chapter 3 conﬂict prevention and resolution, and

This chapter focuses on key issues relatingto conflict prevention, conflict resolution,and peacebuilding. It draws on the conflictrisk factors and triggers identified in Chapter1. Conflict resolution refers to themechanisms for ending conflict, andpeacebuilding to measures aimed atconsolidating the peace after a violentconflict. Civil wars — whose distinctivefeature is that they are executed by a rebelmovement — can be ended militarily or bya peace deal, or a combination of the two.The few cases of decisive military victory inAfrica include the National ResistanceMovement’s victory over the Government ofUganda in 1986, and the Government of Angola’s defeat of UNITA in 2002.Sometimes, however, even when the rebelmovement defeats the government andassumes power, a role reversal occurs, withthe ousted government waging a rebellion.This happened in Rwanda following theRwanda Patriotic Front defeat of theextremist Hutu regime in 1994. Negotiatedsettlements tend to be common. Examplesinclude Sierra Leone (between theRevolutionary United Front and the govern-ment in 1999), Côte d’Ivoire (between thegovernment and the rebel “New Forces” in2003 and 2007), and Burundi (under theaegis of the Arusha peace process). Thischapter proposes measures to address theroot causes of violent conflict. It also

examines conflict resolution and peace-building tools.

Conflict prevention

Economic growth and development

Many conflict risk factors in Africa seem tobe related to the region’s relative economicdeprivation. Hence, policies that succeed inincreasing income and education levels,stimulate economic diversification, andstrengthen a middle class that derivesincome and political influence from itshuman and financial capital, are likely to aidconflict prevention in the long run. Broad-based economic growth, in particular, willeventually raise incomes and make recourseto violence a less attractive option for theyoung men and women who participate inviolent conflict. Economic growth must beequitable to ensure that it benefits the poor,and the young men and women who arelikely to participate in violent conflict.

Equitable economic growth is also likelyto increase the effectiveness and stability ofdemocratic institutions. Dahl (1989, p252)argues that democracy only succeeds in a‘modern dynamic pluralist society’,characterized by ‘a dispersion of: (i) politicalresources, such as money, knowledge,status, and access to organizations; (ii) strate-gic locations, particularly in economic,scientific, educational, and cultural affairs;

C H A P T E R 3

Conflict prevention and resolution, andpeacebuilding strategies

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and (iii) bargaining positions, both overt and latent, in economic affairs, science, com-munications, education, and elsewhere’.Extremely poor people do not have anybargaining positions.

Only when the citizenry possesssomething they can use to hurt the incomeof elites in political positions can theysucceed in keeping elites to the contractimplied by a democratic political system.Such dispersion of resources and positionsare closely associated with high averageincome.

Natural resource management

Case study evidence shows that naturalresources have fuelled recent civil wars inAngola, Sierra Leone, DRC, and Liberia. Insome of these countries, mismanagement ofnatural resources also aided state collapsethat culminated in civil war. Soundmanagement of natural resources thereforelies at the heart of building a viable andsecure state in these countries. In somecountries, the cause of conflict is thedistribution of revenues from resources:Resource-producing regions are sometimesmarginalized, resulting in regionalinequalities, which could lead to violentconflict. In such circumstances, theappropriate policy would entail implement-ing a more equitable distribution of therevenues. The agreement between theGovernment of Sudan and the SudanPeople’s Liberation Army to end the long-drawn civil war in Southern Sudan is a goodexample. The agreement stipulated thatrevenues from oil — located in the south —would be split equally between the regionand the central government. Chapter 4

recommends some policies in the post-conflict context.

Democratization and the social contract

Violent conflict is unlikely to take hold if acountry has a framework of widely-agreedrules, formal and informal, that govern theallocation of resources and the peacefulsettlement of grievances. The idea of a socialcontract as the basis of the modern state canbe traced back to political philosophers likeHobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. A socialcontract does not refer to an explicitcontract, but to a degree of government byconsent, in return for, minimally, theprovision of security. Within a society, socialcontracts can be vertical, if they areauthoritarian in the sense of ThomasHobbes, or horizontal, if fashioned by agreater degree of consent, as advocated byJohn Locke.

What does a good social contract entail?Kant’s (1795)1 essay on the ‘Perpetual Peace’provides us with fundamental clues. First,the expression ‘perpetual’, impliespermanence as opposed to a transient truce.In contemporary language, the expression“self-enforcing” may be used to signify thatthere are no incentives to deviate from the‘peace’. Second, and most crucially, Kantrefers to a ‘republican’ constitution. By thishe means the separation of powers betweenthe executive and the legislature. Theindependence of the judiciary may beadded. Good government lies at the heart of the idea of a social contract. Our

22 African Development Report 2008/2009

1 Although Kant speaks about a perpetual peacebetween nations, his argument can be extended to groupswithin a nation state.

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contemporary understanding of goodgovernance can include a host of otherfactors beyond the separation of powers,such as decentralized decision makingpowers. Third, the stability of the peacedepends on the source of Conflict preven-tion and resolution, and peace buildingstrategies 25 sovereignty or legitimate powerwithin the nation. Kant points out that goodgovernance provided by dictators orabsolute monarchs is inherently unstable asthey or their successors face temptations todeviate from it. The assurance of goodgovernance is therefore more reliable in arepresentative system of government,implying some degree of democracy.

The preceding discussion makes thecase for democracy as the basis of the socialcontract. However, as discussed in Chapter1, democratic institutions are sometimesunable to reduce the risk of conflict onset inAfrican countries. This may undermine thecase for democracy as the basis of the socialcontract.

The recent trend toward multi-partyelectoral regimes is strong and is unlikely tobe stemmed. Democratic institutions seemto somewhat constrain behavior within war,reducing the lethality of conflicts, eventhough they are ineffective in preventingthem. Reversing this trend is neitherdesirable nor feasible. Autocratic regimes,after all, tend to only provide the ‘peace ofthe zoo’ (peace by repression) (Hegre et al., 2001). Thus, the relevant question ishow to create or increase synergies amongthe democratization process, peace, anddevelopment in Africa.

Democratic institutions are chains ofdelegation from a principal (the body of

voters) to agents at various levels — party leaders, MPs, heads of states, and thepublic service. Elections provide the means to formally delegate authority topoliticians and to reassess their performanceat regular intervals, but they do not providea means to monitor the agent betweenelections. Without monitoring devices, theagent can abuse the delegated authority.Moreover, elected officials are put inpositions where they can both manipulatethe outcome of the next election and beempowered to remove the electoralinstitution. Thus, elections alone are notsufficient to ensure a democratic delegationchain.

Elections must be combined withconstraints on the executive. Policies thatencourage elections without safe-guardingconstraints are not likely to have a conflict-reducing effect, and may even increase therisk of conflict. That armed conflicts oftenbreak out during or after elections bearswitness to the enormous value of electedoffice to prospective candidates. Effectiveconstraints on representatives reduce thisvalue and create an environment for healthypolitical competition with considerablylower risks of violence. In mature dem-ocracies, the legislature functions as aninstitutional constraint. But members ofparliament could also abuse their authority.An elected parliament alone is not aguarantee of scrutiny.

