cfr - kupchan 02-08-2005

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

1/18

The Travails of Union: The American Experience and its Implications for Europe 103

Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University andSenior Fellow and Director of European Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Hismost recent book is The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of theTwenty-first Century(New York: Vintage, 2003).

Survival, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 200405, pp. 103120 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

The Travails of Union: TheAmerican Experience and its

Implications for Europe

Charles A. Kupchan

Europes ongoing process of integration has entered an uncertain and

tentative phase. Member states have agreed upon a constitutional treaty,

but ratification is by no means assured. From the United Kingdom to

central Europe, candidates questioning the merits of deeper union have

fared well in recent elections. Scepticism of the European Union (EU)

runs strongest on matters of geopolitics. The Iraq War continues to

divide the union, prompting observers and policymakers on both sides

of the Atlantic to be generally dismissive of the geopolitical consequencesof European integration. This attitude is hardly surprising in the United

States, where the EU tends to be seen, even among the foreign policyelite, as little more than an economic union. But Euro-scepticism is also

mounting in Europe itself, revealing a worrisome level of self-doubt.

Taking a long-term strategic look at the present EU, Wolfgang Munchau

recently wrote in the Financial Times, it is difficult to see how it can fail to

split.1

To fret about Europes future and dismiss its geopolitical relevance

may be fashionable, but it is neither justified nor wise. To be sure, the EU

is hardly on the cusp of becoming a superpower; it is still struggling to

establish the institutions needed to forge a common foreign policy and to

come up with the manpower required to carry out modest military

missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. But Europes trajectory, whenput in a comparative and historical context, points definitively to its

successes, not its shortcomings. Acts of political union are always slow

and difficult, their geopolitical implications becoming apparent only

gradually.

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM103

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

2/18

104Charles A. KupchanConsider the case of the United States. A federation of Britains

former colonies began life in 1789, with the ratification of the

Constitution. It was another 70 years, however, before the union had asingle currency. In military terms, the United States remained strikingly

weak for decades. A century after the unions foundation, the US army

maintained an active force of only 25,000 men. Americas governing

institutions were similarly underdeveloped. Federal institutions were

weak throughout the nineteenth century, falling prey to the continuing

power of the separate states and to paralysing struggles between the

executive branch and Congress. All the while, however, the United States

was quietly but steadily altering the balance of power across the

Atlantic, gradually driving European influence from the Western

Hemisphere. At centurys end, imperial aspirations accompanied the

consolidation of the federation and the countrys increasing navalstrength. Over the course of the next five decades, the United States

emerged as the worlds pre-eminent military power.

This article draws on the early history of the United States to put

European unification in historical relief, suggesting that Europes

accomplishments after five decades of integration are anything but

trivial. On the contrary, they are singularly impressive. Europes

experience with union hardly parallels that of the United States, and the

EU is unlikely to attain a federal character similar to Americas at least

for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, a comparative perspective makes

clear that political unions take shape in incremental fashion and not

without setbacks, indicating that Europes ongoing experiment is

proceeding apace and hardly irrelevant in geopolitical terms.Indeed, the geopolitical consequences of European integration are in

part responsible for the turmoil that has beset Atlantic relations: great-

power peace and political union mean the end of Europes strategic

dependence on the United States. It is not the case, however, that

Europes mounting ambition need come at the expense of its link to the

United States. The rise of a more muscular Europe, if handled adeptly by both Europeans and Americans, has the potential to salvage a

transatlantic alliance that is currently strained to breaking point. Building

a strong Europe is a critical step toward rebuilding a strong Atlantic

community.

The travails of integration: the United States

After attaining independence from Great Britain after the Revolutionary

War of 1776, the American colonies formed a loose union in 1781. The

governing institutions established by the Articles of Confederation

quickly proved too weak to sustain the union Congress did not even

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM104

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

3/18


have the authority to raise taxes or regulate inter-state trade resulting

in a second attempt that led to the Constitution ratified in 1789.

