Chapter 10, Saddam Hussein, the Threat That Never Was ?

WEBSITEWWW.NUCLEARIRANWATCH.INFO

FROM THE BOOK, TEHRAN’S WARS OF TERROR AND ITS NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPABILITY , PUBLISHED 2007,

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Not since the America‘s involvement in Vietnam, have there been such torn and

conflicting issues of a war. In the halls of US Congress, the echo is that the US

should never have invaded Iraq nor confronted Saddam Hussein. In this chapter, I

cover issues concerning Saddam‘s threat. I will endeavor to summarize, and pull

back, layer upon layer of this black hole purgatory of Saddam Hussein. Then, I will

leave it to the reader, to decide, was Saddam Hussein, A Threat That Never Was?

1990, since the shifting sands of Desert Shield, which became Desert Storm: I was

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there. Schooled as a US Army Armored Calvary Scout, (most of the public does not

even know what Armored Calvary is, even after Tom Clancy book on the subject1) I

patrolled the former East/West German border. During the cold war, we were trained

to fight the Soviet War Machine, now we were facing a former-semi-ally of America.

The Iraqi military forces were armed and trained with Soviet equipment and

standards. In addition, forgotten is the American military involvement, from the CIA,

DIA, and etc. (advisory training for Iraqi forces). 1aThey also helped the Iraqi military

fight Tehran in the Iraq-Iran wars. This was not the cool mountain forests of

Germany, but a parched furnace, a vast empty desert. Somewhere out there was

the fourth largest military in the world, with the largest chemical warfare arsenal and

capability in the Mid-East. Saddam military had used these chemical weapons,

against the Iraqi Kurds and Iran. Iraq‘s war with Iran started on September 4th,

1980, and ended August 8th, 1988. Estimated killed and injured somewhere between

one and two million lives.2

After we were told we won the Gulf War in 1991, more CAV Scouts (many British

scouts also) were killed by friendly fire, than Iraqi fire, the high price of being out in

front. Unlike many other soldiers, my duties bounced me from one end of the Gulf to

the other.3I missed the bullet with my name on it perhaps, but like many Desert

Storm Vets, I developed respiratory aliments- asthma and bloods in my lungs.

Note: Friendly fire, or fratricide, incidents killed or injured about 17 percent of the

American casualties during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Following the war in the

gulf, U.S. officials vowed to lessen the number of friendly fire incidents in any future

conflicts.4

There was still sporadic fighting in 1991 after we won, mostly along the border with

Iraq in Kuwait. But from what I saw, my experiences through my travels, in Saudi

Arabia, Kuwait and other places, I knew this war was just beginning.5, 6 I wrote a

book on Saddam‘s military, his deadly arsenals of chemical and biological weapons,

using UNSCOM and declassified military records, published in 2002. However written

mainly for a military audience, it was given an excellent book review by US Army

Armor magazine at Ft. Knox in 2003. (see copy in appendix) .7

My time in Israel as a volunteer with the IDF, through SAR-EL, allowed me to go to

lectures, seminars, and even listen to personal accounts, and more. You tend to see

life a little bit differently when you are living with a gun pointed to your head, and

people are getting injured or killed on a weekly -daily base. I learned the Israeli says

little and means much. Many times, I would get these blanket stares.. which were

silently yelling ―they just don‘t get it‖. These times, critically shaped this book, and

understanding Saddam Hussein.

Thousands upon thousands of papers, along with hundreds of books, articles have

been and are still being written on Saddam, and his deadly arsenals. Now America‘s

main battle ground, for Iraq is the political arenas. Even with Saddam dead, the war

in Iraq rages ever deeper, ever deadly. America officials, press, people and more are

now clamoring (even more so in Britain), we should have never invaded Iraq. No

WMD were found. With US congressional rapid-fire statements such as, ―there were

no terrorists in Iraq until America invaded.‖ Somehow this butcher of Baghdad is an

innocent bystander, who posed no threat to the Mid-East, to America. No WMD

arsenals were found in Iraq, but like Iran, Saddam was building his chemical and

biological delivery systems, along with a dedicated infrastructure, composed of

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thousands of research personnel and scientists. So I am not armed if I only have a

rifle, but no bullets, even a few billion of dollars worth. Saddam and his WMD deadly

arsenals will be debated for sometime to come.

But what I will point out to the reader is that Saddam was more that just a hollow

threat. He was a dangerous, calculating dictator, more than willing to plunge the

world into war, to gain his fame, his grandiose designs for a Babylon Empire. As we

look back at Saddam, he was brilliant on so many aspects. In 1976, Saddam rose to

the position of general in the Iraqi armed forces. In a short time he became the de

facto ruler of Iraq, some years before he formally came to power in 1979. Saddam

was integral to the U.S. policy in the region: a policy which sought to weaken the

influence of Iran and the Soviet Union.

Long before Saddam, Iraq had been split along social, ethnic, religious, and

economic fault lines. We can see these Iraqi social dilemmas, at their worst today, in

sectarian violence, Sunni versus Shi'ite, Arab versus Kurd, tribal chief versus urban

merchant, nomad versus peasant. But in the midst of this, Saddam was able to

consolidate his power in a nation riddled with these profound divisions.

Before the 1970‘s, most of Iraq's people lived in the countryside, and roughly two-

thirds of Iraqis were peasants. But this number would decrease quickly during the

1970‘s as Saddam invested much of its oil profits into industrial expansion.

Within just a few years, under Saddam, Iraq was providing social services that were

unprecedented among Middle Eastern countries. Saddam established and controlled

the "National Campaign for the Eradication of Illiteracy" and the campaign for

"Compulsory Free Education in Iraq" and largely under his auspices, the government

established universal free schooling, up to the highest education levels; hundreds of

thousands learned to read in the years following the initiation of the program. The

government also supported families of soldiers, granted free hospitalization to

everyone, and gave subsidies to farmers. Iraq created one of the most modernized

public-health systems in the Middle East, earning Saddam an award from the United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

To diversify the largely oil-based economy, Saddam implemented a national

infrastructure campaign that made great progress in building roads, promoting

mining, and developing other industries. The campaign revolutionized Iraq's energy

industries. Electricity was brought to nearly every city in Iraq, and many outlying

areas. After nationalizing foreign oil interests, Saddam supervised the modernization

of the countryside, mechanizing agriculture on a large scale, and distributing land to

peasant farmers.

More impressively, Saddam's organizational prowess was credited with Iraq's rapid

pace of development in the 1970‘s; development went forward at such a fevered

pitch that two million persons from other Arab countries and Yugoslavia worked in

Iraq to meet the growing demand for labor.

Saddam focused intensely on creating loyalty to the Ba'athist government in the

rural areas. The Ba'athists established farm cooperatives, in which profits were

distributed according to the labors of the individual and the unskilled were trained.

The government's commitment to agrarian reform was demonstrated by the doubling

of expenditures for agricultural development in 1974-1975. Moreover, agrarian

reform in Iraq improved the living standard of the peasantry and increased

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production.

As president, Saddam made frequent references to the Abbasid period, when

Baghdad was the political, cultural, and economic capital of the Arab world. He also

promoted Iraq's pre-Islamic role as Mesopotamia, the ancient cradle of civilization,

alluding to such historical figures as Nebuchadnezzar II and Hammurabi of ancient

Babylonia. He devoted resources to archaeological explorations. In effect, Saddam

sought to combine pan-Arabism and Iraqi nationalism, by promoting the vision of an

Arab world united and led by Iraq.

In foreign affairs, Saddam sought to have Iraq play a leading role in the Middle East.

Iraq signed an aid pact with the Soviet Union in 1972, and arms were sent along

with several thousand advisers, the bulk of his armaments were from the Soviet

block. In the span of a few decades, Saddam fashioned Iraq into a modern Mid-East

country, the fourth largest military in the world at that time, along with the largest

inventory of chemical biological arsenal there.8

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] ARMORED CAV, BY TOM CLANCY, PUBLISHER: BERKLEY TRADE; (NOVEMBER 1, 1994) A fact book about the history, men, weapons, tactics, missions, and equipment of an Armored Cavalry Regiment: The Introduction discusses the Cavalry arm of an army. A primer on armored warfare, history, armor and ordinance is next. The concepts of armor and defeating armor are shown. Then an interview with General Frederick Franks, commanding officer of the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command, headquartered at Fort Monroe Virginia, and the former commanding officer of VII Corps in Iraq, discusses the changes of Armored Cavalry from Vietnam through the Gulf war. It includes detailed reminiscences of the battle against the Iraqi Republican Guards Divisions north of Kuwait. [1a] ALLY TO ADVERSARY - AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF IRAQ'S FALL FROM GRACE, BY RICK FRANCONA, US NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS - ISBN 1557502811 Rick Francona, a former DIA, later CIA operative wrote about his secret meetings in Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War, to cease-fire talks in southern Iraq in 1991. Ally to Adversary is the story of how Iraq, a virtual U.S. ally during its long war with Iran, came to be America's foe on the battlefields of Desert Storm and beyond. While for most Americans, Desert Storm was simply a war against a faceless enemy, for Rick Francona it was a war against friends and former colleagues. He served as General Norman Schwarzkopf's personal interpreter during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. [2] THE IRAQI THREAT & SADDAM HUSSEIN’S WMD, TRAFFORD PUBLISHING 2002, BY STEPHEN E. HUGHES [3] FRIENDLY FIRE ON TODAY'S BATTLEFIELD CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA WARFIGHTING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TITLE: FRIENDLY FIRE ON TODAY'S BATTLEFIELD, AUTHOR: MAJOR A.C. KOEHLER, UNITED STATES ARMY THESIS: U.S. ARMED FORCES LACK AN ADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO IDENTIFY FRIENDLY VEHICLES ON THE BATTLEFIELD; HOWEVER, THROUGH ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY AND TRAINING, THIS PROBLEM CAN BE REDUCED. DURING DESERT STORM, More than 75% of the fratricide casualties occurred in ground-to-ground engagements. Also, fratricide accounted for 77% of the US armored vehicles damaged in battle. Fratricide will not be eliminated but it can be reduced through advances in technology and training. Misidentification was the major cause of fratricide in desert storm. Identification of targets was difficult because of the fast-moving battlefield, covering vast distances during limited visibility. During Desert Storm in Iraq, in 1991 , M2 and 3 Bradleys destroyed more Iraqi armored vehicles than the M1 Abrams tanks. But, 20 Bradleys were lost; 3 during combat and 17 due to friendly fire accidents. To remedy some problems that were identified as contributing factors in the friendly fire incidents, infrared identification panels and other marking/identification measures were added to the Bradleys. HTTP://WWW.GLOBALSECURITY.ORG/MILITARY/LIBRARY/REPORT/1992/KAC.HTM [4] FIXES TOUTED TO COMBAT FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES, BY JIM GARAMONE, DESERT STORM AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE. HTTP://WWW.DEFENSELINK.MIL/NEWS/FEB1999/N02021999_9902027.HTML [5] IRAQ THE MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1991 TO PRESENT RESOLUTION 687 OBLIGATED IRAQ TO, AMONG OTHER THINGS, CEASE FURTHER OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTIONS. DESPITE THE “CEASE FIRE,” HOWEVER, HOSTILITIES WERE SUSPENDED ONLY TEMPORARILY IN 1991. In the intervening eleven years, Iraq‟s unceasing military provocations have required United States and coalition partners to engage Iraqi forces repeatedly. Coalition combat and Reconnaissance aircraft have flown more than 250,000 sorties over Iraq since April 1991 to enforce the terms of the cease-fire agreement and maintain the no-fly zones. Iraqi forces have fired on these aircraft thousands of times, and U.S. and coalition pilots have returned fire thousands of times. HTTP://209.85.135.104/SEARCH?Q=CACHE:2XXJGTCR2KKJ:WWW.FED- OC.ORG/WAR%2520ON%2520TERROR/IRAQFINAL--WEB.PDF+DESERT+STORM+SADDAM%27S+CEASE+FIRE+VIOLATIONS&HL=EN&CT=CLNK&CD=8 [6] ARMY WAR COLLEGE (U.S.) STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. SECOND-GUESSING THE END OF DESERT STORM, BY WILLIAM L. DOWDY. CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA, FEB 1992. P. 3. DOC. CALL NO.: M-U 39080-435 [7] IBID 2

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[8] IBID 2, CH1 page 33, THE IRAQ ARMY, CH.6 IRAQI BIOLOGICAL & CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS BIOGRAPHY SADDAM HUSSEIN SEE ALSO [1] THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN HTTP://HISTORY1900S.ABOUT.COM/GI/DYNAMIC/ [2] IN DEPTH, IRAQ SADDAM HUSSEIN LAST UPDATED DECEMBER 29, 2006. HTTP://WWW.CBC.CA/NEWS/BACKGROUND/IRAQ/SADDAM_HUSSEIN.HTML [3] THE SADDAM HUSSEIN SOURCEBOOK, DECLASSIFIED SECRETS FROM THE U.S.-IRAQ RELATIONSHIP HTTP://WWW.GWU.EDU/~NSARCHIV/SPECIAL/IRAQ/

Central Intelligence Agency, Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons of Mass

Destruction, March 1991, Top Secret/ Declassified

Source: Freedom of Information Act

This study, completed by the CIA‘s Office of Scientific and Weapons Research after the

conclusion of the first Persian Gulf War, examined the status of the four components of Iraq‘s WMD programs – chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles – as of January 15th, 1991, the day President George H.W. Bush signed National Security Directive 54, authorizing the use of force to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The report asserted that Iraq apparently believed that it needed chemical weapons

both as a deterrent and to fulfill its role as ―protector‖ of the Arab world. There were strong indications, according to the report, that Iraq was prepared to use chemical weapons in any conflict with the United States. The author(s) characterized Iraq‘s biological weapons program as ―the most extensive in the Arab world.‖ With respect to

nuclear weapons, the report concluded that Iraq probably had the capability, if combined with clandestinely acquired foreign technology, to develop nuclear weapons in the late 1990‘s. Iraq‘s ballistic missile program was ―the most advanced in the Arab

world,‖ the report also concluded. Page 7, ―Iraqi chemical warfare programs are by far the largest in the 3rd world. Iraq combined production capability of blister agent mustard and the nerve agents sarin

and GF, is the principal in his arsenal, was about 2,000 tons per-year. Iraq has stressed the development of advanced chemical weapon agents, such as its pursuit of persistent nerve agent VX. In addition Iraq has developed binary chemical weapons with longer shelf life, enabling it to maintain sizeable stockpiles. Iraq is maintaining a wide range of battlefield proven CW agent warheads for its Scud and modified Scud ballistic missiles.‖ SOURCE: IRAQ AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK HTTP://WWW.GWU.EDU/~NSARCHIV/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/#DOCS

A Wing and A Prayer Returning from Desert Storm in 1991, leaving Saudi Arabia, we stopped and refueled in Belgium. Shortly after taking off, a bomb went off that had been placed in

the wing. By just a Wing and a Prayer, the bomb did not ignite the fuel in the wing, nor did the wing sheer off as we made a return emergency landing. This

along with other events, I

realized that a deeper war in the Mid-East was just beginning for Americans.

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Picture taken from a window seat.

Looking Back: UNSCOM and UNMOVIC

April 3rd, 1991, Security Council resolution 687

(1991), Section C, decides that Iraq shall

unconditionally accept, under international

supervision, the destruction, removal or rendering

harmless of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles with a range over 150

kilometers, and related production facilities and equipment. It also provides for

establishment of a system of ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq‘s

compliance with the ban on these weapons and missiles. It requires Iraq to make a

declaration, within 15 days, of the location, amounts and types of all such items.1

Under the terms of Resolution 687, Iraq was barred from selling oil until UNSCOM

verified the destruction of its prohibited weapons. These sanctions were eased in

1996 under the "Oil for Food" program that allowed Baghdad to sell oil, place the

proceeds in a U.N. supervised escrow account, and use the funds to purchase non-

military goods. But Baghdad's stubborn refusal to comply with Resolution 687 has

cost Iraq more than $120 billion in forgone oil income--a measure of the importance

Saddam accords to retaining his WMD capabilities.2

Deception: The Iraqis made extensive and elaborate efforts to hide their prohibited

weapons programs. The strategy involved highly coordinated efforts among many

Iraqi bureaucracies, including the Office of the President; Special Security

Organization (run by Saddam's son and heir apparent, Qusay); Special Republican

Guard; Higher Security Committee; Military Industrial Commission; Iraqi Intelligence

Service; and Directorate for Military Intelligence.3

Baghdad's pattern of denial and deception continued until the termination of

inspections in 1998, after a series of crises provoked by Iraqi noncompliance.

Baghdad relentlessly sought to deceive and confuse UNSCOM inspectors through

fraudulent statements, false documents, and the misrepresentation of the roles of

government personnel and the purpose of facilities. Iraqi propagandists developed

false cover stories for weapons facilities, such as the "Baby Milk Factory" that had

sprouted security fences and roof camouflage at the onset of the Gulf War.

Obstruction: Baghdad also undertook strenuous efforts to frustrate inspections in

the field by blocking UNSCOM convoys, diverting inspectors to safe areas, and

moving banned weapons, materials, and equipment to isolated hiding spots. In

several instances, satellite intelligence revealed that Iraqi officials literally moved

forbidden items out the back door of a facility while U.N. inspectors were coming in the front door.4

The Iraqis also made repeated attempts to defeat the inspection by gaining advance

notice of inspections through intelligence-gathering operations targeting inspectors in

Iraq, Bahrain (where UNSCOM maintained a field office), and even New York City at

U.N. headquarters.5 Iraqi agents bugged hotel rooms, conference rooms, and offices

used by inspectors, monitored U.N. radio frequencies, and tapped telephones. Iraqi

agents also infiltrated a number of spies into UNSCOM's Baghdad operations. When

Hussein Kamal al-Majid, the high-ranking defector who oversaw some of Iraq's most

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secret military programs, met with UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus after defecting in August 1995.6

Former UNSCOM inspectors reported: "It was a rare inspection when the Iraqis did

not know what the inspectors were looking for before they arrived." A panel of

former U.N. inspectors concluded that of UNSCOM's 260 inspections, "only half a dozen actually surprised the Iraqis." 7

Al Mukhabarat (Directorate of General Intelligence) had teams whose role was to

organize car crashes to cause traffic jams if the Inspectors suddenly change course

towards a target the Iraqi wished to conceal. Crashing into inspectors‘ cars was a

ploy often used on UNSCOM.8

Iraq Defeats Intelligence-Gathering By US Satellites and Electronic Signal Intercepts

Iraq Also Learned To Defeat Hi-Tech. Intelligence-Gathering Capabilities By U.S. Satellites And Electronic Signal Intercepts.

Baghdad Was Given Key Satellite Data By The Soviet Union And Helped By The East Germans To Develop Sophisticated Means Of Defeating Satellite Intelligence

Collection.

SOURCE: IRAQI INSPECTIONS: LESSONS LEARNED, P. 4, DAVID KAY HTTP://WWW.NTI.ORG/DB/ARCHIVES/NUC/EOS/KAY.HTM

Intimidation: During UNSCOM inspections, Iraqi officials often resorted to physical

intimidation and harassment. They shoved television cameras and lights into the

faces of inspectors to distract them, snatched documents out of their hands, and

blocked entrance to certain facilities or rooms within those facilities. David Kay, an

inspector dispatched by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reported that:

Inspectors were awakened with telephoned threats; obscene and threatening notes were slipped under hotel doors; hotel rooms were ransacked; verbal abuse on the

street and at inspection sites became common; on several occasions inspectors were physically attacked by outraged Iraqi ‗civilians‘; UN vehicles were bombed and tires slashed; and shots were fired over the heads of inspectors as a team photographed

Iraq's secret uranium enrichment equipment.9

Iraqi soldiers on September 24th, 1991, prevented one inspection team from removing documents related to the design of a nuclear weapon from the Nuclear Design Center in Baghdad by holding the inspectors in a parking lot for four days, before allowing

them to depart with the documents.10

Saddam's internal security forces also sought to intimidate Iraqi personnel familiar

with the details of its illicit programs to deter them from passing information to the inspectors. If the Iraqi authorities discovered that government officials had been too cooperative with the inspectors, they harshly punished not only the whistleblower, but

also his entire extended family. Former IAEA inspector David Kay recalled that disloyalty often was punished by death.11

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U.N. Dealings: Baghdad has tried to drive wedges between members of the

Security Council to undermine its support for the inspectors. It has dangled oil deals

before France and Russia. Moscow also has a sizeable financial stake in the survival

of Saddam's regime because it otherwise is unlikely to recover about $8 billion in

Soviet-era loans to Iraq. Russia has landed the lion's share of contracts under the

U.N.-sponsored "Oil for Food" program, and has become Iraq's largest export

customer, signing more than $4 billion in business deals since 1996. The United

Nations also has become a major beneficiary of Iraq's oil exports through its supervision of the "Oil for Food" program.12

Iraq also sought to undermine the inspectors by going over their head to deal with

the U.N. bureaucracy in New York. After Iraqi defiance sparked a series of crises that

paralyzed the inspections, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan was drawn into

negotiations to revise the ground rules for inspections in February 1998. Annan

announced an agreement with Saddam Hussein with much fanfare at a press

conference, saying: "Can I trust Saddam Hussein? I think I can do business with

him." But Annan's agreement was quickly violated by the Iraqis, like all the previous agreements on inspections.

End of UNSCOM

Continued Iraqi violations led the United States and Britain to bomb suspected Iraqi

weapons facilities for four days in December 1998, after the final withdrawal of the

UNSCOM inspectors.

UN Surrenders To Saddam,

Creates Less Effective Inspection Group, “UNMOVIC”

The United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),

set up in 1999 to replace UNSCOM, ends up even less effective than its predecessor.

UNMOVIC inspectors will have no direct access to intelligence gathered by member

states, unlike UNSCOM, which would have been even less effective if it did not

benefit from access to intelligence gleaned by U.S. and other intelligence agencies.

UNMOVIC inspectors will be drawn from a more diverse list of countries, because

Iraq had complained that UNSCOM personnel disproportionately came from Western

nations, especially the United States and Britain.

The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)

was created through the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1284

of December 17th, 1999. UNMOVIC replaced the former United Nations Special

Commission (UNSCOM) and continue with the latter's mandate to disarm Iraq of its

weapons of mass destruction, and to operate a system of ongoing monitoring and

verification to check Iraq's compliance with its obligations not to reacquire the same

weapons prohibited to it by the Security Council.

Following the mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441,

Saddam Hussein allowed UN inspectors to return to Iraq in December 2002.

UNMOVIC led inspections of possible nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities in

Iraq until shortly before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in spring 2003, but did not find any

weapons of mass destruction.13

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Examples From UNSCOM Records 1997 -1999

June 1997: Iraqi escorts physically deter an UNSCOM pilot from flying an inspections team to its intended destination.

September 13th, 1997: An Iraqi officer physically prevents an UNSCOM inspector onboard a helicopter from taking photographs of suspicious movements by Iraqi vehicles inside a designated inspection site.

September 17th, 1997: While being detained outside an inspection site, UNSCOM inspectors witness and videotape Iraqi guards transporting files, burning documents, and

dumping remains into a river.

September/October 1997: UNSCOM inspection teams are refused access to three separate designated inspection sites, based on their "presidential status".

October 29th, 1997: Iraq demands that Americans on the U.N. Special Commission inspection team leave; the Americans leave temporarily but return November 20th.

1998

January 13th, 1998: Iraq temporarily withdraws cooperation, claiming that the inspection team had too many U.S. and British inspectors.

January 22nd, 1998: Iraq refuses inspection of eight presidential sites.

February 20th-23rd, 1998: U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan secures Iraq's cooperation. Iraq signs a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations, pledging "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" for their inspections.

October 31st, 1998: Iraq ends all forms of cooperation with UNSCOM. UNSCOM withdraws.

November 14th, 1998: Iraq allows inspections to resume.

December 16th, 1998: UNSCOM removes all staff from Iraq after inspectors conclude Iraq is not fully cooperating. Four days of U.S. and British air strikes follow.

1999

December 17th, 1999: U.N. replaces UNSCOM with the U.N. Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Iraq rejects the resolution.

September 16th, 2002: Iraq once again claims it will allow unconditional return of U.N. weapons inspectors to Iraq and grant them unrestricted access to suspected sites.14,15

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] DISARMING IRAQ, THE LESSONS OF UNSCOM HTTP://WWW.HERITAGE.ORG/RESEARCH/MIDDLEEAST/BG1608.CFM [2-4,] IBID 1 [5] IRAQIS PERFECT THE ART OF EVADING UNSCOM," JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, BOYNE FEB. 1, 1998 [6] MONITORING AND VERIFICATION IN A NONCOOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS FROM THE U.N. EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ," THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, JONATHAN B. TUCKER, 1996

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[7] WHY IRAQ WILL DEFEAT ARMS INSPECTORS, GARY MILHOLLIN, THE NEW YORK TIMES, SEPT 16, 2002, [8-11] IBID 1 [12] RUSSIA AND IRAQ BY CARRIE SATTERLEE, FEBRUARY 28, 2003. FACTS ON WHO BENEFITS FROM KEEPING SADDAM HUSSEIN IN POWER

Russia controls roughly 5.8 percent of Iraq's annual imports. Under the U.N. oil-for-food program, Russia's total trade with Iraq was somewhere between $530 million and $1 billion for the six months ending in December of 2001.