Both democratic and non-democraticexecutives can be constrained bystrengthening the following practices andinstitutions:

• Transparency of public budgets andaccounts

Conflict prevention and resolution, and peacebuilding strategies 23


• General auditors capable ofevaluating the state budget andaccounts.

• Subjecting public investment projectsto competitive bidding

• Independent judiciaries• Independent central banks• Rigid constitutions — requirements of

super-majority or referenda to changethem

• Independent electoral commissions.• Decentralization of economic and

political governance to enablewidespread participation and fosterownership of the governance process.Decentralization may also help defusesecessionist pressures.

These constraining institutions are not onlylikely to decrease the incentives for violentcompetition for elected (and non-elected)office, but should also help put in placegrowth-promoting policies that in turnstrengthen the functioning of democraticinstitutions in the long run.

The application of western-typedemocracy may pose special problems inethnically polarized societies like Rwandaand Burundi. In such societies, additionalmeasures are needed to protect minorityrights. In the absence of such guarantees,democracy may lead to abuse andmarginalization of the minority. If theminority is in power, it would be reluctant toallow a democratization process, out of suchfears.

Strengthening neighborhoods

The payoffs to preventing conflicts may bemuch larger than immediately apparent

since violent conflict in one country some-times spreads to neighboring countries. Theevidence reviewed in Chapter 1 alsohighlights the importance of good neighbor-hoods: The risk of armed conflict onset islower where the neighborhood is relativelyrich, democratic, and peaceful. The policyimplication for international actors aiming toreduce the incidence of conflict is not todivert all resources to the most risk-pronestates, but to support the countries that havethe best policies, the highest growth levels,and the best-functioning political systems.The stability and relative wealth of countriessuch as South Africa and Botswana have apotential to ‘spill over’ to neighboringcountries, if not in a fashion as direct as thespread of conflict. Steadfast support of theislands of success may be as important asaddressing the crises that appear.

Regional integration

Violent conflicts in Africa often spill overinto neighboring countries. Furthermore,some countries in Africa have supported, orbeen accused of supporting, rebellion inneighboring countries. Regional integrationwould promote peace and security byeliminating or minimizing these sources ofconflict. It would also reduce mutualsuspicions among countries, therebyreducing the tendency for regional armsraces. Membership incentives could alsohelp prevent or end conflict. For example,the resolution of ongoing conflict was a pre-condition set by the East African Communityfor Burundi’s accession to the regional body.



Conflict resolution andpeacebuilding tools

The following are some of the political andsecurity interventions that have beenimplemented over the years as conflictresolution and peacebuilding measures.

Political interventions

Power-sharing

Power sharing is a tool for conflictprevention, conflict resolution, and peace-building. As a conflict resolution tool, it isusually part of a peace deal. Power sharingcan serve as a carrot for parties opposing agovernment to agree and respect a peacedeal: Every side has a stake in the peace interms of the fruits of office, and maytherefore have some incentive to not deviatefrom it. Success or failure will depend on theindividual parties’ commitment to thestipulations and mechanisms of powersharing — the rules of the game — and thepresence of external mediation andguarantees.

In the longer term, by being inclusive,power sharing may be a preferable form ofdemocracy to a winner-take-all majoritariansystem. Power sharing is not only inclusive,as all minorities are part of government, butit may dampen harmful and potentiallyconflict-producing elite competition. Powersharing, based on a proportionalrepresentation electoral system, could beconsidered superior to the more traditionalWestminster-style majoritarian system, as themajority has to accommodate the minority.This is certainly relevant to Africa with itshigh degree of ethnic diversity. Even incertain Westminster-style governments in

former British colonies, power sharing hasinvolved sharing ministerial positionsamong groups delineated along regional,ethnic, and other identity-based lines.Several factors tend to undermine powersharing in a post-conflict context. First isasymmetric information: Parties to the peacetreaty may have private information abouttheir own strengths and intentions. Somegroups or militias may retain an outsideoption of returning to war by only partiallydisarming. Second, commitment to thetreaty may be incomplete, due to weakdomestic and international anchors. Third,external assistance may be inadequate, thusconstraining reconstruction given the lowrevenue base in post-conflict societies. Thequality of external assistance also matters.Power sharing may also break down ifexternal guarantors are biased, or perceivedas such. Finally, the power sharing deal maybe incomplete and not include all relevantgroups.

Jarstad (2006) argues that power sharingmay not be a panacea as far as sustainingpeace treaties or promoting democraticdevelopment is concerned. First, when thereare valuable resource rents at stake, orterritories over which some groups havecontrol, power sharing may be aninsufficient incentive for some parties tohold to the peace. A group mayopportunistically sign the peace treaty andthen find an excuse to revert to war. This hasbeen painfully demonstrated in Angola.Second, power sharing may not prevent theformation of splinter groups acting asspoilers in the peace process. Certainopportunistic elements may break awayfrom the peace process, hoping to gain



more in the future by a return to conflict.Third, power sharing formulas tend toreward those enamoured of violence, and tomarginalize moderate voices. This not onlyendangers the peace accord, but may alsoretard the future evolution of democracy.Fourth, power sharing may perpetuateethnic polarities in the long term. Fifth,power-sharing could be costly in terms ofeconomic resources. Post-electoral violencein Kenya in early 2008 led to the formationof a Grand Coalition Cabinet. This involvedthe creation of an additional nine ministries,bringing the total to 40, equally splitbetween the two leading parties in theDecember 2007 election. In addition, thereare about fifty assistant ministers. Substantialfinancial resources will be required to runsuch a large power-sharing government.

For all these reasons, power sharingformulas need to be carefully designed. Oneoption is to have temporary power sharingmechanisms that are dismantled later asdemocracy takes root. This was the ideabehind the Arusha peace accords forBurundi: initially parties were to sharepower and later the constitutionapportioned Hutu and Tutsi representation;and Sierra Leone, where the RUF wereinitially part of the government after the1999 Lomé Peace Accord. Second, adecentralized system of government, withseveral layers of political and economicdecision making, may aid a power-sharingarrangement by allowing a greater role forminority groups and groups outside of thecentral government. In this regard, afederalist system, with provinces or states,rather than a unitary system, may be moredesirable. Furthermore, a bicameral rather

than a unicameral legislature would besuperior, as in the United States, with theSenate elected on a different basis to thelower chamber: Each state, however large orsmall, sends two senators, while the Houseof Representatives is elected on the basis ofpopulation. Third, the electoral system,whether proportional or majoritarian,should succeed in returning representativesof different ethnicities. Fourth, care must betaken to ensure that moderate elements arerepresented. It should be noted that a futuredemocratic system may have to take on adifferent configuration to an immediatepost-war power-sharing agreement. Finally,constraints on executive power — notablythrough an independent judiciary — are allimportant in the long-run. Including all ofthese elements in any one power-sharingpackage is virtually impossible, and therelative weight placed on the various factorshas to be judged on a case-by-case basis.

