chapter 003-_p30_legal fiction - persona designata

8/14/2019 Chapter 003-_p30_LEGAL FICTION - Persona Designata

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Page 1 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 1

A book about the validity of the High Courts 14-11-2006 decisionISBN 978-0 -9751760-6-1 (Book-CD), 978-0-9751760-7-8 (Book-B&W), 978-0-9751760-8-5 (Book-Colour)

PLEASE NOTE: You may order, any of the published books, by facsimile 0011-61-3-94577209 E- [email protected]

Chapter 003 LEGAL FICTION - persona designata* Gary, I like this, Chapter as you are basically saying to people they are not living in the REAL

world but in a FICTIONAL world, is that it?

**#** INSPECTOR-RIKATI, that is right. Australians really havent got a clue what they are as

nationals and are easily led by the nose, so to say. Not particularly a good example!

As I stated in A LETTER TO YOU DOCUMENT;

It should be kept in mind that the High Court of Australia in Sue v Hill was not sitting as aCourt of law, but rather sitting, acting as personae designatae, as a Court of Disputed

Returns on behalf of the Federal Parliament, and as such its Sue v Hill ruling was bias, and in

my view absolutely worthless!

Here we have High Court of Australia judges dealing with a case for and on behalf of the Federal

Parliament making declarations which somehow binds the High Court of Australia as a Court oflaw where any such kind of declaration would have been considered utter and sheer nonsense. Sue v

Hill, was not a normal case litigated before a Court of law and should never as such have been

given any credibility. It basically was a political case and judges of the High Court of Australia

would have done better to avoid such controversy as I view a gross abuse of their positions. I view,

that if they had claimed the same in sitting as a Court of law, and so to say, they might well havemade themselves the laughing stock.Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and 278

The oath of a justice of this court is ' to do right to all manner of people according to law' Our sworn

duty is to the law itself and to the organic nature of the constitution first of all. If, then, we find the law tobe plainly in conflict with what we or any of our predecessors errornously thought it to be, we have, as I

conceive no right to choose between giving effect to the law, and maintaining an incorrect interpretation,It is not, in my opinion, better that the court should be persistently wrong than that it should be ultimately right.

In Preston Ice and Cool Stores Pty Ltd. v. Hawkings (1955) V.L.R. 89; (1955) Austin Digest 337.It was held that where there is a review/appeal the party having sought such review/appeal is not bound by the

grounds used in the original hearing but may refer to other grounds even so, such grounds had not been uponwhich the original order was based.

The High Court of Australia rather then to accept, as was admitted by the Australian governmentSolicitors, that a Section 75(v) of the Constitution application for a Mandamus/Prohibition was

appealable directly to the High Court of Australia blatantly disregard this. By this making a

mockery of the appeal rights provided for by the Framers of the Constitution. By this the judges

having taken upon themselves to be above the Constitution!

8. That as to your issue that the injunction no longer would have any validity I urge the

court to consider the following of the 2 November 2001 transcript at pages 8 and 9;

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA; Im not necessarily, at the moment, disputing the election. Im disputing thewrits.

HIS HONOUR; I understand.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA: So thats different, sir. At least nobody say Im crying sour grapes for not winning

whatever an election ---

HIS HONOUR; Because you havent lost yet.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA; Thats right. I havent lost yet. Im doing before it.

As such, the issue before the Court was one that I contested the validity of the writs, which

obviously had the flow on that I disputed the validity of the purported election to be held.


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The criteria of the challenge of the Writs is not defeated by purported elections held as if the writs

are defective and of no effect then any of the purported elections held are as if they never occurred.

As the ADDRESS TO THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA stated;13. That for example, to show how the delay in publication effect not only the Proclamations relating to the

election, but generally undermines the publications of the Courts, the Notices required by law withStatutory requirements of a minimum days and Acts to come into force the following is referred to:

(a) The Government Notices Gazette GN41 dated 17 October but published on 18 October 2001 or

later, includes a document numbered 9620598 that is of the Governor-General of a 8 October2001 signed Proclamation to commence on 17 October 2001 under subsection 2(1) of the

Parliamentary Service Amendment Act 2001, fix 17 October 200 as the day on which that Actcommences. As such, it is to commence 1 day before it is actually published in the State of

Victoria (or other States up to 6 days before it was published, Tasmania publication was on 22October 2001 and).

(b) The Government Notices Gazette GN41 dated 17 October 2001 but published on 18 October2001 includes a document 9620601 which provides NB: The prescribed time for lodgement of

objection is 28 days.. Clearly, the later publication results that citizens are denied the 28 daysstatutory lodgement period. Meaning that in Tasmania they were robbed of 5 days in view that

the publication was 5 days later.

(c) The Government Notice Gazette GN41 dated 17 October 2001 but published on 18 October 2001(Victoria) includes a document 9620606 revoking under subsection 6(1) of the AustralianProtective Service Act 1987 certain matters from 17 October 2001 even so it wasnt published in

Victoria until 18 October 2001. Again, In Tasmania it wasnt published until 22 October 2001and as such again 5 days of people kept unaware of it.

The matters regarding Gazettes are very serious indeed, affecting many people their rights andinvalidating many rules, regulations and laws, yet the High Court of Australia displayed a total

disregard to all this.McKenzie v. The Commonwealth of Australia and Others 59 ALJR 191 Gibbs CJ:

I am by no means satisfied that s. 353(1) of the Act, which provides that the validity of any election orreturn may be disputed by petition addressed to the Court of Disputed Returns and not otherwise, would

prevent this Court from interfering by injunction if a challenge were successfully made to the provisions ofthe Act on constitutional grounds.

Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28 (28 April 1998)Dawson J pointed out in Hunter Resources Ltd v Melville when discussing the statutory provision in that case:

" substantial compliance with the relevant statutory requirement was not possible. Either there was

compliance or there was not."

Hansard 4-3-1898 Constitution Convention DebatesMr. SYMON (South Australia).-There is no doubt whatever if the possibility which Sir Edward Braddon

has indicated could arise, it would be a very grave blunder, and it would be a mischief which we ought atall hazards to avoid; but that would not be the position. If such a case as he put were to arise, it would not be

necessary for the person who was aggrieved or considered himself aggrieved by the federal officer to proceed inthe Federal High Court. He could proceed in any federal court or in any court invested with federal jurisdiction.

Hansard 4-3-1898 Constitution Convention DebatesMr. SYMON.-I was going to say that it does not confer any right. It is a safeguard, because it will prevent any

application for mandamus or prohibition, both of which are prerogative rights, being made in any court except

the courts invested with federal jurisdiction. The provision says that if you apply as against an officer of the

Commonwealth-Sir JOHN FORREST.-It might be against the Governor-General of the Commonwealth.Mr. SYMON.-No, but supposing it is? I will take that position, and say that it does not give any right to get

mandamus or prohibition.Sir JOHN FORREST.-It is optional.

Mr. SYMON.-It is not optional. It merely gives a jurisdiction in certain applications.

AndMr. SYMON.-My honorable friend (Sir John Forrest) will see that the proposal before the Convention would

not interfere in any way with the proceedings he has mentioned. Whatever [start page 1879] jurisdiction the statecourts have now in regard to writs of mandamus and to prohibitions against officers of the state will remain. All

the provision says is that writs of mandamus and prohibitions against officers of the Commonwealth shallbe within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. The point that my honorable friend. (Dr. Quick) has referred


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to is one worthy of the attention he has given to it. The distinction is that writs of mandamus and

prohibitions are prerogative rights, and these other cases are not.

Dr QUICK.-Is not habeas corpus a prerogative right?

Mr. SYMON.-It is not a prerogative right.