According to the Russian Ambassador to Iraq, Vladimir Titorenko, new contracts worth another $200 million under the U.N. oil-for-food program are to be signed over the next three months.

Russia's LUKoil negotiated a $4 billion, 23-year contract in 1997 to rehabilitate the 15 billion-barrel West Qurna field in southern Iraq. Work on the oil field was expected to commence upon cancellation of U.N. sanctions on Iraq. [The deal is currently on hold.]

In October 2001, Salvneft, a Russian–Belarus company, negotiated a $52 million service contract to drill at the Tuba field in Southern Iraq.In April 2001, Russia's Zaruezhneft and Tatneft companies received a service contract to drill in the Saddam, Kirkuk, and Bai Hassan fields to rehabilitate the fields and reduce water incursion. Together the deals were valued at $13.2 million.

A future $40 billion Iraqi–Russian economic agreement, reportedly signed in 2002, would allow for extensive oil exploration opportunities throughout western Iraq. The proposal calls for 67 new projects, over a 10-year time frame, to explore and further develop fields in southern Iraq and the Western Desert, including the Suba, Luhais, West Qurna, and Rumaila projects. Additional projects added to the deal include second-phase construction of a pipeline running from southern to northern Iraq, and extensive drilling and gas projects. Work on these projects would commence upon cancellation of sanctions.

Russia's Gazprom Company over the past few years has signed contracts worth $18 million to repair gas stations in Iraq.

The former Soviet Union was the premier supplier of Iraqi arms. From 1981 to 2001, Russia supplied Iraq with 50 percent of its arms. Soviet-era debt of $7 billion through $8 billion was generated by arms sales to Iraq during the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war.

Three Russian firms are suspected of selling electronic jamming equipment, antitank missiles and thousands of night-vision goggles to Iraq in violation of U.N. sanctions. Two of the companies identified are Aviaconversiya and KBP Tula.

France

France controls over 22.5 percent of Iraq's imports. French total trade with Iraq under the oil-for-food program is the third largest, totaling $3.1 billion since 1996, according to the United Nations.

In 2001, France became Iraq's largest European trading partner. Roughly 60 French companies did an estimated $1.5 billion in trade with Baghdad in 2001, under the U.N. oil-for-food program.

France's largest oil company, Total Fina Elf, has negotiated extensive oil contracts to develop the Majnoon and Nahr Umar oil fields in southern Iraq. Both the Majnoon and Nahr Umar fields are estimated to contain as much as 25 percent of the country's oil reserves. The two fields purportedly contain an estimated 26 billion barrels of oil.1[4] In 2002, the non-war price per barrel of oil was $25. Based on that average, these two fields have the potential to provide a gross return of about $650 billion.

HTTP://WWW.HERITAGE.ORG/RESEARCH/MIDDLEEAST/WM217.CFM [13] IRAQI UN RECORDS SOURCE: HTTP://WWW.UNMOVIC.ORG/ [14] THE LESSONS OF UNSCOM AND UNMOVIC TREVOR FINDLAY HTTP://WWW.VERTIC.ORG/ASSETS/YB04/FINDLAY%208.PDF [15] UNSCOM CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN EVENTS HTTP://WWW.UN.ORG/DEPTS/UNSCOM/CHRONOLOGY/CHRONOLOGYFRAME.HTM

10-12

Saddam had fostered the modernization of the Iraqi economy along with the creation

of an in-depth –many branched security apparatus to prevent coups within the Iraqi

power structure and insurrections apart from it. Before I can touch on Saddam links

to terrorism and other entities, we must take into account the vast security and

covert network Saddam created, and his covert compartmentization, of his activities.

Iraq: a country the size of France, and a population of about 22 million. UN

Inspectors were vastly outnumbered by over 20,000 Iraqi Intelligence officers, who

were engaged in disrupting their inspections and concealing evidence of

Saddam‘s deadly arsenals.

There was a shifting of appointments which was part of Saddam‘s policy of

balancing security positions. By constantly shifting the directors of these

agencies, no one could establish a base in a security organization for a substantial

period of time. No one could become powerful enough to challenge the President.

SOURCE: HOW IRAQ CONCEALS AND OBTAINS ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, BY IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI MERIA.IDC.AC.IL/JOURNAL/2003/ISSUE1/JV7N1A5.HTML

(See also in final footnotes of chapter 10, pages 98-100 for summary of Saddam’s Security Apparatus.)

10-13

We have seen the badgering, the deceptions, covert prevention activities towards UN

Iraq Inspections, and Saddam‘s brutal state apparatuses. However, Saddam was brilliant in so many aspects that here was a man who was politically skilful in the lethal arena of Iraqi politics: tenacious, capable of great charm, calculating, often pragmatic and deeply ambitious. ALSO NOTE [1] FORMER DICTATOR'S DREAM WAS TO UNITE ALL ARABS, DEC 30, 2006. HTTP://WWW.USATODAY.COM/NEWS/WORLD/IRAQ/2006-12-29-SADDAM-OBIT_X.HTM [2] PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, AUBREY IMMELMAN, MARCH 2003. PATHOLOGICAL NARCISSISM Saddam exhibits extreme grandiosity, overconfidence, and self-absorption to a degree that renders him incapable of empathizing with the pain and suffering of others. He is devoid of empathy and unmoved by human suffering, which permits him to commit atrocities against his own people as readily as he is willing to brutalize his enemies. HTTP://WWW.CSBSJU.EDU/USPP/RESEARCH/SADDAM%20PROFILE.HTML [3] IRAQI ARMY During the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, the Iraqi armed forces underwent many changes in size, structure, arms supplies, hierarchy, deployment, and political character. Between 1980 and the summer of 1990 Saddam boosted the number of troops in the Iraqi military from 180,000 to 900,000, creating the fourth-largest army in the world. With mobilization, Iraq could have raised this to 2 million men under arms--fully 75% of all Iraqi men between ages 18 and 34. The number of tanks in the Iraqi military rose from 2,700 to 5,700 and artillery pieces went from 2,300 to 3,700. Headquartered in Baghdad, the army -- of an estimated 1.7 million or more Iraqis, including reserves and paramilitary -- in 1987 had seven corps, five armored divisions (each with one armored brigade and one mechanized brigade), and three mechanized divisions (each with one armored brigade and two or more mechanized brigades). An expanded Presidential Guard Force was composed of three armored brigades, one infantry brigade, and one commando brigade. There were also thirty infantry divisions, composed of the People's Army (Al Jaysh ash Shaabi--also cited as the Popular Army or People's Militia) brigades and the reserve brigades, as well as six Special Forces brigades. HTTP://WWW.GLOBALSECURITY.ORG/MILITARY/WORLD/IRAQ/ARMY.HTM [4]ARMY, FORCES IRAQ HTTP://WWW.FAS.ORG/NUKE/GUIDE/IRAQ/AGENCY/ARMY.HTM BIOLOGICAL Iraq began an offensive biological weapon (BW) program in 1985. By 1990, this program had produced 25 missile warheads and 166 400-pound aerial bombs that were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin, or aflatoxin. Further, Iraq acknowledged production of approximately 20,000 liters of botulinum toxin solution, 8,425 liters of anthrax solution, and 2,200 liters of aflatoxin. Baghdad also admitted to having researched the weapons potential of the camelpox virus, human rotavirus, enterovirus, and the toxin ricin. CHEMICAL Iraq made extensive use of chemical weapons (CW) during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988. In 1988, Iraq mounted a massive chemical attack against the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing approximately 5,000 civilians. Before Desert Storm, Iraq succeeded in producing the blister agent mustard, as well as the nerve agents, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin and VX. After its 1991 defeat, Iraq declared to UN inspectors that between 1982 and 1990 it produced 3,859 tons of CW agents and more than 125,000 filled and unfilled "special munitions." These munitions were mostly stored at the Muthana State Establishment, Iraq's major CW production, filling, and testing facility. Iraq's CW infrastructure suffered extensive damage during the 1991 Gulf War. After the war the United Nations was authorized to verify the destruction of all of Iraq's WMD and long-range delivery systems. By mid-1995, inspectors had largely completed verification and destruction of Baghdad's chemical stocks, munitions, and relevant production facilities and equipment. [5] IRAQ COUNTRY PROFILE NTI.ORG/E_RESEARCH/PROFILES/IRAQ/INDEX.HTML

To understand the deadly threat Saddam Hussein posed, let‘s first begin with US

Congress Report, US Intelligence Post/Prewar Iraq WMD assessments, and Saddam‘s

links to terrorism in 2006. Clearly, there were serious failures in US Intelligence

presented to Congress and the American people, concerning Iraq and Saddam, as

detailed in this Congressional report. However it does fail to exam key pieces

concerning Saddam‘s threat (which I will cover later in this chapter).

As an example, if I have, a cup, and I tell you it is empty of water, but contains

some water, have I misinformed you? Does it matter? And what if this cup concerns

deadly arsenals of WMD, terrorism, how little is little, and not worth noticing?

10-14

Report of Select Committee On Intelligence United States Senate

Report On The U.S. Intelligence Community's Postwar Findings about Iraq’s

WMD Programs and Links To Terrorism and How They Compare With

Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq September 8th, 2006.

NOTE: Where paragraph says blacked out, the Senate Report blacked out classified information in that sentence- paragraph.

(U) Conclusion 1: Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's

October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for

Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the

underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic trade

craft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence.

Similarly, the assessment that "all key aspects - R&D, production, and weaponization

— of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and

more advanced than they were before the Gulf War" was not supported by the

underlying intelligence provided to the Committee.

But The Report Often Gives A No- Yes Answer..

―Intelligence showed that Iraq was renovating or expanding facilities that had been associated with Iraq's past BW program and was engaged in research that had BW

applications, but few reports suggested specifically that the activity was related to

BW. ‖

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

(UAV)

―(BLACKED OUT) The key judgment in the NIE that Iraq was developing a UAV "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents" also overstated what the intelligence reporting indicated about the mission of

Iraq's small UAVs. ‖

―Numerous intelligence reports confirmed that Iraq was developing a small UAV program (BLACKED OUT), but none of the reports provided to the

Committee said that Iraq intended to use the small UAVs to deliver chemical or biological weapons. An Air Force

intelligence footnote, which stated that biological weapons delivery, was a possible mission for the small UAVs. However other missions were more likely, involving

chemical warfare agents.

What Are UAV’s?

"Unmanned air vehicles" is the term used in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to refer to unmanned systems that fly within the atmosphere and are not rocket-propelled.

10-15

Different terms may be used in other contexts, but for MTCR purposes this term includes cruise missiles, as well as target drones, reconnaissance drones, and other forms of UAVs, be they military or civilian, armed or unarmed. UAVs can be as large as a jetliner or as small as a model airplane, can be jet or propeller driven; there are even concepts for guided, unmanned

blimps that would be UAVs.

Uses of UAVs UAVs have been in military service since at least the use of the V-l cruise missile and target drones in World War II. Since then, their use has grown dramatically in land-attack (in ground-, sea-, and air-launched modes), reconnaissance, as targets, and even in some civilian applications such as pipeline inspection and crop-dusting. The U.S. military is at the cutting

edge, with nuclear-armed cruise missiles in the inventory for over 20 years, and extensive use of conventionally armed cruise missiles and of reconnaissance UAVs in the Gulf War and most of our subsequent military engagements. As UAVs become more capable (as in the recent use of armed UAVs in Afghanistan), they are taking on more missions that have been exclusively

the province of manned aircraft; this is expected to grow in the future, with the further development of so-called Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs).

The UAV Proliferation Threat These same attributes of UAVs that are so useful for the U.S. military -- for example, the ability to strike targets with precision and substantial protection from interception and to collect real-time intelligence -- makes UAVs in the hands of our adversaries a threat to us and to our friends and allies. Moreover, UAVs are potential delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and indeed are ideally suited for the delivery of chemical and biological

weapons (CBW) given UAVs ability to disseminate aerosols in the right places at the right altitudes. And while, thus far, the primary concern for adversary use of WMD-armed UAVs has been with nation-states -- such as Iraq, which has been converting L-29 trainer aircraft to UAVs for probable CBW use -- there is a potential for terrorist groups to produce or acquire small UAVs and use them for CBW delivery.

Dealing With the UAV Proliferation Threat U.S. efforts to impede threats stemming from the proliferation of UAVs and their technology encompass a broad spectrum of measures. As in other nonproliferation areas, the U.S. attempts to use aggressively all of these tools to affect various aspects of the UAV proliferation threat.

Conclusion Just as they provide real opportunities for U.S. and allied militaries, UAVs also provide opportunities for our adversaries to threaten us. Dealing with that threat has been a part of U.S. nonproliferation efforts for over 15 years, and we have been strengthening our ability to impede and cope with it -- broadening MTCR export controls, adding "catch-all" controls, improving our military and intelligence capabilities. But we will need to keep working hard to keep pace with the threat, not only because our adversaries are determined, but because the

increasing reliance on UAVs worldwide (including in civilian roles) and the dual-use nature of much UAV technology will make our job more difficult in the future.

SOURCE: CRUISE MISSILES & UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES, VANN VAN DIEPEN, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NONPROLIFERATION TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES WASHINGTON, DC JUNE 11

th, 2002,

STATE.GOV/T/ISN/RLS/RM/11045.HTM

10-16

Task Force On Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare U.S. House Of

Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 The Iraqi WMD Challenge -- Myths

And Reality February 10th, 1998

And while public attention is focused on ballistic missiles, Iraq has even

more effective and lethal platforms of the delivery of its weapons of mass destruction. In late December 1996, German intelligence confirmed that Iraqi weapons technicians developed a drone described as "the little guy's cruise missile." This

unmanned aircraft is made of plastics and plywood -- simple and cheap to produce without any tell-tale equipment that can attract the UN inspectors. The drone has a range of about 700 kilometers and is

equipped with a very accurate GPS navigation system illegally purchased in the West. It is

almost impossible to detect this drone by radar because of its size, slow speed and lack of metal parts. The BND's experts are most alarmed by the Iraqi fielding of a version of this drone that can be also launched from ships. Consequently, one cannot rule out the possibility of an Iraqi-controlled commercial ship suddenly launching these drones outside the coasts of Europe -- from where these missiles can reach and threaten London, Paris or Berlin -- as well as the Atlantic coast of the US.

LINK: HTTP://WWW.FAS.ORG/SPP/STARWARS/CONGRESS/1998_R/980210T-FR.HTM

When the United Nations was still allowed to inspect

Iraq's weapons facilities, inspectors heard rumors of a

UAV that had been modified to deliver CBW. On

December 17th, 1998, during the end of Operation

Desert Fox, a British missile blew open a hangar to

expose at least 12 UAVs. These aircraft had spray

nozzles and wing-mounted tanks that feasibly could be

used to distribute chemical or biological agents. Not all

were destroyed. Two years later, surveillance photos caught what looked to be L-29s

undergoing flight tests.1, 2

10-17

The L-29, first built by Czechoslovakia in 1955, was the Iron Curtain version of the Cessna. The single-engine, dual-seated plane is a basic flight trainer for novices. Czech aerospace firm Aero Vodochody sold Iraq 78 L-29s during the late 1960s; it later sold 91 of the follow-up version, the L-39, in the early 1980s. The L-29 can carry

two bombs weighing 100 kilograms or four rockets in its two rocket-throwers. According to the Czech Air Force web site, it is 10.8 meters long, reaches 3.1 meters high, has a maximum speed of 231 kilometers per hour, has a practical flight ceiling of 10,900 meters and can, at most, range 1350 kilometers. If it were to be modified into a UAV, it would be able to fly at higher altitudes and farther than the first production US UAV Predator (which is 8.22 meters long, 2.1 meters high, and can reach top speeds of 135 miles per hour, range up to 454 miles, and has a ceiling of 7620

meters).3

A modified L-29 UAV is not the most effective way to distribute chemical/biological

agents. MiG-21s and helicopters have been examined as possibilities. The L-29 is vulnerable due to its relatively slow speed, adverse reaction to high temperatures, and need to fly low to fully discharge its payloads. And the chemical/biological agents are

best dispersed under very specific weather conditions; otherwise, they may be rendered harmless. But the L-29's low price (used ones go for $100,000 on the open market) and the UN restrictions placed on Iraqi missile programs make experimenting with UAVs a viable option for Iraq.4

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] DRONES OF DEATH HIT BY TORNADOS, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 19

th, 1998.

NEWS.BBC.CO.UK/1/HI/EVENTS/CRISIS_IN_THE_GULF/FORCES_AND_FIREPOWER/238483.STM UNCERTAIN ABILITY TO DELIVER A BLOW [2] IRAQ COBBLES TOGETHER WEAPONS SYSTEMS WITH MIXED RESULTS, ANALYSTS SAY, BY JOBY WARRICK, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 5

th, 2002; PAGE A01.

Operation Desert Fox in 1998: a British missile sheared off the top of a military hangar in southern Iraq and exposed a closely guarded secret. Plainly visible in the rubble was a new breed of Iraqi drone aircraft -- one that defense analysts now believe was specially modified to spread deadly chemicals and germs. Up to a dozen of the unmanned airplanes were spotted inside the hangar, each fitted with spray nozzles and wing-mounted tanks that could carry up to 80 gallons of liquid anthrax. If flown at low altitudes under the right conditions, a single drone could unleash a toxic cloud engulfing several city blocks, a top British defense official concluded. He dubbed them "drones of death." HTTP://WWW.WASHINGTONPOST.COM/AC2/WP- [3] CZECH AIR FORCE, "L-29 FACT SHEET, "IRAQ SAID TO BE DEVELOPING L-29 DELFIN INTO HEAVY PAYLOAD UAV," DEFENSE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS' STRATEGIC POLICY, SEPTEMBER 2001. WW.CZECHAIRFORCE.CZ/INDEX.PHP. [4] IRAQI L-29S COULD EASILY BE WEAPONS, AVIATION EXPERTS SAY," AEROSPACE DAILY, SEPT. 27

th, 2002.

MODIFYING CZECH LIGHT AIRCRAFT INTO UNMANNED PLANE NOT DIFFICULT - EXPERTS," CTK NEWS AGENCY (PRAGUE) VIA BBC MONITORING EUROPE, SEPT. 24, 2002. SEE ALSO [1] IRAQ SEEN MAINTAINING INTEREST IN UAV TO CARRY WEAPONS," AEROSPACE DAILY, MARCH 6

th, 2001.

"SPECIALIST: LAX LAWS ON UAV EXPORTS COULD LEAD TO NEW THREAT AGAINST US RICH TUTTLE," AEROSPACE DAILY, SEPT. 19

th, 2001.

[2] BUSH WARNS OF CHEMICAL ATTACKS ON THE US, TONY HARNDEN, "THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, OCT. 8th,

2002. UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, "IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS," OCTOBER 2002. HTTP://WWW.CIA.GOV/CIA/PUBLICATIONS/IRAQ_WMD/IRAQ_OCT_2002.HTM.

Al Musayara-20

In the 1990s, Iraq began research and development work on Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs), designed and built specifically as unmanned vehicles. The initial work was the responsibility of Iraq‘s Military Research and Development Committee (MRDC), directed by Dr. ‗Imad from 1993 until 1996. Between 1995 and

1997 the MRDC worked on the Al Yamamah UAV project, which formed the foundation of subsequent indigenous UAV development in Iraq. The Al Yamamah project consisted

of three designs, the Al Yamamah 2, Al Yamamah 3, and Al Yamamah 4. The Al

Yamamah 2 and 4 UAVs were propeller-driven with pusher piston engines. The Al Yamamah 3 was jet powered, using a TS-21 turbo-starter from the Russian Su-7/FITTER aircraft. Iraqi engineers realized that most UAVs were not jet powered

10-18

because slower, propeller-driven UAVs were simpler to construct and control and could remain airborne longer. Problems with the L-29 UAV conversion program in the late 1990s caused the Ibn-Firnas General Company to copy the Yamamah 2 design, increase the size of its tail boom, and rename it the Al Musayara-20 (aka RPV-20 or

UAV-20), in order to fulfill Saddam's request to produce the first fully autonomous UAV.1

June 2002: an Al Musayara-20 UAV flew a demonstration flight that lasted three hours and covered a total distance of 500 km, although a source with direct access

claimed the UAV remained within 15 km of its launch point. The UAV was initially controlled by the ground control station, then switched to autopilot shortly after takeoff and remained on autopilot until recovery. In November 2002, Ibn-Firnas concluded a contract to provide 36 Al Musayara-20 UAVs to the Iraqi Army for battlefield reconnaissance (the Republican Guard ordered a similar number). The

contract specified the delivery of: Thirty Al Musayara-20 with autonomous, programmed guidance; Six Al Musayara-20 with remote-control capability, for training

purposes only; Twelve Yamama-11 training aircraft (probably targets); Eight simulators; Control, navigation, and reconnaissance equipment; Six ground control stations. In its 2004 Report, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was unable to confirm if the specified items were delivered.2

Al Musayara-20

The Al Muysayara, or UAV-20, was the most successful of Iraq's efforts to produce an

autonomous UAV. Pre-OIF U.S. intelligence feared that Iraq's small UAVs were

"probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents." Another judgment, later

retracted, stated that Iraq intended to attack the U.S. with its unmanned UAVs. This

assessment was based on alleged Iraqi procurement of U.S. terrain software for its

guidance systems and reports that the UAVs could travel 500 km. ISG determined

that, although BW dispersion was an inherent capability of the small UAV, that the Al

Musayara-20 was designed as a battle field reconnaissance. ISG did note, however,

that if Iraqi leadership made the decision and if a suitable dispenser system were

available, this UAV did have the range, payload, guidance, and autonomy necessary

to be used as a biological weapon delivery platform.3

However the UAV-20 did not, have sufficient payload capacity to serve as an effective CW platform, as judged by ISG.4

Remote-Control Unit Labeled ―PCM Telecommand System, Skyleader Radio

Control Limited‖

Feranti Technologies Vertical Gyro Type FS60P

Video Recorder Labeled ―VCR Vinton Military Sytems Ltd‖

Single Rate Gyro Units Labeled ―BAE Systems‖

Electronic Unit Labeled ―DMS Technologies, 08/02‖

Sony 700X Super Steady Shot, Digital Eight Video Camera, Model DCR-

TRV530E

Humphrey Vertical Gyro, Model VG34-0803-1

Multiplex Micro-IPD 7-Channel Narrowband Receiver 35 Mhz

Schmalband-Empfanger Multiplex Uni 9, 35 Mhz

Al Musayara-20 General Specifications

Length 3.45 m

Wingspan 4.80 m

Height 0.95 m

Gross Weight 116 kg

Empty Weight 80 kg

10-19

Maximum Takeoff Weight 115 kg

Maximum Speed 170 kph

Maximum Flying Time per Tank 3 hrs

Maximum Altitude 3,000 m

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DIRECTOR CIA ON IRAQ‟S WMD, SEPT, 2004. The Iraqi Survey Group also reported that the Republican Guards had directed that some Al Musayara-20s be converted in weapons-carrying UAVs (conventional explosives).HTTP://WWW.CNS.MIIS.EDU/PUBS/OP11/INDEX.HTM. [2] THE CROP DUSTING TERRORIST, RICHARD A. MULLER TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, MARCH 11, 2002 [3] UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES AS TERROR WEAPONS: REAL OR IMAGINED? DENNIS M. GORMLEY, SENIOR FELLOW CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES (CNS) MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JULY 2005. HTTP://WWW.NTI.ORG/E_RESEARCH/E3_68A.HTML [4] IBID 1

Report of Select Committee On Intelligence United States Senate

Report On The U.S. Intelligence Community's Postwar Findings about

Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links To Terrorism and How They Compare

With Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq September 8th, 2006 Page 58-59

―(U) Conclusion 9 : Postwar findings do not support the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessments that Iraq had developmental program for UAV, probably intended to deliver biological agents, or that an effort to procure US mapping

software, strongly suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for

missions targeting the United States. Postwar findings support the view of the Air Force, joined by DIA and the Army, in the NIE published in January 2003, that Iraq’s UAVs were for reconnaissance.‖

But on previous pages concerning Iraq UAVs, in this report, chose to dismiss deadly

capabilities of UAVs. Then more shockingly, this report believes in only non-

threatening intentions of Saddam Hussein. His drones would be, and are only

reconnaissance drones. Page 45,

―Biological warfare agent delivery is an inherited capability of most UAVs and that

Iraq may choose to exploit this capability.‖ Page 50, ―The ISG, uncovered numerous examples of Iraq’s disregard for UN sanctions and

resolutions in an effort to improve its missiles and UAV capabilities‖, and this enabled Iraq to develop a more robust delivery systems programs.

