R E P O R TCES PROJECT

C e n t r e f o r E a s t e r n S t u d i e sOÂRODEK STUDIÓW WSCHODNICH

W a r s a w M a y 2 0 0 5

CES Project

NATO’s new role

in the NIS area

Final Project Report

© Copyright by OÊrodek Studiów Wschodnich

Editor

Anna ¸abuszewska

Graphic design

Dorota Nowacka

Translation

Magdalena Klimowicz (Introduction,

Key Points of the Report, Part I, Part IV)

Ilona Duchnowicz (Part II)

Izabela Zygmunt (Part III)

Proofreading

Jim Todd

Publisher

Centre for Eastern Studies

ul. Koszykowa 6a

Warsaw, Poland

tel. + 48 /22/ 525 80 00

fax +48 /22/ 525 80 40

The Centre’s analytical materials can be found

on the Internet at www.osw.waw.pl

More information about the Centre for Eastern

Studies is available at the same web address

ISSN 1642-4484

Contents

Introduction / 5

Key Points of the Report / 10

Part I NATO and the Eastern partners: basic information / 15Marek Menkiszak, Jacek Wróbel, Krzysztof Strachota, Marta Jaroszewicz

Introduction / 15

Factors determining security in the NIS area: a brief review / 151. Eastern Europe – factors determining regional security2. The Southern Caucasus – factors determining regional security3. Central Asia: factors determining regional security

The Importance of the Eastern partners for NATO / 22

NATO’s Partnership mechanisms applicable to the Eastern partners after the Istanbul summit / 24a. Participation of NATO’s Eastern partners in Partnership mechanisms b. The NATO summit in Istanbul and the Eastern partners

Appendix 1. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership – Refocusing and Renewal; main theses contained in the document / 31

Appendix 2. Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building – main theses contained in the document / 33

Part IICountry reports / 34Marek Menkiszak, Stanis∏aw Górka, Micha∏ Kolasiƒski, Jacek Wróbel, Marta Jaroszewicz, Wojciech Bartuzi, Adam Balcer, Wojciech Konoƒczuk

RUSSIA / 34

BELARUS / 44

UKRAINE / 46

MOLDOVA / 56

GEORGIA / 60

AZERBAIJAN / 64

ARMENIA / 69

KAZAKHSTAN / 72

KYRGYZSTAN / 76

UZBEKISTAN / 80

TAJIKISTAN / 84

TURKMENISTAN / 88

Part IIINATO policy towards its Eastern partners: Proposals / 91Marek Menkiszak

Introduction: NATO’s character, limitations and capabilities / 91

Major obstacles in NATO’s relations with its Eastern partners / 92

Suggestions concerning the basic objectives and principles of NATO policy towards the Eastern partners / 95

Problems affecting the partnership policy’s implementation, and suggested solutions / 99

Conclusion: NATO’s new role in the NIS area? / 105

Part IVPoland and NATO’s policy towards their Eastern partners / 107Marta Jaroszewicz

The peculiar character of the NIS area / 107

Polish strategy assumptions / 108

Poland’s potential and limitations / 108

Poland’s priorities and activity areas / 109

Conclusions / 111

INTRODUCTION

This report is an outcome of joint research workcarried out by the employees and external co-ope-rators associates of the Centre for Eastern Stu-dies (CES) – a Polish governmental analytical cen-tre. It has been developed as a result of a two-yearCES research project titled “NATO’s new role inthe NIS area”. In the present Final Project Report,all the countries covered by the research are dis-cussed. The report’s conclusions, although mainlybased on information given and opinions ex-pressed by the people we talked to, have not beenconsulted with our interlocutors. The content of this report contains solely the opi-nions of the contributing authors, and does notreflect the official position of the authorities ofthe Republic of Poland.

Assumptions and aims of the project

The North Atlantic Alliance has been increasingits involvement in the process of stabilisation ofregions located outside its area and in the co-ope-ration with non-NATO partners, including thecountries of the NIS area. Admitting seven newcountries from Central and Eastern Europe toNATO, establishing a new scheme of relationshipsbetween the Alliance and Russia (the NATO–RussiaCouncil), initiating new forms of enhanced part-nership with Ukraine (the Action Plan) and otherpartners (IPAP, PAP-T, PAP-DIB) and taking deci-sions (at the Istanbul summit) which are crucialfor the development of the Partnership (concern-ing inter alia the focusing of attention on the areaof the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia) implya need to determine further policy towards NATO’seastern neighbours and to analyse the perspec-tives for developing relations between the NIS--area countries and the Alliance. Considering its knowledge of the NIS area and itsvital interests, Poland is interested in playing therole of an active participant in the debate focus-ed on this issue. Bearing this in mind, the CESdecided to carry out a research project entitled“NATO’s new role in the NIS area” over the periodof 2003–04.

The project’s basic aims were as follows: a) to compile information and formulate conclu-sions on relations and co-operation between NATOand the individual partner countries of the NISarea which have taken place to date; b) to prepare an analysis of the expectations, con-cepts and ideas promoted by partner states aswell as NATO itself, relating to the further evolu-tion of relations and co-operation between theAlliance and the individual NIS states, and anassessment of realistic perspectives for that evo-lution and of the role which the Alliance mightplay in the NIS area; c) to present analytical conclusions and suggestedactions to be taken (including Poland’s possiblecontribution) and to take part, together with ana-lysts from the interested countries, in a discussionfocused on this issue.

Project implementation

The project was implemented by a team compo-sed of employees and external associates of CES,co-ordinated by Marek Menkiszak. The implemen-tation was divided into two stages: Part 1 of the project, implemented in 2003, focu-sed on relations and co-operation between NATOand countries of Eastern Europe and the SouthernCaucasus, i.e. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova,Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The main resultof Part 1 was the Interim Project Report. Theassumptions and recommendations contained inthe publication were a subject of an internationalseminar organised by the CES in December 2003.Part 2 of the project, implemented in 2004, focu-sed on relations and co-operation between NATOand the countries of Central Asia, i.e. Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmeni-stan. In the course of Part 2, on the basis of theinformation and opinions collected, and our ownanalysis thereof, conclusions were formulatedconcerning new research areas, and the assump-tions discussed in the Interim Project Report wereupdated and partly verified. This Final ProjectReport is the result of the two-year research work. Study visits paid by the project participants toNATO institutions and partner countries in theNIS area played a crucial role in implementingboth parts of the project. The information and

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opinions collected were the basis for the conclu-sions formulated by the CES Project team. As part of the project, the participants carriedout a comprehensive search for materials. Thesewere drawn from public sources such as news-papers and magazines (in particular those pub-lished in partner states), publications issued byNATO and governments of partner states, andPolish, Western and Eastern analytical centres. In total, in the period 2003–04 9 study visits to12 countries took place, the total duration ofwhich was 97 days. In May–July 2003, two teamscomposed of two project participants each paidstudy visits to 8 countries (the NATO Headquar-ters in Belgium, and the partner states of Russia,Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia andAzerbaijan). In June 2004, another visit to NATOHeadquarters took place. In September 2004 twoteams composed of two project participants eachpaid study visits to 4 countries (Kazakhstan, Kyr-gyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), and in De-cember 2004 another visit to NATO Headquar-ters aimed at presenting the results of that partof the project which focused on the Southern Cau-casus and Central Asia, and holding meetings re-lated to research activities. In total, during all the visits, the project partici-pants held 188 meetings with 250 people – rep-resentatives of state administration structures,government and non-government analytical cen-tres and other institutions established in the part-ner states and dealing with the relations withNATO, structures within the Alliance managingthe relations with Eastern partners, Polish diplo-matic missions at NATO and in partner states,and diplomatic missions of selected NATO mem-ber states in partner countries. Furthermore, the project participants held a num-ber of meetings with representatives of Polishstate administration structures – the Ministry ofForeign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence inparticular. The compiled information and opinions, alongwith the authors’ own views, served as the basisfor elaborating this Final Report.

Content of the Final Project Report

This Report consists of the following four parts:

Part I contains basic information on the security--related situation in the individual regions cover-ed by the NIS area, the motivations for NATO’sinterest in the co-operation with the Easternpartners, and the mechanisms of the Euro-Atlan-tic Partnership with special emphasis on the de-cisions of the Istanbul NATO summit relating tothat issue. The chapter also contains charts inwhich the main Partnership instruments are dis-cussed, and which contain information on the in-volvement of individual partner states in thosemechanisms and summaries of some of the re-cent major documents touching upon the issueof the Partnership.

Part II contains a description and assessment ofrelations and co-operation between NATO andindividual Eastern partners, i.e. Russia, Belarus,Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistanand Turkmenistan. Firstly, this part contains a des-cription of how NATO is perceived in individualpartner states, their policy objectives and aspi-rations towards the Alliance. Furthermore, inPart II the authors have endeavoured to determineNATO’s attitude towards those countries, to dis-cuss the evolution of relations and co-operationof those countries with NATO, to present andassess individual co-operation areas and priori-ties thereof – mainly from the perspective of thepartners, to characterise the main problems (inthe authors’ opinion) arising in those relationsand co-operation, their sources and consequences,and conclusions relating to the possible evolutionof relations and co-operation, along with sug-gestions for possible actions to be taken by theAlliance towards individual partner states.

Part III contains general conclusions concerningNATO’s policy towards Eastern partners. In par-ticular, the following issues are discussed: themain obstacles impeding the development of co--operation between NATO and the NIS-area coun-tries, on the part of both NATO and the partners;suggested objectives for the Alliance’s policy to-

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wards the Eastern partners; the proposed assump-tions of that policy, and a review of problemsoccurring in the policy implementation, alongwith suggested solutions. Furthermore, Part IIIattempts to answer the question relating to theproject title, i.e. the potential new role of NATOin the NIS area.

Part IV focuses on Poland’s policy towards NATO’sEastern partners and the role that our countrymay play in NATO’s policy towards them. In par-ticular, it contains an analysis of Polish interestsin the NIS area, and of the assumptions of Poland’spolicy towards the Eastern partners; a descrip-tion of Poland’s potential and the limitationsthereof; a profile of Poland’s co-operation withthe Eastern partners, and ways of implementingPoland’s policy towards the Eastern partners asproposed by the authors.

The content of this Report is based on the know-ledge gained in the course of research, includinginformation and opinions expressed by numer-ous interlocutors representing different countriesand institutions. At the same time, the Report isa reflection of the authors’ personal views andconvictions. It should be noted that the authorsassumed a more critical approach when prepar-ing their analyses of policies pursued by thosepartner states which aspire to join NATO and ofthe policy of the Alliance itself. Bearing in mindthe limited size of this publication, a number ofsignificant issues were of necessity treated in a shortened and cursory manner.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to express their gratitudeto each person whose knowledge and practicalassistance have contributed to the developmentof this Report, including our numerous interlocu-tors, the staff of the Centre for Eastern Studies,Polish diplomatic and consular services, and rep-resentatives of the Polish state administration. The authors would like to thank Mr Adam DanielRotfeld, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Po-land, for his kind support for this project.

The authors would like to thank everyone towhom they talked during their study visits, i.e.representatives of the following institutions:

NATO Headquarters: NATO International Staff:Private Office of the Secretary General, SpecialAdviser to the Secretary General for Central andEastern European Affairs, Secretary General’s Spe-cial Representative for the Caucasus and for Cen-tral Asia, Division of Political Affairs and SecurityPolicy (Directorate of Euro-Atlantic Integrationand Partnership, PfP Section, Russia and UkraineRelations Section), Division of Defence Policy andPlanning (Directorate of Defence Co-operation,Force Planning Directorate), Public DiplomacyDivision (Outreach Countries Section, Press andMedia Section, NATO Security Through ScienceProgramme), Operations Division (including CivilCrisis Response Section); International MilitaryStaff – Division of Co-operation and Regional Se-curity (Co-operation Policy Branch), PartnershipStaff Elements; Permanent Delegations and Mis-sions at NATO Headquarters of: USA, United King-dom, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, the Nether-lands, Canada, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia,Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,Tajikistan.Russia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia –Department for All-European Co-operation;Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies; Councilfor Foreign and Defence Policy, Institute of Europeof the Russian Academy of Sciences; Institute ofthe USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Aca-demy of Sciences; Centre for European SecurityStudies – Institute of Scientific Information forSocial Sciences of the Russian Academy of Scien-ces; Institute for Strategic Assessments; CarnegieMoscow Centre; Institute for Applied Internatio-

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nal Research; NATO Information and Documen-tation Centre in Moscow; NATO Military LiaisonMission in Moscow; Saint Petersburg State Uni-versity.Ukraine: National Centre for Euro-Atlantic Inte-gration of Ukraine; NATO and European SecurityDivision of the European Co-operation Depart-ment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; NationalInstitute for International Security Problems un-der the National Security and Defence Council ofUkraine; National Institute for Strategic Studiesunder the President of Ukraine; National Scienceand Research Centre for Defence Technologies andMilitary Security of Ukraine (Ministry of Defen-ce); Department of International Co-operationand Board of Scientific-Technical Policy, Depart-ment of International Co-operation and EuropeanIntegration of the Ministry of Emergency Situa-tions and Protection of the Population againstthe Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe;NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine; Ukrainian Centrefor Economic and Political Studies named afterO. Razumkov; Centre for International and Euro-pean Studies at Taras Shevchenko Kyiv NationalUniversity; Centre for Peace, Conversion and Fo-reign Policy of Ukraine; Kyiv Centre for PoliticalStudies and Conflictology; Democratic InitiativesFoundation; Atlantic Council of Ukraine; Embassyof Poland (former NATO Contact Point Embassy).Moldova: General Department of InternationalSecurity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;Department of Military Policy and InternationalRelations of the Ministry of Defence; Ministry ofReintegration; OSCE Mission to Moldova; Centrefor Strategic Studies and Reforms; Euro-AtlanticCentre; Public Policy Institute; Pro Marshall Centrein Moldova.Belarus: Department of International Security andArms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;Board of International Military Co-operation ofthe Ministry of Defence; Faculty of InternationalRelations and the Centre for International Stu-dies (CENTIS) of the Belarusian State University(BGU); European Humanities University (EHU);“Strategy” Analytical Centre; Embassy of Poland(former NATO Contact Point Embassy); Bela-rusian National Front (BNF); United Civic Party(AHP) and independent experts.Azerbaijan: Foreign Relations Department andPublic Policy Department of the President’s Office;Department (Centre) for Foreign Policy Planning

and Strategic Studies of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs; International Co-operation Departmentof the Ministry of Defence; International AffairsOffice of the State Border Service; Milli Mejlis –the Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan(Standing Commission on Security and Defence);Embassy of Turkey (NATO Contact Point Embassy);Department of Conflictology and Migration Stu-dies of the Institute of Peace and Democracy andindependent experts.Georgia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Military-Poli-tical Department; Ministry of Defence: Depart-ment of Defence Policy and International Rela-tions, Department of Euro-Atlantic Integration,Main Personnel Department; General Staff: Stra-tegic Planning Board, PfP Co-ordination Staff; Na-tional Security Council: Department of Defence;Parliament: Parliamentary Delegation to the NorthAtlantic Assembly, Committee for Security andDefence; Embassy of Great Britain (former NATOContact Point Embassy); The Caucasus Institutefor Peace, Democracy and Development; GeorgianFoundation for Strategic and International Stu-dies; Georgia for NATO; Southern Caucasus Insti-tute of Regional Security.Armenia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Depart-ment of Arms Control and International Security,Policy Planning Department; Ministry of Defence:Department of Foreign Relations and MilitaryCo-operation; OSCE Mission; Embassy of Greece(NATO Contact Point Embassy); Embassy of theUSA: military attaché office; Armenian AtlanticAssociation; Armenian Centre for National and In-ternational Studies.Kazakhstan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Depart-ment of OSCE and International Security Institu-tions; Ministry of Defence: Main Directorate forInternational Programs (Directorate for Kazakh-stan–NATO Co-operation); Kazakhstan Institutefor Strategic Studies under the President of theRepublic of Kazakhstan, Centre for Foreign Policyand Analyses under the MFA, Embassy of Spain(former NATO Contact Point Embassy); Embassyof the USA (NATO Contact Point Embassy): mili-tary attaché office; Embassy of Turkey: militaryattaché office; Assessment Risks Group.Kyrgyzstan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs: centralministry apparatus, Department of Western Coun-tries and OSCE; Ministry of Defence: Board forInternational Co-operation; Security Council; Mi-nistry of Ecology and Emergency Situations: De-

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partment of Monitoring and Civil Emergency Plan-ning, Civil Defence Board (international co-ope-ration unit); International Institute for StrategicStudies under the President of the Kyrgyz Repub-lic; Embassy of Turkey (NATO Contact Point Em-bassy): military attaché office; Embassy of theUSA: military attaché office; Border Guard Service;Higher Military College; Institute for War andPeace Reporting; independent experts.Uzbekistan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Depart-ment of UN and International Political Organisa-tions; Ministry of Defence: Department for Ensur-ing Co-operation with NATO; Institute for Stra-tegic and Regional Studies under the Presidentof the Republic of Uzbekistan; Embassy of the USA;Embassy of Turkey (former NATO Contact PointEmbassy); Embassy of Germany (NATO ContactPoint Embassy); Embassy of Turkmenistan; OSCEMission; Freedom House office;Tajikistan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Depart-ment of International Organisations; Ministry ofDefence: Department of International Contacts;Security Council; Committee for the Protectionof State Borders; Embassy of France (NATO Con-tact Point Embassy); Embassy of the USA: militaryattaché office; United Nations Mission; OSCEMission; International Crisis Group; “Asia-Plus”Information Agency.

The authors would like to express their grati-tude for help received from the following insti-tutions:Management and staff of: Embassy of the Repu-blic of Poland in Moscow, Embassy of the Repu-blic of Poland in Minsk, Embassy of the Republicof Poland in Kyiv, Embassy of the Republic of Po-land in Chisinau, Embassy of the Republic of Po-land in Tbilisi, Embassy of the Republic of Polandin Baku, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Ye-revan; Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Al-maty, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tash-kent, Department of Security Policy of MFA, De-partment of Strategy and Foreign Policy Planningof MFA, Department of Information System ofMFA, Department of Europe of MFA, Internatio-nal Co-operation Department of MoD, DefencePolicy Department of MoD, National Security Bu-reau at the Chancellery of the President of theRepublic of Poland.

Special thanks for supporting the project aredue to: – Ambassador Jerzy M. Nowak and Mr MarekKuberski from the Polish Permanent Delegationto NATO and numerous other employees of theDelegation, including Marcin Kaêmierski and To-masz Sadziƒski,– Director Robert Kupiecki, Mr Miros∏aw CieÊlik,Mr Tomasz Ch∏oƒ and Mr Jaros∏aw Kurek fromthe Department of Security Policy of MFA,– Director Rafa∏ Seniuch from the InternationalCo-operation Department of MoD and Mr Micha∏Piwowar from the Defence Policy Department ofMoD,– Ambassador Jacek Multanowski and Mr Wac∏awSzczurski, from the Embassy of the Republic ofPoland in Tbilisi,– Mr Wojciech Górecki from the Embassy of theRepublic of Poland in Baku,– Colonel Micha∏ ¸agodzki from the Embassy ofthe Republic of Poland in Almaty– Ambassador Zenon Kuchciak, Mr Micha∏ ¸ab´daand Mr Sebastian Orze∏ from the Embassy of theRepublic of Poland in Tashkent.

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KEY POINTS OF THE REPORT

I. NATO’s relations with its Eastern partners

RUSSIA

The Russian Federation endeavours to developco-operation with NATO in selected fields, and indoing so it has been employing the new mecha-nism of privileged partnership initiated in 2002.By engaging in dialogue and co-operation withthe Alliance, Russia wants to increase its politi-cal prestige and its influence, and gain tangibleeconomic benefits in the field of defence. At thesame time, it does not formally aspire to NATOmembership, and does not show any willingnessto adjust to standards observed in countries ofthe Alliance through internal transformation.The relations between NATO and Russia are com-plex. On the one hand, we observe an intensifiedwillingness on Russia’s part to co-operate withNATO in some areas, and the number of eventscarried out by the Alliance in co-operation withRussia, including those related to military co-ope-ration, has markedly increased. On the otherhand, however, critical opinions of NATO and ofindividual allies in Russian rhetoric are heard evermore frequently. Moreover, Russia is departingfurther and further from the standards observedin NATO states, and treats the Alliance’s activityin the NIS area as a challenge to its interests. In its co-operation with Russia, NATO should focuson selected, specific projects based on real de-mand which could benefit both parties and en-courage Russia to carry out a democratic internaltransformation. The divergence between Russia’srights and obligations must not be widened fur-ther. NATO and Russia should make theoreticaland – more importantly – practical preparationto carry out joint peace support operations inthe NIS area.

BELARUS

Belarus does not aspire to become a NATO mem-ber and constantly has opposed any enlargementof the Alliance. The authoritarian internal policy pursued by Pre-sident Alyaksandr Lukashenko, his aggressive

anti-NATO rhetoric and lack of willingness to co--operate with NATO have made bilateral co-ope-ration very limited. Nonetheless, Belarus mustnot become completely isolated. From the pers-pective of both NATO and Belarus, dialogue atlower levels and limited co-operation in practi-cal fields seem to be beneficial and possible. Thisis further confirmed by the fact that lower-levelBelarusian politicians directly responsible forsuch co-operation have expressed their interestin developing such relations.