AndMr. BARTON.-The object of this clause is a very clear one, if I may mention it without interrupting the

honorable member. In certain cases the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction, in others appellate. If

you do not specially mention this, then in cases of mandamus, prohibition, and injunction, it can only havethe ordinary appellate jurisdiction, but if you mention it specially as within the judicial power, and

provide for it as an original jurisdiction, then a case may be taken straight to the court instead of havingto filter through another court.

And

Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-There is no doubt whatever if the possibility which Sir Edward Braddon hasindicated could arise, it would be a very grave blunder, and it would be a mischief which we ought at all hazards

to avoid; but that would not be the position. If such a case as he put were to arise, it would not be necessary

for the person who was aggrieved or considered himself aggrieved by the federal officer to proceed in theFederal High Court. He could proceed in any federal court or in any court invested with federal

jurisdiction.

And

Mr. BARTON.-I think it would apply to any case in which, under the common law, or under any statutemade for the furtherance of the duties imposed by it, you could obtain, we will say, a writ of mandamus.

And

Mr. BARTON.-The object of it is to make sure that where a person has a right to ask for any of these writs he shall be enabled to

go at once to the High Court, instead of having his process filtered through two or more courts.And

Mr. WISE.-I would not limit the right of appeal any more than it is limited at present, although I quite admitthere may be a certain absolute right of appeal to the High Court conferred by this Constitution which does not

exist in the case of the Privy Council. I am prepared to run that risk rather than run the greater risk of saying thatthe right of appeal to the High Court should be dependent upon a chance majority in Parliament.

Mr. HIGGINS.-How does Mr. Barton's amendment cure the case?Mr. WISE.-By striking out the word "exceptions."

Mr. HIGGINS.-But by imposing conditions you can practically prohibit a man getting into the court.Mr. WISE.-I don't think so, because any such Act would be held to be ultra vires. The honorable

member knows that the power to impose conditions is granted, but it does not allow you to impose such

conditions as would render the right impossible.Mr. ISAACS.-But giving the right to Parliament is totally different.Mr. WISE.-Any condition which would prevent the right of appeal would be held to be ultra vires. There is

one slight alteration which might meet the difficulty of the honorable member. We might put in the words"condition as to amount" but at the same time that might limit it too much. I think Mr. Barton's suggestion is the

right one.Mr. HIGGINS (Victoria).-I hope the amendment will not be carried. I quite admit that Mr. Glynn has done

good service in calling attention to the question, but we have to accept one of two risks. We have either toprescribe that every application or order, no matter how trumpery, is to involve a right of appeal to the High

Court, or else we shall have to trust the Federal Parliament that it will not do injustice.

And

Mr. ISAACS.-I have no objection, provided there is a limit. We must recollect that Parliament is powerless to

pass an appropriation until the Ministry think fit to bring down a message from the Governor-General.

Hansard 31-1-1898 Constitution Convention DebatesMr. WISE (New South Wales).-I think that the clause as it stands is a necessary safeguard to the individual

liberty of the subject in every state. It does not interfere with the right of every state to alter its laws and to

deprive its citizens of their liberty of being tried by a jury of their fellow countrymen, but it does say that theFederal Parliament shall be compelled to submit any person accused of a breach of the federal laws to

trial before a body of his own fellow citizens, in the state to which he belongs. If this clause were not hereoffenders under the Federal Parliament might be removed under an executive act from one part of the

Commonwealth to another, to be tried by resident magistrates, and the Federal Executive would be givenauthority which might permit them to tyrannously interfere with the liberties of every subject in the

community.Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-The only argument I have heard in support of the argument of my honorable

friend (Mr. Glynn) was that which O'Connell used in the House of Commons. He said that he was concerned in a


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case in which a prisoner was being tried for murder. The case was tried in Ireland. The one witness who was

called for the defence was the murdered man. There wa s no doubt as to his identity, but the jury found the

prisoner guilty.Mr. HIGGINS (Victoria).-I feel very strongly that, no matter how much we may value trial by jury as a piece

of machinery, it is not a matter for this Constitution at all.

The above quotations makes clear that the Commonwealth of Australia cannot interfere with the

right of appeal from a Federal Court to the High Court of Australia, where the High Court of

Australia has original jurisdiction. As such the High Court of Australia was wrong to, so to say,

isolate the s383 CEA1918 section but should have accepted that S75(v) of the Constitution gave adirect right to the High Court of Australia, original refused by the registrar on 30 October 2001,

who then made known that instead the application should be made to the Federal Court of Australia.Mr. BARTON.-

The object of it is to make sure that where a person has a right to ask for any of these writs he shall be

enabled to go at once to the High Court, instead of having his process filtered through two or more courts.

There can be no question that the writs were defective and unconstitutional ball those issued by theGovernor-General as well as those issued by the Governors.

Mr. SOLOMON .- HANSARD Constitutional Convention 31 January 1898 [page 302]

We have all had a great deal to say about this Federal Court. Most of us, when we were candidates for election tothe Federal Convention, placed great stress upon it as affording a means of bringing justice within easy

reach of the poor man.

Well, the High Court of Australia manipulated its powers to first refuse me to file with the Court in

October 2001 the Section 75(v) writs, despite it having jurisdiction, making clear that I had to apply

to the Federal Court of Australia, and then on 7 November 2001 Marshall J holding that he had no

jurisdiction as it was a matter for the Court of Disputed Returns. It becomes beyond the financialability for the POOR MAN to obtain justice where judges are manipulating in this manner their

position.PAVLEKOVIC-SMITH v AEC (1993) 115 ALR 641, Dawson J;

If a challenge on justiciable grounds can be mounted to the validity of a general election a question that Ineed not consider such a challenge cannot be entertained by the Court of disputed Returns. It may be

that the High Court has such a jurisdiction but that has not been decided; see the dicta of Gibbs CJ inMcKenzie v Commonwealth .

The Court of Disputed Returns acting as personae designatae (for the Parliament) wouldnt be

the appropriate Court venue to deal with all matters, as a Court of law , I had placed beforethe Federal Court of Australia. For example I disputed the validity of all writs, and the Court of

Disputed Returns can only deal with one disputed writ! The Court of Disputed Returns neither has

jurisdiction to deal with a Section 75(v) application for mandamus/Prohibition which was on 7

November 2001 before Marshall J. therefore, I can only conclude that the High Court of Australiabecame the constitutional terrorist rather then being the GUARDIAN OF THE

CONSTITUTION and as set out also it struck out my NOTICE OF APPEAL regardless that no

orders were made to formally invoke jurisdiction as my numerous objections made were not

dismissed. I for one made sure that in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT the many objections were

placed and Gummow J himself referred to the ADDRESS TO THE COURT and as such he knewor should have known what was before the Court. As the Hansard records of the Constitution

Convention Debates made clear the Framers of the Constitution did not want the Commonwealth of

Australia to have any legislative powers with the right of any citizen to pursue an appeal to the High

Court of Australia with re refuses by a federal court to issue a Mandamus/Prohibition. Then what

were the judges on about on 3 October 2001 one should ask?The issue is that well before the purported election was Held I followed the legal processes against

the validity of the writs (not the election itself as it was not held then) and as such it was not a

matter for the Court of disputed Return as parliament had never any judicial powers to decide

constitutional and other legal matters, I pursued as a Court of law.


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HANSARD records the following Constitutional Convention 22 April 1897 [page 1150]

Mr. BARTON: I have to propose a new clause to follow clause 48 in this form:

Until the Parliament otherwise provides all questions of disputed elections arising in the Senate or Houseof Representatives shall be determined by a Court exercising federal jurisdiction.We have not said "the High Court" here, because there is power in the Constitution to invest any court

with federal jurisdiction, so that this clause will work in this convenient way that the Court of a State

invested with federal jurisdiction may determine such a matter in any States

HANSARD records the following Constitutional Convention 22 April 1897 [page 1150]

Mr. BARTON: I have to propose a new clause to follow clause 48 in this form:

Until the Parliament otherwise provides all questions of disputed elections arising in the Senate or House

of Representatives shall be determined by a Court exercising federal jurisdiction.