10-20

L-29 ―Iraqi Officials provided the ISG with differing accounts of the purpose of L-29 remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). Some reported that the aircraft was to be used

as a decoy for coalition aircraft, a targeting drone, for reconnaissance and possibly electronic warfare. One Iraqi engineer without direct access to the information, said that in 1995, many Iraqi Air Force Engineers believed the intended use was to attack a US aircraft carrier with chemical or biological weapons. The ISG could not confirm or deny that the L-29 had a CBW role, but regardless, said program was failure and its funding terminated in 2001.

(Report of Select Committee On Intelligence United States Senate Report, page 51)

With Failures Of The L-29 RPV Program, Iraq Began In 2000 To Pursue New,

Long-Range UAV Options.

Iraq remained interested in UAVs, and the MIC ordered the development of indigenous reconnaissance UAVs and target drones. Iraq‘s Ibn-Firnas group after 1998 developed the Al Musayara-20 UAV as a battlefield reconnaissance UAV.

Iraq began a second, more secret, indigenous UAV development program in early

2000, called Al Quds, which would focus on meeting military requirements for airborne

electronic warfare programs. However the Al Quds UAVs were still in development at the start of OIF.

SOURCE: IRAQ SURVEY GROUP FINAL REPORT, REPORT_VOL2_DELIVERY-01.HTM HTTP://WWW.GLOBALSECURITY.ORG/WMD/LIBRARY/REPORT/2004/ISG-FINAL-REPORT/ISG-FINAL-

Perhaps the reader may believe that there was no inherit threat. This is just a matter

of what if, and maybes. However, if a man attempted to kill you, or he fully intended

to kill many others, but was prevented from doing so, would he be a threat? More

specifically if he was going to use his deadly arsenals of bio/chemical weapons? For a

period of almost 5 years for 1991-1995 Saddam‘s through the covert methodology,

and his brutal security agencies, kept the bulk of his biological deadly arsenal hidden

from UN Inspections. These were only uncovered by the defection of his son-in-law

Hussein Kamel. More startling, was an offensive biological warfare arsenal, armed

with Scud missiles, aircraft and more. This was unknown even to the CIA, and other

world Intelligence agencies. But the last question never really asked by any UN or

other agency, what if Kamel had never defected? What we know today and what

would have Saddam done with this hidden deadly arsenal?

Some one million pages of material were obtained from his defection. Newly-

declared documents, which showed massive biological weapons programs, revealed a

lot more of Saddam‘s deadly arsenals, chemical weapons programs, missile

endeavors , and nuclear. Later on, as UNSCOM went through some million of

documents, they found that there were interesting gaps. All the biological

weaponization and military delivery capabilities were just described as research.

There was nothing on weaponization, that is to say, nothing on taking what you

know to be a bio-warfare agents such as anthrax say -- and putting it into a warhead

that can be used as a military weapon.

Hussein Kamel's defection established to UNSCOM that not only had they been

missing something, but they've been missing a vast, huge amount of what they were

supposed to be finding and far more than they had ever suspected. Their worst

nightmare scenario was eclipsed by the documents, and it meant the beginning of a

major new phase of biological, missile, chemical, and nuclear investigations. For it

was only because of the careful scrutiny of these Iraqi documents, that UN

10-21

Inspectors really knew that there had to be a greater Iraqi WMD deadly arsenal

hidden, somewhere, in the vast area of Iraq.1

So, Kamel’s defection was a two edged sword. It did not reveal enough, almost a smoke screen, a camouflage to Saddam’s deadly WMD arsenals. It may have well been, Kamel was only trying to throw UNSCOM off the track of inspections, to satisfy the international community and America when he denied to UNSCOM and other International Iraqi investigatory agencies, there was nothing more to be found.2

Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid

Kamel, was the son-in-law and second cousin of Iraqi

leader Saddam Hussein. He defected to Jordan and took to

helping the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)

and the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA

inspection teams assigned to look for weapons of mass

destruction in Iraq. Kamel rose through the army ranks to

become Iraq's minister of military industries, heading the

Military Industrialization Commission and supervising Iraq's

weapons development programs from 1987. He married

one of Saddam Hussein's daughters, Raghad Hussein, and

lived in Iraq until 1995. On August 7th of that year, Kamel

and his wife defected from Iraq, along with Kamel's

brother, Col. Saddam Kamel al-Majid, and the brother's wife, another of Saddam

Hussein's daughters.3

Kamel maintained that Iraq had destroyed its weapons of mass destruction and

related programs after the end of the first Gulf War.4

"I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons—biological, chemical, missile, nuclear—were destroyed.” Hussein Kamel 5

However, the full extent of Kamel‘s revelations, (Kamel‘s declaration of destroying all

of Saddam‘s deadly arsenals) were kept away from the general news media in an

attempt to pressure Saddam Hussein into revealing even more about his deadly

arsenals, and to encourage more high level Iraqi officials defections. But once the full

discloser of Kamel‘s testimony was released, it brought down harsh bitter criticism,

on American Officials and the Bush Administration, as a cover up, to justify invasion

of Iraq in 2003.6

In February 1996, after intermediaries for Saddam Hussein had assured them that all

would be forgiven, Hussein Kamel and Saddam Kamel were convinced to return to

Iraq with their wives. Three days after their arrival, on February 23rd, minus their

wives, they were killed by Saddam's security forces in a gun battle.7

However, Kamel was either totally kept in the dark concerning Saddam‘s deadly

arsenals, or he knew and was sent by Saddam to appease, and derail UN Inspections

in Iraq. For Kamel stated over and over gain in interviews, before international

governmental officials, there was nothing to be found in Iraq, no WMD, nothing, for

he had destroyed it all. But this had the opposite effect, instead of derailing UN,

there was literary an explosion in UNSCOM, starting a fire of questions and

inspections. Could Kamel having served, lived with Saddam Hussein dark, murderous

brutality, knowing full well the bloody retaliatory responses of Saddam, after so

betraying Saddam, possibly just return to Iraq, and not fear for his own life? More

likely than not, it was a plan hatched by Kamel, approved by Saddam that went

horribly wrong? Related information to consider.8

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Special Security (Al-Amn Al-Khas)

Background

Al-Amn al-Khas (Special Security) was created during the Iran-Iraq War and

emerged as the most powerful agency in the security apparatus. It emerged from

within General Security in 1982 to provide bodyguards to Saddam Hussein after a

failed assassination attempt. Hussein Kamel, Saddam‘s cousin, son-in-law, and

Minister For Military Industrialization, (as well as minister of defense after the 1991

Gulf War)was instrumental in creating this agency and selecting the most loyal

agents from General Security, Military Intelligence and General Intelligence to serve

in it. Hussein Kamel‘s brother, Saddam Kamel, was also a member of Special

Security. There was an estimated 5,000 members in this organization mostly from

the towns of Tikrit, Huwayja and Samarra. Members of this Bureau enjoyed a higher

standard of living than the elements of the other agencies.9

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] SPYING ON SADDAM, A DEFECTOR‟S REVELATIONS, FRONTLINE NEWS DOCUMENTARY HTTP://WWW.PBS.ORG/WGBH/PAGES/FRONTLINE/SHOWS/UNSCOM/ [2] IBID.1 [3] IBID.1 [4] INTERVIEW WITH HUSSEIN KAMAL,ON 22 AUGUST 1995 - UNSCOM/IAEA WWW.CASI.ORG.UK/INFO/UNSCOM950822.PDF [5] THE DEFECTOR‟S SECRETS HUSSEIN KAMEL, THE HIGHEST-RANKING IRAQI OFFICIAL EVER TO DEFECT FROM SADDAM WWW.COMMONDREAMS.ORG/HEADLINES03/0226-01.HTM [6] STAR WITNESS ON IRAQ SAID WEAPONS WERE DESTROYED, BOMBSHELL REVELATION FROM A DEFECTOR CITED BY WHITE HOUSE AND PRESS 2/27/03 HTTP://WWW.FAIR.ORG/INDEX.PHP?PAGE=1845 [7] IBID 4 [8] HUSSEIN KAMEL - THE DEFECTOR'S SECRETS, BY JOHN BERRY, 2/24/03 WEALTH OF INFORMATION: HUSSEIN KAMEL, FORMER IRAQI MINISTER OF MILITARY INDUSTRY ,MARCH 3 2003 ISSUE HUSSEIN KAMEL, THE HIGHEST-RANKING IRAQI OFFICIAL EVER ... WWW.RATICAL.ORG/RATVILLE/CAH/KAMEL022403.HT [9] MERIA JOURNAL MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, VOL. 6, NO. 3 – SEPT. 2002 IRAQ'S SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE NETWORK: A GUIDE AND ANALYSIS BY IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI HTTP://MERIA.IDC.AC.IL/JOURNAL/2002/ISSUE3/JV6N3A1.HTML [10] THE BIG LIE, BY RUSS BAKER, THE NATION, APRIL 7, 2003 ISSUE. Newsweek disclosed that the Bush Administration had deliberately suppressed information exculpating Iraq--information from the same reliable source previously cited by the Administration as confirming that Iraq had developed weapons of mass destruction since the 1991 Gulf War. HTTP://WWW.THENATION.COM/DOC/20030407/BAKER

Iraq's offensive BW program was among the most secretive, and

highly guarded of its programs of weapons of mass destruction. Its

existence was not acknowledged until July 1995. During the period

from 1991 to 1995, Iraq categorically denied it had a biological

weapons program and it took extensive covert methods active steps

conceal Iraq‘s bio-warfare arsenal and capabilities from UNSCOM

Inspectors in Iraq. These included fraudulent statements, false and forged

documents, misrepresentation of the roles of people and facilities and other specific

acts of deception. For example, Iraq claims to have destroyed much of the

documentation and overt evidence of the program. At the same time Iraq maintained

other aspects of the program such as the equipment, supplies (e.g., bacterial growth

media), and personnel as an intact entity and facilities of the program such as the

Al-Hakam facility that produced BW agents.1

In 1983 and 1990, UNSCOM estimated that Iraq produced or procured some 30,000

aerial bombs, used to disseminate chemical or biological agents. UNSCOM supervised

the destruction of 12,000 of these bombs, as well as the aerial bomb production

plant.2

10-23

Saddam’s Shell Game

State Department, December 19th, 2002: "Iraq denies any connection between UAV

programs and chemical or biological agent dispersal. Yet, Iraq admitted in 1995 that

a MIG-21 remote-piloted vehicle tested in 1991 was to carry a biological weapon

spray system. Iraq already knows how to put these biological agents into bombs and

how to disperse biological agent using aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles. Why do

they deny what they have already admitted? Why has the Iraqi regime acquired the

range and auto-flight capabilities to spray biological weapons?" (partially repeated in

White House, January 2003, p.6).3

There were modifications of Mirage F-1 drop-tanks for the dispersion of biological

warfare agents in 1990-91, producing three modified drop-tanks as well as one prototype drop-tank. Iraq claims that the drop tanks were destroyed in mid-1991.

UNSCOM verified the remains of the three modified tanks, but did not find the dissemination devices. One of these was presented to UNSCOM in April 1998. UNSCOM

was not able to find evidence for the destruction of the modified drop-tank. These modifications of the Mirage F-1 drop-tanks for use on a MiG-21 fighter aircraft, would enable it to be remotely piloted. Iraq claims that this program was terminated in April 1991. Another missing equipment of concern, was Iraq‘s development of aerosol generators for use on a modified crop dusting helicopter, from July 1987-Sept 1988. Iraq handed over to UNSCOM various items related to this project in March 1996.4

Additional Examples of Iraq’s Years-Long Strategy of Deception and

Concealment5:

Only In 2003, When Confronted By Inspectors, Did Iraq Turn Over The "Iraqi Air

Force" Document That Contradicts Iraq's Chemical Weapons Declaration – By

Disclosing An Additional 6,500 Bombs With 1,000 Tons Of The Blistering Agent Mustard Gas.

Anthrax

After Lying For Four Years, Iraq Admitted In 1995 To Producing Nearly 8,500 Liters Of Anthrax.

Furthermore, The Iraqi‘s Noted That Only One Facility Was Involved In The Production

Of Anthrax And That None Of The Biological Agent Was Produced In 1991. Moreover, Iraq Said It Filled 50 R-400 Bombs And Five Missile Warheads With Anthrax.

UNMOVIC's Report Recollects UNSCOM's Conclusions:

Iraq's Anthrax Production Potential Could Have Been As Much As 25,000 Liters.

Evidence That A Second Facility Produced Anthrax In 1991.

Evidence That More Than Five Warheads Were Filled With Anthrax.6

FOOTNOTES/ REMARKS [1] DISCOVERY SADDAM‟S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE WEAPONS Iraq began an offensive biological weapon (BW) program in 1985. By 1990, this program had produced 25 missile warheads and 166 400-pound aerial bombs that were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin, or aflatoxin. Further, Iraq acknowledged production of approximately 20,000 liters of botulinum toxin solution, 8,425 liters of anthrax solution, and 2,200 liters of aflatoxin. Baghdad also admitted to having researched the weapons potential of the camelpox virus, human rotavirus, enterovirus , and the toxin ricin. IRAQ COUNTRY PROFILE HTTP://WWW.NTI.ORG/E_RESEARCH/PROFILES/IRAQ/INDEX.HTML [2] IBID 1 [3] HTTP://WWW.WHITEHOUSE.GOV/INFOCUS/IRAQ/DISARMAMENT/DISARMAMENT.PDF [4] IRAQI DROP TANKS FACTS HTTP://WWW.NTI.ORG/E_RESEARCH/PROFILES/IRAQ/BIOLOGICAL/2134_5676.HTML

10-24

[5] UNRESOLVED DISARMAMENT ISSUES IRAQ‟S PROSCRIBED WEAPONS PROGRAMMES, A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF IRAQ‟S PROSCRIBED WEAPONS PROGRAMMES, MARCH 6

th, 2003, UNMOVIC WORKING

DOCUMENT WWW.UN.ORG/DEPTS/UNMOVIC/DOCUMENTS/UNMOVIC%20UDI%20WORKING%20DOCUMENT%206%20MARCH%2003.PDF – [6] IRAQ BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROFILE HTTP://WWW.IRAQWATCH.ORG/PROFILES/BIOLOGICAL.HTML

Only In 1995 Did Iraq Declare Its Offensive Biological Weapons Program,

After Publicly Denying Its Existence For Four Years.

Only In 1997 Did Inspectors Discover Evidence Of Production Completed On

Prohibited Missiles In 1992.

Only In 1997 Did Iraq Declare An Additional 187 Pieces Of Specialty

Equipment Used To Produce Deadly Chemical Agents.

Only In 2003 When Confronted By Inspectors, Did Iraq Turn Over The "Iraqi

Air Force" Document That Contradicts Iraq's Chemical Weapons Declaration –

By Disclosing An Additional 6,500 Bombs With 1,000 Tons Of The Blistering Agent Mustard Gas.

SOURCE: DISARMING IRAQ: THE LESSONS OF UNSCOM, BY JAMES A. PHILLIPS HTTP://WWW.HERITAGE.ORG/RESEARCH/MIDDLEEAST/BG1608.CFM

10-25

Weaponization

Between the late 1980s and the start of Desert Storm in

1991, Iraq attempted to develop a range of systems for the dispersion of BW agent. In the dash to field viable BW weapons the workers in the program adapted robust bombs

capable of mounting on many types of aircraft and warheads, including the Al Husayn missile. They also worked furiously to

ready an aircraft spray system.

August 1990: Through a unilateral decision by Lt. Gen. Kamel Hassan, Iraq decides

to produce biological weapons for the Gulf War. SOURCE: IRAQI DECLARATIONS, UNSCOM, SEPTEMBER, 1997.

Bio-Warfare Crash Program 1990

August 1990: Following its invasion to Kuwait on August 2nd, Iraq launches a crash

program to speed biological weapons development. The program includes research

into virology and genetic engineering. Iraq shifts its emphasis to production and later

to weaponization of biological warfare agents. The Foot and Mouth Disease plant at

Daura is converted to biological weapons production. 1-3 FOOTNOTES/REMARKS [1] WILLIAM J. BROAD AND JUDITH MILLER, "HOW IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM CAME TO LIGHT," NEW YORK TIMES, FEBRUARY 26th, 1998. [2]UNSCOM EIGHT REPORT UNDER PARAGRAPH 8, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 715, 1991, S/1995/864, OCTOBER 11

th, 1995.

HTTP://WWW.CNS.MIIS.EDU/RESEARCH/IRAQ/EXCERPT.HTM [3] DOES IRAQ HAVE 1,000-YEAR WEAPONS? MSNBC, DATE NOT IDENTIFIED; UNSCOM EIGHT REPORT UNDER PARAGRAPH 8, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 715 (1991), S/1995/864, OCTOBER11th, 1995. HTTP://WWW.CNS.MIIS.EDU/RESEARCH/IRAQ/EXCERPT.HTM>.

1990: Iraq modifies a MIG-21 fighter plane to be a remotely piloted vehicle and

equips it with a 2200-L tank and a spray mechanism.1,2

FOOTNOTES/REMARKS [1] RAYMOND A. ZILINSKAS, "IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: THE PAST AS FUTURE?" [2] JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (JAMA), VOL. 278, NO. 5, AUGUST 6

th, 1997, P. 420.

1990: 100 Al-Hussayn Missiles (Al-Hussein) Are Shipped To The Al-Muthanna State

Establishment. Of These, 25 Fitted With Biological Warheads: 13 Filled With Botulinum Toxin, 10 With Aflatoxin, And 2 With Anthrax. All Of Them Were

Reportedly Deployed: 10 In A Deep Railway Tunnel And 15 In Holes Dug Along The Tigris River. IRAQ BIOLOGICAL CHRONOLOGY 1990-1999 HTTP://WWW.NTI.ORG/E_RESEARCH/PROFILES/IRAQ/BIOLOGICAL/3889_3893.HTML

Before the first Gulf War, Iraq prepared at least 25 Al Hussein missile warheads with chemical warfare agent for offensive use in a surprise attack mode. According to former UN inspector David Kay, the missiles were authorized to be launched if Baghdad were attacked with nuclear weapons. Iraq maintained that 80 special warheads for Al Hussein missiles were produced: 50 for chemical weapons, 25 for biological weapons, and 5 for chemical weapons trials, though its declarations changed several times. UNSCOM also received evidence of the probable existence of

a number of additional special warheads. Iraq never accounted for the 25 biological warheads or for up to 50 conventional warheads.1

10-26

Iraq, in the haste to

prepare for the

1991 conflict,

deadly weapons

systems tried and

tested with CW

agents were the

preferred choice,

the R-400 aerial

bomb and the Al

Husayn warhead,

charged with

anthrax, botulinum

toxin and aflatoxin.

Additionally,

engineers at Al

Muthanna rushed

the auxiliary fuel tank, modified

into a spray system, of the Mirage F1 aircraft

into service.2

Prior to Desert Storm, Iraq had dedicated complimentary programs to develop spray

technology that could effectively disseminate either CW or BW agents. These spray

dispersal systems were intended for use in conjunction with various developmental

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) programs, helicopter-borne spraying systems ("The

Zubaidy Device"), 122 mm rockets, LD-250 aerial bombs, and fragmentation

weapons. Initial testing began quickly and rapidly showed progress by the time of

Desert Storm 1991.3

MiG-21 RPV. A senior NMD official (The National Monitoring Directorate, UN) recently

reported on his pre-OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) research of the 1990-91 MiG-21

RPV development project and the associated Mirage F-1 CBW spray tank project, as

well as the later L-29 RPV project. The purpose of the research was to prepare the

NMD to respond to urgent requirements from UNMOVIC. The NMD official said his

investigation confirmed that the MiG-21 RPV had been intended for a mission to

deliver CBW agents and that the Mirage F-1 project was a related effort to develop

an aircraft-mounted CBW spray tank. While the MiG-21 RPV effort failed, the Mirage

F-1 spray tank development, on the other hand, was considered successful. While

varying in some minor details concerning the timing of some test events, this NMD

official essentially corroborates the UNSCOM report.4

Iraq also admitted that it deployed germ weapons between January and July 1991,

but the numbers and location of weapons deployed remain uncertain due to

inconsistent Iraqi accounts. Because Iraq falsely stated that the BW program was

obliterated in July 1991, observers of Iraq believed Iraq never gave a credible

account of the program. It remained the least understood part of Iraq's WMD effort

in the run up to the second Gulf War.5

Iraq acknowledged conducting 14 open-air tests of biological weapons from January

1991 to March 1998. At the same time, Baghdad provided no persuasive evidence

that it had unilaterally destroyed its biological agents and munitions, as it claimed to

have done.6

10-27

FOOTNOTES/REMARKS [1]IRAQ, MISSILE PROFILE HTTP://WWW.IRAQWATCH.ORG/PROFILES/MISSILE.HTML [2] PROFILE OF A PROLIFERATOR: IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM FEBRUARY 2, 2001 ROD BARTON, FORMER PRINCIPAL BIOLOGICAL INSPECTOR WITH UNSCOM AND FORMER DIRECTOR OF PROLIFERATION STUDIES, AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HTTP://WWW.CNS.MIIS.EDU/PUBS/DC/BRIEFS/020201.HTM [3] IBID 2 [4] IRAQ SURVEY GROUP FINAL REPORT, CONGRESS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. STATEMENT BY DAVID KAY ON THE INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP. The Iraq survey group (ISG) was a fact-finding mission sent by the multinational force in Iraq after the 2003 invasion of Iraq to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs developed by Iraq under the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Its final report is commonly called the Duelfer report. It consisted of a 1,400-member international team organized by the pentagon and CIA to hunt for suspected stockpiles of WMD, such as chemical and biological agents, and any supporting research programs and infrastructure that could be used to develop WMD. HTTP://WWW.MISSILETHREAT.COM/REPORTS/PAGEID.1735/DEFAULT.ASP [5]HOW IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM CAME TO LIGHT BY WILLIAM J. BROAD AND JUDITH MILLER THE NEW YORK TIMES FEBRUARY 26, 1998 HTTP://WWW.LIBRARY.CORNELL.EDU/COLLDEV/MIDEAST/IRAQBIO.HTM [6] WMD: THE DEADLIEST THREAT OF ALL HTTP://USINFO.STATE.GOV/PRODUCTS/PUBS/IRAQ/THREAT.HTM

Document 6: CIA, Iraqi BW Mission Planning, 1992; Secret Declassified

Desert Storm Documents. Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released

under the Freedom of Information Act

This information report states that in the fall of 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered that

plans be drawn up for the airborne delivery of an unspecified biological agent. The

probable target was Israel. The plan envisioned a conventional air raid employing

three MiG-21s, to be followed by another raid involving three MiGs and a SU-22

aircraft that would disperse the biological agent. The first mission was shot down

over the Persian Gulf and "no efforts were made to find another method to deliver

the BW agent." FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] HTTP://WWW.GWU.EDU/~NSARCHIV/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ [2] HTTP://WWW.GWU.EDU/~NSARCHIV/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/WMD06.PDF

File: 062596 CIA 74624 74624 01.txt Subject: Iraq‘s BW Mission Planning / Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT WHICH IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT IN ORIGINAL FORMAT IS AVAILABLE BY

REQUEST.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE DIST: 1992 COUNTRY: IRAQ SUB: IRAQI BW MISSION PLANNING SUMMARY: IN THE FALL OF 1990, IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN ORDERED THAT PLANS BE DRAWN UP FOR THE AIRBORNE DELIVERY OF A BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) AGENT THE PLAN CALLED FOR THREE MIG-21‘S CARRYING ONLY CONVENTIONAL HIGH

EXPLOSIVE ORDINANCE TO STAGE AN AIR RAID. IF THIS MISSION WAS SUCCESSFUL, THEN A SECOND MISSION DF THREE MIG-21‘S WAS TO BE FLOWN WITH AN SU-22 BW DISPERSAL AIRCRAFT FOLLOWING THEM AT A SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER ALTITUDE. THE FIRST MISSION WAS SHOT DOWN OVER THE PERSIAN GULF, HOWEVER AND NO EFFORTS WERE MADE TO FIND ANOTHER METHOD OF DELIVER THE BW AGENT2. THE PLAN CALLED FOR A TEST MISSION OF THREE MIG-21‘S TO CONDUCT AN AIR RAID USING CONVENTIONAL HIGH EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE. IF THESE AIRCRAFTS WERE TO PENETRATE AIR DEFENSES AND

SUCCESSFULLY BOMB THEN A SECOND MISSION WAS TO TAKE OFF WITHIN A FEW DAYS OF THE FIRST, USING THE SAME FLIGHT PATH AND APPROACHES. THE SECOND MISSION, ALSO

COMPOSED OF THREE MIG-21‘S CARRYING CONVENTIONAL ORDINANCE, WAS TO SERVE AS A DECOY FOR A SINGLE SU-22 AIRCRAFT FOLLOWING THE SAME ROUTE BUT FLYING BETWEEN 50 AND 100 METERS ALTITUDE; OPTIMAL DELIVERY ALTITUDE FOR BW AGENT

10-28

WAS JUDGED AT 50 METERS AT THE SPEED OF 700 KILOMETERS AN HOUR. WHILE WIND AND WEATHER CONDITIONS WOULD BE CRITICAL TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A BW MISSION, FOR SECURITY MISSION, FOR SECURITY REASONS THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO INVOLVE AIR FORCE METEOROLOGISTS IN MISSION PLANNING. SHORTLY AFTER

HOSTILITIES BEGAN THE THREE –MIG TEST MISSION TOOK OFF FROM TALLIL AIRFIELD, NEAR AN NANASARIYAH. ALL THREE AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN EARLY IN THE MISSION. AND AS A RESULT, PLANS TO LAUNCH THE SU-22 ARMED WITH A BIOLOGICAL AGENT AND FLYING UNDER COVER OF A SECOND, DECOY MISSION WERE CANCELLED. END OF MESSAGE SOURCE-LINKS [1] HTTP://WWW.GULFLINK.OSD.MIL/DECLASSDOCS/CIA/ [2] 19960626/062596_CIA_74624_74624_01.HTML

Tallil Airfield Iraq, Desert Storm

Tallil Airbase, Sector Operations Center Intercept Operations Center

Tallil Airbase is located approximately 310 kilometers Southeast of Baghdad and 20

kilometers southwest of the city of An Nasiriyah. The airfield is served by two main

runways measuring 12,000 and 9,700 feet. Sited on sandy desert, the base is

capable of supporting at least two fighter squadrons with support units. According to

the "Gulf War Air Power Survey", Tallil had 36 hardened aircraft shelters. At the each

end of the main runway are hardened aircraft shelters known as "trapezoids" or

"Yugos" which were built by Yugoslavian contractors some time prior to 1985. Tallil

occupies 30 square kilometers and is protected by 22 kilometers of security

perimeter. SOURCE: HTTP://WWW.GLOBALSECURITY.ORG/MILITARY/WORLD/IRAQ/TALLIL.HTM

Air Base Target Sets, Desert Storm The coalition targeted bases according to their importance to the Iraqi air base

network, their location, the type of aircraft they housed, and the presence of weapons of mass destruction. Planners dropped many of Iraq's 66 air bases from ATOs because attacking them would not help accomplish the campaign's strategic goals.

