the 1977-79

period continue to provide the formal underpin-ning and guidance that govern today’s programsin both civilian and military applications. How-ever, the Reagan administration has initiated abroad examination of the extant policy. Althoughstrongly driven by the administration’s perceivedneed to constrain the Federal budget, the reviewis intended to be comprehensive, and will includean examination of the provisions of the NAS Act.The review will focus on the use of the spacetransportation system for civilian and nationalsecurity purposes and on commercialization ofcivilian Earth observation systems.

The President’s science adviser has undertakenthe review, which will be coordinated via a “Cab-inet Council” mechanism. The Policy ReviewCommittee (Space) of the Carter administrationhas now been disbanded. There are new pres-sures on several fronts. The administration’sbudget cuts have necessitated a wholesale reeval-uation of many planned civilian space programinitiatives in applications and also in space sci-ences. In addition, the success of the shuttle hasintroduced the need to focus on civilian-militaryrelationships at a new level of detail.

CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTERISTICS

OF CIVILIAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE EFFORTS

The possibility and desirability of closer civilian-national security relationships in space dependon the strengths and weaknesses of the currentstructure and the differences and similarities be-tween the two areas of space activity. Althoughthe two programs have certain common interestsand a history of cooperating to solve commonproblems, their different goals and consequentdivergence in evolution have resulted in differentinstitutional and program characteristics. Theseare reviewed below.

Mission Differences

NASA is an R&D agency with its primary mis-sion the development and demonstration ofspace and aeronautics systems and associatedtechnology, the provision of launch services, andthe operation of research and scientific satellites.NASA has a tradition of evaluating the potentialof space technology in a broad societal contextwith a long time horizon. NASA’s R&D efforts arelinked to the requirements of various users, but


its strongest tendency is towards development ofnew technologies rather than meeting short-termneeds of users. Civilian missions require the col-laboration of the widest possible body of usersto help share and justify the very large front-endcosts of space systems. For example, the designof civilian remote sensing systems has been af-fected by the need to resolve the data require-ments of a multitude of civilian missions and todetermine a fair allocation of costs. Conflictsamong agencies over instrument selection, sys-tem characteristics, and technical tradeoffs willcontinue to plague the Government-sponsoredgrowth of operational systems.

DOD’s space activities, by contrast, have somecharacteristics of technology push, but they areprimarily responsive to the requirements of mil-itary operations. DOD has a clear and vital mis-sion, national defense, and space technology isseen as one means, among others, for accomp-lishing it. The military users of space technologyare within DOD, and the problems of transferfrom developer to user are fewer than if the twowere in separate organizations. DOD has beenconsidering possible changes in management thatwould reflect the military’s increased dependenceon space systems and allow for efficient use ofthe space shuttle. These include establishing aseparate Space Command, either in the Air Force,or as a fourth service.

In congressional testimony early in 1981, theSecretary of the Air Force identified an order ofpriority for the various program activities that theAir Force conducts in space.

● First priority was given to the maintenanceand development of a reliable and satisfac-tory launch vehicle capability. Employing theshuttle to maximum advantage for missionsrelated to national security and protectingagainst possible delays and failures in theshuttle program were considered vital.

● Second priority was given to surveillance andwarning satellites. These functions general-ly cannot be performed by alternate ground-based facilities.

● Third priority was assigned to satellitesrelated to communications. Though commu-nications satellites are important, alternate

ground-based means of communications(undersea cables, short-wave) are usuallyavailable.Fourth priority went to weather observationand navigation. Because other means existto carry out their tasks, they are lower inpriority than other satellite systems.

Openness v. Need for Secrecy

The NAS Act mandates, among other things,that NASA provide for the “ . . . widest prac-ticable and appropriate dissemination of informa-tion concerning its activities and the results there-of. ” The specific provision to make informationavailable to the public contrasts sharply with theinformation policies governing classified militaryand intelligence programs, which operate understringent requirements to protect information, in-cluding even the fact that some of the programsexist.

The differences in orientation between the civil-ian and military programs have been maintainedfrom the beginning of the programs to the pres-ent and are fundamental to consideration ofpolicies on technology sharing and other interjec-tor relationships.

●

●

There are inherent conflicts between theneed for secrecy in national security pro-grams, and the free exchange of data char-acteristic of the civilian space program.These conflicts extend into the project office,where secrecy requirements imposed onsensitive national security projects are a con-tinuing fact-of-life, though they are essential-ly nonexistent on the civilian side.For technology sharing, these differencesgenerate a basically asymmetrical relation-ship. Activities or technology in the civiliansector are examined in detail for potentialnational security uses. The reverse does nothold except through specific interagencymechanisms that have been formed to pro-mote information exchange. Even with in-formation exchange, the civilian commun-ity rarely has an opportunity to affect nationalsecurity planning. The reverse is less true.National security planning may often affectcivilian programs.

158 ● Civilan Space Policy and Applications

● Military and intelligence missions normallyenjoy a high relative priority within theGovernment. This is reinforced by thesecrecy surrounding such programs, makingit dificult for most members of the Executive,of Congress, and the public to criticize themeffectively or to bargain for increased atten-tion to and funding for civilian activities. Theresult is that the military or national secur-ity program can seek out or develop newtechnology to aid in accomplishing their mis-sions, using the full range of classified andunclassified experience, whereas civilianprograms have definite limits set on use ofsensitive or classified technology.

● in some cases, not only technical details ofmilitary or intelligence space systems, buteven the fact that such a system exists maybe classified. This creates a special burdenupon the program managers and the con-tractor teams, and makes it very difficult tocarry out technology-sharing activities withother programs. The precautions that maybe necessary to protect the “fact of” a cer-tain system would act as a significant deter-rent to the ability of the classified programteam to volunteer its assistance.

Differences in the InstitutionalSupport Base

At NASA’s founding, it incorporated the Na-tional Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, itstechnical centers, and a number of DOD activi-ties such as the Army Ballistic Missile Group inHuntsville, Ala., and the Jet Propulsion Labora-tory in pasadena, Calif. Thus, NASA inherited aninfrastructure of Government-owned facilities andsupporting technical staffs that were already famil-iar with all phases of the agency’s projects, fromearly definition to the production and test of flighthardware. When NASA expanded to meet thedemands of Apollo and other new program activ-ities in the early 1960’s, it elaborated the patternof relatively autonomous technical centers (seech. 9). NASA’s technical personnel and special-ized facilities represent a unique nationalresource, developed at great cost and represent-ing over 20 years of experience in designing andoperating successful space systems.

