Challenging Assumptions in the Use of Heuristic Search Techniques in Cryptography

John A ClarkDept. of Computer Science

University of York, UKjac@cs.york.ac.uk

24.07.2001

Overview Assumptions People Make. Part I: Boolean Functions and S-Box Design Part II: Identification Protocols based on NP-

complete Problems Part III: Security Protocols with Proofs

Assumptions People Make Cryptographic security has suffered a number

of shocks over the past decade: 1994: Peter Shor demonstrates polynomial time

algorithm for prime factorisation on a quantum computer.

1994: The Bellcore attack. Cryptosystems with injected faults may leak vast amounts of information.

1996: Paul Kocher demonstrates how data dependent timing of exponentiation can break several cryptosystems (inc. RSA)

Various. Power analysis on smart cards.

Assumptions People Make Attacks are really a challenge to fundamental

assumptions: Cryptanalysis assumes search will be carried out in

the classical computing paradigm. Cryptanalysis generally assumes an attack on the

abstract algorithms, not on their implementation. Challenging these assumptions allows some

the most successful cryptanalytic attacks to date.

Assumptions People Make Heuristic optimisation techniques (simulated

annealing, genetic algorithms, tabu search etc) are some of the most successful general purpose tools available, used across most scientific and engineering disciplines.

They have hardly been used for serious modern day cryptography.

One might well ask “Why?”

Assumptions The capabilities of heuristic optimisation

techniques for cryptanalysis and the design of cryptographic artefacts are significantly under-estimated.

Assumptions are made about the scope of application of heuristic optimisation techniques and about the ways in which the techniques should be used.

Challenging these assumptions allows existing applications to be addressed with significantly greater success and allows application of the techniques to new problems.

Assumptions The Big Lie : Heuristic optimisation techniques are just

no good for serious cryptography.

No Nonsense : The cost function f should be a direct and obvious characterisation of the problem to be solved.

Nice Guys : Optimisation users are honest. High Flier : A cost function f needs to be a ‘high

performer’ to be useful. CF Matters : A great deal of care must be taken in

choosing a cost function. Black Box : Heuristic optimisation is a black box

technique. Bit Twiddlers : Optimisation techniques are only suited

to low level cryptographic tasks.

Heuristic Optimisation

Local Optimisation - Hill Climbing

x0 x1 x2

z(x)

Neighbourhood of a point x might be N(x)={x+1,x-1}Hill-climb goes x

0 x

1 x

2 since

f(x0)<f(x

1)<f(x

2) > f(x

3)

and gets stuck at x2 (local

optimum)

xopt

Really want toobtain x

opt

x3

Simulated Annealing

x0 x1

x2

z(x)Allows non-improving moves so that it is possible to go down

x11

x4

x5

x6

x7

x8

x9

x10

x12

x13

x

in order to rise again

to reach global optimum

In practice neighbourhood may be very large and trial neighbour is chosen randomly. Possible to accept worsening move when improving ones exist.

Simulated Annealing Improving moves always accepted Non-improving moves may be accepted

probabilistically and in a manner depending on the temperature parameter T. Loosely

the worse the move the less likely it is to be accepted

a worsening move is less likely to be accepted the cooler the temperature

The temperature T starts high and is gradually cooled as the search progresses.

Initially virtually anything is accepted, at the end only improving moves are allowed (and the search effectively reduces to hill-climbing)

Simulated Annealing Current candidate x. Minimisation formulation.

farsobestisSolution

TempTemp

rejectelse

acceptyxcurrentUifelse

acceptyxcurrentif

yfxf

xighbourgenerateNey

timesDo

dofrozenUntil

TTemp

xxcurrent

Temp

95.0

)( ))1,0((exp

)( )0(

)()(

)(

400

)(

0

0

/

At each temperature consider 400 moves

Always accept improving moves

Accept worsening moves probabilistically.

Gets harder to do this the worse the move.

Gets harder as Temp decreases.

