Chapter 4 notes: Mughal Empire-Two recurring themes so far: infusion of new peoples/idea, and cycles of centralization/decentralization-Can investigate these themes more closely in the context of the Mughal Empire, from 1526 to 1707 to 1857-Mughal Empire has been misperceived by Orientalists as an Oriental Despotism—a civilization which is overbearing on its people, highly centralized, revenue-extracting machine over passive societies, autonomous group formation. In actual fact, it is a more loose, nuanced form of hegemony with diverse and dynamic economy.-Babur is a Mongolian Turk from Kabul who conquered Punjab and then Delhi Sultanate (Lodi) in first battle of Panipat 1526. Founder of Mughal empire, died soon after-Son Humayun took control over a shaky govt., ousted by Suri in 1540, returns in ’55 after Suri’s death, dies soon after-Akbar faced immediate challenge from the Afghan/Rajput Millitary coalition, subdued it in 2nd battle of Panipat, conquers Bengal and Gujarat gives agricultural and economic advantage. Expands the empire tremendously, great patron of the arts/culture-Successors (Jahangir, Shah Jahan, Aurengzeb, ending in 1707) grow empire primarily in the southern direction (Bijapur and Golconda)-Maratha Leader Shivaji fiercely resists Aurengzeb’s conquests…becomes a hero-Administration: Mansabdar (local military rulers, had to provide men to the cavalry on demand) system, paid with revenue from jagirs (non-heritable land grants), subdhars (governors) at the top, zamidars (landlords) at the bottom who had to collect taxes-Akbar placed Hindus at top spot including Mansingh as his chief general, abolished Jizya, changed calendar to the solar one, founded Din-e-Ilahi—a universalist religion, brought other religious leaders to his place of worship in Fatehpur Sikhri, married a Rajput Hindu Princess-Not popular among ulema (scholar in Islamic jurisprudence) but he maintained order.-Aurengzeb reversed some of the religiously flexible policies for mostly economic reasons than anything else. -Although the Mughal State extracted a tremendous proportion of the total output of the agrarian sector, the method of collection was highly decentralized, and statistics show a great amount of agricultural growth under such rule. Peasant revolts under Aurengzeb were mostly by farmers who were prosperous and wanted to keep more. -Gained quite a bit from Oceanic trade but had a weak navy which allowed European ships to control the sea lanes. Portuguese opened up Goa in early 1500s but did not monopolize trade thanks to Arab/Gujaratis as well as Ottomans. English succeeded Portuguese as traders, English EIC began trade in 1619 under Jahanigir with few costal forts-Mughal Empire was based on a lot of political and economic flexibility, merchants had a autonomy in trade, empire richens with inflow of precious metals from European traders-Created a parallel system of courts to supplement local sharia courts.-Women had a lot of influence in the royal family. -Culturally rich period, many developments in music, art, language, architecture (Taj, Red Fort), etc. which resulted from a confluence of cultures-Mughal empire ends in 1857 when Brits try Bahadur Shah Zafar in Red Fort, exile to Burma, and exterminate the rest of the Mughal imperial line.

Chapter 5 Notes: India between Empires-General historiographical misconception that the age inbetween empires was dark; in fact it mixes high and low points, should not confuse erosion of power with erosion of socio-political-economic erosion.-Aurengzeb’s death in 1707 marks the end of era of great Mughals and entrance into era of lesser Mughals. Agrarian revolts and dissent reached its greatest intensity in the 18th cent., many theories as to why (Hindu, peasants economically oppressed by Mansabdars, factional conflict among Mughal Nobility, withdrawal of financial support by banking firms)-Recent Analysis points to: Imbalances of wealth and class disparities, invasions of Nadir Shah and Abdali, disruption of bullion flow from Europe due to surge in European production-Nadir Shah sacks Delhi in 1739, much land goes from Mughals to Marathas, Subadars appoint themselves nawabs (independent rulers)-Mughal emperor is totally aloof, didn’t even participate in the third battle of Panipat—1761—where Abdali defeats Marathas-Brits. win battle of Plassey giving them political control over Bengal, company defeats refugee Mughal Emperor’s army in Buxar in ’64, giving them the diwani of Bengal (right to revenues)…After overcoming fierce resistance from the Marathas, captured Delhi in 1803.-The weakening of the Mughal Emperor allowed for the rise of power in revenue farmers, merchants, bankers, and service gentry. All Nawabs recognized Mughal as quintessence of legitimacy but power was greatly decentralized by that time. Retained some Mughal administrative practices.-Mughal Successor States took 3 forms: 1) independent kingdoms ruled by Subadars dependant on merchant bankers, 2) Warrior States, and 3) local kingdoms which became more substantial over course of 18th century. -Traditional ports decline as colonial ports took their place. Maintains cultural vitality (Bhakti, Usuli—rational—islamic jurisprudence continues, Carnatic Music). Held out many attractions to Brits waiting to take advantage of them.

Chapter 6 Notes: Transition to Colonialism-Transition to Colonialism begins with conquest of Bengal in the 50s and ends with Punjab and Awadh in the 1840s. Several important issues here: impetus behind expansion, reasons for colonial conquest in an era of decolonialization, collaboration between EIC and Indian intermediate social groups, and the factors producing B. success.-Europeans wanted to stop the flow of precious metals to India, dominated external trade and shipping, resulted in the wrecking of the regional state system-British and French EICs got involved in internal politicking by offering their military services to one over another, and in the process, made an economic profit French eventually lost out. -Beginning of the end: Bengali Nawab Siraj-ud-daula, succeeding his highly diplomatic father—opens up too many fronts at the same time, calls for end to English fortifications in Calcutta, they do it anyway, Nawab brings his troops in and crushes them, English avenge their humiliation by sending in a Madrasi force under Robert Clive. Through some bankers, he bribed Mir Jaffar to be a turncoat, killed daula in battle, and got tons of cash. Advised his superiors to keep up the chase for more land and more money.

-Another nawab, Mir Kassim, tried to consolidate power, battle of Buxar highlighted him, nawab of Awadh, and Mughal Emperor against EIC. EIC wins diwani of Bengal. -Revenue was used to finance further conquest of other parts of India. Tried to sell protection to nawabs at high cost to make them unpopular among their people and prime them for assimilation (subsidiary alliance system). Took Gujarat in 1803.-Awadh is a good example of subsidiary alliance erosion. Signed on to the protection contract, alienated all of his zamindars, ceded all his western terr. in 1800, along with Arcot. -Mysore and the Maratha Confederacy was a tougher task. Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan had a highly efficient bureaucracy, prosperous peasantry, and minimal political corruption. Tipu made very skillful alliances with Marathas and fought to stalemate in late 1700s, but British ultimately won out in 1799. -Marathas adopted some of the Mysorean methods of taxation and revenue collection. They resembled the Mughals for a while, but then were forced into a subsidiary alliance by Wellesley. Brit’s capture of Delhi irked them and they took their last stand in 1818, ending in their defeat.-Last to go was Punjab/Sind under Ranjit Singh in the 90s. Eventually captured in 1840s, though the British made a big mistake in their siege of Kabul, where they lost a lot of men. Punjab fell after Singh dies with the alliance of Jammu’s Dogra. He was granted “permament protection” and had to pay annual tribute.-Needed to finance wars by using doctrine of lapse (Satara, Jhansi, Nagpur). Annexed Awadh in 1856 during the peak of company conquest.-All in all, this analysis reveals local resistance, interactions between EIC and merchant capitalists, and the pressures driving the Brits to conquest.

Chapter 7 Notes: Brit rule from 1757to 1857.-The political framework changed under the Brits in a continuous yet significant manner. -The state was essentially a military despotism. Recruited local Indian sepoys to supplement company force. Essentially a mercenary army, highly effective. Together with Madras army and other forces, has the largest standing army in the world (155,000). -Developed a civilian bureaucracy, although formal authority lay in the board of directors in London. Parliamentarians didn’t like it and impeached Warren Hastings, first gov. general. Nevertheless, they had much local autonomy since they are so far away. Upper administration was all British. -Granted limited autonomy to Indian rulers who acknowledge British lordship. British residents of princely states were influential in internal administration. Overall, an efficient means of management. -Company generated mechanisms to keep the stability and security of land revenues intact. “Permanent settlement” arrangement assigns revenue collection to the Zamindars, Early on, many defaulted under pressure of debt because they could not force tenants to produce more and the revenue demand was high. In the 19th century, colonialists gave zamindars more power like the power of eviction.-Barrage of criticism that free trade is the best way to sell British goods in Asian market. 1810s, India can’t compete with cheap British textiles, 1813 Charter act ends the EICs monopoly of trade w/ India. -China tea trade now is crucial to the company. Without land, EIC would be wiped out. Force cultivation of indigo, and production of opium in India finances the tea trade.