DOD’s role in operating the military and na-tional security programs, on the other hand,evolved very differently. Although encompassingan extensively laboratory structure, DOD movedaway from the “arsenal approach” of in-housetechnical laboratories in the years followingWorld War Il. The process of developing ballisticmissiles, the prototype for DOD’s space effort,followed a pattern in which a Government proj-ect team of civilian and military personnel actedas overall managers for a private contractor team;one major contractor acted as system integrator.This pattern persists today. Technical assistancefor specific parts of the system is often obtainedfrom government laboratories, but the labora-tories typically do not undertake management.Practically the entire DOD space program man-agement is vested in the Air Force Space Divi-sion, a part of the Air Force Systems Command.This Space Division is supported by the Aero-space Corp. as system engineers. Thus, whereasNASA development management activities aredone largely at separate centers, DOD activitiesare centralized. The Space Division has responsi-bilities equivalent to those of NASA in that it isresponsible for all procurement, launch, and on-orbit control and recovery. Generally, when a sat-ellite system becomes operational, the missionaspects of the satellite system come under thecontrol of a user command, say Strategic AirCommand or Defense Communications Agency,while the Space DiviSion maintains control ofother aspects of the satellite system includingreplacements. The Space Division can and doescall on other DOD agencies and laboratories. TheSpace Division has direct control of the launchfacilities at the Eastern Test Range at Cape Canav-eral and the Western Test Range at VandenbergAFB.

Thus, in both the civilian and military spaceprograms, a great deal of the national capabilityresides in the contractors, and to the extent thata single contractor may support both programs,significant technology transfer occurs, withoutdocumentation and without the need for specificefforts. Within NASA, programs are largely devel-oped and managed by the centers, and any con-sideration of technology sharing or closer institu-tional relations between NASA and DOD needsto take into account these differences in the twoprograms.


International Aspects

International cooperation was one of the objec-tives set for NASA in 1958, and the United Stateshas pursued an extensive cooperative programwith technical, economic, and political benefits.Although certain foreign countries participate insome DOD space activities, their participation isbased on joint defense objectives; its characteris quite different, from NASA’s internationalactivities.

There would likely be tension between securityrequirements and any extensive interaction be-tween other countries and the United States incivilian space efforts if there were a much closercivilian-military relationship. Some of these ten-sions are already evident as the military and non-U.S. users both plan to use the shuttle. Scientistsin foreign countries might also be less willing todeal with a U.S. space program closely linked tonational security activities.

The relationship between the civilian and mil-itary space programs is affected by the presenceor absence of treaties, laws, and rules of conductgoverning activities in the “international com-mons” of outer space—i.e., by the entire interna-tional legal framework. During the 1960’s prec-edents were set that strengthened the U.S. posi-tion that governments could carry on non-threatening activities constrained only by the pro-hibition in the 1967 “Treaty on Principles Gov-erning the Activities of States in the Explorationand Use of Outer Space” on weapons of massdestruction. The SALT I agreements in 1972 fur-ther recognized that there were “nationaltechnical means of verification” (presumablyoverhead reconnaissance by spacecraft) and thatsuch collection devices should not be interferedwith. Civilian remote sensing systems such asLandsat and meteorological satellites have alsooperated on a global basis without restriction;partly to forestall criticism, the United States hasmade data from these systems available to allcountries. The emergence of significant programsby France, Japan, and others during the 1980’smay complicate the existing ground rules and putadditional pressure on the United States to main-tain open programs conducted in cooperationwith other nations, particularly with less

developed countries. Current discussion in theU.N. and elsewhere about restricting the gather-ing and dissemination of civilian data should notbe expected to affect U.S. military satellites.

An additional factor that may drive the U.S.space program to emphasize international visibil-ity and accessibility would be the need to re-spond, for practical political considerations, toa newly emerging Soviet presence in peacefulspace applications. The Soviets are known tohave carried out an ambitious program of launch-ing and recovering film camera satellites withhigh-resolution data. The lag by the U.S.S.R. incritical areas of technology, particularly com-puters, has until recently caused the Soviets tosay little about their space applications programswhile playing up manned space flight activities.However, the Soviets recently issued an impor-tant paper to the U. N.* that describes their appli-cations programs in greater detail than previouslyavailable (described in detail in ch. 7). In partic-ular, the Soviets claimed to be planning a “quick-Iook” sensing system with several types of multi-spectral sensors. Mindful of the tremendous im-pact of Sputnik, 25 years ago, forums such as theupcoming U.N. conference, UN ISPACE ’82, tobe held in Vienna in August 1982, may well pro-vide the occasion for the Soviets to announceplans to make their data available to othercountries.

Common Civilian-National SecurityNeeds and Cooperative Activities

Many of the problems faced by both civilianand national security space programs have com-mon roots in the inescapable realities of the harshspace environment and the stringent require-ments associated with launching payloads intospace. In the early stages both the civilian andmilitary space programs depended on using themost suitable military systems. Improving theirreliability was an early and important commontask for both civilian and military authorities. Asa result, a wide range of basic system details wereshared. They included rocket engine design,

*“National Paper: U. S. S.R.,” prepared for the Second U.S. Con-ference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,A/Conf. 101/N P/30, Sept. 2, 1981.

160 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

structures, electronics, guidance, control systems,and a variety of subsystems.

Both programs have common needs for groundlaunch complexes with adequate instrumentationfor prelaunch, launch, and postlaunch monitor-ing and control of satellites and vehicles, andlaunch safety and tracking. These common needshave resulted in highly integrated operations atboth Vandenberg AFB (polar orbit and high in-clination launches) and at Kennedy Space Center(low inclination, deep space, and synchronousorbit launches).

There is also a continuing common need forbetter understanding of outer space. This includesscientific observations of electromagnetic radia-tion at all wavelengths, the characteristics of solarradiation, studies of the Earth’s atmosphere andits attenuation, propagation and reflection char-acteristics, and variations in gravitational effects.Beyond these basic common needs, some civilianand national security programs, such as those formeteorology and communications, have verysimilar technical characteristics.

Combining programs that provide specific typesof information, such as the weather data, hasbeen an attractive but difficult goal. Meteorolog-

ical data is valuable principally if it is put in thehands of users as rapidly as possible, and con-flicting demands for data between customers maymean that one set of users will be slighted if thesystem is less than sufficient for total coverage.Military needs for aircraft operations, for exam-ple, may constrain the satellite’s orbital timingand type of data gathered in ways incompatiblewith civilian weather forecasting.