Temperature cycle

Simulated Annealing

Do 400 trial moves

Do 400 trial moves

Do 400 trial moves

Do 400 trial moves

Do 400 trial moves

100T

95.0TT

95.0TT

95.0TT

95.0TT

00001.0TDo 400 trial moves

95.0TT

Boolean Function Design

Boolean Functions Boolean Functions f:{0,1}n ->{0,1} and S-Boxes f:

{0,1}n -> {0,1}m lie at the heart of much modern cryptography.

Need such functions with particular properties to guard against particular forms of attack:

Balance (equal number of 0s and 1s) High non-linearity Low autocorrelation Correlation immunity High algebraic degree

There are theoretical results relating these – tradeoffs have to be made

Boolean Function Design A Boolean function }1,0{}1,0{: nf

For present purposes we shall use the polar representation

0 0 00 0 10 1 00 1 11 0 01 0 11 1 01 1 1

01234567

1 -10 10 10 11 -10 11 -11 -1

f(x) f(x)x

Will talk only about balanced functions where there are equal numbers of 1s and -1s.

Preliminary Definitions Definitions relating to a Boolean function f of n

variables

)(ˆ)(ˆ)(12

0

xLxfFn

x

Walsh Hadamard

Linear functionL(x)=1x1… nxn

L(x)=(-1)L(x)

(polar form)

Preliminary Definitions Non-linearity

Auto-correlation

For present purposes we need simply note that these can be easily evaluated given a function f. They can therefore be used as the functions to be optimised. Traditionally they are.

)(max22

1 FN n

f

ACf=max | f(x)f(x+s) |xs

Using Parseval’s Theorem Parseval’s Theorem

Loosely, push down on F()2 for some particular and it appears elsewhere.

Loose motivation: arranging for uniform values of F()2 will lead to good non-linearity. This is the initial motivation for our new cost function.

n

n

F 212

0

2 2)(ˆ

12

0

22)()(costn n

Ff

NEW FUNCTION!

Moves Preserving Balance Start with balanced (but otherwise random) solution. Move

strategy preserves balance

Neighbourhood of a particular function f to be the set of all functions obtained byexchanging (flipping) any two dissimilar values.

Here we have swapped f(2) and f(4)

0 0 00 0 10 1 00 1 11 0 01 0 11 1 01 1 1

01234567

1 -10 10 10 11 -10 11 -11 -1

f(x) f(x)x

-11

1

1-1-1

g(x)

1

-1

Getting in the Right Area Previous work (QUT) has shown strongly

Heuristic techniques can be very effective for cryptographic design synthesis

Boolean function, S-box design etc Hill-climbing works far better than random search Combining heuristic search and hill-climbing generally

gives best results Aside – notion applies more generally too - has led to

development of memetic algorithms in GA work. GAs known to be robust but not suited for ‘fine tuning’.

We will adopt this strategy too: use simulated annealing to get in the ‘right area’ then hill-climb.

But we will adopt the new cost function for the first stage.

Hill-climbing With Traditional CF (n=8)

106 108 110 112 114 116104 0 1 0 0 0 096 0 0 0 0 0 088 0 2 1 0 0 080 0 5 7 2 0 072 1 19 31 6 0 0

Varying the Technique (n=8)

108 110 112 114 11680 0 0 0 0 072 0 0 10 0 064 0 0 59 0 056 0 0 186 0 048 0 0 140 1 040 0 0 2 0 032 0 0 0 0 024 0 0 0 0 0

108 110 112 114 11680 0 0 0 0 072 0 0 0 0 064 0 0 0 0 056 0 1 0 0 048 2 7 35 5 040 4 39 158 27 032 4 26 79 11 024 0 0 2 0 0

108 110 112 114 11680 0 0 0 0 072 0 0 0 0 064 0 0 0 0 056 0 0 1 7 148 0 0 14 56 240 0 0 27 176 1832 0 0 23 64 1124 0 0 0 0 0

Non-linearity Non-linearity Non-linearity

Au

tocorr

ela

tion

Simulated AnnealingWith Traditional CF

Simulated AnnealingWith New CF

Simulated AnnealingWith New CF+Hill Climbing With Traditional CF

Tuning the Technique Experience has shown that experimentation is

par for the course with optimisation. Initial cost function motivated by theory but

the real issue is how the cost function and search technique interact.