Transitional justice

A number of judicial processes are ofteninstituted at the end of a conflict. Typicalinterventions include international tribunals,criminal prosecutions, and reparations forvictims. Africa has hosted a number ofinitiatives of this kind, such as theInternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone Truth and ReconciliationCommission, the gacaca process(community courts) in Rwanda, and the firstindictments of the International CriminalCourt (ICC) against leaders of armed groupsin Uganda.

In 2002, the ICC was set up in TheHague, the Netherlands, to try crimes



against humanity, war crimes, and the crimeof aggression (although the latter is not yetunder the court’s jurisdiction). The ICCemerged from a UN General Assemblyconference in Rome in 1998. At present, ithas 106 full member states. The court cannotexercise jurisdiction unless the accused is anational of a fully fledged member state; it ismeant to complement existing nationalsystems of justice in handling war crimes.The court’s jurisdiction is unclear whennational reconciliation processes grantamnesties to perpetrators of war crimes. Todate, the court’s activities have beenexclusively focussed on Africa: Uganda, theDemocratic Republic of Congo, the CentralAfrican Republic, and Sudan (Darfur). InUganda, action was brought by thegovernment against the rebel leader ( Joseph Kony) and associates of the Lord’sResistance Army operating in the north.Kony and others continue to demandimmunity from these trials in return forpeace. Critics argue that the writ of the ICCdoes not run universally to cover morepowerful nations, citing the fact that theUnited States seeks immunity for its citizens,despite being a non-member.

The gacaca process in Rwanda involvesa system of community courts. Faced withthe enormity of the genocide, and the largenumber of alleged perpetrators — someestimate that it would take the ordinaryjudicial system 150 years to try all theaccused and the international court inArusha could only try a 100 or so prominentsuspects — the Rwandese authoritiesdelegated part of the system of justice to theindigenous, community based ‘gacaca’method of traditional conflict resolution (see

Graybill and Lanegran, 2004). These wereargued to have three major advantages. First,this system lightens penalties for those whoconfess by halving their sentences. This hasled to speedier procedures and disposal ofcases. Second, apologies are central to theproceedings. Last, and not the least,affordable reparations through contributionsto a community fund and/or communityservice is a cornerstone of ‘gacaca’.Arguably, this system is far more likely toachieve the long-term reconciliationnecessary for lasting peace due to theexplicit acknowledgement of the need forapologies and reparation, and not leastbecause it is a home grown solution to adomestic problem.

Fears have been raised, however, thattransitional justice can undermine peace:The real or perceived threat of prosecutioncan discourage rebel leaders from agreeingto and honouring a peace deal, or ex-combatants from participating in a DDRprogramme. In contrast, supporters say thatwithout justice and the end of impunity,reconciliation would be impossible. Thedemands for justice would have to bebalanced against the risk of prolongedwarfare, as the case of the Lord’s ResistanceArmy suggests.

Truth and reconciliation commissions

The role of truth and reconciliationcommissions can be traced back to theinfluential work of John Paul Lederach(2003). Lederach advocates the pursuit of‘conflict transformation’, as opposed to‘conflict resolution’ or ‘conflictmanagement’. Conflict transformation differsfrom the other two concepts because it



reflects an alternative understanding of thenature of conflict itself. Conflict resolutionimplies that conflict is harmful — hence it issomething that should be ended. It alsoassumes that conflict is a short-termphenomenon that can be resolvedpermanently through mediation or otherintervention processes.

Conflict management assumes thatconflicts are long-term processes that oftencannot be quickly resolved, but the notionof ‘management’ suggests that people canbe directed or controlled as though theywere physical objects. Also, the notion ofmanagement suggests that the goal is toreduce or control the violence, rather than todeal with the real source of the problem.Conflict transformation, according toLederach, ‘is to envision and respond to theebb and flow of social conflict as life-givingopportunities for creating constructivechange processes that reduce violence,increase justice in direct interaction andsocial structure, and respond to real-lifeproblems in human relationships’ (Lederach2003: 14). Reconciliation is therefore partand parcel of conflict transformation. It is along-term process, which needs to be broadand inclusive of individuals andcommunities if success is to be achieved,and its path can be associated with ups anddowns instead of following a linearprogression (see van der Mark, 2007).

Lederach apparently views justice as acentral element of reconciliation and truth asan important ingredient in achieving justice.Reparation is another important input;otherwise, the principle of justice may not be served. The reconciliation processoccurs across several dimensions: legal,

psychological, religious, social, political, andeconomic. Truth and reconciliation com-missions are a mechanism for achievingjustice and, therefore, reconciliation. To besuccessful, the mechanism has to be acrossthe aforementioned dimensions and has towork at the individual as well as communitylevel in addition to functioning at thenational level.

Truth and reconciliation commissions(TRCs) are increasingly being used topromote reconciliation following violentconflict in many parts of Africa, mostfamously in South Africa, but also inRwanda, Sierra Leone, the Central AfricanRepublic, Ghana, Morocco, and Nigeria.TRCs provoke some thorny issues. Shouldthey be part of the judicial process, orshould they only serve as a reconciliationmechanism? Also, should they be combinedwith other processes such as war crimestrials?

Even though reconciliation should inprinciple occur at broad levels, it worksmainly on individuals. Healing can helpachieve national reconciliation, whichunderpins power sharing and long-termdemocratisation, both of which could bestepping stones in peace building.Achieving a common national position onthe events of the past may be helpful, whereall sides assume responsibility for errors andcrimes. Some believe that healing, orreconciliation, cannot be achieved withoutjustice, which in turn requires somepunishment (or at least the acknowledge-ment by those granted amnesties of crimescommitted) and restitution. Restitution hasan important economic dimension — thelivelihoods of both perpetrators and victims



need to be guaranteed. Otherwise,forgiveness may not occur and old woundswill remain festering. Broad-based post-conflict economic recovery is essential.

Peacekeeping

United Nations peacekeeping

The United Nations defines peacekeeping as“a way to help countries torn by conflictcreate conditions for sustainable peace”(www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/). Peace-keeping can achieve this objective byproviding the means to police a peaceagreement, build trust among belligerents,and provide technical and logistical supportfor key transition activities like disarmament,demobilization and integration of combat-ants, and elections. Peace agreementsbetween warring parties are normally notself-enforcing. Peacekeeping provides amonitoring and enforcement mechanism.The first UN peacekeeping mission wasestablished in 1948 to monitor the ArmisticeAgreement between Israel and its Arabneighbours. Since then, there have been 63UN peacekeeping operations around theworld.

Over the years, efforts have been made toadapt UN peacekeeping operations to copewith the evolution of conflicts and the globalpolitical landscape. Born at the time whenCold War rivalries frequently paralyzed theSecurity Council, UN peacekeeping goalswere primarily limited to maintainingceasefires and stabilizing situations on theground, so that political solutions to conflictcould be pursued. UN peacekeepingmissions consisted of military observers andlightly armed troops with monitoring,

reporting, and confidence-building roles insupport of ceasefires and limited peaceagreements. The end of the Cold Warushered in a new context for UN peace-keeping operations. Accordingly, the UNshifted and expanded its field operationsfrom “traditional” missions involving strictlymilitary tasks, to complex “multidimensional”enterprises designed to ensure theimplementation of comprehensive peaceagreements and assist in laying thefoundations for sustainable peace. Today’speacekeepers undertake a wide variety ofcomplex tasks, from helping buildsustainable institutions of governance, tohuman rights monitoring, to security sectorreform, to the disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration of former combatants(www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/).