UKRAINE

Since 2002 Ukraine has officially aspired to joinNATO. The adoption of the NATO–Ukraine ActionPlan (NUAP) and Annual Target Plans (ATPs) allow-ed the renewed systematisation of the fields of co--operation. This co-operation is particularly activein the military field, which is related to the factthat the civilian minister of defence Yevhen Mar-chuk has given a strong impetus to defence re-form. The developments which took place overthe period 2003–04 showed however that theUkrainian authorities used the relations with theAlliance for their own ends, and did not abandonthe multidirectional policy. The democratic revolution has brought an inten-sified interest on the part of the Allies in Ukraine,and has created a highly favourable political at-mosphere around it. If the new president reallywishes to lead Ukraine to eventual NATO mem-bership, he will have to demonstrate a determi-nation to achieve real progress in implementingthe assumptions of the Strategic Defence Bulletin(SDB), introducing standards observed in NATOstates – not only in the military field but also inpolitics (Euro-Atlantic values) – and to initiate a comprehensive debate which would result in a national consensus relating to NATO member-ship. Should the new reforms be radical and effec-tive, the raising of bilateral relations to the levelof the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2006,and eventual NATO membership, seem plausible.

MOLDOVA

Moldova is in NATO’s area of interest due to theunresolved conflict over the separatist region ofTransnistria, the risk of destabilisation in the re-gion related thereto, and the problem of Russian

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troops stationed in eastern Moldova. Chisinau,on the other hand, expects NATO to grant its poli-tical support to the resolution of the Transnistriaproblem and to efforts aimed at withdrawingRussian troops from that area. Moldova has notrequested NATO to introduce peacekeeping troopsto the conflict region in the future. The develop-ment of co-operation between NATO and Mol-dova in carrying out joint activities as part ofPartnership for Peace projects is rather limited.However, one major project carried out withinthe Trust Fund, closed in 2004, is an exception.Lack of financial resources and structural weak-ness on Moldova’ part, and certain fears express-ed by Chisinau connected with Moscow’s nega-tive reaction to any intensified co-operation be-tween Moldova and NATO, remain serious obsta-cles which impede co-operation. It is expectedthat in the immediate future the level of co-ope-ration between NATO and Moldova will not bealtered.

GEORGIA

Georgia is the Alliance’s most active partner inthe Southern Caucasus and aspires to NATO mem-bership. Georgia sees the development of its co--operation with NATO as a means of strengthen-ing state security in the context of tense rela-tions with Russia, and of obtaining external sup-port for the process of defence transformation.Security problems are of fundamental impor-tance in Georgia. The support granted to Georgiaby the Alliance is so insignificant that it cannotinfluence these problems. Irrespective of theincrease in the volume of material and technicalassistance offered to Georgia, its security is notexpected to improve in a significant way unlessits “frozen conflicts” are resolved. It seems thatthis issue is unavoidable for NATO. The prospectsfor the development of co-operation betweenNATO and Georgia within the scope defined inthe Partnership are encouraging.

AZERBAIJAN

Azerbaijan wishes to co-operate more closelywith NATO and – in the long-term perspective –aspires to membership in the Alliance. Nonethe-less, Baku has not decided to announce its unequi-vocal willingness to join the Alliance because of

several important factors determining its foreignpolicy (the unquestioned priority of resolving theKarabakh conflict; neighbouring relations withRussia and Iran). From the Azerbaijani perspective,deepening co-operation with NATO may contri-bute to the improvement of the country’s securi-ty, but it should be remembered that the only part-ner which can actually guaranty the country’ssecurity is Turkey, Azerbaijan’s ally. The develop-ment of co-operation with the Alliance is seen asa way of exerting pressure on Armenia, as a methodof strengthening the country’s position in rela-tions with Russia and of winning foreign supportfor the process of transforming the armed forces.The prospects for the development of co-opera-tion between NATO and Azerbaijan are fairly po-sitive. However, a serious threat related to the vir-tualisation of the Individual Partnership ActionPlan for Azerbaijan has appeared, which may re-sult from several internal factors determining thepolicy pursued by the authorities in Baku, inclu-ding the undemocratic nature of the Azerbaijanipolitical regime.

ARMENIA

Armenia does not aspire to NATO membership,and is mainly Russia-oriented in its security policy.Nevertheless, Armenia’s co-operation with theAlliance has been gaining momentum over thelast three years. The development of relationswith NATO is associated with Yerevan’s fears ofcloser relations between Azerbaijan and the Allian-ce. Moreover, it is seen as a way of protectingthe country against a possible change in Russia’spolicy towards Armenia, and of reducing the ten-sions emerging in its immediate neighbourhood.Potential fields of co-operation between Arme-nia and NATO are limited by the unresolved Kara-bakh conflict, the alliance with Russia and Arme-nia’s unfavourable relations with Turkey. In itspolicy towards Armenia, NATO should concen-trate on encouraging Armenia to carry out defen-ce reform and resolve its conflicts with its neigh-bours.

KAZAKHSTAN Kazakhstan does not strive to integrate withNATO, and its policy towards the Alliance is re-strained. The years 2002–04 saw a significant in-crease in Kazakhstan’s activity within the confi-

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nes of the PfP. Astana sees the development of co--operation with NATO as a way of gaining realmaterial and political benefits and diversifyingmilitary co-operation. Furthermore, Kazakhstantreats its co-operation with the Alliance as a bar-gaining chip in its relations with Russia. The un-democratic system of government in Astana, Ka-zakhstan’s dependence on its defence co-opera-tion with Russia and the nature of the Alliance’sinterest in Central Asia (which is practically limit-ed to purposes related to the operation in Afgha-nistan) restrict the area of co-operation betweenNATO and Astana. In its policy towards Kazakh-stan NATO should offer concrete benefits, but atthe same time it should voice some requirements.

KYRGYZSTAN

Although increasingly intensive, the co-opera-tion with NATO is not a priority for Kyrgyzstan,which in the field of security is mainly focusedon developing co-operation with Russia. In Kyr-gyzstan NATO is seen as a structure which canoffer financial and technical support. The nega-tive economic situation in the country and itsauthoritarian regime limit the prospects for co--operation. NATO should take into considerationthat in the near future Kyrgyzstan will continueto depend on external help. While bearing thisin mind, NATO should combine the increase intargeted help (including that related to bordersecurity) with formulating stricter requirementstowards Kyrgyzstan associated with the intro-duction of the values and standards observed inNATO states.

UZBEKISTAN

Since 11 September 2001, Uzbekistan, which aspi-res to the role of a regional leader, has been themost active of the Central Asian countries co-ope-rating with NATO. In spite of this, Uzbek authori-ties have prioritised bilateral relations in their fo-reign policy. This is why NATO is perceived in thecontext of relations with the USA. In its foreignand security policy Uzbekistan is driven by theprinciple of balancing between the three majorpartners (Russia, China, USA) and avoiding overlyclose relations with any of these. The most seriousobstacle hampering the development of co-ope-ration between NATO and Uzbekistan lies in Uz-

bek president Islam Karimov’s authoritarian re-gime, which is struggling with major internal pro-blems. Due to the nature of the regime, any NATOstrategy applied to the authorities in Tashkent isunlikely to result in success, which would meanconvincing Uzbekistan to start a more construc-tive co-operation with the Alliance.

TAJIKISTAN

Tajikistan was the last of the Central Asian coun-tries to develop relations with NATO (it joinedthe PfP in 2002) and continues to be interested inbroadening co-operation. The Alliance is seen asa partner which can help in achieving a partialdiversification of co-operation in the field of secu-rity. The co-operation itself remains rather limit-ed, which results from Tajikistan’s fears of thereaction of Russia, with which Dushanbe hasclose political and military relations, and frominsufficient knowledge of the mechanisms of co--operation. For the Alliance, the importance ofTajikistan lies in the fact that it borders on Afgha-nistan. NATO should emphasise the developmentof an informational policy and consider its invol-vement in the field of “soft” security.

TURKMENISTAN

Turkmenistan is not interested in developingrelations with NATO, and bilateral co-operationis limited to civilian affairs. The totalitariannature of the political regime and the policy ofself-isolation in the international context are themain obstacles in deepening its relations withthe Alliance. It should be noted, however, thatTurkmenistan acknowledges NATO’s role in Cen-tral Asia and has not withdrawn from relationswith the Alliance, even if they are purely symbo-lic. NATO’s initiatives aimed at intensifying itsrelations with Turkmenistan are regularly igno-red by Ashgabat, and the prospects for co-ope-ration remain very limited.

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II. NATO’s policy towards its Eastern partners

Geographically, the NIS area lies partly in Europe,which is becoming increasingly integrated as a zoneof freedom and prosperity. On the other hand, so-me of the NIS states are located in a zone of insta-bility which is a source of numerous threats forNATO member states in the field of “soft” and tra-ditionally understood security, or they lie in theclose neighbourhood of such areas. Instability inthe NIS area is further deepened by the deficiencyof democratic standards in countries of that re-gion. Therefore, the basic objective of the policy pur-sued by NATO and its member states towards itsEastern partners should be to offer active assis-tance to the process of internal democratic trans-formation in the partner states (in the defencesectors, in particular) and to support stabilisationefforts in the NIS area by helping the states ofthat region to improve their capacity to counter-act threats related to security, and to co-operatewith NATO in that field. In the context of specificproblems the Alliance should, inter alia, simplifythe structure of different forms of partnership; ex-tend the priority of building interoperability withsome of the partners, and combine it with thebuilding of democratic defence institutions; com-bine (whenever possible) the co-operation withpartners with the issue of “soft” security; enhancethe flexibility of co-operation mechanisms andthe financing thereof (by extending the applica-bility of the Trust Fund mechanism, among othermeans); counteract the devaluation of major part-nership mechanisms, the IPAP and PAP-DIB in par-ticular; strive to eliminate those co-operation ini-tiatives which do not result in tangible benefits;improve the mechanisms of co-ordinating co-ope-ration and assistance (including the bilateral ones)to avoid harmful duplication; enhance its institu-tional presence in the partner states by offeringpersonnel and technical support to liaison officersand establishing permanent NATO offices; signi-ficantly intensify the informational policy in part-ner states; initiate a discussion with interestedpartners, focused on local conflicts in the NIS area,support their efforts aimed at resolving such con-flicts and organise theoretical and practical pre-parations to carry out or support a peace support

operation in that area, should an initial politicalagreement be reached. NATO has devised instruments such as MAP, NUAPand IPAP which, if applied consistently, mightexert serious influence on the NIS area. For NATO,this could be an opportunity to play a new im-portant role as a promoter of democratic changeand stability in the area. The lack of political willmanifested by some of the partners is a majorobstacle to achieving these goals. This mainly re-sults from the undemocratic nature of politicalregimes in power in most of the Eastern part-ners. In this context, a comprehensive approachfrom NATO and all the allies to transformation--related tasks and some forms of co-operationbetween the Alliance and other democratic struc-tures (such as the European Union and OSCE) intheir initiatives in the NIS area, are all the more ne-cessary. The Alliance’s internal problems are a fun-damental obstacle to NATO’s potential in the fieldof democratic transformation and stabilisationin the NIS area. By this is meant here the lack ofa common concept of policy towards that area,the lack of consensus among the allies as to cer-tain forms of partner policy, and the direction ofdevelopment of relations with individual part-ners. Without reaching such a consensus basedon the community of the allies’ interests, NATOmight be unable to play its important new role inthe NIS area. Reaching such a consensus will notbe possible without a comprehensive debate amongNATO member states, to which this Report mightbe a modest contribution.

III. Poland and NATO’s policytowards the Eastern partners

Poland’s geopolitical location, economic condi-tions and historical ties make its relations withthe Eastern neighbours one of the priorities ofPolish foreign policy, and any destabilisation inthat area may pose a threat to Poland’s interests.The importance of the NIS area in the context ofPoland’s security requires carefully planned andfar-reaching activities aimed at promoting West-ern, Euro-Atlantic values and stabilisation in theregion. It is in Poland’s interest that these goalsare efficiently achieved within the strong Euro--Atlantic Partnership. Poland’s bilateral relations

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with the NIS-area countries should not be redu-ced to making and maintaining contacts and im-proving the statistics, but should focus on deve-loping effective co-operation combined withjoint initiatives carried out under the auspices ofthe PfP. As part of the “Eastern dimension” of NATO’s po-licy, Poland should shift the emphasis from thesphere of declarations to the sphere of practicalactions. In this context, Poland’s activities shouldbe backed by proper financial involvement andcarried out, whenever possible, jointly with otherallies, in particular Western European countries.Poland must strive to keep Eastern issues con-stantly within the Alliance’s area of interest. Fromthe perspective of Poland’s raison d’état, the in-clusion of Ukraine in NATO is particularly impor-tant. Poland’s most valuable contribution to NATOis its knowledge of the East and its experience inconducting defence reform.

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Part I

NATO and the Eastern

partners:

basic information

Marek Menkiszak,

Jacek Wróbel,

Krzysztof Strachota,

Marta Jaroszewicz

Introduction

In late 1991 and early 1992 a particular group ofstates were among others which became NATO’spartners. Henceforth these states will be refer-red to as the Eastern partners. These states wereformer Soviet republics which entered the inter-national political scene in 1991 following the col-lapse of the USSR. The term “Eastern partners”will not be used to apply to Lithuania, Latvia andEstonia, former Soviet republics which in fact hadgained independence a few months earlier, andexperienced different political developments.There is one element apart from geographicallocation and historical background which linksall the Eastern partners defined above. It is thefact that these countries have links with Russiato a more or less close degree, and have institutio-nalised these relations in the form of the Com-monwealth of Independent States (CIS). Thesecountries also share a large amount of problemssuch as Soviet-type defence structures, difficulteconomic situations, a deficiency of democraticstandards, a number of unresolved conflicts, andother problems associated with the transforma-tion process.

Factors determining security in the NIS area: a brief review

1. EASTERN EUROPE – factorsdetermining regional security

General viewEastern Europe is a region whose borders (parti-cularly the western ones) are defined accordingto political rather than geographical criteria. Cur-rently, this region unambiguously comprises theEuropean parts of those post-Soviet states whichare not EU or NATO members, i.e. the Europeanpart of Russia (including the Kaliningrad oblast,which is a Russian exclave), Ukraine, Belarus andMoldova. The area defined above is large (c. 5.1million sq. km.) and densely populated (c. 175 mil-lion inhabitants); its major part lies within theborders of the Russian Federation. Ethnically, thepopulation is predominantly Slavic (Russians, Uk-rainians, Belarusians) but Moldovan Romanians,Turkic peoples (Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Gagauz,

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and others), Caucasian peoples (Chechens, the peo-ples of Dagestan, and others), Finno-Ugric peoples(Mordvins, Udmurts, Maris, and others) live theretoo. In terms of religion, Orthodox Christiansform a majority, but there are also large groupsof Roman Catholics, Uniates and Muslims. Located within the borders delineated above,Eastern Europe is on the one hand an area inter-connected by strong economic ties (energy net-work, transport system, mutual commercial re-lations), but on the other it is sharply diversifiedin terms of the internal situation, the nature andevolution of local political systems, etc. Since the late eighteenth century a large part ofthat area, with its turbulent history, has been a component of Russian statehood (the RussianEmpire, and later the USSR). Currently, Russiacontinues to exert massive influence on the East-ern European states which were established afterthe collapse of the USSR. This is manifested, interalia, in the field of security. Russian troops arestationed in all the states of the region. Russiaand Belarus co-operate very closely in the fieldof security and defence. Nonetheless, the influ-ence in the region of Western states and struc-tures, such as the European Union, the USA andto a lesser extent NATO, is growing.

Factors determining internal securityThe Eastern European states are continuing toundergo a complex transformation process. It hasbeen noticeable, particularly in recent years, thatthere seems to be a growth of systemic divergen-ces among them. In terms of economy, Russia,Ukraine and Moldova are states which have madeadvanced progress in introducing a market eco-nomy, but there is also Belarus, with its basicallynon-market economy. As far as the political sys-tem is concerned, there is an authoritarian dicta-torship in Belarus, the strengthening of a mode-rately authoritarian system in Russia, weak de-mocracy in Moldova and a transformation fromoligarchic democracy to Western-type democracyin Ukraine. These aspects, combined with econo-mic problems (most seriously in Moldova), cul-tural differences and ethnic tensions (especiallyin Russia and Moldova) tend to foster conflict situ-ations. The scale of such conflicts, however, is usu-ally smaller than it had been in the early 1990s.

Conflict-generating potential of the regionAs a region, Eastern Europe does not lack ten-sions or conflicts. However, these have emergedmost clearly in two major areas – Transnistria inMoldova and the Northern Caucasus in Russia.However, threats related to what is referred to as“soft” security are common for the entire region. The frozen Transnistrian conflict in Moldova isone of the most serious sources of destabilisa-tion in the region. Russia is a de facto party tothis conflict due to the fact, among other things,that the remaining part of the Operational Groupof Russian Forces (OGRF) is stationed there.NATO states have made the ratification of theadapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty(CFE) dependent on the withdrawal of Russiantroops from Moldova and Georgia. Therefore, thesolution to this problem is of major importancefor relations between the West and Russia, andfor the stabilisation of the situation in Europe.Although still there is no peace treaty betweenMoldova proper and the separatist TransnistrianRepublic (the only agreement which is in force isa memorandum not to resort to military mea-sures and the necessity to find a political solu-tion to the problem), an outbreak of armed con-flict is not very likely. In spite of that, furtherpolitical and economic conflicts between Chisi-nau and Tiraspol cannot be excluded. The func-tioning of the separatist republic implies a prob-lem of illegal trade in arms (either manufacturedby Transnistrian companies, or probably origi-nating from Russian arms depots in Transnistria)and poses threats related to the strengthening oforganised crime structures (smuggling, traffickingin human beings, illegal migration). This is con-nected with the fact that the internationally un-recognised Transnistrian Republic does not con-sider itself bound by international legal commit-ments made by Moldova (although the authori-ties of the separatist republic are in some caseswilling to co-operate with structures of otherstates).Another serious problem is political and ethnicconflicts in the Northern Caucasus. In this con-text, the most serious of such problems is theconflict in Chechnya, where separatist tenden-cies were (and still are) traditionally strong. Theintervention of the Russian army and securityforces in the republic in the years 1994–96, and

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again since 1999, has led to significant humanand material losses. In Chechnya and other repu-blics of the Northern Caucasus cases are contin-ually encountered of the authorities’ and securityforces’ violating fundamental human rights andthe rule of law, which is confirmed by numerousreports from international democratic institu-tions and non-governmental organisations. Thishas caused a radicalisation of the part of the ar-med Chechen opposition, who more and morefrequently resort to terror; in addition – this situ-ation leads to destabilisation, strengthens the in-fluence of Islamic fundamentalism, and causesan escalation of symptoms of terrorism in theentire non-ethnically Russian Northern Caucasus.Combined with long-standing local ethnic con-flicts and a difficult economic situation, thesedevelopments form an immense potential fordestabilisation which additionally poses threatto the neighbouring regions (the Southern Cau-casus in particular). Furthermore, it is a source ofthreats in the field of “soft” security, which im-pact upon NATO and EU member states, amongothers. The other disputes and conflicts emerging in thatregion do not currently have any major destabili-sation potential. This concerns some of the notfully resolved border disputes and ethnic tensions(including those between the Crimean Tatarsand the Slavic inhabitants of Crimea in Ukraine).

Apart from the above-mentioned threats, theregion of Eastern Europe is where other threatsemerge, in particular those related to “soft” se-curity. From the perspective of NATO and EUmember states, the most serious problems in-clude limited effectiveness of control over theexport of arms and dual purpose products (thisproblem, to varying degrees, is present in all thecountries of the region); the activity of interna-tional terrorist networks; drugs smuggling andtrafficking in human beings (the main smug-gling channels from Asia to Western Europe runthrough Eastern Europe); cross-border organisedcrime; the safety of nuclear power plants. The im-provement of the safety of nuclear weapon stor-age and preventing the proliferation of nucleartechnologies are problems specific to Russia, a nu-clear power.