Although the United States was nominally a federation from 1789onwards, it was not until the twentieth century that the country attained

a distinctly unitary character with a strong federal government and

common national identity. Throughout the nineteenth century,

Americans grappled with many of the same issues that Europeans have

been confronting amid their ongoing effort to construct a political union.2

Divided loyalties: the states versus the union

Fearful that a strong central government would imperil the freedom of

its citizens, the founding fathers deliberately designed federal institutions

whose power was divided among executive, legislative and judicial

branches. The miniscule size of the civil service further weakened thereach of the federal government, as did the power of the individual

states, which retained the right to raise their own militias and had

authority over many other matters, including economic regulations,

police and law enforcement. In addition, northern and southern states

were deeply divided over a host of core issues, including slavery,

protective tariffs, westward expansion, and the pace of industrialisation

and urbanisation.

During the unions early decades, state legislatures not infrequently

resisted the authority of the federal government. Consider the response

of Virginia and Kentucky to the Alien and Sedition Acts passed by

Congress in 1798 to limit foreign influence and domestic dissent during

conflict between France and Britain. The legislatures of Virginia andKentucky endorsed resolutions contending that state governments had

the right to declare acts of Congress void and of no force. The

Kentucky Resolution (drafted by Thomas Jefferson) maintained that the

Constitution was a compact between the states and that the parties to

the constitutional compact in their sovereign capacity should be the

rightful judges in the last resort, whether the bargain made has beenpursued or violated. The Virginia Resolution (drafted by James

Madison) declared that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous

exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the states

had the right to interpose, for arresting the progress of the evil, and for

maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and

liberties appertaining to them.3 Although the legislatures of Virginia and

Kentucky endorsed these resolutions, they were not enforced, preventing

an open clash with the federal government.

The centre was weakened not just by the determination of the states

to resist its authority, but also by the fact that contrasting political

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM105

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

4/18

106Charles A. Kupchancultures divided the union. More religious settlers tended to gravitate to

the North, whose culture was heavily influenced by Calvinist, Puritan

and Quaker teachings. The South attracted settlers seeking to escape theconstraints of religious authority and moral obligation, leading to a

libertarian outlook that historians have dubbed Cavalier in coastal

regions and Scotch-Irish Highland in the interior. Whereas northerners

were interested in building communities infused with social and moral

purpose, southerners preferred a rugged agrarian individualism. These

differences impaired the consolidation of the federation and slowed the

spread of a common national identity.

The individual states asserted a strong hold over political identities

and loyalties through much of the nineteenth century. When Robert E.

Lee, an officer in the US army and ardent opponent of secession, was

facing the prospect of choosing sides on the eve of theCivil War, he stated his intention to head to Virginia

and fight against the union, claiming I shall return to

my native state and share the miseries of my people. 4

Before the late nineteenth century, a plural verb

always followed the use of the term the United

States, connoting a grouping of semi-autonomous

polities, not a unitary nation.

The outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 revealed just

how contested and fragile the union was by the

middle of the nineteenth century. Although the war

did settle most of the political issues that had divided the union, thereby

strengthening the hand of the federal government, the power of federalinstitutions began to weaken soon after the fighting ended. Burdened

with the debts accumulated during the war as well as the costs of the

reconstruction of the South, Washington was in no position to argue in

favour of an expensive expansion of the civil service. So too did the

nation only slowly surpass the states as the primary locus of political life.

Soon after the Civil War, Americans deemed the United Statessufficiently unitary to begin using a singular verb following references to

the countrys name. But a sense of national unity remained elusive, with

local and state loyalties continuing to exert a strong pull. It was not until

the two main nation-building experiences of the twentieth century

widespread industrialisation and great-power war that a strong

national identity eventually took shape.