We have not said "the High Court" here, because there is power in the Constitution to invest any court

with federal jurisdiction, so that this clause will work in this convenient way that the Court of a Stateinvested with federal jurisdiction may determine such a matter in any States

The Hon. N.J. BROWN (Tasmania)[10.27 stated, HANSARD Constitutional Convention 13

September 1897[pages 464-466]A certain interval must elapse before the federal court is established to deal with a disputed election, andthe only object of this provision is that the House itself shall deal with the matter until the federal court is

established.As such, and not otherwise was clearly referring to the period after a federal court was

established and there after no longer the Parliament would deal with disputed elections. The disputeabout the writs, albeit resulting to elections, doesnt appear to be the issue as where the writs are

unconstitutional then they are null and void and so any purported election held without the need to

challenge each and every result of such unconstitutional held election by way of petition before the

Court of disputed returns. Indeed, the Court of Disputed Returns lacks the powers to hear and

determine such defects of a general election being held constitutional valid.Sue v Hill [1999] HCA 30 (23 June 1999) :

These provisions are now reflected in Div 1 of the present legislation, particularly in sub-ss (1) and (2) of s 354,

but with additional provision in respect of the Federal Court and Territory Supreme Courts. Further, s 192 of the

1902 Act still persists as s 353(1) of the Act. This states:

"The validity of any election or return may be disputed by petition addressed to the Court ofDisputed Returns and not otherwise." (emphasis added)

The phrase "and not otherwise" implements the policy stated by Sir William Lyne in 1902 to remove the dealingwith election petitions from the control of the Committees of Elections and Qualifications to which such matters

were then referred, and to direct the petitions for trial in the Court of Disputed Returns.

As such, the validity of any election is not limited to be heard before the High Court sitting as a

Court of Disputed Returns but can be heard also before any competent Federal Court. Indeed my

very argument against Marshall J judgment was that I pursued a constitutional issue challenging thevalidity of the general election that was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Disputed Returns. It

appears to me that judges of the High Court of Australia, not being able to use their evolutiontheory in a Court of law, then launch it in their political Court of Disputed Returns session instead.

Again, I can but repeat it that the High Court of Australia sitting as a Court of Disputed Returns is

acting for the Members of Parliament to make decisions on their behalf and as such is bias and Iview abused its powers to purport to give a decision that should not have been and neither was

within the jurisdictional competence of the High Court of Australia sitting as a Court of Disputed

Returns but was only within the jurisdictional competence of the High Court of Australia sitting as

a Court of law within Chapter III of the Constitution. When it sits as a Court of Disputed Returns it

is not bound by the same principles as a Court of law and for this a petitioner can be found to havehad a valid claim but the Court can nevertheless dismiss the case upon the argument they do not

think that there would have been any great difference in the lection outcome, if this person had not


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politicians had a personal interest to enlarge their powers by having accepted that they were no

longer a constitutional Parliament but placed themselves above the Constitution they needed the

very judges they had recommended to be appointed and now were acting on their behalf to make a

decision that favoured them to the maximum. As such, I view, the High Court of Australia judgeswere political stooges for the Parliament, doing, so to say, their dirty work. Here we have that a

Court of Disputed Returns not having any constitutional jurisdiction to determine constitutional

issues but only can determine election issues upon what is constitutional applicable set it self up to

give parliamentarians (for whom they acted) JUDICIAL POWERS to determine constitutional

issues. The issue should be considered if the Parliament itself in stead of the High Court ofAustralia sitting as a Court of disputed Returns, was to have heard the petition of the Sue v Hill

case, could it have then made the decisions the Court of Disputed Returns handed down on its

behalf? In my view only a fool could have accepted the Parliament to make decisions as to

constitutional matters and have this judicially applicable to any court of law operating within

Chapter III of the Constitution. It is an irony that the very judges who are the GUARDIAN OFTHE CONSTITUTION then turn out to be the terrorist of the Constitution by their conduct to

hand over JUDICIAL POWERS, in the manner they did, to the Parliament.

After all, nothing stops the Federal Parliament to abolish the Court of Disputed Returns and then

build upon what the Court of Disputed Returns has established that in future the parliamentarians

themselves can use the Sue v Hill judgment to indicate they now have also JUDICIAL POWERSto make decisions in regard of constitutional issues. In my view, every judge sitting in a Court of

Disputed returns should ask himself/herself can the Parliament which I represent make such

decision or would this transgress the judicial powers into legislative powers? Perhaps, the judges of

the High Court of Australia lack appropriate training and experiences to determine the difference

between representing political motivated politicians to make decisions on their behalf in a Court ofDisputed Returns and that of sitting as a judge in a Court of law where they must remain impartial

and bound to follow the true intentions of the Framers of the Constitution. In my view, the judges

may not be aware of their utter ridiculous and absurd judgments they made as judges sitting as a

Court of Disputed Returns ( personae designatae) in the Sue v Hill case, and this makes it even

worse as they will follow their own ill-conceived judgment and by this ongoing deny the people of

a Court of law that determines matters on judicial basis what is truly constitutionally applicable. Iview therefore it is a LEGAL FICTION that the High Court of Australia is the GUARDIAN OF

THE CONSTITUTION, rather I view, such as what is stated in this book and other books

published that the High Court of Australia is rather a constitutional terrorist.

It is often a LEGAL FICTION that justice is provided, where the lawyers of the Federal

Government (the CDPP) are not just threatening but in fact swindling the Court to make orders forlegal cost for the Commonwealth of Australia, which the Magistrate on 17 November 2006 only

allowed for in a limited way, even so the documents served refer only to court cost and does not

provide for legal cost. Indeed, if it were to do so it would deny a fair and legal election to occur as

no one could fairly challenge election matters. It would be left only to the rich and powerful to

challenge electoral matters, no matter how right they might be. Many people therefore cave in underthreats and while lawyers may boost they won the case, reality is they swindled the Court and in the

process the Defendant in their criminal conduct. I take it very serious when lawyers are

manipulating the legal processes in a way to place undue pressure upon a Defendant to win a case.

To me that is not what justice is about. With elections the rights of any elector should never be

compromised by highly paid lawyers who regardless how wrong they might be themselves neverloosing as they make money out of litigating, then threatens a law abiding elector in to caving in to

plea guilty as to threaten with pursuing cost, despite the documents served (summons) not providing

for this. Yet, even the High Court of Australia manipulates this matter to make orders for cost, in

regard of a challenge to electoral matters and so rob the ordinary average elector of any reasonable

opportunity to challenge the validity of electoral laws, therefore it is a ILLUSION that we have


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FAIR and PROPER elections where anyone challenging the validity of elections is faced with

huge legal cost. I view, that no fair minded Court could accept any legal cost being ordered where it

relates to electoral matters as ultimately it denied the ability of providing FAIR and PROPER

elections, as the appeal process is part of the election process. Unless an election process is withinthe financial means for any elector, that includes any challenge to its validity, as the appeal process

is part of an election, there can be no FAIR, and PROPER elections, and threats and threats should

never be part of this process. In my view the lawyers themselves are the real criminals! Yet, appear

to me sanctioned by the Court to pursue this criminal conduct. Then JUSTICE is a LEGAL

FICTION.As the orders of the HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA makes clear The notice of appeal be

struck out. Now, how on earth can it be that a Section 75(v) application of the Constitution for a

mandamus/prohibition is struck out without being heard upon its MERITS is beyond me, and as

previous published books set out extensively the Framers of the Constitution made clear that where

there is a claim of ULTRA VIRES, as I did in support of the applications that the election to beheld were unconstitutional, etc, it ought to be heard.TAYLOR v. TAYLOR [1979] HCA 38; (1979) 143 CLR 1 (22 August 1979) (Folder 1)

Similarly in Commissioner of Police v. Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383, at p 395, Dixon C.J. and Webb J. said that "itis a deep-rooted principle of the law that before anyone can be punished or prejudiced in his person or property

by any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding he must be afforded an adequate opportunity of being heard."

Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates; Mr. GORDON.-

If he joins a plea of ultra vires with a plea of conflict of law, that ought to be heard.

Despite that I challenged the validity of the writs, the Proclamation, the legislation and this versus

constitutional provisions and limitations the High Court of Australia having first fraternized with

the first Defendant Governor-General then railroaded the case by having it struck out. Writs issued

by the Governor-General before the Proclamation being published are invalid and without legalforce. But, the way to High Court of Australia pears to me to operate is as a KANGAROO

COURT and STAR CHAMBER COURT and that to me is a very serious matter.Hansard 11-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates; Dr. QUICK.-

The Federal High Court is empowered to-declare a law passed by both Houses and assented to by theCrown ultra vires, not because the Legislature has exceeded its jurisdiction, but because of some fault of

procedure.Hansard 8-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Sir JOHN DOWNER.-The High Court is the protector of the Constitution. What we provide is that "the law"shall not be so-and-so. My honorable friend wants to provide that "the proposed law" shall not be so-and-so.

Does he mean to say that the High Court would have no power there? We are to take care that the Constitution ispreserved, and that the relative rights of the two Houses are not violated.

While the High Court of Australia on 3 October 2003 was dealing with the Appeal upon a basis ofwhat the Commonwealth of Australia had legislated, the Framers of the Constitution made clear

that if a federal court refused to issue an order for mandamus/Prohibition then an applies lies to the

High Court of Australia and the Commonwealth of Australia could not interfere with this right by

way of legislation.

To me it is therefore in that regard a LEGAL FICTION to pursue JUSTICE in the High Court ofAustralia, and also proved that there are no FAIR and PROPER elections where the validity of

elections comes down to where the judges fraternized with the first Defendant Governor-General

contrary to legal principles and then strike out an appeal constitutional entitled to be made to the

High Court of Australia as the Framers of the Constitution themselves made clear. If judges dont

even understand they should not fraternize with one of the parties in a litigation before their courtthen what else can they be deemed to understand, I ask?

It is a LEGAL FICTION that the High Court of Australia cannot have a jury, as the Framers of

the Constitution clearly anticipated a state jury to be used in certain cases before the High Court

of Australia.Hansard 25-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates; Sir GEORGE TURNER.-


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The wording, as I have read it, would leave it absolutely open to this course of proceeding: New South Wales

might have made a rate which was objected to by Victoria; the Federal Parliament, after full discussion, after

hearing all that can be said, after making inquiries, either by a select committee or by an Inter-State Commission,to get the fullest information, might have declared that it was not necessary for the development of its territory,and that therefore it was a bad rate. But there would be nothing to prevent an appeal from that decision to

the High Court. The High Court would have a perfect right, it seems to me, under the wording of his

amendment, to re-investigate the whole matter, perhaps by a jury-a jury it may be from the stateinterested, or before the Judges alone, as inquiring into a matter of fact .

There is another LEGAL FICTION that somehow JUSTICE is provided for people accused ofTERRORISM, where the Federal Attorney-General somehow determines matters and lawyers

somehow have to be screened and qualified by the Commonwealth of Australia to be acceptable to

defend a accused. It is plain stupidity to even consider that such a system can be in place let alone

actually do so. Any accused in breach of Commonwealth law simply is to be dealt with before aState Court and the State Court is governed by State legislation, and the Commonwealth of

Australia has no constitutional powers to interfere with this.Hansard 8-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian

Convention)Mr. HIGGINS.-I did not say that it took place under this clause, and the honorable member is quite right in

saying that it took place under the next clause; but I am trying to point out that laws would be valid if theyhad one motive, while they would be invalid if they had another motive.

Hansard 9-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian

Convention) Mr. GLYNN.-

We ought not to create the evil of making the Judges not merely interpreters, but the extenders of the

Constitution, and we ought to give the Constitution such a degree of elasticity as will render it capable of being

moulded to the changed conditions as time goes on, and prevent the dangerous alternative of judicial

expansion.And

Mr. ISAACS.-How could it?

Mr. HIGGINS.-It could not. The dead-lock clauses only apply to laws passed by the Parliament.

Mr. DOBSON.-But some honorable members argue that they would apply to a proposal to amend the

Constitution.

Mr. HIGGINS.-No, because the Constitution is not passed by the Parliament.

Hansard 31-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National

Australasian Convention) Mr. SOLOMON.-

We shall not only look to the Federal Judiciary for the protection of our interests, but also for the justinterpretation of the Constitution:

Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates Mr. BARTON.-

No; because you do not give any power with regard to punishing crime to the Commonwealth ,

HANSARD 8-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National

Australasian Convention)Mr. OCONNOR .-The amendment will insure proper administration of the laws, and afford their protection to

every citizen.Mr. SYMON .-That is insured already.

Mr. OCONNOR .-In what way?Mr. SYMON .-Under the various state Constitutions.

Mr. OCONNOR .-Yes. We are now dealing with the prohibition against the alteration of theseConstitutions. We are dealing with a provision which will prevent the alteration of these Constitutions in

the direction of depriving any citizen of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Because ifthis provision in the Constitution is carried it will not be in the power of any state to pass a law to amend itsConstitution to do that. It is a declaration of liberty and freedom in our dealing with citizens of the

Commonwealth. Not only can there be no harm in placing it in the Constitution, but it is also necessary for

the protection of the liberty of everybody who lives within the limits of any State.


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Hansard 11-03-1891 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the NationalAustralasian Convention) Mr. CLARK:

What we want is a separate federal judiciary, allowing the state judiciaries to remainunder their own governments.

It should therefore be very clear that any person accused of terrorism is denied a FAIR and

PROPER trial if the Commonwealth of Australia in anyway at all interferes with the accused right

to have legal representation to his/her choice, and nothing the Commonwealth of Australia can do

as to deny any lawyer to represent a accused, regardless the lawyer not being approved by theCommonwealth of Australia as proceedings remains to be subject to State court legislative

provisions and any lawyer being the member of the Bar of the State Supreme Court then can

practice to represent an accused as to deny this would infringe the right of a lawyer to do so, as well

as the accused to be somehow restricted to select a lawyer that the Commonwealth of Australia may

prefer. Therefore, any idea as to have a special TERRORIST court might be nice to consider todetermine the guilt of who I consider the greatest terrorist John Howard, but even he is entitled

upon the rights as like any other person provided for within the Constitution. No special

TERRORIST courts therefore could be deemed constitutionally valid as again;Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates Mr. BARTON.-

No; because you do not give any power with regard to punishing crime to the Commonwealth ,

QUOTE 19-7-2006 ADDRESS TO THE COURT

LEGAL FICTION

Sue v Hill Authority;GRADUAL INDEPENDENCE, that is what the High Court of Australia argued in the Sue v Hill

case to oust her, despite being a subject of the British Crown from the Senate. Quite frankly, at that

time, I had myself argued that in 1919 by the signing of the Treaty of Versailles the

Commonwealth of Australia had become in effect an INDEPENDENT nation and by this the

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) was no more valid then any othercolonial legislation.