Originally developed to deal with inter-state conflict, UN peacekeeping has beenincreasingly applied to intra-state conflictsand civil wars in recent years. Although themilitary remain the backbone of mostpeacekeeping operations, peacekeepingpersonnel now include administrators andeconomists, police officers and legalexperts, deminers and electoral observers,human rights monitors and specialists incivil affairs and governance, humanitarianworkers and experts in communications andpublic information (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/).

In 2005, nearly 77 percent of all UNpeacekeeping forces (or 50,000 out of a totalof 65,000) were located in Africa. In terms offinance, African missions accounted forclose to 75 percent of the UN’s peace-keeping budget (US$2.9 billion out ofUS$3.9 billion in 2004–05 (United Nations



Department of Public Information).Furthermore, there have been 54 peace-keeping missions in Africa since 1948. Thismakes the African continent the mostimportant region for UN peacekeeping atthis time.

Multinational peacekeeping missions,including those under the aegis of theUnited Nations, reflect the principle thatpeace is a global public good. This meansthat peace in distant lands is of benefit to thecitizenry of the rest of the world. Themotivations behind the missions may bealtruistic, but strategic factors such asrefugee spillovers and the costs of meetingcomplex humanitarian disasters such asfamines may make peacekeeping serve notonly as a palliative, but also as a preventiveexercise. But the international community’swillingness to pay for such operations inAfrica, mostly by Western tax payers, may belimited. Peacekeeping missions in Africabuttress peace accords, but these missionsare often inadequately funded and manned.

UN peacekeeping has met with variedoutcomes in Africa. The UN and the UnitedStates intervened in Somalia in 1994 in whatproved to be a disastrous mission. The U.S.forces withdrew in late 1993, after a botchedmilitary operation left 18 U.S. troops dead. Asecond UN mission withdrew in 1995. InRwanda, UN peacekeepers were unable to prevent the genocide in 1994 that claimed 800000 lives. In Sierra Leone, UNpeacekeepers were overrun by the rebelRevolutionary United Front (RUF), whoused the peacekeepers’ weapons to try tomarch on the capital in 2000. However,following British intervention, the UNpeacekeepers later helped maintain the

peace and conduct elections in 2002. InDarfur, the UN mission has been hamperedby lack of logistics to cover an area the sizeof France and Sudanese Governmentobjections that it prefers an African Unionforce. UN peacekeepers helped conductelections in Liberia in 2005 and in the DRCin 2006.

Several issues confront peacekeeping asa tool for conflict resolution and peace-building. The first is funding and logistics,and the often restrictive mandates thatcircumscribe the role of peacekeepers.Second, the presence of UN peacekeepers isnormally subject to the consent of the hostcountry government. This means thatwhenever a government does not approve,peacekeeping effectively ceases to be anoption for resolving a conflict. Third,peacekeeping pre-supposes that a peaceexists that should be kept. Thus, peace-keeping by itself does not resolve a conflict.It can only be used when some sort of peacedeal has been struck. Fourth, the appro-priate time horizon for peacekeepers to stay in a country is debatable. Over the long term, peacekeepers may come to beperceived as an occupying force. Fifth,peacekeeping usually occurs in large-scaleconflicts that assume a national dimension.Peacekeeping operations have not beenassociated with lower intensity, localizedconflicts.

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) is one of thefew empirical studies on peacekeeping. Theauthors use a dataset of 124 post-world warII civil wars and find that “multilateral,United Nations peace operations make apositive difference”. However, the results ofempirical studies on conflict issues tend to



be fragile and highly contested. Furtherwork is therefore needed to provide anempirical basis for policy conclusions andrecommendations.

Peacekeeping by African institutions

African organisations have also been involvedin managing the continent’s security crises inrecent years (see Boxes 3.1 and 3.2). Onbehalf of the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity, former President Mbeki of SouthAfrica mediated between the Government ofZimbabwe and the opposition to resolve thecountry’s political and economic crises. TheAfrican Union and the UN are deploying ajoint peacekeeping mission to Darfur, Sudan.The Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS) sent peacekeeping or

peace enforcement troops to SierraLeone and Liberia. However, lack of financeand logistics have often hampered regionalpeacekeeping operations.

Disarmament, demobilization, and

reintegration

Disarmament, demobilization, and reinte-gration (DDR) is an early step in thetransition from war to peace. The overallobjective is to prevent the resumption ofarmed conflict by dismantling rebel forces’fighting capacity, and helping combatants toreturn to “normal” civilian life and to earn aliving by peaceful means instead of war.DDR consists of three closely-relatedphases. Disarmament, the first phase, isprimarily a military operation concernedwith managing arms and ammunition. Itinvolves the collection, control, and disposalof arms and weapons. Disarmament offersphysical evidence of the warring parties’


Box 3.1: Lessons from the Economic

Community of West African States

(ECOWAS)

The fifteen-member Economic Community of

West African States (ECOWAS) has been

spearheading conflict resolution efforts in the

region. Nigeria has been the key player. Finance

has been a major challenge, with Nigeria

meeting the bulk of the costs. Final estimates for

the cost of Nigerian participation in the

intervention in Liberia were between 4 and 10

billion US dollars.

A key lesson from ECOWAS conflict resolu-

tion and peacebuilding efforts is that there is

need to collaborate with other stakeholders,

notably, the UN. The synergy of ECOWAS and

UN efforts has generated considerable

dividends with the strength of each institution

fully exploited while its constraints are mitigated.

Thus, ECOWAS capacity for rapid troop deploy-

ment is utilized in situations where the UN on its

own would not be able to act quickly due to the

time involved in obtaining the requisite mandate.

Once the mandate has been obtained, the UN

then reinforces the initial ECOWAS troop

deployment which otherwise might not be

sustainable due to ECOWAS limited resources.

Such collaboration was instrumental in the

interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote

d’Ivoire.

One weakness of ECOWAS is that it has not

built its capability to address the root causes of

conflict in its member states. Even though its

early warning system could forecast potential

crisis in member states, ECOWAS capability to

confront and resolve the root causes of these

crises is severely limited.



Box 3.2: Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region

The Great Lakes Region comprising the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania

and Uganda, has seen a number of prolonged conflicts, prompting several peace efforts. The Arusha

Peace Agreement for Rwanda, signed in 1993, was mediated by Tanzania, in conjunction with the then

Organization of African Unity (now African Union) and France, Belgium and the United States.

However, the Accord was unable to prevent the outbreak of violence in Rwanda in 1994.