The regulation of trade and monetary union

Prior to the Revolutionary War, each colony oversaw its own economic

policy, including the setting of import duties. The independent states

Contrasting

political

cultures

divided the

union

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM106

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

5/18


retained authority over fiscal policy under the Articles of Confederation,

one of the reasons that Congress proved unable to govern. The

Constitution transferred to Congress responsibility for setting duties forthe union as a whole and for regulating interstate trade, making the

United States a customs union. Rather than speeding political and economic

integration, however, a common external tariff proved extraordinarily

divisive. An industrialising North sought protective barriers for its infant

manufacturing base while an agrarian South preferred an open market for

its cotton, tobacco and other agricultural products.

The diverging economic interests of individual states not infrequently

induced them to challenge the federal governments authority over

matters of trade. The economy of New England was crippled by the

trade embargoes and blockades that accompanied the War of 1812. A

regional protest movement culminated in the Hartford Convention of

1814, at which the states of the region came close to breaking with the

union and adopting their own trade policies. In similar fashion, in

response to the tariff bills of 1828 and 1832, the legislature of South

Carolina passed the Ordinance of Nullification, declaring both tariffs

null and void within the states boundaries. President Andrew Jackson

charged that South Carolina was on the brink of treason and

insurrection, and threatened the use of military force to compel the state

to collect duties.5 Due in part to a tariff compromise in Congress, the

crisis was resolved without conflict.

Clashing economic interests were to play an important part in the

outbreak of the Civil War, the outcome of which strengthened the unions

hold over economic matters. But even after the war, individual statesand local communities retained significant control over economic policy

and regulation. It was not until the late 1800s and early 1900s, with the

rapid expansion of interstate trade and a national railway network, that

the federal government and courts intervened to establish economic

regulations and regulatory agencies.

As for monetary matters, the Constitution expressly granted toCongress the right to coin money. Nonetheless, the United States did

not have a single currency for another seven decades. From the

ratification of the Constitution until the Civil War, notes issued by state-

chartered banks served as the primary paper currency in circulation. Fear

of centralisation was the primary impediment to a common currency.

Alexander Hamilton argued in favour of establishing a national bank, but

many others feared the accumulation of economic power in the hands of

federal authorities. Legal considerations also played a role: the

Constitution gave Congress the right to regulate and standardise coins,

but not to issue paper notes.

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM107

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

6/18

108Charles A. KupchanTo finance the Civil War, the federal government finally began to issue

paper money. Although the Supreme Court initially found the issuance of

greenbacks to be unconstitutional, it eventually reversed its position, andfederal issue soon supplanted the notes of state-chartered banks. The

United States thus did not enjoy a single currency until almost a century

after its first attempt at union under the Articles of Confederation.

National security policy

From its founding until the end of the nineteenth century, the United

States remained a geopolitical lightweight, possessing neither the will nor

the capacity to project influence outside its immediate neighbourhood.

Throughout the 1800s, Americas diplomats were few in number; the

Department of State was housed in a few rooms. Most US emissaries

abroad occupied honorary rather than professional posts. Evenadventurous presidents found themselves unable to flex the countrys

muscle, stymied by a Congress that checked repeated presidential

attempts to expand US commitments in the Caribbean and Pacific.

Writing about the decades following the Civil War, Fareed Zakaria notes

that the United States could not expand because its policymakers

presided over a weak, divided, and decentralized government that

provided them with little usable power.6

Americas armed forces, like its geopolitical ambition, remained

limited until the end of the 1800s. During the unions early decades, state

militias constituted the countrys main fighting units, numbering about

700,000 at the time of the War of 1812. The regular army focused

primarily on conflicts with Indians. In 1861, this force consisted of only

16,000 men, most of them serving at posts on the Indian frontier. The

army swelled in size during the Civil War, but it was rapidly

demobilised thereafter, with the active force soon dwindling to roughly

25,000 men. By 1890, the United States was a world-class economic

power, but it ranked fourteenth in the size of its army, just after Bulgaria.

The US navy also remained limited in size and mission during thebalance of the nineteenth century, focusing primarily on coastal defence

and commerce protection. Before mobilisation for the Civil War, some

7,600 men served in the navy, about one-tenth the manpower of the

British navy. After increasing in size during the 1860s, the navy

demobilised quickly after the war. Between 1864 and 1870, the number

of naval vessels fell from 700 to 200, only 52 of which were operational.