The Family Court of Australia even published this in its judgment!But, while I had this great kind of argument as to why the Commonwealth of Australia was an

INDEPENDENT nation, I later discovered that constitutionally this could not be so. If, the

Commonwealth of Australia somehow became an INDEPENDENT nation then at some point oftime legislation enacted in the commonwealth of Australia and in any of the states would be

defective as they would no longer be what the respective Constitutions required.

The commonwealth of Australia exist as a part POLITICAL UNION between the States, and it

would be sheer impossible for the Commonwealth of Australia to somehow then dictate the States ifit remained to be colonial entities or become independent. No such constitutional powers were ever

provided for in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) and the Framers of

the Constitution clearly opposed such possibility without a Section 128 referendum! Indeed, they

made clear that the Commonwealth of Australia could not, so to say, throw off the Imperialconnection under this Constitution.The signing of the Treaty of Versailles could not have somehow invoked the Commonwealth of

Australia to become INDEPENDENT and neither can there be something like a gradual becoming

of INDEPENDENT as to even contemplate this on constitutional grounds would mean that having a

Constitution is of no avail as no one will know when things are purportedly changed over time as it

be the judges who may declare what they view by hindsight.The POLITICAL UNION between the Colonies (now States) to form a political alliance, albeit

partly, was a contract that was binding among them. However, can we accept that somehow a

contracts between them on partial political issues somehow then can change everything?


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Would this mean that if tenants of a building are making an alliance then somehow they can

become the owners of the building merely because they claim that over time they became the

owners by what they did?

As the Framers of the Constitution made clear, external affairs gave the Commonwealth of

Australia powers to make treaties but only for so far it already was within its constitutional powers.

It could not use it to acquire somehow powers it didnt possess in the first place. As such, while theCommonwealth of Australia, for example, may make a treaty with any other foreign nation that

their citizens drivers licences will be accepted as valid without needing a international drivinglicence, the truth of the matter is that there is no constitutional powers for the Commonwealth of

Australia to do so in the first place, as only the States have the legislative powers in that regard.

If it were to be allowed for the Commonwealth of Australia to make any kind of treaty in regard ofmatters the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) specifically withheld any

legislative powers for, then the whole notion of having a Constitution that can only be amended by

way of Section 128 referendum no longer is applicable as the Commonwealth of Australia can

simply circumvent any constitutional limitation by making treaties in regard of matters it didnt

have constitutional powers for.The Constitution is constant and can only be amended by Section 128 referendum. CoAG

(Council of Australian Governments) is an unconstitutional entity and cannot therefore somehow

circumvent Section 128 provisions either.

When I contested the legal validity of the application of the Cross Vesting Act, in 1994, I was, so to

say, thrown out by the Courts, yet in 1999 the High Court of Australia in the Wakim case thenformally declared the purported Cross vesting act to be unconstitutional.

In my 28 October 2002 correspondence, to Mr Justice Michael Kirby, I contested the validity of the

Australian Act, and on 17 June 2003 His Honour in the MIMA case then made clear the Australian

Act had no legal enforcement against the Constitution.

It doesnt matter if the States therefore somehow agreed to the enacting of the Australian Act asit was beyond the powers of Subsection 51(xxxvii) to allow for this in that this subsection only

allows for matters to be referred that is in dispute between two or more States but not all States. The

Australian Act could not be held to have been a matter of dispute between two or more Statessuch as the Murray River can be!

There never was any constitutional powers given to the High Court of Australia to declare theCommonwealth of Australia to be some alleged INDEPENDENT nation as its constitutional

powers are bounded by the limits of the Constitution.

Are we next going to have that essentially we have become part of the Republic of Indonesia

because we now are enacting legislation dealing with refugees to please the Indonesian

Government?

As Author of various books about certain constitutional issues under the INSPECTOR-RIKATIlabel I have extensively canvassed those constitutional issues, and rely upon my past published

books also in support of this argument that Australians are Australians because they are living in theContinent of Australia and that they are British nationals and this is EMBEDDED in the

Constitution to remain so. No one can point out that there is a country named Australia where it

makes laws regarding, say, driving licences, council rates, etc for the whole of the nation. TheCommonwealth of Australia doesnt even have legislative powers over local governments in the

States.

It is simply a LEGAL FICTION that the Commonwealth of Australia is an INDEPENDENT

nation, and so also that somehow the Commonwealth of Australia has a Queen of Australia.

Would it not encompass that judicial officers who made an oath of alliance to the British Monarchand since remained judges of the Courts but never did make a new alliance to the pretended Queen


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of Australia then are disqualified from sitting as judicial officers at the bench of the Queens

Courts?

Surely, no one could accept that lawyers who swore an oath of alliance to the British Monarch

somehow could continue to be members of the Bar and be judicial officers when we somehow nowhold that the British Monarch and its subjects are all foreigners and ousted from not only voting

but also from being Members of Parliament, as Heather Hill was?

When I applied to naturalize it was in the perception that I would become a British national with the

British Crown as head of the Empire. It is not, in my view, for the High Court of Australia then to

somehow imply later with the Sue v Hill case that somehow I never gained any alliance to theBritish Crown, neither became a subject of the British crown but somehow became a subject to a

non existing Queen of Australia of a fictional country.

In my 30 September 2003 published book titled;

INSPECTOR-RIKATI on CITIZENSHIP

A book on CD about Australians unduly harmed.

ISBN 0-9580569-6-X

I canvassed the issue then about the case of Pauline Hanson and David Ettridge as to what Iconsidered to be their wrongful conviction. I pointed out that it was immaterial what was stated on

the flip side of the membership card as what was relevant was that the membership Card showedthat the person was a Member of Pauline Hanson One nation and as such were full members for

purpose of legislation. On 8 October 2003 the Queensland Attorney-General and Minister of Justice

then wrote to me that in fact legal issues I had raised had not been canvassed by any of the parties inany of the proceedings. Yet, subsequently the Court of Appeal about word for word used the very

legal argument I had used in my book as to overturn the convictions.

What was clear is that those who joined Pauline Hanson One Nation for all purposes were

Members regardless of what may have been stated otherwise to try to interfere with this on the

flip side of the membership card. Likewise, I naturalized to become an British national referred toas Australian because of being resident in the Commonwealth of Australia, and do not accept that

somehow years later the High Court of Australia, and notably beyond its constitutional powers (as it

did with the MABO case, as the colonies joining Federation did not accept there was a native titleissue in Australian colonies existing) can then interfere with my constitutional rights being a British

national. It is not relevant for this if the British Parliament did or did not legislate as to Australiansbeing foreigners as it would be ULTRA VIRES, as it has no legislative powers to deny

Australians their British nationality that is embedded in the Commonwealth of Australia

Constitution Act 1900 (UK).Hansard 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates Mr. DEAKIN.-

In this Constitution, although much is written much remains unwritten,

Because no judge can be an adjudicator in his own cause, it must be clear that in effect not a single

judge could purport to have a position to decide this matter if his/her own position depends upon the

outcome of this matter to be decided.

It would be judicial bias for any judicial officer to decide a matter in which his very own survival ofbeing a judicial officer depends upon the outcome of the matter.

The first principles of British law incompetence, propter affectum to sit upon the trial must be considered.

In my view a Jury of men in the language of omni exceptions majores could without difficulty

consider the matters and if it is tenable for a High Court of Australia to somehow create on its own

some kind of a LEGAL FICTION that does not exist but affects by this the very constitutional

rights enshrined in the Constitution!