Depression and economic downturn in the 20s and 40s respectively hit India hard. Despite strong demand for Indigo in war and fashion, cultivation was fairly unremunerative and so was overthrown in Bengali “Blue Mutiny” in ’60.-Company did little to contribute to economic growth or equity in early 19th century, having already taken everything they wanted from the pre-colonial economy. Peasant mobility severely limited due to the state’s rent/revenue policy. Not many restraints from labor exploitation.-Masked political immoral behavior with ambiguity. Racist Wellesley has his men approach puppet Mughal with reverence, makes a coin after him, keeps most of the common law and court systems. Bentinck abolished Hindu practice of Sati. To galvanize Hindu commercial and clerical support, they had a state-sponsored neo-Brahminical ruling ideology. Many didn’t buy their cultural bribery.-Began building railways, looted revenues of quasi-independent states, tried to soften the edges of political economy by lowering revenue rates.

Chapter 8 Notes: Reinvention and Reform of Tradition-Old historiography seems to suggest that India was shaped almost entirely by British colonialism. More accurately, the company raj was all about invented and consolidated the traditional India of the peasant and Brahmin. Settled Indian community was fashioned by the British (sedentarization) to tie it to the wider world economy. Crystalized the Brahminical hierarchy into practice and formalized sharia into a legal code. -Two times must be separated from each other. The first is the late 18th century and the second is the early 19th century. The first is characterized by military aggression and economic plunder but not much social intervention. Latter half has the British trying to achieve legitimacy by formulating a neo-brahminical and pseudo-Mughal ruling ideology.-Of the three driving currents—Free Trade, Utilitarianism, and Evangelism—the last was least successful. 1813 Charter Act breaks the monopoly and opens up the shores, even to Christian missionaries. Utilitarian-driven policies are most successful. -Divide up social change between rural and urban centers. In the rural areas, Brits defined the boundary between forests/pastoral lands versus agricultural plains, assaulted the forests and caused disruption of tribal lands as well as climate change. Subjected to discipline and immobility of agriculture. Subjugation of tribes and nomads gives rise to settled peasant family as the common unit, some tea plantations here and there. -British begin task of rank-ordering groups vis-à-vis brahminism. Some social movements like the Satya Narayanis of Gujarat had a coherent ideological rejection of Brahminism. Science and reason has reached many urban centers long before socially-interventionist, utilitarian governor-general Bentinick had arrived on the scene. (Hindu) Presidency College (English Language) of Calcutta was founded in 1818 due to Indian initiative. -Young Bengal group from Hindu College flaunted Westernization. Conservative reaction was from Dharma Sabha (Radha Kanta Deb, patron of the college and supporter of western ed.), even petitioning against Beninck’s abolition of Sati. Didn’t defend the practice, just the Brit’s interference in it. Ram Mohan Roy wanted to re-rationalize tradition and bring about a reformation in the process. Formed Brahmo Samaj, rejected caste, idolatory, sati, and wanted a return to the monotheism of the Upanishads. Used the

Vedas, the source of the conservative opposition, to tear down arguments. Strong proponent of British Education system, called upon them to promote this in India (1820-30). Many others followed suit in other parts of the country including Sayid Ahmad Khan in the north. -Education-wise, attituted are very different. Indian’s see English education asa means of self-strengthening (proto-nationalist), which British Colonial attitude was primarily the desire to civilize, to create interpreters to understand those who they ruled over. Bengali and Urdu were important at the lower levels of public administration, English and Urdu was imported to Punjab.-Muslims resisted the westernization of the society and instead embraced reformist movements. -The time was not one without revolts. Both subaltern and landed magnates resisted colonial authority. Some of the most fearsome uprisings came from the tribal leaders. Most famous was Santhal hool of 55-56. Urban resistance centered mostly on artisans like weavers. -Overall, the time was turbulent, resistance was widespread, both logic and overt policy were equally important in causing turmoil, the only problems with the resistance was 1) lack of organization and 2) lack of temporal convergence. 1857 mutiny changes this.

Chapter 9: 1857 Rebellion, Collaboration, and Transition to Brit. Raj.-The mutiny of 1857 is complicated, many factors go into its creation. What’s unique about this one in particular is the temporal convergence, expanded scale, and the level of intensity. -Soldiers lost pay bonuses for service abroad, lost prestige with annexation, and of Awadh, and families had high land revenue taxes. Rifle Cartridges greased with cow and pig fat was repulsive, those who would not use the cartridges were sentenced to jail. Others felt bad, mutinied, marched to Delhi, installed Bahadur Shah Zafar (Mughal Emperor) as symbolic head of revolt. Concentrated in Delhi, word of the revolt spread to garrison towns and the countryside. Brit Army in East is separated from the army in Punjab. -Second field of the revolt happened in Awadh, where political and economic resentments ran deep. Brought about the collapse of the Brit. admin., Brit. troops had to win back Awadh village by village. -3rd focus: Central India, Maratha territories, Rani of Jhansi died fighting the British on horseback. -War was mostly confined to the north and central India. Nizam of Hyderabad tried to keep the mutiny away from his kingdom. Sikhs of Punjab were placated by the Brits and easily contained. Force on its way to China was diverted to Bengal to help put it down. -Was fired by a series of regional patriotisms. Nobles were deeply angered by British treachery in making and breaking treaties whenever they please. They offered the people a return to Mughal Soverignty, which was good in some sense but also alienated rivals from participating (Hyderabad).-Religious Millenarianism was an important theme in the 1857 revolt. British singled out the Muslims as responsible. Many muslim preachers were predicting the fall of the company raj, many groups declared a jihad on the company. Some proclamations of jihad recognized the common threat against Hindus and Muslims alike.

Chapter 10: High Noon of Colonialism, 1858-1914: State and Political Economy After mutiny of 1857, the crown takes control of India from the company

mismanagement. India was fashioned into a colony in the classic pattern—used for trade balancing of payments/captive market and strategic defense.

Shift in control => shift in titled positions (governor general => viceroy), first task is to reorganize the British Indian army and civil bureaucracy to reassert its authority after the ’57 revolt.

The ratio of british to Indians in the army was crystallized to never fall below 1:2, maintained till WWI. Counterposing natives against natives in classical colonial pattern to maintain dominance. Justified racial recruitment on the basis of whack theory of racial propensities in war. Regional favoritism left an negative indelible colonial mark on the subcontinent.

Indians fought in battles all over the world as part of the British Indian army, and often not to India’s strategic benefit. But Indian taxpayers paid for these wars anyway.

Natl. Bureaucracy entrance was stacked against Indians (civil service exams held only in London for long time, senior officials were always british, even lower levels of admin were blocked even to educated and qualified Indians).

Also a restructuring of the political economy. India was captive market for British manufactured goods, but also a source of agricultural raw materials (jute, cotton, wheat, etc.). Funneled back to London via export surplus, used mostly to pay off administrative costs, foreign wars etc., and generally not helpful to Indians => classical colonial economic exploitation. Switching the rupee standard from silver to gold caused depreciation, increasing the real value of India’s payments to Britain.

There was an economic drain of wealth of 5-6%: stirling => council bills => rupees => product (jute) => rupee profits reconverted to stirling to renew the cycle

India was crucial to the balance of payments between ’70 and WWI. Growing protectionism in Europe made it impossible to sell manufactured goods. Captive marked ensured a balance. Britain=deficit world, surplus India, India=opposite.

Nationalists caught on to the drain of wealth theory: while it is not clear that funds were unilaterally taken away from India, they were invested in things not beneficial to Indians, they should have been reinvested within country

Charges of exploitation called for change in governance. Changes in tenancy legislation because of the need to increase purchasing power of agrarian populace to support the market for British goods. Merchants prefer credit over rent mechanism to siphon off agricultural surplus => peasants=a cycle of debt, lenders=cheap cash crop.

Commercializing Indian farming exposes them to the world market’s ups and downs. Peasants shift to high-value labor-intensive crop to subsist, experience periods of boom followed by an even harder bust.

Increasing pressure to maintain India as the most important outlet for Brit. Man. Goods. India prevented from raising customs, then customs were eliminated entirely. When customs became a last resort due to dire financial circumstances, British counterslapped a tariff on the infant textile industry of Bombay—the first major Indian step into industry—rather than helping it along with protective tariffs

Indian colonial economy was greatly disadvantaged. Natl. critics claim deindustrialization given that artisan exports dwindled. Counter critics say that

maybe Indian domestic economy absorbed all artisan output, but this is invalidated by arguments comparing gross natl incomes of India and Britain => insufficient demand. Also, some internal econ. clashes: cheaper yarn is good for weavers, bad for spinners.

Indian railways is a prime example of metropolitan imperatives taking precendence over colonial interests. Constructed to serve the needs of Britain (movement of brit. man. goods, extraction of resources to port cities, troop movement). Foreign Capital investment results in guaranteed returns regardless of the profits of railroads. Outflow of interest from India exceeds inflow of capital.

Britain was in search of Indian backers after the revolt of ’57. Reinvented the structure of rule from Indian layered sovereignty to unitary sovereignty via buttressing traditional princely rule in exchange for loyalty. No move to make Indians citizens, just subjects of empire and traditional princes.