When Benjamin Harrison took office in 1889, the US navy ranked

seventeenth in the world.

The 1890s proved to be a crucial turning point in Americas career as a

great power. The federal government embarked on a major naval

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM108

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

7/18


building programme, drawing on the countrys economic strength and

industrial base to build a fleet that ranked seventh in the world by 1894.

With political power centralised in the hands of President WilliamMcKinley and with a new battle fleet at his disposal

the United States in 1898 began to flirt with formal

empire, driving Spanish forces from Cuba and

colonising the Philippines and a host of other islands.

Backed by a muscular brand of popular nationalism,

the United States appeared ready to emerge as a

geopolitical heavyweight.

Even with its new military power and centralised

institutions, however, Americas appetite for global

engagement remained quite limited. The United States

preferred neutrality during the First World War,entering the conflict only after German attacks on US

shipping. After the war, it quickly retreated into

isolationism, resisting global leadership until President Franklin Roosevelt

and Pearl Harbor convinced Americans of isolationisms folly. Americas

rise to power was thus slow and belaboured. But the long decades of

incremental union were step-by-step changing the face of global politics.

The travails of integration: Europe

History appears to be reversing itself. Over the course of the nineteenthcentury, Americas political union gradually came together, endowing the

United States with the will and capability to challenge Europeshegemony over global affairs. Now, Europe is slowly but surely building

a political union, endowing it with the will and capability to contest

Americas dominating sway.

To be sure, this historical analogy must be qualified. Americans may

have had to overcome potent regional differences, but Europe faces more

enduring cultural and linguistic dividing lines. Americas states fought

only one war against each other, whereas Europes have fought many.

European nation-states, each with its own armoury of history and

communal myth, are poised to remain the primary locus of politicalidentity and loyalty at least for the foreseeable future. These obstacles

to deeper integration may put an upper limit on the ultimate scope ofEuropes union.

The difficult course of US amalgamation does, however, shed

optimistic light on Europes past and future. Even with a common

language and religion, it took well over a century for the US federation

to cohere and exhibit geopolitical ambition beyond the Western

Hemisphere. Americas pursuit of a federal union faced not only regular

The 1890s

were a turning

point in

Americas

career as a

great power

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM109

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

8/18

110Charles A. Kupchansetbacks, but nearly collapsed amid civil war. In light of this record, it is

par for the course that Europe, after 50 years of working at union, should

still face struggles between Brussels and national capitals, experienceperiods of political malaise, and have yet to forge a common approach to

foreign and security policy. Some EU members remain hesitant to enter

the euro zone. Others may balk when it comes to ratifying the

constitutional treaty. But such setbacks pale in comparison with the

destruction and bloodshed of Americas Civil War. Judging from

Americas past, the EU is on, if not ahead of, schedule.

The United States may have had a constitution from the start, one that

specified at least in principle the balance of power between the central

government and the states and among the different branches of the

federal government. But it was not until the twentieth century that a

relatively stable equilibrium emerged among these competing centres ofauthority. Furthermore, the balance of power between the states and the

union remains unsettled, with the two still contending for authority over

a host of issues, including education, gay rights and civil liberties.

In similar fashion, Europes institutions have evolved as integration

has proceeded. The European Commission and Parliament have

substantially more power than they did several decades ago. A

constitutional treaty has been agreed upon and member states are now

gearing up for ratification. If adopted, EU institutions would be

immeasurably strengthened. The Council would have a chief executive

who serves for two and one-half years rather than an unwieldy

presidency that rotates every six months. Europe would have a single

foreign minister and its own diplomatic corps. The EU is certainly notheaded toward a US-style federalism, but it may well consolidate in a

manner sufficient to make its geopolitical interests and its military

capacity major factors in shaping the global landscape.