In collecting observational data of the Earth,the civilian community has information needsthat are both identical to and quite separate fromthose of the military. Both communities havequite similar requirements for medium-scalemaps. However, the military need for intelligencerequires high resolutions not needed for mostcivilian programs. As civilian programs have ma-tured, additional resolution and spectrum needshave caused some convergence of technical re-quirements, which further complicates the taskof preserving the security of the DOD-operatedsystems while improving the capability of systemsused for civilian operations. An example of thedifficulties encountered in implementing joint sys-tems is the National Oceanographic Satellite Sys-tem (NOSS) (for description see pp. 50-51).

ISSUES AND POLICY OPTIONS

Technology Transfer

Inherent in the establishment of separate na-tional space programs has been concern for ef-fective “technology transfer” among differentactivities and agencies. In many cases costly tech-nologies developed to meet the objectives of onespace program may have direct utility for otherprograms. Sharing hardware and expertise canavoid unnecessary duplication of effort, savescarce financial, technical, and human resources,and enhance program capabilities.

In considering technology transfer, one mustdistinguish space-related technology (launchvehicles and facilities for guidance, command,and control of launchers and satellites) from appli-cations-related technology (sensor systems, com-munication equipment, data collection, and proc-

essing technologies). A special result of applica-tions technology is the data themselves (e.g.,remote-sensing images), which can be sharedwithout transferring the technology used to gath-er or process them. in general, space-relatedtechnology has been more easily transferred,because it is less sensitive and less specializedthan applications technologies.

Technology can be transferred either from civil-ian to military/national-security (MNS) programs,or vice versa. Substantially different issues arisedepending on the direction and type of technol-ogy involved. In general there are few if anyrestrictions placed on the transfer of civilian orNASA-developed technology to MNS programs.Problems arise when classified technology or dataappears to be of use to the civilian sector.


● Transfers to the civiIian sector of space-related technology developed for the militaryare relatively direct and open for unclassifiedprograms and technology, but involve addi-tional controls and supervision when thereare classification considerations that affectthe MNS programs. In practice, there is con-siderable sharing of military space-relatedtechnology between the sectors.

● By far the most complex and difficult rela-tionships to manage are those involving thetransfer of applications-related technologyfrom the military/national security sector tothe civilian sector. Since the national securityapplications are highly sensitive, there arenecessarily strict limitations on access totechnical information, even to evaluate itspotential usefulness for civilian purposes.

The key to effective transfer is to combineawareness of different programs at the policy andadministrative level, to exchange information atthe technical level, and to agree on joint respon-sibilities:

● The easiest transfers to implement are thosethat involve the direct use by a private con-tractor of technology developed in a classi-fied program to meet similar needs in an-other. This situation allows a lower bid to bemade, and enables the contractor to assureadherence to costs and schedules. Sincecontractors cannot themselves approve thetransfer of classified technology, the Govern-ment must take the lead in facilitating suchactions, even though the same personneland facilities may be used by the firm in-volved,

. Procedures for transfer are most complexwhen a classified technology is suitable fora civilian program but no channels have

been established for the two programs to in-teract. Frequently, no direct interface be-tween classified and unclassified programs,or even between separate classified activities,is allowed at many technical and manageriallevels.

The objective of technology sharing or transferarrangements is to ensure that the broadest useis made of available technology and that nationalresources are not wasted through unnecessary

duplication of effort. The condition governingsuch transfers is that disclosure of the technologynot reduce the effectiveness of a program or proj-ect, or harm national security.

There are several factors that impede the tech-nology transfer process at the program-manage-ment level. There are few internal incentives totransfer technology to other programs; from thepoint of view of national security program man-agers, transfer to civilians may compromise secu-rity and tie up valuable time, money, and man-power in conducting and supervising the transfer.Unless there is a clear quid pro quo in the formof additional resources or the prospect of futureaid from the civilian program, technology transferwill have low internal priority.

The competitiveness of the aerospace industryin part offsets the reluctance to share informa-tion and expertise. Competitiveness works in twomajor ways. In the first place, it causes new pro-prietary technology to be developed to improveproducts and sales potential across the space sec-tors. In the second place, the competitive bid-ding for Government work promotes technologysharing because using an existing technology isless costly in time and resources than develop-ing a new one. These factors provide an incen-tive for both Government and industry to con-sider existing technology and hardware in thedevelopment of system requirements, specifica-tions, and design approaches. Additionally, evenif a complete system such as a space vehicle maybe classified, technology sharing of many unclas-sified subsystems or component technologiesmay be possible.

In practice, there is a continuing exchange ofdata and viewpoints between programs in theseveral sectors at both formal and informal levels.in many instances informal exchanges and discus-sions are preferred over formal, because of lowervisibility and the greater flexibility afforded by theabsence of formal arrangements and their relatedinstitutional/bureaucratic implications. Withoutaccess to classified information it is impossibleto evaluate the overall efficiency of these relation-ships.

Technology transfer is further enhanced inthose situations when a common contractor base


is involved across sectors, or when personnelfrom one sector and technology are able to moveto similar or related functions in other sectors.A good example of the latter has been active orretired military personnel working with NASA.

In addition to various informal and intra-indus-try mechanisms for technology transfer or shar-ing, there is a formal body to coordinate betweenNASA, DOD, and AACB. AACB is the highestlevel formal coordinating mechanism betweenDOD and NASA. By a 1960 interagency agree-ment, the responsibilities of AACB included:

● planning of NASA and DOD activities toavoid undesirable duplication and to achieveefficient utilization of resources;

● coordination of activities of commoninterest;

● identification of problems requiring solutionby either NASA or DOD; and

● exchange of information between NASA andDOD.

AACB is cochaired by the Deputy Administratorof NASA and the Director of Defense Researchand Engineering (DDR&E) of DOD. Both of theseare policy-level officials. AACB has panels to dealwith issues that arise in several main areas. AACBis concerned primarily with defining broad poli-cies rather than working out detailed arrange-ments for cooperative activities. Technical detailshave generally been coordinated by special inter-agency committees or working groups organizedfor those purposes. Many joint NASA/DOD sub-panels and committees, which report to AACBpanels, have been established to assist interac-tion. There are also many individually negotiatedagreements and understandings.