Final remarksDespite numerous problems and security chal-lenges, Eastern Europe – compared with the re-maining NIS-area regions – has the best pros-pects for developing and tightening its relationswith Euro-Atlantic structures, including NATO.This is further confirmed by the permanent in-crease in those structures’ involvement in East-ern Europe. The European Union has includedUkraine, Moldova and Belarus in the EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy (however, it should be no-ted that Belarus is currently unable to benefitfrom the main ENP instruments). The EU is con-tinuing to develop its special dialogue and co--operation with Russia. The co-operation betweenNATO and the states of that region is gainingmomentum as well. This includes privileged dia-logue and co-operation with Russia, and withUkraine (in this case, the co-operation has reach-ed the highest level of advancement). The suc-cess of the democratic revolution which tookplace in Ukraine in late 2004 is potentially a posi-tive factor for influencing the region’s develop-ment prospects. All of these elements are con-ducive to the adoption of Western standards byat least some of the states of the region. Marek Menkiszak, Jacek Wróbel

2. THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS –factors determining regional security

General viewThe Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan,Georgia) is a region located between the range ofthe Greater and Lesser Caucasus and betweenthe Black and Caspian Sea. Although not verylarge (186,000 sq. km.), the area is highly diver-sified in terms of ethnic composition (Caucasiannations – Georgians, Abkhaz, Lezgins and others;Turkic nations – Azeris; Indo-European nations –Armenians) and religion (Christians of differentdenominations; Shiite and Sunni Muslims), andis afflicted with strong regionalisms, separa-tisms and conflicts which are deeply and firmlyrooted in the long and rich history of the region. The Southern Caucasus is internally diversified,but from the functional point of view it is oneregion, as in principle all local problems influ-ence the general situation in that area. In orderto be effective, any possible solutions to these

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problems and to the regional development pro-jects should refer to all of the Southern Cauca-sian states. The Southern Caucasus is located at a strategicintersection of traditional and present-day com-munication routes connecting the North with theSouth (Russia – the Middle East) and the Eastwith the West (Europe – Central Asia; this is theonly route which does not run through Russiaand Iran). Therefore, control over these routes al-ways was, and continues to be, of strategic im-portance for Russia, Iran, Turkey, the EU and theUSA, and since the collapse of the USSR the com-petition for such control has had a major influ-ence on the situation of the entire region. Thetraditional importance of communication routesin the Southern Caucasus is reinforced by relati-vely large deposits of crude oil and natural gasin the shelf of the Caspian Sea, and by the compe-tition of powers for the control over explorationof deposits and trade in natural resources. Nearly 200 years of Russian presence in the South-ern Caucasus, Russia’s strategic interests, the im-perial mentality of a significant part of the Russianelites, together with the power of its political,economic (including control over the energy sec-tor, and over the major part of economies of theSouthern Caucasus states) and military instru-ments make Russia’s influence the strongest inthe region.Furthermore, Moscow possesses the most usefulpolitical, economic and military instruments,which are crucial for resolving the present con-flicts. Russia is the only country to maintain basesand military installations in all of the region’s re-publics, moreover, it provides patronage for themajority of political organisations associating Ar-menia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and its controlover the economy and its civilisational impactare the most profound. Whereas Russia’s presencein the region is approved of in Armenia, it pro-vokes objection in the remaining two republics,most notably in Georgia.At the same time, the presence and interests inthe region of the European Union (concerning,among other matters, the inclusion of the South-ern Caucasus in the European NeighbourhoodPolicy in 2004), the USA (driven by its involve-ment in ensuring stabilisation in the region,geo-economic interests – searching for alterna-tive sources of crude oil and natural gas – and its

growing political and military presence, seen asan element of establishing the USA’s position inthe Near and Middle East region and in Russia)and Turkey are becoming more and more serious.The USA’s activity is particularly disturbing forRussia (and Iran), and has an impact on the paceat which the political situation is developing.

Conflict-generating potential of the regionDuring fourteen years of independence the South-ern Caucasus has shown considerable potentialfor instability. Currently, most of the conflicts arein the “frozen” stage, but their deeply rooted cau-ses still remain valid. 1. “Para-states”. The civil wars of the early1990s, supported by Russia’s unofficial but con-siderable help, resulted in the separation of Abk-hazia and South Ossetia from Georgia; as a con-sequence of the conflict between Azerbaijan andArmenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the surround-ing areas conquered during the fighting, becameseparated from Azerbaijan with the help ofArmenia, in turn supported by Russia. The politi-cal organisms which emerged thereafter possessall the attributes of independence except inter-national recognition; Abkhazia and South Ossetiahave close political and economic relations withRussia, Karabakh likewise with Armenia; these“para-states” are treated by Moscow as instru-ments for exerting pressure on Georgia and Azer-baijan and securing Russia’s influence in Arme-nia. The capital cities have not abandoned theidea of regaining control over these regions, andin the context of the negative results of interna-tional mediation (and Russia’s deciding vote),the growing danger of armed reintegration (e.g.the cumulating tension over South Ossetia in2004, and the “arms race” and war rhetoric inAzerbaijan) poses a serious threat to the stabili-sation of the entire region. It should be notedthat the problem of other separatisms and strongregionalisms, although to an incomparably small-er extent, has so far not been resolved, particu-larly in Georgia and Azerbaijan.2. International conflicts. Two of the threeSouthern Caucasian states – Azerbaijan andArmenia – remain in an actual state of cold war,which is manifested inter alia in the maintenanceof a mutual and permanent economic and politicalblockade. Additionally, Armenia is being blocked

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by Turkey, Azerbaijan’s ally. Furthermore, thereis tension in relations between Georgia and Russia;Russia resorted to force and offered military sup-port to Abkhazia and South Ossetia during the ci-vil wars in Georgia in the 1990s, and since 1999has threatened Georgia with attack (with parti-cular intensity in late 2004 and early 2005) underthe pretext of the fight against the Chechen ar-med underground, which allegedly has its basein Georgia.3. “Pervasion of conflicts”. The situation in theRussian Northern Caucasus has an immensenegative impact on the security in the SouthernCaucasus. Since the early 1990s the “para-states”have been supplied with volunteers, arms, etc.from the northern part of the Caucasus. TheChechen conflict is the most serious problem, asit is connected with periodic southward infiltra-tion of militants, accusations and threats voicedby Russia, as well as crime-related and humani-tarian problems. Moreover, the development offundamentalist tendencies in the Northern Cau-casus (in Chechnya and Dagestan in particular),and the terrorism associated with it, is potentiallydangerous, especially for Muslim Azerbaijan.The growing tension in relations between theUSA and Iran has an additional negative impacton the Southern Caucasus, in both political andeconomic contexts.

The unresolved conflicts in the states of theSouthern Caucasus are impeding or even blockinginternational co-operation; they ensure Russia’sprivileged position, deter political and economicpartners, accelerate the local “arms race”, etc. In-directly, they result in criminal threats (e.g. relat-ed to smuggling through corruption-stricken bor-ders which are difficult to seal), humanitarianand political problems (such as the question of re-fugees – mainly Georgians, Azeris and Chechens).

Factors determining internal security The relative weakness of the state and of politi-cal mechanisms remains a major problem for theregion. Since independence, the rotation of rul-ing elites and the succession of power have inthe large majority of cases been illegal. In Geor-gia, there was a civil war in 1992 and a peacefulrevolution led by Saakashvili in 2003; in Arme-nia, a bloodless coup d’etat in 1998 and a mas-sacre in the Parliament in 1999; in Azerbaijan,

coups d’etat in 1992 and 1993, and the legal, al-though undemocratic, election of Ilham Aliyevin 2003), and the authorities’ dialogues with oppo-sition and society do not usually comply fullywith Western standards.Another important obstacle impeding stabilisa-tion in the region is the deep socio-economic crisiswhich hinders the strengthening of statehood,conflict resolution and the financing of politicaland social reforms. Mass labour migration (inparticular to Russia) is a particularly strikingsymptom of the crisis – on average, one-third ofall the inhabitants of Armenia, Azerbaijan andGeorgia live and work abroad on a permanent ortemporary basis.

Final remarks Despite the fact that the Southern Caucasus isafflicted with deep and complex conflicts andproblems, some positive tendencies are notice-able. The growing political and economic invol-vement of the West (the USA, the EU, NATO) isstimulating internal reforms, and the develop-ment of individual states in the region fostersthe development of regional and trans-regionalco-operation (e.g. in connection with the build-ing of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline; NATOas a forum for contacts between Armenia andAzerbaijan) and the process of resolving con-flicts (the reintegration of Ajaria in 2004) or atleast managing them (South Ossetia, 2004).Apart from that, we have observed a number ofpositive tendencies in the region which fosterthe creation of stable and development-orientedpolitical mechanisms, such as the gradual im-provement of situation in Georgia following the“rose revolution”, and new prospects for the co--operation of Georgia and the region with theWest within the confines of the EU’s EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy. Krzysztof Strachota

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3. CENTRAL ASIA: factors determining regional security

Note: The following text was prepared prior to theMarch 2005 regime change in Kyrgyzstan

General viewCentral Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) is a highly diversifiedregion in terms of geography (nearly 4 millionsq. km. of land of various configurations, clima-tes, availability of water, etc.), demography (ran-ging from desolate deserts and steppes to one ofthe world’s most densely populated areas, theFerghana Valley), economy (an abundance of natu-ral resources, in particular large deposits of cru-de oil and natural gas in Kazakhstan and Turkme-nistan, and the exploration thereof; differencesin the level of advancement of industry and agri-culture); ethnic background (the Turkic or Turanicnations, the Indo-European nations, i.e. the Ira-nian Tajiks and the Slavic minorities), culture (dif-ferent traditions and historical civilisation models– steppe cultures, Turkish, Persian, Russian tradi-tions; the non-homogenous attitude towards Is-lam, et al.) Central Asia’s internal diversity hasincreased since the collapse of the USSR and thebeginning of each country’s individual transfor-mation processes. This means that security-re-lated problems at sub-regional and local levelsare highly diversified.

External factors determining regional security The distinctive character of the region is particu-larly visible in the geopolitical context; Russiatreats the individual states of the region as itsexclusive zone of strategic influence (Moscowclaims a right to a monopoly on the militarypresence in the region, political patronage overthe relations of the states of the region with theoutside world, and to control over strategicbranches of the economy, especially those relat-ed to exploration and distribution of fossil fuels).Neither the development of relations with theUSA and NATO, nor the participation of indivi-dual states in the anti-terrorist campaign after 11 September 2001 (including the presence ofAmerican and allied troops in the region) hassucceeded in significantly altering this situation. In spite of Russia’s still decisive influence, con-

sistent attempts are made to weaken its mono-poly, particularly by the USA (within the confinesof that country’s global policy, and most notice-ably after September 11th) as well as by regionalpowers (China, but likewise India, Pakistan, Iranand Turkey). From the point of view of thesestates (apart from the USA, which is activelyinvolved in the field of security policy) the maincurrent field of activity is connected with find-ing durable economic ties (including those relat-ed to transport) with the region. It is expectedthat the influence of these countries will gain inimportance, while the mechanism assembledaround Russia will lose its impact. At the same time, it should be stressed that thesignificance of trans-regional problems veryoften has an immense impact on the individualstates, e.g. the special place and activity of Turk-menistan and Kazakhstan in the Caspian Searegion (and by extension the inclusion of thesecountries in processes and problems occurringoutside of Central Asia), and Uzbekistan andTajikistan’s specific dependence on Afghanistan(until 2001, Afghanistan supported the Islamicopposition in those countries, while at the sametime it was a playground for Tashkent and Du-shanbe’s actions behind the scenes; the issue ofdrug trafficking still remains a problem), amongother matters. Despite numerous efforts, the Central Asian sta-tes have not managed to create an efficient re-gional co-operation forum in either the political,economic or military dimensions. The only activeorganisations associating the states of the region(apart from Turkmenistan, which is self-isolatedor only symbolically present) are dominated byRussia and subordinate to its interests (e.g. theCIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation,and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation).

Internal factors determining regional securityAll the countries of the region are in the phase ofshaping their statehood, and undergoing politi-cal, economic and social transformation; all ofthem – although to different degrees – are afflict-ed with problems related to this issue. In all ofthese countries, authoritarian tendencies are in-creasing in strength (in Turkmenistan they aredownright totalitarian), which is manifested inthe weakness or lack of political opposition (there-

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by threatening the radicalisation thereof), instan-ces of human rights violation, etc. These tenden-cies were further confirmed by the recent elec-tions and electoral campaigns which took placein all the states of the region (starting from theSeptember 2004 elections in Kazakhstan, throughthe ballot in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, to theelections in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). It shouldbe noted that since the gaining of independencein the region, there have been no instances of a transfer of power (excluding Tajikistan, underthe circumstances of a civil war), and the problemof succession of power is one of the major drivingforces of internal policy. Kazakhstan, in connection with the reforms con-ducted there and the skilful management of thecrude oil sector, is a leader among the NIS statesin terms of economic development. But with thisexception, all the states of the region are strug-gling with a profound economic crisis which ne-gatively impacts on their independence, develop-ment prospects, living standard and public mood.The economic crisis in Uzbekistan has resultedin particularly disturbing social consequences.The region’s economic problems are heightenedby the consequences of a population boom dur-ing the last two decades. The emergence of an ideological vacuum (not,however, including Turkmenistan), which can-not possibly be filled with national ideas or stateideas, is another negative aspect of the transfor-mation process. Furthermore, the developmentof externally fuelled religious fundamentalism,which results from the accumulation of prob-lems and reflects social unrest, is particularlydangerous for the entire region. What is mostdisturbing is the development of the pan-Islamicradical Hizb ut-Tahrir party (mainly active in thewhole Ferghana Valley and Uzbekistan), and theemergence in 2004 of a new form of fighting –suicide bomb attacks in Uzbekistan (the perpe-trators most probably included citizens of Kazakh-stan). None of the measures taken by the autho-rities of individual states seem to have been suf-ficient to reverse this process, or at least slow itdown. The negative impact on Central Asian se-curity of factors such as the socio-economic crisiscombined with geographical determinants (longborders, difficult to protect; the proximity of Af-ghanistan, the world’s leading opium producer;the Central Asian states’ location along the fa-

vourable transport routes Afghanistan–Russia––Japan or Western Europe) as well as a relativelyweak state apparatus, heightens the threats re-lated to trafficking in drugs, arms and humanbeings, mainly from the territory of Afghanistan.

Conflict-generating potential of the regionIn the post-Soviet history of Central Asia, themost frequently occurring threats to its stabilityas of now have been outbreaks of local conflictsrooted in mutually reinforcing ethnic/regional,socio-economic and ideological problems (forexample, the series of local conflicts and unrestin the Kyrgyz and Uzbek parts of the FerghanaValley between 1989–1995, and in particular thecivil war in Tajikistan between 1992–97), andlater, with actions carried out by fundamentalistorganisations aimed at bringing down theauthorities, especially in Uzbekistan (namely theattacks carried out by the Islamic Movement ofUzbekistan in 1999 and 2000, and attacks ongovernment buildings and embassies in Uzbe-kistan in 1999 and 2004). The emergence of suchproblems in upcoming months and years cannotbe excluded, particularly in the whole FerghanaValley and Uzbekistan. Although open armed conflicts between indivi-dual states in Central Asia have not broken out,armed incidents have occurred (such as the bom-bardment of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan by Uzbekforces during the “Batken crises”), as has indi-rect participation in domestic conflicts (duringthe civil war in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russiasupported the government forces), not to men-tion demonstrations and threats to resort toforce (during the tensions between Turkmeni-stan and Uzbekistan, and between Uzbekistanand Kyrgyzstan, inter alia). Next to matters of pre-stige, the main causes for tensions were relatedto border disputes (the process of the final deli-neation of borders within the region has not yetbeen completed) and the increasingly urgent pro-blems connected with water management (thereis a lack of co-ordination between the states re-garding individual sections of the rivers; also, a defective and conflict-bearing system of com-pensating for concessions in water managementpolicy – the periodical suspension of Uzbekistan’spayments to Kyrgyzstan for water with coal andnatural gas in the winter months). It must be ta-

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ken into account that the problem of water man-agement will gain in importance, which – com-bined with the lack of efficient co-operation me-chanisms – may lead to the potential escalationof conflict.

The situation in Afghanistan is a factor whichhas traditionally determined security in CentralAsia. The perspective of a renewal of fighting inthat country (in the case of a possible end of theUSA–NATO mission in Afghanistan) could havedisastrous consequences for the entire region.Currently, however, this threat relates mainly tothe issue of “soft” security. Krzysztof Strachota

The Importance of the Easternpartners for NATO

There is a number of reasons why NATO has beenintensifying its interest in the Eastern partners:

– the enlargement of NATO and the eastward ex-pansion of the geographical and political areaof the Alliance’s activityAs a result of the two most recent NATO enlarge-ments (in 1999 and 2004), 10 Central and EasternEuropean countries were included in the NATOarea, whose borders have thus been significantlyexpanded eastwards. A large number of the newlyaccepted states are associating their vital inte-rests with the Eastern neighbourhood, and are ac-tively interested in ensuring stabilisation in thatregion. Following the latest enlargements, thecountries of the NIS region (NATO’s Eastern part-ners) now outnumber the remaining NATO part-ner states. Currently, the Eastern partners makeup 60% of all the countries which participate inthe Partnership for Peace (12 out of 20 countries).

– the geography of sources of threats to the se-curity of the NATO area, comprising the south-ern parts of NIS states, Central Asia and theSouthern Caucasus in particularThe evolution of the nature of threats to the se-curity of the Alliance (resulting in the enhancedrole of asymmetrical threats) and its related in-ternal transformation have contributed to NATO’sintensified activity in areas located further eastof the NATO area. Currently, particular impor-tance is placed on NATO’s peace support opera-tion in Afghanistan, which implies enhanced in-terest in the security-related situation in the neigh-bouring regions (including Central Asia), and alongroutes for the redeployment of troops and equip-ment (including the Southern Caucasus). More-over, it has become evident that the area ofthreats to the security of the North Atlantic areaforms a “zone of instability” comprising the South-ern Caucasus and Central Asia, among others, aswell as Transnistria. Efforts aimed at ensuring sta-bilisation in these regions have become a drivingforce in the process of enhancing the Alliance’sinvolvement in relations and co-operation, andin supporting the reforms conducted in the coun-tries of these regions.

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– the necessity for NATO to take a position onthe membership aspirations of some of the East-ern partners, Ukraine and Georgia in particularProspective NATO membership has been consider-ed by some of the Eastern partners as an aim oftheir security policy. Ukraine and Georgia haveclearly expressed such an interest. These twostates have developed active co-operation withthe Alliance. They have made serious efforts toadjust to the Allies’ standards. This has encourag-ed NATO to enhance its interest and activities re-lated to them.

– a demand for an assessment of new mecha-nisms for co-operation with Russia (the NATO––Russia Council), the improvement of relationsbetween NATO and Russia in 2001, which hadan impact on the Alliance’s co-operation withsome other Eastern partnersRussia continues to be the Alliance’s unique part-ner. An improvement in the relations betweenNATO and Russia since the events of 11 Septem-ber 2001 has contributed to the creation of a newform of deepened co-operation. A need has emer-ged to assess the effects of its functioning. Onthe other hand, these events have created ini-tially better circumstances for the co-operationof other Eastern partners with NATO, includingthose which previously used to co-operate withthe Alliance on a very limited basis.

– a need to assess the new mechanisms of co--operation with Ukraine (the Action Plan) andother Eastern partners (IPAP, PAP-T, PAP-DIB)Ukraine remains a distinctive partner for NATO,and the positive resolution of the Ukrainian po-litical crisis in late 2004 offers conditions for bi-lateral relations and co-operation to become yetcloser. It seems that an assessment of the effectsand a possible revision of the new form of rela-tions between NATO and Ukraine (the NATO––Ukraine Action Plan), initiated in 2002, are ne-cessary. NATO is conducting regular reviews andadaptations of other partnership instruments,particularly the newer ones initiated after 2002,mainly for the benefit of the Eastern partners(IPAP, PAP-T, PAP-DIB).

– a number of problems in relations with theEastern partners which require NATO’s reactionNATO’s relations with the Eastern partnersabound in numerous problems (discussed in otherparts of this Report). Resolving them is not pos-sible without implementation of the hitherto ap-proved decisions and initiatives, and the adop-tion of new ones, by NATO.

– the destabilising influence of the unresolvedconflicts in the NIS area on the security of theNorth Atlantic area, regional security and co--operation between the Eastern partners andthe AllianceThe unresolved, “frozen” conflicts in the NIS area,particularly in Transnistria and the SouthernCaucasus, have a destabilising influence on thesecurity of neighbouring states and the regionsin which they are located. Moreover they createchallenges to the security of the North Atlanticarea. Furthermore, they impede the developmentof co-operation between some of the Easternpartners and NATO, limit the prospects thereof,and hinder the processes of stabilisation anddemocratic transformation in these countries.

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NATO’s Partnership mechanismsapplicable to the Eastern part-ners after the Istanbul summit

a. Participation of NATO’s Eastern partners in Partnership mechanisms As Partnership mechanisms have developed andevolved, so Eastern partners have participatedin their subsequent patterns. The tables below

contain, in highly abbreviated form, basic infor-mation on the institutions and mechanisms ofNATO’s Partnership and the participation there-in of the individual Eastern partners, and on theforms of permanent NATO representation inthose partner countries1.

1 The below discussed Partnership institutions and mecha-nisms were presented in greater detail in the InterimProject Report published by CES, Warsaw, December 2003.