Europe already enjoys a single market with an aggregate economic

output comparable with that of the United States. The EU now has a

population of 450 million, compared with 295m in the United States. It istrue that Europes population is poised to shrink while that of the United

States is expected to grow. But at current rates of fertility and

immigration, Americas population will not draw even with that of the

EU until 2040 or later. For the next four decades, Europes market will be

substantially larger than Americas.

The EUs introduction of a single currency has been an unqualified

success. The German mark and French franc are gone for good, and the

British pound may soon follow. The euro has gained considerable ground

against the dollar over the past two years, indicating investor confidence

in its ability to serve as a reserve currency. The euro accounts for almost

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM110

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

9/18


20% of the foreign exchange reserves held by national central banks.7

As the euro gradually takes its place alongside the dollar as a global

reserve currency, the US Federal Reserve will increasingly have to sharepower with the European Central Bank in managing

the international monetary system. This transition

could occur more quickly than expected should

Americas eroding fiscal situation induce international

investors to rush toward euro-denominated assets.

Europes progress on matters of defence

admittedly lags behind its success on other fronts. But

that is to be expected; the units that come together to

form unions as a matter of course cling tenaciously to

their sovereignty when it comes to security. In the

United States, the individual states for decadesinsisted upon maintaining their separate militias and only gradually

became comfortable with the prospect of a sizable army and navy under

the control of the federal government. A full century after formal union,

Americas army ranked fourteenth in the world and its navy seventeenth.

Although EU member states have yet to integrate their defence

policies and their militaries, an aggregate look at Europes armed forces

reveals considerable capability. In terms of aggregate defence spending,

the EU ranks second in the world, well behind the United States, but

ahead of China and Japan. It also ranks second in the total size of its

armed forces after China. To be sure, these aggregate numbers need to

be discounted because of the relatively low readiness and quality of

European forces and the absence of a unified policy or commandstructure. But they do indicate impressive potential should Europes

integration on matters of defence move forward.

Indeed, Europe may well be ready to turn the corner on the defence

front, decidedly moving toward greater integration on matters of both

policy and capability. The EU has established the European Defence

Agency to oversee military planning and procurement. It is graduallyassuming responsibility for peacekeeping operations throughout the

Balkans. In August 2004, the Eurocorps took over command of the

NATO operation in Afghanistan. Individual member states are

implementing important defence reforms intended to give their forces

greater firepower and mobility. Europe may well pursue these efforts

with added urgency now that Washington has announced its intentions

to withdraw Americas main combat units from the European theatre.

The EU may well be passing through a period of institutional

transformation and centralisation not unlike that experienced by the

United States at the end of the nineteenth century.

The EUs single

currency has

been an

unqualified

success

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM111

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

10/18

112Charles A. KupchanThe geopolitical consequences of European integrationUnder the best of circumstances, the European Union will have a modest

military capability by 2010, giving it the ability to fight a regional war in

Europes periphery and to contribute in a limited manner to operations in

other areas. It is inconceivable that Europe will acquire within the next

decade or two a military capability in any way comparable to that of the

United States. In this respect, it is quite likely that the United States willremain the sole military superpower for the foreseeable future.

Europes ability to contest Americas military primacy is, however, far

too high a standard for determining whether European integration is of

geopolitical consequence. The United States did not become a global

power until the Second World War, but its rise had global implicationsfar earlier. During the nineteenth century, America effectively drove

European powers from the Western Hemisphere, irreversibly altering

the distribution of power across the Atlantic. And by the end of the

nineteenth century, the United States was exerting its influence in East

Asia and the Middle East, ending Europes exclusive influence in these

regions.

In similar fashion, the EU is extending its democratising and pacifyingeffects eastwards, obviating Europes need for its American protector.

The United States is accordingly getting ready to decamp from the

Continent. Coupled with EU enlargement, Americas departure from

Europe will give the EU a new sway across Eurasia. The future of pivotalstates, such as Turkey, Russia and Ukraine, will be more heavily affected

by decisions taken in Brussels than in Washington. The EU, not theUnited States, may soon be the most influential actor in the worlds

strategic heartland. In addition, the EU is already deeply engaged in the

Middle East and is broadening its political and economic presence in East

Asia. The EUs geopolitical weight is being felt far ahead of its emergence

as a major military power.