Security Classification Barriers

Civilian access to classified technology is inevi-tably limited. As defined in executive orders thatestablish the rules for security classification, thereare specified levels of potential damage to the na-tional security that must exist before security clas-sification and controls can be imposed. Whensuch conditions exist, the relevant informationis classified at its appropriate level and restrictedto those individuals possessing the requisite clear-ances and “need-to-know.”

Because the effectiveness of a national secur-ity program may depend on the security protec-tion of key attributes, there are many legitimateincentives for managers of classified programs se-verely to limit knowledge or access by personnelwho have secondary, as opposed to primary, rea-sons for program involvement. Technology shar-ing inevitably falls in the “secondary” category.On the civilian side there are incentives to remainfree from the restrictions and encumbrances thatclassification and security controls require. Shar-ing classified sector technology with programs inthe civilian sector, therefore, has disincentives onboth sides. It is warranted only when it can beestablished that there are sufficient benefits andsavings to civilian programs to justify the transfer,given additional program costs and potentialsecurity risk.

Interagency Government mechanisms havebeen established that provide for selected civilianpersonnel to be cleared in order to have accessto sensitive programs and related technology.Because of the security considerations and “needto know” criteria, the number of such person-nel is kept as low as is judged feasible, to dis-charge technology transfer or other coordinationobjectives. The few cleared civilian agency per-sonnel are responsible for knowing the entirerange of civilian interests in their field and foridentifying the potential match between civilianprogram needs and the classified system technol-ogy. When the civilian need occurs, an evalua-tion is made of the potential benefit in relationto the security risk of release. Though in prac-tice there is wide variation, the relationship be-tween classified and unclassified programs can-not fail to be unbalanced. Personnel working inclassified programs can readily learn about tech-nologies under development in unclassified pro-grams, but the reverse does not hold. A securityconcern at the margin will almost always out-weigh an otherwise equivalent civilian benefit.

There are long-standing controversies concern-ing the security classification programs of theGovernment. The issues have not been whetherthere should be classification, but how to pro-vide appropriate levels of security protection fornecessary programs without abuses and withoutundue shielding of Government activities frompublic scrutiny. Because determinations of


whether given entities are to be classified and ifso, to what degree, are necessarily made bymembers of the national security community(under guidelines established by the President asCommander-in-Chief), whose primary responsi-bility is to protect national security, not to fostercivilian applications, there is an inevitable tenden-cy to “play it safe” by stringently classifying allsensitive materials.

Persons who have had experience in both civil-ian and national security programs acknowledgethat there are instances of failure, but also notesuccesses in technology transfer; given the inher-ent difficulties, they generally argue that the pro-cesses are as good as it is reasonable to expectwithin current policy guidelines.

The uneven relationship between nationalsecurity and civilian interests is frustrating, pri-marily to personnel in the civilian sector. Theydistrust the capabilities and incentives of classi-fied program managers to evaluate the potentialfor civilian uses of technology developed in clas-sified programs. Civilian sector personnel are notin a position to “browse” through classified tech-nology, or to pursue ideas or insights generatedin the normal course of engineering or scientificendeavors. Civilian frustration is particularly acutewhen independent civilian investigation leads to,or stumbles onto, technology that has alreadybeen classified or is then placed under securityrestrictions.

Within the executive branch, interagencyboards and mechanisms charged with exchang-ing information and coordinating implementationof policy guidelines provide oversight of transferprocesses. Congressional oversight is providedthrough the Select Committees on Intelligenceand the various committees that oversee the civil-ian and other military space programs. An entirelynew dimension will be brought into being if sig-nificant operational space systems are developedand operated by private commercial firms.

Additional problems arise from the existenceof various levels of security controls within theclassification scheme, whereby those privy to cer-tain kinds of information may not have access toother parts or to the whole. Internal Governmentreviews have been carried out periodically to re-

examine: 1 ) the need to provide continuing pro-tection for specific classified systems, technology,and data, and 2) the degree of protection thatmay be required. Oversight is provided by prop-erly cleared congressional committees and staff.Because the congressional oversight function ex-tends to many other aspects of the DOD-oper-ated space program, there is need for continu-ing review of security classifications in order toease barriers to technology transfer and to thebroader use of data from DOD-operated systems.

Interagency Review Mechanisms

The current practice of permitting access to alimited number of key individual from NASA andother civilian agencies with a need to knowabout the nature and capabilities of classified sys-tems provides an initial indication of what is avail-able and what is possible. The subsequent steps,leading to detailed understanding of the classifiedsystem and its components, and relating this un-derstanding to the possible civilian setting inwhich the technology might be used, are all de-pendent on this initial, survey-type exposure tothe classified systems. Therefore, it is incumbenton DOD (and other national security entities) tocontinue the practice of clearing individuals atvarious levels in the civilian user agencies andto provide them with periodic briefings on clas-sified systems and technologies. it is equally nec-essary for agencies with a need for such infor-mation to select individuals for access to highlyclassified information who are capable of mak-ing broad judgments about the desirability oftechnology transfer. Individuals at the policylevel as well as at the technical and manageriallevels are needed in order to cover the variousaspects of the agencies’ needs.

The next steps in the transfer process call formore detailed knowledge of the technology anda degree of individual specialization that will varygreatly depending on the nature of the technol-ogy. At this level, quite often an expanded setof cleared people is required from the civilianagency, with a very narrow focus on the specif-ics of the system or subsystem involved. Thisdegree of access will depend on a determinationthat the technology in question can be transferred


without compromise. This determination inevi-tably is made by DOD or another national secur-ity agency. If a decision is made that a technology(or piece of hardware) may not be transferred,an appeal may be made up to the managementlevel at AACB. Further appeal would require re-ferral to an interagency forum at the White Houselevel, usually via the NSC mechanism. Becauseof the special clearances required for the discus-sions in such a’forum, the NSC mechanism is wellsuited for this purpose. Alternatively, the “mech-anisms for consensus” discussed in this reportcould also serve as the interagency forum, withproperly cleared representatives from the agen-cies involved.

It should be emphasized that there is no indica-tion that there has been arbitrary or capriciousapplication of the security barriers to precludecivilian use of military technology. The centralfact is that national security authorities have lit-tle incentive to press for greater access or use oftheir technology, systems, or data. Such broad-ened access is potentially threatening because ofthe loss of control it implies—the prospect thatmore information is being released than is desir-able. These legitimate concerns are not readilydismissed, nor can they be easily tested by thecivilian agencies. Thus, the interagency mecha-nism needs a “third party” such as the NSC staff,the Science Adviser, or perhaps the Vice Presi-dent, to ensure that such questions receive bal-anced consideration. Congress can play an im-portant role through hearings, oversight, and ex-plicit incentives, both in uncovering the scopeof the problems and in resolving them.