Regional and international peace efforts have also been undertaken for the Democratic Republic of

Congo. In 1999, the country and neighbouring countries signed the Lusaka Peace Agreement, an

initiative by President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, acting on behalf of the then Organization of African

Unity (African Union) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, the

agreement did not bring peace to all parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Subsequently, the

government negotiated other peace deals with rebel groups with the help of the international

community. The UN has now deployed its 23000-strong largest ever peacekeeping mission in the

country.

Burundi is a good example of international cooperation in conflict resolution. The late Julius Nyerere,

former president of Tanzania at the time, and then Nelson Mandela, were the main mediators in the

country’s peace process in the 1990s and early 2000s. Subsequently, regional member countries —

with the support of the African Union and the UN — set up a Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi. The

Regional Initiative led to a peace accord with the government and the main rebel groups, and the

holding of elections in 2005. The international community — UN, EU and bilateral donors — financed

the peace process and provided peacekeepers. The African Union provided the African Union Mission

for Burundi (MIAB) with a large South African contingent. This was followed by the United Nations

Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The UN Peacebuilding Commission, set up in 2005 to support peace

efforts in countries emerging from conflict, has chosen Burundi (together with Sierra Leone) as its first

two countries to support.

The peace process in the Great Lakes Region offers many lessons, notably, the need for a regional

approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, given the porosity of national borders, and the inter-

connections of conflicts in the region. Another important lesson is the need for coordination of external

efforts. Ambassador Ould Abdallah, the UN Special Envoy in the Great Lakes Region, 1993–95,

claimed that the proliferation of mediators, of which 13 existed during his tenure in Burundi, contributed

to delaying agreement among the protagonists (Daley, 2006).


submission to a political process.Confidence building is essential todisarmament. Throughout the 1990s, forexample, the Governments of Niger andMali invested in symbolic post-conflictdisarmament interventions such as weaponsdestruction ceremonies. Likewise, thecreation of verification mechanisms as partof DDR interventions — including the publicdestruction of arms — helps build confid-ence between former warring parties andcivil society, and rebuild governmentlegitimacy. Small arms collection anddestruction — as pursued by Mozambique,Sierra Leone, Liberia, Republic of Congo,Côte d’Ivoire, and other countries acrossAfrica — seemed to offer an importantsymbolic commitment to peace. Notably, inCôte d’Ivoire in 2004 Prime Minister SeydouDiarra handed over his arms as part of theDDR process. Arms destruction also servesto prevent recirculation. In Mozambique andNamibia, arms continued to be purchasedon the black market and turned up in violentcrime in South Africa (Dzinesa 2007). Theporousness of national boundaries imposesa need for regional coordination to minimizespill over effects: Disarmament couldstimulate cross-border trade and trafficking.

Demobilization, the second phase, is ashort-term process designed to reduce thesize of the armed forces and to dismantleother informal groups through downsizingand complete disbandment. It ordinarilyinvolves assembly, quartering, administra-tion, and some form of discharge package.

Reintegration, the final phase, isdesigned to assist former combatants andtheir dependants resettle. It may includereinsertion (cash) payments, household

material, land allocation, training, inputs,school fees, counselling, advisory support,credit schemes, job placements, and healthsupport and referral services.

Challenges of reintegration

The challenges accompanying reintegrationinto state security structures and productivecivilian livelihoods are formidable. Securityservices are often in dire need of reform — they may have been politicized andpolarized during wartime. In the absence ofreform, ex-combatants may find re-integration into the security forces especiallydifficult. With or without reform, integratedex-combatants are often disillusioned withtheir new role and dissatisfied with theirattributed rank.

Likewise, the social and economicabsorptive capacities of cities, villages, andfarming areas to which ex-combatantsreturn may also be seriously eroded bydecades of conflict. The lack of adequatephysical and human capital to successfullyreintegrate is likely to induce frustration anddissatisfaction, and raise the risk of resortingto alternative (violent) means to securelivelihoods. Another issue is potentialtensions when target groups receiveassistance but the local communities intowhich they are being reintegrated (who arealso often needy) do not. In some cases,recognition of this problem has led to effortsto provide benefits to receiving communitiesas well as to reintegrees.

DDR planners and practitioners in Africaface a host of bureaucratic challenges. Theserelate in large part to the appropriatesequencing of interventions and the creationof ex post linkages to ongoing post-conflict



recovery and development programmes.Administrative and financial hurdles some-times accompany large-scale regional DDRprogrammes. The sheer number ofinternational and national stakeholdersinvolved in DDR programmes can frustrate acoherent and coordinated approach andover-burden African governments withinstitutional matters like reporting require-ments. Likewise, enormous logisticalchallenges arise in disbursing reinsertionbenefits through local banks, trackingbeneficiaries, and measuring effectiveness.

The pursuit of economic reform couldalso raise tensions with a DDR programme.In Ethiopia, the transition from the com-munist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam toa market economy led to widespreadretrenchment in the public sector and to adampening of labour market opportunities.This took place at a time when newlydemobilized ex-combatants were enteringthe labor market — reducing the prospectsfor success (Ayalew et al 1999). In certaincases, the UN and the World Bank havesupported Quick Impact Projects to ease thetransition from DDR to longer-termdevelopment, but these are seldom morethan ‘stop-gap’ measures.

There are also fiscal challenges. Peaceagreements often provide for integration ofrebels into the national army, leading to apotential trade-off between two balances:fiscal balance and peace achieved throughpower balance.

For conflicts resolved by negotiation, astrong peace agreement with firm com-mitment to its terms is required to facilitateDDR. When the peace agreement is weak,or commitment to its terms uneven, former

combatants, particularly those still remain-ing in their existing command structures,can assume a spoiler function, as dem-onstrated repeatedly during Sierra Leone’shalting peace process. Also, theknowledgethat demobilization reduces or eliminates its capacity to fight may induce non-cooperative behaviour on the part of therebel movement.

When former combatants are too hastilydemobilised, as occurred immediatelyfollowing Angola’s civil war, they can alsotrigger new waves of violence in commun-ities of return. Combined with an unevencommitment to the terms of the peaceagreement, poorly constructed demobilisa-tion efforts twice contributed to theresumption of armed violence between theMPLA and UNITA in the 1990s. Unlessadequate provisions for meaningful reinte-gration are established at the outset — evenbefore DDR is initiated — premature andpoorly implemented demobilisation canprove counter-productive, even dangerous.A hasty demobilization process may leavecommand and control structures intact whilecantonment itself can reinforce commandstructures.

Disarmament, demobilization, and

reintegration outcomes

A growing body of evidence suggests that DDR is less effective at minimisingarmed violence or promoting sustainablereintegration than expected (Humphreys andWeinstein, 2007; Blattman and Annan, 2008;Pugel, (2008); and Paris, (2004). Box 3.1highlights a study on Sierra Leone. It has alsobeen recognised that some disarmamentprocesses tend to be partial, reducing the



overall stock of illegal arms in circulationonly marginally (Small Arms Survey 2005).

