CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF HIERARCHIC AND ANARCHIC SYSTEMS

by

Korhan Yazgan

A thesis

presented to the University of Waterloo

in fulfilment of the

thesis requirement for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Political Science

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2005

© Korhan Yazgan 2005

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on change and persistence of the structure of the international

system. It attempts to address the question why hierarchic structures prevailed during the

Ancient and Classical eras (3000 B.C. – 1500 A.D.). The thesis compares and contrasts the

Roman Empire (the Pax Romana period 1st century B.C.-3rd century A.D.) and the Chinese

Empire (the T’ang Dynasty 618-907 A.D.) as hierarchic structures and the multi-state system

of ancient Greece (8th-4th century B.C.) and the multi-state system of ancient China (The

Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Period 722-221 B.C.) as anarchic structures. The

thesis suggests that the moral purpose of the state, the competitive security environment, the

desire for benefits and geopolitical and strategic advantages played the major role in the

immediate transformation from anarchy to hierarchy. The thesis asserts that the generation of

common goods, the decline in transaction costs and the success in securing the commitment of

the members and the legitimacy of the system enabled and encouraged the persistence of

hierarchic structures. It also re-emphasizes that whereas the persistence of hierarchic systems

depends on the existence of several factors, only one factor can promote the persistence of

anarchic structures e.g. the moral purpose of the state.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I express my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Asst. Prof. William B. Moul, for his encouragement, constructive critiques and insightful interest throughout the research. Thank you very much for being an excellent guide. I have learnt a great deal from him and one simply could not wish for a friendlier supervisor.

I would also like to thank Prof. Ashok Kapur for his valuable comments, insights and feedback. I have also greatly benefited from the commentary and guidance of Prof. Toivo Miljan.

I present my deep gratitude to Carole Gray, Shelley Vossen and Tracey Cote for their administrative help.

This thesis would not be possible without the generous financial support of Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities and the Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo.

I am grateful to Asst. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı, Asst. Prof. Julie Matthews and Asst. Prof. M. Fatih Tayfur for their support and encouragement.

I would like to offer my sincere thanks to Habib, Necla and Pınar Çelebi and Elif and Cevdet Saral. They provided me shelter and their moral support enabled me to finish my studies.

I am greatly indebted to my flat mate Emre Çelebi, who made everything possible. Not only is he the best chef ever, his friendship, constant support, technical help and infinite patience contributed immensely to my studies and ensured that I completed my thesis.

I have also had the great opportunity to have lovely friends; Nadir Budhwani, Daciana Drimbe, Amanda Steinhoff, Navneet and Geetali Vidyarthi, Laszlo Sarkany, Mehmet Gümüş, Keith Gomes, Jason Hildebrandt, Ryan Slade, Murat Yaşar and Gülay Göksel. Thank you very much for always offering support, love and for your invaluable friendship.

I would also like to express my thanks to all members of Yazgan family and my friends Burak Turgut, Orkun Sanaç, Levent Baran and Meltem Ünlü for their moral support and encouragement.

Many thanks to my parents and my brother, whose constant support, love and encouragement made this possible.

Finally, I should thank Ms. Nuray Ercelep, for her patience and forbearance. I offer my deep thanks for her understanding of my absence. One more time she made me believe the strength of love.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................... iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................... iv TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................... v LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... vii INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................... 1 Anarchy and Hierarchy .............................................................................................................. 3 The Hierarchic Structures .......................................................................................................... 7 The Anarchic Structures........................................................................................................... 14 CHAPTER I THE ROMAN EMPIRE THE PAX ROMANA PERIOD (1ST cc B.C. – 3RD cc A.D.)................................................. 20 The Transformation from Anarchy to Hierarchy.................................................................... 20 The Political Structure of the Roman Empire ......................................................................... 25 The Central and Provincial Administration ............................................................................ 26 The Center.................................................................................................................................. 26 Italy ............................................................................................................................................ 27 Provinces.................................................................................................................................... 28 Protectorates (Allied Kings) ...................................................................................................... 29 The Persistence of the Roman Hierarchical System ............................................................... 30 The Generation of Common Goods.......................................................................................... 30 Security ...................................................................................................................................... 30 Economic Prosperity ................................................................................................................. 33 The Decline in Transaction Costs ............................................................................................ 35 The Standardization of Coinage ............................................................................................... 36 The Standardization of Roman Law ........................................................................................ 37 The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System .................................... 40 CHAPTER II THE MULTI-STATE SYSTEM OF ANCIENT CHINA THE SPRING AND AUTUMN PERIOD (722-481 B.C.) & THE WARRING STATES PERIOD (403-221 B.C.) ........................................................... 46 The Political Structure of the Multi-State System of Ancient China...................................... 47 Comparison of Anarchic and Hierarchic Systems .................................................................. 52 The Generation of Common Goods.......................................................................................... 52 Security ...................................................................................................................................... 52 Economic Prosperity ................................................................................................................. 55 The Decline in Transaction Costs ............................................................................................ 59 The Standardization of Administrative Law ............................................................................ 59 The Standardization of Coinage and Weights and Measures ................................................. 61 The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System .................................... 62 Confucianism ............................................................................................................................. 66 Taoism........................................................................................................................................ 67

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TABLE OF CONTENTS......continued Mohism....................................................................................................................................... 67 Legalism ..................................................................................................................................... 68 CHAPTER III THE CHINESE EMPIRE THE T’ANG DYNASTY (618-907 A.D.) ............................................................................... 72 The Political Structure of the T’ang Dynasty .......................................................................... 73 The Central Administration...................................................................................................... 73 The Provincial Administration ................................................................................................. 76 The Persistence of the Chinese Hierarchical System .............................................................. 79 The Generation of Common Goods.......................................................................................... 79 Security ...................................................................................................................................... 79 Economic Prosperity ................................................................................................................. 81 The Economic Development of the T’ang Dynasty ................................................................. 82 The Effective Mobilization of Resources ................................................................................. 84 The Equal Distribution of Burdens and Benefits .................................................................... 86 The Decline in Transaction Costs ............................................................................................ 87 The Standardization of Written Language .............................................................................. 88 The Standardization of Administrative Procedures and the Codified Law ............................ 88 The Standardization of Coinage ............................................................................................... 90 The Standardization of Weights and Measures ....................................................................... 91 The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System .................................... 93 The Examination System .......................................................................................................... 94 The Legitimacy of the Chinese Empire .................................................................................... 96 The Foreign Relations of the T’ang Empire: The Tribute System in Fact ............................ 99 CHAPTER IV THE MULTI-STATE SYSTEM OF GREECE THE ARCHAIC AND THE CLASSICAL PERIOD (800-400 B.C.) ................................ 107 The Political Structure of the Multi-State System of Ancient Greece .................................. 108 Comparison of Anarchic and Hierarchic Systems ................................................................ 114 The Generation of Common Goods........................................................................................ 114 Security .................................................................................................................................... 114 Economic Prosperity ............................................................................................................... 117 The Decline in Transaction Costs .......................................................................................... 121 The Standardization of Written Language ............................................................................ 122 The Standardization of Administrative Procedures and the Codified Law .......................... 123 The Standardization of Coinage and Weights and Measures ............................................... 126 The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System .................................. 128 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 134 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 141

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Weights and Measures in T’ang Dynasty ……………………………………… 92

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INTRODUCTION

Robert Gilpin suggests that in order to understand system change, a change in the

nature of the actors that compose system, demands a truly comparative study of international

relations and systems (1981:41). Gilpin argues that the general question of why one or another

type of entity predominates a particular historical period has been inadequately addressed

(1981:41). Then, he indicates a very important and challenging question:

What this question asks is why, at various times and in differing contexts, individuals and groups believe one political form rather than another is best suited to advance their interests (Gilpin, 1981:41).

Several forms of political organization such as city-states, empires, city-leagues, nation-

states in certain periods of history coexisted, disappeared and reappeared again in different

forms up until the late nineteenth century. When the first global political system had taken the

form of a system of states Bull points out that:

World order could in principle be achieved by other forms of universal political organization, and a standing question is whether world order might not better be served by such other forms…indeed, the form of the states system has been the exception rather than the rule (1977:20-1).

Hendrik Spruyt, using methods of new institutional history and historical sociology,

answered the question why sovereign territorial state displaced with city-states and city-leagues

by the middle of the seventieth century (1994). Similar studies have not been applied to forms

of political organizations other than sovereign territorial states and it is worth while to explore

why in ancient times different forms of political organizations shaped the political life and why

not others.

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During the Ancient and Classical eras (3000 B.C. to 1500 A.D.) particular hierarchical

forms have co-existed with other hierarchies as well as with anarchic multi-state systems such

as the Roman Empire and the Warring States of China and ancient Greece, the Imperial China,

the Mongol Empire and ancient India; the Habsburg Empire and the Italian city state system.

Nevertheless, Gilpin suggests that the hierarchical types of system or empires have been most

prevalent, at least until modern times (1981:29). Moreover, Buzan and Little argue that during

the Ancient and Classical eras multi-actor systems of independent units certainly existed but

were not stable and were transformed into hierarchic structures (2000: 232). In South Asia, the

East Asia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, anarchic systems regularly and repeatedly

collapsed into empires or suzerain systems. In this context, the question why hierarchic

structures prevailed during the Ancient and Classical eras (3000 B.C. to 1500 A.D.) remains to

be answered.

In order to understand why hierarchical forms of organization prevailed, I analyzed four

case studies: the Roman Empire (the Pax Romana period 1st century B.C.-3rd century A.D.), the

Chinese Empire (the T’ang Dynasty 618-907 A.D.), the multi-state system of ancient Greece

(8th-4th century B.C.) and the multi-state system of ancient China (The Spring and Autumn and

the Warring States Period 722-221 B.C.). Whereas the Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire

are considered as hierarchic structures, the multi-state system of ancient Greece and China are

considered as exceptional or alternative anarchic structures.

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Anarchy and Hierarchy

Systems are regularized patterns of relations among political units (Lieber, 1972:121;

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971:102; Rosecrance, 1963:220-1; Yost, 1979:152; Holsti,

1974:29; Aron, 1966:94; Hoffman, 1961:207; Modelski, 1961:121; Gilpin, 1981:26; Kaplan,

1957:14). “A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units” and “the structure is

the system wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole” (Waltz,

1979:79). Waltz defines political structure on the basis of the principle according to which they

are organized or ordered, the character of the units – the differentiation of units and the

specification of their functions – and the distribution of capabilities across them (1979:88).

According to first principle, structure is defined on the basis of how units stand in

relation to one another, namely how they are arranged or positioned. Hierarchic structures are

centralized systems in which the units stand in relations of super- and subordination (Waltz,

1979:88). On the contrary, anarchic structures are decentralized systems in which the units

stand as equal parts (Waltz, 1979:88). Structure also depends on the functions performed by

differentiated or undifferentiated units (Waltz, 1979:93). The relations of super- and

subordination among the units in hierarchic structures imply their differentiation and thereby

their functions. On the contrary, as long as anarchy prevails states remain like units, because in

anarchic structures they have relations of coordination which implies their sameness (Waltz,

1979:93). Finally, the units of a system are distinguished by their greater or lesser capabilities

which determine their relations to one another (Waltz, 1979:97). Since the units are

functionally undifferentiated and perform similar tasks in anarchic systems, they are

distinguished by their greater or lesser capabilities (Waltz, 1979:97). In hierarchic systems

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units are related to one another by the extent of their capabilities and their functional

differentiation.

On the basis of this conceptual framework, anarchic and hierarchic structures are two

forms of political organization that existed during the Ancient and Classical eras. The Roman

and the Chinese Empires are examples of hierarchic structures and the multi-state systems of

Greece and China are examples of anarchic structures. However, on the basis of the dominant

view of structure, it is not possible to view empires as hierarchic structures. According to

Waltz’s conceptualization of structure, all empires exist within the same structural form (Little,

1993:91). There is no structural distinction between the British or the Roman Empire because

both of them existed in an anarchical setting. Empires extend their territories in the context of

broader anarchic systems so that no systemic transformation occurs through the establishment

of empires whether in the ancient or modern world because no single authority can dominate

the entire political units. Therefore the world system is considered as a continuous anarchic

system (Little, 1993:91-2).

Nevertheless, Wallerstein argues that there is a sharp distinction between the Roman

and the British Empire because the Roman Empire eliminated the other power centers in its

broader system so that it became a world empire (Little, 1993:92). On the contrary, the British

Empire always acted in an anarchic system with other competing states. Therefore, there is a

distinction between empires that exist within an anarchic system and those that transform the

system and alter the anarchic structure (Little, 1993:92). Obviously, Wallerstein’s arguments

are based on the idea that empires are closed systems. Wallerstein suggests that world systems

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are largely self-contained systems and the dynamics of development in these systems are

largely internal (1974:347). The world systems coexisted and they were not parts of larger

social systems. Although there might be contact between systems these contacts did not have

sufficient material effect (Little, 1993:93). However, Bozeman argues that it is difficult to

consider these empires as self-contained autonomous units, in fact although they pretend to be

unique and undisputed powers within the frontiers of their empires, they were actually aware of

each other’s existence and they maintained contact indirectly by means of trade (Little,

1993:94). Therefore, Bozeman challenges the idea that empires were self-sufficient, largely

contained and autonomous units.

Furthermore, Little argues that it is difficult to interpret the Roman Empire as a closed

autonomous system (1993:96). Little suggests that world system can be analyzed as a system

which is divided into several subsystems. In this sense the expansion of Rome can be

considered as a process of expansion of subsystems. Initially, Rome expanded through its

subsystem and then her subsystem coexisted with others and she eventually conquered them all

(Little, 1993:97). Little says, “The agents of these units perceived themselves to be operating

within an international subsystem that was relatively autonomous” (1993:97). The multi-state

system of Greece and the Persian Empire were two examples of subsystems that the Romans

took over. Nevertheless, the concept of subsystem is quite difficult to sustain because it

presupposes the existence of an international system that comprised of the entire political units

at that period. In this sense, the Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire might be considered as

units of regional systems which were not parts of a larger system. To a certain extent these

regional systems were self-contained which developed their own dynamics although they

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cannot be considered as completely isolated from each other. They demonstrated significant

characteristics of a system and it is difficult to consider them as part of a broader anarchic

system because there was not a general system that characterized the entire political units at

that era. In this sense, the structure of these regional systems can be considered as hierarchic or

anarchic within their boundaries. Therefore, the expansion of Rome and China can be

considered as structural transformations within their regional systems. These systems were

transformed into hierarchic structures through the conquest of all units in the system and

hierarchic structures prevailed for long time.

In addition to hierarchic case studies the study will examine multi state-systems of

Greece and China as anarchic examples. A multi-state system or “A system of states or

international system is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them,

and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in

some measure – as parts of a whole” (Bull, 1995:9). Two or more states or even several

systems of states may exist at the same time without forming an international system. They

may have direct or indirect interaction, and interactions may take a form between conflicts

through cooperation.

Wight asserts that for states to form a system of states, “not only must each claim

independence of any political superior for itself, but each must recognize the validity of the

same claim by all the others” (1977:23). He labels the Western, the Hellenistic, the Chinese

system (771 BC – 221 AD) and the South India as clear examples (Wight, 1977:22). It is

obvious that ancient Greece and China were system of states that consisted of independent

states. These systems were truly anarchic structures as states stand equal to each other.

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The Hierarchic Structures

The research question is examined as a process of transformation from anarchy to

hierarchy and hierarchy to anarchy. The reasons of predominance of hierarchic structures will

be analyzed on the basis of three stages. The first stage is the emergence of the hierarchic

structure or the collapse of anarchic structure. In this stage the actual shift from hierarchy to

anarchy occurs, such as the establishment of an empire. The duree of the stage depends on the

circumstances. The second stage is the maintenance of the hierarchic structure. The reasons

why a system shifted to a hierarchic structure and why it remains as such may be different

because after the first stage certain dynamics emerge and create incentives to the actors of the

system (both center and parts) to sustain the hierarchic structure. In other words, an anarchic

structure can be conceived as a totality, which is the sum of the parts. Whereas, a hierarchic

structure is more than the mere sum of parts, it has certain properties that arise from the process

of integration and these properties might turn out to be forces that encourage actors to maintain

it. In the third stage, the hierarchic structure dissolves into an anarchic structure again.

Although all of these stages are interrelated there are certain factors that affect each of them

separately. Nevertheless, the particular interest of this project will be the first and second

stages.

“Most states-systems have ended in a universal empire, which has swallowed all the

states-system” (Wight, 1977:43). The first and second chapters deal with two universal

empires: the Roman and the Chinese. This analysis demonstrates that the major reason of the

transformation from hierarchy to anarchy (the first stage) was the unification of the system

through conquest in order to achieve peace. Rome and the state of Qin pursued similar policies

7

and their conception of security was based on domination of their enemies. Both of these states

were in a competitive security environment in which states identify each other’s security

negatively and see the others as enemies. One of the major implications of this type of self-

other identification is that states will act like deep revisionists and may try to destroy or

conquer others (Wendt, 1999:262).

These characteristics were clear for the Roman Empire. Garnsey and Whittaker suggest

that the very existence of a truly independent power was viewed by Rome as a potential threat

to her own security (1978:170) and “right from the start there was the determination to

dominate whatever was within reach and to build up strength to extend that reach” (Badian,

1968:5-6). “For every new gain, every increase in power – whether by extension of influence

or territorial control – required and created a new security zone, and every new neighbor,

especially a powerful one, became – or was perceived as – a threat, regardless of earlier

alliances” (Raaflub, 1996:300). Furthermore, the major security policy of the state of Qin was

“the more states were suppressed the wider the area of unity and order would become, until

only one state existed and there would be no more war” (Watson, 1992:91). In this context, the

main reason of the transformation from anarchy to hierarchy stemmed from the policies of

these states, which sought peace through conquest and unification under a single authority.

Obviously, their efforts were supported by other several features such as geopolitical position,

rich natural resources, strong aristocratic warrior traditions and values, the size of their

territory, the impact of outside pressure and most significantly the military capabilities and

inability of their neighbors to prevent their domination. Doyle mentions that the neighboring

societies of Rome were either too weak to threaten Roman security, once overrun, or their pro-

8

Roman factions and patrimonial rulers found positive incentives to collaborate with Rome

(1986:91). In respect of the Chinese Empire, Rodzinski claims that the unification was

particularly a result of the aggressiveness and the failure of the other states to oppose Qin

effectively (1979:32). However, without the fear of others and the desire to achieve peace

through conquest, all these factors remain secondary.

After the establishment of the unification and the hierarchic structure, certain dynamics

emerge within the system and they turn out to be incentives for both the center and the parts to

sustain the hierarchic relationship. First of all, the generation of common goods such as

security, economic prosperity, effective mobilization of resources, and facilities for

transportation and communication encourages hierarchic structures. The Roman Empire during

the Augustus period did so. Peace was enduring, dependent not on Augustus but on Rome, so

that it was called Pax Romana, which stood for peace and order (Last, 1975:445; Watson,

1992:99). Similarly, the T’ang dynasty was able to secure peace during his reign. As Rodzinski

notes, “there had been few eras in world history when a civilized area existed in peace for such

a long time. The remark is, unfortunately, true enough and a very bitter comment on the history

of the human race” (1979:131). The military capabilities and military strategy, the national

fidelity of people, the strength of balanced government, the political stability, the social and

cultural forces of honor and religion, the conditions of its neighbors, the continuous waging of

war were some of the factors that contributed to the military success of these Empires

(Luttwak, 1976; Mann, 1986:274; Doyle, 1986:85-91; Brunt, 1990:102-114; Ferrill, 1986:25-8;

Blainey, 1988; Somers, 1986:973; Wechsler, 1979:160-1; Rodzinski, 1979:131; Li, 1978:176).

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Although not guaranteed, peace and security promote economic prosperity. Peace and

security are the major conditions of the realization of economic activities and implementation

of economic policies. Becoming part of a peaceful Empire can secure opportunities for

economic growth. The Pax Romana and the T’ang dynasty were remarkable examples of these

peaceful periods, which resulted in the availability of economic benefits as a common good.

Hopkins very clearly summarizes: “The Roman empire provided conditions for modest

economic growth…by extending the area of cultivated land…by increasing the size of

agricultural units to achieve economies of scale…by using systematic accounting methods…by

allowing and encouraging the growth or persistence of towns…by effecting economies of

scale…by achieving significant increases in productivity” (2000:11-2). Adshead and Eberhard

suggest that the period of T’ang dynasty was wealthier and more populous than the Han had

ever been (Adshead, 1995:56, 68; Eberhard, 1977:180). Several years of internal peace, good

harvests and effective administrative policies, the equal-field system, state monopolies,

government owned manufactories, development of the crafts, improved communications,

significant amount of sea trade, the Buddhist monasticism and spread of capitalism were some

of the factors that encouraged the economic growth (Wechsler, 1979:209; Rodzinski,

1979:120-2; Adshead, 1995:56-8; Latourette, 1967:153). As mentioned above, the realization

of these secondary factors depends on peace as a primary factor. Furthermore, the Rome and

the T’ang dynasty were also able to provide the effective mobilization of resources and equal

distribution of burdens and benefits as other common goods that promoted the maintenance of

hierarchic structures.

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Another dynamic of the hierarchic structures is the reduction in transactions costs in

various types of interactions. Transaction costs emerge when two or more actors coordinate or

cooperate to perform certain tasks and achieve mutual goals in various spheres of social life.

Transaction costs may involve in gathering, evaluating and exchange information, in preparing

for, negotiating and concluding verbal or written agreements, producing, transporting and trade

of commercial products, and so on. Weber argues that cooperated efforts are more efficient

than individual efforts so that actors facing high transaction costs could benefit from joining

political entities with well developed cooperative organizational structures (Weber, 2000:17).

If a central administration is able to provide and implement standardized regulations and

procedures evenly throughout its entire system, this might reduce transaction costs and create a

significant incentive for both the center and the parts to sustain the hierarchic form. The major

fields in which transaction costs were decreased are security, economy, transportation and law.

Both the Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire pursued very successful policies that there

was a high level of uniformity and standardization within the Empire. The reduction in

transaction costs in the Roman Empire can be observed in the economic sphere through the

standardization of administrative law and procedures, the standardization of coinage, and

weights and measures (Mann, 1986:271-2; Starr, 1982:26; Hopkins, 1980; Bozeman,

1960:187-211; Garnsey and Saller, 1987:55; Edmondson, 1993:184). Furthermore, the

technical and practical capacities of the legions of Rome and the projects that were realized

reduced transaction costs in transportation and communication (Mann, 1986:274-6). Watson

says, “The advantages of empire were plain to see. Law, currency, weights and measures were

standardized. Commerce and industry thrived under Pax Romana, with goods moving largely

by sea over a Mediterranean now at last substantially free of pirates” (1992:101). Furthermore,

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the T’ang Empire was able to reduce the transaction costs in several spheres such as

administrative procedures and written language, coinage, measure and weights, and a standard

application of codified law (Li, 1978:101-2; MacNair, 1951:73-4; Fairbank, 1978:7; Wechsler,

1979:177-8; McKnight, 1995:410-20; Wechsler and Twitchett, 1979:273-7; Twitchett,

1970:66-78; Eisenstadt, 1969:48).

Finally, the ability to provide commitment and the legitimacy of the system is an

important factor that promoted the dominance of hierarchic structures. The belief in the moral

purpose of the state deeply affects the legitimacy of particular forms of political organizations

and legitimacy is directly connected to commitment.1 The more legitimacy the authority has,

the more likely it sustains commitment. Furthermore, there are other factors that encourage the

commitment of members to the system. Easier assimilation and integration and the high

mobility of elites in the system will provide easier access to the benefits. This in turn will

increase the commitment of members to the system because if the members share the benefits

of the system they will favor and defend the maintenance of the system.

The Roman Empire was very successful in securing the commitment of states and

individuals to the center and to the system as a whole. Besides the use of force, the gradual

development of ideological, political and cultural integration among all provincial elites (the

Romanization of the provincial elites), the extension of citizenship, the diffusion of Senate

membership and Rome’s process of interaction between the center and periphery are the major

factors that provide commitment and legitimacy throughout the Empire (Lendon, 1997:7;

1 The moral purpose of the state can be defined as a conception of the individual or social good that historical agents hold for organizing their political life (Reus-Smit, 1999:31).

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Mann, 1986:254,260-7; Doyle, 1986:91; Dise, 1991:7-8; Edmondson, 1993:181; Brunt,

1990:127; Sherwin-White, 1973:222; Garnsey and Saller, 1987:123-4). Especially the notion

of citizenship was very crucial as Mann suggests: “Greek style citizenship of Rome itself to

produce what was probably the widest extent of collective commitment yet mobilized”

(1986:254). Furthermore, the Roman society and economy were imperialized by pursuing the

welfare of its parts. The Emperor aimed to distribute the burden of taxation equally and secured

the fair collection and expansion of revenues of the State (Doyle, 1986:87). In this sense the

equal distribution of benefits and burdens was another factor that contributed to the

commitment of the citizens.