Have generalised the initial cost function to give a parametrised family of new cost functionsCost(f)=||F()|-(2 n/2+K)|

R

Tuning the Technique (n=8)

112 114 11656 0 0 048 2 5 1340 9 68 8032 29 74 11524 1 1 316 0 0 0

K=4

Non-linearityA

uto

corr

ela

tion

112 114 11656 0 0 048 0 1 340 11 16 832 41 42 2424 201 6 516 42 0 0

K=-12

Illustration of how results change as K is varied400 runs

Tuning the Technique (n=8)

112 114 11648 0 0 040 3 2 232 19 10 624 45 2 016 11 0 0

K=-14

Non-linearity

Au

tocorr

ela

tion

112 114 11648 0 1 040 3 2 332 15 8 224 53 2 016 11 0 0

K=-12

112 114 11648 0 0 140 2 5 232 15 9 324 51 2 016 10 0 0

K=-10

112 114 11648 0 0 040 2 2 132 11 12 624 44 3 116 18 0 0

K=-8

112 114 11648 0 0 140 0 5 1332 2 27 4224 0 0 1016 0 0 0

K=-6

112 114 11648 0 3 240 3 19 2032 5 17 2724 1 1 216 0 0 0

K=-4

112 114 11648 0 8 540 6 32 1532 3 16 1524 0 0 016 0 0 0

K=-2

112 114 11648 5 12 140 12 43 132 6 19 124 0 0 016 0 0 0

K=0

Further illustration of how results change as K is varied. 100 Runs

Comparison of Results

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 124 12 26 56 118 244 494 1000 20144 12 26 56 116 240 492 992 20104 12 26 56 116 240 480 992 19844 12 26 56 116 236 484 980 19764 12 26 56 116 238 484 984 1990

MethodLeast Upper BoundBest Known ExampleBent ConcatenationGenetic Algorithms

Our Simulated Annealing

Reprise

112 114 11656 0 0 048 2 5 1340 9 68 8032 29 74 11524 1 1 316 0 0 0

K=4

Non-linearityA

uto

corr

ela

tion

112 114 11656 0 0 048 0 1 340 11 16 832 41 42 2424 201 6 516 42 0 0

K=-12

This exceeds a conjectured bound on auto-correlation.

Millan’s Table Table due to Bill Millan provides more detail

summary of what current theoretical state of the art is.Unbalanced

-1 0 1 2n=3 2 2,2 0,1 0,0n=4 6 4,3 4,2 0,1n-5 12 12,4 12,3 8,2n=6 28 26,5 24,4 24,3n=7 56 56,6 56,5 56,4n=8 120 116,7 112,6 112,5

Correlation Immunity

Demonstration of such a function cited as an open problem in 2000.

Tools can generate these very easily.

Sadly, it has already now been demonstrated

Note: higher order immunities seem beyond the tools at present – future work.

(Non-linearity, Degree)

Why Don’t They do Better? At smaller n the techniques seem to do very well. As n gets large their utility decreases. Revisit the cost function – essentially of the form

Can expand this as the modulus of a cubic

Essentially now a single parameter cost function in X. Moving over to a more general polynomial has been used to

provide better results. Some preliminary results on higher level optimisation look

encouraging.

3

)(ˆ XF

31

223

)(ˆ3)(ˆ3)(ˆ XFXFXF

S-Box Design Won’t give details here but the same sorts of cost

function can be used for multiple output functions. Again attempting to control the whole spectrum

brings benefits.