Leone with plaudits for a successful DDRprogramme that paved the way for a stablepost-war political order following a brutalcivil war that lasted from 1991 to 2002.However, there is some empirical evidencethat the reintegration component of the DDRprogramme may not have been that success-ful. Drawing on data from a survey of 1,043combatants from the five warring factions inSierra Leone’s civil war, Humphreys andWeinstein (2008) sought to identify theimpacts of DDR, particularly in relation to‘effective’ reintegration. Their strategy was tocompare reintegration success rates betweenthose that entered and those that did notenter the DDR programme. Four distinctoutcome measures were used to test thedifferent ‘dimensions’ of reintegration: (i) access to employment, (ii) the extent towhich fighters maintain ties with theirfactions, (iii) trust in democratic processes,and (iv) the combatants’ belief that they areaccepted by family and community members.The study found no discernible evidence thatparticipation in DDR programmes actuallyfacilitated reintegration.

Northern Uganda is an unusual butimportant place to evaluate the impact ofchild and youth soldiering and the meaningof reintegration. Tens of thousands ofcivilians were forcibly recruited by the rebelLord’s Resistance Army, LRA, during morethan two decades of war — two-thirds ofthem children under the age of 18. A modestnumber of early LRA recruits werevolunteers (many of whom became seniorcommanders in the force) and only ahandful of them returned from the bush.


Box 3.3: DDR in Sierra Leone:

successful reintegration?

The international community showered Sierra

Leone with plaudits for a successful DDR

programme that paved the way for a stable

post-war political order following a brutal civil

war that lasted from 1991 to 2002. However,

there is some empirical evidence that the

reintegration component of the DDR pro-

gramme may not have been that successful.

Drawing on data from a survey of 1,043

combatants from the five warring factions in

Sierra Leone’s civil war, Humphreys and

Weinstein (2008) sought to identify the

impacts of DDR, particularly in relation to

‘effective’ reintegration. Their strategy was to

compare reintegration success rates between

those that entered and those that did not

enter the DDR programme. Four distinct

outcome measures were used to test

the different ‘dimensions’ of reintegration:

(i) access to employment, (ii) the extent to

which fighters maintain ties with their factions,

(iii) trust in democratic processes, and (iv) the

combatants’ belief that they are accepted by

family and community members. The study

found no discernible evidence that participa-

tion in DDR programmes actually facilitated

reintegration.

Source: Humphreys and Weinstein (2007)



Box 3.4: DDR for children: the Uganda case

Northern Uganda is an unusual but important place to evaluate the impact of child and youth soldiering and

the meaning of reintegration. Tens of thousands of civilians were forcibly recruited by the rebel Lord’s

Resistance Army, LRA, during more than two decades of war — two-thirds of them children under the age

of 18. A modest number of early LRA recruits were volunteers (many of whom became senior commanders

in the force) and only a handful of them returned from the bush. Thus, virtually all ex-combatants in this

region are former abductees, and DDR programmes have focused on the reception and return of children

and youth escaping from abduction.

To investigate the effectiveness of DDR for children, Blattman and Annan (2008) conducted a large-scale

representative survey of nearly 1,000 households, including nearly 500 former abductees. The findings

suggest the need for a shift in conventional understanding of the impacts of war on children and youth and

a change in the approach to their post-conflict reintegration. In contrast to the predominant focus among

NGOs on reuniting families and providing ‘psychosocial’ care — activities to minimize mental ‘traumatisation’

and social dislocation — the evidence suggests comparatively little broad-based psychological

traumatisation or aggression among former abductees, child or adult. Rather, indications of disabling

symptoms of distress are concentrated in a relative minority, especially those that experienced the most

severe violence and those who returned to the least supportive family environments. The main impact of war

appears to be substantially lower education, diminished productivity, and increased poverty and inequality,

largely due to time away rather than to trauma. The impacts are greatest for children, who are more likely

to have had schooling interrupted.

The consequences of these human capital losses for post-conflict redevelopment are substantial. With

so many young people affected, and since lost education and experience take time to re-accumulate, if ever,

the level and growth rate of income in northern Uganda will be depressed for decades to come. Such

evidence suggests a shift in reintegration programming towards closing the education and economic gap.

For aid policy, the main lesson learned is the need to shift to a more targeted approach to psychosocial

support for the most affected, and an increased investment in programmes that promote secondary

schooling, enterprise development, and adult learning. For the Government of Uganda, the evidence

supports continued emphasis on broad post-conflict youth programmes, but caution regarding the late and

potentially damaging roll-out of the official DDR program.

Source: Blattman and Annan (2008)


Thus, virtually all ex-combatants in thisregion are former abductees, and DDRprogrammes have focused on the receptionand return of children and youth escapingfrom abduction.

To investigate the effectiveness of DDRfor children, Blattman and Annan (2008)conducted a large-scale representativesurvey of nearly 1,000 households, includingnearly 500 former abductees. The findingssuggest the need for a shift in conventionalunderstanding of the impacts of war onchildren and youth and a change in theapproach to their post-conflict reintegration.In contrast to the predominant focus amongNGOs on reuniting families and providing‘psychosocial’ care — activities to minimizemental ‘traumatisation’ and socialdislocation — the evidence suggestscomparatively little broad-based psychol-ogical traumatisation or aggression amongformer abductees, child or adult. Rather,indications of disabling symptoms of distressare concentrated in a relative minority,especially those that experienced the mostsevere violence and those who returned tothe least supportive family environments.The main impact of war appears to besubstantially lower education, diminishedproductivity, and increased poverty andinequality, largely due to time away ratherthan to trauma. The impacts are greatest forchildren, who are more likely to have hadschooling interrupted.

The consequences of these human capitallosses for post-conflict redevelopment aresubstantial. With so many young peopleaffected, and since lost education andexperience take time to re-accumulate, ifever, the level and growth rate of income in

northern Uganda will be depressed fordecades to come. Such evidence suggests ashift in reintegration programming towardsclosing the education and economic gap. Foraid policy, the main lesson learned is theneed to shift to a more targeted approach topsychosocial support for the most affected,and an increased investment in programmesthat promote secondary schooling, enterprisedevelopment, and adult learning. For theGovernment of Uganda, the evidencesupports continued emphasis on broad post-conflict youth programmes, but cautionregarding the late and potentially damagingroll-out of the official DDR program.

The Nigerian Government has launcheda number of disarmament efforts in thecountry over the last several decades. Manyof these have taken place in the Delta region— a conflict involving non-state actors —but none has proven particularly successful.Between 1997 and 1999, for example, the Delta State Government initiated adisarmament programme for the warringethnic factions from the Ijaw, Urhobo, andItsekiri ethnic groups, while the governor ofWarri offered cash, short-term training andemployment to militant youths to give uptheir weapons. These initiatives failed tosignificantly reduce the number of arms incirculation or to yield measurable reductionsin violence.

In July 2004, the governor of Rivers Stateinitiated a disarmament programme toaddress the escalating violence in the NigerDelta. This programme never took hold andrenewed fighting between heavily armedmilitant groups led to the intervention of theFederal Government. By October 2004, thenPresident Olusegun Obasanjo negotiated a



temporary end to the violence, leading tothe establishment of an atypical ‘peacetime’DDR programme. The key elementpreventing real progress on this initiativewas the lack of attention to reintegrationefforts and opportunities for former militantsto earn gainful employment.