The T’ang dynasty was also able to provide elite commitment through political, cultural

and ideological integration, by using ideological, coercive and remunerative measures, and

through the legitimacy of the concept of Sino-centrism (Somers, 1986:981; Fairbank, 1992:84-

5; Latourette, 1967:143; Li, 1978:179-180; Pye, 1984:67-8). Particularly the concept of Sino-

centrism and the examination system were vitally effective to provide the commitment of

Chinese. However, the T’ang dynasty had difficulties to sustain the commitment of the non-

Chinese population and the relation of the Empire with non-Chinese societies was not stable

(Fairbank, 1968:2-11; Zhang, 2001:52-8; Wechsler, 1979:286-7; Rodzinski, 1979:122-3;

Eberhard, 1977:180-1; Cranmer-Byng, 1973:68; Schwartz, 1968:276-8; Ng-Quinn, 1983;

Yang, 1968:24-31).

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The Anarchic Structures

The multi-state systems of Greece (8th – 4th century B.C.) and the multi-state system of

ancient China (The Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Period 722 – 221 B.C.) were

truly anarchic structures that consisted of small independent states. The third and fourth

chapters of the study focus on why these multi-state systems remained anarchic in an era,

which was remarked by hierarchical structures. The analysis of the multi-states system of

Greece reveals that, although several conditions to maintain a hierarchic structure existed, the

moral purpose of the state seems to be the major factor that led these states to remain

independent.

Initially, the study shall consider whether the dynamics that emerge in hierarchic

structures emerged in the anarchic structures as well. Anarchic structures are less likely to

provide security as a common good. Throughout the Archaic and Classical periods, although

peace was seen as the primary goal of Greek way of life and there were methods for peaceful

settlements of disputes, the Greeks fought for various reasons such as power and

aggrandizement, material enrichment, border disputes, honor and respect, fear, etc. (Finley,

1963:56-7; Osborne, 2000:82-3; Watson, 1992:50). Bozeman suggests that the chief reason for

war was the city-state itself because “[t]he polis was to secure a good life for the people in

terms of individual development, and since the realization of this aim was deemed to be

possible only if a city did not exceed a certain size…peace through political unification was

actually inconsistent with the primary purpose of political association as understood by the

Greeks” (Bozeman, 1960:77-8). In the economic sphere, the Greek city-states managed to

increase their welfare during the Archaic and Classical period and the system already

14

maintained several conditions for further economic growth. However, the lack of a hierarchic

structure like the Roman Empire impeded further economic rise because of the lack of security

especially in sea-borne trade, numerous media of exchanges and methods, difficulties in

transportation among states, lack of standardized economic regulations, lack of legal security

and property, etc. (Starr, 1982:428, 1991:315; Hammond, 1986). Moreover, the Greek city-

states system consisted of several elements that reduced the transaction costs within the city-

states, such as standardized language and alphabets, codification of law and standardized

administrative procedures (Bengtson, 1988:63; Mann, 1986:204-6; Rollo, 1937:135-6; Van

Sickle, 1974:269-70; Graham, 1982; Freeman, 1999:104; Wight, 1977:52; Kokaz, 2001:95;

Ober, 1996:56). Nevertheless, due to the importance given to the independence and autonomy

of the city-states, these factors were mostly limited to the boundaries of individual city-states.

The major factor that led to the maintenance of the anarchic structure was the

commitment of the citizens to the polis. The main political form of Hellas, the poleis, unlike

other contemporary forms of organizations, sustained the commitment of elites and the loyalty

and active participation of all male adults. First of all, geographical fragmentation and isolation

contributed to the development of polis (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:50; Finley, 1963:21;

Sealey, 1976:10). Second, the moral basis of the polis, the moral values and philosophical

assumptions of Greeks led them to form a community life based on the form of polis

(Bozeman, 1960:70-1; Holsti, 1974:46; Reus-Smit, 1999:46; Kokaz, 2001:101). Third, the

development of citizenship, which was based on mutual responsibility for the administration of

the city, was another factor (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:54; Freeman, 1999:90; Finley,

1963:23). Fourth, the emergence of hoplite warfare and phalanx was an important factor that

15

promoted the emergence of community consciousness and commitment to the polis (Freeman,

1999:91-3).

The analysis of the Spring and Autumn Period (SAP) 722-481 B.C. and the Warring

States period (WSP) 403-221 B.C. demonstrates first of all that there is clear evidence of the

sovereignty of the states that comprised the system (Holsti, 1974:33; Walker, 1953:24; Watson,

1992:85). In this anarchic structure, although peace and security were two major goals of these

states, they chose war as a means to achieve peace and war became a normal part of life (Li,

1978:40-53; Walker, 1953:76-88; Holsti, 1974:43; Lewis, 1999:616, 632). The fundamental

aim of these wars was to control the central area of China, the Honan province, plunder and

increase in territory (Rodzinski, 1979:26, 28). In the economic sphere, Ancient China

witnessed a rudimental growth during the SAP and the WSP. The great improvement in the

means of production and distribution, the introduction of iron, the efficient farming, the land

tenure system and land taxation, a large number of extensive transportation and irrigation

projects, specialization in manufacture, the rise in influence and activities of merchants and

state policies brought about greater welfare to the states (Hsu, 1999:577-80; Rodzinski,

1979:24; Walker, 1953:17-8; Li, 1978:60-2; Eberhard, 1960:55). During these periods,

substantial reduction in transaction costs was realized within the individual states. The states

standardized their administrative procedures by the replacement of older internal rules and

forms by a systematic code of laws (Walker, 1953:34). Although the rise in economy resulted

in the growth of a money economy and the emergence of minted coins, at the systemic level

there was no uniformity in medium of exchange (Eberhard, 1960:55; Lewis, 1999:607).

Regarding the weights and measures, it could be argued that although there was a standard

16

within the individual state, there were various measures of units in different states (Lewis,

1999:610).

The commitment and loyalty of the people also played a very important role in the

emergence, maintenance and collapse of the anarchic structure. Initially, the multi-state system

of China transformed from the feudal system of the Zhou dynasty. Since the vassals were given

land by the Emperor they were directly committed to the Emperor. However, the increase in

power of individual feudal lords at the expense of the Zhou dynasty resulted in the emergence

of the anarchic system. The acquisition of further territory, the isolation of feudal lords, the

aggrandizement among the vassals, the establishment of local administration and the

development of central bureaucracies within the individual states, the organization and

maintenance of armed forces and its extension into the countryside, the extension of tax

liability, the recognition of the property, large-scale irrigation and construction projects,

collection and storage of grains, construction of walled cities resulted in the increase of the

power and independence of feudal lords at the expense of the central authority (Eberhard,

1950:34; Holsti, 1974:35; Lewis, 1999:611; Walker, 1953:35). Meanwhile, the commitment

and loyalty of the people shifted from the dynasty to the prince of the state and the state itself

(Walker, 1953:36). The increase in awareness of broad differences in dialect, customs, religion,

legends, and cults among the various regions and the growth of rudimentary forms of

nationalism promoted this process.

These were the major reasons why the system transformed and remained anarchic

during these periods. Nevertheless, a major characteristic of these periods reveals the fact that

17

the moral purpose of the state did not fit with the form of the political organization of the

system. There were 1773 states in the Zhou dynasty. Throughout the beginning of the SAP,

these states were consolidated and allied with each other and their number decreased to 170

and then 14. At the beginning of the SAP in 722 B.C., there were seven major states.

Therefore, there was a clear-cut period of consolidation and absorption. This consolidation

continued during the SAP and WSP and the multi-state system collapsed with the ultimate

triumph of state of Ch’in (Qin) and its establishment of rule over all of China in 221 B.C. The

major factor behind this consolidation was the moral purpose of the state. The moral purpose

of the state was based on the philosophical assumptions of the Legalist school and the concept

of Sino-centrism. The central assumption of Sino-centric world order was that China was the

civilization and the Chinese emperor as Son of Heaven had the mandate of Heaven to rule. The

major dictum of the Legalist school was that subjugation of all hostile states would lead

realistically to peace. “because the more states were suppressed the wider the area of unity and

order would become, until only one state existed and there would be no more war” (Watson,

1992:91). The state of Qin was the pioneer of the Legalist school and the unity of all under

Heaven. Furthermore, Watson and Rubin suggest that the legalist ideas on organizing the state

for war and achieving peace through universal conquest reflect the policies actually pursued by

those states (Watson, 1992:91; Rubin, 1976:55). On the basis of these assumptions the

existence of multiple states that were independent of and not subordinate to Heaven was an

unacceptable idea to Chinese political thought. Obviously, the moral purpose of the state

cannot solely be attributed to the success of the state of Qin. However it was the major

stimulating force behind its policy.

18

The final chapter concludes that the desire to achieve peace accompanied with natural,

social and institutional advantages led to the transformation from anarchy to hierarchy. The

generation of common goods such as security, economic prosperity, effective mobilization of

resources, the decline in transaction costs in security, economy, transformation and law and the

success of Rome and T’ang dynasty to sustain the commitment of members of the system and

the legitimacy of it as a whole were the major factors that led to the persistence of hierarchic

structures. The Greek’s belief in the moral purpose of the state promoted by the geographical,

moral and strategic factors encouraged the persistence of an anarchic system in the multi-state

system of Greece. Although the multi-state system of China remained anarchic as a result of

the dissolution of the feudal system of Zhou dynasty, the moral purpose of the state and the

philosophical and moral values of the system promoted the emergence of the hierarchic

structure.

19

CHAPTER I

THE ROMAN EMPIRE

THE PAX ROMANA PERIOD (1ST cc B.C. – 3RD cc A.D.)

The history of the Roman Empire is classified by historians as the Kingdom (until the

5th century B.C.), the Republic (5th – 1st century B.C.), and the Empire (1st century B.C. – 3rd

century A.D.). Although during the Republican period, the Roman city-state acquired a vast

empire, the emergence of a system of government controlled by an emperor marked the

beginning of the Roman Empire (Ward, Heichelheim and Yeo, 1999:246). The first three

hundred years of the Empire is identified, as the Principate because of one of the chief titles of

the emperor was the princeps, the first among equals within the Roman nobility. After 282

A.D., the empire is identified as the Dominate because the princeps abandoned and the title

dominus, lord and master adopted. This chapter examines the reasons of persistence of the

Roman hierarchic structure during the Pax Romana Period (The Principate – 1st century B.C. –

3rd century A.D.) In order to understand why a hierarchical structure developed and

maintained, initially, I shall focus on the immediate transformation of the structure from

anarchy to hierarchy.

The Transformation from Anarchy to Hierarchy

The Roman Empire was established through conquest of Rome. Therefore, the

motivations of this annexation might reveal the factors that led to the formation of the

hierarchic structure. There are several factors that encouraged Rome for annexation such as

Rome’s identification of self and other and its implication on their foreign policy, the lack of

20

any impediment against the rise of Rome such as rivalry of other states, the fear of powerful

neighbors, the strength of the Roman army, the habituation to war and record of success, the

benefits of this success, and the continuing demand for more benefits (Rich, 2004:61).

The self other identification is an important element that determines foreign policies of

states. The conception of security at that period was definitely different from others.

Understanding the context of the era is vital, because certain periods of history can be

classified according to their specific circumstances. It is possible that we could make an

analogy between the security environment of the Roman Empire and the hypothetical

construction of Wendt’s security systems. Wendt argues that concept of security changes

according to how the self is identified cognitively with the other (1992:399). He presents three

security systems according to different identifications of the self and other. One of these

systems is a competitive security system that has a Hobbesian culture of security (Wendt,

1992:400, 1999:259). In this type of system states identify each other’s security negatively and

see the others as enemies. This kind of representing the other as an enemy has at least four

implications for a state’s foreign policy posture and behavior (Wendt, 1999:262). Under these

systems (a) states will act like deep revisionists and may try to destroy or conquer them (b)

their decisions will discount the future and may be oriented toward the worst case (c) the

relative military capabilities will be seen as crucial (d) states will fight on the enemy’s terms,

namely, observing no limits on their own violence. The logic of this kind of systems is clear:

the war of all against all in which actors operate on the principle of kill or be killed. It is truly a

self-help system where nobody can account on each other for help. Security is seen as a deeply

competitive zero-sum affair and security dilemmas are particularly acute. Finally, these types

21

of structures may generate four types of tendencies at the macro level (Wendt, 1999:265): (a)

endemic or unlimited warfare (b) elimination of unfit actors (c) balancing among powerful

states (d) difficult neutrality or non-alignment.

Obviously, the security environment of the Roman Empire and Wendt’s competitive

security system with a Hobbesian anarchy is not perfect matches. However, there are certain

elements that can be identified in the period of the Roman Empire that are similar to Wendt’s

hypothetical construction. When we look at the Roman history we see continuous fighting till

the period of Pax Romana. During the period of Kingdom and early Republic Rome was in a

struggle for survival with the Etruscans (sixth century), Latin city-states (sixth to fifth

centuries), with its immediate neighbors such as Veii, Sabin, Aequ and Volsc (fifth century),

with Gauls (fifth to fourth centuries), Samnites (fourth century), and with Carthage (fourth

century). During these centuries, similar to a competitive security system, we observe intense

fighting among units threatening the very existence of one another. Raaflaub clearly

emphasizes the external threat against Roman Empire and its consequences on politics and

culture of the society. Raaflaub says that one of the reasons that made Rome an imperialist

state was

… outside pressure. The decisive fact is that there was such pressure but that it was intense, threatening the very existence of the city, and that it continued, almost without interruption, for a very long time: one hundred fifty years, six generations….Rome, too, I suggest, was only able to overcome its difficulties by adjusting its value system, behavior patterns, and social as well as communal structures. It did so in various ways (1996:290-1).

Rich points out

The Romans were not always successful in their wars and some enemies – the Gauls, Pyrrhus, Hannibal – threatened the very survival of the Republic.

22

Memories of these dangers were real enough, and in my judgement the fear of powerful neighbors, although not, as used to be supposed, the key to Roman imperialism, must remain an important factor in accounting it (2004:61).

According to Raaflub, the Latin wars in 338 B.C. were a turning point for Rome where

she gained a decisive victory. From that moment on Rome was transformed into an imperial

city-state from a hegemonic city-state and followed a clear imperialist policy (1996:289). After

consolidating its power from these successive wars we see the great expansion of Rome

towards Italy, Western Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, Africa and more. Obviously, the

effect of this security environment deeply influenced the foreign policy behavior of Rome.

During this imperialistic phase the main element of the Roman conception of security is based

on domination of the enemy. Badian suggests

Roman policy, from almost as far as back as we can trace it, was different [from that of the Hellenistic powers]. Of course, for a long time Rome had to recognize the equality of some other powers. …But right from the start there was the determination to dominate whatever was within reach and to build up strength to extend that reach. Equality was conceded only beyond the range of effective power, and every attempt was made to build up power where it had shown itself deficient (1968:5-6).

Raaflaub says “For every new gain, every increase in power – whether by extension of

influence or territorial control- required and created a new security zone, and every new

neighbor, especially a powerful one, became-or was perceived as – a threat, regardless of

earlier alliances” (1996:300). The limits of territory that Rome claimed dominion were

continually advancing. The expansion did not cease as long as any independent people

remained. The very existence of a truly independent power was viewed by Rome as a potential

threat to her own security (Garnsey and Whittaker, 1978:170). The internal pacification was

the main strategy of Rome during this phase. In this context, we may argue that Rome’s policy

23

was based on the idea of conquering the enemy, and it tends to account on the worst scenario.

The long years of war between small city-states created an enemy based self-other

identification. The struggles for survival for long years made war an evitable part of life and

led to emergence of shared knowledge about the identities, roles and identifications of self and

other as enemies.

Obviously, security was not the only factor that encouraged Rome for further expansion

and warfare. Rome’s expansion was not a continuous process sustained at a stable rate,

therefore, there is no single determining factor behind the expansion. In fact, there were many

and complex determining factors. The Roman imperialism and security through domination for

the Populus Imperium Romanum was intertwined. Romans waged war for expansionism and

for several benefits of this expansion and exploitation such as land, booty, glory and tribute

(Brunt, 1990:267; Raaflaub, 1996:279; Rich, 2004:62; Doyle, 1986:125). Harris suggests that

apart from defensive considerations, the habituation to continuous warfare and desire for glory

and economic benefits, which were conferred by successful wars, there were some other

factors that promoted Rome’s desire for further expansion (1979:234-40; 1989:153-6;

2004:18). Glory was an important factor. Romans believed that all good men should seek

otium cum dignitate (Garnsey and Whittaker, 1978:161). Otuim stands for security from

external attack and dignitas suggests the glory of the whole state. Raaflub suggests that

achievement in political and military leadership played a very important role in the political

ethos and value system of Roman aristocracy (1996:278-9). Glory and dignity can only be

achieved through public service and great achievements in war. “Once it was in place, it must

have had a profound effect on foreign policy decisions” (Raaflub, 1996:279). Rich points out

24

that in several cases, the Roman commanders decided to wage war at their own discretion for

their desire to win glory (2004:57). Furthermore, Rich asserts that land and booty were two

major benefits that most Roman citizens got from war and after major wars confiscated land

was distributed among them in land allotments until the fifth century (2004:53). Land and

booty were two major needs and benefits that encouraged Rome to wage wars. A growing

population, the growth of large landholders, the growing demand of landless urban proletariat,

the need for colonization and the change in the character of the army were the major factors

that pressured Rome to fight more wars (Doyle, 1986:87-8).

The Political Structure of the Roman Empire

After the transformation, the hierarchical structure of the Roman Empire began to be

established. During the Kingdom, for many years, Rome fought several wars with its

immediate neighbors and traces of the imperial structure of Rome appeared after the Roman

dominance in Italy. Rome was able to achieve unity in three centuries and during this period

the administrative structure of the Roman system was continuously changing (Homo,

1996:321). When the Republic was abolished, Rome was composed of Rome and Italy,

protectorates and provinces. The establishment of Empire increased this variety by the division

of provinces into distinct categories and by the possession of Egypt as a completely different

category. I shall focus on the period of Principate when the foundations of the hierarchical

structure were established.

25

The Central and Provincial Administration

The Center

Initially, Roman society was organized like a confederation of communities called

Populus Romanus who were citizens consisted of three tribus (communities). Every tribus

consists of ten curias and every curia has ten gens (clans). The head of populus was a king who

helds the right of imperium (execution). He was also the chief of priests, chief of justice and

the general commander. There were two assemblies ranking below the King: the comitia

curiata and the Senate. The comitia curiata was composed of curias of citizens and perform

the function of legislation. The Senate was an advisory organ composed of head of gens.

Because of the despotic administration of kings, Rome transformed to a Republican regime in

the fifth century B.C. (Agaogullari, 1998:18). Under this regime, centurias, a new unit of

societal division, formed a new assembly, comitia centuriata. The comitia centuriata was

important because it chose two consuls who possessed the imperium for a year. Among these

three assemblies, the Senate was the main and dominant administrative unit of the Republic

that concentrated the real power (Grant, 1997:1, Agaogullari, 1998:19).

Under this Republican regime as Roman rule was gradually built up, the machinery of

the Republic was not able to govern these vast and varied territories. Eventually, the crisis of

the Republic led to a civil war that ended with the victory of Octavian. After the victory,

Octavian became the head of Rome as the continuous consul. Then, he was honored the

princeps senatus (first man of the state) by the Senate and was given the name Augustus as an

honor to the restorer. The administrative system of the Augustian period was a matter of

dispute because it seems that the old system of the Republic had been restored and the Senate,

26

the magistrates, and people continued to perform many of their old functions in a familiar way.

However, many authors argue that Augustus was the dominant force and the Principate was a

monarchy (Heichelheim, Ward and Yeo, 1999:252, Le Glay, Voisin and Le Bohec, 2001:177).

The power of Augustus and his successors were based on laws passed by the senate and the

people and the system was similar to a constitutional monarchy. Nevertheless, the power of the

Emperor gradually increased at the expense of the other sources and given the emperor’s

constitutional powers, financial resources and raw military force, the later emperors became

absolute monarchs (Heichelheim, Ward and Yeo, 1999:252). Augustus had powers that formed

the three pillars of the regime: imperium (executive function), auctoritas (authority in a divine

sense, supreme prestige) and tribunicia potestas (inviolability, veto over magistrates, the right

to convene the senate, the right to propose laws and more) (Le Glay, Voisin and Le Bohec,

2001:177). In this context, the center of the Roman system gradually transformed to a

hierarchical system beginning with the Principate. However, in order to understand the

structure of the whole system clearly it will be helpful to consider the position of the center vis-

à-vis the provinces.

Italy

Through the end of the Republican period, Italy was considered as an integral part of

the City (Rome and its close neighborhood). It was directly governed by the Comitia, Senate

and magistracies and had considerable privileges in administration, justice, citizenship, military

and taxing (Homo, 1996:337). However, the establishment of the Principate gave rise to an

opposition between the Senate and the magistracies and the Emperor. As a result, the power of

the Emperor and new institutions increased at the expense of the Senate and the magistracies

27

(Homo, 1996:325). The administration and legal issues began to be exercised by the

representatives of the Emperor and Italy lost its privileges. Therefore, through the Late Empire,

due to political causes and administrative necessities Italy became like other regions and

divided into provinces (Homo, 1996:327-8).

Provinces

At the beginning of the Empire, territory outside Italy under the Roman rule was

composed of three distinct elements: protectorates, provinces and Egypt. The areas that were

directly administered by the Romans were called provincia (province). The notion of provincia

was used in three senses: (a) a sphere of operations assigned to a magistrate; (b) an existing

territorial division of Roman administration and (c) a new territory added to the others (Lintott,

1993:23). The administration of the provinces consisted of three main aspects: the maintenance

of law and order, command of the provincial garrison and internal and external security, the

financial administration, and the administration of provincial communities themselves. Rome

relied on native elites for the performance of the daily business of imperial administration

(Dise, 1991:3). Those elites were rewarded by Roman support for their position, power and

prerogatives. Some of them might have citizenship or immunity from taxation.

The basic structure of provincial administration under the Principate was clear (27 B.C.

– A.D. 284). The head was the emperor, the princeps, who had the control of most of provinces

and almost all of its army. The other provinces were under the control of the Senate; therefore

the provinces were categorized as imperial provinces and senatorial provinces. However, since

these provinces were ungarrisoned, and since the Emperor controlled admission to the Senate

28

and promotion within its ranks, the Senate’s authority was neither exclusive nor absolute.

Eventually, the Senatorial provinces were transferred into Imperial one (Dise, 1991:1; Garnsey,

1987:21; Stevenson, 1976: 211; Le Glay, Voisin and Bohec, 2001:201; Homo, 1996:340-1).

The Roman administrative policy was accustomed according to the local circumstances

of a province. The Romans did not change the provinces whose inhabitants belonged to cities

possessing institutions of a type with which they were familiar (Stevenson, 1976:208). They

only impose their municipal system on regions that were organized in a different way. In some

cases, old tribal institutions were recognized and left to operate as long as their authorities were

willing to cooperate with the Roman representatives, especially in the matter of taxation

(Stevenson, 1976:208).

Protectorates (Allied Kings)

The protectorates were vassal states, usually kingdoms, which maintained their native

institutions. Rome had the sovereign control of their foreign policy and of their internal affairs.

This arrangement was generally found in the East, Europe, and Asia and exceptionally in the

West. Some of them were in the form of client-kings, were free in their internal administration

and some of them were immune from taxation, but they might be required to provide troops

and their foreign policy was determined by the Emperor. All these protectorates were gradually

absorbed into the provincial system as a process from the reign of Augustus to the early second

century (Stevenson, 1976:215; Lintott, 1993:34; Ward, Heichelheim and Yeo, 1999:270). In

this context, during the Principate the hierarchical structure of the Roman Empire was firmly

established and remained the major form of political organization.

29

The Persistence of the Roman Hierarchical System

The Generation of Common Goods

Security

Orders have certain primary or elementary goals and security is the first and foremost

of these goals (Bull, 1995:4). Likewise, security was always the primary concern of the

Romans. Rome’s success in providing security through a hierarchic structure was one of the

reasons that explain the endurance of it. During the development and the persistence of the

Empire, security lies behind all other purposes. By committing themselves to this whole, the

provinces, protectorates and allied kingdoms both benefit from and contribute to this security.

The Augustus period mark the end of the Civil Wars which were precipitated by the

failures of the Republic and it brought peace to a world where war had been normal since the

end of Greek and Roman history (Last, 1975:445). The peace created by Augustus lasted for

over two centuries and signified the full magnitude of the Rome’s achievement. Peace was

enduring, dependent not on Augustus but on Rome, so that it was called Pax Romana (Last,

1975:445). Romans conceived peace as World Empire with security from outside interference,

law and order within it (Starr, 1982:16). Adcock very well summarizes what does peace meant

for the Romans:

Granted all this, there is something to be said in conclusion on what the Empire and the emperors now came to stand for among ordinary people under the Principate. They stood, above all, for Peace. When Napoleon III said “The Empire is Peace”, he said, with less grounds, what Augustus might have said….Once the frontiers had been defensively advanced and made secure, there were either very few wars or only distant ones. But peace under the Principate received a positive content, something more than the absence of military operations. Peace came to mean more than that. It was not only freedom from the fear of war, it was the confident belief that men could live side by side in ordered security…The pax Augusta which had shielded the Empire from

30

external wars is reinforced by the providential Augusta which makes peace a boon to all subjects and seeks to protect them from that fear of civil war which was so potent an influence making the Principate welcome (1964:102-3).