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Name ot the mechanism

North AtlanticCo-operationCouncil (NACC)

Euro-AtlanticPartnershipCouncil (EAPC)

“Partnership for Peace”Programme(PfP)

Year of introduction(end)

1991(1997)

1997

1994

Goals

A forum of multilateral dialogue andco-operation with countries of theWarsaw Pact, and later with neutralEuropean countries as well; conductingpolitical dialogue in the field of securityand defence

Has replaced the NACC, an extendedforum of dialogue and consultationbetween NATO and partners focused onissues of policy and security and the co-ordination of PfP; apart from consulta-tion activities referring to securityissues considered important for theEAPC participants, the Action Planprovides for consultation and co-opera-tion activities in fields such as crisisresponse and peace support operations,regional issues, arms control and proli-feration of weapons of mass destruc-tion, combating terrorism, defence, civilemergency planning, military co-opera-tion, nuclear security, air traffic mana-gement, scientific co-operation, etc.

A programme of practical co-operationbetween NATO and individual partnerstates (so far reformed several times),aimed at enhancing the stability andminimising threats for peace, and atbuilding reinforced relations in the fieldof security; on the basis of the PfPFramework Document, participant part-ner states are obliged to obey the rulesdefined in the UN Charter, theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights,the CSCE Final Act and in other docu-ments; achieve transparency in defenceplanning and budgetary matters; ensuredemocratic control of the armed forces;develop ability to carry out exercisesjointly with NATO; to plan and carryout peace support and humanitarianmissions.

Implementation forms

Meetings of heads of states, representa-tive of ministries, experts; one meetingformula relating to all participants

Regular meetings at the levels ofambassadors, ministers of foreignaffairs and ministers of defence; occasionally in the form of a summit.Furthermore, starting in 2005, theEAPC will hold annual the meetings in a special format, with participationof representatives from non-governmen-tal structures as a Security Forum. The composition of EAPC may differ:during plenary sessions, with participa-tion of NATO and partner groups, in the NATO plus individual partnercountry form; within the confines of the EAPC, ad hoc working groupsare also active.

The Partnership, shaped jointly byNATO and participant states, can beadjusted to the needs of these countries,and provides for a diversification oftheir participation in individual PfPmechanisms. The basic form of partici-pation in PfP consists in the implemen-tation of a two-year IndividualPartnership Programme (IPP) deve-loped on the basis of the PartnershipWork Programme (PWP); furthermore,the PfP includes a possibility of theinterested partners’ participation in PARP, OCC or IPAP.

Table 1: Selected Partnership institutions and mechanisms established prior to the Istanbul summit

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Planning andReview Process(PARP)

PermanentJoint Council(PJC)

NATO–UkraineCommission(NUC)

PfP StaffElements (PSE)

Euro-AtlanticDisaster Res-ponse Co-ordi-nation Centre(EADRCC)

Political-MilitaryFramework forNATO-led PfPOperations(PMF)

OperationalCapabilitiesConcept (OCC)

1994

1997(2002)

1997

1997

1998

1999

1999

The main operational aims of the PfPare as follows: the partners shouldachieve interoperability facilitatingtheir co-operation with forces of theNATO states and support partner states’efforts connected with defence reform.The PfP enables the partners to takepart in individual consultation withNATO, should threats to their securityemerge.

A mechanism implemented in a two-year cycle, modelled upon NATO’s forceplanning system, which offers the part-ners the Alliance’s support in the fieldof determining and assessing the armedforces and capabilities which can bemade available for the purpose of co-operating with the Alliance’s forces dur-ing NATO-led exercises and operations

A mechanism, meeting in the “16 + 1”formula (since 1999 in the “19+1”formula), for consultation, co-ordinationand possible joint decision-making andactions for NATO and Russia, focusedon 19 agreed fields

An organ for consultation and co-opera-tion between NATO and Ukraine whichdeals with assessment of the implemen-tation of the assumptions contained inthe Charter on a Distinctive Partner-ship, the NATO–Ukraine Action Plan,and possible broadening of forms of co-operation implemented so far

A mechanism for co-operation of offi-cers from NATO states and partnercountries, dealing mainly with exerciseplanning

A point for information exchange andco-ordination between NATO and thePfP member states in the field of civilemergency response

A document regulating the forms andrules of the Partners’ participation inNATO-led PfP operations

An instrument aimed at enhancing thePartner’s and the Alliance’s capabilitiesto jointly participate in future NATO-ledoperations; special emphasis is placedon developing allied multinationalforces

On the basis of information about the armed forces, inter alia through the preparation of the Survey of OverallPfP Interoperability delivered to NATOby PARP participant states, the so-called Partnership Goals aredefined to help prepare the forces of partner states to better co-operatewith the forces of NATO states; thesegoals are jointly approved by NATO and the given partner country

Regular meetings at the levels ofambassadors, military representatives,ministers of foreign affairs, ministers ofdefence, chiefs of staffs; occasionally inthe form of a summit; auxiliary cells:permanent and ad hoc working groups

Regular meetings at the level of ambas-sadors and military representatives, and at the levels of ministers of foreignaffairs, ministers of defence and chiefsof staffs; occasionally in the form of a summit

Cells which function within individualNATO military headquarters, composedof officers from partner countries andmember states

Organisation of joint exercises, opera-tions, the functioning of a joint Euro--Atlantic Disaster Response Unit(EADRU)

Reinforcement of the consultationprocess with partner countries in thephase of a crisis escalation, and thepartners’ broader involvement in discus-sions of operational plans and in theprocess of generating forces

Establishing a database on the pool of forces and capabilities offered by the partner states for the purpose of exercises and operations, on mecha-nisms of assessment thereof, and offeedback reception; increasing co--operation between staffs and specificmilitary units, the partners’ participa-tion in exercises carried out jointly with NATO forces

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PfP Trainingand EducationEnhancementProgramme(TEEP)

MembershipAction Plan(MAP)

Trust Fund (TF)

Virtual SilkHighway (VSH)

NATO–RussiaCouncil (NRC)

1999

1999

2000

2001

2002

A collection of methods for optimisationand improvement of training and education within the confines of PfP

A mechanism of the Alliance’s helpoffered to aspiring countries in theirpreparations for possible future membership, based on intensified, individualised dialogue

Initially a mechanism for helping part-ner states eliminate anti-personnelmines; later supplemented by support inthe field of destroying arms and ammu-nition, arms depots, etc. It is planned tobe extended with issues of managing theconsequences of defence reform

An infrastructural programme aimed at helping scientific and academic com-munities from the Southern Caucasus,Central Asia and Afghanistan gain easier access to computer and Internetnetworks

A mechanism, meeting in the “20”formula, and since 2004 in the “27”formula, for consultation, consensusbuilding, co-operation, common decisionmaking and carrying out joint activitiesbetween NATO and Russia in the fol-lowing 9 fields: struggle against terror-ism, crisis management, non-prolifera-tion of weapons of mass destruction,arms control and confidence-buildingmeasures, theatre missile defence,search & rescue at sea, civil emergen-cies, military-to-military co-operationand defence reform, new threats andchallenges (this list may be furtherextended with new co-operation fields)

Co-operation between NATO’s and part-ners’ training and educational institu-tions, preparing a basis for furtheractions carried out within the PfP, cre-ation of interoperability instruments forpartners, offering them instruments andmethods of exercise planning, givingthem advisory support in preparingnational training and education strate-gies, establishing distance educationand a simulation management network

Consists in the adoption of concreteadjustment actions by the participantstates on the basis of recommendationsissued by the Alliance. Responsibility for implementation there-of falls on the aspiring states; in thisrespect, NATO and member states offerthem comprehensive technical and advi-sory support, and organise review meet-ings; MAP offers its participant states a number of issues relating to allaspects of membership, from amongwhich they can select those which theyconsider most important; participationin PfP and PARP is an integral part of MAP implementation

Each project is implemented by the so-called Leading Nation (a member stateor, since 2004, a partner state), whichis responsible for winning political andfinancial support for the project; techni-cal implementation thereof is carriedout by the NATO Maintenance andSupply Agency (NAMSA)

Interconnecting scientific and academicinstitutions from participant states bymeans of a special satellite network

Regular meetings at the levels of ambassadors and military represen-tatives, ministers of foreign affairs,ministers of defence and chiefs of staffs;occasionally in the form of a summit.Other bodies are the PreparatoryCommittee and ca. 20 ad hoc workinggroups and expert groups

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NATO–UkraineAction Plan(NUAP)

IndividualPartnershipAction Plan(IPAP)

PartnershipAction PlanAgainstTerrorism

2002

2002

2002

A plan of intensified consultationsbetween NATO and Ukraine, modelledupon MAP, which simultaneously setsgoals and strategic priorities pursued by Ukraine on its way to Euro-Atlanticintegration in the following fields: political and economic issues, security,defence and military issues, informationprotection and security, legal issues

A mechanism addressed to individualpartner states, aimed at offering themtailored support relating to the processof democratic transformation in fieldssuch as political and security policyissues, defence and military issues, pub-lic information, science and civil emer-gency planning, administrative, protec-tive security and resource issues.Another purpose of IPAP is to co-ordi-nate the bilateral help granted to part-ners by NATO member states

A document aimed at setting rules &priorities of co-operation betweenNATO and partners in the field of strug-gle against terrorism and of lines ofactivity. It defines the following opera-tional goals of anti-terror co-operation:expanding political dialogue and theexchange of information, enhancing thecapability to struggle against terrorism,eliminating circumstances which facili-tate the operation of terrorist groups,the efficient neutralisation of conse-quences of terrorist attacks, and sup-porting partner states in their struggleagainst terrorism

The overall reforms goals defined inNUAP are pursued, inter alia, throughimplementing specific obligationsadopted in Annual Target Plans (ATP).Responsibility for the implementation of NUAP falls on Ukraine; NATO statesoffer help and advice in this respect

Implementation of IPAP consists in the given partner state’s preparing a Presentation Document on the basis ofwhich this country, in co-operation withthe Alliance, prepares a proper ActionPlan which defines the following: over-all goals of internal reforms and areasof those goals’ implementation, and thesupport to be granted in this respect byNATO and its member states. The IPAPimplementation cycle is two years, afterwhich an assessment of the implementa-tion is made; responsibility for imple-menting IPAP falls on the partners

PAP-T does not have separate implementation mechanisms, it is implemented through the existingPartnership instruments, particularlyIPP and IPAP; implementation is subject to assessment published byNATO and partners in reports whichcontain, among others, a list of plannedactivities

Partner

Russia

Belarus

Ukraine

Moldova

Georgia

PfPFrameworkDocument

22 June1994

11 January1995

8 February1994

16 March1994

23 March1994

FirstIPP

1995(notimple-mented)

1997

1995

1995

1996

PARP

does notparticipate

since 2004

since 1995

since 1997

since 1999

Trust Fund

-

1 project

1 project, 1 projectcompleted

1 project un-der prepara-tion, 1 projectcompleted

1 project

IPAPPresentationDocument

does not participate(participationin NRC)

does not participate

does not participate(participationin NUAP)

does not participate

7 April 2004

IPAPapproved

-

-

-

-

29 October2004

Source: Informational materials published by NATO; CES materials.

Table 2: Eastern partners’ participation in selected Partnership mechanisms (as of January 2005)

NACC/EAPC

December1991/May 1997

March 1992/May 1997

March 1992/May 1997

March 1992/May 1997

June 1992/May 1997

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Azerbaijan

Armenia

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

4 May1994

5 October1994

27 May1994

1 June1994

13 July1994

20 Febru-ary 2002

10 May1994

1996

1996

1996

1996

1996

2004

1998

since 1997

since 2002

since 2002

has declar-ed willing-ness to par-ticipate

since 2002

does not participate

does not participate

1 project

-

-

-

-

1 projectcompleted

-

19 May 2004

has declaredwillingness toparticipate

considerswhether toparticipate

does not participate

17 September2004

does not participate

does not participate

consultationsin progress

-

-

-

consultationsin progress

-

-

March 1992/May 1997

March 1992/May 1997

March 1992/May 1997

March 1992/May 1997

March 1992/May 1997

March 1992/May 1997

March 1992/May 1997

Source: NATO International Staff, CES materials

Partner

Russia

Belarus

Ukraine

Moldova

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Armenia

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Security agreement(NATO certification)

December 1995(May 1998)

June 1995 (-)

March 1995(March 1996)

October 1994(October 1998)

December 1994(December 1996)

October 1995 (May 1998)

January 1995(March 1999)

July 1996 (April 1999)

June 1995 (March 1997)

August 1995(December 1995)

October 2002(April 2003)

May 1997 (May 1998)

Signing ofPfP SOFA

-(advancednegotiations)

-

6 May 1996

6 September1996

18 July 1995

15 January1998

30 March 2004

31 July 1996

-

24 July 1996

-

-

representativesat PSE

4 liaison officers

-

3 officers

-

-

4 officers

-

1 officer

-

-

-

-

participation in NATO or US-led peace support operations

Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR)1996–2003 – up to 1400,Kosovo (KFOR) 1999–2003 – up to 3400,Mediterranean Sea (OAE) under preparation

-

Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR)1996–1999 – up to 550,Kosovo (KFOR) since 1999 – up to 460,Iraq since 2003 – up to 1800,Mediterranean Sea (OAE) under preparation

-

Kosovo (KFOR) since 1999 – up to 50,Iraq since 2003 – up to 850,Afghanistan (ISAF) since 2004 – up to 50

Kosovo (KFOR) since 1999 – up to around 50, Afghanistan (ISAF) since 2002 – up toaround 20, Iraq since 2003 – up to 150

Kosovo (KFOR) – since 2004 – up to 30,Iraq since 2005 – up to around 50

Iraq since 2003 – up to around 30

-

-

-

-

Table 3: Selected other forms of co-operation between the Eastern partners and NATO and member states (as of February 2005)

Source: NATO International Staff, CES materials

An analysis of the development of NATO Part-nership mechanisms allows clear evolutionarytendencies to be defined2.These could be summarised as follows: 1. The portfolio of areas of dialogue and co-ope-ration with partners gradually expanded, and thepresence of political aspects thereof grew. Thisfavoured a slow elimination of differences be-tween the NACC/EAPC mechanism and the PfP. 2. Despite the constant focus on building inter-operability, the awareness of the need to estab-lish more comprehensive relations with partnersgradually grew among the Allies. 3. On the one hand, the partners’ participationin shaping the partnership became more and mo-re intense on the other, the Allies’ willingness toenhance the Alliance’s involvement with the part-ners grew. 4. To an ever greater extent the Partnerships havecreated mechanisms to prepare selected part-ners for prospective Alliance membership.5. The divergence between the partners and thelevel of their relations with the Alliance has been

growing. The Alliance has actually departed fromthe principle of equal treatment of partners, andhas multiplied partnership institutions in res-ponse to political aspirations of some of the part-ners. 6. In spite of the increasingly intensive participa-tion of subsequent states in the partnership, itwas mainly addressed to countries of Central andEastern Europe and partners from the NIS area(Eastern partners). Since the recent NATO enlar-gement (March 2004) the role of the Eastern part-ners has grown significantly. 7. Problems with implementing the Alliance’s ini-tiatives focused on the partners, consistent withthe initial assumptions, have been accumulating.

b. The NATO summit in Istanbul and the Eastern partners On 28–29 June 2004 a North Atlantic Alliancesummit took place in Istanbul. On 28 June, meet-ings of heads of state & government of the mem-ber states were held, and a meeting of the NATO––Russia Council (NRC) at the level of ministers offoreign affairs took place. On 29 June, the NATO––Ukraine Commission (NUC) and the Euro-Atlan-tic Partnership Council (EAPC) held meetings atheads of states and governments level. Some ofthe decisions taken at the summit are of major im-

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Table 4: NATO representation in the Eastern partner states (as of January 2005)

Partner

Russia

Belarus

Ukraine

Moldova

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Armenia

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

NATO InformationOffice or Informationand DocumentationCentre

+

-

+

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

NATO (military) Liaison Mission

+

-

+

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Current NATO Contact Point Embassy

Italy

Lithuania

the Netherlands

Romania

Bulgaria

Turkey

Greece

USA

Turkey

Germany

France

United Kingdom

declaration of acceptinga NATO liaison officeron a rotational basis

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

not applicable

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

Source: NATO International Staff, CES materials

2 To find out more about the evolution of NATO Partnershipmechanisms prior to the Alliance summit in Istanbul, seethe Interim Project Report published by CES, Warsaw, De-cember 2003.

portance for the Eastern partners. Among otherthings, it was decided that the privileged co-ope-ration with Russia should be continued. The ques-tion of observing democratic standards in Ukraine,and in particular of holding free and fair presi-dential elections, was emphasised, and consider-ed a condition for deepening the relations be-tween NATO and Ukraine. The priority nature ofthe Alliance’s co-operation with countries of theCaucasus and Central Asia was stressed, and inthis context new instruments of dialogue and co--operation, in particular the Partnership ActionPlan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB),were initiated.The importance of the summit is connected withthe fact that the goals of NATO’s partnershippolicy were precisely defined, and the Alliancedeclared its willingness to become more deeplyinvolved in the democratic transformation (withdefence reform in particular) in the NIS states,especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia.During the Istanbul summit NATO declared itsspecial involvement in the strategically impor-tant region of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Inpractice, this was confirmed by the decision toappoint a NATO Secretary General’s Special Re-presentative for the Caucasus and for CentralAsia3, as well as to send two NATO liaison officers(one to the Southern Caucasus, the other to Cen-tral Asia) whose task would be to co-ordinatethe Alliance’s support for defence transformationin the states of the region4. NATO welcomed the development of the Indivi-dual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), adopted at theNATO Prague summit in November 2002, whichis an instrument of the planned transformationof the defence systems (and also, to some extent,the political systems) of the interested partner sta-tes. So far, the following countries have declaredtheir willingness to participate in the IPAP: Geor-gia (the document has now been endorsed), Azer-baijan and Uzbekistan (consultations on the Pre-sentation Documents which they submitted arein progress) and Armenia (which is currently pre-paring its Presentation Documents). Kazakhstanis also considering its possible participation inthe IPAP.

At the Istanbul summit a new instrument of co--operation with partners was adopted, namely thePartnership Action Plan on Defence InstitutionBuilding (PAP-DIB), endorsed on 7 June 2004. It ismeant to be an instrument for co-ordinating theactions carried out by partners and the Alliance inthe field of introducing democratic standards indefence planning, civilian control of the armed for-ces, and other aspects of defence system building. As regards the other documents adopted at thesummit, a report entitled The Euro-AtlanticPartnership – Refocusing and Renewal, endorsedon 23 June 2004, is worth mentioning. It containsa number of initiatives concerning changes toand the development of partnership mechanisms,and a new, clear definition of the fundamentalgoals of the Alliance’s partnership policy. Below we present the main theses of the majordocuments adopted at the NATO summit in Istan-bul which refer to the Eastern partners. Theseassumptions have been formally endorsed by theEAPC member states at the Council meeting atthe level of heads of state and government. Thus,for the Eastern partner states (all of them are EAPCmembers), among others, these theses consist a political commitment. Marek Menkiszak, Marta Jaroszewicz

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3 In September 2004 Robert Simmons was appointed to thispost.4 Their mission is expected to begin in the first half of 2005.

APPENDIX 1

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership –Refocusing and Renewal; maintheses contained in the document

Security depends on domestic reform andwide international co-operation on the partof the partners. Effective security co-opera-tion with NATO is impossible absent basicdoctrines and institutions of a fundamentallydemocratic nature.