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Now, still assuming them to be a Jury, and of course invested with all the attributes of Jurors at the Common

Law, this challenge propter affectum certainly ought to hold good for even were the statute construed as bearing

out a different signification, still an established right was not to be overturned by any supposed negative clause,but by a direct and express affirmation. It was an immutable law of justice of Great Britain, in fact of everycivilised country on the face of the globe, and well laid down had that doctrine been from time immemorial, so

far had the doctrine been carried too, that Blackstone, book i p. 91. Christian's edition, conceives it impossible somonstrous and absurd an injustice should ever exist any where, as that any man should be constituted a judge in

his own cause.

And

Mr. Wentworth gave a very lucid explanation of what in law sedition meant, and how it could most properly beapplied, considering it a Scotticism. Mr. Chief Justice Forbes rather thought the word had its origin from the

Latin tongue, and his Honor, with much classic taste, proceeding to elucidate his idea used an apt quotation fromthe Mantuan Bard -- from the neid of Virgil 1 Book, lines 152, 3, 4, as follows:--

"Ac veluti magno in populo, cum soepe coorta est SEDITIO, soevitque animis ignobile vulgus,

Iamque faces, et saxa volant -- furor arma ministrat."After a most elaborate, eloquent, and argumentative appeal as to the justice and the facts applicable to his client'scase Mr. Wentworth again sat down.

Forbes C.J., Stephen and Dowling JJ, 20 June 1829Source: Sydney Gazette, 23 June 1829

As already set out above that Australians (British nationals) are governed by Constitutional law and

British law! It is impossible for the High Court of Australia to somehow throw of the Imperialpowers while still maintaining that the Imperial legislation such as the Commonwealth of

Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) remains in force albeit upon conditions what they

themselves consider is relevant. Some kind of, so to say, cherry picking tactic.

The mere fact that the people of the Commonwealth of Australia rejected a referendum to become a

REPUBLIC in itself underlines that Australians never accepted that the Commonwealth of Australiais an INDEPENDENT nation but rather that it remains under the British Crown.

Indeed, the monarchist argued that the British monarchy had been good to us and the Republican

were having their say why to keep this kind of pompous royalty if we can do without. The mere fact

that such kind of arguments were going on in itself indicates that the people of Australia didnt

accept to become an INDEPENDENT nation and neither regarded to be so. While for politicalpurposes members of parliament and indeed those in seat of power of Government may elect

wanting to wield unlimited powers, it is not the function of the High Court of Australia to look aftertheir power hungry desires but to declare constitutional provisions as intended by the Framers of the

Constitution aligned with what was amended by successful referendums.

David Hick, as I view it, was therefore a British national by birth, irrespective if his mother wasborn in the UK!

My children and grandchildren born in the Commonwealth of Australia are all British nationals, as

this is their birthright that was embedded in the Constitution!

For the record, it ought to be understood that my naturalization never involved any State official, asit was done at 55 Kings Street, Melbourne at the then offices of the Immigration Department, and as

such unlike most other people my naturalization was purely conducted by Commonwealth of

Australia officers, who obviously lacked any constitutional powers to provide me with franchise

as that was a State matter. It can therefore neither be argued that somehow the state of Victoria didprovide me with franchise as it never did. It erroneously relied upon the ULTRA VIRES

Australian Citizenship Act 1948 as to somehow take it that I was granted franchise where clearly

this never could be so.

In the Moller v Board of Examiners for Legal Practitioners case it is clear that some oath of

alliance was required. Now, if there was some change of oath of alliance because of purportedly

the Commonwealth of Australia having become INDEPENDENT then at what time was the oathof alliance taken by lawyers to practice at the Victorian Bar valid? And, when did lawyers already

have taken this oath of alliance to the British Monarch then make a new oath of alliance to the

purported Queen of Australia? Or is it that we have lawyers (including judicial officers) where


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some have sworn an oath of alliance to the LEGAL FICTION of Queen of Australia while others

to the British monarch?

I take the position that it is not relevant what the High Court of Australia may purport to make out

of matters in the Sue v Hill case, as ultimately it is ULTRA VIRES where they are makingdecisions that are in conflict to the intentions of the Framers (and so amended by the successful

referendums) as expressed in the Constitution.

I view it is beyond constitutional powers for the High Court of Australia to interfere with

constitutional provisions and as such we are and remain to be British nationals and ultimately it will

be up to the people to decide otherwise.Hansard 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates Mr. DEAKIN.-

What a charter of liberty is embraced within this Bill-of political liberty and religious liberty-the liberty

and the means to achieve all to which men in these days can reasonably aspire . A charter of liberty isenshrined in this Constitution, which is also a charter of peace-of peace, order, and good government for

the whole of the peoples whom it will embrace and unite.

Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-I wish to say one word or two before we part. I do not intend to enter into any

detailed examination of, or any elaborate apology for, the Constitution which we have been engaged in framing.But, sir, no man can remain unmoved upon this momentous occasion. We who are assembled in this

Convention are about to commit to the people of Australia a new charter of union and liberty; we areabout to commit this new Magna Charta for their acceptance and confirmation, and I can conceive of

nothing of greater magnitude in the whole history of the peoples of the world than this question uponwhich we are about to invite the peoples of Australia to vote. The Great Charter was wrung by the barons

of England from a reluctant king. This new charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.Again;

This new charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.

My view is that, We, the people have the only power to amend the Constitution and political

appointed judges who may lack any proper perception of what is constitutionally appropriate have

no powers whatsoever to rob us of our constitutional rights.Again, if the High Court of Australia ruling in Sue v Hill that British nationals are not entitled to

franchise and sit in the parliament then this means every Australian by this is in effect excluded

from participating in any election, because of the embedded constitutional provision that we are and

remain British nationals by birth or by naturalization!

And, as the British Parliament did provide for what the Framers of the Constitution intended thatany person subjected to a race legislation by this is having a disability that denies the person to have

citizenship and so franchise (obviously as to avoid persons subjected to race legislation to overturn

the legislation) then by the unconstitutional Racial Discrimination Act each and every Australian is

by this disqualified to have citizenship and so also franchise and to be in the Parliament.

Unlike what I did, I found it remarkable that the High Court of Australia never appropriately quotedthe Hansard records of the Constitution Convention Debates such as in the Sue v Hill, Sykes v

Cleary, the MABO, Pochi, and other cases. Indeed, in the Sykes v Cleary it incorrectly referred to

the Hansard records of the Constitution Convention Debates, taking it out of context, as I have

already extensively canvassed in previous published books. Hence, likely those decision will beoverturned in time to come as having been erroneously made.

Therefore, on this basis also, the Court could not invoke legal jurisdiction as to federaljurisdiction because if Australians are all disqualified to have citizenship and so to be electors,

by whatever reason set out above, then the Court cannot entertain any alleged breaches of

electoral laws.

It might also be asked if the Commonwealth tor of Public Prosecutors lawyers made an oath of

alliance to the FICTIONAL Queen of Australia or made an oath of alliance to the BritishMonarch. After all, we cannot uphold British constitutional law, as the Commonwealth of

Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is by officers who have sworn an oath of alliance to a

foreigner and by this are, so to say, perhaps bend to pursue their own cause regardless how

inappropriate and indeed unconstitutional this might be??


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In my view, one can only have a Queen of Australia if there is such a country as Australia wherethe government of that country has all powers over its subjects by its constitution. Clearly, no such

country exist, as like the European Union, the Commonwealth of Australia is a LIMITED

POLITICAL UNION where there can be no kind of monarchy existing.

The only reason that Australians have the Monarchy is not because the Commonwealth of Australia

is a Monarchy, but because it is created by a LIMITED POLITICAL UNION of the Colonies(now States) who were and remain dominions of the British Empire. Hence, if the States were to

become independent then automatically the Commonwealth of Australia would by this becomeINDEPENDENT provided such INDEPENDENCE was reflected by the people of Australia to

amend the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) that Australians no longer

would be British nationals, etc.Again;

This new charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.