Future of the Space Shuttle System

The shuttle program represents the largest cur-rent area of interaction between the civilian andmilitary space sectors, and it will be the continu-ing focus for many of the civilian-military policyissues in the period immediately ahead. The shut-tle will be central to both the civilian and militaryspace programs.

From the beginning of consideration of theshuttle, the Air Force worked closely with NASAto incorporate defense requirements into thevehicle. Formal coordinating mechanisms were

established, with AACB serving continuously asthe mechanism for coordinating formal policy atthe highest level. The Presidential decision onthe shuitle in 1972 directed it to serve all users,civilian and military. This decision entaileddevelopment of a vehicle that would integratecivilian and military requirements, and militaryrequirements had a significant bearing on manyof its design specifications.

NASA has borne most of the developmentfunding for the shuttle, rather than sharing thisresponsibility with DOD. The initial plan was tolimit the Air Force to building and operating theVandenberg shuttle launch and landing facility,and to paying for operating costs for DOD mis-sions. The Air Force later assumed developmentresponsibility for the inertial upper stage.

The rationale for NASA’s lead role in fundingand management has been that sharing betweenthe two organizations would complicate the man-agement of an already difficult and challengingprogram and drive up the program’s total costs,and that NASA was better equipped to design andoversee manned systems than DOD. A formalNASA/DOD memorandum of understanding(MOU) on management of the space transporta-tion system was signed in early 1977, and revisedin early 1980. The basic MOU establishes thebroad policies; there are additional agreementsand MOUS on specific aspects of the program.

A major problem with this arrangement is thatNASA has had to cut other programs to pay forshuttle overruns. Given DOD’s much largerbudget, it has been argued that the Air Forceshould shoulder some of the shuttle costs; the AirFoce has resisted in order to avoid being put ina budget situation similar to NASA’S. An arrange-ment to “fence off” the shuttle budget so thatit competes with other national programs, andnot with either agency’s continuing projects,would help to alleviate many tensions betweenNASA and DOD.

At the present time, interaction between NASAand DOD elements proceeds at all managementlevels, with active coordination on a daily basis.Inevitably, there has been a continuing series ofstrains and issues that stem from differences inbasic mission and outlook between the two orga-nizations. Many decisions must be made by


NASA without the opportunity for total coordina-tion with all parties of interest, including DOD.

Operations of the space shuttle bring civilianand DOD-operated payloads into the samestream of activities, from prelaunch preparationsthrough recovery and postlaunch processing,with the result that special provisions must bemade to ensure that adequate protection is pro-vided to sensitive information and systems. Whenexamined in detail, the transportation system can-not be divorced from its payloads. Every payloadentails specific operating characteristics that thenbecome subject to some of the same controls thatexist for the compartmented classified systems.Given this added complexity, many have sug-gested that separate shuttle orbiters uniquely con-figured for DOD launches would be preferableto joint facilities, and that DOD ought to operatea separate shuttle fleet altogether. In the future,maintaining payload-shuttle compatibility forcivilian and DOD payloads will be difficult unlessthis common-use principle is strongly supportedat the highest levels in the Government, becauseeach agency desires to maintain direct controlover all aspects of their programs.

There have been suggestions that it might beappropriate to have DOD assume funding andmanagement responsibility for the entire shuttlesystem after it becomes operational, for it appearsthat among the users DOD would have the larg-est number of missions. This role for DOD wouldhave several advantages:

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as the major user, DOD could ensure com-patible scheduling for its high-prioritylaunches;under current budget constraints, operationscosts and engineering refinements for theshuttle could more easily be funded byDOD; NASA could concentrate on science,applications and man-in-space programs;andsecurity requirements for DOD payloadscould more easily be accommodated ‘underDOD shuttle management.

The disadvantages of such approaches are con-siderable, however:

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NASA, as the development authority, has adetailed understanding of the shuttle and itscomplexities; this knowledge base is sharedbetween the NASA centers and their contractors and cannot be easily shifted to DOD(or to any other organization);there are several non-U.S. payloads currentlyscheduled for launch by U.S. vehicles; theseand future launches will be more difficult toaccommodate under DOD management.There is likely to be some foreign resistanceto cooperative programs dependent onDOD launches;the major technical support base for theshuttle—the NASA centers—would be in adifferent agency and would be less easily ac-cessible to the operational manager (unlesscenters were transferred to DOD); this situa-tion would create difficulties in implement-ing changes and improvements to the shut-tle system; andthe image of the U.S. space program wouldbe altered; although still conducted for“peaceful purposes, “ it would be controlledby the military.

Man-in-Space

One of the features of the shuttle is that manis an integral part of the system, required for itssuccessful operation and available to operate ex-periments, to deploy payloads, and to recoverthem in order to return them to Earth or to repairand refurbish them in orbit, as appropriate. Forlaunch of DOD-operated systems, the astronautcrew will need to be aware of the system’s oper-ating characteristics and may be able to contrib-ute to improved operation by using man’s uniqueattributes. These may be DOD personnel orselected non-DOD astronauts. Clearly, foreignastronauts or experimenters could not be em-ployed on such missions. Beyond this limitation,there is a great deal of commonality betweencivilian and DOD-operated missions, and signifi-cant advantage can be taken of this fact, with con-sequent net economies.

The next major step in advancing the capabilityof man-in-space is expected to be an extended


lifetime manned space station in LEO. Experi-ments in such a station are likely to addresscivilian and DOD objectives, and the lessonsIearned will have significance for both civilian andnational security purposes. Certain DOD mis-sions, such as the possible launch of large spaceplatforms with directed energy weapons, couldrequire a significant role for men in orbit. A spacestation is likely to be of broad value for bothcivilian and national security purposes, and re-quire continued DOD-NASA coordination formanned space flight. The current policy calls forsuch coordination, but the mechanisms are large-ly informal.

If a decision is made to proceed with space sta-tion development, it will likely be designed to sat-isfy broad national needs including those of thenational security community. In order to satisfythis objective, the national security communitywill need to be brought into the space stationprogram at an early phase, and should have aformal and significant presence in the planningprocess leading to program approval, when andif this occurs. The history of the shuttle demon-strates that such large-scale, long-term, and highlycomplex developments can be successfully pur-sued and be responsive to the needs of severalagencies. The shuttle has also demonstrated thatsuch programs are not easy to execute. Many ofthe problems with the shuttle concerning inter-national perceptions, separating classified andunclassified systems and personnel, and devis-ing a joint management structure, would recurwith a space station. Given our experience withthe shuttle, special attention should be given toproviding adequate long-term funding from boththe civilian and the military agencies.