Four basic objectives of NATO’sPartnership Policy:

1. Dialogue and co-operation, particularly in the field of threats to security and struggleagainst terrorism – international and domesticissues

2. Reform and promotion of democratic values and democratic transformation –political and practical advice for interestedpartners on defence and security-relatedaspects; encouraging institutional reform and supporting efforts by other internationalorganisations carried out in this respect

3. Operations – preparing interested partnersfor participation in NATO-led operations;developing interoperability and partners’defence transformation in keeping with NATO’sown evolving operational role and capabilities

4. Enlargement – supporting partners whowish to join the Alliance

Current NATO Priorities:

1. Geographic Priority: Special Focus on the regions of Caucasus and CentralAsia

refocus some of the existing resourcestowards those strategically important regionsand support reform in the countries of theregion; give priority to partners implementingthe following co-operation programmes: IPAP,PAP-DIB, PAP-T and PARP; enhanced training

and education; increase the volume of helpwithin the PfP trust fund mechanism andwithin IPAP (for reform-related purposes)

expand the mandate and enhance the roleof Contact Point Embassies and NATO’s support offered to them; expand the contacts

encourage exchange of information betweenAllied advisors in partner countries

nominate Secretary General’s SpecialRepresentative for the Caucasus and forCentral Asia

positive consideration to the requests of partner countries for enhanced local NATOrepresentation provided that they demonstratecommitment to principles and goals expressedin PfP and engage in reforms and implementIPAP and PAP-DIB, manifest the will for substantial contribution to co-operation withNATO (including in support of NATO opera-tions), offer to provide resources to host NATOrepresentations

appoint one NATO Officer for the Caucasusand one NATO Officer for Central Asia, to residein host countries

2. Substantive priorities

reform – democratic transformation, in particular the development of democraticallyresponsible defence institutions in partnercountries

operations – promote the development of partners’ capabilities and their high-value contribution to NATO operations

dialogue and co-operation – in particularregarding the fight against terrorism and pro-tection against weapons of mass destruction

3. Matching the ends and means

NATO expects all partners to fulfil their com-mitments to the protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms, human rights andother fundamental values embedded in thebasic documents of PfP and EAPC. NATO willenhance its efforts to develop and reform thePartnership through the following initiatives:

PAP-DIB: offer support for developing effi-cient and democratically responsible defence

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institutions, defining reform objectives; pursu-ing the objectives through IPAP and PARP

enhance support to nations engaged in IPAP,particularly by the programming of educationand training

welcome continued partner participation in non-Art. 5. NATO-led operations, includingpartners’ enhanced access to documentationand their involvement in decision-shapingprocess

continue to develop and give more substance to the Training and EducationEnhancement Programme (TEEP) and theMilitary Training and Exercise Programme(MTEP), including exercise

encourage the creation of PfP TrainingCentres, including the new centre in Monterey(USA) to be focused on the Caucasus andCentral Asia

encourage partners’ involvement in theOperational Capabilities Concept (OCC) and, if possible, in NATO Response Force (NRF), support the development of partners’ rapidresponse forces and their interoperability withNATO states forces; participation of partners inthe Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)

ensure appropriate representation of part-ners in the Allied Command Transformation at NATO Headquarters in Norfolk, Va.; reviewthe modalities for the PfP Staff Elements (PSE)

engage partners in military co-operation in protection against weapons of massdestruction and in the Conference of NationalArmaments Directors (CNAD)

new EAPC Security Forum – open politicaldialogue with participation of the public

develop the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T), including operationsand exercises, training, border security andmanagement, exchange of information

invite partners to co-operate in the NATOanti-terror Operation Active Endeavour (OAE)to be carried out in the Mediterranean Sea

enhance co-operation in Air Defence and Air Traffic Management

give priority to scientific co-operation, in particular in defence against terrorism

explore whether and how PfP actions couldadd value to efforts aimed at enhancing maritime and harbour security in the Blackand Caspian Seas region

explore possibilities for using PfP co-opera-tion to support partners in ensuring bordersecurity, particularly in connection with the fight against illegal trafficking in arms –to complement the initiatives of other organisations

enhance NATO information policy in partner countries

adapt PARP to better correspond to Part-nership’s overall objectives and priorities, in particular in defence reform and the fightagainst terrorism

consider reviewing the EAPC/PfP committeestructure

replace the PfP Partnership WorkProgramme and the EAPC Action Plan with a single document – the Euro-AtlanticPartnership Work Programme (EAPWP)

harmonise NATO funding mechanisms forEAPC and PfP, and increase their flexibility

ensure greater flexibility and efficiency ofTrust Fund mechanisms, in particular in thefield of managing the consequences of defencereform and destruction of surplus munitions;enable partners to take the lead in developingand implementing PfP Trust Fund projects

review the size and distribution of NATO’sbudgetary and human resources, including a possible re-allocation of resources in accor-dance with the above discussed priorities; the key role of bilateral support offered by the Allies and willing partners to partnercountries

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APPENDIX 2

Partnership Action Plan onDefence Institution Building –main theses contained in thedocument

Member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partner-ship Council (EAPC) reaffirm their convictionthat effective and democratic defence insti-tutions are fundamental to stability in theEuro-Atlantic area and essential for interna-tional security co-operation. PAP-DIB aims to reinforce efforts by EAPC part-ners to reform and restructure defence insti-tutions in accordance with commitments under-taken in the context of Partnership documents. PAP-DIB is open to all EAPC partners, in par-ticular to states from the Caucasus andCentral Asia, and Moldova. It provides a com-mon conceptual platform for co-operation indemocratic defence reform, defines commonobjectives, tailors assistance programmes,and creates new measures of co-operationbetween security structures.NATO and partners will explore opportuni-ties to co-operate with other structures, inparticular the EU and the OSCE, in achievingthese objectives.

PAP-DIB objectives

Develop effective and transparent mechanismsand procedures in the following fields:

1. democratic control of defence activities,including appropriate legislation, co-ordina-tion and regulation of the role and responsibil-ities of legislative and executive authorities

2. civilian participation in developing defenceand security policy, including participation ofcivilians in defence institutions, co-operationwith non-governmental organisations andpublic access to information

3. legislative and judicial oversight of thedefence sector

4. assessment of security risks and defencerequirements – in accordance with interna-tional commitments

5. optimisation of the management of defenceinstitutions and associated force structures,and their inter-agency co-operation

6. compliance of defence sector practices withinternationally accepted norms and practices,including export control on defence technolo-gy and military equipment

7. personnel structures, their training and education, promotion of knowledge of interna-tional humanitarian law, transparent promo-tion and career development, and protectionof the civil rights and freedoms of members of the armed forces

8. financial, planning and resource allocationprocedures in the defence area

9. effective, transparent and economicallyviable management of defence spending, tak-ing into account macro-economic affordabilityand sustainability, and development of policiesin order to cope with the socio-economic con-sequences of defence restructuring

10. ensuring effective international co-opera-tion and good neighbourly relations in defenceand security matters

PAP-DIB mechanisms

PAP and PARP mechanisms will serve as primary instruments for pursuing PAP-DIBobjectives. PARP will be adapted for this purpose. Partners who do not participate inIPAP or PARP may pursue PAP-DIB objectivesthrough IPP mechanisms. New multilateral co-operation activities may also be developedin the EAPC/PfP framework. NATO’s International Secretariat will reportperiodically to Allies and partners on theimplementation and development of PAP-DIB. To the maximum extent possible, NATO-spon-sored multilateral activities will be developedin transparency and co-operation as appropri-ate with other international organisations, in particular the EU and the OSCEAllies and partners are invited to supportand/or contribute to the development andimplementation of programmes and activitiesin support of the Plan, and to provide Partnerswith tailored bilateral assistance.

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Part II

Country reports

Marek Menkiszak

Stanis∏aw Górka

Micha∏ Kolasiƒski

Jacek Wróbel

Marta Jaroszewicz

Wojciech Bartuzi

Adam Balcer

Wojciech Konoƒczuk

RUSSIA

Russia has expanded its co-operation with NATOin some areas, and it desires to reinforce the me-chanisms of its privileged partnership with theAlliance. However, it does not aim at becomingan actual member of NATO, and perceives theAlliance’s activity in the NIS area as one of thechallenges to its interests.

Approach to NATO

Officially, Russia has declared its interest in co--operation with NATO and in effectively using theinstruments offered by the new mechanism ofprivileged partnership with the Alliance, initiatedin 2002. At the same time, it highlights the needfor equality in co-operation, i.e. that NATO shouldrespect its interests to a greater extent. Moscowemphasises that it is not applying for NATOmembership and it does not intend to undertakethe task of reforming its defence system accord-ing to the Alliance’s models or to adjust to NATOstandards. NATO is treated in Russia as an important elementof European security architecture, and as a toolto implement the strategic goals of the USA. Theofficial documents that constitute the formal ba-sis for Russia’s foreign, defence and security poli-cies, the Foreign Policy Concept of the RF, the Na-tional Security Concept of the RF and the MilitaryDoctrine, which were re-edited in 2000, includetexts that are very critical of NATO, and in parti-cular of its enlargement and readiness to con-duct operations without a mandate from the UNSecurity Council5. Since autumn 2003, Russian negative rhetoricaimed at NATO and specific member states hassharpened. Moscow continually criticises the pro-cess of NATO enlargement eastwards as beingunreasonable in security terms, as creating newdivides and as not making a positive contribu-tion to European security. It criticises the stand-point of the Baltic states as part of NATO as alle-gedly anti-Russian. It is also clearly anxious aboutthe growing activity of the Alliance in the NISarea, including the decisions taken at the NATO

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5 Cf. Contseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsyi,Moscow 28.06.2000; Contseptsiya natsionalnoy bezopas-nosti Rossiyskoy Federatsyi, Moscow 10.01.2000; Voyen-naya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsyi, Moscow 21.04.2000.

Istanbul Summit to focus partnership on the Cau-casian and Central Asian states. Moscow sees theincreasing closeness of co-operation betweenNATO and its NIS partners as a serious challengeto its interests. Russia has particularly stronglycriticised the Alliance’s member states for theirfailure to ratify the adapted CFE treaty, and itaccuses some of the allies of de facto toleratingthe presence of terrorists in their territories (re-ferring to Chechen separatists). Moscow’s actual basic objectives in its policy to-wards NATO are as follows:1) to increase Russia’s influence on Alliance policyand its member states, so that they show greaterrespect for Moscow’s interests, and to increasethe political significance of Russia as an equalpartner in resolving key security issues (the po-litical objective);2) to obtain tangible benefits (finances, techno-logies, access to arms market, etc.) from co-ope-ration for the Armed Forces and for the Military--Industrial Complex (MIC) of the Russian Federa-tion (the economic objective).

Some Russian civilian experts have displayed a po-sitive attitude towards NATO and co-operationwith the Alliance. Still, a great part of them be-lieve that NATO as a structure – and as a US poli-cy tool – is losing its significance, which is a con-sequence of the unilateralisation of the US policyand of growing asymmetrical and “soft” securitythreats, which NATO has no instruments to com-bat. Some experts point out to the deepening con-tradictions inside NATO. Some Russian militaryspecialists seem to see some potential benefitsfrom co-operation with NATO. However, theRussian military environment predominantly dis-plays a sceptical or even hostile attitude towardsNATO, is distrustful about the Alliance’s inten-tions, and convinced of its aggressive nature andits desire to weaken Russia.

The reasons given above, and a range of poten-tial and partly coinciding interests, mean interalia that the bilateral co-operation in the fieldsof security and defence between Russia and somemembers of the Alliance is better developed thanas a part of the Russia–NATO mechanisms. In par-ticular, this concerns Russia’s co-operation withFrance, Germany and Italy and, to a lesser extent,

with the USA and the United Kingdom. However,this broader topic is beyond the scope of thisReport.

Evolution of co-operation

Russia–NATO co-operation calendar

20 December 1991 – the Soviet ambassador in Brussels in fact represents Russia at theinauguration meeting of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)

10 March 1992 – Russia becomes a formalmember of the NACC

September 1993 – secret letter from PresidentBoris Yeltsin to leaders of Western states –criticism of the idea of NATO enlargementeastwards

January 1994 – Russia submits the “all-European partnership concept”, which in factwould mean building a CSCE-based Europeansecurity architecture, competitive to NATO

22 June 1994 – Russia signs the Partnershipfor Peace (PfP) programme FrameworkDocument

December 1994 – Russia postpones the sign-ing of the first Individual Partnership Pro-gramme (IPP) as a part of the PfP, following theNorth Atlantic Council’s decisions concerningplans to enlarge the Alliance

31 May 1995 – NATO offers Russia “enhancedpartnership”; Russia signs the first IPP (neverimplemented)

August–September 1995 – crisis in Russia––NATO relations, in connection with NATObombardments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the publication of the Study on NATOEnlargement

January 1996 – Russian soldiers begin to takepart, under NATO’s tactical command, in IFORForces (since 1997, in SFOR Forces) in Bosniaand Herzegovina following arrangements onthe special chain of command

January–March 1997 – intensive talks on thedocument concerning NATO–Russia relations

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27 May 1997 – signing at the NATO–Russiasummit in Paris of the Founding Act on MutualRelations, Co-operation and Security betweenNATO and the Russian Federation, the politicaldocument that provided the basis for the privileged NATO–Russia partnership, which,inter alia, founded the NATO–RussiaPermanent Joint Council (PJC)

March 1998 – appointment of a permanentmission of Russia at NATO (including militaryrepresentation)

March–June 1999 – crisis in Russia–NATO rela-tions due to the bombardment of Yugoslaviaby NATO

June–July 1999 – the incident at Slatina air-port in Kosovo; NATO–Russia agreement onspecial rules for commanding Russian soldiersas a part of KFOR; Russia sends a contingent of soldiers as a part of KFOR

5 March 2000 – during a TV interview,President Vladimir Putin does not excludefuture Russian membership in NATO

February 2001 – opening of NATO InformationOffice in Moscow

November 2001 – British proposals concerningnew mechanisms for enhanced NATO–Russiaco-operation

January–May 2002 – NATO–Russia consulta-tions on the new co-operation formula

May 2002 – opening of the NATO MilitaryLiaison Office (NMLO) in Moscow; retrainingcentres for dismissed officers begin opening inRussia with Alliance support

28 May 2002 – signing of the "NATO-Russiarelations: new quality" declaration at theNATO–Russia summit in Pratica di Mare nearRome, to establish the new privileged partner-ship mechanism by founding, inter alia, the NATO–Russia Council (NRC)

31 July 2002 – completion of the withdrawalof Russian contingents from Bosnia andHerzegovina (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR)

September 2002 – adoption of the “PoliticalAspects of a Generic Concept of Joint

NATO–Russia Peacekeeping Operations”document

February 2003 – NATO–Russia FrameworkAgreement on Submarine Crew Escape andRescue

October 2004 – arrangements on initial frame-work of Political-Military Guidance towardsEnhanced Interoperability between Russianand NATO Forces

November 2004 – Russia sends ships to theMediterranean Sea for their future participa-tion in NATO’s antiterrorist operation ActiveEndeavour; Russian liaison officers start workat SHAPE

9 December 2004 – conclusion of the agree-ment on the modalities of the participation of Russian ships in the operation ActiveEndeavour; adopting the NATO–Russia ActionPlan on Terrorism

The basic co-operation mechanism is the NATO––Russia Council (NRC), which was founded on thebasis of a decision at the NATO–Russia summitin May 2002. As part of this, meetings are heldin the following ways: irregular summit meet-ings (chiefs of states and governments) and regu-lar meetings at ministerial level (until 2004, sepa-rate meetings of ministers of foreign affairs andministers of defence, general chiefs of staff twicea year; since 2004, official meetings of ministersof defence have been limited to once a year), atleast once a month on the level of permanent re-presentatives (ambassadors), and in other agreedformats. Apart from that, it has already becomea tradition to invite the Russian minister of defen-ce to informal meetings with ministers of NATOmember states (currently, twice a year). Withinthe 9 agreed areas of dialogue and co-operation,the activity of NRC is supported by approximate-ly 20 working and expert groups, which meet asneed arises. The NRC agenda is agreed in advance,using consensus, by the Preparatory Committee(PrepCom). One of the rules of work is the equa-lity of the 27 participants in the discussion andthe taking of decisions through consensus, andthe actual lack of so-called pre-co-ordination(earlier co-ordination of standpoints within theAlliance) in most areas.

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The NATO International Staff includes an entitythat specialises in relations with Russia (and Ukra-ine), the Russia and Ukraine Relations Section, aspart of the Division of Political Affairs and Secu-rity Policy.The only Russian specialised entity dealing withco-operation with the Alliance is the NATO Sec-tion in the All-European Co-operation Depart-ment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Militaryco-operation with the Alliance is primarily theresponsibility of the International Co-operationBoard in the General Staff. The Main OperationsBoard in the General Staff, which belongs to thestructures of the Russian Ministry of Defence,also takes part in military co-operation.The chief decision-makers in the Russian policytowards NATO are the Russian President, the Pre-sident's Administration and the Ministry of De-fence (including the General Staff), and (to a lesserextent) the Security Council and the Ministry ofForeign Affairs. In November 2004, pursuant to arrangementsmade in April that year, four Russian officers, whomake up a liaison office, commenced their workat the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Eu-rope (SHAPE) near Mons in Belgium, to ensure bet-ter contact between SHAPE and the General Staffof the Armed Forces of the Russian Federationfor the implementation of practical co-operation.(Before that, Russian officers had worked at SHAPEuntil summer 2002 in connection with the par-ticipation of the Russian subunits in SFOR andKFOR peacekeeping forces). Russian officers havealso been delegated to NATO’s TransformationStrategic Command in Norfolk, USA. At the sametime, more personnel have been allocated to theNATO Military Liaison Office (NMLO) in Moscow.

For Russia’s part, the priority areas in their co--operation with NATO are as follows: the struggleagainst terrorism, military co-operation to achie-ve interoperability, co-operation in terms of crisismanagement, and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).The development of co-operation in the particu-lar areas indicated in the declaration of May 2002can be characterised as follows:

TerrorismThe common struggle against international ter-rorism is still a declared priority for both Russiaand NATO. This area of co-operation has been

considered in rather political (as a display of goodrelations) than practical terms for quite sometime. An ad hoc working group on terrorism isoperating as a part of the NRC. The main resultof the dialogue between Russia and NATO in thisarea is a set of documents concerning joint as-sessment of terrorist threats (including againstpassenger planes and peacekeeping forces in theBalkans). Apart from that, there is discussion onthe definition of terrorism in military doctrines,and sharing expertise, including at subsequentconferences on the role of the military in the fightagainst terrorism (the third conference concern-ing this issue was held in April 2004 in Norfolk,USA). Other elements of co-operation have anantiterrorism aspect. Some Russian specialistsare quite sceptical in their evaluation of the pro-spect of developing co-operation in this field,claiming that NATO as a structure does not haveadequate tools to fight terrorism; co-operationin this field is mainly of a bilateral nature, and issubject to obvious limitations (concerning theexchange of classified information)6. As the ter-rorist threat increased in Russia, the statementsby the NRC and the NATO secretary general inlate August and early September 2004, whichcondemned subsequent terrorist attacks in thatcountry, were of great political significance forMoscow7. They included, among other things,the confirmation of a desire to develop a NATO––Russia Action Plan on the practical struggleagainst terrorism. In turn, Russia’s decision toparticipate in Active Endeavour, NATO’s antiter-rorist operation in the Mediterranean Sea, wasof great political significance for the Alliance.This decision was taken in June 2004, and in No-vember 2004 – even before the formal, legal andfinancial disputes between the parties had beensettled – two ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleetset out for the Mediterranean Sea. Initially, theyonly took part in exercises with NATO forces. On9 December 2004, a NATO–Russia agreement onthe modalities of participation of Russian ships

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6 The strictly bilateral nature of Russia’s antiterrorist co--operation with NATO states was emphasised during themeeting of the defence ministers of Russia and the NATOstates in Nice on 10 February 2005 by Sergey Ivanov, de-fence minister of the Russian Federation.7 The statements by NATO Secretary General of 27 August,1 September and 3 September 2004, and the NRC statementof 7 September 2004.

in the operation was reached. Russia may in factjoin Active Endeavour after its ships obtain NATOcertificates, which is expected in mid-2005. On 9 December 2004, the NATO–Russia ActionPlan on Terrorism was also signed8. The partiesundertook therein to co-operate more closely inpreventing, combating and managing the conse-quences of terrorist acts, inter alia, through shar-ing information and expertise, joint threat as-sessment, joint exercises and scientific and tech-nical co-operation. In this way the antiterroristco-operation of NATO and Russia entered a morepractical phase.

Crisis management This is one of Russia’s priorities, although forNATO’s part this topic is basically limited topeacekeeping issues. An ad hoc working groupon peacekeeping operations is acting as a part ofthe NRC, and an expert group on crisis planningwas operating until late 2004. The main effect ofthe work so far has been the adoption of thedocument “Political Aspects of a Generic Conceptof Joint NATO–Russia Peacekeeping Operations”9,which sets out in greater detail the rules forRussia’s participation in specific phases of thiskind of operations. Moscow has also attemptedto establish military guidelines for joint NATO––Russia peacekeeping operations, yet some of theAllies have opposed this, as it is a matter of greatsensitivity for the Alliance (touching as it doesupon the issue of operational planning, interalia). Nevertheless, in spring 2004, NATO decidedto develop a general document on political andmilitary guidelines for future joint peacekeepingoperations. Further, in September 2004 Russiaand NATO carried out their first procedural exer-cises in response to a hypothetical crisis on thebasis of the adopted experimental operationalconcept. The Russian standpoint on peacekeep-ing operations is quite clear-cut. Moscow is nolonger interested in participating in NATO-ledpeacekeeping operations i.e. as an ordinary con-tributor (it has shown this by withdrawing itstroops from the Balkans, among other actions);instead it wants NRC-led operations (co-decidingon every stage and participation in operational

planning). It is not clear where such an opera-tion could potentially be conducted. Russia has sofar been sceptical about the idea of potentiallyconducting such operations in the NIS area (al-though it has not explicitly rejected such a possi-bility). On the other hand, the Russian proposalsto support NATO-led operations in Afghanistanhave only been accepted to a limited extent(mainly exchange of intelligence informationand supporting efforts to combat drug smuggling;co-operation on border security is being consider-ed). The Allies’ great hopes for enhancing practi-cal co-operation with Russia arose from the dec-larations made by Russian representatives inautumn 2003 of the planned establishment inRussia of a peacekeeping brigade operatingaccording to NATO standards and ready for jointaction with the Alliance. However, the signalsfrom Moscow were mutually contradictory. InNovember 2004, Sergey Ivanov, Russian ministerof defence confirmed plans to establish a regularpeacekeeping force brigade. The Russian sidestated that a 2,500-strong 15th Independent Moto-rised Rifle Brigade had been formed in Samaraon 1 February 2005 as a peacekeeping force. Itsmain objective is to prepare for peacekeepingoperations in the NIS area and, possibly, otheroperations with a UN mandate. According to sta-tements made by the Russian minister of defen-ce Sergey Ivanov in February 2005, the brigadewill take part in the programme for developinginteroperability with NATO member state forces.