S2S1 S3 S4 S5 S6

Uses and Abuses Can use optimisation to maximise the non-linearity,

minimise autocorrelation elements etc. These are publicly recognised good properties that

we might wish to demonstrate to others. From an optimisation point of view one way of satisfying

these requirements is as good as another. But for a malicious designer this may not be the case.

Who says that optimisation has to be used honestly???? What’s to stop me creating Boolean functions or S-

boxes with good public properties but with hidden (unknown) properties?

Planting Trapdoors Can use these techniques to generate cryptographic

elements with good public properties using an honest fitness function

honestFit(x) But also can try to hide useful (but privately known)

properties using a malicious fitness function trapFit(x)

Now take combination and do both at the same time

Want as low as you can get away with for the next N years! The result must still possess the required good properties.

)()1()()( xtrapFitxhonestFitxfitness

Planting TrapdoorsPublicly good solutions with high trapdoor bias found by annealing and combined honest and trapdoor cost functions.

Publicly good solutions, e.g. Boolean functions with same very high non-linearity

Publicly good solutions found by annealing and honest cost function

There appears nothing to distinguish the sets of solutions obtained – unless you know what form the trapdoor takes!

Or is there…

Vector Representations

+1

-1

+1

+1

-1

+1

-1

-1

Different cost functions may give similar goodness results but may do so in radically different ways.

Results using honest and dishonest cost functions cluster in different parts of the design space

Basically distinguish using discriminant analysis.

If you don’t have an alternative hypothesis then you can generate a family of honest results and ask how probable the offered one is.

Games People Play It seems possible to tell that something has been going

on. And we don’t need to know precisely what has been

going on. Since any design has a binary vector representation the

technique is general.

Myriad of further games you can play…

Summary and Conclusions Have shown that local search can be used

effectively for a cryptographic non-linear optimisation problem - Boolean Function Design.

‘Direct’ cost functions not necessarily best. Cost function is a means to an end.

Whatever works will do. Cost function efficacy depends on problem, problem

parameters, and the search technique used. You can take short cuts with annealing parameters

(and computationally there may be little choice) Experimentation is highly beneficial

should look to engaging theory more?

Future Work Opportunities for expansion:

detailed variation of parameters use of more efficient annealing processes (e.g.

thermostatistical annealing). evolution of artefacts with hidden properties (you do not

need to be honest - e.g. develop S-Boxes with hidden trapdoors)

experiment with different cost function families multiple criteria etc.

evolve sets of Boolean functions other local techniques (e.g. tabu search, TS)

more generally, when do GAs, SA, TS work best? investigate non-balanced functions.

Breaking Protocols with Heuristic Optimisation

Identification Problems Notion of zero-knowledge introduced by

Goldwasser and Micali (1985) Indicate that you have a secret without revealing it

Early scheme by Shamir Several schemes of late based on NP-complete

problems Permuted Kernel Problem (Shamir) Syndrome Decoding (Stern) Constrained Linear Equations (Stern) Permuted Perceptron Problem (Pointcheval)

Pointcheval’s Perceptron Schemes

Given

A nm

1a ij

a......aa

...............

a......aa

a.......aa

mnm2m1

2n2221

1n1211

1 js

Find

:

: 2

1

ns

s

s

S n 1

0

:

0

0

:

2

1

mw

w

w

SA nnm 1

So That

Interactive identification protocols based on NP-complete problem.

Perceptron Problem.

Pointcheval’s Perceptron Schemes

Given

A nm

1a ij

a......aa

...............

a......aa

a.......aa

mnm2m1

2n2221

1n1211

1 js

Find

:

: 2

1

ns

s

s

S n 1

:

2

1

mw

w

w

SA nnm 1

So That

Permuted Perceptron Problem (PPP). Make Problem harder by imposing extra constraint.

Has particular histogram H of positive values

1 3 5 .. .. ..

Example: Pointcheval’s Scheme

PP and PPP-example Every PPP solution is a PP solution.