During the process of determining the amount of effort to expend on a particular air

base, planners paid strict attention to the base's geographic location. They targeted Tallil, Jalibah Southeast, and other air bases because they were only a short flight from the Kuwaiti theater of operations. Air bases used to defend Baghdad's air defense sector and avenues of approach, especially bases that housed advanced aircraft such as the MiG-29, were attacked early in the campaign. Bases north of Baghdad opposite Turkey or Iran were a lower priority.

Iraq's deployment bases situated along the Saudi border (e.g., As Salman North and

Wadi Al Khirr New) were targeted because of their importance to Iraq's total air base network, as well as their geographic location. In peacetime these bases were used infrequently since most of Iraq's aircraft were stationed at interior airfields. However, Iraq's combat aircraft generally lacked sufficient range to attack Saudi targets from peacetime locations. Damaging these deployment bases would reduce Iraq's ability to mount counterstrikes and would force Iraqi aircraft to remain at their MOBs. In short,

attacking the dispersal airfields would decrease the Iraqi air threat and increase the value of attacks on the MOBs.

Chemical and biological weapons were among the greatest threats facing coalition forces. The coalition intended to smash Saddam Hussein's chemical warfare (CW) capability with swift, massive attacks upon production centers (Samarra and other

major sites), storage locations (munitions depots), delivery means (artillery, ballistic

missiles, and strategic aircraft), and C2 nodes. These goals mandated that CW storage sites at or near airfields be attacked as part of the anti-air base campaign. Additionally, planners targeted air bases in western Iraq that housed air-delivered

10-29

chemical weapons or Scud missiles aimed at Israel. Finally, air bases with long-range aircraft (the Mirage F-1 and Su-24 Fencer) capable of delivering these deadly weapons deep into coalition territory were high-priority targets.1,2

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] PUBLISHED AIRPOWER JOURNAL - WINTER 1992 DISTRIBUTION A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED. IGNORANCE IS RISK THE BIG LESSON FROM DESERT STORM AIR BASE ATTACKS, CHRISTOPHER M. CENTNER. HTTP://WWW.AIRPOWER.MAXWELL.AF.MIL/AIRCHRONICLES/APJ/CENTNER.HTML

Top Ten Stealth Targets Desert Storm

18. The ten top stealth targets include the Samarra chemical weapons plant (149

missions), Salman Pak biological and chemical weapons development facility (72

missions), Ubaydah bin Al Jarrah airfield in Kut (72 missions), Balad airfield (60

missions),Tallil airfield (57 missions), Tuwaitha nuclear research center (56

missions), Ba'ath party headquar ters (55 missions), Al Asad airfield (48 missions),

H2 airfield (47 missions), and Qayyarah airfield (39 missions)

SOURCE: BAGHDAD THE URBAN SANCTUARY IN DESERT STORM? WILLIAM M. ARKIN DISTRIBUTION A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED. AIRPOWER JOURNAL - SPRING 1997.

HTTP://WWW.AIRPOWER.MAXWELL.AF.MIL/AIRCHRONICLES/APJ/APJ97/SPR97/ARKIN.PDF.

Another Desert Storm Historical Account

Title: F-117A: Desert Storm Missions

Following its deployment to Saudi Arabia, the deployed

stealth wing was designated the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing

Provisional-37th TFW(P). The following day-by-day

chronology of the 37th TFW(P)'s missions during DESERT

STORM was compiled by the wing's historian.

While reading this chronology, one must keep in mind the

unique mission of the world's only operational stealth unit-

to attack high value targets in a dense threat environment

during the dark of night. Therefore, some combat missions

were completed during the late evening hours of one day

while other missions were tasked in the early morning hours of the following day-two

separate days in terms of calendar days, but within one shroud of darkness. As an

example, on Day (Night) 3 of the air campaign, two waves of stealth fighters

attacked their assigned targets, the first wave just after dark and prior to midnight

on January 18th, the second wave after midnight on January 19th. Both waves were

conducted under one shroud of darkness, but actually on two different dates when

considering calendar days. Unless otherwise noted, all time references are to local

time in area of operation.

January 24th, 1991

Night 8, Wave Two The 416th TFS Launched 14 Sorties Against Bridges,

Communication Centers, and An Airfield, Scoring 11 Direct Hits.

Night 9, Wave One

CENTAF (Headquarters Central Air Command Air Forces) tasked the 37th TFW(P) to

resume flying three waves of F-117As against military targets. For the first wave, the

416th TFS sent 14 aircraft against airfields at Qayyarah West, Al Assad, and Kirkuk.

One aircraft aborted after takeoff (returning safely to base). The remaining 13 jets

scored 20 hits. [The 416th TFS was refragged at the last minute to attack Al-

Taqqaddum Air Base. Here F-117As destroyed 3 of 8 "Badger" bombers sitting on

10-30

the runway. Intelligence reports indicated that these aircraft were loaded with chemical weapons for use on Allied ground troops. The bombers were full of fuel when attacked. The next day a conventional strike destroyed the remaining

bombers.] [This was the first night that CENTAF allowed tankers into Iraqi airspace.

This allowed the F-117As to attack farther north. One F-117A returned to base

because of lack of tanker support at the beginning of Night 9]

February 1st, 1991

Night 17, Wave Two

The second wave concentrated on communications installations and military

headquarters buildings, as well as airfields at Ahmed Al Jaber and Tallil Air Base . Six

415th TFS and seven 416th TFS aircraft joined in the attacks, scoring 20 hits.

February 2nd, 1991

Night 17, Wave Three

Five F-117As (three 415th TFS and two 416th TFS) attacked Tallil Air Base and

ammunition storage facilities, scoring five hits. SOURCE: TITLE: F-117A: DESERT STORM MISSIONS HTTP://WWW.F-117A.COM/MISSIONS.HTML

Desert Storm January 17th - February 28th, 1991: The Gulf War effectively began when an F-117A bombed an air-defense control center in Baghdad. A USAF after-action report found that Iraqi forces could not detect the F-117A approaching and often would not start shooting until the bombs exploded. During operation Desert Storm, the F-117A enabled it to fly 1.271 combat sorties in 42 days without losses. Although only 36 stealth fighters were deployed in Desert Storm and accounted for 2.5

percent of the total force of 1,900 fighters and bombers, they flew more than a third of the

bombing runs on the first day of the war. In all during Desert Storm, the stealth fighter conducted 1.271 sorties, dropped more than 2,000 tons of bombs, and flew more than 6,900 hours. F-117 fighters deployed to the Gulf several times during the late 1990's to support U.S. attacks against Iraq designed to deprive Saddam Hussein of his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs and to force his compliance with the UN monitoring regime. F-117 fighters deployed to the Gulf during Operation Desert Fox SOURCE: F-117A NIGHTHAWK HTTP://WWW.FAS.ORG/MAN/DOD-101/SYS/AC/F-117.HTM

Of course, the reader at this point would conclude, there must be more on the

subject matter, further documentation, even with my limited presentation concerning

Saddam Hussein‘s military possible military use, deployment of chemical and

biological weapons during Gulf War I, well.. No, or more correctly, ―there was, and

these documentation records were lost,‖! Just some 75 percent of the material.

Granted much of the material was concerned with the destruction of Saddam‘s

chemical arsenal bunkers, which were either blown up by US ground troops, and or

bombed from the air, and the corresponding fall out from the chemical warfare

agents being released into the open air and exposure value to troops nearby, or

subjected by fall out being carried by winds.

Congressional Hearings Concerning Lost Military Incident Logs, Concerning

Possible Biological and Chemical Warfare Agent Incidents Desert Storm

On March 3rd, 1997, the then Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that the

Inspector General (IG), Department of Defense (DoD), assumed responsibility for an

investigation begun in January 1997 by the Office of the Special Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI) to locate missing U.S. Central

Command (CENTCOM) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) desk logs maintained

10-31

in the Joint Operations Center (JOC), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during the Persian Gulf

War. Specifically, the Deputy Secretary asked that we follow all leads that could be

developed on the location of the original logs or copies in electronic or hard copy

versions; gather all originals and copies that could be located; and, if a full copy of

the logs could not be located, explain why.1

The disappearance of the chemical logs at the time was especially suspicious in light

of the fact that in 1994, the Pentagon's general counsel mistakenly told the Senate

Banking Committee that no such records existed at all. James J. Tuite III, then an

investigator with the committee, says now that he believes "There Was A Conspiracy

To Destroy Documents Related To The Gulf War -- There's No Other Way To Put It." 2

The NBC desk logs were created and maintained by U.S. Army Chemical Corps

officers assigned to the NBC watch desk in the JOC during the period of about August

1990 to March 1991. The logs were maintained in the "normal course of business,"

first in handwritten form, then in computer disk form. They were prepared on

Department of the Army (DA) Form 1594, Daily Staff Journal, or in a similar format,

and they were classified Secret. The purpose of these logs was to provide a

chronological record of any NBC-related key events that occurred each day and to

serve as memory aids for the six NBC officers.3

Although it is not known with certainty how many log pages were generated, it has

been estimated that approximately 180 to 210 pages of logs may have been created

by the NBC desk officers during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Only, 37 pages of logs

are known to exist, all of which are in hard copy form, and are copies of the original

documents. These 37 pages cover only 26 nonconsecutive days during the period of

January 17th through March 12th, 1991. They were assembled from pages that were

in the custody of CENTCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(OSD(PA)), Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Office prior to the investigation.4

1997

Commenting on the vanished chemical logs, Senator Arlen Specter, then chairman of

the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, said the loss of such records is "Just

Incomprehensible -- The Department Of Defense Is Entitled To The Benefit Of The Doubt For A Reasonable Time, But It's Past Its Quota."5

Senator Jay Rockefeller IV, then ranking Democrat on the committee, said that with

the new revelations over what the Pentagon knew and when it knew it, ―there is

evidence of "a cover-up of major proportions." Rockefeller charged that "military

commanders and high Pentagon officials failed our troops and the American public"

by not coming clean on the chemical exposure issue.6

Veterans groups shared that view. Paul Sullivan, then director of the National Gulf

War Resource Center, remarked that "the Pentagon has botched not only the

handling of the records but also the investigation of the handling of the records."

Matt Puglisi, who then directed the Gulf War-related programs for the American

Legion, said that though the loss may be attributable to a bureaucratic foul-up, "there's certainly the appearance of a cover-up, and that needs to be investigated aggressively."7

Most of the records of poison gas detections by U.S. troops during the Persian Gulf

war were lost or partly destroyed by a computer virus that escaped from a game disk

being played at Desert Storm headquarters, the Pentagon reported. According to

10-32

then Army Maj. Patrick Fogleson, computer memories were erased because of an

electronic infection. "Maj. Fogleson said it was called the Jerusalem virus and it was

introduced by one of the liaison officers who brought it into the Joint Operations

Center on a disk with games on it," the Pentagon report said.8

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] DEFENSELINK PRESS ADVISORY: OSAGWI NARRATIVE BRIEF OSAGWI NARRATIVE BRIEF. BERNARD ROSTKER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR GULF WAR ILLNESSES, WILL PRESENT THE NEXT IN A SERIES OF PUBLIC RELEASES OF INVESTIGATIONS WWW.DEFENSELINK.MIL/ADVISORIES/ADVISORY.ASPX?ADVISORYID [2] GULF WAR CHEMICAL INCIDENT LOGS MISSING, BY JON ELLISTON, DOSSIER 1997 PARASCOPE, INC. HTTP://WWW.WEALTH4FREEDOM.COM/WNS/1/LOGS.HTM [3] IBID 1 [4} IBID 1 [5] SARIN RECORDS `LOST' PENTAGON BLAMES COMPUTER VIRUS FEBRUARY 28, 1997, NEW YORK NEWSDAY BY PATRICK J. SLOYAN WASHINGTON BUREAU [6] IBID 2 [7] IBID 2 [8] OSAGWI SEEKING COALITION HELP ON GULF WAR ILLNESSES INVESTIGATIONS. WASHINGTON, AUGUST 27, 1997 (GULFLINK) -- BERNARD ROSTKER, THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT WWW.GULFLINK.OSD.MIL/NEWS/NA_COALITION_082797.HTM

It is also important to note that in 1997, Dr.

Jonathan B. Tucker of the Monterey Institute of

International Studies, created a historical log

concerning Saddam‘s possible use of chemical

warfare agents in Desert Storm. This incredible

painstaking documentation has been largely

forgotten and even ignored. Dr. Jonathan B. Tucker

directed the Chemical and Biological Weapons

Nonproliferation Project at the Center for

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Prior to this

appointment, he worked at the U.S. Department of State, the Congressional Office of

Technology Assessment, the Chemical and Biological Policy Division of the U.S. Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency, and on the staff of the Presidential Advisory

Committee on Gulf War Veterans‘ Illnesses. He also served as a biological weapons

inspector in Iraq with the United Nations Special Commission.

Nevertheless, circumstantial evidence from a variety of sources suggests that Iraq

deployed chemical weapons into the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) the area including Kuwait and Iraq south of the 31st Parallel, where the ground war was

fought—and engaged in sporadic chemical warfare against Coalition forces. The

London Sunday Times reported during the war that intercepts of Iraqi military communications indicated that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had authorized front-

line commanders to use chemical weapons at their discretion as soon as Coalition Forces began their ground offensive. For example, a British signals officer who had been monitoring the Iraqi command net ―heard them give the release order to the front-line troops to use chemical weapons against Rhino (Coalition) force if it

crossed the border.‖ Other sources of evidence for sporadic Iraqi chemical warfare include U.S. Intelligence

reports on the presence of Iraqi chemical weapons in the KTO; military log entries describing the discovery by U.S. units of chemical munitions in Iraqi bunkers during and after the ground war; incidents in which troops reported acute symptoms of toxic

chemical exposure; and credible detections of chemical-warfare agents by Czech, French, and American forces. Most of these incidents are described in declassified intelligence reports, operations logs, and command chronologies obtained under the Freedom of Information Act

10-33

SOURCE : EVIDENCE IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING 1991 PERSIAN GULF WAR MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES SPRING/SUMMER 1997 VOL.4 NUMBER 3 JONATHAN B. TUCKER HTTP://WWW.CNS.MIIS.EDU/PUBS/NPR/VOL04/43/TUCKER43.PDF.

Again I am limited on the amount of material I can present; several volumes of

documentation can be presented on this subject. In my book, The Iraqi Threat and

Saddam Hussein’s WMD, I cover Saddam‘s military deployment of his chemical

arsenal in Iraq and KTO extensively during Desert Storm. I also use declassified

Desert Storm records. However, because of the paramount importance of Dr.

Jonathan B. Tucker research report, I have provided the entire report, in appendix.

During my travels in Israel, I have had the opportunity to talk to men, much more

knowledgeable on this subject, than I could ever hope to be. From a map of Desert

Storm created at US West Point Military Academy, showing Saddam‘s deployment of

his military forces during Gulf War I, and the attacking Coalition Forces, one so

glaring fact stands out so bluntly, it is missed. One of the main reasons Saddam‘s

ground forces could not fully launch a strike with chemical and biological weapons

during Desert Storm against Coalition Forces, is that the Iraqi Military was being

attacked not only in its frontal areas, but mainly from the rear. As pointed out to me,

Saddam‘s military would have had to retreat through these areas, where the

Coalition Forces were, had they been struck with chemical or biological warfare

agent(s), it would have been suicidal. See final footnotes, pages 101 -103 final

footnotes of this chapter 10.

VX Nerve Agent, The Most Deadly Chemical Warfare Substance

Known To Humankind

What Is VX? VX Is A Human-Made Chemical Warfare Agent Classified As A Nerve Agent. Nerve

Agents Are The Most Toxic And Rapidly Acting Of The Known Chemical Warfare Agents. They Are Similar To Pesticides (Insect Killers) Called Organophosphates In Terms Of How They Work And What Kinds Of Harmful Effects They Cause. However, Nerve Agents Are Much More Potent Than Organophosphate Pesticides.

VX Is Odorless And Tasteless.

VX Is An Oily Liquid That Is Amber In Color And Very Slow To Evaporate. It Evaporates About As Slowly As Motor Oil.

With its high viscosity and low volatility, VX has the texture and feel of high-grade

motor oil. This makes it especially dangerous, as it has a high persistence in the

environment. It is odorless and tasteless, and can be distributed as a liquid or,

through evaporation, into small amounts of vapor. It works as a nerve agent by

blocking the function of the enzyme acetylcholinesterase. Normally, an electric nerve

pulse would cause the release of acetylcholine over a synapse that would stimulate

muscle contraction. The acetylcholine is then broken down to non-reactive

substances (acetic acid and choline) by the acetylcholinesterase enzyme. If more

muscle tension is needed, the nerve must release more acetylcholine. VX blocks the

action of acetylcholinesterase, thus resulting in sustained contractions of all the

muscles in the body. Sustained contraction of the diaphragm muscle causes death by

asphyxiation; as little as 200 micrograms is enough to kill an average person. SOURCE: NERVE AGENTS VX CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL HTTP://WWW.BT.CDC.GOV/AGENT/VX/BASICS/FACTS.ASP

10-34

UNSCOM, Iraqi VX Scud

Missile Warhead Photo

An Iraqi engineer and

technician look on, as an

UNSCOM team member

inspects an Iraqi-produced

chemical warhead; the

warhead was designed to be

launched by an Al-Hussein

ballistic missile. Warhead

canisters may be seen on the

left side of the picture and in

the background. Iraq claims

to have produced 75 so-called

"special warheads" (those

capable of carrying chemical

or biological agents) in 1990;

UNSCOM doubts the validity of

this number. Agent fill

included sarin, a binary

chemical agent, anthrax,

botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin. UNSCOM supervised destruction of thirty chemical

warheads; the Iraqis claim that the remaining "special warheads" were unilaterally

destroyed. An UNSCOM team was sent to Baghdad in February 1998, specifically to

address remaining questions surrounding Iraq's design, production, and accounting

of these warheads.

Iraq undertook large-scale efforts to produce VX. These efforts comprised R&D

activities, procurement, production of precursors, modification of a production

facility, production of VX, and weaponization delivery systems from aerial bombs,

Scud missiles and artillery shells.

The verification of Iraq's VX-related activities is complicated due to the unilateral

destruction of all traces of such activities, including remaining VX and its precursors,

carried out secretly by Iraq·

The existence of large-scale VX activities was only acknowledged by Iraq only in

1995, when UNSCOM confronted Iraq with evidence of such activities.

Declared R&D Activities in 1985-1990, Were Verified By UNSCOM Only

Up To 1988

Declared Procurement In 1987-1988 Was Verified, However, Evidence Of Undeclared Procurement Was Found By UNSCOM

Verification Of Production Of VX Precursors Revealed Significant Discrepancies

Between Iraq's Declarations And Information Available From Iraq's Documents

Found By UNSCOM: Production Of Precursors Was Continued In 1989 When Production Of VX, According To Iraq, Had Already Been Stopped.

10-35

More importantly, the reader should note the Iraqi unaccounted time periods for VX production, was during Gulf war I Period, 1990 onward, much of this information remains unknown.

1998 VX UNSCOM Distr. General S/1998/... October 1998

Report of the Executive Chairman on the activities of the Special

Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9

(b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

* Declared Production Of VX Could Be Verified Only For The Period 1987-1988, But

Not In 1990 * Weaponization Of VX Could Not Be Verified Main Outstanding Issues

On VX Remain In The Areas, Where Iraq Did Not Provide Documents And Verifiable

Evidence To Support Its Declarations

In Particular, Iraq's Declarations On The Production Of VX In 1990, Weaponization And Disposition Of VX Are Not Supported By Documents Or Other Evidence Which

Could Be Verified By UNSCOM.

The Following Concerns Were Outlined In Conclusion Of The International Expert Team

To The Technical Evaluation Meeting On VX In February 1998 · Iraq Had Precursors Sufficient For The Production Of 200 Tons Of VX, Which Is Incongruent With Declared Quantity Of Produced VX--3.9 Tons · At The R&D Level, Iraq Obtained Sophisticated

Technology For The Production Of VX. This Is Incompatible With Iraq's Statement

That The Industrial Production Of VX Had Failed

In Contrast To Poor Stability Of VX As Declared By Iraq, UNSCOM, Through Its

Sampling Activities, Found Traces Of A VX Stabilizer· These Facts, In Combination With Iraq's Attempts To Conceal The VX-Related Activities Until 1995, Lead The

International Expert Team To The Technical Evaluation Meeting To The Conclusion That Iraq Was Able To Produce VX In Quantity And Had Obtained The VX Production Technology...

1. UN Document: Iraq's declarations and supporting documents include a specific

distribution, by their type and warfare agent filling, of the 45 special warheads unilaterally destroyed in July 1991. According to Iraq's declarations, 20 of them were chemical weapons and contained only the alcohol component of the CW binary system. Analysis at the laboratories designated by the Commission has detected the presence

of degradation products of nerve agents, in particular VX, on a number of warhead remnants which were excavated. A meeting of international experts, including representatives of the three laboratories, which was held on October 22nd-23rd, 1998, concluded that "the existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq's declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been filled with any chemical warfare agents. The findings by all three laboratories of chemicals known to be degradation products of decontamination compounds also do not support

Iraq's declarations that those warhead containers had only been in contact with alcohols." Clarification by Iraq of these issues as recommended by the meeting would allow the Commission to make a determination whether or not the current assessment of the quantity of special warheads identified amongst the remnants excavated, accounts for all special warheads declared to have been produced by Iraq and provides for the verification of their unilateral destruction.

10-36

UNSCOM undertook to verify Iraq's declarations on the filling of 45 Special Missile

Warheads through the analysis of samples taken from their remnants. These

warheads had been destroyed unilaterally by Iraq through demolition and buried in

the desert. Of these 45 warheads, according to Iraq, 25 had been filled with

biological warfare agents and 20 with a mixture of alcohols (isopropanol and

cyclohexanol). The purpose of chemical analysis was to verify Iraq's statement on

the 20 special warheads filled with alcohols. The same US laboratory found VX

degradation products in some of the samples from 46 fragments of the 45 special

warheads. The chemicals found on the missile warhead remnants were similar to

those found at the VX dump site declared by Iraq. The laboratory reported these

results to the Commission in June 1998.

SEE ALSO [1] UNSCOM'S REPORT ON IRAQI VX WARHEADS OCTOBER 1998. HTTP://CNS.MIIS.EDU/RESEARCH/IRAQ/VXINDEX.HTM S/1998/278 OF 27/03/98 REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN'S MARCH '98 BAGHDAD DISTR. GENERAL. S/1998/278. 27 MARCH 1998. ORIGINAL: ENGLISH ... HE REFERRED TO THE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED AT THE BEGINNING OF MARCH 1998, IN WHICH AN UNSCOM ... WWW.FAS.ORG/NEWS/UN/IRAQ/S/S98-278.HTM [2] UNSCOM-IRAQ EXCHANGE ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS RETURN TO UNSCOM'S REPORT ON IRAQI VX WARHEADS. ... UNITED NATIONS. DISTR. GENERAL. S/1998/1106 20 NOVEMBER 1998. ORIGINAL: ENGLISH ... WWW.CNS.MIIS.EDU/RESEARCH/IRAQ/BIOWEAP.HTM [3] UNSCOM - REPORT OF THE VX EXPERT MEETING - OCTOBER 23

rd, 1998

OVER THE PERIOD OCTOBER 22nd

-23rd, 1998, THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION (UNSCOM) HELD,

IN NEW YORK, A MEETING OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS ON THE ISSUE OF VX. ... WWW.FAS.ORG/NEWS/UN/IRAQ/S/981026VX/VX_REPOR.HTM [4] TESTS SHOW NERVE GAS IN IRAQI WEAPONS, BY JIM HOAGLAND AND VERNON LOEB, WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERVICE TUESDAY, JUNE 23

rd, 1998; PAGE A01.