Common-Use Systems (Unmanned)

The U.S. space effort has derived considerablebenefit from its ability to use civilian and DODtechnology almost interchangeably whereversuch technology was most appropriate to missionneeds (with the highly classified and sensitiveDOD-operated systems a partial exception). Per-haps the earliest example was the use of DODmissile propulsion and guidance systems as spacelaunchers. This joint use has continued, as the

basic Thor, Atlas, and Titan missiles form the coreof a modified and improved family of expendablespace launch vehicles. Even the shuttle uses sol-id-fuel strap-on rocket technology with its rootsin DOD missile experience and DOD spacelaunches.

in spacecraft design, detailed characteristics ofDOD-operated payloads are not generally re-vealed, but as described in earlier sections, therehave been significant common uses in this area.Beyond detailed design features such as solar cellarrays, radioisotope power supplies, pointing andstabilization instruments, thermal coatings, tem-perature control devices (such as the heat pipe),fuel cells, small thrusters, and a host of other sub-systems, there are several major systems that canmeet both civilian and DOD needs.

One of the potential common-use areas is innavigation. The Department of Transportation isthe lead agency for the civilian national naviga-tion plan and is responsible for coordination ofnavigation system planning, with the Coast Guardand the Federal Aviation Administration as ma-jor participants. In space, however, DOD hastaken the lead in the development of global nav-igation systems. In the earlier transit system andmore recently in the new GPS system, DOD’sneeds are being addressed; civilian users are alsobeing accommodated, though not with the samepositioning accuracy as is available to DOD users.In general, civilian use has been considered inmaking GPS decisions, but non-DOD agencieshave responded inadequately, leaving the entireburden of justification to the military rather thanviewing GPS as a joint national system like theshuttle.

In telecommunications, the military makes useof civilian systems by leasing transponders fromINTELSAT and from U.S. suppliers. The Navy, forexample, uses maritime communications linksprovided by COMSAT’S MARlSAT satellites. Pres-ent-generation communications satellites dedi-cated to DOD are not, however, normally sharedwith civilian users. As the technology continuesto mature, and advance concepts such as theLarge Communications Platform (LCP) becomerealistic possibilities, joint DOD-civilian LCPS mayevolve. There are numerous issues surroundingthe concept of LCPS that need to be resolved

Ch. 6—Relationship.s Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 167

(discussed inch. 3), and the questions that resultfro DOD involvement would add a further degreeof complexity to ownership, management, fund-ing, and use of such systems. There appear tobe no insurmountable barriers to DOD involve-ment in an LCP, and there may be significantbenefits from use of such a system. These factorssuggest a general guideline that should be fol-lowed for DOD programs as well as for those inthe civilian sector: proposed DOD research,development, and demonstration programs inareas where there is significant civilian interestand technology base should be reviewed todetermine if there is technology available fromthe civilian or commercial sector that can be ap-plied to the DOD requirement.

In other applications areas, such as meteorol-ogy and Earth (and ocean) observations, there isa degree of common use: DOD uses data col-lected from platforms primarily supplying civilianusers. The executive branch has initiated periodicreviews of meteorological satellites (metsats) toensure: 1 ) that maximum use is made of com-mon systems, and 2) that if there are separatecivilian and DOD platforms (as in the case of themedium-altitude metsats), there is a clear and per-suasive justification for separate programs. Forocean observations, the concept of a NOSS wasproposed as a common-use system to satisfy theneeds of three agencies—NASA, NOAA, andDOD. Contributions to the program were tocome from the three agencies, and the sensor sys-tems and platform characteristics were to be de-termined by common agreement. Data were toflow into the two user agencies, NOAA andDOD; NASA was to be the principal space R&Dagency. The planned multiagency sponsorshipbroke down, however, when DOD funding sup-port did not materialize because of concern thatthe attempt to meet multiple needs would raisethe cost beyond what the Navy was willing topay.

The experience with NOSS indicates thatshared or common use of space systems—al-though desirable from the standpoint of efficientuse of national resources—does not occur, andcannot be sustained, without careful attentionto management and funding channels and to ap-proaches that reduce interagency stresses. Itshould be possible for the United States to carry

out such multiagency programs, but the recordto date has not been particularly promising. Asimilar situation exists in the land remote-sensingarena. There are multiple agency interests, bothfor civilian and national security purposes, in datafrom Landsat-type systems, but no single agen-cy can justify the investment in a satellite plat-form. A cooperative agreement among agencieswould appear to be one approach that couldmove the U.S. program from experimental tooperational status. But long-term Cooperativefunding of a common project such as this appearsto be beyond our current capabilities.

Civilian Use of Data FromDOD-Operated Systems

One of the delicate subjects in the relationshipsbetween civilian and DOD-operated space pro-gram activities is the use of remote-sensing dataderived from classified systems for civilian pur-poses. There are presumably two security con-cerns related to the dissemination of data prod-ucts from classified programs: sensitive technol-ogy and sensitive information content.

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The question of whether classified sensor orapplications characteristics (e.g., sensoracuteness) are reflected in the data productsof a classified system generally can be deter-mined in advance for an entire class of prod-ucts. Such products, in theory, could thenbecome eligible or not, on the basis of tech-nology, for direct utilization outside ofclassified controls and established need toknow. Data might be modified so as to con-ceal the characteristics of the instrumentsused. In general, too, the sensitivity of tech-nology declines steadily with the passage oftime.The question of whether sensitive informa-tion content is contained in the products ofa classified system, generally can be deter-mined only on a case-by-case basis and eventhen may be very difficult to evaluate. Forexample, the possibilities of disclosing poten-tially embarrassing information about a for-eign country are almost impossible to dis-prove, particularly in “worst-case” analyses,if the original sources of data were classified.

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Information content, therefore, may havelonger-lasting sensitivity than the technologyinvolved.