Then the question is what these reciprocal elements that were brought about security.

First of all, the military capabilities and military strategy of the Roman Empire was a very

important factor. The legions of Rome can be considered as specific assets because they were

different than most of the troops of other empires and city-states (Mann, 1986:275-6). The

equipment and technical capabilities of legions made them unique. Roman legions did not

possess only battlefield equipment but they had several logistical equipments such as a saw, a

basket, a pickaxe, an axe, a thong of leather, a hook and etc. (Mann, 1986:274-5). These tools

were carried by footmen themselves and were used for civil-engineering projects. Legions

could construct their roads, canals, and walls and could harvest the agricultural surplus.

Therefore, they were more self-sufficient than any other military troops. They did not depend

on enormous transportation facilities or local labor to build their roads or to supply food. They

were more mobile, easily deployed, well equipped with technical knowledge. Easier

transportation reduced transportation and communication costs, their specific equipment

presented physical assets that other states cannot found by other means and their trained and

skillful human capital that had technical capabilities cannot be substituted easily. These factors

induced other states to commit themselves to the Roman structure. Otherwise they have to

invest in highly trained men, specialized equipment or technical capabilities.

In addition to the military strength, the grand strategy of the Roman Empire had

unprecedented success in its period. There were two major phases of the Roman strategy

(Luttwak, 1976). During the first phase lasting to around 100 A.D., the empire had no clear

31

outer limits and no border fortifications. The main strategy of the legions of the army was

internal pacification (Mann, 1986:274). In this period, Augustus adopted a fundamentally

defensive policy and made annexations only when it was necessary for security (Brunt,

1990:96). In the zone of direct control, legions found ways to penetrate hostile territories to

capture major population centers and political capitals, and then spread out that penetration

without losing the military advantage (Mann, 1986:274).

When the increasing internal pacification reached a certain degree, the legions began to

be deployed around the frontiers of the empire. This demonstrated the second phase of the

strategy. In this phase, the major threat was the outsiders threatening the provinces. Rome

chose containment as a strategy because these groups were nomadic and had no settlement

(Mann, 1986:277; Brunt, 1990:102). Roman emperors pursued a strategy based on preclusive

security that is the establishment of a linear barrier of perimeter defense around the empire

(Ferrill, 1986:25). Accompanied with the tradition of military discipline and tactical

organization, the Roman defense strategy was the most effective in the history up until that

time (Ferrill, 1986:28). Both the internal and external pacification aimed to provide a secure

and stable environment.

In addition, the national fidelity of its people, the strength of its balanced government,

the political stability, the social and cultural forces of honor and religion were some of the

factors that contributed to military success (Doyle, 1986:85). The collectivity of resources from

its provinces in the forms of manpower, tributes and equipment strengthened Rome’s military

superiority (Brunt, 1990:114). Furthermore, Rome’s success in providing security also depends

32

on the conditions of its neighbors. In the west, Rome’s neighbors were tribal societies and

barbarians who were unable to cooperate with each other. They were incapable to repel a

common danger and fought in separate groups, therefore, they were all defeated easily by

Rome. Their lack of social differentiation and small scale contributed to their weakness (Doyle,

1986:89). In the east, there were patrimonial monarchies and fractioned republics and towards

the east the Romans employed a different strategy to provide peace that was based on informal

control and fiction of alliances (Doyle, 1986:90). Some of these societies had political societies

that could collaborate with Rome as they depended on Rome to secure their political position.

In this context, these societies were either too weak to threaten Roman security once overrun or

their pro-Roman factions and patrimonial rulers found positive incentives to collaborate with

Rome (Doyle, 1986:91).

Economic Prosperity

The Roman Empire during the Principate was “unquestionably rich and, in comparison

with other periods, prosperous” (Rostovtzeff, 1972:176). The economic prosperity of the

Empire was an important factor that promoted the dominance of a hierarchic structure by

attracting provinces to the whole. The economic prosperity stemmed from several factors.

First, the Empire was able to control immense material resources in the richest parts of Europe,

Africa and Asia (Rostovtzeff, 1972:176). The Empire benefited from fertile lands for

cultivation, extensive pastures for stock-raising on a large scale, forests, mines, rivers and seas.

Romans were successful in finding these resources and effectively made use of them

(Rostovtzeff, 1972:177). Second, the growth in agriculture and stock-raising stimulated the

economic rise. The Empire greatly extended the area of cultivation and produced vast

33

quantities of cultivation produced vast amounts of grain for export. Third, there was an

increase in the number of mines and quarries. Fourth, the economic growth can be observed in

development of trade by land and sea and manufacture. Manufacture spread around through the

Empire and local manufacturing centers grew at the expense of large ones. The trade within the

Empire grew significantly from the period 200 B.C. to A.D. 200 (Rostovtzeff, 1972:181;

Hopkins, 1980:105). Better system of roads and safety from pirates at sea promoted the rise of

trade. Transportation was relatively easy over the Mediterranean and along the rivers and

highways to the remotest corners of the Empire. Moreover, the standardization of tariffs at the

end of the third century eased the flow of commercial goods. Rostovtzeff emphasizes that trade

was helped by the moderate amount of the customs levied at the frontier of the each province.

This was a great improvement at that time when each Greek city collected duties from every

merchant that entered its territory (Rostovtzeff, 1972:181).

The effectiveness of the Roman economy can be observed in Hopkins comparison of

the Empire and the regions before the conquest by the Romans. Hopkins suggests that “there

was a significant increase in agricultural production, an increase in the division of labor,

growth in the number of artisans, in the size of towns where many of them lived, development

of local markets and of long-distance commerce” and “these changes were most dramatic in

regions which were economically primitive before their conquest by the Romans” (1980:102).

Hopkins very clearly summarizes the common goods that the Roman Empire brought about in

the economic sphere: “The Roman empire provided conditions for modest economic

growth…by extending the area of cultivated land…by increasing the size of agricultural units

to achieve economies of scale…by using systematic accounting methods…by allowing and

34

encouraging the growth or persistence of towns…by effecting economies of scale…by

achieving significant increases in productivity” (2000:11-2).

The Decline in Transaction Costs

Transactions costs incurring to actors in a society can be considered within different

spheres of life. Economy was one of these important spheres. The nature of economic activities

demands security and certainty in transactions. Security provides protection against

infringement of property rights, violation of contracts, or predation by robbers or outsiders.

Moreover, certitude in market environment is necessary in order to reduce the transaction costs

by providing stability in means of exchange, particular weights and measures and the amount

of customs and tariffs. Historically, security and certainty in market activities have been either

provided by traders themselves or the political authorities, which they were bound to. As

Spruyt mentions, historically, there is a relation between economic interaction and political

authority (1994:534). The geographical extension of political authority may correspond with

the spatial extension of the primary market, economic and political boundaries may coincide,

economic interaction tends to takes place within the boundaries of the empires and sometimes

economically integrated zones may transferred into empires (Spruyt, 1994:534). In this

context, it seems that economic activities might be performed easily and successfully under

hierarchical authorities. Therefore, hierarchical structures might be a solution to the problem of

secure and efficient economic interactions due to low transaction costs (Weber, 2000:14).

The Roman Empire was a clear example of this correspondence. The accession of

Augustus resulted in an era of stable government, the basic condition for economic recovery

35

and expansion. The regime of Augustus was dedicated to the cause of civil peace and the

pacification of Rome’s enemies. The success of this policy intensified internal economic

development, and, as long as “It expanded the territory under Roman control, extended the

economic horizons of the empire” (Garnsey and Saller, 1987:51). In this sense, the Roman

Empire can be considered as a successful hierarchical organization that provides low costs of

transportation and economic benefits for all parties, the ruler and the subjects. By providing

security and certainty the structure of the Roman Empire reduced the transaction costs of

economic and social activities. As Watson perfectly summarizes:

The advantages of empire were plain to see. Law, currency, weights and measures were standardized. Commerce and industry thrived under Pax Romana, with goods moving largely by sea over a Mediterranean now at last substantially free of pirates (1992:101).

The reduction in transaction costs can be observed mainly in three areas: the standardization of

coinage, the standardization of legal customs, safe transportation and the Roman law itself.

The Standardization of Coinage

Rome, after the Republic, was able to maintain a sound and stable currency which act

as an exceptional stimulus in the entire field of economic life (Oertel, 1975:387). Augustus

supported economic activity by providing a stable, abundant coinage in gold, silver,

orichalcum and copper (Starr, 1982:26). During the earlier period of his reign, gold and silver

coins were employed in Asia and Spain and for a few years in Rome itself. In 15-14 B.C., he

introduced an imperial mint which was the only source of the gold and silver coinage of the

Empire. This was a remarkable turning point for the coinage of the Roman history and it lasted

in the remaining period of Augustus. Coins were extensively used as a means of collective

36

revenue, paying expenses and storing reserves (Mann, 1986:272). The state’s own

administrative needs to use coinage indirectly promoted trade and urban life (Mann, 1986:272).

For instance, the copper issues were designed to pay the troops on the frontiers encouraged the

growth of trade and industry outward from the interior parts (Starr, 1982:26).

The evidence of standardization and unity in coinage could be found in the study of

Keith Hopkins (1980). Hopkins compared hoards of coins found in seven different provinces in

the period 40-260 A.D. and made deductions about the uniformity of the money supply across

the empire as a whole. Hopkins observes similar trends for all provinces until just AD 200

(Mann, 1986:271). Mann suggests that the empire was a single monetary economy during that

period and there was a systemic nature of economic interaction within the boundaries of

Empire (1986:271). He strongly emphasized the remarkable achievement of unity in Rome.

The Standardization of Roman Law

Another factor that facilitated the decrease in transaction costs and provided a suitable

environment to the functioning of economic market was the law. An idea of natural or

universal law dominated the Stoic philosophy of Rome. The universal law is universally

applicable, unchanging and everlasting. The civil law, which held together a community, was

subordinate to the universal law (Bozeman, 1960:187). There was also the private law in Rome

and this law developed from 450 B.C. to 529 A.D. The law was developed by the opinions of

individual lawyers who depended on traditions, reason and insight. These lawyers abstracted

the concepts that would seem generally applicable (Bozeman, 1960:193). This approach also

resulted in the distinction between the public law of the state and the private rights of

37

individuals. Both laws were accepted extensively throughout the Roman society. The evolution

of these legal principles within the sphere of the empire revolutionized the conduct of human

relations.

For instance, the Romans from earlier times were aware that commerce could not be

performed based on the inherited social customs or imperative commands. The performance of

commerce requires safety of clearly determined particular interests and obligations so that they

developed the notion of contract. The Romans had a general legal form to bind any sort of

personal engagement. One of the most important types of these obligations of contracts was the

consensual contract. The consensual contract was a device for the implementation of all

contracts of sale, hiring, agency and partnership. It replaced the old forms and customs of local

communities and created a unity and standardization.

Romans viewed law as an agreement between equals and a collective obligation.

Bozeman argues “No such constitutional framework of contractual security as the Roman was

evolved by any other people in the ancient world” (1960:201). Romans were very successful in

achieving a system of individual and collective security and they promoted it in their

provinces. For instance, a Roman citizen who violated a treaty with another nation was

surrendered to other nation because of the fact that he had impeached an obligation that rested

on him personally (Bozeman, 1960:203). There were multiple functions of the Roman law. On

the one hand, the employment of legal principles provided a kind of security against the ruder

aspects of imperial government (Bozeman, 1960:211). On the other hand, it gave way to

38

development of distinction between political, religious and legal norms, which promoted the

unity and standardization of transactions.

Furthermore, the law was considered as a regulating force in relations between states

and foreigners (Bozeman, 1960:195). When foreign trade reached certain levels, Romans

developed a kind of law to regulate relations between Romans and non-Roman citizens. A

special set of rules was employed in legal disputes between Romans and foreigners, which

were later developed into a new branch of law: the ius gentium. These relations and set of rules

were depersonalized and institutionalized. Important parts of this law were the official treaties

to determine the rights of trade. The commercial law identified and formulated the universal

elements shared by the positive laws of all nations. International agreements of sale,

partnership, or charter parties were used as internationally applicable standards in commercial

relations of the Empire. Many important aspects of commercial law were adjusted in the

Principate in order to promote the operation of business and trade (Garnsey and Saller,

1987:55). These achievements in law of partnership and agency had important implications for

the history of commerce. Through this law contracts began to bind their co-partners and the

institution of agency had a clear economic significance. The existence of professional

middlemen to administer commercial operations facilitated the speed and volume of economic

exchange. The legal rules guaranteed the emergence of such a class and provided a secure

environment.

Finally, the Roman law was the chief informing principle in the administration of a

community of various races during the period of Principate (Bozeman, 1960:208). The Roman

39

legal procedure made a considerable impact on the subject communities of the Roman Empire

due to sophisticated legal procedures that were used to settle local disputes (Edmondson,

1993:184). These procedures provided models for future legal proceedings and dispute

settlement. The adoption of Roman legal forms, for instance in the Celtic West, substantially

contributed to the general Romanization of provinces and made Rome an effective moral

judicial authority. The Roman contract law achieved a great international appeal throughout the

Mediterranean world because the Roman lawyers were very successful in abstracting its

essence from local traditions and in adjusting its requirements to the customs generally

observed in the commercial intercourse of neighboring people (Bozeman, 1960:210). These are

important examples that demonstrate how the function of law facilitates the transaction costs

through providing means for drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding agreements, information,

and communication. Thereby it secures commitments and prevents free riding, increases level

of certainty and security and promoted a desirable environment.

The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System

One of the reasons that a hierarchical structure prevailed during the Pax Augusta was

the success of Rome in assuring the commitment of its members to Rome. Lendon mentions “It

is certainly true, then, that the Roman empire could not be ruled without force and the fear that

force inspired, but the modest provision of force available makes it unlikely that it was the sole

operative principle of Roman imperial government” (1997:7). Therefore, it is worthwhile to

explore how the Romans were able to maintain the commitment of particular states and citizens

during these two hundred peaceful years. One of the important reasons of the high level of

commitment of provinces was the gradual development of ideological, political and cultural

40

integration among the provincial elites or the Romanization of the provincial elites. In Rome,

political unity among the upper classes gradually developed during the Principate. Beginning

with Italy, Greece and Asia Minor, Rome was able to link the upper strata together. Mann

suggests that Rome incorporated into its own ruling class all the native elites of the empire and

imposed the next intensive and extensive form of compulsory cooperation (1986:260).

The power of the upper class originated through the state and they depended on Rome

to stay in power (Mann, 1986:267). The more they depended the more they committed

themselves to the Empire. These cases are clearly evident for some Greek states (Doyle,

1986:91). Moreover, we can identify the same kind of relation in patrimonial kingdoms of the

East. These kingdoms lacked substantial political integration because they were either not

mobilized politically or they were ethnically divided. Therefore, in order to secure their power

against domestic strife and external threats and to provide more financial resources, they

devote themselves as clients of Rome (Doyle, 1986:91). Dise suggests that since the days of

the Republic, Rome aimed to nurture pro-Roman elements within subject communities, mainly

by offering Roman support for their position in return for their support of Rome’s authority

(1991:7). Edmondson mentions that because Rome did not develop a large bureaucracy to run

the Empire, she relied on the works of local aristocrats. In return, Rome supported these leaders

who defended Rome’s interests (1993:181). In addition, there was no evidence of nationalist

tendencies in these communities. Brunt suggests that the tendency of Roman policy aimed to

unite its subjects not divide and govern. It was easier for Rome to do so, in part, because few of

her subjects had a history of independence (1990:127). Namely, there was not nationalism in

the modern sense.

41

Another aspect of this political integration was the extension of citizenship. The

Romans invented and gradually developed an extensive territorial citizenship. The spread of

citizenship followed new methods under the Principate. The connection of citizenship with

Italian birth or origin and its connection with Latin culture are gradually loosened (Sherwin-

White, 1973:222). Moreover, the meaning of the franchise changed and it becomes a passive

citizenship. People began to seek citizenship not because of political significance but because

of honor and sentiment (Sherwin-White, 1973:222). The extension of the citizenship becomes

the sign of the unification of the Empire within a single system of law. Mann asserts that such

kind of collective commitment never mobilized before (1986:254).

Another aspect of the political integration was the diffusion of Senate membership and

imperial succession to all over the Empire. The local elite were highly mobile and found

several chances to acquire rank and status. The scale of movement among the elite orders of

the Empire was remarkable. Senatorial families disappeared at an average rate of 75 percent

per generation due to unknown reasons (Garnsey and Saller, 1987:123). This failure of

senatorial families to maintain the rank and status gave chances in each generation for the

wealthiest and most prominent members of the elites to move up. The new members were

increasingly come from outside Italy (Garnsey and Saller, 1987:123). There was access not

only to the Senate but access to other orders was also available. For instance, access to

equestrian order was even more open than the Senate (Garnsey and Saller, 1987:123).

42

There were two groups in Rome that had a greater chance to acquire rank and status:

soldiers and a category of slaves. Each year tens or thousands of people were recruited into the

army and if they succeed to survive their term of service, they were rewarded a discharge

payment and able to possess land which means they had the chance to qualify for the local

councils. In addition, those who could become officers had better means for more spectacular

climbs in the hierarchy (Garnsey and Saller, 1987:124). Nevertheless, we need to emphasize

that the entry to upper class was strictly controlled, especially during the term of Augustus, but

the high level of mobility among the upper class was a crucial factor that promoted

commitment.

When we look at the ideological and cultural integration of the local elite we see that

Romanization encouraged the native elites to identify themselves more closely with Rome.

The cultural and ideological Romanization was realized through teaching language and

literacy, building theatres and ampi-theatres and integrating local cults into Roman ones

(Mann, 1986:269). Literacy among the empire provided an infrastructure for ideological

integration but this integration was full upper class literacy and predominantly took an oral

form (Mann, 1986:269). Therefore, the cultural solidarity was largely confined to the upper-

class. The logistical infrastructure of ideological power kept the extensive ruling class together

which had happened in China as well. The process took different shapes in West and East due

to the already well-established culture of the East. However, both had a high degree of cultural

integration among elites.

43

The political integrity of the Empire was also evident in the outward forms of native

political life. Romans encouraged the creation of administrative centers in provinces where

governmental, religious and commercial activities might be focused (Dise, 1991:8). This

concentration of native communities encouraged the beginning of urban life on the

Mediterranean pattern and in some places permanently altered the structure of native life so

that tribal centers become towns and cities. These political centers eventually adopted the

Roman municipal-colonial constitution with its magistracies, aristocratic councils and weak

popular assemblies. The administrative and legal regulations of Rome provided the subject

communities with models of Roman administrative, judicial and legal practices to imitate

(Edmondson, 1993:158). Many of these regulations sent by Rome to provinces were requested

by the provincials themselves and they were not imposed.

Furthermore, Rome’s process of interaction between centre and periphery had an

important unifying effect. The regular act of writing up regulations promoted the development

of a formulaic language of administration (Edmondson, 1993:181). The linguistic and

administrative formulae gradually led to a more standard and uniform style of Roman rule in

various parts of the Empire. Especially, Greek states developed standardized forms of

expressing their relations with Rome and these standard practices encouraged a greater

homogeneity, unity and commitment.

In sum, Rome was able to transform its regional system by conquering major centers of

power. The desire of Romans to achieve peace, the need for land and booty, the demand for

glory and tribute and the Roman superiority in strategy, military, economy and administration

44

encouraged this process. The establishment of hierarchical structure enabled Rome to provide

peace, economic prosperity, transportation and efficient use of resources as common goods.

Furthermore, under the security and certainty of the system, transaction costs were reduced

substantially. Finally, the Roman Empire was very successful in securing the commitment and

legitimacy of its system through ideological, economical, cultural and political means. The

next chapter focuses on the Chinese Empire under which similar processes can be identified.

45

CHAPTER II

THE MULTI-STATE SYSTEM OF ANCIENT CHINA

THE SPRING AND AUTUMN PERIOD (722-481 B.C.) & THE WARRING STATES PERIOD (403-221 B.C.)

A distinctive center of civilization developed in the valley of Yellow River around 2000

B.C., which was called as the Shang or Yin culture. In 1122 B.C. the Zhou dynasty conquered

the Shang state and established a feudal system of supremacy. This feudal system, the Western

Zhou period, continued successfully until the 771 B.C. The Eastern Zhou period followed the

Western Zhou and it extends from the transfer of the capital to Loyang to the ultimate triumph

of Ch’in (Qin) and its establishment of rule over all of China (771-221 B.C.). In Chinese

historical writings the period is sub-divided into two periods: Ch’un ch’iu (Spring and Autumn

722-481) and Chan kuo (The Warring States 403-221) and they represent different phases of

the transition from the Western Zhou feudalism toward the unified empires of Qin and Han

dynasties (Hsu, 1999:550). In fact, Walker believes that this division is misleading because

The Spring and Autumn period (SAP) and the Warring States period (WSP) as a whole is

actually a homogeneous period of political development. The SAP and the WSP present us an

outstanding example of an anarchic structure that prevailed for a long period in the ancient and

classical eras. Therefore, consideration of these two periods is very useful to understand the

persistence of an anarchic structure and why an anarchic rather than a hierarchic structure

prevailed among the Chinese states. Furthermore, another aim of this chapter is to consider the

reasons for immediate transformation from anarchy to hierarchy in the ancient Chinese system.

Initially, I shall consider the political structure of the multi-state system of ancient China and

46

then further consideration of the system will reveal the major factors of the emergence of the

hierarchic system. The next chapter shall focus on the persistence of the hierarchic system of

the Chinese Empire.

The Political Structure of the Multi-State System of Ancient China

The SAP followed the Western Zhou (Chou) period, in which the Zhou dynasty was the

supreme ruler of ancient China. The political administration of the Zhou dynasty was a clear

monarchy and the era is considered to have been as feudal. The head of the Zhou dynasty

granted fiefs to the various generals who had helped him to overthrow the Shang dynasty.

These small feudal domains existed in comparative isolation from each other and the control

was maintained through a system of ceremonial functions. The Zhou kings granted segments of

lands to feudal lords and, in return, received payments. Vassals were also obligated to supply

manpower for wars, guarding the frontiers of Zhou lands and following the king in wars.

By the beginning of the eight century B.C., there was a deconcentration of king’s power

and by the beginning of the fourth century; the centralization of power in the hands of the

individual states had been completed. During the early periods of the SAP (771 – 483 B.C.),

the power and independence of feudal lords grew rapidly at the expense of the central authority

and these vassals created regular governmental organizations. Both processes promoted the

decline of feudalism. Furthermore, the expansion of state functions, large-scale irrigation and

construction projects, collection and storage of grains, construction of walled cities, and

organization and maintenance of armed forces led them to build up coherent administrative

structures and they became independent and self-sufficient states (Holsti, 1974:33). All these

47

developments led to eliminate divided control and to centralize state power in the person or

symbol of the ruler of the individual states.

In this context, a system of independent states developed and replaced the small,

hierarchical feudal order of the Western Zhou period. After the eight century, the Zhou

dominance was nominal and local states became essentially independent states. The Zhou

Dynasty consisted of 1773 states. These states consolidated and allied with and against one

another and their number decreased to 170. By 722 B.C., there were seven important states: Lu,

Cheng, Wei, Sung, Chi, Ch’en, Ts’ao, Ts’ai, Ch’i (Qi) and Chou (Zhou). Almost unanimously

authors agree that during the SAP there existed a system of sovereign states and there is clear

evidence of the sovereignty of the various states (Holsti, 1974:33; Walker, 1953:24-5; Watson,

1992:85).

Those states that maintained their sovereignty were treated as equals no matter what

their size or nature. They fought with each other, changed allies and made treaties, while

treating each other as independent units. For instance, it was customary that a state’s envoy

asks for permission for passage through the states, which lay in the path of their missions.

Zhang claims that the states were sovereign since they held the exclusive capacity to conclude

international treaties, declare war and have diplomatic representation and he says “To the

extent that these states were territorialized, sovereignty involves territoriality, too” (2001:47-8).

Moreover, political organization was an important indication of sovereignty because a territory

was considered as a state if only it had an effective political organization.

48

The leagues and alliances of states played an important role among the states during the

SAP. The first league was the Zhou league. The state of Ch’i became the first leader of the

Zhou League, an alliance of a number of Zhou states formed in 680 B.C. to serve as a common

defense alliance against the most important enemy, the state of Ch’u. There were mainly two

groups of leagues, the Zhou league and the alliance of Ch’u. However, there were other leagues

built up by the Qin in the West and by the Wu in the southeast. The primary function of these

leagues was collective security (Walker, 1953:87). They also played a significant role in

peaceful settlements of disputes between their members. The system of leagues was

widespread for over two centuries and demonstrates the fall of political power of the Zhou

dynasty (Rodzinski, 1979:28). The heads of the states assembled according to strict protocols

and heavy tributes were paid to the hegemony by the smaller states.