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructionFor NATO this is one of the priorities of the dia-logue. Although Russia has also declared thisissue an area of priority, its standpoint in thisfield remains somewhat evasive. As a part of theNRC, this issue is being dealt with by an ade-quate ad hoc working group and an expert groupon nuclear arms control and confidence-buildingmeasures. The main effect of the dialogue, whichconcentrates on the assessment of proliferation--related threats and the security of nuclearweapons’ storage, was intended to be the adop-tion of a document on global trends in prolifera-tion of weapons of mass destruction, plannedfor autumn 2003. However, this never happened,due to Russia’s standpoint and to the lack of agree-ment in determining the sources of proliferation-

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8 NATO–Russia Action Plan on Terrorism.9 Political Aspects of a Generic Concept of Joint NATO––Russia Peacekeeping Operations.

-related threats. Russia invited observers fromNATO and partner states to exercises in responseprocedures in the case of nuclear incidents, calledAvaria 2004, which were held in August 2004. InDecember 2004, it was agreed that a report onpossibilities for co-operation in the field of pro-tection measures against weapons of mass de-struction would be prepared in autumn 2005.Still, NATO is not satisfied with the limited de-gree of Russia’s openness in this area of dialogue.In turn, the predominant opinion on the Russianside is that NATO is not the right partner forRussia in the field of non-proliferation and nu-clear security (it is emphasised that Moscow isconducting bilateral talks on this issue, first ofall with Washington). Russian experts often sug-gest that Russia will display greater opennessand readiness to co-operate in this field, if NATOand its member states make a proper financialoffer.

Arms control and confidence-buildingmeasuresThis topic has mainly been raised in the contextof the adapted Conventional Forces in EuropeTreaty (CFE). An adequate expert group is deal-ing with this subject as a part of NRC. NATO’sexpectations from Russia include fulfilling theCFE commitments it made at the Istanbul OSCEsummit in 1999 (withdrawal of Russian troops,military equipment and ammunition from Trans-nistria in Moldova, and concluding agreementson withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia),which Russia has failed to do even though sub-sequent deadlines have expired (the last deadlinefor fulfilling the Istanbul commitments expiredin December 2003). Most of NATO’s member sta-tes have made their ratification of the adaptedCFE treaty dependent on this. Moscow opposessuch conditionality, and demands that NATOmember states ratify the treaty as soon as possi-ble and that the Baltic states join in the treaty(which will limit the military consequences oftheir joining NATO). As Moscow has not mana-ged to win any concessions from NATO, regard-less of reoccurring Russian allegations of disas-sembling the CFE regime and demands to rene-gotiate the Treaty, the political relations betweenRussia and NATO have cooled somewhat. Thiswas one of the reasons why President VladimirPutin rejected the invitation to participate in the

NATO Istanbul summit in June 2004. Another ne-gative factor was a crisis initiated by Moscow inconnection with NATO countries’ support for theair policing of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia afterthey joined NATO on 29 March 2004. Moscowwas dissatisfied because the decision had notbeen consulted with it before being taken, andthe member states bordering on Russia had re-jected its appeal to sign agreements to avoidharmful military activity in the region of theircommon borders. The Russian side clearly main-tains pressure on the Baltic states in connectionwith this issue, as Russian military aircraft noto-riously violate their air space (this concerns Es-tonia in particular).

Theatre Missile Defence – TMDThis topic and project are essential for both sides.As a part of the NRC it is dealt with by a properad hoc working group, which is divided into thefollowing subgroups: terminology, TMD experi-mental concept, TMD operational concept, train-ing and exercises, and TMD system and capabili-ties. The project idea consists in considering thepossibility of interaction between Russian andNATO non-strategic missile defence systems (orthe combination thereof into one system) to pro-tect deployed armed forces (and, potentially, stra-tegic objects and cities). So far, the terminologyhas been agreed on, and an exchange of data onsystem parameters has taken place. The Allies arefinancing subsequent stages of the TMD inter-operability study. A TMD experimental operatio-nal concept has also been adopted, and a com-mand post exercise was conducted on this basisin March 2004. Following a series of such events,field exercises are planned for 2006. The Russianside desires above all to use its missile defencesystems for TMD, and is looking for potential mi-litary and technical co-operation in the produc-tion of new ones. This project is important forRussia for both political (as a psychological break-through and a step towards quasi-allied relations)and, even more so, economic reasons (as a poten-tially excellent chance for engagement and bene-fits for the Russian Military-Industrial Complex[MIC]). Some of the Alliance member states haveexpressed an interest in the project.

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Search and rescue at seaFor both sides this narrow aspect of co-opera-tion has some significance in propaganda terms:it shows good will and potential benefits. TheNATO–Russia Framework Agreement on Subma-rine Crew Escape and Rescue was signed as a partof the dialogue in February 2003, (in the after-math of the Kursk submarine tragedy in August2000) was one of the first effects of the newpartnership mechanism. Russia will take part inthe NATO rescue exercise Sorbet Royal in 2005.The agreement has not so far been applied dur-ing an actual accident.

Civil emergency planning This area of co-operation is welcomed by bothparties. A dedicated expert group has been deal-ing with it as a part of the NRC. Some of theactions in this field have an antiterrorism aspect.The best visible sign of co-operation was theexercise with the participation of rescuers fromNATO countries and partners, which was held inSeptember 2002 at the Russian military testground in Noginsk. Another spectacular exerciseof NATO members, PfP partners and Russia, inthe presence of EU and UN observers, was heldin June 2004 on the Baltic Sea by the Kaliningradoblast coastline. The rescuers were practising in-teraction in managing the consequences of a ter-rorist attack against a drilling platform. In 2004,Hungary presented an initiative to develop co--operation with Russia on civil emergency plan-ning and crisis management, which was support-ed by NATO. Russia and NATO agreed in Decem-ber 2004 to develop a joint exercise plan.

Military-to-military co-operation anddefence reformThese are essential issues for NATO; Russia’s in-terest in them, which was very limited until mid--2003, is also growing. This area includes a wholeseries of narrower issues and initiatives. As a partof NRC, among other groups, an ad hoc workinggroup on defence reform is operating. On 9 De-cember 2004, another NRC-MR Work Plan for 2005and subsequent years was accepted. In the jointannouncement by the parties, the plan was de-scribed as “ambitious”. In terms of democratic management and financ-ing of the defence system, NATO and Russia areconducting a dialogue which, among other issues,

covers defence planning, a professional army,transparency of the defence budget, democraticcivilian control of the armed forces (the latterwithout any visible results). Conferences and se-minars are held, including a seminar on the re-form of the Ministry of Defence, which was heldin September 2004 in Warsaw. In terms of the consequences of reduction of thearmed forces, the projects of retraining centresfor dismissed officers, which have been operat-ing since 2002 in Moscow, St Petersburg, Yaro-slavl, Chita, Perm and Kaliningrad, are being suc-cessfully continued. Apart from that, bilateral co-operation with the United Kingdom, Germany andNorway is ongoing. The Russian side is very satis-fied with the effects of such co-operation. A se-parate project covers co-operation in demining.In terms of military technical co-operation, dia-logue on the restructuring of the defence indus-try is pending. The Russian side has appealed fora wider opening of NATO member states’ marketsto Russian arms. In 2004, NATO launched an in-teroperability study covering NATO and Russianrescue systems in submarines, considering possi-ble future co-operation in the production thereof.In terms of joint exercises and training, a specialmulti-stage NATO–Russia Exercise and TrainingProgramme (NR-ETP) is ongoing. The number ofevents being implemented has significantlygrown; while there were only 6 events in 2002and 21 events in 2003, their number grew in2004 to as many as 57. These are ancillary to thegeneral goal of achieving interoperability10 be-tween selected forces of NATO states and Russia.The Political and Military Guidelines to EnhanceInteroperability between the forces of NATO andRussia, the working out of which was agreed inOctober 2004 by the defence ministers of NATOand Russia, are also intended to serve this goal.This interoperability is planned to be graduallyconstructed, starting from the highest level (in-cluding communication between general staffs)down to the lowest, with a gradual concretisa-

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10 The term “interoperability” in NATO–Russia relations (asin co-operation with other partners) has a different mean-ing than the term of interoperability used among NATOmember states. Generally, this is defined as the ability offorces from different states to train, exercise, and to operateeffectively together in the execution of assigned missionsand tasks. See NATO–Russia Glossary of Contemporary Poli-tical and Military Terms, Brussels 8.06.2001.

tion of its parameters. The ability to communi-cate on various levels is a matter of priority. Inthe opinion of the Alliance’s representatives, a qualitative change has taken place in this areaof co-operation. Nevertheless, the co-operationpredominantly lacks a strictly military nature (vi-sits, conferences, seminars). NATO attaches greatimportance, inter alia, to the interoperabilitycourses which was conducted in autumn 2004by lecturers from the Alliance member states atthe General Staff Academy in Moscow. The co--operation is co-ordinated by the Military Prepa-ratory Committee (Reinforced), which is support-ed among others by the exercise expert groupand logistics group. A certain impediment to theco-operation was posed by the fact that Russiahad not signed the Status of Forces Agreement(SOFA). Moscow has declared its will to resolvethis problem since May 2003; it promised thatthis would happen by the end of 2004. Consul-tations on this matter to address the formal andlegal reservations on the Russian side were pen-ding between the parties in 2004. Moscow ex-pected this to be a special agreement, differentfrom the standard PfP agreements. The govern-ment of the Russian Federation accepted theagreement draft in February 2005, and PresidentPutin signed it on 9 March. In terms of long-haul air transport, talks are goingon between NATO and Russia on the possibilityof European members of the Alliance using Rus-sian capabilities in this field. Unfortunately, workon a memorandum of understanding concerningthis matter has been impeded for legal and fi-nancial reasons. Therefore, Russia is currentlyconcluding bilateral agreements on air transitand transport with selected NATO states. So far,this concerns Germany, France and Italy. On theother hand, NATO has signed a framework agree-ment on this matter with Ukraine which is com-petitive to the Russian offer.

New threats and challenges (includingCo-operative Airspace Initiative) This area also includes various issues and projects.For instance, dialogue is pending on new kindsof threat, including to the natural environment.Scientific co-operation has been rapidly develop-ing as a part of the NATO Science Programme. In compliance with Russian appeals, a multilate-ral dialogue on threats connected with the traf-

ficking of drugs coming from Afghanistan wasinitiated at NATO in 2004, with the participationof Russia and other partners, and representativesof other organisations. A seminar on this subjectwas held in October 2004 on the NRC forum. A separate project, which is a priority for NATOand an essential issue for Russia, is the Co-ope-rative Airspace Initiative (CAI). It provides forthe creation of a system for sharing information,according to standards applicable in NATO mem-ber states, on air traffic control (covering civilianand military traffic) of NATO and some of its part-ners, including Russia. A dedicated ad hoc work-ing group is dealing with work on this subject; a feasibility study is currently being prepared. On the other hand, in December 2004, indepen-dently of the CAI project, Russia officially presen-ted a proposal for creating a common system tocontrol airspace and air traffic in the border re-gions between NATO and Russia, initially in theBaltic region. This must be interpreted as an at-tempt to decrease the military consequences ofaccepting Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to NATOfor Russia.

Problems in co-operation

The main problems in co-operation with Russiawhich NATO has raised include: Russia’s insuffi-cient openness in the dialogue on non-prolifera-tion of weapons of mass destruction and on nu-clear safety, as well as its failure to comply withits Istanbul CFE commitments.

In addition to the aforementioned problems, co-operation between Russia and NATO in particu-lar areas is hampered by other impedimentsstemming from the following factors: – negative perception of the Alliance and its poli-cy (especially NATO’s activity in the NIS area) bythe ruling elites, a majority of the military elitesand a great part of the civilian elites in Russia;– the evolution of the Russian political systemtowards authoritarianism, and the increasingdiscrepancy between the system and the Alliedstates’ standards;– Russian attempts to undermine solidarity be-tween the Alliance member states and the grow-ing differences in the respective policies of spe-cific Allies towards Russia;

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– direct and indirect pressure exerted by Russiaon a number of NIS countries to limit the develop-ment of their co-operation with NATO;– differences in the perception of certain interestsand values by the parties (which is especially vi-sible in Russia’s increasingly assertive policy to-wards some of the NIS countries and the conflictin Chechnya, even though NATO is not publiclycriticising Russia for that); – differences, smaller than before but still persis-tent, in the approach to the co-operation (NATO’sfunctional approach, concentrating on selectedpractical projects, versus Russia’s politico-insti-tutional approach of concentrating on workingout rules, legal guarantees and creation of insti-tutions);– the widening gap between the Russia’s in-creasing rights in its relations with the Alliance,and the relatively low level of its obligations;– Russia’s unwillingness to co-operate equallywith other partners (especially as part of the PfP);– differing procedural and technical-militarystandards;– carrying out defence reform in Russia accord-ing to principles other than NATO standards;– elements of the Soviet mindset which persistamong a part of the Russian administration andmilitary circles;– signs of a mercantile approach of the Russianside to its co-operation with NATO, i.e. strivingto obtain quick and measurable financial and eco-nomic benefits, or making the development ofco-operation in certain areas or participation inevents dependent on financial offers from NATOand the Allies (regardless of the growing finan-cial potential on the Russian side).

Conclusions

The picture of NATO–Russia relations is quitecomplex. On the one hand, the number of eventsimplemented jointly with Russia, including inthe area of military co-operation, is growing,and work on key projects is slowly progressing.On the other hand, a vast number of events boildown to visits, discussions, simulations and work-ing out documents, and these mainly concernnon-military areas. The Russian side uses the dia-logue forums for political demonstrations, it ma-kes effort only in the areas where it can see essen-

tial benefits for itself, and it does not always ful-fil its commitments. Some clear trends can be observed in Russian po-licy. Moscow does not conceal its dislike for thegrowing engagement of NATO and individualAllies (in particular, USA) in the NIS area. Russiatreats the issue of independent organisation ofexercises as a priority at the expense of its par-ticipation in multilateral PfP exercises. The Rus-sian side is trying, so far rather abortively, to in-clude Eastern partners in co-operation under theauspices of the NRC (at the expense of the PfP).Since late 2003, Russia has been lobbying withgrowing importunity for the Alliance to estab-lish official contacts and start co-operation withthe Collective Security Treaty Organization(CSTO), of which it is the initiator and the lead-ing participant11. This has to be interpreted as a Russian attempt to impose its control on co--operation between part of the NIS and NATO.

NATO should contribute to Russia’s constructiveinclusion in the Euro-Atlantic security architec-ture. To make that realistic, NATO in its policytowards Russia should encourage the country toproceed with internal democratic transformation,including in its defence sector, in compliancewith the standards applicable to the Alliancemember states. Without such harmonisation ofstandards, a tangible community of values andbasic interests, effective partnership and deepen-ing co-operation between NATO and Russia is im-possible, let alone any hypothetical future mem-bership of Russia in the Alliance (which at thepresent time seems unrealistic). Any actions byRussia that are contrary to those goals (includ-ing attempts to slow down NATO’s co-operationwith other Eastern partners) should be clearly andpublicly criticised. Policy towards Russia shouldbe aimed at balancing the rights and obligationsof the Russian side. Co-operation with Russiashould not be targeted at fast propaganda suc-

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11 The Collective Security Treaty Organization was formallycreated in September 2003 through the institutionalisationof the Collective Security Treaty, which had been signed inTashkent in May 1992. Its current members include: Russia,Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.The appeal to establish co-operation between NATO andCSTO was reiterated by Russian president Vladimir Putin inhis speech at the session of the Russian Security Council on28 January 2005.

cess, and broken up into many events that giveno real benefits to any of the parties. Instead, itshould focus on selected, important projects thathave a chance of being successful and of yieldingtangible benefits for both parties. Therefore, pri-ority needs to be granted to such areas of co--operation as the Co-operative Airspace Initiative(CAI), co-operation in civil emergency planning,and issues of defence reform and military-to-mi-litary co-operation leading to achieving a basiclevel of interoperability. In addition to continuing the co-operation in itspresent forms, NATO should analyse the condi-tions, rules and feasibility of conducting NATO––Russia peacekeeping operations in selected con-flict zones in the NIS area (such as Transnistria,Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia) following theachievement of initial political agreements be-tween the parties. The benefits of such co-ope-ration would include increased chances for set-tling those conflicts and consequent regional sta-bilisation, and enclosing Russian policy in a con-structive framework of co-operation. It wouldalso reinforce Russia’s privileged status in its part-nership with the Alliance, and give a practicallesson of interoperability. NATO should adjustthe concept and formal framework of joint ope-rations to planning a specific operation, once theoperation’s place and objective has been estab-lished. Developing purely abstractive assump-tions seems purposeless in this case. The same assumption should also underlie an-other important project in co-operation withRussia, namely Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).This potentially extremely interesting project mayserve the security interest of NATO states well,provided that it is adjusted to specific needs. Thebest way of using it would be providing a coverfor forces deployed by the parties as a part of a joint NATO–Russia crisis management opera-tion. This also needs common defining by NATOand Russia, including in geographical terms, ofthe potential sources of missile attack threats.Creating an abstract co-operation model doesnot make any sense. NATO should consider the growing activity of theCollective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),which is dominated by Russia; yet it should not,contrary to appeals by Russia and some of itsallies, establish official contacts and co-opera-tion with this security structure, as this would

mean an indirect legitimisation of the particularresponsibility and rights of Russia in the mattersof NIS-area security, and would be tantamountto supporting its asymmetrical relations withpart of the countries in the region. This is not inthe interest of NATO, as this would not contributeto the democratisation and stabilisation of thearea. The same concerns the Shanghai Co-opera-tion Organisation, where Russia and China arethe dominant players.

As for more detailed issues, some Russian expertscomplain that Russian personnel (especially mili-tary personnel), trained as a part of either PfP orbilateral co-operation with member states, arenot being used properly. This problem needs tobe referred to in the dialogue with Moscow. Due to the fact that the level of reliable know-ledge on NATO and its policy is rather low, andthat negative stereotypes about it are widespreadin Russia, the Alliance should intensify its infor-mational activity in Russia, e.g. by supportinglocal initiatives in this field. NATO should notignore Russian anti-NATO propaganda in othercountries in the NIS area, and should respond to it.Considering the successful activity of military per-sonnel retraining centres, it is worth investingmore means in this practical project. To other issues, the recommendations includedin the chapter on NATO’s policy towards its East-ern partners apply.Marek Menkiszak

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BELARUS

Belarus, which has the least developed co-opera-tion with the Alliance among the NIS, does notaspire to NATO membership. The authoritarianinternal policy of President Alyaksandr Lukashen-ka, who is ill-disposed towards NATO, is a majorobstacle to enhancing co-operation. Belarus’ se-curity policy is Russia-oriented, and Belarus clo-sely and actively co-operates with Russia alonein the military field.

Approach to NATO

The Belarusian authorities have been pursuing a policy which consists in attacking and traduc-ing NATO and the USA on the internal scene, andmaintaining contacts with Russia and China inexternal relations. At the same time, they declaretheir will to co-operate with the West, includingNATO. State propaganda continues to blame theopposition, the West and NATO for the Bela-rusian government’s failures. The same is chara-cteristic of statements by President AlyaksandrLukashenka, who additionally emphasises theneed to protect Belarus from the hegemony ofother states (meaning the USA). Of the NIS coun-tries, Belarus is the place where the false Soviet--era stereotype of NATO as an “aggressive mili-tary bloc” has been most strongly fixed. Minskinsists that the Alliance is useless, and protestsagainst its enlargement. It is undeniable thatRussia and Ukraine have improved their rela-tions with NATO, which has in turn impacted onthe situation in Belarus, and President Luka-shenka has spoken positively about the West onseveral occasions. Nevertheless, hopes for a chan-ge of the Belarusian policy towards the Alliancehave as yet proven vain. Regardless of the gene-rally critical stance on NATO presented by thepresident’s inner circle, individual Belarusian mi-nistries (including the Ministry of Defence) havecontinued to offer the Alliance limited co-opera-tion in certain areas. Opposition political parties and non-governmen-tal organisations display a positive attitude toNATO, and are in favour of intensifying co-opera-tion. A desire to join the Alliance has only beendeclared by the Belarusian National Front (BNF)and the intellectual elites linked to it.

Evolution of co-operation

Due to political reasons, co-operation betweenNATO and Belarus has been very limited for years.Belarus signed the PfP Framework Document on11 January 1995, and it submitted the Partner-ship Presentation Document on 29 April 1996. Belarus does not take part in IPAP, and it doesnot aspire to NATO membership either. It joinedPARP in 2004, but its status at PARP remainedrather unclear for some time. Belarus was plan-ning to present the Partnership Goals in autumn2004, but failed to do so at that time.