In my view, it would be sedition for any judge of the High Court of Australia, having made an oath

of alliance to the British Monarch then to make a ruling against the Monarch that would

undermine the very intentions of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) thatsuccession of the British Crown will be the monarchy, as for example by the Bill of Rights it is well

recognised that all judicial officers as well as Parliamentarians are to respect the Monarchy and itsposition.

Also, as I pursued naturalization after about 23 years having resided in the State of Victoria, and as

such did not quickly get naturalized but indeed took my time to understand what seemed to beapplicable and for all purposed Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the second was the rightful Monarch

to the British throne, and being the British Monarch who was for all purposes was and remained the

Queen under which Australian State and Federal laws are enacted, then a later fictitious Queen of

Australia for an INDEPENDENT Australia cannot be deemed to override constitutional

foundations.By marriage, I had a name change, from Schorel to Schorel-Hlavka, to but for all purposes

remain the same person. As such, regardless if for title purposes there was some alleged name

change the person was and remained the British Monarch, the rightful Monarch in regard of theCommonwealth of Australia.

As I understand it the British Monarch cannot obtain an other titles as Queen of Australia where nosuch Monarchy exist. In my view, it is an insult to name the British Monarch Queen of Australia

as being a Queen without a country.

As the British Parliament enacted Section 51(xix) that the Commonwealth of Australia could

naturalize aliens to become British subjects, then neither the Commonwealth of Australia and for

this matter the High Court of Australia can turn this into naturalization of aliens to become, say,Chinese, Japanese, Australian, Indonesian or whatever other kind of nationality. The British

Parliament had itself no legislative power but to provide for the Commonwealth of Australia to

naturalize aliens to become British nationals, being subjects of the British Crown.

Indeed, if the British Parliament were to have contemplated to provide for Subsection 51(xix) for

naturalization for aliens to somehow obtain nationality of anything other then British nationalitythen its may itself have been guilty of sedition, as it could not undermine the British Crown and

rights to its subjects.

In my view, the later Sue v Hill judgment, after I had already naturalized in 1994, cannot affect my

constitutional rights to be a British national, and neither that of my children and grand children born

in the Commonwealth of Australia, or for that matter other born or naturalized in theCommonwealth of Australia.


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The AEC having been the culprit to mislead everyone, hardly then can rely upon incorrect writs

issued, as an excuse to proceed with unlawful elections.

Apart of the election issue, it must also be considered that every Notice or Act published in any

Gazette that was to commence from the date of publication might now be found to be NULL ANDVOID where the Gazette was published 1 or more days later. For example the Notifications by the

Reserve Bank. It appears, from what I discovered, that this has been going on for many years and so

numerous Notices and Acts might be invalid. This is a very serious matter.

WATSON v_ LEE (1979) 144 CLR 374, Full Court of the High Court of Australia;

To bind the citizen by a law, the terms of which he has no means

of knowing, would be a mark of tyranny.

Clearly, publication of Notices or Acts After they already are commenced is not proper and placetheir validity at question.

All I sought was simply that elections were being held according to the legal provisions!

What I discovered was that the AEC and the Australian Government Solicitors misled the Court invarious ways as to ensure that this purported election could proceed regardless what the

consequences were and to cause me to be ordered to pay cost for the hearing before the Federal

Court of Australia.Now that I filed the Notice of appeal, the Australian Government Solicitors made clear they willoppose the case upon lack of legal jurisdiction, even so of the fact that there are orders for cost

which in itself entitled me to appeal.

It must be clear, they are playing a sickening game rather then to have argued the case upon its

MERITS.

The Governor-General clearly cant exceed his powers, and is limited to issue writs within and incompliance with Australian Law and the Commonwealth Constitution.

It ought to be clear, that had the AEC acted on 22 October 2001 to request the Governor-General

and the Governors to withdraw their writs, and to issue writs, in accordance with legislated

provisions, then if those writs were issued quickly only a few weeks delay would have occurred.I have checked extensively (after downloading it all) the HANSARD of the Constitutional

Convention of 1891, 1897 and 1898 and it is clear that the framers of the CommonwealthConstitution Bill were in the mind that the States rights to determine certain matters in regard of

elections of Senators must be protected.

The Commonwealth, so the AEC, therefore has no powers to ignore State electoral legislation.

As I pointed out, the AEC or its officers were refusing would-be candidates to nominate, because of

being 10 minutes or so to late from the hour of 12 midday on Thursday 18 October 2001. Yet, with

the House of Representatives, in law (Section 156) there was still 24 hours to go and for the Senatein most States there was still 48 hours to go!

It must be clear, that the Court of Disputed Returns within Section 353(1) cant entertain anypetition in regard of all writs and as such my application before the Federal Court was appropriate.

Lawyers warned me, of the record, prior to the hearing before the Federal Court, that my case

would, so to say, be RAILROADED as there was no way the court would hear my case regardlessof what the MERITS of my case was about!

I take it very serious that a judge of the Federal Court of Australia dismissed my application upon

the basis of there being no legal jurisdiction where clearly my material was giving sufficient

grounds to have the matter heard before the Federal Court.

As I expected the case to be RAILROADED, I had even included what had gone on with theDeputy Registrar of the High Court prior to filing my application in the Federal Court as to make

sure that the Court could be aware of my actions.


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determine the qualifications of a candidate (who declares and maintains that he is duly qualified: s.170(1a)(ii) the

Act or to refuse to return the name of an otherwise successful candidate whose qualifications are in issue: sees.172 the Act and Evans v. Thomas (1962) 2 QB 350. But the performance by the Electoral Officer of his

ministerial functions in these respects does not determine the validity of the return or the efficacy of the electionof an unqualified person to a vacant place in the Senate.

END QUOTE

Clearly, the declaration by the Commonwealth Electoral Commission itself did not purportedly

validate the election and neither any candidate declared elected where there was no valid election.

Where then Mr John Howard was not elected in 2001, so neither others, then he neither could have

been Prime Minister for any longer then 3 Months, as Section 64 limits the appointment of a nonelected person to no longer then a period of three months.

Hence, Mr John Howard was neither then Prime Minister to advise the Governor-General for a

general election in 2004! Indeed, neither was Mr John Howard in any legal position to be involved

in the appointment of the Governor-General Michael Jeffrey and as such that also the appointment

also is unconstitutional and invalid (without legal force- ULTRA VIRES).This document has not canvassed extensively the defects in appointments regarding a Governor-

General but my previous published books have already done so. It also would take up a lot of pages

to set it all out again and I will for this refrain from doing so merely to state that it is

constitutionally embedded that a governor-General can only be validly appointed where it is a

person who is born in the United Kingdom and upon the recommendation of the Home Office isappointed by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II (while she is the current governing Monarch) and any

purported appointment otherwise is constitutionally invalid and has no legal force. Hence, judges

appointed by a purported Governor-General neither can be deemed to be appropriately appointed,

hence neither can claim legal jurisdiction to adjudicate on matters.