5

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

1

11111

11111

1111-1

1-11-1-1

)1,1,2(

))5(),3(),1((

hhhH

Has particular histogram H of positive values

1 3 5

Generating Instances

Suggested method of generation:

11111

11111

1111-1

11-111-

• Generate random matrix A

1

1

1

1

1

• Generate random secret S

5

1

1

3

• Calculate AS• If any (AS)i <0 then negate ith row of

A

11111

11111

1111-1

11-111-

1

1

1

1

1

5

1

1

3

11111

11111

Significant structure in this problem; high correlation between majority values of matrix columns and secret corresponding secret bits

Instance Properties

Each matrix row/secret dot product is the sum of n Bernouilli (+1/-1) variables.

Initial image histogram has Binomial shape and is symmetric about 0 After negation simply folds over to be positive

-7–5-3-1 1 3 5 7… 1 3 5 7…

Image elements tend to be small

PP Using Search: Pointcheval

Pointcheval couched the Perceptron Problem as a search problem.

1

1

1

1

1

1Y

1

1

1

1

1

2Y

1

1

1

1

1

3Y

1

1

1

1

1

4Y

1

1

1

1

1

5Y

current solution Y

Neighbourhood defined by single bit flips on current solution

1

1

1

1

1

Cost function punishes any negative image components

1

3

1

1

AY

costNeg(y)=|-1|+|-3| =4

Using Annealing: Pointcheval

PPP solution is also PP solution. Based estimates of cracking PPP on ratio of PP solutions to

PPP solutions. Calculated sizes of matrix for which this should be most

difficult Gave rise to (m,n)=(m,m+16) Recommended (m,n)=(101,117),(131,147),

(151,167) Gave estimates for number of years needed to solve PPP

using annealing as PP solution means PP instances with matrices of size 200 ‘could usually be

solved within a day’ But no PPP problem instance greater than 71 was ever

solved this way ‘despite months of computation’.

Perceptron Problem (PP)

Knudsen and Meier approach (loosely): Carrying out sets of runs Note where results obtained all agree Fix those elements where there is complete

agreement and carry out new set of runs and so on. If repeated runs give same values for particular bits

assumption is that those bits are actually set correctly

Used this sort of approach to solve instances of PP problem up to 180 times faster than Pointcheval for (151,167) problem but no upper bound given on sizes achievable.

Profiling Annealing

Approach is not without its problems. Not all bits that have complete agreement are correct.

Actual SecretRun 1Run 2Run 3Run 4Run 5Run 6All runs agree

All agree (wrongly)

1-1

Knudsen and Meier Have used this method to attack PPP problem sizes

(101,117) Needs hefty enumeration stage (to search for wrong

bits), allowed up to 264 search complexity Used new cost function w1=30, w2=1 with histogram

punishment

cost(y)=w1costNeg(y)+w2costHist(y)

1

1

1

1

Ay)0,0,3()(

)1,1,2()(

yhist

shist

010123)(costHist y

Analogy Time I: Encryption

Key

Plaintext P

Ciphertext C

The Black Box Assumption – essentially considering encryption only as a mathematical function.

In the public arena only really challenged in the 90’s when attacks based on physical implementation arrived

• Paul Kocher’s Timing Attacks

• Simple Power Analysis

• Differential Power Analysis

• Fault Injection Attacks (Belcore, and others)

The computational dynamics of the implementation can leak vast amounts of information

Analogy Time II: Annealing

Initialisation data

Problem P

Final Solution C

The Black Box Assumption – virtually every application of annealing simply throws the technique at problem and awaits the final output.

Is this really the most efficient use of information?

Let’s look inside the box…..

Analogy Time III: Internal Computational Dynamics

Initialisation data

Problem P, e.g. minimise cost(y,A,Hist)

Final Solution C

The algorithm carries out 100 000s of cost function evaluations which guide the search.

Why did it take the path it did?

Bear in mind the whole search process is public and so we can monitor it.

Analogy Time IV: Fault Injection

Initialisation data

Warped or Faulty Problem P’

Final Solution C’

Invariably people assume you need to solve the problem at hand.