Belarus–NATO co-operation calendar

March 1992 – joins NACC

11 January 1995 – signs the PfP FrameworkDocument (as the last but one NIS country)26 June 1995 – signs the Security Agreement(uncertified by NATO)

29 April 1996 – submits the PfP PresentationDocument

1997 – the first IPP

January 2004 – declaration on joining PARP

July 2004 – signs a memorandum of under-standing with NAMSA on destruction of minestocks as a part of the PfP Trust Fund

September 2004 – planned first participationof a Belarusian unit in the PfP Co-operativeBest Effort 2004 exercises in Azerbaijan(unsuccessful as the exercises were cancelled)

The Belarusian co-operation with NATO as a partof Partnership for Peace proceeds in two-yearIndividual Partnership Programme cycles. TheIPP for the years 2004–05 was agreed in late2003 and adopted in early 2004. It provides for183 events in 21 areas of co-operation (2 moreareas than in the preceding IPP). On the Belaru-sian side, the following authorities are engagedin co-operation: the Ministries of Defence, forEmergency Situations, Foreign Affairs, the StateBorder Troops Committee and the Belarusian Aca-demy of Sciences. Such co-operation is not inten-sive, and covers consultations as a part of theEAPC and PfP, the participation of Belarusian rep-resentatives in the Partnership institutions as

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provided under the PfP, staff talks at NATO head-quarters (the Chief of the General Staff of Bela-rus visited NATO in May 2004), and participationin military & rescue exercises and training. In Sep-tember 2004, Belarusian armed forces (a unit ofthe 120th Guard Mechanised Brigade) were to takepart in NATO Co-operative Best Effort 2004 PfPexercises in Azerbaijan for the first time; however,this did not happen as the exercises were cancell-ed. Belarus intends to send its soldiers to subse-quent Co-operative Best Effort 2005 exercises,which will be held in Ukraine.

The project for destroying the antipersonnel minestock in Belarus as a part of the NAMSA-mana-ged PfP Trust Fund is still in its initial phase. A Me-morandum of Understanding (MoU) was signedwith NAMSA in July 2004. The estimated destru-ction cost of approximately 4.02 million mines(including 3.6 million PFM mines, which Belarusis unable to handle by itself) is approximately 5 mil-lion euro. Canada is the project’s leading nation,and Lithuania is among the other states that havedeclared readiness to finance the project. The so-lutions under consideration are as follows: eitherto transport the mines to Ukraine, where an ade-quate mine destruction infrastructure alreadyexists, or to destroy the mines in Belarus. Pur-suant to the Ottawa Convention, applicable from1 March 2004, Belarus must destroy the minestock within the next four years. Since mid-2003, Belarusian legislation permitsits soldiers to take part in peacekeeping opera-tions abroad (presidential prerogative). At NATO’sIstanbul summit, Minsk declared its readiness toprepare a battalion to co-operate in peacekeep-ing operations with NATO, yet no decisions havebeen taken so far. Support for the InternationalSecurity Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan(availability of airspace for transit, readiness toprovide Il-76 transport aircrafts with crews) wasalso promised on that occasion. The BelarusianMinistry for Emergency Situations declared itsreadiness to the EAPC to prepare a team of rapid-reaction rescuers. Bilateral co-operation amongother countries with Poland, Lithuania, Latviaand Germany, is developing, even though itslevel is still low and some difficulties still exist.During the Prague and Istanbul summits, Belarusoffered its neighbours co-operation on borderprotection and air defence exercises.

The authorities have been preparing to launch a local NATO documentation centre at the Bela-rusian Academy of Sciences for a long time (a de-legation from the Academy visited NATO in No-vember 2003). However, statements by some re-presentatives of the authorities indicate that thisis just an exception from the rule, and that theanti-NATO indoctrination of the general public isbeing continued.

Problems in co-operation

The domestic policy practiced by President Alya-ksandr Lukashenka, which has been deemed un-democratic by the West, and his aggressive anti--NATO rhetoric and unwillingness to co-operatewith the Alliance allow of no opportunity to en-hance relations between Belarus and NATO. Both the authorities and citizens of NATO mem-ber states share the view that Belarus is definitely,and to an increasing degree, departing from thedemocratic standards pertaining to the rule of lawand human rights applicable in their countries.Moreover, Belarus has made hardly any progressin establishing democratic control of the armedforces, or in applying transparency rules to theprocesses of defence and military budget plan-ning. The lack of democratic reform in Belarus hascaused NATO take a consistent and tough stanceon this country. The limited co-operation program-me, including the refusal to sign the SecurityAgreement, is an intentional element thereof. Knowledge of NATO is very poor among the Be-larusian elite (including political scientists andjournalists), let alone the general public. Anti--NATO, anti-US and anti-Western propagandaeffectively maintains a high level of disinforma-tion. None of the academic and non-governmen-tal initiatives planned in 2003, which were aimedat informational and scientific activity dealingwith European and Atlantic security (withoutmentioning NATO by name), were opened or re-gistered due to lack of support from the authori-ties. For the same reason, not a single non-go-vernmental organisation dedicated to propagat-ing Euro-Atlantic ideas is operating in Belarus.The closing of the European Humanities Univer-sity in Minsk in July 2004 put an end to the lec-tures on NATO and Euro-Atlantic security thatused to be given there by two local universityteachers.

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Conclusions

The discouraging actions on the part of Belarusand, consequently, the current refocusing of theplanned NATO activity in the NIS area onto Cen-tral Asian and South Caucasian states will onlyfurther marginalise Belarus as a current and po-tential partner of the Alliance. The improvement of relations between NATO andRussia has not so far resulted in any enhance-ment of possible co-operation with Belarus. It would be reasonable to support non-govern-mental organisations interested in bringing Be-larus and NATO closer and in informing the pub-lic about the Alliance in a reliable manner. Engagement in Belarus is a necessity. The Allian-ce’s policy should remain tough, yet must alsobecome more proactive. The ongoing indifferenceshown by most of the Allies to Belarus needs tobe resisted. Previous experience (IPP, PfP TrustFund) proves that areas of co-operation do existat a lower level, and these should not be abando-ned; instead, this co-operation should be cautio-usly expanded as far as possible. The new NATOmembers can play a role in encouraging NATOstructures to keep trying to change Minsk’s poli-cy. Relations between NATO and Belarus couldonly intensify, if the country changed its internalpolicy. Nevertheless, the Alliance should also con-stantly convey the message of its readiness fordialogue and co-operation. Stanis∏aw Górka

UKRAINE

Co-operation between Ukraine and NATO has in-tensified since the Alliance Prague summit. How-ever, because the former Ukrainian authoritieshave been using relations with NATO for theirown political games, and because of their lack ofreal determination and efficiency in the imple-mentation of NATO standards, no breakthroughin mutual relations has happened that could havelifted Ukraine up to the level of the MembershipAction Plan (MAP).

Approach to NATO

Since Ukraine’s Strategy on NATO, as adopted bythe National Security and Defence Council ofUkraine (NSDC) on 23 May 2002, was approvedunder a presidential decree, Ukraine has officiallyaspired to achieve member status in the Alliance.The objective of complete integration with theAlliance is also included in the law on the Foun-dations of the National Security of Ukraine as of19 June 2003. On the other hand, official docu-ments exist which imply that Ukraine will notaim for NATO membership, namely the resolutionby the Supreme Council as of 1993 on foreign po-licy guidelines, and the provision concerning theintention to become a non-allied state in the De-claration of Sovereignty as of 16 June 1990. Thenew version of the Military Doctrine, revised un-der the presidential decree as of 15 July 2004,specifies Euro-Atlantic integration among the fo-reign policy priorities, yet it does not set out thegoal of membership in a direct manner. Thisambivalence in official documents perfectly illu-strates Ukraine’s attitude to NATO.Initially, Ukraine demonstrated scepticism aboutthe first enlargement of the Alliance eastwards,yet, unlike Russia, it never formulated a categori-cal objection to it. Kyiv gladly welcomed the se-cond enlargement and, referring to the officiallyannounced foreign policy line and declarationsby NATO representatives that the Alliance’s doorsremained open, it stated that it perceived Ukra-ine as a prospective NATO member. Ukraine belie-ves that the transformation and enlargement pro-cesses have caused the Alliance to become a keyelement of the European security system. Themost important issues for Ukraine, in the con-text of enlargement, include preventing any ter-

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ritorial claims, preventing the deployment of nu-clear weapons in the territories of the new mem-bers, and preventing any re-emergence of divi-sion lines or spheres of influence in the Euro-At-lantic area. Ukraine started developing its contacts withNATO to counterbalance attempts to involve Kyivin eastern integration (inter alia, as a part of theCSTO). During the decade of Leonid Kuchma’srule, co-operation with the Alliance was used asa balance against Ukraine’s relations with Russia.It was not accidentally that the signing of theCharter on a Distinctive Partnership and theNSDC’s decision coincided with the tightening ofrelations between NATO and the Russian Federa-tion (PJC and NRC). By developing relations withNATO Kyiv has preserved more room for manoe-uvre in its contacts with Moscow. The possibilitycannot be excluded that the intensification of co-operation following the Prague summit was a res-ponse to the improvement in Russia’s relationswith the USA and West European states. On the other hand, NATO is perceived as a consti-tuent of the idea of “Ukraine’s European choice”.Even that part of the Ukrainian society and repre-sentatives of the political circles who are resent-ful about the Alliance, extrapolating from the ex-periences of the East and Central European na-tions, treat joining NATO as a transitional stageon their way towards EU membership. MostUkrainian experts point to Euro-Atlantic integra-tion as a significant catalyst of the process of trans-forming and modernising the Ukrainian state,the path of which should be marked with suchmilestones as membership in the WTO, NATOand the EU. The issue of joining the Alliance, incontrast to the previous aspirants, is not yet a matter of national consensus in Ukraine.

Evolution of co-operation

Ukraine–NATO co-operation calendar

January 1992 – Ukraine’s representative takespart in NACC

8 February 1994 – Ukraine signs the PfPFramework Document

March 1994 – beginning of Ukraine–NATOconsultations in the “16+1” format

25 May 1994 – Ukraine submits its PfPPresentation Document to NATO

1995 – Ukraine takes part in the 1st PARP stage

13 March 1995 – signs the SecurityAgreement, NATO certification on 28 March1996, ratification by the Supreme Council on 12 September 2002

July 1995 – adopting the first IndividualPartnership Programme (IPP)

14 September 1995 – Hennadiy Udovenko,minister of foreign affairs, participates in a special NAC–Ukraine session; the partiesin their Joint Press Statement voice the expectation of further strengthening of co-operation of “particular importance”

February 1996 – sends a Ukrainian contingentto IFOR (thereafter SFOR) in Bosnia andHerzegovina

6 May 1996 – signs the Status of ForcesAgreement (SOFA), (ratified on 2 March 2000)

7 May 1997 – opens NATO Information andDocumentation Centre (NIDC) in Kyiv

9 July 1997 – signs the Charter on a DistinctivePartnership between the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization and Ukraine at the NATO MadridSummit: NATO declares its support for Ukraine’ssovereignty, independence, territorial integrity,inviolability of frontiers and the Alliance’s lackof intention to deploy nuclear weapons in theterritories of its new members; Ukraine pro-mises reform of the defence sector, reinforce-ment of democracy and civilian control of thearmed forces, as well as increasing inter-operability of Ukrainian forces with NATOforces; NATO–Ukraine Commission (NUC) andcrisis management mechanism are created

8 October 1997 – opens Ukraine’s mission to NATO (with the military mission operatingsince January 1998)

16 December 1997 – the first NUC ministerialmeeting: signing of a memorandum on civilemergency planning, creation of a JointWorking Group on Civil Emergency Planning(JWGCEP) and Joint Working Group on DefenceReform (JWGDR)

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4 November 1998 – Ukraine adopts theNational Programme of Co-operation withNATO until 2001

23 April 1999 – opening of the NATO LiaisonOffice (NLO)

1 September 1999 – sends a Ukrainian contingent to KFOR in Kosovo

October 1999 – the first agreement on NATOsupport for retraining retired Ukrainian soldiers

December 1999 – completion of the Ukrainiancontingent's mission at SFOR in Bosnia andHerzegovina

May 2000 – creating a Joint Working Group onScientific and Environmental Co-operation(JWGSEC)

27 January 2001 – Ukraine adopts theNational Programme of Co-operation withNATO for the years 2001–04

6 December 2001 – Ukraine and NAMSO signa memorandum; beginning of co-operation in destroying Ukrainian weapons and ammu-nition surpluses as a part of PfP Trust Fund

23 May 2002 – NSDC adopts Ukraine’s Strategyon NATO; Ukraine makes a declaration of itsdesire to apply for NATO membership

9 July 2002 – signing the Host Nation Support(HNS) memorandum (ratified on 17 March 2004)

22 November 2002 – adopting an Action Planmodelled on MAP and the first Annual TargetPlan 2002 at NATO Prague Summit

30 January 2003 – creation of the StateCouncil for European and Euro-AtlanticIntegration of Ukraine (SCEEAIU)

6 February 2003 – SCEEAIU approves the 2003 ATP

12 December 2003 – creation of the NationalCentre for Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine(NCEAIU)

31 March 2003 – creation of the Euro-AtlanticCo-operation Directorate as a part of theGeneral Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

25 March 2004 – SCEEAIU approves the 2004 ATP

31 March 2004 – the first meeting of the JointWorking Group on Armaments (JWGA)

7 June 2004 – signing the Memorandum on Strategic Airlift

Following the Prague Summit, Ukraine–NATO re-lations gained momentum. Significant as the in-troduction of such new co-operation mechanismsas AP and ATPs was, still more decisive was theUkrainian engagement in Iraq, which allowed theUS-Ukrainian relations come out from the shadowof the “Kolchuga scandal”, and the nominationof a civilian minister of defence on 25 June 2003.This post was entrusted to Yevhen Marchuk, or-ganiser of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)and a former head of NSDC, who had a good repu-tation in Brussels. He was also believed to be thepolitical author of the decisions taken on 23 May2002 (see above), and of the idea to send a Ukrai-nian contingent to Iraq. Some politicians and ex-perts hoped this rapid development would becrowned by signing the MAP at NATO IstanbulSummit, yet neither the reforms launched by theUkrainian side nor the number of supporters ofUkraine’s aspiration amongst the Alliance mem-bers had reached the critical mass necessary todo that. On 17 March 2004, the Supreme Council ratifiedthe Host Nation Support (HNS) memorandum,which provided a legal basis for Ukraine to granttechnical, information and medical support toNATO subunits conducting military and peace-keeping activity both inside and from the terri-tory of Ukraine. Such assistance will be providedon a commercial basis, although tax and otherduty exemptions have been granted. The Alliedforces gained the right of rapid access to the ter-ritory of Ukraine, in case it should be necessaryfor implementing NATO policy. This agreement isof a technical nature. Before it was signed, everyevent required the signing of separate agreementsregulating such issues as visas, taxes, choice ofsub-suppliers, possible indemnity, safety of parti-cipants and information. Following ratification,this will be regulated at the working level, andnot the highest level.

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On 7 June 2004, the third session of high-levelinformal NATO–Ukraine consultations were heldin Warsaw (the previous ones had taken place inMarch 2002 in Berlin and in May 2003 in Wa-shington). Kyiv got the clear message on the eveof the Istanbul Summit that the level of mutualrelations would not be changed. The followingfactors seem to have decided the postponementof the decision to assess the relations until theNUC meeting in December 2004: a distrust of thedeclarations made by the Ukrainian authorities,and the anxiety that shifting the relations to a higher level could be used for domestic politi-cal games; a lack of consensus among the Alliesas to the model of developing relations withUkraine; and the Russian factor (Alliance beingunwilling to antagonise Russia further followingthe acceptance of the Baltic states into NATO). The Memorandum on Strategic Airlift was signedduring the Warsaw meeting. Ukrainian An-124-100Ruslan aircraft had already been used for trans-porting cargoes from NATO states to Afghanistan(e.g. in 2003–04, Avialinii Antonov carried out 670flights for the Bundeswehr). In June 2003, at theNUC meeting, a group of Allies (Canada, France,Germany, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Por-tugal, Turkey, Greece, the Czech Republic, Hun-gary and Poland) signed a letter of intent to usethe Ruslans until the A400M plane was madeavailable for operation (estimated for sometimein the period 2010–12). The memorandum is a fra-mework document; it specifies the general rulesof financing and insurance, and regulates the le-gal issues. It does not guarantee that the Ukrai-nian planes will automatically be chosen; a ten-dering procedure will be conducted each time.The document must still be ratified. A meeting of the NUC at the level of Heads of Stateand Government was held on 29 June 2004. Thefulfilment of the tasks set in the AP and ATPswas discussed. NATO leaders once again appeal-ed to Ukraine for complete and active implemen-tation of Euro-Atlantic values. Leonid Kuchmaguaranteed that the presidential election wouldbe fair and free, inviting international observersto participate; he declared that Ukraine wouldjoin the antiterrorist Operation Active Endeavour(OAE), and that the country wished to join in theprocess of carrying out multinational events un-der the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC).It was agreed that the subsequent NUC session

(December 2004) would be devoted to reviewingUkraine–NATO relations in order to enhance part-nership, if necessary. Ukraine officially announced its new MilitaryDoctrine shortly after the summit. The previousone had been published back in 1993, and it haddetermined the status of Ukraine as a non-alliednation. The text of the document was acceptedby NSDC in November 2003, and it was approvedunder a presidential decree as of 15 June 2004.However, its publication was continually delay-ed. The agreed (though unannounced) text of thedocument included provisions that unambigu-ously expressed the country’s desire to become a member of NATO (articles 9 and 16). The Mili-tary Doctrine text was published in the secondhalf of July 2004, with some amendments12. Offi-cially, Kyiv claimed that the new version includ-ed amendments that were necessary in the lightof the decisions taken at the Ukraine–NATO andUkraine–EU summits. In truth, the motives weremore likely to be found in the context of theapproaching presidential election, and conse-quently the growing significance of the Russianfactor in Ukraine. The negative effects of the newversion seem to have been overestimated. Thetext, in contrast to the 1993 version, does includereferences to Euro-Atlantic integration (articles9, 10, 16 and 21). Nevertheless, it can be amendedupon the new president’s initiative. Moreover,moderate opinions result from the entire con-tent of decree no. 800/2004, which, apart fromchanging the Military Doctrine, sets concrete Eu-ro-Atlantic integration tasks for the government(including the allocation of budget funds for theimplementation of the 2005 ATP, and agreementon the terms and conditions of Ukraine’s joiningthe OAE and PCC). It needs to be emphasised thatthe response which the changes in the MilitaryDoctrine have elicited proves that public interestin Euro-Atlantic integration is growing. The Allian-ce responded in a very calm and moderate way,as inconsistency in setting foreign policy lineshad been one of the characteristics of LeonidKuchma’s presidency throughout its entire period.Adopting the Military Doctrine fits the imple-

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12 Voyenna doktryna Ukrayiny, approved under decree no.648/2004 by the President of Ukraine as of 15 June 2004,including amendments adopted under decree no. 800/2004by the President of Ukraine as of 15 July 2004.

mentation of objective I.1.B.1 under the AP.Alongside the law on the Foundations of the Na-tional Security of Ukraine, it creates a base fordetermining priorities of the national securitypolicy and directions for implementation there-of, which mirrors the new geopolitical condi-tions, the process of Euro-Atlantic integration ofUkraine (though not as strongly as some sup-porters of this line might have wished), and thepending reform and transformation of theUkrainian defence sector. Yevhen Marchuk was dismissed on 22 September2004 from the post of defence minister and re-placed by Oleksandr Kuzmuk, who had alreadyheld the post in 1996–2001, and lost it after suchincidents as a missile strike on a residential build-ing in the town of Brovary and the shooting downof a Tu-154 passenger plane. A great part of Ukrai-nian experts indicated that the reasons for Mar-chuk’s dismissal could also be found in the con-text of the election campaign. Conducting an election process in compliancewith the rules of democracy was included in theATP as objective I.1.A.1. NATO Secretary GeneralJaap de Hoop Scheffer, during his meetings withUkrainian politicians, emphasised on many occa-sions that the manner in which the election wasconducted would be an important test of mutu-al relations. In the Secretary General’s opinion,the election failed to meet the democratic stan-dards which Ukraine had undertaken to adopt asa part of the AP and ATPs. Yet the Alliance wassatisfied with the way the post-election crisiswas resolved. At first, the NUC meeting was post-poned and its rank was lowered to ambassado-rial level, and finally it was rescheduled. Thisdisturbed the time schedule of work on the 2005ATP, the draft of which Kyiv presented during thePC session with Ukraine on 14 October 2004. At the end of 2004, the Allies’ interest in Ukrainegrew, and a very positive political climate wascreated. However, initially, representatives of thenew authorities (Julia Tymoshenko, Borys Tara-syuk, Anatoliy Grytsenko, and Petro Poroshenko)spoke very cautiously, at times contradicting oneanother, about the future development of Ukrai-ne–NATO relations. Clearer messages concerningthe desire for complete integration with the Eu-ro-Atlantic community were conveyed by presi-

dent Victor Yushchenko at the NUC meeting on22 February 2005, when he spoke of Ukraine’sreadiness to join in MAP; in return, he was givenassurances of the continuation of the open doorpolicy, and of the Alliance’s readiness to adjustthe existing mechanisms to the new president’spriorities. Yet, seemingly, the new governing teamis not going to formulate clear-cut declarationsconcerning the country’s will to become a NATOmember (e.g. a formal request for acceptance) inthe short term, due to some internal policy issues(parliamentary elections scheduled for spring2006, and low support among the Ukrainian pu-blic for the idea of NATO membership). Instead,it has been decided to focus on using the alreadyexisting co-operation instruments to the great-est possible extent, an example of which is thepromise of launching the second weapons andammunition surplus destruction programme asa part of the PfP Trust Fund in spring 2005. Ac-cording to Ukrainian experts, the composition ofthe new government13 suggests that during thepresidency of Victor Yushchenko – in contrast toLeonid Kuchma’s rule – numerous declarationsunsupported by actual reforms will be replacedwith real actions in the field of the Euro-Atlanticintegration of Ukraine.