The states consisted of a capital city and a number of fortified towns. The population

was divided into two: the people of the state or city and the people in the field. The people of

the state included the garrison soldiers and their descendants who were directly ruled by the

ruler and the elite. They had civil and military obligations as well as right to consult to state

affairs. The people in the field had a certain degree of autonomy while paying taxes and

serving to the corvee duties.

The political and administrative organization of most of the states in early SAP, could

clearly be seen in the organization of the state of Sung (Walker, 1953:32). The ruler was the

head of the state and the government consisted of six main officials who were members of

noble families within the state. The ruler’s control over these officials was relatively weak and

49

the roles of these officials and the ruler himself were not clearly defined. Moreover, apart from

their specialized duties, each member was charged with a section of the country as vassals. In

this sense, there was not a centralized system of administration at the beginning. Nevertheless,

throughout the SAP, this de-centralized system was transformed into a more strong centralized

administrative organization especially in the spheres of politics and military.

During the WSP, the system of league of cities was replaced with a system of territorial

states, which were ruled by monarchs and a large number of officials (Lewis, 1999:587). Lewis

suggests that there were an expansion and a contraction of states’ power in the WSP

(1999:597). The power of the states expanded because the city-based state of the Zhou world

altered with a full-blown territorial state and the entire power of the state was concentrated in

the court of the single monarch. The new state was centered on the unique person of the ruler

and his single capital.

The foundations of these changes were laid in the SAP and as the competition among

states increased, state structures began to be adjusted to the changing circumstances. In order to

increase the effective mobilization of resources, some states were restructured into hierarchical

units that had administrative and military functions (Hsu, 1999:573). For instance, the state of

Ch’i, divided the population into 21 divisions for administrative purposes (Walker, 1953:32).

Each of these divisions was subdivided so as to establish a direct line of responsibility to the

top. The leaders of these divisions reported to the central administration once a year and they

were encouraged to choose the leaders of subdivisions on the basis of merit and they were also

controlled by a system of inspectors.

50

This concentration of power in the person of the ruler occurred throughout the WSP by

the middle of the fourth century and resulted in the extension of state control into the rural

hinterlands (Lewis, 1999:602-3). The pressures of war led both rulers and ministerial

households to increase their armies through the recruitment of the rural populace. The

introduction of the dependent official enabled this extension. The establishment of a territorial

state depends on the ability to appoint officials, dispatch them to remote cities, maintain remote

control over them and remove them when necessary.

The military was organized according to a militia system. Each family in the state had

to supply one soldier and these soldiers were grouped in the same divisions and subdivisions.

Thus, people have a certain pride in the militia of their division and also a pride in their state

(Walker, 1953:33). The result of this system was a combination of divided authority under a

centralized administration and a new power. The system, initially developed by the state of

Ch’i, and was later adopted by the other states. These great changes in the state Ch’i were one

of the most important developments in the history of Chinese government (Walker, 1953:34).

Walker believes that all these developments had decisive impacts on the later unification of

China. He says “Indeed, it can safely be maintained that without this background of

development in the Ch’un ch’iu period2 the unification of China under Ch’in Shih Huang in

221 B.C. could have never taken place” (1953:35). This administrative experience and new

political patterns enabled to govern whole of what was to become China.

2 The Spring and Autumn Period.

51

Comparison of Anarchic and Hierarchic Systems

The Generation of Common Goods

Security

“The conquest is always the love of peace” St. Augustine

As discussed above one of the reasons of persistence of Roman hierarchic system was

the emergence of common goods such as security, economic prosperity, transportation and

effective mobilization of resources. However, the analysis of the multi-state system of ancient

China had different characteristics. Peace and security were two major goals of the ancient

Chinese states. Nevertheless, ironically they chose war as a means to achieve peace; therefore,

war became a normal part of life during the SAP and the WSP. Although war was supposed to

be between the barbarians and the Chinese who shared the same culture, most of the wars

occurred between these states and resulted in a decrease in their number, which was ended with

the expansion of the state of Qin throughout ancient China.

The Zhou dynasty ruled China from the twelfth century to the eight century. Li says

that “Generally speaking, the first four centuries of the Zhou dynasty was an era of peace and

prosperity. The last five centuries witnessed a decline of central authority, the rise of local

states, and the prevalence of anarchy and interstate warfare” (1978:45). War was a frequent

form of interaction between states during the SAP and the WSP. For instance the state of Qin

went to war 28 times within a period of 43 years (Li, 1965:40). During these periods, all the

units used organized violence as a method of achieving objectives, such as territory, slaves,

honor or allies. The disintegration of the Zhou dynasty and the emergence of the anarchy

52

resulted in increase in number of wars in both periods. Li argues, “The central authority

weakened, then became nominal, and finally ceased to exist. The weakening of central

authority was accompanied by increasing frequency of foreign and domestic wars” (1978:50).

However, the SAP was relatively more peaceful than the WSP.

During the early SAP, major concerns of the states were the internal consolidation and

the elimination of the power of the hereditary families within states (Walker, 1953:76). Later

on, the anarchy in the system led states to be more concerned about the conduct of external

affairs and the establishment of an external policy for security (Walker, 1953:77). At the same

time, they realized that external alliances also significantly determine the strength and position

of states therefore leagues of states and diplomacy became more important. The first league

was established in 680 B.C. and other leagues followed. The major concern of these leagues

was common security through alliance and they also facilitated the peaceful settlement of the

conflict among members. The system of leagues was observed for two centuries and it was an

important mechanism that reduced the number of wars compared to the WSP. Nevertheless,

whatever methods were employed by the Chinese states during the SAP was quickly dissolved

in the WSP and conflicts were resolved almost entirely by the use of force (Holsti, 1974:43; Li,

1965:53; Walker, 1953:88).

The Chinese states developed new patterns of interaction during the political history of

the WSP. The period from 481 to middle of the fourth century was the formative period of

these patterns of interaction, which were forged in war. The Warring States world was

dominated by seven great powers, which pursued an independent foreign policy and

53

maintained a balance of power (Lewis, 1999:632). The era was marked by shifting alliances,

which were designed to prevent any state to become the dominant power. The WSP was a cruel

and brutal struggle with continuous conquests and aggression in which only the fittest could

survive.

During the WSP, due to developments of warfare technology and change of states’

attitudes, the number of casualties increased tremendously and wars became more brutal. The

peasant-based armies and retinues of personal retainers expanded the scale of warfare and the

large-scale participation of men heightened its savagery. Casualties were measured in

thousands and people were often slaughtered en masse. Cavalry and infantry introduced in

battles and military strategy became a specialized science. Rodzinski suggests that the

fundamental aim of these wars was to control the central area of China, the current Honan

province (1979:26, 28). Moreover, they fought for plunder and increase in territory. These wars

had two consequences. First, the absorption of small states into expanding powers. The large

states invaded and conquered the small states and the number of states, which was about two

hundred in the eight century, decreased steadily to seven major states towards the end of the

fifth century (Li, 1978:50). Second, the formation of a balance of power in which each state

used diplomacy and warfare to further its own interests (Lewis, 1999:616). In sum, the

anarchic system of ancient China lacked any mechanism to produce security as a common

good.

54

Economic Prosperity

Ancient China witnessed a substantial economic growth during the SAP and the WSP.

In almost all spheres of economic and social life the Chinese experienced great developments.

Various innovations and projects stimulated and facilitated the rise in overall economy. The

main reason for the increasing prosperity was the great improvement in the means of

production and distribution (Walker, 1953:17). The most important change was the

introduction of iron approximately from the seventh century onwards (Rodzinski, 1979:24).

People began to utilize iron extensively both in warfare and agriculture. The introduction of

ox-drawn plow was a great advance in agriculture. Iron was used for the manufacture of

agricultural tools as well. The introduction of iron resulted in greater yields of crops and

introduction of animal-drawn plough. The use of iron implements and the rotation of crops

substantially facilitated the efficient farming (Hsu, 1999:578).

Furthermore, the notions of land tenure system and land taxation were introduced. The

peasants were obliged to pay tax in kind from their production. A tax based on production

presumes that the farmer was entitled to use the particular piece of land, namely, it entailed

tenure of land. Once released from the servitude system of the feudal era, peasants began to be

more productive (Hsu, 1999:577). These developments accompanied the extension of system

of irrigation and water control, which in turn enabled a large number of extensive projects. The

building of roads facilitated the transport of supplies for great armies. The rivers were used

extensively and we observed the first important construction of canals and a development of

communications. The irrigation through canals and drainage system facilitated and promoted

the agricultural production. The construction of large-scale waterworks and projects for

55

irrigation and flood control greatly enhanced state power and economic rise such as the great

irrigation project in Szechuan region. Giant dykes and canals were constructed by some of the

most powerful states and these projects promoted the increase in agricultural production

(Walker, 1953:18).

In addition, the growth of agricultural production and trade promoted an increase in

population and cities (Rodzinski, 1979:24; Li, 1978:62; Eberhard, 1960:55). The growth in

economy led to an increase in the number and size of the towns and by the end of the period

many large cities was to be found in various parts of China. Many cities, especially the ones on

trade routes and capital cities, became larger and more numerous. There is also evidence of

establishment of new buildings and elaborate palaces.

Growth was not restricted to the agricultural sector. The geographical specialization in

production challenged the self-sufficient economy of feudal system. Though basic crops were

grown all over China, different sections were specialized in producing different products such

as lumber, bamboo, gemstones, fish, salt, silk, musical instruments, fruits, cooper or iron (Li,

1978:60; Walker, 1953:17). The growing demand among the society and especially among the

nobility for luxury goods that were produced in other regions stimulated inter-regional

exchange of surplus production. The crafts became more specialized and better silk and luxury

goods were produced. The appearance of minted coins reflects an active exchange of material

wealth. Eberhard suggests that the increased use of metal and the invention of coins greatly

stimulated trade (1960:55). The leagues also encouraged trade, communications and cultural

interchange among the states. The members of the leagues met frequently and most of the time

56

the delegations consist of merchants who discusses commercial issues with each other. The

frequent passage of these delegations also promoted road building and the improvement of the

means of communication.

Developments in agriculture and basic industries were accompanied by the rise of an

active market economy (Hsu, 1999:580). Frequent wars, court visits and conferences among

the states, facilitated inter-regional transportation and made it commonplace. Furthermore, the

exchange of gifts introduced products of different regions to each other. Hence, trading

developed in order to secure materials from far away. Hsu emphasizes that land and river

transportation were significantly developed and used for the purpose of commerce. The ever-

increasing contacts between states facilitated rising trade and spreading prosperity. Wealth

became transportable and a wealthy class emerged.

The rise in influence and activities of merchants accompanied the increase in wealth

(Hsu, 1999:582; Li, 1978:60). Although China was politically divided, there were no obstacles

for movement across states. Merchants could freely move from one state to another and

governments had no discriminative policies regarding the merchants of other states (Li,

1978:61-2). Therefore, these benevolent conditions promoted the rise of powerful and wealthy

merchants. Some merchants became so powerful that they challenged the influence of feudal

lords and princes and exercise influence over domestic and interstate affairs. Private ownership

increased constantly in most of the countries by the middle of this period (Walker, 1953:16). In

some states, merchants were protected by the state and informed the courts of any problems in

their profession.

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State policies and actions played a crucial role in the growth of economy and there were

large state monopolies of iron, salt and liquor. For instance the state of Ch’i reformed its

economic policies and began to control prices, to correct the system of measures and weights,

to encourage commerce, to accumulate wealth and enrich the country (Walker, 1953:33). They

aimed to maximize the production, especially the production in farming and cloth making and

they tried to utilize every man and every acre of land (Li, 1978:57). The central government to

accumulate wealth and controlled the arms and the masses through a monopoly on salt and iron

was introduced. Hsu says

Economic growth in ancient China picked up momentum in the Warring States period, with private ownership of land and new manufacturing and commercial activities. When coupled with demographic growth, all of this culminated in urbanization and commercialization. But the initial stage marking a tremendous transformation took place in the Spring and Autumn period (1999:582).

Walker presents us further evidence of the growing prosperity. The number of clothing and

carriage ornaments increased significantly through the end of the period. Bronze began to be

used for decorating homes and became household vessels. Paintings on walls and silk

increased. All these resulted in the formation of the famous artistic crafts and of Chinese art

itself. An ever-increasing number of chariots became available for the public. Members of

richer families began to employ more and more servants and slaves. Nevertheless, in spite of

all developments made in this period, most of China was still in conditions of natural economy

and the self-sufficiency of the villages was still the dominant aspect (Rodzinski, 1979:25).

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The Decline in Transaction Costs

The Standardization of Administrative Law

As mentioned before, the SAP and the WSP were periods of reforms. Many Chinese

states introduced several reforms in order to sustain effective administration and control over

people. One of the important reforms was the replacement of older internal rules and forms by

a systematic code of laws (Walker, 1953:34). The daily-life of society was regulated by laws

and first codes are mentioned in 536 B.C. By the end of the fourth century B.C. a large body of

criminal law existed. The change was stimulated by the growth in complexity of social

organization, the changing class structure and the increasing wealth that needed new forms of

protection (Walker, 1953:34). Walker presents several evidences of this change. Lewis also

observes the evolving use of laws within the individual states. The laws initially regulated the

conduct of war among states. However, later on these codes were extended to penal measures

to control the people (Lewis, 1999:606). The legal codes were also used to regulate and

constrain the actions of officials (Lewis, 1999:610).

This use of laws to control the action of the populace at large was developed in the Qin

legal code. The Qin Statues was an outstanding example of these codes that governed various

aspects of the official conducts. The content of the Statutes consisted of rules for official

conduct, guidelines for keeping accounts, procedures for the inspection of officials, the

maintenance of official records and stores, and terms and stipulates to ensure that the officials

interpret and execute items of the code in the manner intended by the Qin code (Lewis,

1999:610). In this sense, the primary aim of these actual Warring States documents was the

control of the actions of local officials charged with overseeing the people. In addition to the

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centralized administration, legal codes and collective oaths began to be used as recognition of

private ownership of land in exchange of taxes (Lewis, 1999:600).

When we consider the laws that govern relations among states certain patterns emerged

during the SAP. These regular patterns created certain uniformities, which in turn constituted a

system of state behavior expectations. Later on, these uniformities in patterns of interstate

relations form a rudimentary form of interstate law. Walker asserts, “…there is little reason for

us to doubt that the patterns of interstate intercourse which developed did constitute a

rudimentary system of interstate law” (1953:74).

These patterns of conducts partially originated from the feudal era of Zhou dynasty. In

addition, these laws were derived from a growing body of custom, which developed as contacts

and commerce increased. They derived from the increasing number of treaties that were signed

during the period and there were some patterns and rules formed by the league of states. Most

of these laws dealt with diplomacy and the diplomatic activities such as a court visit paid by

one ruler to another, meetings of officials of different states, missions of friendly inquires,

emissaries sent from one state to another and etc. Zhang argues that there were certain codified

norms and codes, which were honored and observed by the members of the system and there

were important extra-territorial institutions and practices that regulated the relations among

them (2001:47). The most important of these institutions and practices were sovereignty,

diplomacy, balance of power and rituals. However, despite all these developments there was no

system of law among all states that provided standardization of administrative and societal

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interactions, which in turn reduces the transaction costs among the whole system similar to the

Roman Empire or the T’ang dynasty.

The Standardization of Coinage and Weights and Measures

The Chinese witnessed the emergence of a money economy and use of coinage during

the SAP and the WSP. The rise in economy resulted in the growth of a money economy

throughout the fifth and fourth century, namely the emergence of minted coins (Eberhard,

1960:55). Initially, string cowries, precious metals, gold, and silver began to be used for

exchange purposes. The increase in commerce and transactions stimulated the greater use of

money and brought about the transition of use of precious metals to copper coinage (Rodzinski,

1979:25). Whereas, the princes used money as rewards or bribes for the bureaucrats, the

merchants employed them as a medium of exchange. Finally, a copper cash began to be used

which remained valid for the following two thousand years.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that this rudimentary form of money economy did not bring

about a standardization of coinage in these periods. Despite the growth of the economy and the

emergence of coinage, ordinary people relied on bartering materials in kind in their daily life.

Although, there was an increase in use of money in society, “it would be easy to exaggerate the

role of cash in what was still primarily a barter economy” (Lewis, 1999:607).

Regarding the weights and measures, it could be argued that although there was a

standard within the individual state, there were various measures of units in different states

(Lewis, 1999:610). Lewis points out that the use of nonstandard weights, volumes or measures

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by an official is to be punished by the payment of substantial fines. Nevertheless, various units

of measure employed in different states are mentioned in several literary sources (Lewis,

1999:610). The exact amounts of the units employed in several states were identified by the

archeological finds.

The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System

The administrative system of the Zhou dynasty is characterized as a feudal system.

Under this system, the vassals were committed and loyal to the Zhou dynasty, since the

emperor granted lands to the feudal lords in return of payments, manpower, security and

support. Therefore, the loyalty of the lords was provided through a direct link between the

lords and the emperor. Furthermore, the rule of Zhou dynasty overlapped with the cultural area

of the Chinese. There was a common culture, which was underpinned by shared recent past and

shared legends. The Chinese all shared common descent as they all derived from the

aristocracies of the Zhou dynasty and these factors reinforced their common identity and

common morality. Finally, the common language played a dual role to enhance the cultural

basis of the ancient Chinese. On the one hand, it enhanced the common identity of the states

against the non-Chinese speaking barbarians and on the other hand, it facilitated the bilateral

and multi-lateral inter-state communication and diplomacy and mutual understanding among

peoples (Zhang, 2001:47).

Nevertheless, by the beginning of the SAP, many of these vassals had acquired or

conquered enough territory so that they were no longer dependent on the Zhou dynasty. The

relative isolation of many feudal units from the central authority and their aggrandizement at

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each other’s expense led to acquisition of territory (Eberhard, 1950:34). As the number of wars

and conquests increased, the territories of feudal lords began to be controlled by central

bureaucracies under the individual states. A state, large or small, controlled its territory as the

supreme and sovereign power. Furthermore, the establishment of local administrations made

the political units more self-sufficient (Holsti, 1974:35). Lewis suggests that the transformation

of the Zhou dynasty into a group of competing territorial states was achieved through the

extension of military service and tax liability into the countryside, the recognition of the

property, which was held and worked by the individual peasant households (Lewis, 1999:611).

As a result, the rulers of these territories began to derive their authority from inheritance rather

than from the central monarchy and the system turned out to be a small number of independent

states.

Hence, the multi-state system of China was established with the collapse of the

authority of the Zhou dynasty and the system of states sustained international relations of

Ancient China for over five centuries. Obviously, the emergence of the multi-state system

altered the loyalty and the commitment of the people. The process of state expansion and

centralization coincided with the development of patterns of increasing loyalty to the state or

patriotism (Walker, 1953:35). Walker claims that whereas the peasants were loyal to feudal

lords previously, later they became loyal to the person of the prince of the state and the state

itself (Walker, 1953:36). As the feudal ties with the reigning Zhou king decreased, the

allegiance of individual states to the dynasty became nominal.

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The new patriotism stemmed from original localism. Prior to the SAP, there were broad

differences in dialect, customs, religion, legends, and cults among the various regions.

Particularly, there was a great cultural difference between the state of Ch’u in the south and the

northern states for example, the Ch’u people were proud of their distinctive music, ceremonies

and traditions. During the SAP, there was a growing awareness of these differences due to

increase in contacts and also the development of pride in local origins and distinctions (Walker,

1953:35). Holsti mentions that “after 771 B.C. ordinary people began to recognize and

emphasize the differences in dialects, customs, religion, and cults among the states as their

contacts with others began to proliferate, and the position of the Zhou monarch-the symbol of

unity-eroded” (1974:33). Therefore, the wide cultural differences and the patterns of patriotism

were firmly established by the end of the SAP.

Furthermore, the sovereignty of the states and their insistence on maintaining

sovereignty promoted the local pride. Holsti emphasizes the growth of rudimentary forms of

nationalism as an important indication of the independence of the feudal states (1974:33). The

struggles among states, their efforts and battles to maintain their existence, and their efforts to

prevent the expansion of other states enforced the sense of loyalty to the state. Through the end

of the SAP, pride in local distinctions and loyalty to the prince of the state became more

important. As a result, in the WSP, the princes could easily organize ordinary people to fight

wars for them, since they believed that they were fighting for the independence, sovereignty

and honor of their own state (Holsti, 1974:33).

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When there was conflict between loyalties the expression of loyalty to the state came

first. Li claims “the people within the feudal fiefs owed absolute loyalty to the prince as

subjects rather than to the feudal lords as peasants. When there was a conflict between the two

loyalties, the loyalty to the prince prevailed, as the feudal lord himself owed allegiance to the

prince” (1978:60). Walker points out several examples of loyalties of people to their states in

which the Chinese preferred death to be alive if its in the benefit of their states (1953:37). The

trend toward increasing patriotism reached its highest levels after the end of the SAP, when the

ruler of states proclaimed themselves as kings and the real battles for the domination of whole

China began among states. During the WSP, the loyalty to state reached its ultimate levels.

Besides all these factors the core of the issue (commitment and legitimacy) lies in the

relation between state and individual, the moral purpose of the state and their implications to

the foreign policies of the individual states. Especially, the philosophical ideas had a deep

impact on external affairs of the states. Russell suggests that the philosophers in ancient China

were not given pure speculation and “Chinese philosophy was essentially practical in that it

was designed to further the art of social adjustment…The prince not only sought, but also

frequently followed, the advice of the philosopher both in internal and external affairs”

(Russell, 1972:17). Therefore, it might be helpful to consider the dominant currents of political

thought in the SAP and the WSP in order to understand the legitimacy and the moral purpose

of the states and its implications on foreign policy.

Due to intensive warfare, political anarchy and moral degradation all the philosophical

schools in ancient China tended to think in terms of an ideal society. Main currents of political

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thought at that period focused on the issues of legitimacy of power, the goals of statecraft and

remedies for the increasingly violent wars (Watson, 1992:89). Therefore, their idealized

version of good governments might help to understand the moral purpose of the state. There

were several traditions of thought, however four of them had the greatest impact:

Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism and Legalism (Watson, 1992:89; Rubin, 1976; Eberhard,

1960:57-61; Russell, 1972:19).

Confucianism

Confucius conceives the state as a large family, in which the father is the ruler, and the

children are subjects. The relation between the ruler and his subjects are characterized by

submissiveness and obedience, however if the ruler’s conduct was immoral the subjects have

the right to resist (Rubin, 1976:17, 26). The law had no importance for the improvement of the

society; rather the moral qualities of the ruler and ritual were emphasized as the most important

elements of good governance. Furthermore, good government consists of sufficient food,

adequate defense, and faith but faith or moral values is the most important because without

faith no nation can survive (Li, 1978:75). The loyalty must be provided through proper conduct

of the ruler. “Only when the ruler was wise and virtuous could the people be expected to be

loyal and obedient” (Li, 1978:75). Confucians believed that the social ills and political anarchy

in the SAP and the WSP stemmed from the disruption of authority, so that they advocated

return to the early form of Zhou feudalism (Li, 1978:75; Eberhard, 1960:58). Peace and order

can only be achieved when authority is firmly established and carefully observed. All states

should be under one kingly family, which had the mandate of heaven to rule the world and the

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restoration of virtue and imperial unity would end strife among the warring states (Watson,

1992:90).

Taoism

The Taoists rejected the view that man is a social being. Man should take a negative

attitude towards the entire world and should resort to drawing whatever comfort from the

miserable conditions of the world. They defended that society is evil and man should break

loose from society and return to nature and merge with the simple and genuine life of universe

(Rubin, 1976:89). The world of nature is beautiful and true, whereas the world of society is

rotten, artificial and false. The natural order could best be achieved through non-violence and

all active government was interference in the natural order. They condemned war, rulers,

government and laws (Li, 1978:85). A simple primitive society is much better than an

advanced one. An ideal society was economically self-sufficient and should produce only the

basic needs of the community so that wars among states can be prevented.

Mohism

Similar to Confucians they believed that the monarchy was the best type of

government. However, the ruler must set rules for his subjects and must be virtous, practical

and utilitarian (Li, 1978:91). Mohists believed that the principles of family love must be

extended to the whole people and they emphasized a universal love for all men under Heaven

(Eberhard, 1960:58). If one loves another member of the upper class just as he loves his father

then the friction between the individual and states would cease. The universal love must be

implemented by the ruler and by using rewards or punishment the ruler will compel those who

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do not believe in universal love. In this sense, the main themes of the Mohists were universal

love and non-militarism. States must deny aggressive policies and turn toward universal love.

The greatest goal of the human action is the satisfaction of the elementary needs of the largest

number and the welfare of the whole society (Li, 1978:90; Rubin, 1976:35).