While the Framers of the Constitution inserted subsection 51(xxvi) into the Constitution as toprotect the wages of Australians and to avoid cheap labour to flood the market we now find that the

Federal Government does precisely the opposite. I have no doubt, so to say, that the Framers of the

Constitution would be turning in their graves in horror if they knew how now the Federal

Government misuses subsection 51(xxvi) for ulterior purposes and how to the contrary to the

intentions of the Framers of the Constitution the Federal Government now has cheap labour

flooding the market and also itself outsource work to deny Australians their rightful entitlements.http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=5487QUOTE

Our Attorney-General is missing in actionBy Natasha Cica - posted Monday, 12 February 2007Bring David Hicks Home has become a mainstream slogan, screamed out in loud Gitmo orange.This week, activist movement GetUp has cranked up a multimedia advertising campaign featuring an image of

Hicks as an innocent child with voiceovers from his father, Terry. Even radio shock jocks now loudly reckonHicks' plight is un-Australian, the same blurred, muddy smear so readily flung against him by hawkish political

players when Hicks first hit our news radar.This shift is an encouraging sign that due process and basic decency are not the exclusive concern of our so-

called elites. At the same time, something vital is still missing.Today it is implausible to deny that much of Hicks' treatment in detention has offended common core principles

of Western law and justice, Australian values, universal human rights and Judeo-Christian morality, regardless ofwhat Hicks did before his capture. Yet deny it Attorney-General Philip Ruddock persistently does.

Recall his bloodless statements just last week that some people don't handle detention well (so who's up for afew years at Guantanamo Bay? It's not the Dame Phyllis Frost Centre) and that we have been advised that Hicks

has been treated humanely and in accordance with international standards for interrogations (by exactly whom,backed up by what evidence, and where does the Geneva Convention sit?).

Further, according to Ruddock, sleep deprivation alone does not amount to torture (not according to its pastvictims, including former Israeli prime minister Menachim Begin) and holding Hicks in a single-occupancy cell

does not amount to isolation, including because he is allowed out for reading (in that library with no books? Ormaybe for a squizzy at that Saddam Hussein execution poster?) and other recreational purposes (Hicks' lawyers

say he has seen direct sunlight just three times in the past month).This raft of claims has received relatively scant critical attention, remarkable at a time when Prime Minister John

Howard's ministerial reshuffle left Ruddock firmly in the legal driver's seat. Is that because Australians, even


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once the war was done and over with I might be proven wrong, but that is not how constitutional

issues are being dealt with, regardless that Gummow J argued about it having been about 22 months

since the election was held. If judges, as I view it, are totally incompetent to understand that the

passing of time does not overcome unconstitutional/illegal conduct then what hope does anyonehave in this kind of Court, I may ask?

http://www.radio.cz/en/article/11324 Judge in 1951 trial to be charged

[23-08-2000] By Olga Szantova

A long-retired judge, 86-year-old Pavel Vitek, is to be charged with murder for a verdict he passed 49years ago. At the time, eleven people were sentenced to death and executed to serve as a warning toall who still resisted the communist domination of Czechoslovakia after the coup in 1948. OlgaSzantova has the story.

The trial, in the summer of 1951, was one of the first and one of the biggest in a series of politically motivated

trials in the early fifties. Their aim: to show that the class enemy was sabotaging the otherwise peaceful andsuccessful construction of a socialist society and that harder measures were needed to protect the working class

from the evils of capitalism. The communists faced serious problems in the countryside, where the moresuccessful farmers were resisting the founding of cooperatives, and wanted to hold on to their farms. Southern

Moravia, one of the most fertile areas in the country, was a particularly troublesome region and a village in thatarea, called Babice, was chosen as the site where the evils of the class enemy were to be demonstrated.

As the communist-led village council was meeting one day, a group of armed terrorists broke in, shooting threeof the council's members dead. A number of villagers were soon arrested and charged with the shooting, among

them the richest local farmer, Jan Plichta. Eleven of them were sentenced to death, including Jan Plichta. Thecase was widely publicized and served as an excuse for the harsh measures used in introducing socialism in the

countryside.

One of the judges in the Babice trial was the now 86-year-old Pavel Vitek. Like other judges in other political

trials of the '50s, he was instrumental in preparing the planned result of the investigation. He, like others, wasgiven precise instructions as to how the trial should be conducted and what the verdict was to be. As a result, 11

innocent people were sentenced to death for the Babice shooting, and judge Pavel Vitek is now being chargedwith their murder.

His is to be the first trial of its kind. More than ten years after the fall of communist rule in this country, the legal

system still hasn't found a way of dealing with these cases. A number of times investigations were started butdiscontinued before any actual charges could be made. In the Babice case, the minister of justice had to intervenebefore the Supreme Court ruled that the case should be brought to trial. It remains to be seen whether it will set a

precedent.

It may be asked, I view, if the judges of the Courts who have acted in the way they did, as like in

the Czech case ought to be held accountable for the death of so many where they may be deemed to

have acted in clear defiance to their judicial obligations to determine matters before the Court upon

their MERITS, rather then, so to say, having railroaded cases.

http://www.clubtroppo.com.au/category/law-civil-liberties/page/2/Reporting on the final anti-terrorism bill

Posted by Ken Parish on Friday, November 4, 2005The Howard Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005 (no. 1 being the one rushed through both

Houses yesterday with bipartisan support) is a considerable improvement on the original draftleaked by ACT Chief Minister John Stanhope. But it still has major problems in my view.

http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Page/Speeches_2000_Speeches_Judici

al_Power_and_Good_Government

Archive for Daryl Williams Attorney-General for Australia 1996 - 200317. Despite the strict separation of federal judicial power, it is accepted that non-judicial functions can be

conferred on federal judges as personae designatae. The judge concerned must have consented to the

conferral, and the non-judicial functions must not be incompatible with the designated person's judicialoffice.


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18. It is this principle which has allowed governments to appoint judicial office holders to conduct Royal

Commissions, and to undertake other roles which, although non-judicial, nevertheless call for the skills and

qualities which a judge can offer.19. A majority of the High Court considered that the function to be performed by Justice Mathews was tooclosely connected with the executive branch of government. They described it as an 'integral part' of the

minister's exercise of power, and insufficiently independent of the executive. In essence, the majority took theview that Justice Mathews' performance of the role would diminish public confidence in her integrity as a judge,

or in the integrity of the judiciary as an institution . The function was thus held to be incompatible with judicial

office.

20. The lone dissenter, Justice Kirby, accepted the constitutional imperative that prevents a judge acting aspersona designata undertaking non-judicial functions incompatible with judicial office.

21. However, Justice Kirby paid great regard to the value of federal judges being available to perform certainnon-judicial tasks, arguing that this was 'incontestably to the benefit of good government' . Justice Kirby noted

the long tradition in Australia of federal and State judges carrying out often 'very controversial and partisan'

governmental inquiries.22. He commented that 'Australia's relatively small population, scarce governmental resources and limitednumbers of trained personnel argue strongly against the imposition of a new and rigid constitutional rule which

history, past practice and constitutional understandings to date would deny'.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persona_designataPersona designataFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, searchPersona designataFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search

The persona designata doctrine is a doctrine in Australian constitutional law which states that,

although it is generally impermissible for a federal judge to exercise non-judicial power, it is

permissible for a judge to do so if the power has been conferred on the judge personally, as opposedto powers having been conferred on the court. The doctrine is considered to be an exception to the

Boilermakers' doctrine ofseparation of powers, which holds that conferral of non-judicial power on

a Chapter III court (a federal court) is unconstitutional.[1]

Contents

1 Background

2 Development of the doctrine

3 Limits

o 3.1 Incompatibility

4 See also

5 References

[edit] Background

While the Australian system of government is parliamentary, with a "fusion of powers" between the

executive and the legislature, the separation of powers with respect to the judiciary has long beenaccepted as an important aspect of the Constitution of Australia.[2] The importance of the principle

is traditionally said to have reached its high point in 1956 with the Boilermakers' case,[2] in which

the High Court of Australia held that non-judicial power could not be conferred on a court

established under Chapter III of the Australian Constitution.[3]

However, Australia also has a long

history of judges being appointed to non-judicial positions.[2]


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The following extracts ma

chapter 003-_p30_legal fiction - persona designata

Documents