[5] REPORT OF THE VX EXPERT MEETING HTTP://CNS.MIIS.EDU/RESEARCH/IRAQ/VXREPRT.HTM

As a result of the evaluation of analytical data, reported to the Special Commission

by three laboratories, UNSCOM pressed Iraqi officials to explain first the origin and

history of the fragments analyzed by all three laboratories and then the presence of

degradation products of nerve agents. It was also emphasized, that Iraq would be

invited to explain the presence of a compound known as VX stabilizer and its

degradation product, and to provide more information on the Iraqi efforts during the

period mid-1988 to the end of 1990 to develop and produce VX by improved

synthetic routes.1

In July 1998, the UN Commission sent an international expert team to Baghdad to

discuss the initial results of the chemical analyses which had been conducted in the

laboratory in the United States and which had identified VX degradation products in

the samples taken from special warhead remnants. At that time, the international

experts judged the results as valid but the Iraqi side stated that it could not accept

the results.2

The UN panel of experts dismissed these contentions and demanded that Iraq

account for the large quantities of chemical warfare agents imported in the 1980s

and for 500 missing warheads.3

UN Mr. Butler, in Baghdad, let Iraq know that the laboratory examinations had

shown the presence of VX. For the seven years of the U.N. hunt for Iraqi chemical,

biological and nuclear weapons, Iraq swore it had never had any VX or planned for

any.4

Saddam Hussein simply responded by forcing all UN Inspectors out of Iraq.

10-37

October 31st, 1998: Iraq announces that it will cease all forms of interaction with

UNSCOM and its Chairman and to halt all UNSCOM‘s activities inside Iraq, including

monitoring. The Security Council, in a statement to the press, unanimously

condemns Iraq‘s decision to cease all cooperation with UNSCOM4.

But the reader should keep in mind that UN Inspectors had to fight every inch of the

way to conduct inspections in Iraq. Many times they were blocked from entering an

area, as they watched helplessly as material was removed. Saddam had his security

apparatus block UNSCOM Iraqi over flights, to investigative points, cause car wrecks

into UN Vehicles, even forcefully remove material from the hands of the Un

Inspectors. UN Inspectors were no less threaten with serious body injury even death,

on a regular basis while attempting to uncover Saddam‘s deadly arsenals of WMD.5,6

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS

[1] UNSCOM - REPORT OF THE VX EXPERT MEETING - OCTOBER 23rd, 1998.

OVER THE PERIOD OCTOBER 22nd

-23rd 1998, THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION (UNSCOM) HELD, IN

NEW YORK, A MEETING OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS ON THE ISSUE OF VX. ... WWW.FAS.ORG/NEWS/UN/IRAQ/S/981026VX/VX_REPOR.HTM [2] TESTS SHOW NERVE GAS IN IRAQI WEAPONS, BY JIM HOAGLAND AND VERNON LOEB, WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERVICE TUESDAY, JUNE 23

rd, 1998; PAGE A01.

[3] IBID 1 [4] IBID 2 [5] UNSCOM: CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN EVENTS HTTP://WWW.UN.ORG/DEPTS/UNSCOM/CHRONOLOGY/CHRONOLOGYFRAME.HTM [6] ON MY MIND THE WEAPON CALLED VX, BY A. M. ROSENTHAL, PUBLISHED: JULY 10

th, 1998,

NEWYORKTIMES.

Examples of Known Iraqi Use of CW: These are selected uses only. Numerous other smaller scale CW

attacks occurred. The war with Iran ended in August 1988. By this time, seven UN specialist missions had documented repeated use of chemicals in the war. According to Iraq, it consumed almost 19,500 chemical bombs, over 54,000 chemical artillery shells and 27,000 short-range chemical rockets between 1983 and 1988. Iraq declared it consumed about 1,800 tons of mustard gas, 140 tons of Tabun, and over 600 tons of Sarin. Almost two-thirds of the CW weapons were used in the last 18 months of the war. Examples of CW use by Iraq: WW.CIA.GOV/CIA/REPORTS/IRAQ_WMD_2004/CHAP5.HTML#SECT1

Use in Iran-Iraq war, 1983-1988

August 1983 Haij Umran Mustard , fewer than 100 Iranian/Kurdish casualties

October-November 1983 Panjwin Mustard, 3,000 Iranian/Kurdish casualties

February-March 1984 Majnoon Island Mustard, 2,500 Iranian casualties

March 1984 al-Basrah Tabun, 50-100 Iranian casualties

March 1985 Hawizah Marsh Mustard & Tabun, 3,000 Iranian casualties

February 1986 al-Faw Mustard & Tabun, 8,000 to 10,000 Iranian casualties

December 1986 Um ar-Rasas Mustard, 1,000s Iranian casualties

April 1987 al-Basrah Mustard & Tabun, 5,000 Iranian casualties

October 1987 Sumar/Mehran Mustard & nerve agent, 3,000 Iranian casualties

March 1988 Halabjah& Kurdish area Mustard & nerve agent, 1,000s Kurdish/Iranian casualties

April 1988 al-Faw Mustard & nerve agent, 1,000s Iranian casualties

May 1988 Fish Lake Mustard & nerve agent, 100s or 1,000s Iranian casualties

June 1988 Majnoon Islands Mustard & nerve agent, 100s or 1,000s Iranian casualties

July 1988 South-central border Mustard & nerve agent, 100s or 1,000s Iranian casualties

Use in Southern Iraq against the Popular Uprising, 1991

March 1991, an-Najaf - Karbala area Nerve agent & CS, Shi‟a casualties not known.

10-38

2004: Although ISG Could Not Find Evidence Of Any Direct Work On BW

Agents, ISG Did Uncover Reports Of Secret Laboratories Run By The Iraqi

Intelligence Services (IIS).

IIS had been involved in Iraq's BW program from its inception in the 1970s, both providing protection and conducting research, so such a revelation would be in keeping with IIS's historical relationship with Iraq's BW program. There was information that suggested that up to 5 IIS laboratories operated in the greater

Baghdad area at various times up until Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Some of the laboratories possessed equipment capable of supporting research into BW agents for military purposes, but ISG does not know whether this occurred, although there is no evidence of it. The laboratories were probably the successors of the Al Salman facility, located three kilometers south of Salman Pak, which was destroyed in 1991, and they carried on many of the same activities, including forensic work. Although unconfirmed

by ISG, reports from former IIS officials—a former IIS chemist and his former

supervisor, the late Dr. Al Azmirli, stated that IIS was involved in the research and limited production of ricin for the development of a BW weapon. Reports also indicated that human experiments had been part of the IIS program. ISG estimated that IIS's interest was almost certainly based on its limited developed use as an assassination weapon.

SOURCE: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, IRAQ SURVEY GROUP FINDINGS GLOBALSECURITY.ORG/WMD/WORLD/IRAQ/BW-ISG.HTM

No Nukes? Enter Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is a Pakistani Scientist and Metallurgical Engineer widely

regarded as the founder of Pakistan's nuclear program. (His middle name is also,

occasionally, rendered as Quadeer, Qadir or Gadeer and his given names are often

abbreviated to A.Q.). In January 2004, he confessed to having been involved in a

clandestine international network of nuclear weapons technology proliferation from

Pakistan to Libya, Iran and North Korea. On February 5th, 2004, the President of

Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, announced that he had pardoned Dr. Abdul

Qadeer Khan. Despite this political scandal, he is still regarded as the Hero of the

Nation by virtually all Pakistanis.He is currently residing in Pakistan.1

―Iraq had been developing a nuclear weapons program in the late 1970’s, until the Israelis bombed the Osirak reactor. After the attack, Saddam pushed the program forward but on a clandestine level. In the wake of the bombing, he summoned the urbane, British educated nuclear expert Jarfar Dhina Jarfar from a jail cell and was explicit that he wanted a bomb and wanted Jarfar to build it for him. When Inspectors arrived after the 1991 Gulf War, they were shocked at how much further

Iraq had moved than anyone had estimated‖.2

Over the next decade, a nuclear program code-named Petrochemical-3 employed

over 20,000 employees, 7,000 of them scientists and engineers, at an estimated cost

of $7 to $10 billion. This program included at least two major enrichment programs

(EMIS and centrifuges, plus preliminary work with chemical enrichment), direct

foreign technical assistance, and massive foreign procurement -- much but not all of

which fell within the domain of legal dual-use items. For example, so as not to

arouse suspicion, the calutron program imported large iron-pole magnets (4.5

meters in diameter) from a European foundry in crude, unfinished form; such iron

forgings were finished to specification in Iraq. The Iraqis obtained the design for

buildings at the Ash-Sharqat nuclear facility that were planned to house calutrons by

duplicating the Yugoslav-built Tarmiya site.3

10-39

Iraq did have a major petrochemical industry which helped provide cover for its

nuclear-weapon-program purchases. However, at least three other factors also

helped shield its foreign procurement of nuclear-related dual-use items from drawing

too much attention.

1. Tensions among IAEA member states in the Middle East following the Israeli

bombing of the Osirak reactor made it harder for the IAEA to be as proactive

with respect to Iraq as it might otherwise have been.

2. Iraq‘s war with Iran could arguably have been placing heavy demands on

certain technologies that needed replenishment through imports.

3. The United States and other Western nations‘ tilt toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq

war gave Iraq many "green lights" for importing technologies that might

otherwise have caused more concern.3a

Under The Watchful Eye of the IAEA

Iraq had run a successful covert, international procurement program to obtain

nuclear technology, very similar to that of Pakistan (even getting hold URENCO

designs but from a different source). What‘s more, some of the same companies and

individuals in Europe were the very same ones that supplied A.Q. Khan‘s Nuclear

Black Market chain, and were approached by Saddam‘s agents.

―By 1991 Iraq had a single machine working in a test stand and was building a facility for a small cascade. The whole thing had been developed under the supposedly watchful eyes of the IAEA and the realization that they had missed the program rocked the organization and the entire non –proliferation regime‖. 4

URENCO In the mid-Seventies, Khan was working in Holland for an Anglo-Dutch-German

nuclear engineering consortium called URENCO. Through his work there, Khan became aware of secret blueprints for two types of uranium enrichment centrifuges: one based on rotors made of aluminium and another based on a highly-strengthened alloy of steel. Khan went on to steal the blueprints and a list of URENCO suppliers. With the

blessing of the then Pakistani government, he established the Khan Research Laboratories near Islamabad and, with the help of the Chinese, went on to secretly develop the country's atomic bomb.5

A.Q. Khan, offered Saddam Hussein critical nuclear weapons technology and

components in the months leading up to the 1991 Gulf War — an offer Iraq turned

down fearing it was a sting operation run by the U.S.6

Documents found from the defection of Kamel, noted that his offer was refused by

Saddam. However, as we have seen, Saddam‘s nuclear weapons blue print followed

a lay out in alignment with A.Q. Khan‘s. Khan had even consulted Bin Laden on the

issue of making an atomic bomb, hardly grounds to distrust Khan.7

Report of Select Committee On Intelligence United States Senate Report

On The U.S. Intelligence Community's Postwar Findings about Iraq’s

WMD Programs and Links To Terrorism and How They Compare With

Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq September 8th, 2006. Page 24

(U) Consistent with ISG determination that Iraq did not pursue a nuclear weapons

program after 1991, the ISG found no clear evidence of the intent to reestablish or

enhance Iraqi personnel. However, the ISG found that shortly after the Gulf War, former Iraqi Nuclear scientists were reassigned to positions which utilized their

10-40

expertise and inherently preserved their capabilities. With this in mind, the ISG suggested that Iraq may have been attempting to keep the scientists‘ skills intact for eventual use in a reconstituted nuclear program, although it found no clear intent behind the reassignments.

A.Q. Khan is covered more in depth in Chapter 12, as well as his connection with

Iran‘s development of nuclear weapons. FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] REVEALED: HOW PAKISTAN FUELS NUCLEAR ARMS RACE SUNDAY JANUARY 18, 2004. ANTONY BARNETT INVESTIGATES THE ILLEGAL GLOBAL MARKET IN NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND EXPERTISE AND HOW THE WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF IRAN, LIBYA AND NORTH KOREA ALL LEAD BACK TO PAKISTAN /OBSERVER.GUARDIAN.CO.UK/INTERNATIONAL/STORY/0,6903,1125614,00.HTML [2]SHOPPING FOR BOMBS , NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ,AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE A/Q/ KHAN NETWORK, GORDON CORERA OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2006, PAGE 103. [3] DECEPTION ACTIVITIES, IRAQ SPECIAL WEAPONS FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS HTTP://WWW.FAS.ORG/NUKE/GUIDE/IRAQ/DECEPTION.HTM [3a] IBID 3 [4] IBID 2, PAGE 103. [5] IBID 1 [6] PAKISTAN NUCLEAR „FATHER‟S‟ OFFER TO SADDAM, IRAQ REFUSED, FEARING A U.S. STING OPERATION BY ROBERT WINDREM NBC NEWS, FEB. 4

th, 2004.

HTTP://WWW.MSNBC.MSN.COM/ID/4163638 [7] IBID 2, PAGES: xiii, 162-163. SEE ALSO [1] ROOTS OF PAKISTAN ATOMIC SCANDAL TRACED TO EUROPE, BY CRAIG S. SMITH NEW YORK TIMES FEBRUARY 19, 2004 [2] DOCUMENTS INDICATE A.Q. KHAN OFFERED NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGNS TO IRAQ IN 1990: DID HE APPROACH OTHER COUNTRIES? BY DAVID ALBRIGHT AND COREY HINDERSTEIN FEBRUARY 4, 2004.

The reader may note, that Saddam‘s deadly arsenals were used in Iraq‘s conflicts, it

was crude but still a combat prove weapon for Saddam‘s forces. There are still so

many issues that need to be covered concerning Saddam‘s WMD. However we have

to see Saddam‘s hidden and forgotten world, its links to international terrorism. For

Saddam Hussein, this evil genius was more than just minor nuisance, now

considered to not to have even been confronted, or bothered with, left alone, to his

own world.

Report of Select Committee On

Intelligence United States Senate Report

On The U.S. Intelligence Community's

Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD

Programs and Links To Terrorism and

How They Compare With Prewar

Intelligence Assessments On Iraq

September 8th, 2006

2. Post War Information –the Relationship Between Iraq and Al Qaeda

. (U) The FBI provided two summaries of statements made by Saddam Hussein

regarding his relationship with Al Qaeda. The summary said that when told there was clear evidence that the Iraqi Government had previously met with Bin Laden, Saddam responded, ―Yes‖. Saddam then specified that Iraq did not cooperate with Bin Laden.

In response to the suggestion that Iraq might cooperate with Al Qaeda because, ―the

enemy of my enemy is my friend,‖ Saddam answered that the United States were not Iraq‘s enemy. He claimed that Iraq only opposed U.S. policies. He specified that if he wanted to cooperate with the enemies of the US, he would have allied with North Korea or China (P. 67).

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In March 2004, ISG obtained a copy of an IIS (Iraqi Intelligence Service - IIS

[Mukhabarat]) 20 page document. This document summarizes highlights of the

activities of an IIS team in 1992. It contained a single entry in the context of a list of

old and new sources about Bin Laden which stated:

―The Saudi Osama bin Laden known Saudi merchant, a Saudi opposition official in

Afghanistan. The Syrian section has a relationship with him‖. (Pp. 68-69)

(The Syrian Section refers to an element within Saddam‘s Iraqi Intelligence Service).

(U) In March 2004, ISG officers showed the document to two high-level IIS detainees.

Both of the IIS officers believed the document was genuine. In addition, Faruq al-Hijazi, whose signature was on the document, confirmed its authenticity. In separate

effort to authenticate the document, CIA officers showed it to a former senior IIS officer who believed the document was genuine. The FBI also showed the document an asset who stated that it was legitimate. (P. 69)

Sudan, Saddam Hussein Bin Laden Connection (U) DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) noted that, ―it is unclear why the IIS Syria

section would have the lead relationship with Bin Laden when he was based in Sudan. It may have been personality driven. Faruq Hijaz (Iraqi IIS) served as a regional manger for Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Arabian Gulf Countries from 1983-1991.‖ (PAGE 69)

However as noted in Chapter 8, concerning Sudan, it makes perfect

sense. The extensive network of terrorists camps from around the

world, made their home in Sudan, trained there, and held their world

conferences there. Also which will be covered later, is Saddam‘s

terrorist training camp manned by Abu Nidal.

Sudan, Saddam Hussein Bin Laden Connection Continued:

Postwar Information –Contacts (U) Based on detainees and other information, the Intelligence Community has proven

details on three contacts between Iraqi officials and Al Qaeda members. Information from the FBI and the DIA indicates that one meeting between an Iraqi Intelligence officer and Al Qaeda took place in Sudan in 1995. In two additional cases, an Al Qaeda

representative unsuccessfully attempted to meet with senior Iraqi leaders in Baghdad. (Pp. 71-72)

Iraqi IIS Officer met with Bin Laden in Sudan in 1995. According to Faruq Hijaz‘s

statements to the FBI, Bin Laden asked for sea mines, military training funds,

and requested that an office be opened in Iraq. Another time Bin Laden

demanded some 10 million dollars from Saddam for Al Qaeda war efforts.

According to the report Saddam refused. (Pages 71-74)

I do agree Saddam Hussein kept Al Qaeda at arms length, being he did not to

provide America with even more reasons for removing him from power. Saddam

said over and over in his statements, he did not trust Bin Laden. In reality,

Saddam did not trust anyone. But Saddam was a Nation builder; he wanted to

carve out an empire. Saddam‘s philosophy did not mix with Al Qaeda‘s. However,

Saddam would use anyone, anything in his quest for power, his goals of being

the leader of the Arab world, as we move more into Saddam‘s world.

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Postwar Information –Contacts Abu Hafs al-Mauritani

Abu Hafs al- Mauritanian has been ascribed several roles within Al Qaeda: spiritual

leader, legal scholar and operations planner. His assets were frozen by the U.S.

government shortly after the September 11th attacks. In May 2003, American officials said they were uncertain of Abu Hafs' whereabouts.

His last reported location at that time had been Iran. Iran denies providing any refuge to Al Qaeda leaders.

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said 'the principal cooperating witness in the 1998 embassy bombings' -- presumably Jamal al-Fadl or Mohamed Odeh -- told investigators Abu Hafs the Mauritanian advocated an Al Qaeda alliance with Iraq,

presumably sometime in the 1990‘s. Wolfowitz said a former Iraqi ambassador to Sudan confirmed this. Wolfowitz further

alleged Abu Hafs made a secret trip to Iraq but said he did not know what happened. He suggested but did not say outright that Abu Hafs met with Iraqi intelligence.

Abu Hafs may be connected to Ahmed Ressam, convicted for plotting to blow up Los

Angeles International Airport around New Year's Day, 2000. He possibly served as bin Laden's chief in Sudan. Also possibly tied to East Africa embassy bombings in 1998.

SOURCE: ABU HAFS THE MAURITANIAN

HTTP://WWW.GLOBALSECURITY.ORG/SECURITY/PROFILES/ABU_HAFS_THE_MAURITANIAN.HTM

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In a post war debriefing conducted by FBI, senior Iraqi Official Hamid

Mahmud al-Khattab al Tikriti, stated that Abu Hafs traveled to

Baghdad in 1998, and again in 2002. Postwar information from

former Iraqi Ambassador to Sudan, Samad Hamid al-Qaisi also

supported this information. (PAGES 73-74)

Report of Select Committee On Intelligence United States Senate Report

On The U.S. Intelligence Community's Postwar Findings about Iraq’s

WMD Programs and Links To Terrorism and How They Compare With

Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq September 8th, 2006

Conclusions: There was no evidence that Iraq trained Al Qaeda in chemical and

biological warfare,and that the information on such activities provided by detainee

Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi was only given to avoid torture. No concert evidence that any

Al Qaeda operatives trained in Iraq but they did agree that there were at least three

meetings with Al Qaeda and Iraqi Officials. Al Qaeda and Saddam only attempted to

exploit one another. However these meetings were initiated by Al Qaeda. No links

with Saddam and 9/11 attacks in America. Nor did Saddam have any knowledge of

the impending Al Qaeda 9/11 attacks or plans (PAGES 105-108, 110).

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was present in Iraq in 2002, however not as a guest of

Saddam Hussein, but was being hunted by Iraqi officials who attempted to, but failed

to locate him. Al-Zarqawi never received any medical treatment, as it was widely

believed in Baghdad. He left Iraq in late 2002, went to Northern Iraq, then to Iran,

and returned to Iraq in 2003 after the fall of Saddam‘s regime. (PAGE 109)

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was the most prominent leader of the insurgency against the

United States' occupation of Iraq until he was killed by U.S. forces in June 2006. At

one time it was believed that he was a guest and a link with terrorism and Saddam.

Born in poor circumstances in Jordan and jailed there for petty crimes

in the 1980s, he became a militant Islamist and fought against the

Soviet Union in Afghanistan. He later was accused of plotting attacks

on tourist sites in Jordan and finally resurfaced in Iraq as the head of

a group called "Tawhid and Jihad." The group was known for attacks

on Shiites and beheadings of foreign hostages, which it documented

and released on videotape. In 2004, he aligned the group with Osama

bin Laden's Al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization. He died

in an air raid north of Baquba, Iraq. SOURCE: PROFILE: ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI BY LEE HUDSON TESLIK CFR.ORG/PUBLICATION/9866/

Ansar al-Islam, Al Qaeda Community in Northern Iraq: Saddam did not have

any official contact with this group. They were in Northeastern Kurdish area, an area

not controlled by Iraq since 1991. But the report noted that Iraqi Intelligence had

infiltrated it, and was covertly spying on it. (PAGES 109-110)

IV Regime Intents Assessments of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Analysts misjudged the impact of sanctions and UN Inspections on Saddam‘s regime.

Saddam‘s drive for WMD, was to impose Iraq as a regional power, status and to

offset threats from Israel and Iran. That Saddam only wanted to give the appearance

of having WMD, to offset Iran. There was no over all strategy in place by Saddam

Hussein to reconstitute his WMD, after sanctions were lifted. (PAGES 111-113)

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Evidently this report sights Israel as one of the contentions Saddam Hussein was

pursuing WMD, to off set the Israeli threat. But this report totally ignores that in fact

Saddam Hussein was openly supporting a war in Israel, opening threatening war with

Israel, and even stated he would liberate the land of Israel. Saddam‘s made 30,000

dollars, in cash payments to each suicide bomber‘s family, for their actions. He built

his Jerusalem Army, for war with Israel, and more.

If Saddam Hussein was paying suicide bombers, encouraging them to blow

themselves up in Canada, threatening war with Canada, creating an invasion army,

an American ally, how would it be any different, than what Saddam Hussein was

doing to Israel, an American ally? The Report of Select Committee On Intelligence

United States Senate Report On The U.S. Intelligence Community's Postwar Findings

about Iraq, could be considered of criminal neglect, in this matter. Later I will detail

these issues, in this chapter.

The American political structure, news media and more have been using this report

as a foundation, to substance the claim that Saddam Hussein was not a threat, and

there was no need for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The mood and actions of US

Congress is to withdrawal all American forces out of Iraq. But for now, let‘s look at a

neglected issue, from this report: Abu Nidal, and Saddam Hussein‘s terrorist training

camps in Sudan.

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) a.k.a. Black September, the Fatah

Revolutionary Council, the Arab Revolutionary Council, the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

Description: it is an international terrorist organization led by Sabri al-Banna. It split from PLO in 1974. It is made up of various functional committees, including political,

military, and financial. Activities: ―Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost

900 persons‖. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in July 1988 in Greece. They are suspected of

assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security Chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and

has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. It has not attacked Western targets since the late 1980s.

Strength: Several hundred plus militia in Lebanon and limited overseas support structure.

Location/Area of Operation: Al-Banna may have relocated to Iraq in December 1998, where the group maintains a presence. It has an operational presence in Lebanon in the Bekaa Valley and several Palestinian refugee camps in coastal areas of Lebanon. It also has a presence in Sudan and Syria, among others. It has demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe.

External Aid: It has received considerable support, including safehaven, training,

logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations.

SOURCE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS HTTP://WWW.STATE.GOV/S/CT/RLS/RPT/FTO/2801.HTM#ANO

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Abu Nidal was a Palestinian political leader and the founder of Fatah — the

Revolutionary Council (Fatah al-Majles al-Thawry), more commonly known as the

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). At the height of his power in the 1970‘s and 1980‘s,

Abu Nidal, or "father of the struggle," was regarded as the world's most ruthless

terrorist leader. In a rare interview with Der Spiegel in 1985, he said: "I am the evil

spirit of the secret services. I am the evil spirit which moves around only at night

causing them nightmares."