The unyielding complexities and uncertainties ofattempting to identify and weigh these two typesof sensitivities have effectively limited civilian usesof the data products from systems that have pri-mary national security-related missions. It is infea-sible in an unclassified report to present arounded evaluation of the mechanisms that areemployed to declassify and disseminate informa-tion initially obtained from classified spacesystems. There are, however, some aspects thatare appropriate for open discussion, and il-luminate the types of issues that are involved:

Executive orders that have defined the cri-teria for classification also provide for theorderly downgrading and ultimate declassi-fication of data as their original sensitivitydeclines with age. Sensitive intelligence in-formation is eligible for exemption fromautomatic downgrading at specified inter-vals, but not from the requirement for peri-odic review. As a result of these overall pro-visions, there are mechanisms and proce-dures within all national security relateddepartments and agencies that regularly ef-fect the release of data that were onceclassified. However, the delay often amountsto a decade or more.

. Information itself, even when derived fromcurrently classified sources, is released occa-sionally to sharpen public understanding ofissues or programs. DOD and the Depart-ment of State, for example, regularly reporton the strategic-military capabilities and pro-grams of the U.S.S.R. or other foreign coun-tries. In such cases there is no reference orattribution to the specific source of the in-formation. Such decisions inevitably turn onthe judgment of the responsible officials,who weigh the potential benefits and risks.One problem is that many civilian agenciesoften do not have highly placed officials withthe proper security clearances to deal direct-ly with their opposite numbers in the militaryand intelligence agencies. This leaves keydecisions entirely in the hands of nationalsecurity authorities.

Any DOD/civilian program interaction in theuse of classified data products, even throughscreening mechanisms controlled by nationalsecurity interests, inevitably increases the expo-sure of the national security programs. At thesame time, such joint activity imposes some na-tional security controls or considerations on thecivilian activities. While these relationships canbe balanced within the context of Federal Gov-ernment activities and operations, there are nomechanisms in place to handle such interactionwith the private sector, State and local govern-ments, or academia. To make broad and routinecivilian use of data products generated by clas-sified systems it would be necessary to effectfundamental changes in policy at the nationallevel.

An important option, therefore, would be toconduct an interagency review and/or a congres-sional inquiry of: 1) the degree to which nationalsecurity systems can satisfy civilian user needs,and 2) the funds, personnel, and hardware re-quired to satisfy appropriate needs. In the plan-ning of next-generation DOD and intelligencesystems, the possibility of accommodating well-defined civilian needs should be explicitly con-sidered. It may also be appropriate to articulatea general policy in this area, in order to over-come the obvious reluctance of national securityauthorities to be burdened by considerations ofcivilian utility. Such a policy directive might in-clude the following points:

DOD-operated systems will be designed torespond to national security needs and areconsistent with the overall principles of“peaceful purposes,” as stated in the NASAct, and relevant treaty obligations such asthe Outer Space Treaty;to the extent that such systems can satisfycivilian user needs, they will be planned andoperated to do so, subject to the provisionthat acceptable performance of the primarymissions be a priority;cost of incremental additional operations,hardware, personnel and supplies, to the ex-tent these can be explicitly identified, willbe borne by the civilian user or users; andthere will bean interagency mechanism forcoordinating the activities required to carryout the above tasks.


Institutional Change

Introduction

The world is a much different place in 1981than it was in 1958, when the current policy andinstitutional framework for the national space pro-gram was developed. The United States and otherleading countries have had almost 25 years toassess the ways in which space achievementmight, as President Kennedy suggested in 1961,“hold the key to our future on Earth.”

In carrying out the ApolIo mission, NASA grewinto a capable organization, one which becamelarger than anyone anticipated in 1958. On thebasis of its over two decades of experience, NASAhas also developed into a particular kind of insti-tution in the eyes of the world, of the U.S. public,and of its own staff. Any consideration of changesin the overall structure of the U.S. space programcannot ignore the results of these past 23 yearsof activity. In particular, it must recognize thatthe political environment, especially the natureand scope of foreign competition and the degreeof U.S. domestic support, has altered a great dealsince 1958.

One major change is that the U.S. nationalsecurity space program is larger and more vitalto our defense posture than anyone except a fewvisionaries expected in 1958. As DOD and theintelligence community exploit existing spacecapabilities and explore the potential of futurespace systems, they have given an ever more im-portant role to space technology in U.S. securi-ty planning. The national security space programhas also evolved with particular institutional char-acteristics, and two decades have demonstratedthat there are substantial differences in organiza-tional style and methods between the civilian andmilitary space programs.

As discussed previously, there have beenrepeated interactions between the separate spaceprograms, and those interactions reflect a mixedrecord of cooperation and conflict. periodic as-sessments of this record and of the reasons formaintaining separate program structures have allconcluded that the existing relationships are fund-amentally sound, What the following discussion

examines is whether this conclusion remains validin the 1980’s.

The Original Rationale Reconsidered

The reasons for establishing separate space pro-gram structures in 1958 were discussed previ-ously. Briefly restated, they included: 1 ) that therewere clear defense and intelligence applicationsof space technology, and that those applications,including the R&D supporting them, were bestcarried out under the management of nationalsecurity agencies; 2) that there were also scien-tific, economic, and political justifications, nottied to national security applications, for spaceactivities, and that these required a sizable non-military space program; 3) that the national in-terest was best served by keeping these “other”space activities outside the national securityframework, because:

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they were not relevant to DOD’s mission andmight even interfere with high-priority secu-rity-oriented space projects by, for example,competing for resources and technical talentor by making it harder to keep the security-related efforts classified; andthe existence of a separate civilian space pro-gram meant that the United States couldmake use of that program as a tool of domes-tic and foreign policy by openly engaging inboth cooperative and competitive interna-tional space efforts of a nonmilitary charac-ter, and could more easily transfer the resultsof the Government’s space research effortsinto the civilian economy.

This analysis will present the implications andalternatives that flow from differing assumptionsabout the civilian and military programs and theirproper relationships. The issue is whether the ad-vantages of maintaining the current separationoutweigh the benefits of closer policy, institu-tional, and programmatic relationships among thevarious Government space programs. If it appearsthat there is no longer adequate justification fora large, institutionally distinct civilian space ef-fort on the current scale of NASA, then the issuebecomes how best to reduce or redeploy the ex-isting capabilities (facilities and personnel) of the

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civilian space effort to meet current priorities andneeds.

Options for Future Civilian-NationalSecurity Relationships

At this time the United States has a civilianspace program which, despite past accomplish-ments and a high degree of technical and mana-gerial expertise, is having difficulty gatheringpolitical and budgetary support for new pro-grams. On the other hand, the national securityuses of space technology are receiving high prior-ity. From the national perspective, what wouldbe the implications of a closer NASA-DOD rela-tionship including even the possibility of merg-ing the civilian, defense, and/or intelligence pro-grams into a common structure?