Tried to push for supporters beyond princes. Taluqdars (aristocrats in Awadh) who were loyal in ’57 were given economic protection. Helping of landlords was balanced by protection to peasants. local self-gov. introduction=beginning of demo.

Created provincial councils (1861) in Bombay, Bengal, and Madras. British majority but some non-official Indians consulted. Viceroy extended idea to increase indian’s say in local politics. Costs for councils were tariffed locally. Partly accepted the idea of elected reps. “Morley-minto” extended links between lower and higher councils.

Morley-Minto (‘09) extends differential patronage to various categories like Muslims and depressed classes, reforms were extended in the Montagu-Chelmsford (‘19) and then gov. of India act of ’35.

Curzon generation (turn of century) was characterized by increased arrogance and racial superiority. Underlying position was that of insecurity: competition from European imperial rivals and back-talk from Indian natl’sts, who are already talking about swaraj. State of affairs was bad with widespread famine and disease.

Chapter 11: Nation in Making, rational reform, religious revival, swadeshi, ’58-‘14 Old historiography focused on the politics of western educated elites, use founding of

INC (‘85) to mark the beginning of real nationalism in India. Modern focus includes movements by subaltern groups. Anti-colonialism is now seen as much more than just dissent by western-educatees. There is social reform informed by reason and religious revival that rejects this. This movement is complicated, not necessarily a convergence of beliefs but inter-connectedness. Competing narratives informed by regional, linguistic, and religious differences all contributing to the discourse on the Indian nation.

Some impetus for the redefinition in social identities was caused by the British census taking. Some castes rewrote their history to move up the ranks.

The British announced an intention not to interfere with religion and tradition but it ended up doing so by classifying majority and minority classes in its census. It also favored religious associations over linguistic and regional identities. Regardless of internal differences among muslims, they were clubbed together as one artificial political unit, encouraged to emphasize religious identities in the putting forth of political aims. This caused anti-brahmin reactions...low caste uprisings

Social Reform and Religious revival both characterize this nationalistic period, but both are too complicated to be pigeonholed into the standard dichotomies

(modern/traditional, reform/revival, etc.). Some progress in widow remarriage and age of consent raising. During epidemic, colonially-imposed medicines were rejected by the populous more as a rejection of autocracy than a rejection of medicine itself. Colonial irresponsibility in the arena of public health.

Conflict between revivalists and reformers in the context of religion. No necessary contradiction between rational and national.

19th century maharashtra was the center of hindu revival and reform (Brahminical overtones). Lajpat rai headed the arya samaj movement under dayananda saraswati, reforming many social issues from the context of Hindu supremacy over other faiths (supremacist overtones). Calcutta had Ramakrishna and Vivekananda, the latter was very rational and visionary in conceptions of tolerance, religion, and nationalism. Overall, the time was characterized by both movements.

There is no fault line between trandition and modernity. There was constant give and take. Bankim Chatopadyay and Rabindranath Tagore drew upon rationalism and humanism in the modernist and nationalist view. Attitude to European modernity was discriminating and judicious. Aurobindo Ghose makes this point strongly

Variety of responses by muslim intelligencia. Sayid Ahmed Khan tried to alter british conceptions of disloyalty by urging followers to accept british edu but not its ideals. Established his own school in ’75 with British patronage, but they were guarded against value intrusion. Ulema rejected him but ashraf classes enrolled in large numbers. Affluent muslims challenged brits on the legal injunctions involving Islamic code. Conservatives bashed him for shallowingly adopting European culture. But not everyone disagreed with him on every single account. Allahabadi agreed with the schooling idea but disagreed with Khan’s proposal that muslims not join the INC.

Subaltern anti-colonialism predated the urban elite’s attempt to mass mobilize against british rule.

Intelligensia was articulating their disaffection in local political associations, these groups banded together to become INC in ’85, w/ 73 self-appointed delegates. Made of professionals, lawyers, et al. Early leadership was moderate, operated in a constitutional fashion of raising petitions etc. Nationalist writers critiqued Britain’s economic policies (land-revenue demand leading to famines, wealth-drain, abuse w/ indentured labor). Called for cutbacks in govt. military expenditure and increased capacity for Indians to determine budget. Congress was moderately successful, but 90s onwards were characterized by bolder approach (inspired by Tilak’s ganesh festivals and assassination of hated plague commissioners). Curzon’s harsh imperialism added more fuel to the fire.

Curzon tried to revoke concessions in education and local government. Partitioned Bengal in ’05 to divide and conquer. Pitted Muslims against Hindus by seating muslims in Dhaka. Muslim league founded in ’06. Asked his successor Minto for separate electorates.

Stiff resistance to partition of the province => beginning of swadeshi. 4 Strands of the swadeshi movement: 1) old moderates who believe in constitutional methods but offended by curzon’s aggressive measures (Banerji, Gokhale), 2) Self-strengthen before head-on collision with British Raj (Tagore), 3) assertive leaders who believed

in passive resistance w/ violence only if repression is intolerable, 4) revolutionary terror is the only way.

Early on, atmashaktis began program for boycott and natl edu, constitutionalists redefine swaraj as something close to full independence. Boycott of british cotton was highly effective. Bande Mataram became the rallying cry, Bankim Chatopadhyay’s poem was slightly controversial in that it refers to mother Bengal, equates her with the mother goddess, and is in a novel with anti-muslim sentiment.

Extremists decided to hold on violence as a tactical move. Boycott resulted in a recover of local industry and artisanal crafts but Calcutta/Bombay manufacturers hiked up prices to squeeze extra profit, making the movement expensive. Muslims rioted against hindu moneylenders/traders in Bengal.

Political activism took root in Punjab, Maharashtra and Madras outside of Bengal. Extremists were on the defensive at the next congress session. Constitutionalism took root. Extremist leadership was imprisoned but the british ended up going back on promises to Bengali muslims, annulled partition in ’11. Moved capital out of Bengal into delhi. New viceroy was met in Delhi by a bomb.

Swadeshi era was characterized by redefinition of nationalist aims and cultural reawakening. Prevailing narrative was that of difference and universality (reason/humanism), rejected European concept of nation-state (Ghose: should not crush communal liberties/freedoms of regional peoples, no Unitarian imperial state). They steered a creative path where there was no contradiction between tradition and modernity. The vision embraced the spiritual treasures of the Hindus, Muslims, and Europeans in so far as it is rational…distinctly universal in aspiration

Anti-colonial thought in this era left contradictory legacy in context of religious/linguistic/regional communities. British had defined Hindu’s as majority, so easier to seep into the discourse. Granting of communal electorates in ’09 complicated further. Difficult to be muslim communitarian and Indian nationalist

Nationalist ideologues argued that the structure of an Indian nation would have to be (con)federalist (Bharata was the prince at the center of princes, Moghul was the same). Tagore and Iqbal were prepared to be patriots but not nationalists. Coexistance of multiplicity of identities had a stable point here but not for longer.

Chapter 12: Colonialism Under Siege: State and Political Economy after WWI Severe dislocations of economy brought by WWI leads to mass nationalism of 20s.

1:2 ratio of brit to Indian soldiers is lost. 60K goto mesopoatamia. Many die. Financing the war effort caused the most detrimental effects. Defence expenditure

goes up 300%, printed more money to pay for it, inflation causes shortages and high-prices. Industrial sector benefited, though, insofar as they were protected by duties. They did will from 19-20 but fell in the worldwide slump of 20-22.

The british were able to pull the war off without much resistance, even pulling British soldiers out of India to send them abroad. There were different viewpoints on what to do about the war. Gandhi saw nothing contradictory with recruiting soldiers andnon-violent protest. Radicals wanted to take advantage of it, moderates wanted something in return, revolutionaries purchased guns, muslim clergy argued against fighting in middle east. Increasing cooperation btwn. Muslim league (which Jinnah, a congress man, is invited to join) and congress => Lucknow pact of ’16 which allows for

separate electorates for muslims in order to bond against common enemy. Tilak out of prison, welcomed back to congress, sets up home rule leagues around country

British had to punish revolutionaries and assuage moderates. The ploy to divert attention away from the center was veiled by promises to introduce responsible government in India. Moderates were not pleased by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of ’19 which goes a step further from the ’09 policy of separate electorates via the creation of diarchy—places local self-gov in the hands of Indian ministers, had property and edu requirements which tended to favor raj-supporters.

1935 act increases franchised voters and autonomy of regional government, increasing Indian involvement at all levels of power. But the real key discretionary powers were in the hands of the viceroy (ability to curb power in provinces, defence, foreign affairs, etc.) and the beginning of federationism only happens when ½ the provinces accede.

Colonial state devolves authority in some places and increases it in others. Brings localities in greater contact with each other. Pitting Indian against Indian and directing attention away from the center allowed the british to maintain colonial agenda—strategic and economic.