Reflected in ‘well-motivated’ or direct cost functionsWhat happens if we inject a ‘fault’ into the process?Mutate the

problem into a similar but different one.

Can we make use of the solutions obtained to help solve original problem?

PP Move Effects

What limits the ability of annealing to find a PP solution? A move changes a single element of the current solution.

Want current negative image values to go positive But changing a bit to cause negative values to go positive

will often cause small positive values to go negative.

01234567 01234567

iAYi

W 2'' i

WiAYiW

Problem Fault Injection

Can significantly improve results by punishing at positive value K

For example punish any value less than K=4 during the search

Drags the elements away from the boundary during search. Also use square of differences |Wi-K|2 rather than simple

deviation

01234567

AYW

Problem Fault Injection

Comparative results Generally allows solution within a few runs of annealing for sizes (201,217) Number of bits correct is generally worst when K=0. Best value for K varies between sizes (but can do profiling to test what it is)

Has proved possible to solve for size (601,617) and higher. Enormous increase in power for essentially change to one line of the

program Using powers of 2 rather than just modulus Use of K factor

Morals… Small changes may make a big difference. The real issue is how the cost function and the search technique interact The cost function need not be the most `natural’ direct expresion of the

problem to be solved. Cost functions are a means to an end.

This is a form of fault injection on the problem.

Profiling Annealing

But look again at the cost function templates

Different weights w1 and w2 will given different results yet the resulting cost functions seem plausibly well-motivated.

We can view different choices of weights as different viewpoints on the problem.

Now carry out runs using the different costs functions. Very effective – using about 30 cost functions have

managed to get agreement on about 25% of the key with less than 0.5 bits on average in error

Additional cost functions remove incorrect agreement (but may also reduce correct agreement).

)(costHistw)(costNegw)(cost 21 xxx

Radical Viewpoint Analysis

Problem P

Problem P1 Problem P2 Problem Pn-1 Problem Pn

Essentially create mutant problems and attempt to solve them.

If the solutions agree on particular elements then they generally will do so for a reason, generally because they are correct.

Can think of mutation as an attempt to blow the search away from actual original solution

Profiling Annealing: Timing

Simulated annealing can make progress, typically getting solutions with around 80% of the vector entries correct (but don’t know which 80%)

But this throws away a lot of information – better to monitor the search process as it cools down.

Based on notion of thermostatistical annealing. Watch the elements of the secret vector as the search proceeds. Record the temperature cycle at which the last change to an

elements value occurs, i.e. +1 to –1 or vice versa At the end of the search all elements are fixed. Analysis shows that some elements will take some values early in

the search and then never subsequently change. They get ‘stuck’ early in the search.

The ones that get stuck early often do so for good reason – they are the correct values.

Profiling Annealing: Timing

Tested 30 PPP instances (101,117) with 72 different strategies (different weights wi for negativity and histogram component costs and different values of K). Ten runs at each strategy.

Maximum number of initial bits fixed at correct values

Channel is highly volatile – hence need for repeated runs. Note also that some runs had up to 108 of 117 bits set

correctly in final solution. For small K the minimum number of bits correct in final

solution is radically worse than for larger values of K.

<4040-4950-5960-6970-79

261831

(151,167) Results

Tested 30 PPP instances (131,157) with 16 different strategies. Ten runs at each strategy.

Maximum number of initial bits fixed at correct values

Channel is highly volatile – hence need for repeated runs.

Note also that one run had up to 139 of 147 bits set correctly in final solution.

<4040-49 50-5960-6970-7990-99

378831 (max=97)

Profiling Annealing: Timing

Tested 30 PPP instances (151,167) with 32 different strategies (different weights wi for negativity and histogram component costs and different values of K). Ten runs at each strategy.

Maximum number of initial bits fixed at correct values

Similar general results as before. Also tried for (201,217) – some runs in excess of 100 initial

stuck bits correct.