The failure of this process left manyarmed groups distrustful of the governmentand of its motives and apprehensive aboutany future disarmament initiatives. Thisshadow continues to hang over ongoinggovernment efforts to resolve the crisis inthe Delta. Even so, most armed groupmembers have expressed a willingness toleave militia activities if they are provided

with employment opportunities and securityis restored to the region. This revealspositive prospects for future disarmamentcampaigns, but participation will be heavilydependent on improving crediblecommunity stability and creating viableeconomic alternatives to earning a livingthrough violence.

Small arms control

Small arms are the preferred weapons ofgangs, individual criminals, and armedgroups opposing the state. A modestnumber of small arms in the hands of smallnumbers of people can yield devastatingoutcomes. Consequently, small arms control


Box 3.5: Disarmament without gainful employment in the Niger Delta

The Nigerian Government has launched a number of disarmament efforts in the country over the last several

decades. Many of these have taken place in the Delta region — a conflict involving non-state actors — but

none has proven particularly successful. Between 1997 and 1999, for example, the Delta State Government

initiated a disarmament programme for the warring ethnic factions from the Ijaw, Urhobo, and Itsekiri ethnic

groups, while the governor of Warri offered cash, short-term training and employment to militant youths to

give up their weapons. These initiatives failed to significantly reduce the number of arms in circulation or to

yield measurable reductions in violence.

In July 2004, the governor of Rivers State initiated a disarmament programme to address the escalating

violence in the Niger Delta. This programme never took hold and renewed fighting between heavily armed

militant groups led to the intervention of the Federal Government. By October 2004, then President Olusegun

Obasanjo negotiated a temporary end to the violence, leading to the establishment of an atypical

‘peacetime’ DDR programme. The key element preventing real progress on this initiative was the lack of

attention to reintegration efforts and opportunities for former militants to earn gainful employment.

The failure of this process left many armed groups distrustful of the government and of its motives and

apprehensive about any future disarmament initiatives. This shadow continues to hang over ongoing

government efforts to resolve the crisis in the Delta. Even so, most armed group members have expressed

a willingness to leave militia activities if they are provided with employment opportunities and security is

restored to the region. This reveals positive prospects for future disarmament campaigns, but participation

will be heavily dependent on improving credible community stability and creating viable economic

alternatives to earning a living through violence.

Source: Hazen (2007)


programs are usually organized at the end ofa violent conflict with the objective ofretrieving arms and ammunition — oftenthrough the use of a combination ofvoluntary and forcible measures. In order tosupport ‘local ownership’ of such processes,specially-created national DDR or disarma-ment commissions and ‘national focalpoints’ are sometimes established to see theprocess through. The emphasis has some-times been on demonstrating rapid andvisible results. Thus, carefully arranged rowsof hardware and cantoned ex-combatantsare sometimes regarded as more convincingexpressions of progress than demonstratedreductions in real and perceived insecurity.

The narrow spectrum approach toaddressing arms availability and armedgroups remains dominant. The emphasis of peace-support operations and of African governments on containing cross-border arms trafficking and on forcibledisarmament is well-documented (SmallArms Survey 2005). It is also widely recog-nised that (targeted) arms embargoes,sanctions, and border patrols, while allvisible expressions of action, can onlypartially contain the vast surplus ofweaponry already in circulation. Despitegrowing attention on security sectorreforms, small arms and munitions contin-ued to be frequently leaked from poorlysafeguarded state armouries and securityforces, as has been documented in Uganda,Congo, and Angola (See, for example,Nichols and Muggah, 2007, and Muggah,2004, for a review of DDR programmes inthe Republic of Congo). Thus, even whenthe tap is turned off through reductions inimports and enhanced border patrols, the

sink is still brimming with legal and illegalweaponry.

Arms and ammunition are not onlyproduced and transferred from western andeastern countries to the Global South. Sincethe end of the Cold War, manufacturingcapacities have expanded to more than 90countries (Small Arms Survey 2007, 2006).While considerable transfers from NorthAmerica, Western, and Eastern Europe, andAsia persist, military- and civilian-gradeweapons are being produced in Africa fordomestic consumption (Small Arms Survey2007, 2006). Several North African countries,together with South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria,Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda,harbour arms and ammunition productioncapacities. Containing arms availabilityincreasingly has as much to do withregulating and reducing domestic produc-tion and circulation, as with dealing with theinternational trade. Increasingly, weaponsare made in Africa.

The circulation of foreign-producedarms encompasses more than aninternational black market run by nefariousarms dealers. Arms are transferred in manyways, including through legal inter-statetrade, illegal and covert internationaltransfers, shipments between states andarmed groups, illegal cross-border anddomestic trafficking, transfers betweenarmed groups and civilian recirculation inlocal informal markets. Throughout theprocess, a host of intermediaries — fromarms dealers, shipping companies, andcorrupt officials are implicated withweapons traveling by air, road and sea.Factors that appear to statistically shapeillegal arms markets include the extent of



trade barriers, the porosity of internationalborders, and domestic policing capacities(Killicoat 2007).

Small arms control has become a priorityfor some post-conflict African governments.Since the mid-1990s, considerable diplomaticenergy has been devoted to elaborating inter-national and regional frameworks to controlsmall arms proliferation and trafficking acrossAfrica. These initiatives were motivated byrising international concern with thetransnational implications of arms circulation— particularly from developed countries toAfrica. They were also inspired by attemptsto contain spiralling rates of conflict andcrime across the continent. By investing inenhanced information-sharing, forensicsgathering, and practical cooperation acrossthe continent, it was expected that armstrafficking could be curbed. Africaninstitutions such as the Organisation ofAfrican States (now the African Union), theEconomic Community for West African States(ECOWAS), and the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC) elaboratedpractical export and import control andcollection initiatives alongside the EU, theOrganisation of American States (OAS), thePacific Islands Forum (PIF), the League ofArab States, and many other organizations.

Many international instruments andagreements relating to arms control areavailable to help shape dialogue withnational partners, and facilitate coordinatedand responsible action (see Table 3.1).These measures have established importantprecedents for, inter alia, weaponsmanufacturing controls, regulation ofcivilian possession, stockpile managementand security, transfer controls, marking and

record-keeping and tracing (See www.smallarmsurvey.org for a review ofinternational and regional measures andcorresponding texts). While many commit-ments are not legally-binding per se, they dooffer vital entry-points for enhancinginternational and regional cooperation tosupport stability and security.

Increasingly, regional initiatives arebeing adopted to stem the flow of new armsto and within Africa. These included effortsby ECOWAS, initiated by Mali in 1993. Otherinitiatives include the SADC Protocol tocontrol arms. In 2004, eleven countries inthe Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa alsosigned the Nairobi Protocol for thePrevention, Control and Reduction of SmallArms and Light Weapons — the first suchbinding agreement in the region. Together,these efforts seek to promote the preventionof criminal and conflict violence by elimin-ating civilian ownership of automatic andsemi-automatic rifles, introducing sanctionsfor unlicensed possession and promoting


Table 3.1: Some small arms control

instruments

Global Africa

UN Firearms Protocol ECOWAS Moratorium

(2001) (1998, 1999)

UN Programme of Bamako Declaration

Action (2001) (2000)

Wassenaar Arrangement SADC Firearms

(2004; 2002) Protocol (2001)

Ottawa Treaty on Nairobi Protocol

Landmines (1997) (2004)


controls on manufacturing, import, export,transit and transfer of arms.