There are three distinct kinds of relationshipsthe two programs can have, depending on thestatus of the two sectors:

● Option 1: Separate Civilian and NationalSecurity Programs:

A. Separate projects with provisions fortechnology transfer (status quo).

B. Single project, with designated leadagency (space shuttle, metsats).

C. Ad hoc joint management/funding forspecific projects.

● Option 2: independent Space R&D Agencyfor both civilian and national security proj-ects (with operations conducted separately).

● Option 3: Absorption of elements of NASAby DOD and other Federal agencies.

The following will present the advantages anddisadvantages of the three options.

Option 1:

Separate civilian and military programs.

The general rationale for this approach waspresented in the previous section. In addition,there are specific pluses and minuses dependingon how relations are handled:

A. Separate projects with provisions for tech-nology transfer. —This is the current prac-tice for most projects:

1. Benefits:

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Allows defense and intelligencespace programs to be managed inthe context of their particular goals,without slighting civilian programs.Preserves high degree of security forDOD/intelligence programs.Maintains well-established manage-ment patterns for all sectors.Stimulates beneficial competitionbetween projects.

20 costs:●

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May lead to overemphasis withinNASA on developing new technol-ogy rather than meeting nationalneeds and satisfying potential users.Accepts some duplication and ineffi-ciencies.Increases difficulty of planning andfunding national programs of interestto civilian and military/intelligencesectors.May lead to premature commitmentto a major civilian post-shuttle devel-opment program to maintain vitalityof independent civilian sector.

B. Single project with designated lead agen-cy.—This has been the procedure adoptedfor the space shuttle (and attempted forNOSS), where both sectors are able toagree on the need for a common capabil-ity. One agency (in this case, NASA) ischosen as the lead agenc:y and designs anddevelops the technology according to itsown management procedures, in consulta-tion with other users. In the case of the shut-tle, the current plan is that operations willalso be managed by one agency:

1. Benefits:● Avoids duplication of effort and asso-

ciated costs.● Increases political and financial sup-

port for long-term projects.● Facilitates coordination between de-

veloper and user.2. costs:

Leads public and international com-munity to confuse civilian and mili-tary programs.

. In the case of the shuttle, has ab-sorbed a disproportionate amount of


C. Joint

NASA budget and personnel, with-out direct support from DOD; leadagency tends to be left “holding thebag.”management/funding for selected

projects.–This has not been the practice,but might be useful to avoid some of theproblems associated with separate pro-grams and lead agency responsibilities:

1. Benefits:● As for the previous case; in addi-

tion, joint management and fundingwould ensure careful attention byboth parties and ease the strains onthe lead agency.

2. costs:● As above; however, joint manage-

ment might complicate decision-making.

Given the underlying separation of the civilianand national security programs, any of the abovethree approaches can be used for specific proj-ects. This gives management considerable leewayin establishing patterns for cooperation and fund-ing; in the case of joint civilian-military projects,congressional oversight would have to involveseveral subcommittees.

Option 2:

Independent space R&D agency for all Federalspace projects, civilian and military.

In this case, an essentially new agency wouldbe created to manage all U.S. space-related R&D.Based primarily on existing NASA and Air Forcecapabilities, the new agency would be orientedtoward serving a variety of national needs, in-cluding those of DOD and the civilian agencies(Departments of the Interior and Agriculture,etc.). The operation and maintenance of systems,once developed, would be the responsibility ofthe mission agencies.

1. Benefits: Links NASA’s technical capabilities

in areas such as manned space flightand space propulsion to high-prior-ity national security objectives.

● Provides political support and policyrationale required to preserve the

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major part of NASA’s facilities andpersonnel.Allows for budgetary and program-matic coordination of entire U.S.space R&D effort, civilian and mili-tary, including what are now distinctDOD programs; better balance be-tween technology push and user pullin what are now NASA programs.Permits total Federal space budget tobe adjusted to policy priorities andallows the new agency to be reim-bursed from other Governmentagencies and private sector for itsR&D work in direct support of theirrequirements.Routine links to users would facilitatetransition from R&D to operations forprograms now in NASA.Facilitates joint programs in areassuch as space transportation of in-terest to entire space community.

2. costs:●

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Inverse of most benefits of option 1;puts the space agency in a less publicsupport role and makes it difficult touse for political and foreign policypurposes.Likely, in current context, to resultin unbalanced R&D program withnational security requirements pre-dominant (this might also be consid-ered a benefit).Disrupts established DOD-contrac-tor relationships.Does not answer question of whatto do with space science programssuch as planetary exploration, be-cause agency emphasis would be onuser-oriented applications; likely tolead to reemphasis of space science.Potential loss of NASA’s role as inno-vator and developer of new technol-ogies relevant to the civilian econ-omy.Some highly classified national secu-rity programs will still remain off-Iimits.

3. Requirements:● Establishing extensive pattern of


mutual trust and cooperation be- ●

tween new agency and various usersof its R&D services. ●

● Requires some means for resolvingconflicts between different usersover how to employ the new agen- ●

cy’s technical capabilities and over

Minimizes problems of transitionfrom R&D to operations.Provides opportunity to trim or elim-inate nonessential parts of NASA in-stitutional base.May facilitate transfer of space sys-tems to the private sector.

priority to be given to different pro- 2. costs:gram activities. ●

● Change in congressional oversight ofcivilian space activities, with more ●

emphasis on mission-agency ori-ented committees (Armed Services,Agriculture, Natural Resources, etc.). ●

Option 3:

Absorption of NASA by DOD and other Federal●

agencies.

In this case, NASA would be dissolved with key ●

elements, such as the centers, being taken overby DOD, other Federal agencies, and privatefirms or universities:

1. Benefits: ●

May reduce costs.Links technical and institutionalcapabilities relevant to national secu-rity objectives directly to users with-in DOD and intelligence agencies.

Loses the benefits posited for op-tion 1.Gives up an established and success-ful institution for uncertain efficien-cies and budget savings.Not clear that NASA centers couldeasily be absorbed within DOD andother mission agencies.No single locus for space R&D insupport of civilian mission agenciesand U.S. private sector.Public and congressional reactionlikely to be mixed, but predominant-ly negative; same for overseas reac-tion.Makes ambitious civilian programssuch as Apollo or permanentmanned stations much more difficultto consider.

chapter 6 relationships between the civilian and national

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