Political economy also changed from that during its high noon. Dislocation of war provided protection to india’s textile industry, which beat out the Lancashire mills by a lot. Depression wiped out british industry access to Indian market as well as wiping out india’s export surplus. By putting pound off the gold standard and pegging the rupee to it, there was an outflow of gold to Britain. To fight back against depression, conducted deflationary policy which halted flow of foreign funds into India, crunched credit, and collapsed agrarian prices.

Depression caused London to loose some control to Delhi (tax collection etc.) but finances were held. Central bank of London in control (currency, credit). British firms established in India to allow continued benefits of Indian possession.

Chapter 13: Gandhian Nationalism and Mass Politics in 20s Indians has opposed the raj through constitutional, extra-constitutional, and armed

insurrection but to no avail. Gandhi arrived with “non-violence” like a colossus. Gandhi’s major political philosophical contributions are contained in his Hind

Swaraj. Rejected western modernism, economic imperialism, and representative institutions. Favored an enlightened anarchy of peasants with a ruler to give voice to the collective will, Ram Rajya. Sita is idea woman. Spinning is impt ritual.

Returns to India in ’15, surveys the social and political scene, tries our mass agitations a few years later in Gujarat and Bihar, establishes himself.

First all-india mass agitation in ’19 after montagu-chelmsford and Rowlatt act (extends wartime ordinances into peacetime…can hold Indians without trial). Got help of home rule leagues, Khilafat, but no congress (no machinery in place). Largest since 1857.

’19 agitation was fierce, people reeled under the pressure of social/economic conseq. of WWI. Muslims were upset about Kanpur Mosque incident (many killed) and ’14-18 war for Islamic ummah => Khilafat Muslims led by Mohamed and Shaukat Ali join Satyagraha Sabha to attack symbols of British authority.

Characterized by unusual unity between Hindu, Muslim, and Sikhs. Punjab—the least nationalist—was under martial law. In ’19, people in Amritsar looking for a public fair were shot in Jallianwallah Bagh Massacre, killing hundreds and injuring over a thousand.

Gandhi’s genius comes from his fusing love of the homeland with the loyalty to religion. People misinterpret him to be totally out on left field compared to everyone else at the time. His promotion of the Khilafat movement gave meteoric fame in INC

He supported Khilafat because it was reasonable and moral. Hindu’s had obligation to support Muslim brothers. The basis of the problem was Lloyd George’s “Broken Pledge,” to leave Turkey, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Jeddah alone. Supported Ali’s call for a mixed commission to decide the needs of the Arabs and Armenians. Recognized that Palestine was a sticky issue.

Supported 3 Natl cries: Allaho Akbar (not shy from Arabic words), Bande Mataram/Bharat Mataki Jai, Hindu-Mussalmanki Jai. Devised perfect formula to harness emotive power of nationalism in linguistic regions and forging religious unity based on mutual respect (my supporting Khilafat saves the cow from the muslim’s knife). Swaraj is the only way safety of both faiths is possible.

Gandhi wove negative value of ahimsa with satyagraha. Had a strong emphasis on discipline/leadership. Advocated violence if there was a choice between it and cowardice, but India does not have a sword to draw. Offered ahimsa as a political tool to the Congress.

Captured the leadership of the congress in ’20, outmanovering moderates. Jinnah tried to bring hindu-muslim unity but deplored mixing religion and politics…he was shouted down. Mixed symbols of spinning wheel and hand-woven cloth with crescent moon and Turkish fez.

Not all of his policies went without criticism. Tagore despised boycotting educational institutions since there was gross “uneducation” in the swadeshi period

All-India Congress Committee endorsed his non-cooperation movement and boycott of reformed councils. They reorganized the regional congresses by linguistic lines, modified the constitution: goal is to seek swaraj through legitimate and political means. Mass program builds political capital out of sweeping populist ferment.

’19-’22 was characterized by labor unrest unrelated to congress. His vision of village revival was embraced. But congress leadership was afraid that masses would go ahead of the leadership and redefine swaraj.

Laid special importance to cutting across class, caste, and religious differences in public policy. Congress considered no revenue and rent payments by Gandhi rejected the latter since he wanted tenants and landlords to band together.

Gandhi was a god of the people, Mahatma/Maharaj. Overcame contradictions Boycott was far more effective in ’21 than ’05 => Prince of Wales’ visit was dismal.

Planning to begin no-revenue campaign in Gujarat but called it off because peasants killed Brits in UP.

Divisions within Congress brought to open after non-cooperation movement ends in ’22. C.R.Das and Motilal Nehru want to wreck raj from within by participating in councils, break with Congress and form Swaraj Party. Hindu-Muslim unity starts to break apart with some violence in UP and Punjab. Mohamed Ali calls for federation of faiths. Das calls for 50-50 allocation of future gov posts and jobs. Punjab

bifurcated into Unionists led by Fazl-i-Hussain and Hindu bigots led by Lajpat Rai (in favor of majoritarian politics). It’s easy to say that the cause was gandhi’s dangerous mixing of politics and religion, but in fact religion had successfully excited nationalists without embittering communities before majoritarian bigotry took over. Religion was less of a barrier to forming common front than any nationalistic politics with accommodation of internal differences.

British created the prospects of Indian unity with the all-white Simon Commission (investigate future constitutional reforms in India). Congress under pressure to come up with plan, boycotted the commission and had another led by M. Nehru. League under Jinnah agreed to participate if they agreed to generate a charter safeguarding muslim rights. “Communalism” takes pejorative connotation. Mohamed Ali’s position of equally important identities as a muslim and Indian no longer holds.

Leadership dithers over important question of complete independence. M. Nehru’s report calls for dominion status. Bose and J. Nehru call for complete independence. Almost passed but Gandhi intervenes in the congress session, because afraid that they are moving too fast and giving way to the masses. But the masess rioted in ’28, esp. in Bombay. By the time Gandhi finally accepted purna swaraj, labor militancy and youth radicalism was repressed. The congress only reluctantly decide to make the release of these prisoners a demand.

All in all, the british’s attempt to provincialize politics was countered by nationalism in the 20s. Congress opened up somewhat from the elite to the populous, but still maintained some bias in favor of the middle and rich classes as well as industrialists. Not all rich people agreed with him but followed for expediency. Poor looked to him because they had no one else. Constructive work in villages resumes after Gandhi calls off mass movement. Swaraj party is successful in Bengal and Center but not in Punjab. Congress’ refusal to support Das’s 50-50 strategy yields a bifurcation of politics into loyalism vs. bigotry. British decided to rest their reigime on already fully provincialized politics (princes/rural elites). ’29 is the passage of the purna swaraj resolution in congress. Congress is left with the mission of undermining the colonial structures of domination/collaboration while harnessing various strands of opposition without being spread too thin.

Chapter 14: Depression Decade, society economics, politics The depression of the 30s were characterized by changes in social relations and

quickening of political pace. The crisis showed how closely india’s economy was tied to the world’s, and allowed a renewed context for the agitations of ’22, as well as the class/caste/religion conflicts. British responds first with repression and then with diversionary tactics. Gandhian old guard of congress is under fire from radical and socialist elements. Muslim league is rebuffed by the congress in ’37 and began a search for an alternative political strategy.

Indian economy experiences great depression in 1) collapse of prices, and 2) rupture in the circuits of monetary credit. Crisis in agrarian production coincided with industrial economies of the west. Flow of foreign capital into agrarian sector drops, prices fall. Liquidity crisis affects prices, creditors pulled out and would not offer loans, peasants struggled through the depression at lower standard of living, underproduction means that in the outbreak of WWII, starvation hits.

Depression’s effects in urban areas is more mixed. Unemployment and low wages were the norm. Flow of capital from rural to urban allowed protection to certain industries like cement, which did very well. Sugar industry flourishes under protection. Good times for urban consumption but not for investment.

Gandhian civil disobedience launched in this context. Less bold than purna swaraj: most of his demands were economic (i.e salt tax, less revenue tax, textile protection). British did practically nothing. Salt march was the kick-off event, and was successful

By the end of the year, the movement started to polarize: flagging in some and revolutionary in others. Peasant revolts between Muslim tenants and hindu landlords was one problem. People who firebombed the central legislature, stole from chittagong armoury, and assaulted the Calcutta seat of govt. became local heroes.

Gandhi didn’t want to promote this kind of violence so he agreed to negotiate with the viceroy. The Gandhi-Irwin pact of ’31 achieved almost nothing (3 vagaries, no release of Bhagat Singh) and angered nationalists but signaled the end of civil disobedience. He was invited back to the second roundtable discussion to discuss India’s future constitution but again returned empty-handed. Civil disobedience began again in ’32. Arrested 120K people, the movement crushed in 2 years.

British tried to divide the Hindus by giving various groups separate electorates. Ambedkar—leader of the depressed classes—passed the Poona act of 32, agreeing to drop the lower caste allotment in exchange for more seats.