The state was a machine to be used for the general welfare. Government was like a

primitive machine, the identical parts of which were set into motion at the command of the

ruler (Rubin, 1976:43). Rewards and punishment were the means of governing and all the

instructions of the Son of Heaven were instructions on how to operate the levers of the

machine. The ruling mechanism was integrated in an ascending order from the town head to

the ruler of the kingdom to the Son of Heaven (Rubin, 1976:43). The utopia was the ideal

unified state when the Great unity reigned, all under Heaven was communal property and it

was governed by the most skillful and the ablest men (Rubin, 1976:44). Part of the utility of the

universal love was its contribution to inter-state peace. However, in the short run, peace must

be sought through discouraging aggressors. Defensive war is the key to peace among states. A

state, which renounced offensive war, could be so proficient in defense that no other state

would dare to attack. If all states followed this policy all would become invulnerable to attack

and live in amity and peace (Watson, 1992:90).

Legalism

The most important school of this period were the Legalists. They emphasized the

necessity of law, which should be just and fair. Law must be equally enforced upon all,

including members of the royal house. Law should be exact and clear and supported by

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punishment and rewards. The observance of law was not only an end in itself; the real goal was

to channel each individual’s energy to the service of the state. The enforcement of law

necessitates a strong government and government must be strengthened at all costs. They

defended creation of a centralized and all- powerful state by any means regardless of moral or

ethical considerations (Li, 1978:92). What makes a state powerful is not traditional culture and

allegiance to moral norms but “The sovereign who wished to build a powerful and efficient

army needed, in the first place, to centralize power, and concentrate all resources into his own

hands. This implied a reorientation of the entire social structure from its economy through its

culture so that everything could be subordinated to the single goal of acquiring control over all-

under-Heaven” (Rubin, 1976:57). An ideal society was “a society composed of well-organized

farmer-soldiers governed and controlled by an all-powerful state headed by an omnipotent

prince” (Li, 1978:93). People’s duty was to live and work for the ruler and carry out orders

(Eberhard, 1960:59). The Legalists rejected the idea that the state exists to serve the people;

rather the ruler is in need of the state. The ruler needs above all to subordinate the people

himself and then to use it for the conquest of hegemony in all-under-Heaven (Rubin, 1976:62).

The Legalist arguments were first adopted by the state of Qin. Shang Yang, the most

representative and the founder of the Legalist school, was the organizer of the state of Qin

(Eberhard, 1960:59; Rubin, 1976:56). In the middle of the fourth century Shang Yang was able

to establish a system on the basis of legalist doctrines which in the course of a little over a

hundred years would enable the ruler of the state of Qin to unify the entire country (Rubin,

1976:55). The general aim of the reforms of Shang Yang were centralization of government,

strengthening the power of the ruler over the people, expansion of the resources of the country

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and their concentration in the hands of the government (Rubin, 1976:59). Legalists interpreted

the SAP and the WSP as follows:

A life and death struggle between them became unavoidable. In this world which lacked the notion that equal states might coexist, there was no possibility of independence as such. Each ruler had a choice between dominance and subordination. In the Warring States era, the latter meant destruction of the ruling dynasty and absorption of its national territory by its conqueror. Under such conditions the only alternative to ruin was a struggle for supremacy over one’s neighbors (Rubin, 1976:57).

The legalist ideas on organizing the state for war and achieving peace through universal

conquest reflect the policies actually pursued by those states (Watson, 1992:91). Rubin also

suggests “Historians who are accustomed to identifying Confucianism as the state ideology of

China often forget that the first real official ideology was the doctrine of Legalism…” (Rubin,

1976:55). The legalist believed that subjugation of all hostile states would lead realistically to

peace. “because the more states were suppressed the wider the area of unity and order would

become, until only one state existed and there would be no more war” (Watson, 1992:91). The

Legalist arguments were compatible with the Confucian ideas, which also advocated imperial

unity for all China under the mandate of heaven. The major philosophical tradition during the

Zhou dynasty assumed that the Zhou king bore the title of Son of Heaven enjoyed authority not

power. “He performed ritual functions like a holy person to whom Heaven had entrusted the

rule of “all-under-Heaven” that is, the states of China which the ancient Chinese viewed as the

center of civilization in general” (Rubin, 1976:2). Rubin suggests that “The concept that all of

China was a single all-under-Heaven ruled by a single person, the Son of Heaven, had the

effect of making political fragmentation seem an anomaly, a falling away from the proper order

of things, consequently temporary and transitional, representing a step toward a new unity”

(1976:2). The existence of multiple states that were independent of and not subordinate to

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Heaven was an unacceptable idea to Chinese political thought (Rubin, 1976:2). Watson claims

that this common ground provided the traditional legitimacy of the Chinese warring states

(Watson, 1992:91). It might be argued that the Chinese states followed a combination of all

ideas from major political thoughts as Li suggests “A Chinese was a follower of the entire

Chinese heritage rather than a particular school of philosophy” (Li, 1978:84), though it is

obvious that the Legalist arguments seemed to have the greatest impact. The state of Qin

followed the policies and unified China, which were based on legalist arguments.

In sum, the comparison of anarchic Chinese system and hierarchic systems

demonstrates that the security was one of the major problems of the system and similar to the

Roman foreign policy vision, the Chinese believed that peace can be achieved through

conquest of all enemies under a single authority which was manifest in the Legalist doctrine

and the Sino-centric world view. This vision appears to be the major factor that stimulated the

immediate transformation from anarchy to hierarchy. Furthermore, similar to hierarchic

systems there existed economic growth and decline in transaction costs through standardization

of law, administrative procedures, weights and measures and coinage. However, all these

developments were limited to the boundaries of individual states, therefore the systemic

dynamics of a hierarchic structure cannot be observed in the multi-state system of ancient

China. These dynamics can be clearly seen in the next chapter, which shall focus on the

Chinese Empire.

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CHAPTER III

THE CHINESE EMPIRE

THE T’ANG DYNASTY (618-907 A.D.)

Chinese history could be analyzed in three forms of international order: a multi-state

system, a unified and universalist empire and a world order associated with it, and a state

among states in the Westphalian system (Zhang, 2001:45). The multi-state system of China

dates back to the collapse of the Zhou dynasty in 770 B.C. (including the Spring and Autumn

period and the Warring States period) until the establishment of the first universal Chinese

empire by the Qin in 221 B.C. After a long period, the Chinese Empire transformed into a

nation state after the arrival of the European international society in East Asia in seventeenth

century, though the transformation took place until mid twentieth century. My consideration of

hierarchical structures regarding the Chinese history focuses on the Chinese Empire. Generally,

the history of the Chinese Empire were divided and analyzed in terms of dynasties, therefore,

my study shall focus on the T`ang dynasty (618-907 A.D.), which was truly a hierarchical

period.

The T’ang dynasty followed the Sui dynasty and the three centuries of the rule of Sui

and Tang dynasties (589-907 A.D.) reestablished the Chinese ideal of unity that had developed

under the Han dynasty. The formal beginning of the T`ang dynasty was 618 B.C. (Somers,

1986:972). During the T`ang period, China was the largest, the most populous, the best

governed, and more than probably the most civilized country in the world (MacNair, 1951:81,

88). During this period, especially the Golden T`ang from 618 to the great rebellion of An Lu-

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Shan in 755, the separate worlds of classical antiquity were transformed into a new unity

thanks to magnetic pre-eminence of T`ang China in political, social, economical and

ideological spheres and to the ‘acquisitive cosmopolitanism’ of the T`ang court (Adshead,

1995:54). It was under the T’ang that Sino-centric view of the world, which will be dealt with

below, most corresponded with reality (Adshead, 1995:103). The Empire was extended

through Korea, south into northern Vietnam, into Central Asia and through the west of the

Pamirs (Fairbank, 1992:78). The rule of T’ang dynasty was a remarkable period and presents

us significant amount of data to consider why a hierarchic structure persisted. Why and how

the T’ang Empire persisted and why alternative institutions failed to replace the Pax Sinica is

the main subject of this chapter.

The Political Structure of the T’ang Dynasty

The Central Administration

The T`ang central government was partially inherited from the system of the three

central ministries used by the Sui dynasty and partially from the Han dynasty (Rodzinski,

1979:118). The dynasty ruled the entire country as one state and empire. The dynasty built up

an elaborate bureaucracy and centralized state machinery to fulfill basic functions such as

collecting the revenue, undertaking public works, preserving the social system and defending

the country. This administrative system of the T`ang dynasty basically continued up to the

twentieth century.

The structure of the government resembled a pyramid (Rodzinski, 1979:118). All basic

decisions emanated from the capital and the emperor, who has absolute power, was at the top.

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All officials were appointed directly from the capital so that centralization was the main

characteristics of the system (Latourette, 1967:143). Somers characterizes the Chinese system

as absolutist because, first of all, the emperor claimed formal status at the head of a hierarchical

order, in which all subjects were encompassed, and second, the emperor had an unlimited

power by having the greatest power in the land in his own hands (1986:973). Furthermore, the

government was centered on the Sun of Heaven in his person (Fairbank, 1978:7). Namely, his

personality was the concrete object of loyalty rather than any impersonal concept of state,

people or nation and his rule was personal. The Chinese doctrines suggested that the emperor

represents the benevolence of heaven and rules according to the Mandate of Heaven. The

misbehaviors of the Emperor turn out to be natural disasters as signs that heaven is

withdrawing its mandate to the current ruler. Therefore, this doctrine also justified the

overthrow of a dynasty and replacement of a new one without requiring any structural or

organizational arrangement (Pye, 1984:60). This was the basis of transition of power in the

Chinese empire.

The three basic elements of the government were the emperor and his court, civil

bureaucracy and the military. The civil bureaucracy composed of the Three Secretariats, Six

Ministries and a Board of Censors. The three secretariats that formed the central government

were: (a) The Imperial Chancellery (b) the Imperial Secretariat (c) the Department of State

Affairs. The Chancellery and the Secretariat performed the function of policy formulating and

advisory organs and the Department of State Affairs was the chief organ of the executive

(Wechsler, 1979:169). When the system began to function firmly, the Secretariat acted as a

legislative organ and participated with the emperor in the formulation of laws or decrees and

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drafted edicts (Li, 1978:177-8). The Chancellery reviewed these drafts and commented on

them and the Department of State Affairs with its six subordinate boards put them into effect.

The Chancellery or the court of Emperor was generally staffed from close friends,

veterans of uprising wars and relatives (Wechsler, 1979:170-1). The central civil bureaucracy

consisted of people who had prior experience from early dynasties, or were sons or grandsons

of officials, or descended from former imperial houses. The composition of the bureaucracy

was a source of strength for T’ang dynasty because its members were highly experienced in

government and had close relationships and affiliations with the dynasty, which facilitated the

control of the empire (Wechsler, 1979:174).

The Department of State Affairs consisted of six sub-boards or ministries. These boards

were administration or officials, finances, rites, army, justice and public works. These

ministries formed the backbone of the central administration. Furthermore, there were nine

Offices and five Bureaus controlling special administrative fields and the Imperial Court. In

657, the T`ang government was using 13.500 officials to rule a population of probably 50

million (Fairbank, 1992:82).

Finally, there was the court of Censors, which performed the duty of controlling and

reporting on actions of the officials. The court was headed by a Grand Censor and was

responsible for the examination and scrutiny of the personal as well as official life of all

officials under active tenure (Li, 1978:178). For inspectional purposes of the censorate, the

Empire was divided into ten provinces each of which was headed by a censor, known as the

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inspector general. Traditionally, the censorate was a completely independent organ of the

government (Walker, 1947:5). Throughout the dynasties it was considered as a power apart

from the Emperor. Main characteristics of the censorate were its independence, freedom,

honesty, zeal and stability during all dynasties (Walker, 1947:12-15).

The Provincial Administration

The provincial administration of T’ang dynasty was designed on the bases of provinces

(10), prefectures (over 350), counties (1500) and districts (16000) (Wechsler, 1979:174). The

provinces were simply units for periodical inspection and they had no permanent governor, nor

administration and no intermediary functions (Twitchett, 1970:105). Prefects administered the

prefectures and beneath them there were county magistrates. The counties were under the

jurisdiction of the prefectures and they were appointed directly from the capital. Similar to the

Han period, there was a dual administration in the prefectures: a civil and a military

administration. The latter was independent of the former. Therefore, the same area was

governed by a particular administrative prefecture and at the same time by a particular military

prefecture (Eberhard, 1977:177). The heads of civil administration, which were in charge of

these units, were appointed by the emperor. The districts inhabited by non-Chinese people

were ruled by their own princes, but the princes were given Chinese titles (Latourette,

1967:143). The staff members of these head-officials were locally hired and eligible to move

up into regular bureaucratic offices (Dull, 1990:71).

The administration system was governed by a centralized system of statute law, in

which authority and responsibility of each office were carefully restricted and defined. The

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military and financial system of provinces were so devised that there was minimum direct

intervention of the central administration. The main tasks of these provincial officials, the

prefects and county magistrates, were the maintenance of order, military matters and the

administration of land, financial business, tax system and collection, registration of population,

and official markets. (Twitchett and Wechsler, 1979:273).

Considering the military administration, the T’ang dynasty had twelve large standing

armies and local regional commands (Wechsler, 1979:174). Later on, the regional commands

replaced with the higher-level governments-general. These government-generals controlled the

frontier areas and strategic areas of the interior and they established over 272 prefectures of the

Empire’s 358 prefectures (Wechsler, 1979:205). These regional commands were placed over

the civilian administration and had full authority over all military affairs in that region.

Although the prefectures were subordinate to government-generals, their subordination was

nominal. In peacetime, their powers become a dead letter and they possessed same powers with

the prefectures (Wechsler, 1979:205).

There were also mobile administrative units located at strategic points and they were

established to coordinate local administration and implement government policies temporarily.

The T`ang dynasty also established local units to provide reliable locally based source of

manpower for the military (Wechsler, 1979:175). These forces were under the direct control of

the capital and registered on the civilian registers. The local units sent soldiers on a rotating

basis for military service to ensure their control by the capital. During the T’ang period, the

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emperor could rely on these local, self-sufficient units as a source of manpower, which were

individually too small to pose any threat to the dynasty.

Nevertheless, the An Lu-Shan rebellion was a turning period for the T’ang dynasty and

its administration system. Twitchett argues that it was the beginning of a totally new

administrative period (Twitchett, 1970:109). The central government lost a substantial amount

of power to local authorities and the disintegration of the old land, registration and tax systems,

which had depended on close supervision of central administration, altered the entire system.

In place of direct control over all members of hierarchy, a resident commissioner or governor

was appointed for each province with the duty of overseeing the officials within his

jurisdiction.

These governors both had the titles of military governor and civil governor and they

had many subordinates. Although, at that time this seemed a wise method to supervise the

empire, later it turned out to be a step toward disintegration because it led to reestablishment of

local states (Latourette, 1967:148). The control of outer regions declined and the regime had to

cede power to the military. They challenged the military power of the central government and

exerted greater influence in civilian matters than before. The regime could no longer govern

from the center with uniform laws and institutions. The elite bureaucracy was unable to

maintain countrywide procedures and during the period from 756 A.D. to the end of dynasty,

localism and particularism prevailed. There was a general decentralization of local authority

from center to the provinces (Fairbank, 1992:83; Twitchett, 1970:123).

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The Persistence of the Chinese Hierarchical System

The Generation of Common Goods

The generation of common goods is important to the persistence of hierarchic structures

because, while these common goods serve the interest of the center, they also provide

incentives for the periphery to become attached to it. Therefore, common goods such as

security, economic prosperity, facilities for transportation and communication and the effective

mobilization of resources both serve interests of the center and the periphery. In case of the

T’ang dynasty, internal pacification and the economic prosperity that arose from this peace,

and the effective mobility of resources through the tax-land system, the grand-canal system and

the examination system shall be noted in order to comprehend their role in generation of

common goods. Finally, the equal distribution of burdens in the generation of common goods

and the distribution of outcomes shall be addressed in order to clarify the role of T’ang dynasty

in generating common goods.

Security

The peace and security within the Empire was the first and foremost objective of the

T’ang dynasty. The initial period of the T`ang rule, the first decade, was a period of internal

pacification (Wechsler, 1979:160-1). During this period the major task was not to strengthen its

own power but to defeat the military potential of major rivals (Somers, 1986:973). Major rivals

of the T`ang dynasty held considerable armies, especially in the North China region, and

several battles were fought to substantiate the T`ang dynasty’s claims to preeminence. Somers

summarized the initial objectives of the T`ang dynasty as: (a) crush the military power of

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prominent rivals. (b) demilitarize the areas of heaviest fighting. (c) co-opt the regional power

holders into T`ang system through appointment as governor-generals (1986:973).

When the T’ang dynasty occupied the Sui capital (the former dynasty) and some

provinces, they were only one of many regional regimes. The other provinces were under the

control of rebel organizations, of the former Sui civil and military officials or of local gentry

who opposed banditry and civil strife. The T’ang dynasty was able to secure the support of

many petty rebels, Sui officials and gentry leaders by implementing policies of amnesty,

appointment, and reward (Wechsler, 1979:161). Furthermore, in order to destroy the power of

major rivals they skillfully deployed their ever-increasing military strength. From then on, the

T’ang Empire remained peaceful till the rebellion of An Lu-Shan in 755-63. Rodzinski points

out:

The T`ang dynasty remained on the throne for over a full century before a great peasant rebellion finally sent it tumbling to its doom. During this period relative prosperity and peace still prevailed, as it had done for a longer period in the southern period of the country. This has caused one author to remark that there had been few eras in world history when a civilized area existed in peace for such a long time. The remark is, unfortunately, true enough and a very bitter comment on the history of the human race (1979:131).

The importance of security might better be understood when we consider the dynasty

after the An Lu-Shan rebellion. In the late T’ang period, with the increase of internal

rebellions, governor-generals were given extraordinary powers to achieve more efficient

military campaigns (Li, 1978:176). Therefore, they became too powerful for the imperial

government to control after the rebellions had been suppressed. They collected their own taxes,

appointed their own officials and maintained their own armies. Li argues that they were like

independent kingdoms (Li, 1978:176). They appointed their successors and they were

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hereditary rulers. Even they fought with other governor-generals and annexed territory. The

Emperor had to depend on other governor-generals to suppress them. The institution of

governors-general promoted decentralization among the empire (Eberhard, 1977:180). They

surrounded themselves with little courts of their own drawn from the local gentry and local

intelligentsia. It may be assumed that, as the capability of the center to provide security among

the provinces decreases, the provincial authorities became more self-reliant for their security.

Therefore, the center could not perform one of its main functions and the ties between center

and provinces began to loosen.

Economic Prosperity

Through the seventh and mid-eight centuries, the Chinese experienced high levels of

economic prosperity. Under the rule of Hsuan Tsung, the empire reached the pinnacle of its

glory. The Empire was wealthier and more populous then the Han had ever been. The annual

budget of the state reached so high levels that were much more than the Han period (Eberhard,

1977:180). Adshead argues that, once united, the Empire brought about peace over wide areas,

security from foreign invasion, an open structure of society and a high level of consumer

spending (1995:56). The extent of restoration was great (Adshead, 1995:68). The empire for a

certain period included all the provinces of the Han Empire, except for North Korea, as well as

new provinces in the south. Its population was at least 50 million and its revenue was 60

million cwt of grain equivalent. The economic prosperity arose from several factors.

Obviously, the first and foremost factor was long-during peace among the empire. In addition,

good harvests and effective agricultural policies reinforced peace and growth. Furthermore, the

Empire used its resources remarkably well, which substantially contributed to the overall

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prosperity. As a result of all these factors commerce, wealth and population increased

(Wechsler, 1979:209). Furthermore, the T’ang dynasty introduced several effective policies to

distribute the benefits of this economic growth among its subjects. In this context, the overall

economic prosperity turned out to be a common good that both serve the interest of the capital

and the provinces.

The Economic Development of the T’ang Dynasty

The developments in agricultural production had implications over all other aspects of

economy. The economy was mainly state-controlled and an agricultural type economy. The

equal-field system resulted in a great increase of agricultural production and vast amounts of

land brought under cultivation (Rodzinski, 1979:120). Furthermore, the T’ang government

reintroduced the state monopolies for salt, wine and tea. All of these were important source of

additional revenue. The government also owned large manufactories that produced for the state

itself.

The general success in agricultural production and the rise of prosperity also brought

about a further development of crafts (Rodzinski, 1979:122). There was a significant

development of the manufacture of silk, paper and porcelain in large scale. These were

important developments because in late antiquity, the chief commodities traded were textiles,

minerals and species. All these led to an increase in domestic trade, which was promoted by

improved communications, including a new postal system on the main roads from the capital.

With the general stabilization and improvement of the economy the state grew prosperous and

began to build up large reserves.

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Foreign trade appears to reach greater proportions under the T`ang than at any previous

time. By the eight century, there was a significant amount of sea trade with the Persians, Arabs

and merchants from India and a special office was created in the city for the registry of ships,

the control of exports and the collection of duties (Latourette, 1967:153). The leading

commodities of the trade were silk, spices and porcelain and the Chinese bought such goods as

ivory, incense, copper, tortoise shell, and rhinoceros horn. The T`ang China was by far the

greatest producer of silk and its role increased with the abolition of Alexandrian line

production by Arabs and China became the sole exporter of silk.

Another indicator of security and growing prosperity was the progress of capitalism

(Adshead, 1995:56). The Buddhist monasticism had a very important role in the spread of

capitalism in China (Adshead, 1995:57). Buddhist monks came from states that were more

commercialized than China and although they were prohibited to possess property they brought

China certain capitalist institutions such as the prototype of the permanent, non-kinship

association; the specific practices of the auction, compound interest, equitable mortgage and

the money club (Adshead, 1995:57). In addition to capitalist institutions, Buddhist monasticism

implanted the notion of capital itself. The multiplication of wealth by investment and

circulation was introduced by some sects of Buddhist monastery. Finally, both by their

teaching and by their own outlay on lavish buildings, temple furnishing, incense, precious

ornaments and books, the Buddhist monasteries promoted spending and circulation (Adshead,

1995:58). The stability of institution of the Empire, the greater skill and institutional creativity

of the dynasties, the geographical isolation of China, strong cultural framework and the

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stimulus of Buddhism provided China the right environment and climate for the progress of

capitalism (Adshead, 1995:56-8).

The increase in population also demonstrates the growing prosperity and security. At

that time, The T’ang Empire was certainly the largest and most populous state in the world

(Cotterell and Morgan, 1975:96). Latourette claims that nearly three centuries of the T`ang rule

was, with the exception of some later years and times of turmoil, among the most prosperous

and culturally brilliant in the history of China (1967:152).

The Effective Mobilization of Resources

The T’ang dynasty was very successful in mobilization of its resources in various

spheres. The development of transportation by the T’ang greatly facilitated the mobility and

use of resources, which indirectly secured the economic growth. The T`ang period experienced

a tremendous increase in maritime activity. Particularly with the use of the Grand Canal, a

higher percentage of China’s commerce began to be exercised waterborne and a higher

percentage of China’s production was commercialized than anywhere else in the world of late

antiquity (Adshead, 1995:71). The establishment of the Grand Canal enabled the flow of grain

surplus of the south at the disposal of the north. The number of Chinese ships increased

substantially and the Chinese were able to built larger ships. The use of Grand Canal was also

vitally important for the integration of the fertile Yangtze Valley, which was extensively

developed by the T’ang and had an important role in economy. Braudel mentions that, thanks

to the south, China could live above its means and could invest beyond its savings and this was

an important reason of China`s superiority (in Adshead, 1995:60). The southern kingdoms

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enriched China by their Buddhism, maritime trade and more sophisticated legal systems, and

contributed to the T`ang synthesis (Adshead, 1995:60).

The T’ang was also successful in the rationalization of civil bureaucracy that facilitated

the use of human resources. The Empire was ruled through an expert civil bureaucracy and a

new articulation of law. The T`ang bureaucracy was rationalized through recruitment by

competitive examinations and control by superior personnel management techniques and the

T`ang state achieved higher levels of law and order, more power over its subjects. “T`ang

government was more meritocratic, more intelligent, more effective than any other in its

world” (Adshead, 1995:68). Cotterell and Morgan asserts that a strong civil service that was

recruited by examination was the foundation of the hundred and fifty years of peace and

prosperity that the reign of Emperor T`ai Tsung inaugurated (1975:95).

The financial and agricultural policies of the T’ang dynasty significantly altered the use

of resources. The new articulation of rural life, the equal field system with its periodical

allocation and redistribution of land, its coordination of landholding and tax responsibility were

radical regulations that were less decentralizing and more beneficial to the state (Adshead,

1995:70). This policy solved the problem of aristocratic exception, peasant commendation, tax

evasion and consequent fiscal problems, which had led to fall of the Han Empire. The system

provided an assured basis of taxation through the allocation of land to farmers and by its

periodic revisions. The system maximized the advantages China already enjoyed in the field of

agricultural technology and provided the framework for others such as bigger farms, the

substitution of wheat for millet, the plough for the hoe, water mills and closer integration of

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arable farming and silk production (Adshead, 1995:70). Rodzinski believes that the equal-field

and taxation policies accompanied with the development of agricultural methods resulted in a

great increase in agricultural production (1979:120). More lands became available for

cultivation. Due to these developments the revenues of the T`ang government reached larger

amounts than the Han dynasty acquired and this financial stability lasted for over a century and

promoted the political stability (Rodzinski, 1979:120).