The Sudan: A New Haven For Terrorists And Extremists In Africa? (By David

Ignatius) (Extension Of Remarks - February 5th, 1992)

(Page: E197) Hon. Wm. S. Broomfield In The House Of Representatives

February 5th, 1992

Sudan Terrorism

Mr. BROOMFIELD: ―Mr. Speaker, I am deeply concerned about recent reports

that Sudan is becoming a new beachhead for terrorists and fundamentalist radicals in Africa. I urge the administration to step up its efforts to dissuade the Sudanese Government from pursuing this unwise and dangerous policy. Should the Sudan

ignore our warnings, it may be time to formally label that country as a terrorist state.‖

Abu Nidal Organization ―Recent reports reveal that the fundamentalist government of General

al-Bashir is cooperating with Iran in an effort to make the Sudan a base for Islamic radicalism and terrorism in Africa. The Sudanese Government already supports fundamentalist groups in North Africa and now, with the arrival in

Khartoum of terrorist groups, including the notorious Abu Nidal organization and Hezbollah, it appears to be blending Islamic fundamentalism with Palestinian radicalism.‖

U.S. Department Of State, 1996 April: Patterns Of Global Terrorism, 1995

Office Of The Secretary Office Of The Coordinator For Counterterrorism,

Philip C. Wilcox, Jr

Sudan was placed on the US Government's official list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in August 1993, the Sudanese Government has continued to harbor members of some of the world's most violent organizations: the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), Lebanese

Hezbollah, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Egypt's al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or IG), and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS). The NIF also supports Islamic and non-Islamic opposition groups in Uganda, Tunisia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and

Eritrea.

Sudan's support to terrorist organizations has included paramilitary training, indoctrination, money, travel documentation, safe passage, and refuge in Sudan. Most

of the organizations present in Sudan maintain offices or other types of representation. They use Sudan as a base to organize some of their operations and to support compatriots elsewhere. Sudan also serves as a secure transit point and meeting place for several Iranian-backed terrorist groups.

LINK: HTTP://WWW.HRI.ORG/DOCS/USSD-TERROR/95/STATESPON.HTML

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In 1973, Abu Nidal (real name Sabri al-Banna) was a PLO

representative based in Baghdad. During his stay in Iraq in the

1970s, Abu Nidal began to drift away from mainstream PLO

thinking. With Saddam‘s help, Abu Nidal set up a rival

Palestinian group known as Fatah Revolutionary Council, funded

and supported by Iraq. Abu Nidal based himself in Baghdad. But

Saddam expelled Abu Nidal from Iraq in order to bolster its case

for receiving aid from the United States during the Iraq-Iran

war. From there, he went to several different countries, but

ending up in Libya. To say that Abu Nidal had a wide spectrum of international

terrorism would be an understatement, to say the least.

During the cold war, Nidal was also quite involved with communist Russian-Chinese

client states; he even had a terrorist training camp in the former East Germany.

However, Abu particularly had a warm working relationship with Libya. The Qadaffi

regime warmly welcomed Nidal and his network of terrorists to train for his further

terrorist attacks. Nidal was also quite involved with the Provisional Irish Republican

Army and its attempt to assassinate Margaret Thatcher in a bombing of a Brighton

hotel. This certainly exposes that the Soviet KGB was behind its client states such as

Libya and was quite determined to assassinate the heads of Western states such as

Britain. After being expelled from Iraq, the organization moved to Syria, where it

worked to undermine peace plans involving Jordan, Israel, and the PLO. In turn, in

1999, in an attempt to rid itself of international sanctions, Libya formally kicked out

the Abu Nidal Organization.

However, before leaving Libya in 1999, in December 1998 Abu Nidal was officially

welcomed, by Saddam and returned to Iraq, where he set up an operational office.

It was not until 1999 that the ANO group was forced out of Libya and Egypt.

Abu Nidal Organization is held responsible for over 100 terrorists operations which spanned

the global. It has carried out a number of successful terrorist attacks that resulted in

the death of over 900 people. Targets included the United States, Israel, France, the

UK, moderate Palestinian leaders, and various Arab countries. Major operations

included the attacks of Vienna and Rome airports in 1985, the attack on Neve

Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, and the Pan Am flight 73 hijacking in 1973 that led to

the death of 22 people. ANO was also responsible for the day-excursion ship attack

in Greece in July of 1988. ANO was responsible for the assassination of a Jordanian

diplomat in Lebanon, in 1994. Also, the Abu Nidal Organization succeeded in the

assassinations of PLO security chief Abu Hul and PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad. Abu

Nidal Organization also attempted to assassinate an Israeli ambassador to the UK. USA, ANO even had a covert operation in America, in the late 1980‟s, in St Louis Missouri, where several ANO members ran a food coupon ring. In November of 1989, the cell leader, Zein Isa, murdered his own teenage daughter for threatening to reveal his activities to US law enforcement.

SOURCE: Profiles In Terror, the Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations, The Abu

Nidal Organization, Pages 99-104 Mannes, 2004 JINSA Book.

However, Abu Nidal‟s first venture to Sudan was as a PLO representative in 1969

1 before he

went to Baghdad, where he developed contacts that would last him a lifetime. He had a deep hatred for Israel; his ANO even assassinated several Palestinian members of the late Yasir Arafat

PLO government, and on several occasions tried to assassinate Arafat himself,2 because Abu

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Nidal saw as a betrayal, the fact that they were working towards peace with Israel. For example in

1992, Lebanon, Col. Anwar Madi, commander of the PLO guerrilla forces in southern

Lebanon was assassinated along with three of his bodyguards as he drove from

Sidon to his office on the city's outskirts.3 It is hard to say if he was ruthless and

paranoid, though we know of two major purges of the ANO organization by Abu

Nidal. In one, he killed some 50 members over internal power struggles, and in

another 150 members were killed because Abu Nidal believed one or more of them

was working for Israel MOSSAD.4

His hatred for Israel firmly aligned his beliefs with Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda

and others. In all what is known about this terrorist Abu Nidal, with all his years in

terrorism, his affiliations with other state sponsors of terrorism, such as Sudan,

Libya, Iran, Syria, and Iraqi and his contacts with other terrorists, it is almost a

blank slate. We do know he keeps his members compartmentalized from one

another, and even the most minor infraction is met by a death sentence.5

From a report in 2000, ANO Organization, Lebanon

Secular Rejectionist Groups Palestinian Refugee Camps In Lebanon, These groups are all supported by or under the influence of Damascus; thus it is likely

that they will yield to Syrian wishes regarding their operations. They all maintain some

infrastructure and support in the Bekaa Valley, and in the past they engaged in terrorist activities both against Israeli targets and in the international arena. The Fatah

Rebels, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC) are uncompromising toward Israel and the Oslo process. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) opposes accommodation with Israel, although founder Naif Hawatma has petitioned to return to the West Bank. The PFLP is undergoing a leadership transition; founder George Habash‘s deputy and putative successor Abu Ali

Mustafa returned to the West Bank and expressed a willingness to be incorporated into the Palestinian mainstream, although he also opposes Oslo.

Islamist Groups

Hamas and PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) are the most active in the refugee camps,

although the Lebanese group Hezbollah and extremist splinter factions such as Usbat al-Ansar and al-Jamal Islamiya are also active. The vacuum left by the combination of Fatah‘s focus on activities in the Palestinian Authority and the decision of the other

secular groups to give priority to political over military action has given unprecedented opportunity for the Islamist groups to gain support in the camps. Although in the past

Hamas collaboration with Hezbollah was limited, lately the two have developed closer ties. This relationship extends from the training of Hamas operatives in Iran to cooperative recruitment efforts in the refugee camps. PIJ, the other major Islamist group, has focused on military operations against Israel, creating opportunities to exploit Hezbollah‘s resources and facilities in Lebanon.

The fostering of improved relations between Hamas, PIJ, and the Iranians (through Hezbollah) has dramatically increased the groups‘ penetration of the camps, expanding their influence and their ability to mobilize there. That Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi toured southern Lebanon only two days after the Israeli withdrawal demonstrates that Iran remains determined to boost its involvement with these groups.

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More disturbing than the sheer growth of the Islamist movements in the camps is the growing evidence of their links to terrorist groups outside Lebanon. For example, Usbat al-Ansar, the Islamist splinter group in Ein al-Hilweh with ties to Osama bin Ladin, has been linked to the Jordanian group arrested in December 1999 for terrorist

conspiracies and is currently on trial. Usbat al-Ansar was involved in clashes with the Lebanese Armed Forces in January 2000 that occurred concurrently with riots in northern Lebanon pitting other Sunni Islamists against the Lebanese government. Also in the north, Hizb‘al-Tahrer al-Islamiya (the Islamic Liberation Party) has escalated its activities in northern Lebanon, especially among Palestinians not living in refugee camps.

SOURCE: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON - A NEW SOURCE OF CROSS-BORDER TENSION? DR. NICOLE BRACKMAN, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE’S PEACEWATCH, SPECIAL REPORTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS, NUMBER 263, MAY 30, 2000. HTTP://WWW.ICT.ORG.IL/INDEX.PHP?SID=119&LANG=EN&ACT=PAGE&ID=5384&STR=ABU%20NIDAL

But the ANO organization has brutal self mutilating purges; you really have to be a

hardcore terrorist to belong to this organization. Take for example,

Over three hundred hard-core operatives were murdered (in Lebanon) on Abu Nidal's

order. On a single night in November 1987, approximately 170 were tied up and blindfolded, machine-gunned, and pushed into a trench prepared for the occasion. Another 160 or so were killed in Libya shortly thereafter...Abu Nidal's paranoia, fed by our crusade against him, caused him to destroy his organization.

SOURCE: MICHAEL LEDEEN, ON ABU NIDAL ON NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE AUG 20, 2002. NATIONALREVIEW.COM/LEDEEN/LEDEEN082002

One of ANO‘s most infamous operative was Carlos the Jackal.6His deadly terrorist

career left a bloody trail.7 Carlos has long since been rendered to obscurity. Abu

Nidal and his ANO, have for sometime been regarded as no more than a gun for hire,

a mercenary force. But if we stand back and look through the eyes of Abu Nidal, he

had to survive the many shifting changes in the world, such as the end of the cold

war, changing Mid-East country leaders from Iran to Syria.8 Abu was a survivor; he

kept worldwide network working, offices in Sudan, Egypt, etc. Unofficially, we can

only guess about the true extensive nature of his terrorist network, but his links

have had to be quite extensive, for Saddam Hussein would not have wasted his time

with him. And as we have seen, Saddam Hussein and Abu Nidal had decades‘ long

working relationship. FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] ABU NIDAL, 1969: BANNA IS CHOSEN AL FATAH'S REPRESENTATIVE IN SUDAN. HTTP://LEXICORIENT.COM/E.O/ABU_NIDAL.HTM [2] ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PALESTINIANS: BIOGRAPHY OF ABU NIDAL- SABRI AL-BANA POSTED ON NOVEMBER-12-2000. WWW.PALESTINEREMEMBERED.COM/JAFFA/JAFFA/STORY163.HTML [3] ABU NIDAL: RUTHLESS MAVERICK TUESDAY, 20 AUGUST, 2002, 21:10 GMT 22:10 UK HTTP://NEWS.BBC.CO.UK/2/HI/MIDDLE_EAST/2203099.STM [4] ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (ANO) ATTACKED TERRORISTS/FORMER TERRORISTS TARGET (JUNE 30, 1992, LEBANON) INCIDENT DATE: JUNE 30, 1992. [5] ABU NIDAL, WORLD'S MOST PROLIFIC TERRORIST HTTP://JUDICIAL-INC.BIZ/ABU_NIDAL.HTM [6] INSIDE TERRORISM, BRUCE HOFFMAN, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1998, PAGE 187. [7] Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (born October 12th, 1949) is a Venezuelan-born self-proclaimed leftist revolutionary and mercenary. He was given a nom de guerre Carlos when he became a member of the leftist PFLP (Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine), and several other groups including ANO. Sánchez obtained notoriety for a 1975 raid on the OPEC headquarters, resulting in the deaths of three people. For many years, he was among the most wanted international fugitives. He is now serving life imprisonment in France CARLOS THE JACKAL: TRAIL OF TERROR CARLOS THE JACKAL, WORLD'S MOST NOTORIOUS TERRORIST. WWW.CRIMELIBRARY.COM/TERRORISTS/CARLOS/TEXT/ [8] ABU NIDAL

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HTTP://WWW.CFR.ORG/PUBLICATION/9153/ABU_NIDAL_ORGANIZATION_IRAQ_EXTREMISTS.HTML?BREADCRUMB=%2FREGION%2F150%2FEGYPT

A September11th, Connection?

It is important for the reader to remember

that Abu Nidal had cold war connections and

a terrorist base of operations in the former

East-Germany. But there is strong

circumstantial evidence which ties Abu Nidal

with the 9/11 highjackers, however it may

just be bygone - past connections from Abu

Nidal‘s lifetime terrorists affiliations.

Abu Nidal?

Ziad Jarrah – was the pilot-hijacker of

United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in a

field in Pennsylvania after passengers rose up

against the hijackers. He came from an

affluent family in Lebanon and attended

private Christian schools. He moved to

Germany in 1996 and found a girlfriend, Aysel

Senguen. He lived a secular lifestyle before

growing more devout in late 1996 and

thereafter. He was fully radicalized by 1999

and joined the other Hamburg plotters around

then.1 "A constant figure in Jarrah's life in

Germany was his great-uncle, Assem Jarrah

who had worked for a long time as an

informer for the Stasi, the East German secret service, while maintaining connections

to Abu Nidal's terror group ANO." 2

German‘s Der Spiegel reporter Gunther Latsch told Aydintasbas that Ziad Jarrah was

"very close" to his great-Uncle Assem, the Abu Nidal operative: "He was the one who

picked him up at the airport when Ziad first came to Germany. The uncle paid for his

apartment. He really took care of him." 3

Assem Omar Jarra Assem Immigrated Back To Lebanon Two Months Before The

9/11 Attacks On The United States

Born in Lebanon in 1962, Assem Omar Jarra is conflictingly reports as either he was

the great-uncle or distant cousin of Ziad Jarrah, the 9/11 hijacker. His work permit

was found in the charred remains of the Flight 93 along with Ziad's burnt passport.

Jarrah enrolled in Hamburg University in 1982, and graduated five years later when

he became a manager with the German division of Frizenios. His work included the

sale of chemical and medical equipment to national governments.4

In the 1980s, Assem had served with Libyan Intelligence, and worked alongside the

Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal, before aligning himself with former East-Germany

Stasi styled after the Russia KGB intelligence, where he was codenamed Carsten

Berg. 5

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A handwritten notation on the back of the computer punch-card in Assem Omar Jarrah's East German Stasi file said he had contact with people who were involved in

"Operation Trader" - a code-name used by the Stasi to describe a group of Palestinian terrorists active in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The group was run by Abu Nidal. Assem immigrated back to Lebanon two months before the 9/11 attacks on the United States.6

Assem Omar Jarrah began working for the Stasi as an informant in 1985 after

arriving in Griefswald from Lebanon two years earlier as a pharmacy student.

According to Stasi files, which were made public after German reunification in 1990,

the uncle was also an agent of the Libyan secret service.7

In his 1999 book, "Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police," former

AP reporter and White House communications director John O. Koehler describes the

inroads Nidal's organization made among students like Assem Jarrah. In one

particular chapter, the author discussed a luncheon between Stasi's Col. Rainer

Wiegand and two of his informers, both Lebanese science students, during which the

informers reveal how they were targeted for recruitment by Abu Nidal.8

Another Account From German Newspaper Investigation in Stasi Records

―Also the material over Assem Omar Jarrah, which came 1983 as a pharmacy student from Lebanon to grab forest, is rather meager. The data are alarming nevertheless, in the few still existing documents. In a note with it, Jarrah is assigned

to the Libyan Secret Service. And: On the back of a touching punch card of the head

department XXII (terror defense) is handwritten noted, Jarrah has contact to persons, who are seized in the operational procedure ―dealer‖. Under this code word the MfS information about the activities collected one of the berüchtigsten Palestinian terrorists and of the eighties seventies: Sabri Chalil aluminium-Banna alias Abu Nidal. He operated at that time with its ―Fatah revolutionary advice‖ from Libya, where revolution leader had put Muammar aluminium-Gaddafi training camps,

money and weapons to it at the disposal.‖ 9 (9-10)

Former East Germany- Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR),

The German Democratic Republic

The Stasi had 102,000 full-time officers and noncommissioned personnel on its rolls,

including 11,000 members of the ministry's own special guards‘ regiment. Between 1950 and 1989, a total of 274,000 persons served in the Stasi.

―The Stasi was much, much worse than the Gestapo, if you consider only the oppression of its own people,‖ according to Simon Wiesenthal of Vienna, Austria, who has been hunting Nazi criminals for half a century. "The Gestapo had 40,000 officials watching a country of 80 million, while the Stasi employed 102,000 to control only 17 million." One might add that the Nazi terror lasted only twelve years, whereas the Stasi had four decades in which to perfect its machinery of oppression, espionage, and

international terrorism and subversion.

Stasi, The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police By JOHN O. KOEHLER,

Westview Press, "Worse than the Gestapo." —Simon Wiesenthal, Nazi hunter LINK:WWW.NYTIMES.COM/BOOKS/FIRST/K/KOEHLER-ASI.HTML?_R=2&OREF=SLOGIN&OREF=LOGIN

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FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] THE STORY OF ZIAD JARRAH HTTP://WWW.CBC.CA/FIFTH/THEPILOT/STORY.HTML [2] ASSEM OMAR JARRAH - WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA Born In Lebanon In 1962, Assem Omar Jarra Is Conflictingly Reported As Either The Great-Uncle Or Distant Cousin Of Ziad Jarrah, The 9/11 Hijacker. ... EN.WIKIPEDIA.ORG/WIKI/ASSEM_OMAR_JARRAH [3] GERMANY REPORTEDLY INVESTIGATES STASI PAST OF HIJACKER'S UNCLE 11/04/2001 | THE ASSOCIATED PRESS [4] FINGERS POINT AT IRAQI LEADER AS EVIDENCE GROWS LAST UPDATED: 12:01AM GMT 01/12/2001 HTTP://WWW.TELEGRAPH.CO.UK/NEWS/MAIN.JHTML?XML=/NEWS/2001/12/01/WIRQ201.XML [5] IBID 3 [6] IBID 3 [7] IBID [8]STASI: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE EAST GERMAN SECRET POLICE BY JOHN O. KOEHLER WESTVIEW PRESS; NOVEMBER 2000) [9] GERMAN SPIEGEL THE MIRROR 45/2001, PAGE 34 05. NOVEMBER 2001, HTTP://WWW.SPIEGELGRUPPE.DE/SPIEGELGRUPPE/HOME.NSF/ [10] ASSEM OMAR JARRAH ENCYCL.OPENTOPIA.COM/TERM/ASSEM_OMAR_JARRAH

So What Happened To Abu Nidal?

This man, Abu Nidal who could have provided so many answers about Saddam

Hussein, this master terrorist of decades long involvement around the world,

supposedly killed himself in Baghdad Iraq, in 2002. According to former Iraqi

intelligence officials, he did it to avoid being captured by them, over a plot to

overthrow Saddam Hussein. But Abu Nidal, a master of assassination, and other

black arts, did not know how to kill himself, he had to shoot himself several times to

get it right. SOURCE: ABU NIDAL, PALESTINIAN TERRORIST LEADER IS REPORTED DEAD, BY SERGE SCHMEMANN, AUGUST 20, 2002. HTTP://QUERY.NYTIMES.COM

Mohammed Atta

The most hotly debated issue of a 9/11 and Saddam Hussein, is the Al Qaeda

hijacker Mohammed Atta. There were many reports that he had met with Iraqi

intelligence in Czechoslovakia.1 The Czechs have long maintained that Atta, leader of

the 9/11 hijackers in the United States, met with Ahmed al-Ani, an Iraqi intelligence

official, posted to the Iraqi embassy in Prague, in April 2001.2

What We Do Know and Is Accepted: 1) Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani served as consul at Iraq's embassy in Prague between March 1999 and April 21st, 2001 and he was actively involved in agent-handling during this period. 2) Mohammed Atta applied for a visa to visit the Czech Republic on May 26th, 2000, in Bonn, Germany. According to Czech visa records, Atta identified himself as being a

"Hamburg student." Since a visa was not necessary to catch a Czech plane to the US, Czech intelligence concluded he had business in the Czech Republic. 3) Just prior to leaving for the U.S., Atta made 2 trips to the Czech Republic in 2000. The first was on May 30th, where he went without a visa to the transit lounge of Prague International Airport; the second was by bus to Prague on June 2nd with visa BONN200005260024. 4) When captured by US Forces, Al-Ani denied that he met Atta, as did the Baghdad

government.

5) According to George Tenet testimony before a Joint Committee of Congress (June 18th, 2002): ―Atta allegedly traveled outside the US in early April 2001 to meet with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague; we are still working to confirm or deny this

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allegation. It is possible that Atta traveled under an unknown alias since we have been unable to establish that Atta left the US or entered Europe in April 2001, under his true name or any known aliases.‖3

What did Mohammed Atta do on his June 2000 visit in Prague?

No one has any idea. Some people have speculated that he could have met with

Iraqi government officials, but no evidence has been provided for such a meeting.

Something must have been important for his trip to Prague because Mohammed Atta

seemed to a make big effort to go to Prague before coming to the U.S. for the first

time.

This issue is still being debated, but no conclusive evidence has surfaced. In the

Report of Select Committee On Intelligence 2006 report, on the Atta –Iraqi Czech

meeting, addressed on pages 94-97 , many sections are blacked out concerning this

matter, an entire page,‖ ―97‖, is blacked out. The real unanswered question is, ―why

was Atta in Czechoslovakia to begin with?” Of course, there are those who believe a

former Saddam Official would come forward, and admit he was involved with the

deaths of a couple of thousand Americans.4

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] THE MOTHER OF ALL CONNECTIONS FROM THE JULY 18, 2005 ISSUE: A SPECIAL REPORT ON THE NEW EVIDENCE OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN SADDAM HUSSEIN'S IRAQ AND AL QAEDA. BY STEPHEN F. HAYES & THOMAS JOSCELYN 07/18/2005, VOLUME 010, ISSUE 41 WWW.SENATE.GOV/~LEVIN/NEWSROOM/RELEASE. [2] THE IRAQ CONNECTION AL QAEDA-HUSSEIN LINK IS DISMISSED, BY WALTER PINCUS AND DANA MILBANK WASHINGTON POST, JUNE 17, 2004; PAGE A01. THE SADDAM-9/11 LINK CONFIRMED, BY LAURIE MYLROIE FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM | MAY 11, 2004 [3]MOHAMMED ATTA IN PRAGUE FAQ, BY RICHARD M. SMITH, JUNE 19, 2002. WWW.COMPUTERBYTESMAN.COm [4] 04-15-2005 - LEVIN RELEASES NEWLY DECLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE... LEVIN RELEASES NEWLY DECLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS ON IRAQ-AL QAEDA ... MEETING OCCURRED BETWEEN 9/11 HIJACKER MOHAMMED ATTA AND AN IRAQI INTELLIGENCE.

At this point, it is important for us to see how essential Sudan was

for Al Qaeda. Sudan is a haven for international terrorism. From

there, Bin Laden launched his terrorist‘s campaigns against the

Great Satan, America. There in Sudan, among the premier of other

Terrorist organizations, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, state

sponsors such as Iran, Syria and more, was Bin Laden. But what

we do not know are the details of the collaboration among these

groups, most importantly ANO in Sudan. Bin Laden left Saudi Arab,

due to Saudi government allowing US Troops on Saudi soil, (for

the Gulf War I, in 1990‘s,). Saudi Arab holds two of the most

Islamic holy site, Mecca, where all Moslems are required to turn to

and pray five times a day, make a holy pilgrimage once in their

life, and Medan.

Between 1991 and 1996 while Bin Laden was in Sudan, Al Qaeda took part in several

major terror attacks. First, the World Trade Bombing, on February 26th, 1993, when a

bomb exploded in the parking garage of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six and injuring more than 1,000. Al Qaeda was involved in the bombing of two

hotels in Aden, Yemen, which targeted American troops en route to Somalia on a humanitarian and peacekeeping mission. It also gave massive assistance to Somali militias, whose efforts brought the eventual withdrawal of the U.S. forces in 1994. Bin

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Laden was also involved in an assassination attempt against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia, in June 1995 as well as in two major terrorist actions against the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia: the November 1995 attack in Riyadh and the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing.1

Ali Mohamed helped Bin Laden move to Sudan, his covert right-hand man. It is

now well known he had connections with Iranian Hezbollah as back as 1984, but

more importantly, he remained in close contact with Imad Mughniyah. It was Ali

who brokered an alliance with Iran, Hezbollah and Imad Mughniyah, of which the FBI finally acknowledged. 2

The best connection for a solid link between Al Qaeda and Hezbollah is Saif al

Masry. He was captured by Georgian special forces, in October 2002.3He was

identified during the 1998 Africa Embassy bombing trial in 2001 as a member of

Al Qaeda‘s Shurah, or military committee.4In 1993, al Masry, who was trained by Hezbollah, was part of the cell that fought US Troops in Somalia.5

―We may never know every detail of what took place at the historical summit in Khartoum brokered by Ali Mohamed, but circumstances suggest that it may have been the birthplace of the African Embassy bombing plot. Bin Laden’s was a great

admirer of Mugniyah’s work in Beirut; and he is believed to have instructed was Ali

Mohammed to pattern the African embassy destruction after the Hezbollah truck bomb that took down the US diplomatic headquarters in Beirut.‖6

But how important was Ali Mohamed to the Al Qaeda Organization?