Many observers of transatlantic affairs dismiss the geopolitical

consequences of these ongoing changes in the relationship between

Europe and the United States. The two sides of the Atlantic, they

contend, form a stable security community, with the West resting ondurable institutional and normative foundations capable of withstanding

international change.8 A shift in the balance of power is of little relevance because the Atlantic community no longer plays by the rules of

realpolitik.

Recent events suggest otherwise. Power balancing across the Atlantic

was generally absent during the Cold War, but the Atlantic security order

that emerged after the Second World War is fast coming undone. The

political divide that opened over the Iraq War may well prove to have been

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM112

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

11/18

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

12/18

114Charles A. KupchanIt is the case, however, that Berlin and Paris along with most

European publics were prepared to break with Washington precisely

because Europe is at peace and no longer needs its American guardian. Inthis sense, the rift was directly related to the success of European

integration and the consequent desire of many Europeans for strategic

independence from the United States. Furthermore, the transatlantic

divide over Iraq is in the long run likely to advance rather than hamper

European unity on matters of defence for a number of reasons.

Firstly, those European governments that backed the war have paid a

heavy political price for doing so, especially in light of the ongoing chaos

in Iraq. As a result, pro-European sentiments have been strengthened at

the expense of Atlanticist inclinations. The fall of the Aznar government

in Spain was a critical turning point in this respect, weakening the pro-

war coalition and complicating the political fortunes of Tony Blair, SilvioBerlusconi, Alexander Kwazniewski and other leaders

who aligned themselves with Washington. Central

Europeans have also been disgruntled with the

absence of tangible rewards for their loyalty, with

Polish citizens asking why their companies have not

been awarded lucrative contracts in Iraq, why they

still need a visa to visit the United States, and why

the US forces based in Germany are leaving Europe

rather than relocating to Poland.

Secondly, the war has driven home to many

Europeans that they are increasingly on their own in

geopolitical terms, with the United States focusing itsattention and resources on other quarters. The

Pentagon has announced plans to bring homethe main combat units that

have for decades been deployed in Europe. Even if many Europeans

were to remain staunch defenders of a tight strategic bond with the

United States, Europes traditional Atlantic option is no longer available.

Whether they like it or not, countries like Britain and Poland will have nochoice but to look to a stronger and more collective EU to manage

European security.

Thirdly, anti-American attitudes are at least for now informing

electoral politics in many EU member states. What began as popular

opposition to the Bush administration and its policies appears to have

deeper and broader political implications, with surveys revealing that

some two-thirds of the public in France and Germany have unfavourable

views of the United States.10 Furthermore, rather than seeking to

moderate anti-American sentiment, a number of European leaders have

been capitalising on it for electoral purposes, magnifying its political

European

governments

that backed

the war have

paid a heavy

political price

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM114

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

13/18


significance and intensity. This trend gives a boost to European unity by

adding allure and urgency to the call of some Europeans for the EU to

serve as a counterweight to America. It also, however, marks anunfortunate and dangerous development; the emergence of a Europe that

defines itself in opposition to the United States would have adverse

consequences for not just Atlantic relations, but also the broader

international community. Competitive instincts would be reawakened on

a global basis should balance-of-power logic again divide the two sides of

the Atlantic.

Europe and the United States have thus reached a strategic turning

point, one at least as important as that of a century ago when an

integrating America crossed a critical threshold in its evolution as a

union, embracing a new level of geopolitical ambition and fundamentally

altering its relationship with Europe. At the turn of the twentiethcentury, Britain had the good sense to make room for America, paving

the way for a peaceful power transition across the Atlantic. At the turn of

the twenty-first century, the challenge ahead is to ensure that the current

strategic transition between the two sides of the Atlantic is as peaceful as

the last.