Gov of India act passes in ’35. Provincial section abolished dyarchy in favor of rule under elected Indian minsters (keeping emergency powers just in case, holding on to all vital aspects of sovereignty, finance, and defense). Federal part calls for future federation with princely state reps counterposing british Indian provinces, such that nationalists can’t get a majority by construction.

Widely denounced by Nehru, Bose, and Jinnah. Key was to divert attention. Congress decided to contest provincial elections scheduled for ’37, and won a

MAJOR landslide victory. Growing competition within the party between left-wing (Nehru and Bose) and

gandhian conservatives. Also, Communist party, Radical Humanists, and Congress Socialist party had roles to play. Gandhi tried to cut the radical elements out by giving the leadership to Nehru and Bose. Nehru was a Fabian socialist but decided not to push it too hard for the sake of expediency in getting rid of the British.

Bose had a more radical social and economic agenda geared towards Indian conditions but with a militant nationalistic side. Bose defeated gandhi’s candidate for the head of the party, but they convince him to resign. Forms a forward bloc and tries to unite the leftist forces. Congress barred him and elder bro from holding office for 6 years.

INC split into conservative and radical factions. Also, muslims opposition was strong under Jinnah (he was rejected after ’37 election so had to look elsewhere to safeguard muslim rights).

Viceroy declares India a belligerent in the war, Congress fails to get satisfactory answers from British and resigns. Gandhi goes for a solo satyagraha campaign, while militants go all out for independence.

Chapter 15: Natl’ism and Colonialism in WWII, economic and political confrontation

WWII fromteh Indian natl’st perspective was a war between old and new imperial powers. Gandhi called for individual satyagraha, lotsa people arrested (bose et al.)

War economy had galloping inflation. Massive defense spending. London’s treasury was low so they arranged things such that India would pay now and be reimbursed later. Imports drop, serious shortages occur.

Poor and urban laborers suffered more this time than in the depression of the previous decade. Devastating famine in Bengal killed over 3.5 million people. There was no aggregate food-availability decline…it was simply a matter of declines in exchange entitlements of vulnerable social groups. British colonial policy protected troops and industrial classes deemed necessary for the war effort; agricultural laborers and peasants lost food entitlement in the millions. Wages and employment goes down, prices skyrocket, volatile market forces peoplel to pay for food in cash, famine code was never invoked to help these people, an untold holocaust of the war.

There was a debt reversal between Britain and the colonial govt. Britain owed 1.3 billion pounds after the war. Intruded into the food market with price controls. The poor in Bengal starved, Punjabi’s made little profit and complained bitterly.

Nationalists and British state squared off in this environment of economic crisis. Bose escaped and tried to bring about dissent among Indians in the British army. Communists turned it into a people’s war against the nationalists, and were blamed for it. Japan’s defeat of Britain in ’42 emboldened congress leaders to make more strident demands. Churchill sent an emissary supposedly to prevent the nationalists from allying with the enemy. We now know that he never intended them to succeed. Gandhi proposes the quit India movement, which passes through congress in ’42.

Largest uprising since ’57. Led by lower-ranking congress officials since everyone else was in jail. Urban movement lasted a month before being repressed. Spread to the countryside, peasants attacked all symbols of British authority. Administration collapsed in many districts around the country. Revolts were multi-class, liberated localities set up congress governments. Muslim-majority provinces took no part in the q-india movement. RSS and right-wing Rajagopalachari stayed aloof. Industrialists dabbled with the congress but ultimately sold out to British. Communists played a weak role. British army in top form slaughtered many martyrs but provided more fodder for congress in future elections.

INA led by bose, who gets surrendered Indian soldiers from Singapore, adds civilian recruits. Extremely diverse group of people. Attacked the symbol of british dominance, sought to replace loyalties of Indians fighting under the british. Had a lot of muslims and Sikhs, as well as women.

INA began from Zafar’s tomb in Burma, fought and lost in north-east India/Burma but was revitalized in ‘45-’46. Congress and League applauded INA. Trial of three soldiers from the INA at Red Fort=> supported by high-power legal team from the congress, were eventually released under pressure. The trials caused mass rioting from ’45-’46. Mutinies, uprisings, dissent within the british armed forces. All parties united. British realized that they could not contain them, and moved to discuss the terms and shape of independence. Soon, mass strife took place over this key issue

Chapter 16: Partition of India, creation of Pakistan Various interpretations of why India and Pak. broke up. There is the muslim “two

nation” theory and the Indian “tearing two communities apart” theory. The real reason can be found in the structural contradiction and peculiarities of Indian society and politics. Need to follow the development of Jinnah/League’s claim to two nations.

Some revisionists believe that Indian social tradition is completely a british construction; thereby rejecting the two nation theory. However, they probably created categories more than they molded identities. Also, it ignores the possibility that identity building also came as a function of resistance against a common enemy.

Muslim social identities were formed by socio-economic patterns linked to British rule, not shaped by it. It was thought that the 19th century reform movements and ideological links with other Muslim nations (Khilafat etc.) facilitate the construction of a distinct muslim identity but in fact it was quite fragmented by class, region, doctrine, sect, etc. Religiously informed cultural identity as one of many identities does not translate directly into communalism.

After 1857 mutiny, British saw Muslims as a significant and distinct community (prone to religious revivalism), a counterpose to assertive hindu elites. British sought landed muslims as allies, which people like Sayid Ahmad Khan promoted (via two nation theory) to give them greater political importance in the eyes of the British. British were careful about discontent and gave them separate electorates with the ’09 morley-minto reforms.

Muslim politics continued to be shaped by local elements. Until turn of century, no mention of muslim conception of nationalism. Even conservatives were anti-colonial rather than anti-national. Nationalist narrative authored by both Hindus and Muslims offer a multiple visions of nationhood. Muslims got in on the discourse while seeking accommodation of their differences.

Separate electorates—once offered—could not be withdrawn. The contradiction between the provincializing of politics and communal politics plagued muslim politics till the end of colonialism in India. Were made a perpetual minority no matter what the constitutional arrangement, local politicians used local influence and had no need for a central party—as opposed to non-muslim parties which had a great advantage in allying with the INC.

Muslims never followed the lead of a central political organization until the final decade of rule, when they had to decide on constitutional reforms. They mostly worked within the limited framework of the local level and found the need to work cooperatively with members of other communities, but there was no need to work with a communal group whose identity was defined solely by religion. Following the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, separate representation certainly did not guarantee solidarity (alliances were commonly forged). Khilafat brought politics back to the central stage, but—ironically—they ended up allying themselves with Gandhi. Muslim league dies in the 20s.

In the early 30s, there was no central voice for the muslims. ’16 Lucknow Congress-League agreement gave weighted representation for minorities but no representation by population, which angered many. Lajpat Rai warned that the price for separate

electorates is partition (of Punjab and probably Bengal)—muslims didn’t like this. The Congress’ natl’sm wanted equal citizenship without equal representation.

Muslims were anxious to advance regional interests at the cost of communal interests. Unionists had the most weight in the constitutional dialogue. With communal award of ’32 and act of ’35, Muslims in Punjab and Bengal retained their separate electorates and got more seats than other communities. They could also electorally capitalize on the newly created provinces of Sind and NWFP, but minority muslims lost protection on the councils from British officials.

Some muslim politicians turn to Jinnah, who had disappeared to London—a disappointed congressman—only to return to head the league in ’34. Their goal was to de-provincialize muslim politics: upon getting majority province support, minority provinces would have every incentive to join in to have their central grievances resolved. But there was no urgency to join the league’s bandwagon.

In the ’36-’37 elections, Jinnah tried to get support from the majority provinces and strike a deal with congress but failed to do both. Congress won a landslide and the league won 4.4%. Provincial politicians did not care for a nat’l party with no track record. Had a hand in the coalition govt. of Bengal with the KPP but was rejected by the north-west provinces. Since those were the provinces actually agitating against the congress hindu-raj, the league needed to get in on the action ASAP.

League got support in regions where muslims were outnumbered. But all in all, the congress’ overwhelming victory convinced them to disregard the league entirely in the formation of provincial government.

League had to adopt all muslim causes and play a fine power balance with the provincial parties to get support and then leverage with Congress.

In 20s and 30s, muslim opposition against the congress hardens. Unionist and KPP agree to support League at the center. They preferred a weak center and stong provinces as opposed to the federation arrangement of the ’35 act. Even with weighted representation, they would always remain a minority/have no power in a new India.

The way out of this quandary was to invoke Sayid Ahmad Khan’s point that of two nations. Iqbal was a leading supporter of the idea of creating a separate state in the Northwest from Punjab, NWFP, Sind, and Baluchistan. Ali invents the word Pakistan as a confederation of states from here to the Bosphorus. Idea of mass movement of peoples was not palatable so people thought of alternatives.