The Equal Distribution of Burdens and Benefits

One of the major concerns of the Empire was even distribution of burdens in forms of

land and taxes. In order to realize this goal, they reestablished the policy of land equalization,

which was inherited from the previous dynasties and applied on a large scale. In this respect,

every adult male received a certain amount of abandoned land from the previous dynasty.

According to this law, as far as possible all peasants should own the same amount of land and

the formation of large estates should be prevented (Eberhard, 1977:176). The law also aimed to

protect farmers against loss of land. This policy served to ease the social tensions, to assure

steady revenue for the government and made peasants available for military conscription.

However, the system broke down and was abolished officially in AD 780. It is obvious that the

maintenance of such a system in eight century was not easy with the means available.

Moreover, Twitchett argues that the whole system assumed a uniform, identical tax-

load on all taxpayers, irrespective of their actual circumstances or the region in which they

lived (Twitchett, 1979:24-8 in Wechsler, 1979: 177). In fact, the T’ang dynasty introduced a

system of progressive taxation based on assessment of property on the one hand, and of land

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levies based on the areas under cultivation on the other (Twitchett, 1970:24). The system

comprised four basic liabilities: a tax in grain and a tax in kind paid in terms of cloth, and there

were two types of labor service, the regular annual corvee and miscellaneous labor service.

Since the system assumed that each tax-payer received an equal amount of land from the state,

the amount due to each taxable individual were fixed and took no account of his personal

circumstances (Twitchett, 1970:25). This system remained the fundamental tax system of the

empire till sixteenth century. In this sense, the system aimed to provide equitable amount of

taxes among the individuals.

The Decline in Transaction Costs

Compared to anarchical structures, in hierarchical structures it is easier to reduce the

transaction costs among the units. Reduction in transaction costs facilitates any type of

interactions and therefore turns out to be an incentive for both capital and provinces to sustain

the hierarchic structure. The T’ang Empire was able to reduce the transaction costs in several

spheres. Obviously, these developments were partially a result of inheritance from previous

dynasties. Nevertheless, the T’ang dynasty either developed the existing forms or demonstrated

a remarkable success in inventing new forms for the organization of society, thus, it became a

center of attraction. Particularly, the standardization of administrative procedures and written

language, standardization of coinage, measure and weights, and a standard application of

codified law enabled the Chinese Empire to reduce the transaction costs and to preserve its

hierarchic structure.

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The Standardization of Written Language

It should be noted that the T’ang dynasty inherited a standardized written language that

facilitated all other forms of interactions. The Chinese Empire was able to integrate and

standardize the variant forms of writing in one system, which turned out to be the universal

system throughout the Empire during the Qin dynasty (221-247 B.C.) (MacNair, 1951:73).

Before the unification (221 B.C.) different scripts of the Chinese language had existed side by

side. In that year, the government announced that the Small script, which had been the official

script in the Qin state prior to the unification, became the standard form of writing and the use

of other scripts would be punished by law (Li, 1978:102). This measure no doubt facilitated

communication within the empire and also prevented the last excuse for misunderstanding and

misinterpreting the law. Despite the various dialects and the political disunity of China, the

written language remained the same since the days of Qin. MacNair believes that the

universality and continuity of the written language have contributed substantially to the

longevity and unity of the Chinese culture (1951:73).

The Standardization of Administrative Procedures and the Codified Law

The bureaucratic-administrative structure of the Chinese Empire was introduced by the

Qin and early Han dynasties. It was developed by legalists who were professionally qualified

administrators, given definite territorial jurisdictions, paid fixed salaries, controlled by written

correspondence and replaced in regular periods (Fairbank, 1978:7). Similar to the Roman

system, they developed impersonal regulations. In this context, the T’ang administrative

system was governed by a centralized system of statute law in which the authority and

responsibility of each office were restricted and defined by law and the dynasty was ruled

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under a comprehensive code of penal and administrative law (Wechsler, 1979:178). The code

was completed in 629 and was composed of five hundred articles and modeled on the codes of

previous dynasties. In addition, the imperial high commission presented a new set of

administrative Statutes in thirty chapters and detailed administrative Ordinances in fourteen

chapters. The code provided useful procedural guidelines to Chinese magistrates. These codes

empowered the new types of governments and institutions with legal force and a standard

codified form.

One of the striking similarities between Rome and China is that, like the Roman

compilations that preceded them, the Chinese codes laid down the substance of the law and

also implicitly specified its procedures. The codes thus provided the appropriate responses,

principles and procedures by which these problems were to be resolved (McKnight, 1995:420).

For instance the principle of allocation of accountability is a good example. The assignment of

accountability was accompanied by the pervasive idea that men are chiefly punishable for acts

for which they were responsible (McKnight, 1995:410).

All the categories of codified law such as the Code, Statutes, Regulations and

Ordinances and administrative procedures were revised frequently and updated according to

changing circumstances and remained a major preoccupation of the T`ang rule (Wechsler and

Twitchett, 1979:273-4). The Code that was developed by the T`ang dynasty remained

authoritative until the fourteenth century and provided a model for the first legal Codes in

Vietnam, Korea and Japan (Wechsler, 1979:178, McKnight, 1995:410). Due to this highly

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developed and updated legal system the direct intervention of the capital was kept to a

minimum (Wechsler and Twitchett, 1979:273).

The Standardization of Coinage

The expansion of trade during the T`ang dynasty called for a stable and sufficient

currency and the administration attempted to supply this demand and maintain its monopoly of

coinage (Twitchett, 1970:66). The manufacture of coinage was reserved for the government

and the principle that ‘currency is the privilege of the ruler’ was always maintained (Twitchett,

1970:66). Manipulating currency was one of the major concerns of the government (Eisenstadt,

1969:48). The government’s privilege was protected by heavy legal sanctions such as death

penalty and enslavement.

Twitchett asserts that in 621 the emperor began minting a new coinage of a uniform

size, weight and metal content and the new money remained the standard coin throughout the

T`ang dynasty (Twitchett, 1970:66-70 in Wechsler, 1979:174). Twitchett says that “The K`ai-

yuan t`ung-pao coins which were produced from 621 onwards to provide a stable medium of

currency remained the standard coin throughout the dynasty” (Twitchett, 1970:69).

Obviously, the system of coinage did not function as effectively as today’s systems.

The organization of minting coin was very loose (Twitchett, 1970:68) and the monetary system

was backward, complex and inefficient (Eisenstadt, 1969:48). In mid-T’ang period, the

manufacturing was mainly made in provincial mints and the unit of account varied locally and

between merchants and government agencies. This confusion of currency units and exchange

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mechanisms was a serious problem for the merchants (Eisenstadt, 1969:48). After this period

several measures were taken to alleviate the problems, and in 845, the organization was

changed and the manufacture of local mints was set up under the control of the civil governors

of the provinces (Twitchett, 1970:69). In spite of all these problems, it is clear that during the

T`ang dynasty a general money economy continue rapidly to develop (Twitchett, 1970:83).

Twitchett also emphasizes the development of a credit system in T`ang times. The first

and best known was the flying money or convenient exchange (Twitchett, 1970:72). In this

system, the merchants from the provinces paid money, which they had made from the sale of

their goods at the capital, to the agents of provincial governors in the capital. In return they

received a certificate. When they returned back to their provinces, they presented these

certificates to the provincial authorities and the provincial authorities in turn paid them the

equivalent of sum of money. By this method, the risk and troubles of carrying money were

reduced and the provincial authorities were saved the trouble of transporting their tax money to

the capital. During the ninth century, this system was widespread (Twitchett, 1970:72).

The Standardization of Weights and Measures

The standardization of weights and measures in Chinese social life derives back to the

Qin period (MacNair, 1951:74). Before the unification, legal codes and economic systems were

altogether different in different parts of China. Since differences in weights and measures

impeded the movement of trade and variances in statutes caused confusion in law enforcement,

the Qin regime ordered the adoption on a nation-wide scale of a new system of weights and

measures as promulgated by the imperial government (Li, 1978:101). During the T’ang

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dynasty there was an official market director who was in charge of controlling the markets in

the capital and large towns in the provinces. He was responsible for keeping the order,

registering all market shops, inspecting weights and measures, fixing approved schedules of

prices, and ensuring the quality of goods (Wechsler, 1979:177). Therefore, we see that the

standardization of weights and measures was one of the major concerns of the administration.

The standard T’ang weights and measures were:

Table 3.1 Weights and Measures in T’ang Dynasty

Length

10 tsun = 1 ch’ih (slightly less than 1 English foot) 5 ch’ih = 1 pu (double pace) 10 ch’ih = 1 chang 1800 ch’ih = 1 li (app. 1/3 English mile) Area

1 mou = a strip (app. 0.14 acre) 100 mou = 1 ch’ing (app. 14 acres) Capacity 3 sheng = 1 ta-sheng 10 ta-sheng = 1 tou

10 tou = 1 hu 1 hu = 1 shih (app. 7/4 bushels)

Weight

3 liang = 1 ta-liang (a standard once) 16 ta-liang = 1 chin (app. 1.5 English libre) Cloth 1 p’i of silk = a length 1.8 ch’ih in width, 40 ch’ih long 1 tuan of hemp= a length 1.8 ch’ih in width, 50 ch’ih long

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The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System

It is difficult to sustain any form of social organization without securing commitment of

members. Obviously, the lack of mass participation in political life in Ancient and Classical

eras made elite commitment vital for the maintenance of any form of order. In this respect, the

T’ang dynasty was able to provide elite commitment through political, cultural and ideological

integration, and by using ideological, coercive and remunerative measures. In addition, these

various methods were underpinned by the legitimacy of the concept of Sino-centrism.

One of the methods that the T’ang dynasty received commitment was through imperial

ritual. Somers, in his study on the consolidation of power of T’ang Empire, suggests that

imperial rituals such as Feng and Shan sacrifices in seventh century were part of the efforts to

extend imperial power. These kinds of rituals had been made during the Han period to

consolidate more power. Somers demonstrates that the Shan and Feng sacrifices increased the

number of people who were registered to imperial records, which was an indirect indication of

people’s commitment to the Empire (1986:981).

Furthermore, the coercive methods were used by the T’ang dynasty to provide

commitment. Many imperial military campaigns were undertaken between A.D. 598 and 668

that went out from the capital region in northwest China as far as central Manchuria and the

Korean peninsula (Somers, 1986:981). In addition, the regular provincial recruitment of

officials through an elaborate examination system was vitally important for the commitment of

the elite.

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The Examination System

From the Han dynasty to the T`ang, the clan members’ holding high office in the

government were from aristocratic clans that had high status. These aristocratic clans of the

northwest were mainly non-Chinese in origin, but they were sinicized and the Sui and T`ang

dynastic founders had intermarried with these nomadic tribal families. In this period,

appointments to office were made by recommendation (Fairbank, 1992:84). Through this

system the elite perpetuated itself, especially the elites of northwest aristocratic clans

(Fairbank, 1992:84). Nevertheless, this system obstructed the mobility of talent and turned

against it and the newly arisen Sino-barbarian families of the northwest struck a blow at the

great Chinese families (Fairbank, 1992:84). Therefore, the T’ang altered the system of rule by

aristocratic families with a new system of a rule by a trained bureaucracy selected by merit

through the examinations (Fairbank, 1992:85). Although the recommendation system

continued to exist, the examination system gradually became the major form and helped to

break the power of the old aristocratic families and to provide the T’ang a substantial source of

power (Latourette, 1967:143).

The examination system and the support of scholarship were initiated by the Han

dynasty and they were further developed by the T’ang. The examination began at the

provincial level and candidates were examined every three years by officials that came from

the capital. The successful candidates were designated lower ranks in provincial administration

and their scholarly progress continued for higher posts. There were also ultimate imperial

examinations held every three years at the capital. Those who became successful were admitted

to the higher service and could hope to reach the topmost positions such as ministers or grand

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counselors. To underpin the examination system, the dynasty built-up a system of state schools

in order to provide training for candidates. In 628, there were five schools and more than 2000

students that were educated in them (Wechsler, 1979:214). The students were taught classical

Confucian education, such as classics and literature, but they were also given degrees in

history, law, mathematics, poetry, calligraphy and Taoist philosophy (Latourette, 1967:143).

Later on, the number of people recruited through examination increased gradually and the

system was reorganized to function effectively.

The examination system and bureaucracy gave rise to one of the greatest achievements

of Chinese civilization: the civil service. The civil service, which was based on this body of

shared knowledge and ethics (Confucianism), was a significant achievement. The system was

highly competitive and it impressed people that they were under the rule of intellectual and

cultural superiors (Pye, 1984:67). Furthermore, officials were regularly transferred from place

to place and never to serve in their own home districts.

Li believes that the adoption of civil service examination provided efficiency for the

T`ang bureaucracy (1978:179). It emphasized written examinations as a means to measure the

qualifications of a candidate to governmental posts. The concept of professional civil service,

competitive entrance examinations, regularized evaluations and systematic promotions

substantially contributed to the smooth functioning of the system. The T’ang government

attempted to cultivate a national purpose of solidarity so as to prevent localism that had been

blamed for the division of China after 220 A.D. by emphasizing talent and ability in a

prospective official’s qualifications. The examination system did not depend on any

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consideration of family or local background; therefore the government would be the sole

dispenser of power, fame and wealth. Through this system the government obtained the

undivided loyalty of a most powerful group and those who had been rewarded after passing the

examinations could be trusted to support the status quo (Li, 1978:180). The examination

system with modifications and interruptions continued to function during the next twelve

centuries.

Moreover, the examination system, by promoting the mobility of provincial elite

secured the commitment of them to the center for a long time. Pye suggests that it is difficult to

determine whether the examination system either facilitated or impeded elite mobility,

however, he mentions that a significant portion of officials who succeeded in examinations

were members of different families and few families had more than two generations in office

(Pye, 1984:67-8). He says that “On the whole, it would seem that there was more mobility

throughout most of Chinese history than in even eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England”

(Pye, 1984:68). An important evidence of this mobility was that non-Chinese rulers could also

become actual emperors of China, especially in eras of Chinese weakness (Fairbank, 1978:9).

They could take over the imperial functions of Son of Heaven at the zenith of structure.

The Legitimacy of the Chinese Empire

The legitimacy of the Chinese Empire was underlined by two fundamental bases: the

concept of Sino-centrism and the tributary system. Sino-centrism is the assumption of Chinese

superiority (Fairbank, 1968:2). The central assumption of the Sino-centric world order was that

China was the civilization and the Chinese emperor as Son of Heaven had the mandate of

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Heaven to rule. The Son of Heaven, who was at the top of the order, was omni-competent, and

functions as military leader, administrator, judge, high priest, philosophical sage, arbiter of

taste and patron of arts and letters (Fairbank, 1968:6). He remained superior to ordinary people

because of his unique function in maintaining order among mankind and maintaining harmony

between human society and the rest of cosmos. Two implications of this rule were (a) the

institutional structure of the Chinese world order had to be hierarchical. (b) China as the

superior moral power was responsible for maintaining and harmonizing this order with the

moral examples, institutional innovations and force if necessary (Zhang, 2001:53). The

Chinese tended to consider their foreign relations as an expression of this internal order and the

tributary system was the embodiment of the Sino-centric world order.

The tribute system was a political mechanism that provided coexistence among China

and non-Chinese states (Zhang, 2001:52). It embodied the political submission of barbarians

and Imperial China’s sense of superiority reinforced this submission. The tribute system

provided the institutional mechanism of coexistence of the Chinese Empire and barbarian

tribes, kingdoms, and peripheral communities. The tribute system witnessed its most

aggressive and rapid expansion and institutionalization during the T’ang period. The system

extended to include many non-Chinese states and polities from Central, South and Southeast

Asia and it is argued that the T’ang dynasty had as many as seventy-two tributaries (Zhang,

2001:52).

Nevertheless, the crucial question is how this Sino-centric world order and the tributary

system were viewed by non-Chinese states and whether the Chinese Empire were successful to

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fit the theory of Sino-centrism and the practice of tributary system. Fairbank claims that all

these non-Chinese states and people were expected in theory to be tributary to the Son of

Heaven in central China, but the theory generally did not fit the facts (Fairbank, 1968:2-3). The

basic reason of this contradiction was that Chinese cultural area did not overlap with the Sino-

centric world order (Fairbank, 1968:3). Chinese superiority must be understood as a cultural

superiority because to sinicize the barbarians was one of the main thrusts of imperial expansion

(Zhang, 2001:55). Non-Chinese groups could be sinicized and ruled by the Empire if they

accepted Chinese customs, Confucian ideology and proper rituals. Therefore, the most

important means of the Chinese were Confucianism and their culture. The inner zone and the

Sinic zone was culturally tied to China but the outer zone of China was composed of people

who possessed distinctly non-Chinese culture such as Manchus, Mongols, Uighur Turks,

Tibetans, and others. The problem was that these people had to be included in the Chinese

world order because they provided the dominant military force in the East Asia. In this context,

there was a mismatch between the Chinese culture-based theory, superiority of Son of Heaven,

and the geographic fact of nomadic inner Asian fighting power. Chinese needed the striking

power of these Inner Asian people, but their cultural and economical superiority was not

always sufficient to control them (Fairbank, 1968:3).

Zhang also suggests that the Sino-centric Chinese worldview was not accepted by

others (Zhang, 2001:54). There were many cases when Chinese emperors explicitly

acknowledged the equality of barbarians (Zhang, 2001:54). Therefore, the legitimacy through

Sino-centric worldview could only be sustained domestically:

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The hypocrisy embodied in the organizing principles, norms and practices of the Chinese world order is embedded as an intended institutional feature. It may be indeed argued that it is precisely such purposive institutional ambiguities in the actual operation of the tribute system that made it a flexible system for the conduct of Imperial China’s foreign relations. The myth of Chinese superiority had to be maintained, however, for domestic purposes (Zhang, 2001:54).

We could better understand the non-Chinese view of Chinese world order by

considering relations between these populations and the T’ang Empire.

The Foreign Relations of the T’ang Empire: The Tribute System in Fact

Fairbank conceptualizes the Chinese world as three main zones (1968:2). First, the

Sinic zone involves the most nearby and culturally similar states such as Korea, Vietnam, and

Ryukyu Islands. Second, the Inner Asian Zone consists of nomadic and semi-nomadic people

who were non-Chinese. Third zone is the Outer zone, consisting of outer barbarians including

Japan and other states of Southeast and South Asia and Europe. The major neighbors of the

T’ang dynasty were the Eastern Turks, the Western Turks, the Indo-European-speaking

peoples of the Tarim basin, The Korean kingdom and the Tibetans.

The Eastern Turks were the greatest threat and rival for the T`ang dynasty from the

beginning (Wechsler, 1979:181; Rodzinski, 1979:122; Eberhard, 1977:181). Due to the nature

of nomad feudalism, the structure of the states of the northern nomads was always unstable and

impermanent and broken up with relative easy by the rise to power of new tribes which would

lead to new alliances, confederations or empires (Rodzinski, 1979:122). The Chinese had great

difficulties to establish a firm control over the Turks. Although, the T`ang dynasty came to

power with the aid of Eastern Turks, shortly Eastern Turks turned against the dynasty. Initially,

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the Chinese were able to defeat and built-up suzerainty over the Eastern Turks, but they could

not guaranteed a long-lasting domination over them (Eberhard, 1977:180, Wechsler, 1979:181-

2).

The Chinese struggled with the Western Turks mainly for the control of Central Asia

for commercial concerns and to prevent a union between the Turks and Tibetans (Eberhard,

1977:182). The third emperor of the dynasty divided the Western Turks and built up two

federations, which were under the control of Chinese protectorates-general in late 650s

(Wechsler, 1979:280). However, in mid 660s the tribal federations allied and regained their

independence from the Chinese. Even some sinicized Turks, who served the T`ang dynasty and

received a Chinese education, rebelled against the Chinese authorities (Wechsler, 1979:287).

The T`ang also formed suzerainty over the Oasis kingdoms, the Indo-European-

speaking peoples of the Tarim basin. However, the relation between the dynasty and these old-

kingdoms was similar to Turks. These tributaries rebelled against the Chinese and allied with

other tributaries and rejected the Chinese authority whenever they consolidated their power

(Wechsler, 1979:226). The Korean kingdom turned out to be a protectorate in late 670s.

However, while Korea was recognized as a Chinese suzerainty, in fact, it was an independent

country (Rodzinski, 1979:124). In a short period of time, the Chinese had to withdraw from the

region after a defeat (Wechsler, 1979:284). Similarly, we could not observe any stability for

the tributaries of the Tarim kingdoms and Tibetans (Wechsler, 1979:286). Throughout the

seventh century, the Tibetans were a considerable military force and a strong rival of the

Chinese for the control of Central Asia (Rodzinski, 1979:123).

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The Chinese influence also extended further to the Western regions. Through the

middle of the eight century the area west of Pamirs-Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, Ferghana

and much of Afghanistan were all under the control of Chinese. However, the Western Turks

and the Arabs in late seventh and eight centuries challenged the Chinese influence and Chinese

control was not welcomed in this region as well (Rodzinski, 1979:131).

The T’ang dynasty employed certain strategies to provide commitment of these tributes

such as force and diplomacy, conquer and divide, bribes or marriages (Wechsler, 1979:223;

Yang, 1968:24). They employed the old policy of playing on the divisions between the tribes.

Especially in times of military weakness, the Chinese developed certain methods such as

cessation of contact, buying them off by honors or material inducements, using one barbarian

against another through diplomacy and finally accepting barbarian rules at the apex of the

Chinese world (Fairbank, 1978:11-2). The Emperors were eager to assimilate the barbarians

and many barbarians were brought to capital in the military service of the Empire and many

sons of barbarian princes were educated in the schools of the capital (Latourette, 1967:145).

Nevertheless, as we see from the factual historical progress, these strategies were

successful to a certain extent and the Sino-centric world order was not firmly accepted by the

non-Chinese neighbors of the T’ang dynasty (Cranmer-Byng, 1973:68). Then the final question

is although there was a contradiction between the theory and facts of Chinese world order, why

or how the Empire sustained for such a long time. Zhang asks that why the Chinese

international order should have been organized differently from the ancient Greek city-states

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system (2001:56). Why did the tribute system persist and even expand when the Chinese

Empire was extremely weak? Why did the Chinese world order organize differently and why

did alternative institutions fail to replace the Pax Sinica when the Chinese were weak. In other

words, Zhang aims to explain the institutional rationality of the tribute system.

Zhang agrees with the idea that the ideas about the moral purpose of the state could

explain the divergent institutional designs and practices of historical societies of states.

Therefore, the endurance of a particular world order could be attributed to “the persistence of a

dominant idea about the moral purpose of the state” (Zhang, 2001:56). In Chinese society the

hegemonic belief in the moral purpose of state is embodied in Confucianism, which is to

promote social and cosmic order and harmony. “As the Confucian conception of the world is

civilizational, the organizing principle of sovereignty is concentrically hierarchical, with China

sitting at the core and others assigned a place according to how ‘civilized’ they are” (Zhang,

2001:56). An elaborate set of rituals was designed as standards of an ancient civilization, which

defined the norms of procedural justice and the observance of which decides the places of

others in the hierarchy of Chinese world order. It also enabled others to participate in this

order. In this context, the tribute system seemed the fundamental institution that embodies both

philosophical assumptions and institutional practices of the Chinese world order and organized

the relations between the Chinese and others.

Zhang argues that so long as the hegemonic belief in the moral purpose of the state,

namely the belief of Chinese on Confucianism, prevails, the tribute system is likely to remain

as a basic institutional practice in the Chinese world order (Zhang, 2001:57). Furthermore, this

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argument also explains: (a) how Imperial China could maintain its world order in times of

military weakness because military strength is neither necessary nor a sufficient condition for

the maintenance. (b) It explains the fact that no alternative institutional design could serve the

purpose better as long as the non-Chinese ruling elites accept the assumptions underlining the

prevailing belief about the moral purpose of the state as Chinese do. However, as explained

above, there was no stable belief in the institution among the non-Chinese.

Fairbank points out that the rule of Son of Heaven could be maintained over so much

people and terrain because of its superficiality (1968:8). The emperor was the supreme ruler

because his officials did not attempt to rule directly in the districts and remained loyal to the

emperor. Their training in Confucianism committed them to social order which formed the

privileged upper strata. Therefore, the answer might be the cultural influence of the Chinese in

general and the Emperor in particular. The Chinese believed that the mystical influence of the

all-wise example of virtue of Son of Heaven reached beyond China to all mankind and gave

them order and peace as parts of a concentric hierarchy (Fairbank, 1968:8). However, since

rulers outside China beyond the administrative-bureaucratic structure, they became attached to

Empire by personal ties that form the feudal relations. The interior vassals were under the

effective influence of the Son of Heaven, both cultural and coercive. However, the exterior

vassals were of lower rank and ruled in peripheral areas were not under the coercive power of

the emperor. As the area under the control of Chinese expanded, the exterior vassals became

interior as they come into contact with the Son of Heaven. It was in this way that the Chinese

world-order was unified and centralized in theory by the universal preeminence of the Son of

Heaven (Fairbank, 1968:9).