Renewing Atlantic partnership: the need for a strong Europe

The traditional Atlantic alliance is gone for good. The United States is

ending its days as a European power at the same time that the EU and itsmember states are becoming ready to emerge from the shadow of

American influence. A central question emerges amid the political rancourand conceptual confusion that accompany these tectonic shifts: are the

prospects for reclaiming an Atlantic partnership more auspicious if the EU

emerges as a stronger and more unified geopolitical actor or if it remains

primarily a civilian power with decentralised policies on matters of

security and defence?

Proponents of a civilian avocation for the EU have several arguments

in their favour. A more unified and muscular union would, at least at the

outset, lead to more transatlantic tension, not less. As it has in the past

few years, Washington would likely react with affront to the prospect ofan increasingly autonomous EU as well as one in which a common

security policy makes it difficult for the United States to partner withindividual member states as it sees fit. It is also the case that the

international community will continue to rely heavily on the EUs civilian

profile; its capacities in nation-building, peacekeeping and democracy

promotion are poised to remain crucial assets for years to come. 11

The Atlantic partnership, however, will be far better served by a

militarily capable EU rather than by one that defines itself as a civilian

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM115

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

14/18

116Charles A. Kupchanpower. A division of labour in which the United States fights wars while

the EU focuses on nation-building will prove uniquely corrosive over time.

Americans would resent the fact that they would be running far greaterrisks than their European counterparts. With the US homeland now facing

the threat of terrorist strikes, Americans have become particularly sensitive

to the contributions of others in neutralising this threat. In turn, Europeans

would resent their ancillary strategic role as the clean-up crew of the

international community. They would also bristle at the permanently

diminished influence that comes with such a role. A civilianised EU is a

recipe for dismantling the Atlantic partnership, not rebuilding it.

A more capable EU would restore a measure of balance to the Atlantic

community, providing the foundation for a meaningful and equitable

sharing of tasks along the full spectrum of missions. It is true that

Washington may well take umbrage as the EU fashions its own securitypolicy and embarks on a more independent course, but Americans would

ultimately welcome the prospect of an EU able to shoulder more

responsibility in Europe and to contribute to operations elsewhere

especially those aimed at combating terrorists and preventing the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Iraq war has placed

extraordinary strains on Americas military, making the United States

particularly aware of the importance of securing the help of capable allies

in the future.

Greater EU capacity also increases the likelihood that the United

States and Europe succeed in forging a consensus on vital strategic issues.

The more capability the EU has to offer, the more Washington will work

to secure its help, listening to Europes concerns and modifying USpolicies accordingly. In addition, when the EUs capabilities are more

robust, its perception of threats may also be in closer alignment with

those of the United States. How parties perceive threats is at least to

some degree shaped by the means at their disposal to deal with them.

A stronger and more unified EU is paradoxically less likely than a weak

union to cast itself as a counterweight to the United States. Anti-Americansentiment in Europe stems in part from Washingtons dismissive attitude

toward Europe, an attitude that would change in step with the EUs

evolution. So too does European pique arise from Europes frustration

about its own weakness; standing up to America is to some degree a way

of compensating for the EUs inability to affect outcomes through any

other means. A stronger EU would enable Europe to contribute actively to

international missions, thereby removing this important source of anti-

American resentment and clearing the way for shared interests to

promote joint action. Even if a more autonomous EU and the United

States might at times pursue separate paths, Europeans and Americans in

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM116

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

15/18


the end share a common purpose and a commitment to democratic values.

Each is still the others most natural and reliable ally. A more capable

Europe would bring these commonalities into greater relief.Finally, the EU needs to improve its military capacity in order to pick

up the strategic slack left by Americas impending departure from

Europe. Europes periphery is almost certain to experience violent

conflict in the years ahead; the EU needs to prepare itself accordingly or

find itself exposed and impotent. The EU would not be the only party to

suffer. When Europeans proved incapable of stopping ethnic conflict in

the Balkans in the 1990s, political tension and mutual recrimination beset

the Atlantic community, not just Europe.