Most were predicated on the idea that muslims were a nation and not a minority. With the outbreak of war in Europe, congress stated its conditions for war, claiming to speak for all of India. League had to come up with a counter demand—combining the requirements of the majority and minority muslims—to contest the congress. Rising to this challenge, the league declared in ’40 the need for independent muslim states in the northwest and east on the grounds that they were a separate nation; they insisted that their nationalistic vision was just as valid as the congress’. While vanquished just 3 years earlier, they had increasing muslim discontent on their side.

The resolution had holes: no mention of a strong/weak center of Muslim/Hindus, nor of any partition or Pakistan; it seemed to be merely an amorphous declaration of sentiments rather than a concrete plan of action. The crux was that all negotiations on this issue had to be reconsidered in light of this fact, that the muslims were a separate

nation. The league, however, did have a considered view that these majority provinces be sovereign and autonomous states.

The ambiguity was intentional to avoid foreclosing other possibilities. There were accounts where—while the new muslim nation would have significant non-muslims in it—both constitutions would have protections of minorities.

The initial demand was understood to be consistent with separate nations welded together into an Indian confederation with common defense etc. The idea was in power-sharing. Jinnah himself seemed satisfied with this interpretation.

Jinnah argued that the transfer of power had to include a dissolution of the center—the artifact of British colonialism. Once created, Pakistan could decide whether to enter the confederation or simply make treaties, but either way the first step was getting Pakistan to be conceded by the British and Congress.

Jinnah maintained that Punjab and Bengal would maintain their borders with large non-muslim minorities. Reciprocal protection of minorities would be in place. Equitable share of power at the center.

Jinnah had a tough balancing act, trying to rouse a base muslim population mostly found in hindu-dominated provinces. Can’t rouse the muslim populace without angering landed ashraf classes. Strategy was to build as many bridges as possible with big-wigs.

Jinnah often had scorn for mullah who touted islam openly but came to resort to religion at the end b/c this was only way to mobilize a politically divided community.

The idea for Pakistan became greatly popular among most muslims. Yet popularity did not necessarily yield a strong enough politic for its achievement. Jinnah needed to get support from the majority province politicians and negotiate with the non-muslims in these two provinces.

Cripps Mission of ’42 offered provinces and not communities the opportunity to opt out of the newly forming Indian union, which demonstrated the contradiction in Jinnah’s demand. But Cripps failed and muslim politicians chose to alienate non-muslims rather than break ranks with the league. “Rajaji” offered Jinnah a Pakistan composed of the muslim majority districts of Punjab and Bengal, leaving the challenge of negotiation with India defense etc. But Jinnah knew this would lead to a power imbalance and vetoed the “moth-eaten Pakistan.”

Cripps and Rajaji exposed the central problem: Pakistan could entail a partition of provinces. Jinnah lost all offices except for Sind and negotiations with Congress about selecting members of the viceroy’s executive council failed.

In ’45-’46 elections, Jinnah wins all muslim seats and 75% of vote. People electrified by the cry for Pakistan, no specific agenda in place. Had been won by local leaders with alliances to league. But there are still problems…local Sikhs and Hindus upset.

Cabinet mission plan offered Jinnah a real consideration: undivided India with weak center or divided with partitioned provinces. Jinnah rejected a sovereign pak in ’46, moving towards 3 tiered gov. Jinnah soon realized that the mission’s proposal would not hold (prompted by Nehru’s statement as prez of INC).

League desperately calls for “direct action day”. Violence careens out of control around the country, esp in Calcutta. Appted minister from congress and league are at odds with each other in the interim govt.

Riots everywhere…British decide to officially leave by summer ’48. Hindu Mahasabha demands partition of Punjab and Bengal…Nehru approves. Moutbatten intends to get out of India as fast as possible with the least damage to British interests. Nehru and Patel are ready to take power at the center at the cost of partitioning India. Sharat Bose reaches a compromise with League about a unified and independent Bengal that had Gandhi’s approval too…but this was rejected by Nehru/Patel.

Mountbatten makes is plan for partition privy to Nehru and Jinnah in summer ’47. Jinnah seems to faulter on whether or not he will agree to the proposal but Mountbatten closes the deal. Legislators of the partitioned provinces need to vote for partition, and decide whether or not to join existent constituent assembly or ‘Pak’ constituent assembly.

It turns out that the majority of legislators in both provinces actually rejected partition but the east-Punjab and west-Bengal reps had to vote under the Congress command.

Jinnah was presented with the choice of either an undivided India with no guarantee of muslim share of power or a carved-out Pakistan. If jinnah had been more confident of his following in the muslim provinces, he might have opted for the former and used the weight of the provinces to secure rights in majority and minority provinces. This failed: jinnah feared his own followers, mistrusted the congress high-command, and Mountbatten’s decision to move up the date to ’47. He had no choice but to accept that which he rejected in ’44 and ’46.

Congress agreed to partition on the condition that it would be the final negotiation on the matter. The Congress version of the story was that partition entailed certain areas “opting out” of the union of India as opposed to the division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan. British accepted this version, which seeming destroyed Jinnah’s two nation theory. This seceding view seemed to have the underlying stipulation that muslim areas would return to the union of India if it failed. Religion was insufficient to bring the muslim provinces solidly behind the All-india platform; Jinnah had to settle for a truncated pak. Contradictory logic of British’s provincial politics vs. communal electorates means that the particularisms of the Muslim provinces is the most important driving force here. Also, congress was obstinate about conceding power at the center.

Partition was accompanied by slaughter of hundreds of thousands as they cross state lines.

Chapter 17: 1947. Memories and Meanings Millions of people herded across lines, hundreds of thousands killed, land divided

across religious lines when never done so before, 2 wars over Kashmir and a third with Bangladesh. Rise of hindu majoritarian parties and resurgence of hindu-muslim violence in the north-west of the country. Recurrence of center-region problems. All problems seem to stem from the troubled legacy of ’47.

This part of south asian history has been extremely controversial. Standard explanation comes from British theory of divide and rule as well as muslim two nation theory. Both are inadequate. Statist historians are wrong.

After partition, 60 mill muslims in Pak (largest muslim state in world, then) and 40 mill in India (largest non-muslim state in world). Suggests that they were not a homogenous community (regional and local loyalties, language, occupation, socio-

economics). Peacefully coexisted with other religions through most of early history. Seems odd that people would create a state under the assumption that islam was the most important impulse of identity.

Jinnah, the father of the nation, was a protagonist of hindu-muslim unity and stood for a joint congress-league program. Jinnah is praised and blamed for the birth of Pak. But the whole time, both he and the rest of the league were intentionally ambiguous about what the Pakistan claim was…left it to the populous’ imagination. His appeal to religion was a political tactic, not an ideology.

Religion was never traditionally used for political ideology. Local/regional politics didn’t develop in the framework of the league but rather the other way around. Religion was used to paper over cracks within the Muslim community.

Many flaws in Jinnah’s strategy. He underestimated Britain’s anxiety to relinquish power, thought congress would bend over backward to avoid partition (in concordance with Gandhi’s wishes), and overestimated his control over majority province politicians. Gandhi had little control over Congress’ Nehru and Patel.

For Jinnah, Pakistan was the way to win equal power for Muslims at the center. Jinnah looked for power at the all-india level. His politics was a contradiction in itself; his nationalism was more inline with congressmen than leaguers, he was a distant man who tried to pander to the people, a secular man who pandered to religion, a constitutionalist who threatened agitation, and a center-oriented nationalist who resulted in a partitioned India. Ironically, he never intended islam to play much of a role in the actual governance of the state. People today don’t know this…they believe him to be the man who gave expression to the vision of an Islamic state, the ultimate victory of islam in the subcontinent.

There is a gap between meanings and memories in both Pak and India. Nehru’s unitary vision of the nation ignores the wealth of narratives that went into the making of the nation. Gandhi’s utopia is an example. There are many models which have variations on the theme of decentered democracy; it’s all to easy to buy into the conflation of nation and state when neither existed until ’47.

In the retroactive narrative on nationalist past, only congress-muslims were nationalist, makes it seem like communal divide was solved by partition, nehruvian brush ignores political and linguistic diversity in the aftermath, makes it seem like independence was won through only gandhian non-violence (illegitimating the revolutionaries who fought for freedom and ignoring the death accompanying partition). Indian Minority muslims blame jinnah for leaving them behind while majority members blame him for destroying the unity. Babri Masjid demolition shows that the meaning had been lost on both Indians and Pakistanis.

Rise of communalism resurfaces many of the memories of ’47. People don’t understand why India accepted dominion status or Pakistan, but this was the only way that India could claim the unitary center at Delhi and control ¾ of the country by pulling the princely states in. This required sacrificing unity and full independence.

Centralized power in India has not helped the poor despite a professed ideology to the contrary. Neither Gandhi nor Nehru’s vision of eradicating the poverty, discrimination, and exploitation which the colonialists fail to address. Accentuation of center-state relations, threats to secular ideology, class, caste, communal conflicts, and military disputes with Pak are all legacies of ’47.