<4040-4950-5960-6970-7980-8990+

03613242 (max=98)

Some Tricks

Won’t go into detail but there are some further problem specific tricks that can be used to reduce the remaining search.

For example, you can generally tell easily whether you have an odd or even number of bits wrong.

Sum the image elements taking values of … -7,-3,1,5,9,13.. (S1)

Sum the image elements taking values of … -5,-1,3,7, 11.. (S2)

Find the corresponding sums T1, T2 in the provided histogram

If T1=S1 and T2=S2 then there are an even number of bits wrong

If T1=S2 and T2=S1 then there are an odd number wrong

A Few Tricks More

Look at the image elements wi produced. If I knew what they should be I could use linear algebra

to solve the system. I do not know whether they are right or not – but often

they are, or nearly so. If wi=1 is obtained by some run. It is very likely that the

actual value it should be is 1,5,9 (assuming an even number of bits wrong).

Assume it is correct. Then changing any bits of the current solution to obtain the original solution must not change the value of wi

This means half the bits xj I change in the solution x must agree in sign with corresponding bit aij in the ith row (and half must disagree). This reduces the complexity of the remaining search.

Quantum Computation

Everything I have reported so far has assumes the classical computational paradigm.

The very assumption that gave rise to the biggest shock in cryptography.

Let’s not fall into the same trap. Can heuristic search and quantum computing work together?

Grover’s Algorithm

Consider a function f(x) : x is in 0..(2N-1) there is a single value v such that some predicate P(v) holds.

Then Grover’s algorithm can find v in approximately O(2(N/2)) steps.

Thus if we have a state space of size 2100, it will require O(250) steps

Now let us return to the (101,117) PPP case. Finding a solution to this by quantum search would require O(259)

steps. But if we can obtain a solution with 108 bits correct, we could

ask a different question. What are the indices of the 9 wrong bits? Assuming each index can be couched in 7 bits, we have 7*9=63 bits This means that Grover’s can find the answer in O(232)

Grover’s Algorithm 2

And it’s not all one way. If there are more states satisfying a predicate one might expect the task of finding one of them to be easier than previously.

Indeed if there are M states v satisfying the predicate P(v) then the search becomes of order

And so characterise positions from which you can use heuristic searcheffectively and use QC to find them. Then use HS to reach optimium

2/12

M

N

Use QC to get in this range

Now hill-climb to get here

Some Questions

Can you fix an element of the solution at +1 and –1 and determine likelihood of correctness based on distribution of results obtained?

Affects of different parameters (e.g. power parameters)? How well can we profile the distribution of results in order to

isolate those ones at the extremes of correctness? Can we apply similar profiling tricks to other NP-complete

problems Permuted Kernel Problem?

Example – Permuted Kernel Problem

Arithmetic carried out mod p

635223

562452

441253

0

such that V of Vn permutatiosecret Find perm

permAV

5

4

6

5

3

2

nmA 1nV

Example – Syndrome Decoding

Arithmetic carried out mod 2

set bitsk with S

secret find

Small number k of bits in S set to 111 nnmm SAW

000111

100110

011001

0

0

1

0

0

1

W Image

Given

set bits 56 has

exampleFor

15125122561256

S

SAW

1

0

0

AMatrix

Some Questions

Why does everyone try to find the secret/key directly? e.g. for Block ciphers can we use guided search techniques to

generate better approximations? Use search to generate better (or more) cryptanalytic tools, e.g.

multiple approximations? Very loose. What would happen if you tried to search for a

key on a difficult traditional encryption algorithm?

Encrypt(K: P)=C

Suppose you tried a guided search based on Hamming Distance

Encrypt(K’: P)=C’

Cost(C’,C)=hamming(C,C’) (or sum of such costs over Pi)

No chance of success at all. But what is the distribution of the failures? Is there a cost function that would induce an exploitable distribution of solutions?

Evolving Secure Protocols

Some Questions

Work combines fault injection and a `timing’ attack? What is the equivalent of differential power analysis for

heuristic search?