In Bin Laden‘s move to Sudan, Ali Mohamed not only helped to ensure that this core

group of two thousand fighters made the trip safely to Khartoum, but his

responsibility went beyond mere travel arrangements: He was tasked with setting up

an entire new level of second –tier level training camps.7In this new safe haven Bin

Laden, Al Zawahiri, and leaders of Al Qadea‘s Military Shura, set the stage for what

has been called a geometric leap forward in their violent vision of Jihad. There, they

created their international Islamic front, involving terrorists from around the world.8

In one of the most outstanding covert operations conducted by Ali Mohamed , in

1995, he actually smuggled Ayman al-Zawahiri into America, for a fund raising tour

in US Mosques, then out again!9

Hamas – Al Qaeda -Sudan Bin Laden started off with about US $300-$400 million which he had inherited from his

father, who owned one of Saudi Arabia's biggest construction groups. Bin Laden set up a building business in Kenya and a concrete factory in Yemen, and he invested in construction projects in a number of European cities, including Rome. In Sudan's capital Khartoum, bin Laden established links with the Al Shamal Islamic Bank, import/export business Wadi al Aqiq, investment company Taba Investment Company and a number of other businesses concerning exports.

One of bin Laden's first operations was to support Hamas and to help intensify its

vision of attacking Israeli and US interests. With the Palestinians, bin Laden developed a worldwide money-laundering network for mostly drug money, which was used to finance terror attacks, and notably to keep the Hamas struggle going.

From bin Laden's viewpoint, the United States is run by Jewish capital, which is why he believes that the US forged such close ties with Israel. 10

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In 1996, Bin Laden leaves Sudan for Afghanistan; he leaves the country voluntarily,

according to Sudanese officials, but Sudan was under the threat of the United

Nations sanctions for harboring terrorists and increased fears of a US military

response on their soil because of Bin Laden‘s terrorist actives. 11 At this point, I need

to stop here, for we need to move on. FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] AL QAEDA TIMELINE CBC NEWS ONLINE | UPDATED JUNE 8

th, 2006.

HTTP://WWW.CBC.CA/NEWS/BACKGROUND/OSAMABINLADEN/ALQAEDA_TIMELINE.HTML [2] TRIPLE CROSS, HOW BIN LADEN’S MASTER SPY PENETRATED THE CIA, THE FBI, BY PETER LANCE 2006 HARPER COLLINS PUBLISHER 2006, PAGE 140. [3] THE SURPRISE IN THE GORGE, OCTOBER 20, 2002; AL-QAEDA FLOURISHES IN FAR-OFF SPOTS, AS THE DISCOVERY OF AN ENCLAVE SHOWS, BY PAUL QUINN-JUDGE HTTP://WWW.TIME.COM/TIME/EUROPE/MAGAZINE/2002/1028/COVER/WGEORGIA.HTML [4] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. USAMA BIN LADEN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS... 15 A. Saif Al Islam El Masry. 16 Q. Can You Tell Us What The Word Saif Means In Arabic? ... 18 Q. This Person Saif Al Islam El Masry Was In the Military ... CNS.MIIS.EDU/PUBS/REPORTS/PDFS/BINLADEN/060201.PDF [5] IBID 2, PAGES 141-142 [6] IBID 2, PAGE 143 [7] IBID 2, PAGE 78 [8] IBID PAGE 78 [9] IBID PAGE 17, PHOTO SECTION. [10] ASIATIMES, DEC. 8 2001, CENTRAL ASIA/RUSSIA AL-QAEDA PRIMED FOR WIDER STRUGGLE BY SYED SALEEM SHAHZAD ATIMES.COM/C-ASIA/CL08AG01.HTML

The Report of Select Committee On

Intelligence United States Senate Report

On The U.S. Intelligence Community's

Postwar Findings about Iraq‘s WMD

Programs and Links To Terrorism and

How They Compare With Prewar

Intelligence Assessments On Iraq

September 8th, 2006, which was to be

the most complete summary of Saddam

Hussein, and at least gave the most

crucial aspects of Saddam Hussein.

But this report provided little information

into this deadly terrorist Abu Mussab al-

Suri and Iraqi Intelligence, one of their

top trained terrorist. How could this be?

Mustafa Setmarian Nasar

His real name was Al-Haj Mohammed Na(s)sar, ,a.k.a as Abu Musab al-Suri and

Umar Abd al-Hakim. Nasar was born in 1959, in Syria where he joined the Muslim

Brotherhood, an affiliate organization of Bin Laden‘s right hand man, Al Zawahiri‘s

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.1

Mustafa Setmariam Nasar was a key figure in Al Qaeda before his capture in

Pakistan, in November 2005. Nasar is in US custody in an undisclosed location, like

Ali Mohammed. In 2001, he openly pledged his loyalty to Osama bin Laden as a

member of Al Qaeda. However, he knew and worked with Bin Laden in the Soviet

Afghan War, and has considered himself an Al Qaeda member since that time. Nasar

worked closely with Midhat Mursi al-Sayid ―to train extremists in poisons and

chemical‖ during his time in Afghanistan, and was also involved in training at the al-

Ghuraba terrorist camp.2

10-55

Nasar became a Spanish citizen by marriage, formerly

directed and taught at terrorist training camps in

Afghanistan where he met with Osama bin-Laden and

was known to be an expert in the use of poisons. Nasar

moved to the United Kingdom in 1995 where he served

as a European intermediary for Al Qaeda. He traveled

widely to Europe and Afghanistan during the late 1990s

before finally moving his family to Afghanistan in 1998.

Nasar was indicted in Spain in 2003 for training Al

Qaeda ―sleeper‖ agents to be sent to Spain, Italy and France. At one time, the U.S.

Government offered a $5 million reward for his capture.3

Mustafa Setmariam Nasar was among a number of Al Qaeda leaders, including Sayf

al-Adil, Sa‗d bin Laden, al Zarqawi and others, who sought refuge in Iran after the

fall of the Taliban regime, in 2001 and had operated for some time from Iranian

territory. Names of Al Qaeda leaders present in Iran have figured in various media

outlets since 2002, and there is little doubt that a number of leading Al Qaeda

members have been present on Iranian territory for extended periods of time. Nasar

is believed to have entered Iranian territory at the beginning of 2002.4

Initially, Nasar and other al Qaeda leaders were placed under house arrest,

(according to Iranian Officials) and transferred to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard

Corps (IRGC) barracks near the holy city of Mashad, in western Iran. However, after

the US Administration declared Iran to be part of the axis of evil, the IRGC

apparently still allowed Al Qaeda leaders to enter and leave Iran as long as they

sought approval from the IRGC‘s high command. But most importantly, after his stay

in Iran, he wrote the Islamic Warfare book, International Islamic Resistance Call,

which is some 1600 pages, published in 2004. This book is believed to be the

collective efforts of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar.5

As a prominent trainer, military instructor and jihadist lecturer,

Mustafa Setmariam Nasar had a large network of top-level

contacts in many jihadist organizations, and he is believed to

have trained militants who later returned to Europe as ‗sleeper

cells‘, especially in Spain, Italy and France, according to Spanish

authorities. His specific involvement in terrorist operations

remains unknown. There are unconfirmed reports that he may

have been present at the decisive ‗Tarragona summit‘ in July

2001, where Muhammad Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh met to put

the final touches on the 9/11 plot.6

The International Islamic Resistance Call

Mustafa Setmarian Nasar one of this decade's most important leaders of the

international jihadist movement, published a 1,600 page book in December 2004

entitled "The International Islamic Resistance Call" which outlines future strategies

for the international jihadist movement. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar is not only a

founder of both Al Qaeda and the Algerian GIA, but also widely acknowledged as a

master of both urban warfare and the usage of explosives. His book begins by

dictating that armed jihad must be supported through a "…background of political

thinking, understanding and programming".7

10-56

"The International Islamic Resistance Call" outlines future strategies for the

international jihadist movement. Al-Suri is not only a founder of both Al Qaeda and

the Algerian GIA, but also widely acknowledged as a master of both urban warfare

and the usage of explosives. 8

Once the jihadist groups have created a sustainable civil society, they can begin al-

Suri's three stage battle: first, all forms for war presence of the enemy in our land …

other world countries second, and at their homeland third". Throughout his book, al-

Suri names these enemy countries as the "…Jews, Americans, British, Russian, and

any and all the NATO countries, as well as any country that takes the position of

oppressing Islam and Muslims". He further provides a clear indication that only by

carrying out terrorist attacks and decentralized urban warfare would the jihadi

network win. Al-Suri explicitly calls for attacks on all sectors of the enemy's

influence, both civilian and military. According to his book, the "…political, military,

economical, educational, missionary, and tourist presence…etc in our countries" are the primary targets of jihad.9

Al-Suri then describes the "third generation of mujahideen" as a generation currently

in the process of being defined, born after the "September happenings, the

occupation in Iraq, and the Palestinian Intifada". While exhorting the third generation

to keep to their roots in the international movement, al-Suri describes his 1990

decision that jihadist groups can not hope to confront America and its allies directly.

The groups must move from the classical structure for an underground organization,

which a hierarchical "pyramid" shaped chain of command, to a "secret gang-war

(structure), which has different and numerous cells untied together (separate

cells)."10

On May 16th, 2003, 14 suicide operatives launched a wave of IED attacks against several targets in Casablanca: a Spanish restaurant, the Farah Hotel, a Jewish community center, a Jewish-owned Italian restaurant, a Jewish cemetery and the Belgian consulate.11Twelve of the bombers succeeded in reaching their targets. Two people reportedly were arrested before they could detonate their devices (though it also is possible that they got cold feet or their devices malfunctioned). In total, 45 people were killed in the attacks -- 12 bombers and 33 victims, most of who were at the Spanish restaurant. It was the bloodiest terrorist attack in Moroccan

history.12

WMD

Al-Suri, stated that the 9/11 planes should have been loaded with some kind

of weapon of mass destruction; he profoundly believed that WMD was the best

tactical means of conducting warfare against the great Satan, ―America‖.13

In his open letter, Al-Suri talks at length about the importance of using WMD

against the United States as the only means to fight it from a point of

equality. He even criticizes Osama bin Laden for not using WMD in the

September 11th attacks: ―If I were consulted in the case of that operation I

would advise the use of planes in flights from outside the U.S. that would

carry WMD. Hitting the U.S. with WMD was and is still very complicated. Yet,

it is possible after all, with Allah‘s help, and more important than being

possible—it is vital.‖ Al-Suri states ―the Muslim resistance elements (must)

seriously consider this difficult yet vital direction.‖ Al-Suri also surprises his

readers by sending requests to North Korea and Iran to continue developing

their nuclear projects.14

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Al-Suri, ―I had the honor to know Sheikh Osama since 1988. I had the honor to become a member of Al Qaeda and work with the organization until 1990 during

which I trained some of the Al Qaeda vanguards. I taught martial and military science at Al Qaeda camps and the camps of all Afghan Arabs. I specialized in making explosive devices and the carrying out of special operations and guerilla warfare in cities in which I received advanced training in Iraq, Egypt and Jordan‖. (p.14a)

Where did he get his terrorist training? In Baghdad, in 1980’s.

Al – Suri received military training at Syrian Moslem Brotherhood, safe houses

in Jordan, and was subsequently sent to Iraq, where the Syrian MB had

extensive military training facilities at their disposal. Al-Suri was trained in

special operations, guerrilla warfare techniques and explosives engineering.

Because of his skills, he became military instructor and later a member of the

Syrian MB’s military command in Baghdad. Some time in 1981 or 1982, he also

went with a small group of Syrian jihadists to Cairo where they received

security and intelligence training. SOURCE: THE AL-QAIDA STRATEGIST ABU MUS„AB AL-SURI: A PROFILE, BY BRYNJAR LIA, PHD, SENIOR RESEARCHER HEAD OF THE TRANSNATIONAL RADICAL ISLAMISM PROJECT, NORWEGIAN DEFENCE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT (FFI) PRESENTATION OMS-SEMINAR MARCH 15

th, 2006 OSLO – NORWAY

From his book, the camp is in Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq. In his book ―The Call for

Global Islamic Resistance‖, he recalls his experience there:

―I joined a training course which prepared the Muslim Brotherhood’s military branch

cadres during the Jihad and revolution against Hafez Assad’s regime. I was 22 years old and that was in the Iraqi army’s Racheed camp in Baghdad in 1980. The trainer was a righteous man from the old guards who pledged allegiance to Sheikh Hassan

al Bannah (the founder of the Muslim brotherhood) at 17. He accompanied Sayyid Qutb [the leading ideologue of the jihadist movement], and then spent the rest of his life outside Egypt. I recall that the first thing he said [was] ―Are you Muslim brotherhood members.‖ We all said ―yes.‖ Then the trainer said while pointing at his neck ―you will all get slaughtered, do you approve of that?‖ Then we happily and joyfully said ―we approve Sir.‖ He then turned to the chalkboard and wrote the title

of his very first lecture: ―Terrorism is a duty and assassination is a Sunnah, an action

ordained by the Prophet Mohammed.‖15

Nasar's theories of war also called for the most deadly weapons possible. In

Afghanistan, he worked with Al Qaeda leaders to train fighters in the use of "poisons

and chemicals" at two camps near Jalalabad and Kabul, according to the State

Department.16-17

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1]ABU MUSAB AL SURI HTTP://WWW.GLOBALTERRORALERT.COM/PDF/0705/ABUMUSABALSURI.PDF [2] ABU MUSAB AL SURI, ALIASES: ABU MUSAB AL-SURI, MUSTAFA SETMARIAN NASAR, MUSTAFA SITMARYAN NASSAR, UMAR ABD AL-HAKIM HTTP://WWW.TKB.ORG/KEYLEADER.JSP?MEMID=6065 [3] IBID 1 [4] IBID 1 [5] IBID 2 [6] IBID 2

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[7] AL SURI S ADAPTATION OF FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE DOCTRINE BY ANDREW BLACK HTTP://JAMESTOWN.ORG/TERRORISM/NEWS/ARTICLE.PHP?ARTICLEID=2370137 [8] IBID 7 [9] IBID 7 [10] IBID 7 [11] THE BOMBERS WERE IDENTIFIED AS SALAFIYA JIHADIYA ADHERENTS WITH CONNECTIONS TO THE MOROCCAN ISLAMIC COMBATANT GROUP (GICM) AND AL QAEDA, UPDATED JANUARY 11, 2005, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS MOROCCO: CURRENT ISSUES, CAROL MIGDALOVITZ, SPECIALIST IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE DIVISION. HTTP://WWW.FAS.ORG/SGP/CRS/MIDEAST/RS21579.PDF [12] 2 CASABLANCA BOMBINGS SUSPECTS ARRESTED NOV 3 2006. HTTP://ABCNEWS.GO.COM/INTERNATIONAL/WIRESTORY?ID=2626358&CMP=OTC-RSSFEEDS0312 [13] ABU MUSAB AL SURI: ARCHITECT OF THE NEW AL QAEDA,PAUL CRUICKSHANK, CENTER ON LAW AND SECURITY, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW. NEW YORK, NEW YORK, USA, MOHANNAD HAGE ALI AL-HAYAT LONDON, UK HTTP://209.85.135.104/SEARCH?Q=CACHE:NC_XEA_V5DYJ:WWW.LAWANDSECURITY.ORG/DOCUMENTS/ABUM [14] ARCHITECT OF NEW WAR ON THE WEST, WRITINGS LAY OUT POST-9/11 STRATEGY OF ISOLATED CELLS JOINED IN JIHAD BY CRAIG WHITLOCK, WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERVICE, TUESDAY, MAY 23, 2006; A01. WASHINGTONPOST.COM/WP-DYN/CONTENT/ARTICLE/2006/05/22/AR2006052201627.HTML [14a] IBID 13 [15] GLOBAL JIHAD AND WMD, BETWEEN MARTYRDOM AND MASS DESTRUCTION SEPT 26, 2005, INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM INFORMATION CENTER AT THE CENTER FOR SPECIAL STUDIES (C.S.S) HTTP://209.85.135.104/SEARCH?Q=CACHE:OZRHNNEZHCEJ:WWW.INTELLIGENCE.ORG.IL/ENG/ENG_N/PDF/WMD.PDF+AL+SURI+AND+SADDAM+HUSSEIN&HL=EN&CT=CLNK&CD=39 [16] IBID 14 [17] AN OMISSION OF NOTE, IRAQ, IRAN, AND AL QAEDA'S MASTER STRATEGIST. BY DAN DARLING 06/02/2006 HTTP://WWW.WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM/CONTENT/PUBLIC/ARTICLES/000/000/012/283BRWUS.ASP?PG=

Abu Mussab al-Suri and Iraqi Intelligence:of course there is no indication of any ties

with al Suri after he left Iraq in the 1980‘s. But he is worth noting as well as a couple

of others who graduated from Saddam Hussein‘s terrorist warfare schooling.

A Syrian-born Spaniard, Abu Dahdah, (aka Imad Eddin Barakat

Yarkas) is a close associate of Abu Musab al-Suri; both belonged

to the Syrian Moslem Brotherhood. Author Stephen F. Hayes,

details in his book, ―The Connection: How al Qaeda's

Collaboration With Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America‖.

He believes Yarkas did in fact train with Abu Musab al-Suri, in

Saddam‘s terrorists‘ camp.1

Saddam Hussein supported Syrian religious extremists in the efforts to overthrow the

then Syrian leader Hafez al Assad. In 1982, Assad brutally put down this rebellion at which point the extremists, who had formed the group Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, scattered. Some went to Iraq where they trained with Iraqis at the al Rashdiya camp

outside Baghdad. One of the Syrians who spent time at the camps was Imadt Yarkas who would later become the leader of Al Qaeda's operations in Spain. He stayed in Iraq until 1986.2, 3

Yarkas arrived in Spain, in 1986, from the Mid-East, settled down in Spain, married

and became a car salesman. We only know that in 1995, he established an al-Qaeda

cell in Spain, led by him. He began making contacts with other Al Qaeda cells across

Europe and to the terrorist group's leadership in Afghanistan, when Osama bin Laden

was residing there in the late 1990‘s. Yarkas recruited a large following, the exact

numbers is really not known , but many went to form other Al Qaeda cells; many

went to fight in places like Chechnya, Bosnia and in Afghanistan, and would be

involved in 9/11, the Casablanca and Madrid terrorist attacks. One key recruit was a

10-59

Moroccan by the name of Amer el Azizi, who became Yarkas' right-hand man. Azizi

soon became a courier among the Al Qaeda cells in Europe, often traveling to

Afghanistan and Turkey. He recruited North African sympathizers as foot soldiers.

Later, Azizi allegedly formed an alliance with the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-

Zarqawi 4.

The 9/11 Attack

Together, Yarkas and Azizi provided logistical support to the Hamburg cell, who by

2000 and 2001 was gearing up to carry out 9/11. In fact, in July of 2001, Yarkas and

Azizi agreed to host a meeting in the Tarragona region of Spain for Mohammed Atta

and other key al-Qaeda strategists planning the 9/11 attack. That month, Atta

arrived from Florida and met with Yarkas, Ramzi Binalshibh, and others, including

possibly Mamoun Darkazanli, (Assem Omar Jarra) another Syrian living in Germany

who is accused of creating the Hamburg cell.5

Salafist Islamists, Spanish Commission on Terrorist Attacks

The 2004 Madrid train bombings (also known as 11-M, 3/11, 11/3 and M-11)

consisted of a series of coordinated bombings against the Cercanías (commuter

train) system of Madrid, Spain on the morning of March 11th, 2004, which killed 191

people and wounded 2050. On March 11th, 2004, between 7:36 and 7:39 on that

morning the bombs exploded. As it turned out, only ten of the bags exploded,

detonated by signals from cell phones, and only one of the trains had actually arrived

in the crowded station.6

The Spanish Commission investigating the March 11th, 2004, terrorist attacks in

Madrid recently concluded that since the late 1990s, foreign radical Islamists have

been using Spain for jihadist activities in support of Al Qaeda‘s terrorist operations,

particularly al-Zarqawi‘s anti-Coalition attacks in Iraq. On-going counter-terrorism

investigations reveal that Salafist Islamists traveled to Spain in the late 1990s to

early 2000s to organize a network of cells for recruiting suicide bombers for

operations in Iraq, Bosnia, and elsewhere and, for terrorist training in Al Qaeda

camps in Afghanistan and Indonesia.7

These foreign jihadists played a significant role in creating and organizing the cells

that were involved in 9/11, conducted the Madrid attacks (11-M), and planned to

bomb the National High Court. Moreover, the National Center of Intelligence (NCI)

has identified numerous Muslim immigrants who have recently left Spain to join the

insurgency in Iraq.8

The Muslims involved in jihadist activities in Spain were not necessarily members of

Al Qaeda. Instead, they were religious activists that either individually or in groups

or cells, decided to act locally in support of Al Qaeda‘s global jihad ideology.9

The international activities of the militants identified in the Spain‘s Commission‘s

year-long investigation, establish an ―Al Qaeda method‖ which has become a

roadmap and strategy for the foreign fighters who came to Spain and for local

Spanish Muslims.

Sociologist Manuel Castells, in his appearance before the Commission, argued that

Muslims in Europe – who feel disenfranchised due to a variety of sociological and

religious reasons – believe the myths and disinformation put forth by bin Laden and

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his organization. Consequently, the ―Al Qaeda Idea‖ becomes a precept, a maxim, a

cause, and ultimately a strategy for engaging in jihad. 10

Abu Musa’ab al-Suri

One of the more pernicious personalities to emerge from counter-terrorist operations

Spanish authorities believes he founded the first Al Qaeda cell in Spain. Al-Suri‘s

manifesto designs the future of jihad. In his vision, he calls for a new holy war that

employs nuclear, chemical and ―bacteriological‖ (biological) weapons, and dirty

bombs. 11

The international activities of the militants identified in the Commission‘s year-long

investigation, strengthens the notion that the ―Al Qaeda method‖ became a roadmap

and strategy for the foreign fighters who came to Spain and for local Spanish

Muslims. Sociologist Manuel Castells, in his appearance before the Commission,

argued that Muslims in Europe – who feel disenfranchised due to a variety of

sociological and religious reasons – believe the myths and disinformation put forth by

bin Laden and his organization. Consequently, the ―al-Qaeda Idea‖ becomes a

precept, a maxim, a cause, and ultimately a strategy for engaging in jihad. 12

Emerging from Spain’s investigate commission, the most pressing issue is the chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological (CBRN) threat from non-state actors; al-Suri’s ―call to martyrs‖ and the legitimization of CBRN as a legitimate tool in jihad.13

Another area of concern to the Ministry of Interior and Spanish intelligence is the

increasing presence of Moroccans in Al Qaeda cells. The apparent ease with which

foreign jihadists motivated Spanish Muslims to radicalize their religious beliefs and

recruit them for suicide operations in Iraq illustrates a demographic and ideological

shift among Spanish Muslims.14

The apparent specialization of recruitment and indoctrination techniques by Salafist

Islamists now emphasizes a return to their home countries to continue the jihad in

the name of Al Qaeda. Moreover, Spain and other European countries are

increasingly becoming more than just a transit area for mujahideen who travel to

conflict zones in the Middle East and beyond. Indeed it is particularly worrying that

cities all over Spain have been converted into recruiting platforms for suicide

operations.15

A Spanish court sentenced Syrian-born Imad Yarkas to 27 years for conspiracy to

commit murder in connection with the September 11th attacks in the US.16-19 FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] THE CONNECTION: HOW AL QAEDA'S COLLABORATION WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS ENDANGERED AMERICA BY STEPHEN F. HAYES, JUNE 2004, HARPERCOLLINS PUBLISHERS. [2] THE CONNECTION - PART III HTTP://WWW.FLOPPINGACES.NET/2005/05/25/THE-CONNECTION-PART-III/ [3] THOMAS JOSCELYN: AN INTERESTING, BUT MISSING BIOGRAPHICAL DETAIL, AT LEAST ONE OF YARKAS'S SYRIAN COHORTS WAS ALSO TRAINED BY IRAQI INTELLIGENCE. GHUSAB GHALYOUN, THOMASJOSCELYN.BLOGSPOT.COM/2006/03/INTERESTING-BUT-MISSING-BIOGRAPHICAL.HTML [4] PROFILE: IMAD YARKAS HTTP://NEWS.BBC.CO.UK/2/HI/EUROPE/4282764.STM [5] MADRID SUSPECT HAD TIES TO 9/11 FIGURE, MONDAY, MARCH 15, 2004, AP. [6] ASSESSING SPAIN‟S AL-QAEDA NETWORK, BY KATHRYN HAAHR, VOLUME 3, ISSUE 13 (JULY 1, 2005) HTTP://WWW.JAMESTOWN.ORG/TERRORISM/NEWS/ARTICLE.PHP?ISSUE_ID=3388 [7] AFTER 3/11: THE EVOLUTION OF JIHADIST NETWORKS IN SPAIN, BY JAVIER JORDÁN, ROBERT WESLEY HTTP://JAMESTOWN.ORG/TERRORISM/NEWS/ARTICLE.PHP?ISSUE_ID=3582

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[8] IBID 6 [9] IBID 6 [10] IBID 7 [11] IBID 6 [12] IBID 6 [13] IBID 7 [14] IBID 6 [15] IBID 6 [16] SPAIN CONVICTS SYRIAN OF CONSPIRACY IN 9/11 RENWICK. MCLEAHTTP://PHYSICS911.CA/PDF/2005/SPAIN_CONVICTS_SYRIAN.PDFN SEPT 26 2005 [17] MADRID 3/11 TRAIN BOMBING. WHAT DO WE REALLY KNOW 28 MONTHS LATER? SPAINEXCHANGE.COM/TRAVEL_SPAIN/ARTICLE-43.HTM [18] FROM 9/11 TO 3/11 HTTP://WWW.MSNBC.MSN.COM/ID/4523891/ [19] SPAIN PROBED TERROR SUSPECT PRIOR TO MADRID ATTACK, MARCH 17, 2004,AP.