British suffered little to none after ’47. There was some nostalgia. Mountbatten patting himself on the back for a job well done—when in fact it was a administrative and human disaster—is an admission of the colonial master’s dereliction of duty at the moment of greatest crisis.

Subcontinent has never recovered from the tragedy of immediate post-partition (killings on trains, etc). Some writers and artists have done a good job bringing the human tragedies to light but others have failed to give a full accounting of the tragedy and trivialized it in the process.

Need to be careful to equally represent and examine the state as well as the community in the context of violence. People who emphasize one or the other are obfuscating the field of study. Implicating entire communities presents a distorted picture of what happened in ’47. Evidence shows that most didn’t participate in violence against religious opposites and actually protected victims. Can’t treate groups as undifferentiated blocks. This approach will restore our understanding of subaltern groups, women, and others.

Chapter 18: Post-Colonial South Asia from ’47 to ‘71 It is important to breach the divide between pre and post ’47, as well as the spatial

divide between pak and India. Millennia of culture and history is more powerful than any political border.

The important forces of centralism/regionalism, nationalism, religious assertion (communitarian and sectarian) continue to mold the subcontinent after independence. Congress claimed the triumph of centralism and nationalism but pak demonstrates the partial success of regionalism and religious communitarianism. It might be tempting to attribute the congress’ success in establishing a relatively stable democracy to it’s secular nationalism and centralism.

Yet this seems premature. India has experienced significant pressure from regional and communitarian groups, probably just as due to it’s secularism and democraticism as pakistan’s authoritarianism. Is this just an endemic issue of periodic shifts between center and region?

Borders in the region have always been extremely permeable. Pak had the ignominy of a region successfully breaking away in ’71 (Bangladesh). India and Pak currently suffer tensions in Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, and the Sind.

The question is why India has only done marginally better than Pak in holding back regional dissonance. To answer this, we need to strip ourselves of all ideational self-projections and all biases we may have for one “ism” over another.

The way India was partition precluded it from becoming two successor states. India inherited the centralist structure, the personality, even the name. Pak was given the role of seceding from the center. It had to build a center from scratch, control territories thousands of miles apart through unfriendly territory, etc.

Explanations of how India ended up with a parliamentary democracy privilege the congress at the expense of other important institutions. While the congress was a key player, it owes a lot to the inherited police, military, and civil bureaucracy. There is still much bureaucratic authoritarianism in India. Formal democracy (elections etc.) had to be frequently supplemented with authoritarian methods.

With help of existing structures in place, congress was able to setup a westminister-style parliamentary democracy. Having regular elections and widening the electoral base has helped, but political privilege has prevented serious socio-economic change.

Nevertheless, on balance, parliamentary democracy has led to upward mobility in the populous. Backward/scheduled castes have been a serious impact on local politics and challenged the congress to reform. Mobilizing electoral support around symbols like the Babri Masjid have been tested by the BJP, to great resistance by other parties. Question is whether or not it’s alright to democratically dilute secularism.

Changes in center-region dialectic have led to shift in balance between democratic and authoritarian tendencies. One way to measure progress is formal (regular elections) vs. substantive (equitable socio-economic development) democracy.

The roots of center-region problems in south asia can be tied to historical circumstances more than inherent diversities of culture. Both needed to setup strong central governments (with a focus on unity) after the trauma of partition. In pak, fear of survival was even greater with it’s ill-defined Islamic ideology.

Both India and Pak look federal in form but are actually unitary: the chief minister and his cabinet can be dismissed by the center in a move known as “president’s rule.”

It is commonly thought the success of formal democracy in the region is due to the INC, but it is likely due more to the inheritance of the unitary structure. ICS => IAS. The fact that disarray within Congress was a little less than that of the league accounts for much of the differences in success between authoritarianism and democracy (it’s the links forged by political parties with bureaucracy)

Nehru shifted center-state relations towards the executive, despite some accommodations he made with local party bosses. Both Congress and League were prone to personality cults of local leaders. Deinstitutionalization of congress was reflected by broadening of political base by newly mobilized social groups. Change in balance of power is reflected with relationship with civil bureaucracy. Nehru used the bureaucracy significantly to buttress the center, and this gave the it more discretionary power in policy implementation.

Scholars are now questioning Nehru’s achievements in placing India on a democratic path. His opposition of linguistic reorganization is just one example. Potti Sriramalu starved to death in ’52 trying to create a telegu-speaking province. Gujarati opposition to the division of the Bombay Province was another road block. Akali Dal—the premier Sikh party in Punjab—was demanding a linguistic state for Punjab-speakers…was not conceded until Indira Gandhi.

DMK in Tamil Nadu was the most serious sessionist challenge, a counterpose to the Hindi-speaking north. Completion of linguisitic reorganization in the 50s-60s was insufficient to alleviate center-region tensions, erupting again in the 80s.

Problems in Kashmir can be traced to Nehru’s early years. Hindu Maharaja with Muslim-majority populace signs an accession agreement with India after NWFP tribals attack. Nehru turns it over to the UN which divides the province 2/3 Indian and 1/3 Pakistani. Administration was under the popular Sheikh Abdullah until he was arrested in ’53. Slowly the provinces were brought under the center’s control as they assign charge to administrators willing to do Delhi’s bidding.

Nehru used carrot-stick approach with other congressmen effectively to lead the party to electoral victory in 3 successive elections despite organizational disintegration

unmended by Nehru. His personal charisma carried him through with the masses and the fat cats. His economic policies tried to build industry but ended up not helping to alleviate basic social problems like malnutrition, poverty and disease.

N’s death plunged the party into state party bossism. Shastri is his successor but only shortly before he dies. Congress is starting to break apart from the inside because there have been no organizational reforms. State bosses apply pressure so Shastri turns to the higher civil services to forestall a takeover.

State boss influence ended when they failed to deliver at the polls of 67. Partnership with civil bureaucracy was no longer sufficient to maintain power. Indira Gandhi chosen as the new head, very cunning woman who surrounds herself with skilled bureaucrats. Declares ’69 a populist socio-economic program. Tried to appease to high caste landed elites and subordinate classes across regional arenas. Her rally call “eliminate poverty” delivered at the polls in ’71 and ’72.

’71 general elections coincided with first general election in Pak of ’70 with military crackdown (declared by Z. Bhutto leading to Bangladesh’s successful secession) => shatters the myth that the basis for Pak was Islam. Since then. central government worked on evolving a center capable of keeping the nation together. Question: why did Pak fall off the democratic track? It’s not Jinnah’s early death or the League’s weakness. Non-elected institutions were also very weak as well. Answer: having to build a center from scratch as well as the war with India over Kashmir within months of independence created the conditions for bureaucratic/military dominance.

Division of the army of undivided India was still incomplete. Central leadership was in no position to fight the war but ended up skewing the relationship between elected and non-elected institutions. Revenue extraction and administrative consolidation becomes the primary goal, not the construction of a system capable of reflecting linguistic and cultural diversity.

Politicians were edged out of the decision-making process and bureaucratic authoritarianism took hold. This tilted the regional balance of power in favor of Punjabis in the civil administration against non-punjabis. Conflict between administrators and politicians has defined the overt military and covert democratic authoritarianism in the region.

The culture of military coups—for example, the ’58 coup when the military moved with the president to take control—begins with assassination of first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan. He was from a minority province and thus disliked by Punjabi federal bureaucracy as well as the Bengali majority, whose dominance he tried to forestall by delaying the drafting of the constitution.

State functionaries were afraid of Bengali dominance. This internal battle for supremacy coupled with the competition from India and international pressure to capitalism put the autonomy of the political process on hold. The only way to exert power from the center was to distort the political process => “power vacuum” explanation of the failure of parliamentary democracy doesn’t hold. Must distinguish between military dominance and military intervention.

It was much easier to tinker with the political process than twist it to fit. Pak maintained the façade of a parli democracy to give it ultimate flexibility for the military and bureaucracy to control. They consolidated state authority by dispensing the political process.

Pak was a military and bureaucratic-controlled state until ’71. Military reigime of Ayub Khan is characterized by differential patronage to select segments of society, so that he could maintain dominance with the least effort. These left-out groups engineered his downfall and dissented against his successor, Yahya Khan. Bengali’s resented urdu as the national language, Ayub recognized it in the constitution but the center-region damage was already done. Developments in the 60s highlight the limits of state consolidation under military/bureaucracy in societies with systematic depoliticization.

Ayub’s basic democracies order of ’59 stretched scope of bureaucratic control into politics but he marginalized the threats: intelligentsia and industrial labor. Took Washington’s advice and strove for growth rather than redistribution. Widening disparities took its toll.

Legacy of Punjabi Army domination has frustrated attempts to return to democracy. Yahya Khan agreed to hold first nation election with universal adult franchise but would not allow the people to eliminate any of the structure the bureaucracy and military had worked so hard to build—he had absolute power to veto anything he disliked.