Operation Rachel was launched in 1995as a joint operation by the police forces ofSouth Africa and Mozambique to preventand reduce criminal violence. The primaryobjective was to target arms — particularlymilitary-style weapons — availability acrossseveral Southern African countries. Since1996, the police forces of South Africa andMozambique worked together to identifyand destroy arms caches still buried inMozambique following the country’s civilwar (Dzinesa, 2007, and Chachua, 1999).

Operation Rachel specifically aimed toprevent weaponry from falling into thehands of smugglers/ traffickers who directthem to lucrative underground markets,where they are used to perpetrate violentcrime. It also included initiatives to removeand destroy unstable explosive devices andmaterial from these caches, therebypreventing injury to innocent civilians(women and children) in the vicinity.

The intervention was a stunning success.Operation Rachel collected and destroyedsome 21,600 firearms, 1,610 anti-personnellandmines, and 5.1 million rounds of


Box 3.6: Operation Rachel: successful regional arms control in Southern Africa?

Operation Rachel was launched in 1995 as a joint operation by the police forces of South Africa and

Mozambique to prevent and reduce criminal violence. The primary objective was to target arms —

particularly military-style weapons — availability across several Southern African countries. Since 1996, the

police forces of South Africa and Mozambique worked together to identify and destroy arms caches still

buried in Mozambique following the country’s civil war (Dzinesa, 2007, and Chachua, 1999).

Operation Rachel specifically aimed to prevent weaponry from falling into the hands of smugglers/

traffickers who direct them to lucrative underground markets, where they are used to perpetrate violent

crime. It also included initiatives to remove and destroy unstable explosive devices and material from these

caches, thereby preventing injury to innocent civilians (women and children) in the vicinity.

The intervention was a stunning success. Operation Rachel collected and destroyed some 21,600

firearms, 1,610 anti-personnel landmines, and 5.1 million rounds of ammunition between 1995 and 2005. In

2006, more than 3,060 small arms and light weapons, 105 missiles, 75,000 firearm magazines, and 300,000

rounds of small arms ammunition were gathered with more than 95 per cent in good working condition. South

Africa’s 2005 report to the 11th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice stated

that “Operation Rachel has had a positive impact on the stability of South Africa, Mozambique and the

Southern African region”.

Operation Rachel’s success is attributed in part to a high degree of co-operation and intelligence-sharing

between states and a culture of learning and adaptation that occurred between the Mozambique and South

African police forces over successive operations. This translated into consistently well-planned and

executed interventions. Other SADC member states that are strong candidates for similar initiatives are

Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (given their recent peace processes and the number of arms

caches that are presumed to be located in these two countries), as well as Tanzania and Zambia.

Source: Stott and van der Merwe (2007).


ammunition between 1995 and 2005. In2006, more than 3,060 small arms and lightweapons, 105 missiles, 75,000 firearmmagazines, and 300,000 rounds of smallarms ammunition were gathered with morethan 95 per cent in good working condition.South Africa’s 2005 report to the 11th UnitedNations Congress on Crime Prevention andCriminal Justice stated that “OperationRachel has had a positive impact on thestability of South Africa, Mozambique andthe Southern African region”.

Operation Rachel’s success is attributedin part to a high degree of co-operation andintelligence-sharing between states and aculture of learning and adaptation thatoccurred between the Mozambique andSouth African police forces over successiveoperations. This translated into consistentlywell-planned and executed interventions.Other SADC member states that are strongcandidates for similar initiatives are Angolaand the Democratic Republic of Congo(given their recent peace processes and thenumber of arms caches that are presumed tobe located in these two countries), as well asTanzania and Zambia.

Recommendations

Disarmament, demobilization, and reinte-gration; and small arms control are closelyrelated activities. The following measuresare recommended to enhance theireffectiveness:

Adopt people-centered benchmarks of DDRand small arms control ‘success’: Untilcomparatively recently, conventional DDRand small arms control programs empha-sized measurable output indicators such as

the number of arms collected, combatantsdemobilized and funds disbursed. Asimportant as these metrics are, they are notthe same as effectiveness outcomes orimpacts. Development policy makers andpractitioners should be encouraged todevelop more effective ‘success’ bench-marks, including indicators tailored tomeasuring changes in real and perceivedsafety and security.

Ensure adequate human and capitalinvestment in DDR, particularly reintegra-tion: While considerable attention is devotedto disarmament and demobilization, thereneeds to be renewed engagement with‘reintegration’. There is a pressing need tomove beyond a narrow interpretation ofreintegration as consisting of economicwellbeing to one that takes into account itspolitical, social, and psychological dimen-sions. Likewise, there is a critical need forAfrican governments and donors to invest inlonger-term reintegration. Too often, supporttails off shortly after reinsertion benefits areprovided to ex-combatants and their depend-ents. Likewise, reintegration efforts are noteffectively linked with parallel reconstructionprocesses. Ensuring that the developmentsectors effectively aligns interventions with‘reintegration’ priorities is an important, ifchallenging, enterprise.

Enhance linkages between DDR and securitysector reforms: There is an obvious need formore cooperation in the planning andimplementation of synergies between DDRand SSR. DDR is unlikely to be effectivewithout an accountable and functionalsecurity sector. In the absence of security



guarantees or of legitimate security entities,it is unlikely that combatants or civilians willlay down their arms. Moreover, without aneffective SSR strategy, there will be fewoptions for qualified ex-combatants to playa role in new security institutions.

Adopt regional and localized approaches toDDR, SSR and arms control: While Africangovernments should be able and willing toplay a central role in overseeing DDR, SSR,and arms control at the national level, it isimportant to focus on both the regional andlocal dimensions of security.

Conclusion

The prevention of violent conflict in Africaremains an important challenge, given theprevalence of conflict risk factors. Thechallenge requires a range of measures relat-ing to economic management, politicalparticipation, and regional integration.Equitable economic growth is needed to

empower the poor and raise living stand-ards. Care should be taken to ensure thatcommunities in which natural resources arelocated are the primary beneficiaries of theexploitation of the resources. Regionalintegration will reduce regional tensions andarms races.

Conflict resolution and peace buildingalso face numerous challenges that ofteninvolve costs and trade-offs. The relativemerits of the various measures have to becarefully analyzed and balanced, takingindividual context into account. As withconflict prevention, the need for a regionalapproach is paramount. However, thedecline in violent conflict in Africa in recentyears suggests that conflict resolution effortsare achieving some measure of success. Thisneeds to be consolidated to end theremaining conflicts in Africa. Furthermore,the decline reinforces the need for peace-building to ensure that the gains are notreversed.



chapter 3 conﬂict prevention and resolution, and

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