* * *

This analysis points to several policy recommendations for leaders on

both sides of the Atlantic. European elites need to restore to the

European project the political momentum that it has lacked in the recent

past, making deeper union and, in particular, a more common and

robust security policy a top priority. Britain has a particular role to play

in this respect, with its military experience and capability critical to

turning the EUs geopolitical aspirations into reality. Precisely because

enlargement may make it difficult for the union as a whole to move

forward on defence issues with alacrity, a vanguard group leading the

way is not only desirable, but vital. In the meantime, EU leaders shouldintensify efforts to reach out to their counterparts in the United States.

Making a greater contribution to missions in Afghanistan and Iraq and

working to counter anti-American sentiment within the EU would be

helpful steps.

Washington can do its part by returning to a steadfast policy of

supporting European unity, ending its counterproductive efforts to fosterdivisions within Europes ranks. The United States should also welcome

unambiguously the construction of an autonomous and capable EU

defence force, its current ambivalence only giving some quarters in

Europe an excuse for failing to tackle the urgent task at hand. Finally,

Washington needs to return to the centrist brand of internationalism that

guided US foreign policy for the last six decades. Only by doing so can

the United States restore confidence among Europeans that they still

have in America a responsible and reliable partner. Only then can

Europeans and Americans refashion an Atlantic community capable of

anchoring a stable and prosperous international order.

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM117

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

16/18

118Charles A. KupchanThe future course of European integration is anything but

foreordained. Only a clairvoyant could have foreseen in the late 1800s

that the United States was headed for political centralisation and globalpre-eminence. The EU today is similarly a work-in-

progress, with the character of its governing

institutions and the scope of its geopolitical ambition

still evolving. Americas integration admittedly cannot

serve as a model for Europes; political unions are

radical and contingent experiments, whose results are

always unpredictable. Nonetheless, the history of

Americas arduous ascent does make clear that

Europe has already made remarkable progress along

the path of political integration. This insight reveals

little about Europes ultimate disposition but a greatdeal about the urgent need to begin adapting Atlantic relations and

global politics to the realities of Europes emerging union.

Political

unions are

radical and

contingent

experiments

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM118

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

17/18


AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Jonathan Monten

and Rositsa Petrova for providing

research assistance.

Notes1 An la carte Europe is likely to split,

Financial Times, 4 October 2004, p. 15.2 This historical overview draws on

Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the

American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and

the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first

Century (New York: Vintage, 2003).

For further discussion and citations,

see pp. 160177.3 See Walter Hartwell Bennett,

American Theories of Federalism

(Tuscaloosa, AL: University of

Alabama Press, 1964), pp. 92100; and

Thomas Bailey, The American Pageant:

A History of the Republic (Boston, MA:

Heath, 1956).4 Cited in Michael J. Sandel, Democracys

Discontent: America in Search of a Public

Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1996), p. 15.5 John Blum et al. (eds) The National

Experience: A History of the United

States (New York: Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich, 1977), pp. 218219.6 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power:

The Unusual Origins of Americas WorldRole (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1998), p. 55.7 International Monetary Fund,Annual

Report 2004, 30 September 2004, p.

103, Appendices, table 1.2.8 G. John Ikenberry,After Victory:

Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the

Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 2001), esp. pp. 246256.9 Renewing the Atlantic Partnership,

Report of an Independent Task Force,Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H.

Summers, co-chairs, Charles A.

Kupchan, project director (New York:

Council on Foreign Relations, 2004),

p. 9.1 0 Pew Research Center for the People

and the Press, A Year After Iraq War:

Mistrust of America in Europe Ever

Higher, Muslim Anger Persists, 16

March 2004, p. 24.1 1 See Andy Moravcsik, Striking a New

Transatlantic Bargain, Foreign Affairs,

vol. 82, no. 4 July/August 2003.

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM119

8/14/2019 CFR - Kupchan 02-08-2005

18/18

120Charles A. Kupchan

Kupchan.pmd 11/12/2004, 2:32 PM120

cfr - kupchan 02-08-2005

Documents