As I have pointed out, Abu Musa‘ab al-Suri, was one of the most deadliest terrorist

who came out of Saddam‘s terrorist camps in Iraq, that we know of. But it is really

what we do not know that hurts us. But let‘s dig deeper, and see more.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Haddad was born Christian to Greek

Orthodox parents in Safad, in what is today

northern Israel, in 1927. During the 1948

Arab-Israeli War, his family fled to

Lebanon. He studied medicine at The

American University of Beirut; The PFLP is

a Marxist-Leninist, Palestinian secular

nationalist movement. The PFLP was

founded in 1967 by George Habash after the crushing defeat of

the Arabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. This defeat largely

discredited the pan-Arab movement and focused attention towards Palestinian

nationalism. Inspired by revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology, Haddad saw the

Palestinian nationalist movement as part of a broader movement to transform the

Arab world along Marxist-Leninist lines. The PFLP joined the PLO in 1968, and quickly

became the organization's second-largest faction (behind the late Arafat's Fatah

faction). The PFLP under Haddad was dedicated to destroying Israel, because like

Abu Nidal, and his ANO, he didn‘t want anypeace of any kind with Israel; only

Israel‘s full destruction was acceptable to him.1

Iraq –Abu Nidal

Haddad Marxist-Leninist organizational philosophy placed him in the former cold war

Soviet camp, with Abu Nidal. To say that Haddad had a full spectrum of worldwide

terrorist connections and operations would be an understatement. He had turbulent

relationship with the late Yassir Arafat.2

Dr. Wadi Haddad, this infamous Palestinian terrorist fell into Saddam‘s camp, which

harbored him. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), this PLO

group was responsible for turning the Palestinian cause into a vehicle for

international terrorism in the early 1979.3

Haddad moved to Baghdad in 1972, where he formed the splinter Special Operations

Group. It was from there, that he organized the infamous kidnapping of OPEC oil

ministers during their meeting in Vienna in December 1975, and the hijacking of an

Israeli airliner in Entebbe, Uganda. One of Haddad‘s closest associates during this

period was ―Carlos, the Jackal.‖ In addition to staging their own terrorist operations,

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Haddad‘s organization linked up with a wide variety of European terrorist groups,

including Germany‘s Baader-Meinhof gang and the Japanese ―Red Army.‖ According

to an Iraqi defector…at least fifty members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (PFLP) continued to reside in Iraq until the 1990‘s, and made frequent use

of the Mukhabarat‘s terrorist training facilities.4

On July 22nd, 1968, the PFLP hijacked its first plane, an El Al flight from Rome to Tel

Aviv.

In September 1970, the PFLP hijacked three passenger planes and took them to airfields in Jordan, where the PLO was then based; after the planes were emptied, the hijackers blew them up. In response, King Hussein of Jordan decided that Palestinian

radicals had gone too far and drove the PLO out of his kingdom.

In 1972, PFLP and Japanese Red Army gunmen murdered two dozen passengers at

Israel‘s international airport in Lod.

In 1976, breaking a PLO agreement to end terrorism outside Israeli-held territory, PFLP members joined with West German radical leftists from the Baader-Meinhof Gang

to hijack an Air France flight bound for Tel Aviv and landed the plane in Entebbe, Uganda. In a now-famous raid, Israeli commandos stormed the plane on the Entebbe tarmac and freed the hostages.5-8

When Haddad died, of natural causes (cancer), in 1978, he was buried in Baghdad

with full military honors, by Saddam Hussein.‖6 FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, PALESTINIAN LEFTISTS, OCTOBER 31, 2005. HTTP://WWW.CFR.ORG/PUBLICATION/9128/ [2]POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) TKB.ORG/GROUP.JSP?GROUPID=85 [3] POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE HTTP://MIDDLEEASTFACTS.COM/MIDDLE-EAST/POPULAR-FRONT-FOR-THE-LIBERATION-OF-PALESTINE.PHP [4] ABU NIDAL'S TERRORISM RUN OUT OF SADDAM‟S PERSONAL OFFICE THE PASADENA PUNDIT, DECEMBER 6, 2005, WAYNE LUSVARDI. FREEREPUBLIC.COM/FOCUS/F-NEWS/1535028/POSTS [5] IN THE SPOTLIGHT: THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) OCT. 23, 2002. CDI.ORG/TERRORISM/PFLP-PR.CFM [6] IBID 4 [7] PROFILES IN TERROR, THE GUIDE TO MIDDLE EAST TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, ARRON MANNES JINSA BOOK, PAGES 323-324. [8] BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM, NEW YORK, NY: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1998, PAGES 67-69.

1993, The Year They Forgot

There are twin terrorist events tied to Saddam Hussein in 1993, so quietly forgotten,

hardly mentioned. But we need to look deeply at these events, ponder them,

consider them, reflect them on what we have already covered, then Saddam‘s evil

world shall become clearer.

April 1993, Assassination Plot on former US President George H.W. Bush

During the former president's visit to Kuwait to commemorate the coalition's victory

over Iraq in the Gulf War, Kuwaiti authorities arrested 17 people involved in a car

bomb plot to kill George H.W. Bush. Through interviews with the suspects and

examinations of the bomb's circuitry and wiring, the FBI established that the plot had

been directed by the Iraqi Intelligence Service. A Kuwaiti court later convicted all but

one of the defendants.1

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In retaliation, then President Clinton two months later ordered the firing of 23 cruise

missiles at Iraqi Intelligence Service headquarters in Baghdad. The day before the

attack, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine K. Albright went before the Security

Council to present evidence of the Iraqi plot. And, after the U.S. attack, Vice

President Gore said the attack "was intended to be a proportionate response at the

place where this plot" to assassinate Bush "was hatched and implemented." 2

But the most important thing to consider, is that just 2 months prior to this attempted assassination of an American President by Iraqi Intelligence, Saddam Hussein gave sanctuary to one Abdul Rahman Yasin, an Iraqi citizen who had just committed an act of terrorism on US Soil, killing six , and injuring over a thousand

more Americans.

The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing

World Trade Center, New York, United States, February 26th, 1993

This is also another hotly debated issue, as to what extent Saddam Hussein was

involved. As with most issues trying to form concert evidence which will established

beyond a reasonable doubt, is rarely found in the world of terrorism, most of the

time, long after events no longer matter or by sheer luck. But as we have seen

Saddam Hussein has been a master at covering his trail, obscuring his covert

activities.

WTC Bombing 1993 : Main Terrorist Cell: Ramzi Yousef (Operational

Commander) , Eyad Ismoil (Attacker) , Mohammad Salameh (Facilitator) , Nidal

Ayyad (Facilitator), Abdul Rahman Yasin (Facilitator), Mahmud Abouhalima

(Facilitator) , Ahmad Mohammed Ajaj (Facilitator), Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

(Financier). 3

On the morning of February 26th, 1993, Eyad Ismoil drove a rented Ryder Ford F350

Econoline truck packed with 1,500 pounds of fertilizer-based explosives into level B-2

of the underground garage beneath the World Trade Center. Ismoil departed, leaving

a timing device set to detonate the explosives a while later.

At 12:18 p.m., the bomb, created a crater 150 feet in diameter that blew a hole, five

floors deep in the parking garage. The twin towers were expected to fall, by blasting

one tower which was to fall into the other, this did not happen.

The plotters, including Yousef and Yasin, built the bombs using manuals brought

from Pakistan. Six people were killed and over 1000 were injured in the misfired

blast. An FBI explosives expert later states that, ―If they had found the exact

architectural Achilles‘ heel or if the bomb had been a little bit bigger, not much more,

500 pounds more, I think it would have brought her down.‖ 4

For the sake of brevity, I will only concentrate on two of the 1993 WTC Bombing

terrorists, Ramzi Yousef and Abdul Rahman Yasin.

Ramzi Yousef, 1992 Arrives In USA: Fake Iraq Passport

10-64

On September 1st, 1992, a few days after leaving Khaldan training

camp in Afghanistan, Yousef allegedly entered the United States with

an Iraqi passport of disputed authenticity. His companion Ahmed

Ajaj, carried multiple immigration documents, among them a crudely

falsified Swedish passport. Providing a smokescreen to facilitate

Yousef's entry, Ajaj was arrested on the spot as bomb manuals,

videotapes of suicide car bombers, and a cheat sheet on how to lie to

U.S. immigration inspectors were found in his luggage. 5

Ramzi Yousef said he wanted to kill 250,000 people in the first

World Trade Center bombing.6

For these Islamic terrorists, their God is a God of death, of killing as many as

possible, regardless who they are. There were many Moslems who worked at the

World Trade Center Building, in 1993, people from around the world. Many more

Moslems lived in this area of New York, along with helpless old, handicapped,

children, babies, and the unborn. But it did not matter to Yousef, for he wanted to

kill as many as possible, as seen in the 1998 African American embassies bombings

in 1998. As I pointed out, to kill less than a handful of Americans, two-hundred

innocent African Moslems died, along with some four thousand wounded.

Quickfacts: The World Trade Center Erected In 1971 By The Port Authority Of New York. Was Located In Lower Manhattan, The Largest Financial Hub In The World. Occupied An Area Roughly As Big As A Small Farm (16 Acres).

Each Tower Was 110 Stories.

Envisioned As a Place To Concentrate World Trade Services In Order To Facilitate Trade Between Nations.

Were The Second Tallest Buildings In The United States. Only Chicago's Sears Tower Was Taller.

Accommodated More Than 55,000 Workers. An Estimated 80,000 Visitors Took In The Building Per Day.7

To carry out this mission, Yousef went to stay in an apartment building in Jersey

City, where an American-born Iraqi, Abdul Rahman Yasin, and a Palestinian,

Mohammad Salameh, also lived. Yasin also was a recent arrival in New York from

Baghdad. Yousef and Salameh shared apartments for the next six months in different

buildings in Jersey City. It is believed that Yousef bought most of the materials used

to make the bomb used in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. On February

26th, hours after the bomb went off in the World Trade Center garage, Yousef left on

a flight for Pakistan that he had booked two weeks before.8

Retaliation For American Support Of Israel And Oppression Of The

Palestinian People

The FBI established that the mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing was

Ramzi Yousef. Minutes after the attack, he had sent a message to the New York

Times claiming the bombing was in retaliation for American support of Israel and

oppression of the Palestinian people. Then he left New York on the evening flight to

Pakistan. Investigators lost his trail for almost two years. On February 7th, 1995,

Ramzi Yousef was arrested in Islamabad and was sentenced to two hundred and

forty years in prison.9

10-65

From Iraq, Yousef arrived in American in 1992, crying for, pledging for political

asylum, claimed to be on the run from Saddam‘s regime. Yousef was granted it.10

Now Things Get Murky: Abdul Basit Mahmud Abdul Karim or Ramzi Yousef?

In 1992, Yousef reported to police that he had lost his passport. He claimed to be

Abdul Basit Mahmud Abdul Karim, a Pakistani born and reared in Kuwait.11

Abdul Basit and his family were permanent residents of Kuwait; Kuwait's Interior

Ministry maintained files on them. But the files for Abdul Basit and his parents in

Kuwait's Interior Ministry have been tampered with. Key documents from the Kuwaiti

files on Abdul Basit and his parents are missing. And it appears Abdul Basit finger

print cards have been changed in Kuwait during the 1991 Iraqi occupation of

Kuwait.12

There is also information Abdul Basit’s Kuwait file that should not be there,

especially a notation stating that Abdul Basit and his family left Kuwait for Iraq on

August 26th, 1990, transiting to Iran at Salamchah (a crossing point near Basra) on

their way to Pakistani Baluchistan, where, according to the file, they were to live.13

Calls To Iran While In US

Then, between December 3rd and December 27th, Yousef made a number of calls to

Baluchistan Iran. Several of them were conference calls to a few key numbers, a

geographical plotting of which suggests that they were related to Yousef's probable

escape route--through Pakistani and Iranian Baluchistan--across the Arabian Sea to

Oman, after which the "telephone trail" ends. After Yousef arrest, a National Security

Council staffer confirmed to me that Yousef had indeed fled from the United States

through Baluchistan Iran. Yousef traveled around New York and New Jersey and also

called Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, a militant Muslim preacher, via cell phone.14

Of Passports and Fingerprints

Pakistan also maintains files on those of its citizens permanently resident abroad, at

the embassy in the country in which they live. On August 9th, Baghdad ordered all

embassies in Iraq's "nineteenth provinces" to close. Most did, including the Pakistani

embassy. The files on Abdul Basit and his family that should be in the Pakistani

embassy in Kuwait are missing. The Pakistani government now has no record of the

family.15

No US Governmental inquiring on who really Yousef is or was, has been addressed. FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WHITEHOUSE.GOV/INFOCUS/IRAQ/DECADE/SECT5.HTML [2] THE LONG ROAD TO WAR, MARCH 2003, FRONTLINE PBS.ORG PBS.ORG/WGBH/PAGES/FRONTLINE/SHOWS/LONGROAD/ETC/SYNOPSIS.HTML [3] UNITED STATES VS. YOUSEF, ET. AL., INDICTMENT, THE 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT. JULY 22

nd, 2004.

[4] INDEPTH: SEPTEMBER 11, NEW YORK CITY'S WORLD TRADE CENTER CBC NEWS ONLINE | AUGUST 30, 2006 CBC.CA/NEWS/BACKGROUND/SEP11/WTC.HTML [5] IBID 4 [6] IBID 4 [7] IBID 4 [8] UNITED STATES VS. YOUSEF, ET. AL., INDICTMENT. THE 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT. JULY 22

nd, 2004.

[9] IBID 8 [10] THIRD PUBLIC HEARING OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, STATEMENT OF LAURIE MYLROIE TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, JULY 9

th, 2003

9-11COMMISSION.GOV/HEARINGS/HEARING3/WITNESS_MYLROIE.HTM [11] IBID 10 [12] IBID 10 [13] IBID 10

10-66

[14] IBID 10 [15] IBID 10

Abdul Rahman Yasin An Iraqi, Who

Came From Iraq, Participated In The

1993 WTC Bombing Then Fled Back To

Iraq

Yasin was born in America, in 1960, in

Bloomington, Ind., when his father studied at

Indiana University. He lived there for one

year while his father, Said Taha Yasin,

attended IU. Before leaving the university in

Sept. 1961, the elder Yasin earned a Ph.D in

education. The Yasin family left the United

States that same year after staying 10 years

in Bloomington and moved to Iraq. Yasin

returned to the United States in 1992 from

Iraq when he acquired an American

passport.1

Bomb Expert

Yasin helped mix the chemicals used in the

blast, at one point severely burning his leg.

Yasin lived with several other World Trade Center conspirators at 34 Kensington Ave

in Jersey City.2 The FBI initially detained Mr. Yasin after the attack and then released

him. After it realized the error, the FBI placed Abdul Yasin on the list of "Most

Wanted" terrorists, but Yasin had already fled the country. On the evening of March

5th, Yasin departed the United States on a Royal Jordanian Airlines flight. The FBI

believes that Yasin flew to Jordan and then drove twelve hours to Baghdad, where he

has relatives.3

Bombs and Phone Call To Iran and Pakistan

After the 1993 WTC mid-1993, F.B.I. agents investigation learned that Yasin had

played a pivotal role in the plot, maintaining the Jersey City apartment where the

terrorists received mail, making phone calls to contacts in Iran and Pakistan 4 and

obtaining chemicals used to build the 1,500-pound bomb. A Federal indictment

released in August 1993, accused Yasin of teaching Mr. Salameh how to drive the

rental van that eventually carried the bomb to the underground parking garage of

the Trade Center, where the explosion killed six people and injured more than 1,000.

David Kelley, the prosecutor in Ramzi Yousef's trial, stated that Yasin also helped mix

the chemicals to fuel the bomb.5

According to the bipartisan Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report, Yasin

promptly "fled to Iraq with Iraqi assistance." His travel was arranged by the second

secretary of the Iraqi embassy in Amman, Jordan.6

In the spring of 1994, a Jordanian stringer working for ABC News spotted Abdul

Rahman Yasin outside his father's house in Baghdad and learned from neighbors that

he worked for the Iraqi government. After that news was broadcast, Iraqi authorities

10-67

took Yasin and the other men in the house to an unknown location. His sixty-five-

year-old mother, ill with cancer, was allowed to visit them, until she died in October

1994, in a hospital run by Iraqi security.7 In May 1998, then FBI director Louis Freeh

affirmed that Yasin was in Iraq.8

Not Until 9/11

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the Iraqi regime denied any relationship with Yasin

and any knowledge of his whereabouts. In an interview with PBS's Frontline that

aired on October 29th, 2001, Iraq's U.N. ambassador denied that Yasin was even in

Iraq. "To my knowledge he is not, and there is not any relation with him." Pressed,

the Iraqi diplomat went further. "Absolutely, I know that there is no relation with

that guy. . . . We have no relations with these kinds of guys, with all persons who

are involved in terrorism."9

Eight months later, on June 2nd, 2002, the Iraqi government abruptly changed its

story. Iraqi Official Tariq Aziz, for years the face of the Iraqi regime in the Western

media, appeared on 60 Minutes and assured Lesley Stahl that Yasin had been

imprisoned since his return to Iraq. Aziz claimed that the Iraqi regime held Yasin

prisoner because they worried that the United States would blame Iraq for the attack

if he was returned to America to face trial.10

Rahman Yasin, has never been seen since the 2002, 60 minutes interview.

FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] ONE OF FBI'S TOP SUSPECTS FROM INDIANA, BY JEANNE HOVANEC, THE IUPUI SAGAMORE (INDIANA U. - PURDUE U. AT INDIANAPOLIS) 10/22/2001 PBS.ORG/WETA/WASHINGTONWEEK/VOICES/200110/1022FBISUSPECTS.HTML [2] SUSPECT IS STILL BEING SOUGHT IN TRADE CENTER BOMB CASE SELECT.NYTIMES.COM/SEARCH/RESTRICTED/ARTICLE [3] IRAQI COMPLICITY IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING AND BEYOND BY LAURIE MYLROIE, MIDDLE EAST INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, JUNE 2001, VOL. 3 NO. 6. MEIB.ORG/ARTICLES/0106_IR1.HTM [4] SUSPECT IS STILL BEING SOUGHT IN TRADE CENTER BOMB CASE SELECT.NYTIMES.COM/SEARCH/RESTRICTED/ARTICLE [5] SUSPECT IS STILL BEING SOUGHT IN TRADE CENTER BOMB CASE, NOV.14

th, 1997.

SELECT.NYTIMES.COM/SEARCH/RESTRICTED/ARTICLE [6] THIRD PUBLIC HEARING OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, STATEMENT OF LAURIE MYLROIE TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, JULY 9, 2003. 9-11COMMISSION.GOV/HEARINGS/HEARING3/WITNESS_MYLROIE.HTM [7] YASIN, ABDUL RAHMAN, ALIASES: ABDUL RAHMAN S. TAHA, ABDUL RAHMAN S. TAHER, ABOUD YASIN TKB.ORG/KEYLEADER.JSP?MEMID=5635 [8]ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN FBI.GOV/WANTED/TERRORISTS/TERYASIN.HTM [9] ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN FIRST WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING CELL OPERATIVE GLOBALSECURITY.ORG/SECURITY/PROFILES/ABDUL_RAHMAN_YASIN.HTM

[10] 60 MINUTES: THE MAN WHO GOT AWAY, MAY 31st, 2002.

(CBS) Abdul Rahman Yasin is the only participant in the first attempt to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993 who was never caught. Yasin, who was indicted in the bombing but escaped, was interviewed by CBS News' Lesley Stahl in an Iraqi installation near Baghdad, May 23

rd. Stahl's report appeared on 60 Minutes, June 2

nd.

Yasin confirms that Yousef was the maker of the bomb used in the attack and that Yousef learned the process in a terrorist camp in Peshawar, Pakistan, before entering the United States. "He said that in Peshawar, there were schools that taught" bomb-making. Asked if he knew that Yousef had been trained to come to the United States as a terrorist to make bombs and blow things up, Yasin says, "I knew that, after I started working with them." 60 Minutes independently confirmed that the man interviewed WAS, indeed, Abdul Rahman Yasin.

CBSNEWS.COM/STORIES/2002/05/31/60MINUTES/MAIN510795.SHTML [11] IRAQ SHELTERED SUSPECT IN '93 WTC ATTACK BY JOHN DIAMOND, USA TODAY. USATODAY.COM/NEWS/WORLD/IRAQ/2003-09-17-IRAQ-WTC_X.HTM

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Khalid S. Mohammed

"The Principal Architect Of The 9/11 Attacks

KSM is unofficially –officially recognized as the uncle of Ramzi

Yousef. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, is commonly referred to as

"KSM". KSM, was a Pakistani-Kuwaiti member of Osama bin

Laden's Al Qaeda organization. According to the 9/11

Commission Report, he was "the principal architect of the 9/11

attacks." Like his nephew Ramzi Yousef (three years KSM‘s

junior), KSM grew up in Kuwait but traces his ethnic lineage to

the Baluchistan region straddling Iran and Pakistan.1

Helped Finance The 1993 WTC Bombing

Because KSM has been central to so many of the most significant terrorist plots over

the last twenty years, terrorist attacks, some American government sources have

called him the "Forrest Gump of terrorism". Many of KSM‘s Islamic militant plans

date back from 1994, including the reported financing of his nephew Ramzi Yousef's

1993 World Trade Center bombing, conspiracy in the Operation Bojinka plot, a 2002

West Coast Plot to attack Los Angeles' tallest building, the U.S. Bank Tower, the Bali

nightclub bombings, the failed bombing of American Airlines Flight 63, the murder of

Daniel Pearl, and the 9/11 attacks.2

Khalid kept himself busy with the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, the attack on

the U.S.S. Cole and other terrorist attacks. He sent orders, instruction and money to

the operatives who would carry the attacks out. He traveled the world under as

many as 20 falsified passports, narrowly escaping U.S. authorities on several

occasions.3

―No one exemplifies the model of the terrorist entrepreneur more clearly than Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks.‖4

Traveled World Wide, Sudan Tri-Border Latin America, Yemen and More.

KSM continued to travel among the worldwide jihadist community after Yousef‘s arrest, visiting Sudan, Yemen, Malaysia, and Brazil in 1995. No clear evidence connects him to terrorist activities in those locations. While in Sudan, he reportedly failed in his attempt to meet with Bin Laden. But KSM did see Atef, who gave him a contact in Brazil. In January 1996, well aware that the U.S. authorities were chasing him, he left Qatar for good and fled to Afghanistan, where he renewed his relationship with Rasul Sayyaf.5

But one of the most fascinating connections, Zahid Sheikh Mohammed, brother of

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, phone number was found in the possession of another

Iraqi, with terrorist connections to 9/11 and 1993 WTC attacks, Ahmed Hikmat

Shakir. FOOTNOTES / REMARKS [1] 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 5.1 TERRORIST ENTREPRENEURS, PAGE 145. [2] IBID 1, PAGE 146. [3] KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED WAS ONE OF THE FBI'S MOST WANTED SUSPECTS AFTER THE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES PROFILE: AL-QAEDA 'KINGPIN' HTTP://NEWS.BBC.CO.UK/2/HI/SOUTH_ASIA/2811855.STM [4] IBID 1 PAGE 146 [5] IBID 1 PAGE 147