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In respect of the perception of the non-Chinese people, Schwartz says that “How the

Huns, Turks, Tibetans, Mongols, and others responded to this Chinese perception is a question

that remains to be explored. No doubt investigation will reveal that many of these peoples by

no means accepted Chinese claims and that even where they used the language of the Chinese

world order they may have done so with total mental reservations” (Schwartz, 1968:276).

However, he also suggests that “after all the qualifications and corrections have been made, the

notion of a Chinese perception of world will still prove generally valid in the sense in which all

general propositions about entities such as Chinese society or Chinese culture are valid”

(1968:277). Schwartz believes that at the heart of the Chinese world order, there is a notion of

universal kingship linked to a widely shared sense of participation in a high culture. The

Chinese approach to their world order; claiming some kind of unique universal authority and a

universal king at the top of highest civilization was not much different from other civilizations.

The difference of Chinese world order was the linkage of the concept of universal kingship and

the Confucian criteria of higher culture (Schwartz, 1968:277).

Schwartz admits that the power of the Empire was an important factor that affects the

ability of the Empire to exert its influence, to force its tribute system and shape practical

consequences of events. Nevertheless, the operational consequences of Chinese perceptions

can be observed through Confucianization of non-Chinese peoples in a spirit of total cultural

absolutism (Schwartz, 1968:278). That is to say, the Chinese could exert power by using

culture rather than mere use of force in order to affect the course of events and impose their

perception of world order on ethnic groups. “One is struck by the relative strength and

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persistence of the Chinese perception of world order before the end of the nineteenth century”

(Schwartz, 1968:281).

The reasons of strong and durable overarching perception of such an order were: (a) A

historical contingency, that is to say throughout the course of Chinese history, China was not

challenged in its immediate vicinity by the emergence of any universal state that based its

claims in cultural terms. (b) The Chinese conception of world order may have a much firmer

religio-cosmologic foundation than the other cultures (Schwartz, 1968:278). The Confucian

interpretation of universal kingship was supported by a moral system, which was itself a part of

the ultimate fabric of cosmos. In China, various schools viewed the cosmic status of the

universal kingship differently but they never fundamentally challenged it (Schwartz,

1968:284).

On the one hand, it is definitely clear that the T’ang dynasty was successful in

sustaining the commitment of Chinese people through coercive and non-coercive means such

as rituals and the examination system. On the other hand, the T’ang dynasty’s relations with

non-Chinese people were quite complex. The relations between the Chinese and non-Chinese

people were based on the Sino-centric worldview and the tribute system. The Chinese

attempted to provide the commitment of these people through non-coercive and coercive

means. Furthermore, through the examination system they had the opportunity to rise to higher

ranks of the administrative system. Nevertheless, the evidence shows us that the theory of

Sino-centric worldview did not always fit the tribute system in practice. Although the Chinese

were successful to a certain extent, ultimately the non-Chinese people struggled for their

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independence whenever they had a chance. Therefore, eventually we are faced with the

question that how the Chinese were able to sustain their Empire. All the answers have

significant merit, namely, the moral purpose of the state, superficiality of the administration of

the reinforcement of a high culture had considerable impact upon the structure. Nevertheless,

the question still remains to be explored.

As a conclusion, the T’ang dynasty presents us an outstanding example of a

hierarchical structure that persisted for a long time. Obviously, the T’ang dynasty was very

successful in providing peace and prosperity as common goods and sought to distribute the

burdens and benefits among all subjects. Furthermore, there were substantial developments that

resulted in the reduction of transaction costs in the spheres of security, economy and

administration such as the standardization of administrative procedures, a codified law, coinage

and weights and measures. The Empire was also able to provide commitment and legitimacy of

its subjects through coercive and non-coercive means, though there is still a debate over the

commitment of the non-Chinese people.

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CHAPTER IV

THE MULTI-STATE SYSTEM OF GREECE

THE ARCHAIC AND THE CLASSICAL PERIOD (800-400 B.C.)

Many historians conceived Greece after the collapse of the Mycenean civilization about

1200 B.C., as a prolonged Dark Age in which economic and political life turned out to be a

rudimentary stage. After that epoch, the Greek history is conventionally divided into four

periods: the Archaic Period (800-500 B.C.), the Classical Period (500-400 B.C.), the

Hellenistic Period (336-31 B.C.), and the Roman Period (31 B.C.-300 A.D.) (Finley, 1963:17).

During the epoch of Archaic Greece (from 800 B.C. to 500 B.C.), the urban pattern of classical

civilization firmly established and the multi-state system of Greece developed. The Archaic

and the Classical period presents us a regional anarchical system until the establishment of the

Athenian Empire (approximately in 440s B.C.). Nevertheless, compared to the anarchical

period, the hierarchical period was short, for fifty years or so. Afterwards, the Macedonian and

the Roman invasion of Greece followed. In this context, the analysis of the Archaic and

Classical periods serves to compare and contrast an anarchical structure with the hierarchical

ones that were dealt in Chapter one and three. The main question of the present chapter is why

an anarchical structure prevailed over the Greek city-state system (The Hellas)3 in an era,

marked by hierarchical structures. Initially, the political structure of the anarchic system shall

be considered.

3 ‘Hellas’ will be used interchangeably with Greek city-states since it comprised all Greek cities and their culture. (Watson, 1992:48; Walbank, 2002:241).

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The Political Structure of the Multi-State System of Ancient Greece

The Archaic period (8th-6th centuries) is perhaps the most important period in Greek

history that introduced fundamental innovations. The city-state or polis was the main form of

political organization throughout the Greek world from the eight century to the late fourth

century B.C. The Greek word polis or poleis in its classical sense meant a self-governing state

(Finley, 1963:45). The physical base, a sense of community and the notion of independence

were crucial for the polis (Forrest, 1991:14). It was occupying a defined area and a dependent

territory. Most of them were comprised of a group of towns or a small city surrounded by small

areas of agricultural territory. The city was the center for religion, politics and administration

and it was usually fortified, always consisted of an agora, a place for assembly, a seat of justice

and of government.

Another important criterion for polis was the size of the population because the polis

was people acting in concert (Finley, 1963:47). “The Greeks did not say that Athens went to

war with Sparta: they said that the Athenians, meaning the corporation of armed proprietors,

went to war with the Spartans” (Watson, 1992:50). Therefore, they must be able to assemble

and deal with problems face to face, which was one of the necessary conditions of self-

government. Furthermore, the polis must be self-sufficient as much as the nature permits.

Hence, it must not be so small that it lacked the manpower to carry on the various activities of

a civilized existence, such as defense.

As a community the city-state consisted of citizens (adult males), citizens without

political rights (women and children), and non-citizens (resident foreigners and slaves). The

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polis was like a limited corporation of citizens who were hereditary armed proprietors of the

corporation (Watson, 1992:49). Therefore, one needs to be descended from citizens, have to

own some property and have also to bear arms, which were all together difficult to achieve.

Hence, the polis was an exclusive community and the citizenship was restricted to a small

minority among the majority of non-citizens, slaves and women.

Finally, polis was a self-governing body so that freedom was very important for the

citizens. The freedom was not equated with anarchy but with an ordered existence within a

community, which was governed by an established code respected by all (Finley, 1963:50).

The people were living under a defined or definable constitution, independent of outside

authority to an extent that citizens feel that they are independent. “The commitment of the

Greeks to independence is legendary” (Watson, 1992:49). Each city-state should manage its

own affairs and resented any kind of overlordship or hegemony by another. During the Archaic

period, the Greeks several times fought for this freedom, first against the nobility and later

against the tyrants. “The fact that the community was the sole source of law was a guarantee of

freedom” (Finley, 1963:50). Even though in later periods, some part of the city-state could be

shed involuntarily, by acceptance of tribute paying to a stronger power or voluntarily by

joining an alliance or a federation, there was always a sense of autonomy (Forrest, 1991:14).

The power of the polis was total, it was the source of all rights and obligations, and its

authority reached into every sphere of human behavior. “The polis was inevitable” and “The

law is king” (Finley, 1963:50).

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The system of political administration of city-states evolved from hereditary kingships

to tribal aristocracies, then tyrannies, and afterwards to democracies or oligarchies. Initially,

the central institutions in city-states consisted of a king, a council and an assembly. From the

eight century onwards, the local kingships were overthrown by tribal aristocracies who had

formed the king’s Council and Court. Anderson argues that the Greek city-states were founded

and developed by these tribal aristocracies (1974:29). In this period, the city-states were based

on the privileged rule of hereditary nobility over the rest of the population, which was

exercised through the government of an aristocratic council. The magistrates were the

executive organs of the Council. The authority was based on religious and social tradition and

also economic and military strength. The nobles had the best land and only they could afford to

fight, so that mass population could participate neither in the wars nor in the Council, and all

the important offices were controlled by nobles. Nevertheless, the aristocratic government was

based upon the consent of the citizen community and the Assembly of citizens was not

suppressed. It could voice its opinion on major issues such as foreign policy, colonial policy,

land tenure, etc.

Later on from the mid-seventh century to the sixth century, these aristocratic forms of

rule were transformed either into oligarchies or replaced with tyrants. The main problem

stemmed from the extreme concentration of economic and political power in the hands of

aristocracy (Hammond, 1986:144) and the inability of aristocracy to adapt themselves to new

conditions of life such as the transformation of the Hellenic economy (Bengtson, 1988:62).

Whereas, some states modified their institutions peacefully and transformed into an oligarchy

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or democracy, some of them could not solve these problems and a single individual, the tyrant,

seized power (Anderson, 1974:30; Hammond, 1986:145, 150).

The tyrannies were important because the decline of tyrannies gave way to oligarchic or

democratic forms of government soon after and through the end of the sixth century and in this

period the military and economic foundations of Greek classical civilizations were firmly

developed. The significant shifts in the military organization of the cities also promoted the

establishment of oligarchic or democratic administrations (Bengtson, 1988:62). Armies began

to be composed of hoplites, which were heavily armed medium farmer class citizen-infantry.

These soldiers formed the basis of later Greek democracy and oligarchies, because the decision

to wage wars began to be made by the mass of hoplites. In this context, the tyrannies’ agrarian

revolution and military innovations prepared the Hellenic polis of the fifth century. As a result,

more people began to participate in political life.

When the city-states took their ultimate forms of organization in the classical period,

the administrative structure was based on the Council and the Assembly. A smaller Council

proposed a public decision to a larger Assembly that voted on them without rights of initiative.

The relative degree of democracy or oligarchy within each polis was determined by the

variations in the composition of the Council and Assembly and by the election of magistrates

of the State who performed the administrative duties. Besides, the Council, the Assembly and

the magistrates, there were also state officials who performed the daily administrative duties.

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The colonization movement, which began towards the middle of the eight century to

middle of the sixth century, played a vital role for the spread of polis. The colonies of several

city-states spread from the Greek heartland to the coasts of the Aegean, Black Sea, North

Africa (Egypt, Morocco), Italy, Sicily, Gaul and Spain. The colonization was a highly

organized movement by the mother cities and we see that institutions of mother cities were

reproduced in these cities from the beginning of the colonization (Austin and Vidal-Naquet,

1977:50). The colonies adopted the religious and political institutions of their mother city such

as constitution, calendar, dialect, alphabet, and etc. However, each colony from the outset, and

by intention, was an independent Greek community (Finley, 1963:27, 29). The motivations

were various, such as surplus of population, poverty and desperation, ambition, the shortage of

land and to farm, to trade, to take a chance, personal reasons (Forrest, 1991:17; Hammond,

1986:121; Haywood, 1971:119; Sealey, 1976:31-2; Van Sickle, 1970:206-7). As a result of this

movement, cultural and political forms of organization of city-states spread around and formed

the geographic basis of Hellas.

In the classical period, parallel to these developments, the structure of the system

became more stratified and rigid (Holsti, 1974:47). Some city-states, such as Athens, Sparta,

Acragas, Corinth, Argus and Thebes, increasingly began to dominate the smaller states. Main

sources of this change were the rapid growth and extension of the Athenian naval and

commercial power and the threat of Persian penetration into the Hellas and Macedon (Holsti,

1974:47). As a response to the external danger, several Greek city-states united under the

Hellenic league, which was a military alliance gathered under the leadership of Athens and

Sparta. After the Greeks defeated the Persians, the Hellenic League was reorganized by Athens

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into the Delian League in 454. In order to deter the further Athenian expansion, the

Peloponnesian League was established under the leadership of Sparta. The League developed

from the alliances between Sparta and various Peloponnesian states in the course of the second

half of the sixth century. The autonomy and independence of the members of these leagues

were always a matter of dispute among the League members. During this period the Athenians

had to suppress several revolts by coalition of city-states such as the Boetian and the Euobean.

The Spartans also had difficulties to gather the commitment of its allies although the

sovereignty of members remained unaffected (Bengtson, 1988:80).

Nevertheless, several authors agreed that the Delian League was transformed into the

Athenian Empire in 440s or 430s (Freeman, 1999:201; Holsti, 1974:48; Van Sickle, 1970:354-

5; Doyle, 1986:55-6). The League was transformed when Athens began to capture cities,

coerce the members to confirm the Athenian exactions and send emissaries to supervise the

payment of tribute and domestic policies of weak members (Doyle, 1986:55-6). The purpose of

the League altered to maintain Athens’ economic, cultural and political supremacy. The

position of Sparta in the Peloponnesian League was categorized as hegemony, because of the

differences in degree of control, coercion and influence in domestic affairs (Doyle, 1986:58-9).

Therefore, a diarchic or two-bloc system dominated the Hellas throughout the end of fifth

century, which resulted in the Peloponnesian War between two blocs from 460 to the end of

the fifth century. In fact, by the time of the Peloponnesian War, the system of Hellas was

characterized by formal and informal relations of supremacy and subjugation and hegemonic

and imperial ties dominated what to be an independent states-system. Finally, the Hellas fell

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under the hegemony of Philip II and later on it was transformed into a single imperial structure

by the Alexander the Great, the king of Macedon.

Comparison of Anarchic and Hierarchic Systems

The Generation of Common Goods

Security

“Peace is merely a name; in truth an undeclared war always exists by nature between every Greek city-state” Plato, Laws (Osborne, 2000:82)

Hierarchic type of relations is better to provide security as a common good. The

political unification of autonomous units may provide peace for long periods of time as in the

case of Rome and China. Throughout the archaic and classical period, although peace was seen

as the primary goal of Greek way of life, the Greeks were not quite successful in achieving it.

War was a normal instrument of policy for Greeks, which they used fully and frequently

(Finley, 1963:56). “They did not particularly seek war…but neither did they go to lengths to

avoid it” (Finley, 1963:56). The Greek city-states felt little responsibility towards Hellas and

war was considered as a legitimate means if the citizens saw advantage in it. According to

Thucydides war was common because “We believe that it is divine, and know for certain that it

is universally human, by natural compulsion, to rule whatever one can” (Osborne, 2000:83).

“War was always fairly probable; and encounters at sea between the ships of rival corporations,

which fell below the level of formal war, were to be expected” (Watson, 1992:50). During the

classical period, “It has been estimated that classical Athens was at war two years out of three”

(Osborne, 2000:82).

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The immediate causes of war were the desire for power and aggrandizement, border

incidents, material enrichment through booty, protection of corn supply and transport, the

search for outside support for internal strife (Finley, 1963:56-7). All these factors were

precipitated by the large number of small independent states. Osborne claims that acquiring a

recognized position of leadership was an important goal of city-states so that they wage war in

pursuit of leadership as a regional power. Thucydides describes three reasons for waging war

for power: honor or respect, profit and fear. However, among these reasons, the most

remarkable one was desire for honor and respect. The reason was that much of the hegemony

and domination as a regional power lay in the prestige or honor and when city-states feel that

they were being treated disrespectful they sometimes did respond with force (Osborne,

2000:83).

Bozeman argues that major reason was the polis itself, which was the major

impediment against political unification. The Greeks agreed that peace was the essential

condition of human existence and the city-state was the most appropriate political institution

for the Greek way of life (Bozeman, 1960:77). Nevertheless, they were not successful to

sustain peace and the chief reason was the very success of the city-state:

Since the generally accepted function of the polis was to secure a good life for the people in terms of individual development, and since the realization of this aim was deemed to be possible only if a city did not exceed a certain size, peace through political unification was actually inconsistent with the primary purpose of political association as understood by the Greeks (Bozeman, 1960:77-8).

Therefore, Greeks believed that any hope for permanent peace between so many independent

states was a wishful thinking.

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Nevertheless, although acknowledging the validity of these arguments many authors

argue that the Greek city-states were not in a constant state of war or lived in a system of

unremitting hostility, of all against all (Watson, 1992:50; Kokaz, 2001:95; Osborne, 2000:82).

Osborne claims that although war was common in Hellas, the Greeks did not think of war as

the normal state of affairs in relations among them. Kokaz suggests that the depiction of the

system of Hellas as a state of war is largely misleading (2001:95).

The Greeks developed certain normative institutions and practices to regulate the

pursuit of power and to provide peaceful settlement of disputes. Bozeman claims that because

the Greeks believed that peace through political unification was a wishful thinking they

developed three different methods to the problem of peace and security: (a) they tried to

mitigate the destructiveness of war once it had broken out. (b) they tried to prevent the

outbreak of major wars by maintaining a balance of power between states (in the form of

alliances, leagues and confederations); and (c) they tried to settle disputes peacefully wherever

possible (arbitration). Finley suggests that, since war was considered as a means not an end, the

Greeks relied also on peaceful alternatives and sometimes they were successful (1963:58). One

of them was alliance, the strongest force of a few great city-states for peace. Alliances were

successful because they provided great auxiliary manpower, which was vital at that period.

Reus-Smit argues that there was extensive cooperation among city-states through

extraterritorial institutions and the most important was the institution of third-party arbitration

from the sixth century to the first century B.C. (1999:41). Obviously, sometimes these

institutions were successful sometimes not. He attributes this particular way of practice to the

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constitutional structure of the ancient Greek society of states and a distinctive conception of the

moral purpose of the state and norm of procedural justice (Reus-Smit, 1999:41). The states

used arbitration to solve a wide range of cooperation problems, such as the treatment of

foreigners, regulation of borders, etc. It was also central to other instruments of interstate

cooperation such as concluding bilateral treaties. Although, it was not underpinned by a body

of codified law like today’s system, it was the predominant fundamental institution of

cooperation and an instrument of coexistence among Hellas (Reus-Smit, 1999:45).

In this context, it is obvious that the Greeks did not aim to achieve peace through

political unification because of their conception of primary purpose of political association and

a distinctive concept of moral purpose of the state. However, they attempted to develop other

methods for peaceful settlements of disputes among the city-states such as rules governing

conduct of warfare, balance of power through alliances, and arbitration. It is difficult to claim

that the Greeks were in a constant state of war because these mechanisms were sometimes

successful and there are certain periods that the Greek cities did not fight with each other

severely such as the sixth century (Starr, 1991:211-2). However, compared to a truly hierarchic

structure, the probability of war among the Greek city-states appears to be higher than the

probability of war among units under a truly hierarchic structure.

Economic Prosperity

In general, the economic prosperity of Hellas improved during the Archaic and

Classical period. In fact, the economy expanded slowly during the archaic period but the

massive changes in the economic and social structure of the Hellas during this period gave way

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to a new framework and the greater economic boom of the Classical one (Starr, 1982:417). The

economy of Hellas was based on agriculture and the ideal of self-sufficiency. There was very

little trade between the Greeks and other people before colonization began (Cook, 1946:83,

87). The Greeks in the eight and seventh centuries needed few imports and therefore little

trade. There was small-scale local production and imports were required most of the city-states

(Osborne, 2000:40). The resources of most city-states were limited and roads were primitive.

In addition, the ideal of the polis was self-sufficiency so that there was no powerful urban

bourgeoisie and assemblies and upper classes were rurally based. Moreover, the political

machinery of the polis was too limited to guarantee order and justice beyond its local market

(Starr, 1982:435).

Nevertheless, during the Archaic period, thanks to more skilful exploitation of native

resources and a geographical position between the developed Near East and the barbarian

farther shores of the Mediterranean, the population of Greece covered its needs, expanded its

numbers to some degree and even produced a modest surplus (Starr, 1982:435). These

developments resulted in the rise of cities, the appearance of coinage, the wave of colonization

and the growth of trade by the sixth century, which brought about a remarkable period of

economic prosperity in the classical age. There were fundamental causes of this economic

development (Starr, 1982:419).

First of all, the Greeks acquired great benefits by providing raw materials to the more

advanced eastern centers. Second, the growth of population and the colonization movement

itself promoted the economic growth because the Greek trade was due to need and large-scale

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trade could not arise until city-states began to maintain populations, which could not be

supplied locally, and until urbanization reached certain levels (Starr, 1982:420; Cook,

1946:86). The increase in population stimulated a need for improvements in techniques, skills

and interest. Moreover, the surplus population led to a rise in urban population that dealt with

manufacturing (Mann, 1986:207).

Third, colonization was another encouraging factor. Better ships were built and were

used in greater numbers in this period so that the Greeks gained access to many sources of raw

materials (Starr, 1991:220-1). The archaic age witnessed a substantial development of

manufacture and commerce between mother cities and colonies (Austin and Vidal-Naquet,

1977:54). The prerequisite of large-scale trade was a regular surplus of production in colonies

so that trade was a result of colonization (Cook, 1946:86). Finally, desire of upper classes for

foreign goods, their search for disposable wealth and new routes for booty was crucial for the

growth of trade (Mann, 1986:207; Starr, 1982:421).

All states in this period acquired revenues through market and harbor dues, which were

a major source of actual cash revenues for public treasuries. The polis partially enabled this

process, sometimes unintentionally, by standardization of weights and measures, issue of

coinage, better water supplies and harbor works, and easier transportation (Starr, 1982:433).

For instance, Corinth, which was located suitably to control land and sea trade became

prosperous through raising taxes on commercial activity. Through the end of the colonization

period the Greek world exhibited an unparalleled prosperity (Starr, 1991:313). Hammond urges

that prosperity based on commerce and spread to Hellas, colonies and even to areas such as the

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Mediterranean coast of Spain, Sicily, the Adriatic Sea, the Balkans, and south Russia

(Hammond, 1986:521-2).

In this context, it could be argued that the economic prosperity increased in the archaic

and the classical period. However, the question is whether Hellas might have been more

prosperous if it was organized hierarchically. For instance, Starr believes that making

economic activity was very difficult in Hellas because it was split into a host of fiercely

autarchical states, which had very little policy of public finance. Apart from tolls, fines and

fees major expenses were funded by rich in the forms of confiscation or inflation of the

currency. Within these systems the surplus of economic production over basic human needs

was not great and society was commonly divided into a relatively small rich class and a large

group of the poor (Starr, 1991:315). Furthermore, he mentions that the establishment of the

Athenian Empire enabled a more feasible economic interaction among the city-states. Starr

says that “In these respects the unification of much of the Aegean under Athenian rule eased

commercial interchanges, and the Athenian “owls” were famous as a stable coinage” (Starr,

1991:315).

Furthermore, the lack of security was another impediment in further growth of trade

and prosperity. Hammond notes that prosperity did not bring peace to the fourth century. It

simply enabled states to recover quickly and wage another war. The wars were almost

continuous from 431 to 351, between and within the city-states. The result for Hellas was the

loss of strength. Another hindrance was the lack of public goods such as transportation among

the city-states. The only feasible transportation was by the sea. Therefore, we could not

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encounter such transportation system such as the roads of the Roman Empire or Grand Canal

of the Chinese Empire. The insecurity of sea-borne commerce discouraged the growth of

commerce. Starr suggests “Only a small part of even if the urban population ever cared to

commit itself to maritime dangers… and the main source of demand was internal” (1982:428)

The fierce sense of independence of each polis, however, and the costs of land transport led to

the rise of many small economic centers along the Aegean coasts (Starr, 1982:428). In this

context, although the economic prosperity of Hellas improved during the archaic and classical

periods, compared to Rome and China, there were more serious impediments in Hellas due to

lack of a central organization that might facilitate the economic interaction of all city-states.

The Decline in Transaction Costs

Transaction costs are an important factor that influences the binding arrangement

among autonomous actors. As the level of transactions costs increase states are more likely to

enter into binding arrangements to reduce them. By reducing transaction costs hierarchic

organizations facilitate interactions among individual units. In respect to Hellas, there are

certain elements that reduced the transaction costs among city-states. Nevertheless, due to the

importance given to the independence and autonomy of the city-states, these factors were

mostly limited to the boundaries of individual city-states. Unlike Rome or China, the

standardization of language, administrative and legal procedures, coinage or weights and

measures did not happen in all the Greek city-states. Although, there are remarkable

achievements that generated common practices in inter-city-state relations, these cannot create

any incentives toward a centralization of authority.

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The Standardization of Written Language

The written language was initially introduced to Greeks in about 800 B.C. The Semitic

peoples of Syria, Palestine and near-by countries had evolved a true alphabet and as a result of

commercial contacts between the Phoenicians and the Asiatic Ionians, the Greeks adopted this

system. Later on this system became widespread in the remainder of Hellas before 700 B.C.