Bengalis formed the majority but were poorly represented in the two institutions with power: military and bureaucracy. Also, the cultural dimension (urdu as a national language) imposed further tensions. Exclusionary politics and gross inequities led to Awami League’s fight for provincial autonomy. Rahman wins the general elections but military crackdown in ’71 starts a war with India joining in and freeing Bangladesh.

Chapter 19: Post-Colonial South Asia, Socio-economics, State and politics, ’71-‘03 70s are a populist era. Indira Gandhi was willing to limit central mobility in

broadening the base of support to the end of staying in power. She used a mix of formal democracy and covert authoritarianism unlike what her father had used. More democracy = reorganizing congress but also strengthening regional leaders at the cost of the center. Success at regional level based on populist mobilization gave local politicians the means to attack the center. Gandhi reacted by eliminating any intraparty democracy and appointed all of her own loyalists. Structural contradiction between exec power at the center and resilience of casts as well as the regional problems arising from populism.

Emergency of ’75-’77 was the attempt to ward off regional challenges. Overt authoritarianism worked in the short run but could not sustain opposition charges of illegitimacy. Mounting grievances from all sides resulted in her rejection in the ’77 elections.

Janata party—the loose conglomerate united in opposition to her policies—took power but soon fell to its own structural contradictions. Gandhi came back in Karnataka but dropped the local candidate as soon as it was clear that the subordinate classes and minorities got tired of the janata’s agrarian plan and socio-economically powerful support base. Gandhi came back determined to fight regional dissidence. Punjab, Assam, and Kashmir were all problems of the politics of a congress-dominated center. Substitution of populism with religious majoritarianism was key.

Pitting communalism against regionalism was a well-played card—we see it in the politics of partition, Telegu politics in the 80s, and in Punjabi Politics vis-à-vis the Akali Dal—seeking a Punjabi-speaking linguistic state. Claimed sovereign nationhood (though not necessarily state-hood) for the Sikhs, more radical elements got weapons and launched a violenc campaign for the sikh homeland Khalistan. Assault on Golden Temple, assassination, and riots followed.

Rajiv Gandhi won elections with the Hindu card after mother’s death (rode on the sympathy wave). He opened the doors to Ayodhya mosque and railroaded a controversial conservative muslim women’s bill through congress (Shah Bano). India gets involved with another country’s federal dilemma without having resolved local problems. Tamil minority of Sri Lanka were targeted in ’83 riots by Sinhalese. Tamil Tigers have been fighting for a sovereign tamil state ever since. India gets involved but finds that not all Tamils agree and some fight the Indian army.

Rajiv loses 1 state election after another, corruption scandals, does nothing to negotiate disputed terr. Release of imprisoned Abdullah followed by rigged elections cuts off Kashmiri relationship with India. ’89 natl elections, BJP did well on the issue of a hindu state, but Janata Dal stole the populist thunder. Forms coalition gov. with VP Singh at the top. Reaches out to a wider group and seemed better equipped to reorder priorities of India’s political economy of development. In the end, J. Dal had to work within the established parameters of compromise between formal democracy and covert authoritarianism.

Rise of Hindu majoritarian politics since the 80s in India must be placed in the context of region challenging center. Secularism and Socialism lost credibility and congress turned to religious majoritarianism to convey regional threats, opening the doors to more ideologically committed forces: BJP, RSS, VHP. It was initially deployed against the Sikhs in the 80s but became increasingly anti-muslim. Ayodhya Temple-mosque controversy becomes central.

VHP demanded that the Babri Madjid Mosque be replaced by a temple, congress does nothing to stop this, ’89: holy bricks are transported. Singh’s decision to implement the recommendations of the Mandal commission (reserve jobs at center for backward castes) seems to divide the hindu community by castes . BJPs leader Advani takes a chariot journey to arrive at the site and build the temple, thereby challenging the ideological foundations of the Indian state (secularism). Tore down mosque in ’92, leading to some of the worst attacks on the Muslim community in many parts of India.

Although this damaged the secular façade of the Indian state, religious communalism of the BJP variety is NOT NECESSARILY the binary opposite of secular nationalism. Adherents of the centralized post-colonial nation-state have offered both ideologies as justification. HIndutva’s promise to shore up the central state authority is probably bogus. The real key to move forward is to renegotiate the powers of the center with the varied constituent units. An invariant majoritarian position might further fragment the country’s politics.

The return of congress to power in ’91 allows Narasimha Rao to tackle the “permits, licences and subsidy raj,” which came out into the open after the balance of payments crisis leading to an IMF loan in ‘91. By removing the barriers to entry in industry, economic development continued. However, they moved slowly to rectify health and

education. Sen argues for moving “beyond liberalization” and into expanding social opportunities.

Further decline of the congress in the general election of ’98-’99 created the conditions for BJP coalitions governments at the center. Vajpayee, the moderate face of the BJP, was accepted as the head once the Ayodhya issue, Article 370, and a uniform civil code were placed aside. Vajpayee promised to form coalition governments even with a majority because this is the democratic way—although this was an empty promise.

Sonia Gandhi led the congress to the worst showing in ’99. lost many seats in the Lok Sabha. Ruling coalition was formed by Tamil Desam, DMK, etc. Opposition had regional parties with lower bases of support as well

General elections of ’99 dented the pretensions of the congress and BJP. A string of defeats led the BJP to fall back on its Hindutva line. Victory in Gujarat upon the mass killings of thousands of muslims brings to light the obvious fact that BJP—at the end of the day—is just a coalition of northern and western interests and is not equipped to handle myriad class contradictions.

In 5 years of a BJP government, relations with Pakistan have been nuts. Nuclear tests on both sides, followed by calls for restraint and brinkmanship in Kargil. Agra summit in ’01 gives both sides hope that a reasonable agreement can be reached. Unprecedented media hype. Terrorist attack on parliament diverted resources again away from social opportunities and towards military strategic objectives. By ’03, V. is taking steps to renew peace with P.

While India’s spoils system and bureaucratic corruption/inefficiency has been bad for India, Pak’s military rule (leading to the illegal sales of drugs and arms) has been much worse. 40 years of autocracy has done little for the economy despite higher economic growth numbers. Concentration of wealth in the 20 families or so who control the dice. Formal Democracy is a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for development with social justice.

After ’71, both Pak and Bangladesh had brief periods of parli democracy followed by longer periods of military-influenced rule. Bhutto’s election seemed to bode well for the state, but he maintained much of the autocratic techniques used in Ayub’s government. Watered down populism and rewarded loyalists to the PPP. Had no respect for civil liberties.

Bhutto allows the military to go all out against an uprising in Baluchistan. No progress was made to redefine center-region relations. Called elections in ’77 to appease mounting resentments, and won but was accused of rigging it. No PPP organization to save him from ousting by the opposition.

Ul-Haq assumed control, had the support of the elite classes who disliked Bhutto, won legitimacy by squelching the corruption of Bhutto’s govt. Took the side of Islamic parties in Pak and vowed to bring religiousity back to the center. Passed wildly anti-women acts. Haq strengthened his hold by drawing defense more closely into the day-to-day running of the state. Beneficiaries of his patronage have been influential in modern politics.

Rewards and patronage under the haq reigime created an even bigger stake for the military in the existing structures of the state. Zia uses the Islamic notion of the “advisory council” to conflate representation with selection. Finally gave into

elections in ’85, confident that it could face the electorate. Passage of 8th amendment was highly controversial

8th amendment allows president (military) to dismiss elected prime minister and government without consultation of anyone. Has been used 5 times since ’85 to oust legitimately elected governments.

Zia dies in ’88, fiscal crisis is available to everyone and it is horrendous. Sindhis revolt against the Punjabi domination of government. Violence between linguistic communities.

Following decades showed B. Bhutto (PPP, she also went to Harvard) leading on and off with Nawaz Sharif (P. Muslim league) of the Punjab (chief minster). Dismissals of PM’s led to a lot of instability in the region. Highly polarized and pulverized political arena.

8th amendment was finally scrapped by Sharif after winning huge victory in ’97. After sacking Musharraf, he is deposed. M. promises to hold free elections but never does. Anoints himself President and initiates reforms. Support for war on Terror strengthens his domestic position. Declared himself president till ’07. Has met opposition from Bhutto’s PPP and a 6-party religious opposition (he proclaimed that Pak would become a moderate member of the international community, angering them)

Populism has been even shorter in Bangladesh. Rahman was released and becomes first pres from Awami League. Hunger and war posed problems. He tinkered with authoritarianism, assassinated in ’75 by CIA. Turns to over autocracy under general Ziaur Rahman, performs a kind of socio-political engineering like Ayub and Haq. Assassinated and succeeded by another military dictator, who soon gave it over to democracy.

Military autocracy cannot be brought to an end by mere elections. Formal Democracy has to overcome a wall of structural obstacles, let alone substantive democracy.

All three nations have a common set of social and economic problems. Literacy, life expectancy, ratio of women to men, state of primary education. All have far to go to rectify imbalances along religion, community, class, and gender. Need to break the colonial mold.