(Van Sickle, 1974:269). However, the Phoenician alphabet changed so radically that it became

in a true sense the alphabet of Greeks.

Mann suggests that after 700 B.C. an extensive literacy developed in Hellas and it was

diffused to all average citizens (Mann, 1986:206). In cities like Athens reading, writing and

arithmetic seems to be common attainments among the free population (Finley, 1963:89). The

reasons of diffusion of literacy were, on the one hand the Phoenicians trade routes and on the

other hand democracy (Mann, 1986:206). Thanks to the Phoenician trade routes, literacy

spread to southern Asia Minor colonies and then to the largest traders and the wealthy in each

state. In addition, the democratic structure and institutions of the polis required widespread

literacy because a restricted literacy among oligarchic elite would contradict with the ideals of

democracy.

Obviously, there was a diversity of dialects and customs in the new Greece, which was

reflected in the local variations that appeared in the alphabet (Van Sickle, 1974:270). There

were two main groups, the eastern and the western. The former included the Ionian and

Athenian alphabets, from which today’s Greek alphabet derived from. Nevertheless, despite the

differences in dialects and changes in language, many authors claim that Greeks had a common

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language and they view it as a symbol of Greek cultural unity. Rollo suggests that the Greeks

were a community of language in spite of the many dialects in Early Greek (1937:135).

Namely, language was a real tie between members of different states, which could be seen on

the Greek view of barbarians. Originally, the word barbaroi was used to identify people

speaking a language unintelligible to Greek ears (Rollo, 1937:136). The Greeks possessed a

common identity and Hellas became their term for this unity. They believed that they had come

from a common ethnic heritage and one of the indicators was the common language. The

literacy fixed and reinforced cultural identity and it was the first shared, cross-class, stabilized

culture of known history that was shared by citizens and their families. From eight and seventh

centuries then on, they were a single linguistic people although there were dialect differences

and rapid changes in languages (Mann, 1986:204).

The Standardization of Administrative Procedures and the Codified Law

An essential element of gradual democratization of the Greek city-states was the

codification of law (Bengtson, 1988:63). Greek legislation in seventh and sixth centuries was a

genuine innovation of Hellenes. The first written code was seen in the Italian-Greek city of

Locri in 660s. Afterwards, Thebes, Corinth, Athens, and many other states of continental

Greece and the Aegean area codified their laws before the end of the seventh century. The laws

basically regulated administration, crimes and penalties, funerals, education, property, debts,

and murder.

The Greeks believed that the most efficient way of exerting authority through the law

was to provide an all-embracing code. One of the outstanding examples of codification of law

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was realized by Solon, the magistrate of Athens. Under the authority of Solon, the Athenians

inscribed a comprehensive law on wooden tables. It was truly comprehensive in that it dealt

with the laws of the state, high treason, criminal law, family relations, and commercial activity

(Freeman, 1999:104). However, these laws were not absolute, the Athenians believed that laws

were to serve a community and they could be changed as a community’s needs changed

(Freeman, 1999:104). This understanding of codification of law later on laid the foundation for

European law and promoted the development of western law and legal thinking.

Nevertheless, when we consider the entire Hellas, there is a debate over whether the

Greeks had a notion of international law that governs relations between them. Wight suggests

that the Hellenic system had no notion of international law because the Greeks did not view

polis as possessing rights and being subject to obligations (1977:52). This was because the

polis was developed as the final term of human organization in an early period and also

because of lack of inheritance of legal codes, legal thinking or legal practice. The Greek city-

states had procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes but these provisions were not

examples of arbitration, rather they were just conciliation (Wight, 1977:52). The conciliations

were based on principles of equity rather than law; the decisions were moral rather than legal;

and aimed to establish friendship rather than technically satisfactory settlements. The only

body of international law was the Rhodian maritime law, which was developed in Hellenistic

times. Therefore, Wight concludes that there is not a body of uniform legal principles that

regulate the relations between city-states.

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On the contrary, Kokaz urges that “The History is full of observations that prove

otherwise, such as the tremendous importance accorded to international treaties, the observance

certain rules of warfare for the most part, and the complex judicial system through which the

Athenians governed their empire, to give just a few examples” (Kokaz, 2001:95). She believes

that Wight’s argument is based on the idea that international law is equated with the formally

enacted rules. Ober and Kokaz emphasize the role of informal and unwritten conventions

governing inter-state conflict deriving from common practice (Kokaz, 2001:96; Ober,

1996:56). Ober also suggests that most of the informal rules were followed most of the time in

intra-Greek warfare of about 750 to 450 BC, although he admits that there is lack of evidence

(Ober, 1996:56). Nevertheless, even though there were informal rules that governed the inter-

state relations of warfare, apparently these rules were confined to the sphere of war and there is

uncertainty about the validity of the time frame.

Finally, it was clear that almost all Greek city-states had a tradition of codification of

law. However, these rules vary according to individual city-states so that the codification of

administrative procedures and law did not serve the purpose of lowering the transaction costs

between the city-states. Furthermore, the existence of informal rules and unwritten conventions

and the procedure of third party arbitrations could not definitely play the role of facilitating the

transaction costs because they aimed to resolve conflicts rather than enabling and encouraging

easy transactions such as the Roman Law or Chinese administrative procedures.

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The Standardization of Coinage and Weights and Measures

The use of precious metals as a medium of exchange was not new when it was

introduced in Hellas. Through the end of eight century or, some authors, say in 650s, the kings

of Lydia introduced a coinage as a device to facilitate trade. From Lydia the new practice

spread to Ionia, where the city-states began to mint gold and silver coins (Hammond,

1986:132). Coinage had never existed before 700 B.C. but in the seventh and sixth centuries it

became an important force in the economic progress of Hellas. Before the end of the sixth

century nearly all-important Greek states had their own mints (Van Sickle, 1974:287).

There is no clear agreement on whether the primary motivation of use of coinage was

economic or political in Hellas. The invention and spread of coinage in archaic Greece might

be understood in the framework of the development of social relations and the definition of

values (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:56). The development of civic consciousness is very

important because coinage was first and foremost a civic emblem for Greek city-states (Austin

and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:57). “To strike coins with the badge of the city was to proclaim one’s

political independence” (1977:57). All states had their unique coins e.g. turtle of Aegina,

Pegasus of Corinth, owl of Athens. In this respect, Athens’ attempt to ban all silver coinages of

her allies and to replace with her own could be understood as an indication of demonstration of

Athens power. Therefore, the spread of coinage was related with the phenomenon of the

development of the cities and civic consciousness (1977:58).

Nevertheless, Hammond claims that the primary function of the coinage was to

accelerate the movement of commercial exchange and to enrich the city-states by the

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accumulation of mobile capital. It also promoted the process of internal retail and introduced a

novel form of property in the individual polis. Furthermore, when cities became geographical

centers of economic life coinage emerged as a tangible economic force because there was a

need of a standard measure and medium of value (Starr, 1982:430). Starr urges that the coins

were used for public objectives, for building navies, paying the mercenaries of tyrants, for fines

and tolls on commercial activity, for expenses in the construction of temples, and it was used to

demonstrate the growing pride and power of the minting polis. Coinage was not itself a major

economic force until well after 600, but it was invented when society had grown sufficiently

mobile for the concept of the coinage to take hold Greek economic life.

Greek coinage was developed initially at the main centers of exchange by city-states,

which drew their revenues from commerce. There were three groups (Hammond, 1986:134):

(a) Ionian, led by Miletus and Ephesus, (b) Aeginetan, including Aegina and her financial

allies; (c) Corinthian, led by Corinth and Samos and comprising later Athens and Euboea.

After the use of coinage became widespread, secondary centers began to mint coins and two

systems of coinage dominated continental Greece (Van Sickle, 1974:219). The Aeginetan

system, which was the standard currency in most of the Dorian states, in Peloponnese, southern

and southeastern Aegean including Crete and Egypt and the other was the system of Chalcis of

Euboea, or the Corinthian system, which dominated the West Acarnania, Ambracia, south and

west Italy, Sicily, and Gaul and Spain. This system became more popular when it was adopted

by Athens. Other states had their own coins that were acceptable only within their own

domains. However, Hammond claims, there was no uniformity in coinage in Hellas, and from

the beginning, different standards and types of coinage were in competition (1986:134). There

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was large number of issuing states, each autonomous, each competitive and each partially

dependent for income on the profitable exchange of their coins due to different amount of

silver and weight of coins (Sutherland, 1940:66). It is only possible to identify an international

currency at the end of the fifth century (Van Sickle, 1974:219). Furthermore, the Greeks used

the old Oriental system of weights and measures differently. The units of value derived from

this system with smaller sub-divisions.

The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System

The ability to provide commitment of members is crucial for a political form of

organization to exist for a long period of time. The commitment to the polis is vitally important

to understand why an anarchic structure predominates in Hellas, because it might clearly

impede any incentives or attempts to unite all the Hellenes and built-up a viable empire or a

single authority. The main political form of Hellas, the polis, unlike its contemporary forms of

organizations was very successful in sustaining not only the commitment of elites but also the

loyalty and active participation of all male adults. The consideration of these reasons will be

very helpful to compare and contrast the commitments of Romans, Chinese and Hellenes to

different forms of organization.

The Greeks were strongly committed to their polis and loyal to these small independent

units. There are various arguments about the reasons of this commitment. First of all,

geographical factors contributed to the development of this political organization and

commitment. One of the causes of development of polis was the physical fragmentation of

Greece (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:50; Finley, 1963:21). Mountains and small plains and

valleys divided much of terrain so that small communities were isolated from each other and

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transportation and communication were very difficult and sometimes impossible. Therefore,

settlers generally concentrated in inland valleys and coastal plains. Thus the terrain favored the

development of a large number of independent communities or city-states rather than a single

authority (Sealey, 1976:10).

Second, the moral basis of the polis was a crucial factor that deeply influenced the

political life of Greek people. Bozeman argues that the Greeks had a unique understanding of

international affairs that conceived it as essentially human affairs (1960:70). The moral values

and philosophical assumptions of Greeks led them to form a community life based on the form

of polis. The Greeks believed that freedom is necessary for the evolution of reason, achieving

the true self and excellent man, so that freedom is the chief value and interest in human life.

Therefore, the community life should take a form that would permit all men to pursue the goals

of life disclosed by reason and all men could develop potentialities for excellence (Bozeman,

1960:71). The realization of this aim was deemed to be possible only if a city did not exceed a

certain size. Hence, the political unification of all Greeks is incompatible with the ultimate aim

of a good life. In addition, historically, Mesopotamian countries had a political organization

based on city-states, which influenced the Greek system.

Similarly, Holsti suggests that the polis for the Greeks meant more than a political

institution because it was the ideal social organization for liberating man from his natural state,

and for providing justice, promoting fellowship and harmony and training personal character

(Holsti, 1974:46). There was no incentive among Greeks to unite all the Hellenic people and

built-up a viable empire because Greeks emphasized the virtue of limited political

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organizations (Holsti, 1974:46). Small political organizations allow for the assembly of all free

citizens to help make political decisions and small enough for government and administration

never to impose impersonal influences over the lives of citizens. Therefore, state and society

were indistinguishable concepts among the Greeks.

Reus-Smit explains the reason d’etre of the polis on the basis of Aristotelian moral

philosophy. The polis was the preeminent form of human organization for Greeks because they

believed that quest for justice is a political activity, men are political beings and therefore the

rational pursuit of justice was possible only within the polis.

Its raison d’etre was not, first and foremost, to provide physical security or to facilitate economic exchange, but “to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions.”4 The moral purpose of the ancient Greek city-state thus lay in the cultivation of bios politicos, a form of communal life characterized by the rational pursuit of justice through action and speech (Reus-Smit, 1999:46).

This conception of the moral purpose of the state entailed a discursive norm of

procedural justice that functioned through a process of public moral debate and deliberation.

The belief that public moral discourse was the appropriate way to decide questions of right and

wrong shaped political and legal practices across the Hellas. Even oligarchic states, such as

Sparta, relied on discursive norm of procedural justice. Thus, eventually the moral purpose of

the state requires the participation and commitment of all citizens and the form of political

organization of the city-state.

4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I.9, 23.

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Kokaz, referring to the Aristotelian philosophy, emphasizes that state comes into

existence for the sake of good life and the good life invokes the practice of excellence in the

lives of individuals as well as political communities. “Thus, not only the power and unity of

the polis, but also the very goal of political independence, is irrevocably tied to the practice of

excellence” (Kokaz, 2001:101). Therefore, the most suitable institutions to secure the internal

and external unity of the polis are the ones that promote the good life and the practice of

excellence. The institutions that are based on divine law, human law, written and unwritten,

goodwill, friendship and trust when combined with practical wisdom and moderation might

generate political unity, power and the practice of excellence.

Third, in addition to the geographical factors and the moral basis of the state, the

development of citizenship and notion of community was very important (Austin and Vidal-

Naquet, 1977:54). The concept of citizenship was crucial to the identity and functioning of a

Greek polis. The Greeks conceived town and country (city center and rural areas) as a single

unit (Finley, 1963:23). The whole was bound by not only economics or use of force but also by

psychologically, by a feeling among the members of the community of a unity underpinned by

common cult and tradition. The idea of Athens as a political unit was expressed as Athenians.

Therefore, the Greeks thought of themselves not only as Hellenes against the Barbarians but

also as members of groups and sub-groups within Hellas (Finley, 1963:23). The citizens of a

polis undertook mutual responsibility for the administration of its city’s affairs, its defense and

a relationship with its gods. In return, they shared its wealth and success (Freeman, 1999:90).

Hence, the concept of citizen stood for a shared ownership of a common concern and

ownership of land. Citizenship was both a legal status and implied active involvement in the

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city’s affairs. The Greeks believed that a human being could only reach his fullest potential as

a citizen sharing the government of a polis. In this sense, it had a psychological and a legal

meaning. Furthermore, the development of citizenship and community consciousness also

brought about antithetical notions such as non-citizens and slaves.

The emergence of hoplite warfare and phalanx was an important factor that promoted

the emergence of community consciousness and commitment to the polis. The defense force of

the polis was the phalanx, which developed from 725 to 675 (Freeman, 1999:91). Phalanx was

“a tightly packed body in which lines of men standing shoulder to shoulder, eight or more

deep, fought as a single coordinated force” (Freeman, 1999:91). The soldier in the phalanx had

a special armor called hoplon that gave the name of hoplite warfare. Due to its effectiveness

the form of hoplite warfare became standardized across the Greek world and spread almost all

prosperous states as a defense force. The most important implication of this type of warfare

was that to defend their territory, fighters had to ignore their differences and work together.

“They had to create a community spirit and there was no other way than through consolidating

their loyalty to a city” (Freeman, 1999:93). Therefore, hoplite warfare served to define city

identity and it did not threaten to destroy that identity by its demands on resources. The need to

unite in defense served to create a sense of community among citizens (Freeman, 1999:94).

With this transformation the duty of defense passed from aristocratic heroes to the hoplite. All

citizens participate after a communal sacrifice and are eligible for equal shares. Therefore, the

development of community consciousness was directly influenced by the hoplite reform.

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In sum, there was no mechanism to guarantee security as a common good in the

anarchic Greek system so that war was endemic. Furthermore, peace through political

unification was incompatible with the primary goal of political association. Although, the

Greeks experienced substantial economic development the anarchic brought about several

factors that impede further economic growth such as different tolls, fines, fees and currency,

lack of public finance policy, lack of security and lack of public transportation. In addition, the

standardization of language, administrative, legal procedures, coinage and weights and

measures which brought about decline in transaction costs was limited to the boundaries of

individual states. Finally, several factors encouraged the Greeks commitment to the polis and

prevented political unification such as geography, morality and method of warfare. The belief

in the moral purpose of the state which also underpinned the legitimacy of the system was the

major factor that promoted the persistence of the anarchic system.

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CONCLUSION

The general topic of this study is change in the international system. Particularly, the

study focuses on change in the structure of the international system. Several forms of political

organization such as city-states, empires, city-leagues, nation-states in certain periods of

history coexisted, disappeared and reappeared again in different forms up until the late

nineteenth century. All of these political units shaped different forms of structures of the

international system. One of the ways of understanding change is to look at persistence of these

types of structures. Hierarchy is one of these forms and several authors emphasized the

persistence of hierarchic structures during the Ancient and Classical eras in world history

(3000 B.C. to 1500 A.D.). Anarchic structures were not stable and several times transformed

into hierarchic structures during these periods. In this context, the major research question of

this study is why hierarchic structures prevailed during the Ancient and Classical eras. For this

purpose four case studies have been compared: the Roman Empire (the Pax Romana period 1st

century B.C.-3rd century A.D.), the Chinese Empire (the T’ang Dynasty 618-907 A.D.), the

multi-state system of ancient Greece (8th-4th century B.C.) and the multi-state system of ancient

China (The Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Period 722-221 B.C.). The Empires

were studied to examine hierarchic structures and the multi state-systems were considered as

anarchic structures.

The transformation of anarchy to hierarchy might be analyzed in three stages: the

emergence, the persistence and the collapse of hierarchic structures. I believe that the reasons

why a system shifted to a hierarchic structure and why it remains as such may be different

because after the first stage certain dynamics emerge and create incentives to the actors of the

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system (both center and parts) to sustain the structure. Nevertheless, the major focus of the

study is limited to the first and the second stages.

The analysis of the Roman and the Chinese Empire demonstrates that the major reason

for the transformation from hierarchy to anarchy was the unification of the system through

conquest. Both Romans and the Chinese believed the idea that domination of all enemies will

lead to peace and their main foreign policy was based on this vision. For this purpose they

waged continuous wars. Obviously, the conquests were encouraged by other several factors.

The Romans and the state of Qin benefited from several advantages such as geopolitical

position, rich natural resources, strong aristocratic warrior traditions and values, glory, booty,

the size of their territory, the impact of outside pressure and most significantly the military

capabilities and inability of their neighbors to prevent their domination.

After the establishment of the hierarchic structure, several dynamics emerge in the

system. These dynamics promoted the persistence of the structure by generating incentives for

both the center and the provinces. Certain dynamics of the hierarchic systems generate

common goods such as security, economic prosperity and effective mobilization of resources

and they encourage the provinces to remain part of the structure. Both the Roman Empire and

the T’ang dynasty were able to provide enduring peace and economic growth during the

periods when their structures were truly hierarchic. The military capabilities and military

strategy, the national fidelity of people, the strength of balanced government, the political

stability, the social and cultural forces of honor and religion, the foreign policy behavior of

neighbors and the habituation to war were some of the factors that contributed to the endurance

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of peace in Rome and China. Furthermore, control of immense material resources, the growth

in agricultural production, effective mining, development of trade by land and sea,

development of crafts and manufacture, effective usage of transportation and communication

systems and effective administrative policies were some factors that resulted in economic

growth in both of the systems. It should be emphasized that the Empires enabled all parts of the

system to benefit from the economic growth so that they were attracted to the system.

On the contrary the analysis of the multi-state systems of Greece and China

demonstrates that anarchic systems were less likely to generate common goods. In both of

these systems insecurity prevailed and there was a great difference in the number of wars

compared to hierarchic structures. Various reasons such as power and aggrandizement,

material enrichment, border disputes, honor and respect, fear, control of strategic regions, and

increase in territory led to conflict among states. Furthermore, even though economic growth

can be identified within the systems, there were clear-cut impediments against further increase

in the economic prosperity. Namely, if these systems were hierarchic structures it is more

likely that further economic growth could be achieved. The impediments stemmed from the

anarchic organization of the states such as the lack of security especially in sea-borne trade,

numerous medium of exchanges and methods, difficulties in transportation, lack of

standardized economic regulations, lack of legal security and property.

The generation of common goods is also directly related to the decline in transaction

costs. Standardized and uniform regulations, procedures and implementations are easier to

realize in hierarchic structures and if they can be implemented effectively they substantially

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reduce the transaction costs in various spheres of life. The analysis of Rome and the T’ang

dynasty demonstrates that there were significant reductions in transaction costs in the fields of

security, economy, transportation and law. Especially the standardization of administrative law

and procedures, the standardization of coinage, and weights and measures greatly facilitated all

types of interactions in political and economical life of Romans and Chinese. Furthermore, the

Empires also implemented successful administrative policies to facilitate transportation and

communication by building roads, canals and protecting sea routes. In this sense, all members

of the Empires benefited from this process and becoming a part of this structure turned out to

be an advantage compared to anarchic structures.

In the case of multi-state systems of Greece and China, due to the importance to the

independence and autonomy of the small states, the reductions in transaction costs were limited

within the boundaries of individual states. Due to lack of standardization of laws, procedures

and implementation of policies in the entire system, there were substantial difficulties in

several types of transactions. For instance, although there was a reduction in transaction costs

among the Greek cities due to standardization in language and alphabets, codification of law

and administrative procedures, these developments were strictly limited to the boundaries of

individual city-states. Likewise, the Chinese states standardized their administrative procedures

by the replacement of older internal rules by a systematic code of laws and they realized

uniformity in medium of exchanges and weights and measures internally but at the systemic

level there was no uniformity in either of these spheres.

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Finally, the commitment of the members and the legitimacy of the system is a crucial

factor that determines the persistence of the hierarchic structures. The commitment of the

members can be provided through several means. The Roman Empire was very successful in

maintaining the commitment through the use of force, the gradual development of ideological,

political and cultural integration among all provincial elites (the Romanization of the provincial

elites), the extension of citizenship, the diffusion of Senate membership and the Rome’s

process of interaction between center and periphery. Similarly, the T’ang dynasty was also able

to provide elite commitment through political, cultural and ideological integration, by using

ideological, coercive and remunerative measures, and through the legitimacy of the concept of

Sino-centrism. Easier integration to the system and high mobility among elites were crucial

factors that increase commitment of the members. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the system

turned out to be an important element that determines the persistence of hierarchic structures

which could be observed more clearly in the case of anarchic structures.

The commitment and loyalty to the individual states and the legitimacy of the system as

a whole contributed to the persistence of the anarchic structures. The Greek poleis and the

Chinese states were very successful in maintaining the commitment, loyalty and active

participation of its members. The geographical fragmentation and isolation, the moral basis, the

moral values and philosophical assumptions, the development of citizenship, and the methods

of warfare played the major role in development of such commitment.

Finally, I agree with the idea that whereas the persistence of hierarchic systems depends

on the existence of several factors, only one factor can promote the persistence of anarchic

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structures. In this sense, the Greeks’ belief in the moral purpose of the polis was the primary

factor that brought about the persistence of the anarchic system. Greeks believed that

individuals could only develop themselves if they can actively participate in the political life

and this can only be realized if the political organization of a city does not exceed its

boundaries. Therefore, political unification of the city-states was inconsistent with the Greeks’

primary purpose of the political association and led to the persistence of the anarchic structure.

In the case of multi-state system of China, the major factor that brought about the

anarchic system was the dissolution of the feudal system of Zhou dynasty. However, the two

periods were marked by consolidation and absorption of weak states by the strong. Although

the system remained anarchic there was a clear-cut tendency towards the political unification

of the system and this tendency stemmed from the belief in moral purpose of the state. The

state of Qin organized the state for war and achieving peace through universal conquest. Its

policy was based on the Legalist doctrines and the belief in Mandate of Heaven. These

doctrines suggest that the order can only be sustained if an emperor had the mandate of Heaven

and this was only possible through the elimination of all enemies. On the basis of these policies

the state of Qin realized the unification of the ancient Chinese system in 221 B.C. In this sense,

the incompatibility of the moral purpose of the state and the political organization of the

system created a desire to transform the system.

Some of these arguments have been made by several authors. However, the

comparative historical analysis enabled us to test these arguments empirically. It was argued

that hierarchic structures produce common goods such as security and economic prosperity but

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this has never been tested in terms of the Empires in the Ancient and Classical eras.

Furthermore, as Hendrik Spruyt clearly demonstrates, the decline in transaction costs was vital

in the emergence of nation-states against city-states and city-leagues. However, this study

reveals that it is possible to reduce the transaction costs within the Empires as well. The

reduction in transaction costs can be realized in any type of hierarchic structure. In addition,

the study demonstrates the importance of the commitment of the members and the legitimacy

of a system. The shift in the commitment of the member might directly alter the form of

political organization and the structure of the system. The study also emphasizes the role of

belief in the moral purpose of the state in the formation of structures. The beliefs in the moral

purpose of the state have been emphasized by several authors, however, the multi state-systems

of Greece and China presents us useful historical cases to demonstrate their role.

Change is a very complex phenomenon and recent developments demonstrate that

change in the structure of the international system will continue to be one of the major issues of

international relations. The European integration process and the gradual progress of the

European Union are the most remarkable examples of this change. The analysis of the

hierarchic and anarchic structures in the Ancient and Classical eras shows that similar factors

can be identified in different periods of history. These factors have an important role in

stimulating change in the international system. In this sense, further studies on change and

persistence of different forms of political organizations in different historical contexts will

definitely be helpful to understand the complex phenomenon of change.

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