Co-operation management system The signing of the AP, as compared to the Char-ter on a Distinctive Partnership, has significantlyextended and systematised the areas of co-opera-tion. This co-operation covers political & economic,security, defence & military, informational pro-tection and security, legal issues. The years 2003and 2004 allowed the institutions responsiblefor co-operation with NATO, which had been cre-ated following the Prague Summit, to grow a lit-tle stronger and gain some operational efficiency.The State Council for European and Euro-AtlanticIntegration of Ukraine (SCEEAIU), chaired by the

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13 Borys Tarasyuk, during his previous time in office at theMFA (1998–2000), had already presented himself as a sup-porter of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. He is alsothe director of the Institute of Euro-Atlantic co-operation,which promotes this idea. Defence minister Anatoliy Gry-tsenko and his first deputy Leonid Polyakov both originatefrom the Razumkov Centre (the former was its presidentand the latter was the military programme director), whichis also perceived as an institution that supports the idea ofUkraine becoming a NATO member.

president14, meets every quarter to set strategicgoals and priorities in the field of European inte-gration and develop guidelines for the executiveauthority. The National Centre for the Euro-Atlan-tic Integration of Ukraine (NCEAIU) monitors theeffects of co-operation with Euro-Atlantic struc-tures at its monthly meetings, helps to co-ordi-nate it on the national level, and makes concretesuggestions for its development. The NCEAIU ischaired by Volodymyr Horbulin15. As a part of theGeneral Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, theEuro-Atlantic Co-operation Directorate, headedby General Major Leonid Holopatiuk, has beenestablished. Of the “pre-Prague” system, the in-stitution of national co-ordinators for Ukraine’sco-operation with NATO has been preserved16. Inaddition to that, Ukraine’s mission to NATO (ofwhich the military representation operates as a part) is active in Brussels. On the international level, co-operation is co-ordi-nated through mechanisms common to all thepartner states and by the NATO–Ukraine Com-mission (NUC), which supervises the operationof the Joint Working Groups on Defence Reform(JWGDR), Economic Security (JWGES), Civil Emer-gency Planning (JWGCEP), Scientific and Environ-mental Co-operation (JWGSEC) and Armaments(JWGA). NUC meetings are held irregularly at thehighest level (the Washington and Istanbul sum-mits), and on a regular basis on ministerial (twi-

ce a year) and ambassadorial levels. On 1 Septem-ber 2004, the embassy of the Netherlands becamea NATO Contact Point Embassy (preceded by theembassy of the Republic of Poland, which hadperformed this function for four years). In addi-tion, the Alliance has the following institutionsin Kyiv: a NATO Liaison Office (NLO), which co--ordinates the current co-operation (organisa-tion of visits and PfP exercises; it also supportedthe implementation of the Defence Review), anda NATO Information and Documentation Centre(NIDC), which is in charge of informational activ-ity and of supporting research events coveringUkraine–NATO co-operation.

Implementation of the Annual Target Plans (ATPs)Of the 259 events covered by the 2003 ATP, 84%were internal events (to be conducted by Ukrai-ne), and 66% covered civilian matters. Of the 29legal acts envisaged under the 2003 ATP, 22 wereadopted. The most important of these includedthe Law on the Foundations of the National Secu-rity of Ukraine (19 June 2003), the Law on Demo-cratic and Civilian Control of the Defence Struc-tures and Public Order Enforcement Organisa-tions (19 June 2003), the law On State Control ofInternational Transfers of Goods Designated forMilitary Purposes and Dual-Use Goods (20 Febru-ary 2003), and the Law on State Border Service (3 April 2003). Successes in the 2003 ATP imple-mentation include the establishment of the CivicEuro-Atlantic League Ukraine–NATO by Ukrainiannon-governmental organisations, and launchingthe Ukrainian Research and Academic Network(URAN), which provides access to the general Eu-ropean GEANT network. The 2004 ATP was approved by the SCEEAIU withone quarter delay. It was smaller than the 2003ATP; it included only 226 events, of which 177were internal events. The 2004 ATP, as comparedto the 2003 ATP, contained fewer deadlines“within one year’s time” and more precise dates. The subject matter of the 2004 ATP was mostlya continuation of the activities initiated underthe 2003 ATP. Great emphasis was put on sectionI.2 covering economic issues, including streng-thening state energy security (objective I.2.12).The objective I.3.5 activities (increasing the levelof knowledge on NATO activity among the citi-zens) were enhanced.

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14 Additionally, it consists of the following members: thechairman of the Supreme Council, the Prime Minister, thehead of the Presidentís Administration, the secretary ofNSDC, Ukraine’s governmental plenipotentiary for Euro-pean and Euro-Atlantic integration, the president of theNational Academy of Sciences, the director of the NationalInstitute of Strategic Studies and chief of the NCEAIU, andthe ministers of foreign affairs, defence, justice, economyand European integration.15 The NCEAIU’s composition: the deputy secretary of NSDC;secretaries of state at the ministries of defence, foreign af-fairs, economy and European integration, industrial policy,emergency situations, finance and justice, the State Com-mittee for Radio and TV Broadcasting, and the Security Ser-vice of Ukraine; heads of the Supreme Council’s committeesfor foreign affairs and for security and defence.16 They are nominated by the President of Ukraine. Cur-rently there are 11 of them, and they deal with the follow-ing fields of co-operation: defence reform, armament, de-fence standards and technologies, economy, emergency situ-ations, struggle against international terrorism, science andtechnology, ecology, standardisation and metrology, trans-port and air traffic management and information.

Military-to-Military co-operation Judging from the experience of fulfilling ATPcommitments by Ukraine, co-operation is mostcomplete and effective in the military field. TheMinistry of Defence had carried out 74 (89%)tasks by the end of 2003. Implementation ofother, long-term tasks is in progress. As a part ofthe 2004 ATP, emphasis was put on developingdefence planning procedures in compliance withNATO standards; air traffic information manage-ment and sharing; information security, includ-ing increasing the level of knowledge among thepublic on Ukraine–NATO co-operation and de-fence reform; and minimising the negativeeffects of reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine(converting defence facilities, ecological issues,destroying weapon and ammunition surpluses,and social aspects). The greatest successes included the completionof the Defence Review and the preparation ofthe Strategic Defence Bulletin 2015 (SDB). TheSDB was developed in co-operation with expertsfrom the Alliance member states under the su-pervision of the state commission for reformingand developing Ukraine’s armed forces, othermilitary formations, armament and militarytechnology, chaired by the Prime Minister. The do-cument was presented to NATO member stateson 13–14 April 2004, and was approved by a pre-sidential decree on 22 June 2004. The SDB breaksthe reform of the armed forces into two stages.The army structure is to be reduced and optimi-sed by 2009, and the armed forces will be equippedwith the most modern armament systems with-in the period of 2010–15. By the end of 2005, thenumber of the armed forces is to be reduced from355,000 to 200,000 (160,000 soldiers and 40,000civilian personnel). In 2015, the armed forces ofUkraine should number 90,000–100,000 (includ-ing 70,000–75,000 soldiers). The SDB also inclu-des a financial schedule for implementing thedefence reform. The 2015 defence budget valueis supposed to reach approx. UAH 17 billion (ap-prox. US$3.2 billion). The government is suppo-sed to develop a programme for reforming anddeveloping the armed forces of Ukraine until2009, using the SDB and the Military Doctrine asa basis. The decree that established the model of the ar-med forces based on three types of forces, i.e.Ground Forces, Navy and Air Forces (created out

of the combination of the former Air Force andAir Defence Force), came into effect on 22 June2004. The SDB and MD provide for division of thearmy into three parts: Joint Rapid Reaction For-ces (JRRF), Main Defence Forces and Strategic Re-serve. The SDB envisages that the number of con-scripts will be limited to 51,700 in 2005, then to9,100 in 2009, and the army will finally consistof professional military personnel alone in 2015.The process of strengthening civilian control ofthe armed forces is ongoing. By the end of 2004,civilian officers should take 40% of the posts atthe Ministry of Defence; this ratio is due to riseto 80% by the end of 2005. In 2003, as a part of the Individual PartnershipProgramme (IPP), Ukrainian armed forces tookpart in 152 events, including 24 military exercis-es, 6 of which were held in Ukraine. In 2004, therespective numbers were 220 events, 24 militaryexercises, 4 held in Ukraine. 298 joint events havebeen planned for 2005. Exercises held on a regu-lar basis include Peace Shield, Cossack Step, Cos-sack Express and the ground-and-sea Co-opera-tive Partner. Ukraine designated the following mi-litary components for PfP participation in 2004:the 1st Detached Special Forces Battalion (theUkrainian portion of POLUKRBAT, as a part ofKFOR, the 95th Detached Airmobile Brigade of the8th Army Corps (Zhytomyr), the NBC Company ofthe 704th NBC Regiment (Sambir), the Engineer-ing Battalion of the 11th Engineering Regiment(Brovary), the 1st Mechanised Battalion of the72nd Brigade (Bila Tserkva), the 2nd HelicopterSquadron of the 7th Detached Regiment (Kaliniv),4 aircraft of the 25th Military Transport AircraftRegiment (Melitopol), the 2nd Company of the 1st Detached Marine Battalion (Feodosia), and thefrigate Hetman Sagaydachny (Sevastopol), thecorvette Lutsk and the assault ship KostyantynOlshansky (both in Novoozerne). The followingitems have been added to the list for 2005: anAn-26 sanitary aircraft, the small tanker Fastiv,the fleet tug Kremenets, and a unit for combat-ing submarine sabotage forces and means. Apartfrom POLUKRBAT, Ukraine provides componentsfor two other multinational units: “Tysa” (theUkrainian-Romanian-Hungarian-Slovak engineer-ing battalion) and BLACKSEAFOR (an operationalgroup of 6 Black Sea nations). Ukraine delegatedtwo people to work at the PfP Staff Elements (PSE)

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between 1998–2003; currently, it has three rep-resentatives there. Ukraine continues its participation in the 3rd (en-hanced and adapted) stage of the Planning and Re-view Process (PARP). Pursuant to the SDB, the mainobjective is for the Ukrainian JRRF to achieve com-pliance with NATO standards by 2009.The Multinational Staff Officer Centre, which pre-pares soldiers for work in the multinational staffsof UN and NATO missions, was created in Decem-ber 2003 as a part of the Academy of NationalDefence of Ukraine in Kyiv as a continuation ofcourses held since 2000 (more than 600 studentshave graduated). The Administrative Agreementon the Creation, Financing and Support of theActivity of the NATO–Ukraine Defense Documen-tation Office was signed on 3 August 2004. Since 1999, NATO has supported professional andlanguage courses held by the National Co-ordi-nating Centre for the adaptation of military ser-vice personnel. In 2002, the Donetsk plant de-stroyed 404,000 antipersonnel mines as a part ofthe PfP Trust Fund project, in co-operation withNAMSA (the Alliance’s input was US$ 561,000).Implementation of the second project is due tobegin in spring 2005. The project provides forthe destruction of 133,000 tons of ammunitionand 1.5 million SALW items. The project will beimplemented in four phases over 12 years (theestimated input of the Alliance’s member statesis US$ 27 million). The United States has takenon the role of leading nation for the first phaseof the project. Financial support has also been pro-mised by the United Kingdom and Norway. Ukraine is an active participant in the Alliance--led peacekeeping operations. A total of 2,800Ukrainian soldiers, stationed in the French sec-tor, took part in the IFOR/SFOR mission in Bosniaand Herzegovina from February 1996 to Decem-ber 1999. In addition, Ukraine made 10 aircraftavailable (on commercial terms) for the needs ofSFOR. On 1 September 1999, the Ukrainian con-tingent (the 14th Detached Helicopter Squadron,the 37th Detached Protection Company and the57th Military Hospital) embarked on their serviceas a part of KFOR. In July 2000, those troops werereplaced by the Ukrainian component of POLUKR-BAT, consisting of 321 soldiers of MultinationalBrigade East. The Strpce commune, a Serbian en-clave, is their zone of responsibility. In additionto that, 143 Ukrainian soldiers (the Detached Air-

mobile Platoon and the 92nd Detached Platoon ofthe 11th Detached Engineering Battalion) werestationed in the North sector as a part of BEL-UKROKOS (the Belgian-Luxembourgian-Ukrai-nian-Romanian unit) from December 2002 to July2003.Negotiations on the practical engagement of Uk-rainian ships in the OAE are ongoing.

Non-military aspects of co-operationUkraine has been co-operating with NATO in thefield of Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) since1992. Member states and the Euro-Atlantic Disas-ter Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC) havehelped Ukraine manage the consequences of se-vere flooding in 1995, 1998 and 2001. The JointNATO–Ukraine Project on Flood Preparedness andResponse, as part of which precipitation in theTysa basin is measured, has been implementedsince 2001. It is envisaged that the project willextend over the entire Transcarpathian region inits subsequent stages. Ukraine, along with Russia, is the most activeparticipant in the Science for Peace (SfP) pro-gramme. Ukrainian scientists have received 141research grants since 1999. 250 researchers havebeen granted NATO scholarships to conduct re-search in the Alliance’s member states. Currently,Ukrainian scientists are members of 21 groupsworking on 16 projects. Three representatives of Ukraine have servedtheir internships at NATO International Staffbetween 1998–2003. Currently, one person is oninternship.

Problems in co-operation

Adopting the SDB is an attempt to respond to thegravest problem facing defence reform, namelyfinancial shortages. The SDB specifies the exactamounts that Ukraine intends to allocate for de-fence until 2015, providing for realistic increasesthereof every year. In 2005, the outlays are dueto grow from UAH 4.9 billion (US$ 920 million) toUAH 6 billion (US$ 1.13 billion). The reform ofthe armed forces will allow money to be savedthanks to structural and staff changes. From 1992to 2003, purchase of new military equipmentwas at a minimum. In 2004, however, 92% of thedefence budget was allocated for current main-tenance. If this continues at a similar level, the

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Ukrainian army will lose combat capability atsome point in the period 2005–10 due to thetechnological ageing of its equipment. The situa-tion can only change if the reform line set underthe SDB is consistently followed. The lack of NATO consent to the MAP in the se-cond half of 2004 has further worsened the dis-illusionment of official Ukrainian state structu-res with the effects of co-operating with theAlliance. Yet it was the Ukrainian side that wasto blame for the failure to move mutual relationsto a higher level. Apparently, sending troops toIraq – through winning the favour of the USA –was supposed to take Ukraine significantly closerto the goal of membership, without the need tosubmit to any scrupulous supervision of its ful-filment of other commitments. The selective im-plementation of the AP and ATPs was concentra-ted on military events, avoiding the most urgentinternal policy problems. This could be perfectlyillustrated by the issue of civilian control of thesecurity structures, which is in fact being imple-mented only with regard to the armed forces.Moreover, civilian control tended to be definedas presidential control17. This demonstrates thatmost of the Ukrainian political elite did not un-derstand that the reforms required by NATO werea value per se, as they contributed to the deve-lopment of the Ukrainian state in compliancewith European standards, and that membershipwas just a secondary issue. This was confirmedby the events that have taken place during thepast year or so: the local election in Mukachevo,the Kravchenko affair, and the Jane’s IntelligenceDigest reports on arms deals with Cuba and Ve-nezuela. Yet it was the course of the presidentialelection that provided the most flagrant illustra-tion of this problem. Even though the National Programme for Inform-ing the Society on the Euro-Atlantic Integrationof Ukraine for 2004–07 was approved on 2 De-cember 2003, the image of the Alliance has never-theless worsened. Opinion polls indicate that, if

a referendum were to be held, 14.9% of voteswould be cast for and 47.5% against Ukraine’sjoining NATO18. The state-owned mass mediahave not informed the public on NATO in a reli-able manner; instead, they have even occasion-ally resorted to discrediting the Western part-ners as a tool in the internal political struggle.Negative stereotypes concerning the Alliance arealso reinforced due to the fact that Ukraine be-longs to the “Russian information space”. For in-stance, the war in Iraq is perceived as a NATO in-tervention, which strengthens the conviction thatthe Alliance is an “aggressive military bloc”. Inaddition to the two traditional reasons for aver-sion to NATO (the post-Soviet stereotypes andthe fear of being forced to engage in a conflict),a third one has been developed: membershiprequires significant financial input, which willhave a negative effect on the Ukrainian economy(Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych used to referto this). The Kyiv NIDC is doing its best to easethe problem. The most recent initiative was theopening of NATO information points at 27 regio-nal libraries in autumn 2004. At the time of thecrisis over the Tuzla island19 the consultationmechanism, envisaged in article 15 of the MadridCharter, was not employed. Some analysts be-lieve that a chance for increasing public supportfor membership has been wasted, and Ukrai-nians have been strengthened in their convic-

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17 It is worth noting that the Ukrainian Supreme Council,which is, paradoxically, the most pro-Atlantic parliament sofar, has played quite a minor role in deciding foreign anddefence policy. These issues are totally monopolised by thepresident, and the decree “On measures to improve the effi-ciency of the state foreign policy” of 29 November 2003 hasin fact brought the MFA under the control of the Presiden-tial Administration’s Foreign Policy Department.

18 30% of respondents were undecided, 6.3% would notvote and 1.3% refused to answer. Polls conducted by theDemocratic Initiatives Fund and the Kyiv International In-stitute of Sociology on 4–15 February 2005 (sample of 2,040people, max. error 2.2%).19 On 29 September 2003, Russia started to build a causewayin the Kerch Strait on the Taman Peninsula side running to-wards the Ukrainian island of Kosa Tuzla, while at the sametime expressing a doubt as to which state this territoryshould belong to. As a result, the Ukrainian political elitesand public were united in an unprecedented way over theidea of the state’s territorial integrity. Following negotia-tions between Presidents Kuchma and Putin, the construc-tion work was discontinued on 23 October 2003. On 24 De-cember 2003, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia signedan agreement on co-operation in using the Azov Sea andthe Kerch Strait. Pursuant to it, the waters of the Azov Seaand Kerch Strait were considered internal waters of bothRussia and Ukraine, with the proviso that the Azov Seawould be divided by the state border, and the principles ofusing the Kerch Strait would be established under a sepa-rate agreement.

tion that NATO is a “club for the rich, who do notcare about Ukraine”20. Ukraine’s policy towards the Alliance changes un-der the influence of the Russian factor. In the se-cond half of 2004, Ukrainian foreign policy be-came more East-oriented (changes in the Mili-tary Doctrine, the dismissal of Yevhen Marchuk,the stance taken on the conflict in Transnistria,Victor Yanukovych’s declarations on 27 Septem-ber 2004). This overlapped with already existingproblems (the extent to which the Ukrainian de-fence industry is integrated with that of Russia,the scope of mutual connections between thesecret services of the two countries, the presenceof the Russian Black Sea Fleet), even if they hadnot yet been discussed openly. If we add to thosestill other existing disagreements (e.g. over wea-pon export control), it comes as no surprise thatthe Allies were rather uncertain about the sin-cerity and irrevocability of Ukraine’s decision tostrive for membership and about Kyiv’s determi-nation to adjust the entire country, and not justthe armed forces, to NATO standards.

Conclusions

The presidential election has put a new perspec-tive on Ukraine–NATO relations. However, anyreal shifts of the relations’ level can only be ex-pected in the medium term (i.e. within the nexttwo to three years). The Allies need time to evalu-ate the actions, and not just declarations, of thenew president and government. For the time be-ing, Ukraine can count on a change of relationsto the Intensified Dialogue (ID) formula. How-ever, this would be merely a pro forma event, asthe level of co-operation currently set under theAP and ATPs is in fact higher than the one envis-aged in the ID. An alternative solution could bemaking the MAP a long-term programme. How-ever, this would cause a devaluation of the pro-gramme; even though Ukraine would be able tosign the document in a shorter time, this wouldbe more a symbolic than an actual success. IfUkraine wants to raise its relations to the levelof the MAP (in the current form of the program-

me), it should clearly define its strategic goalsonce and for all, launch an active public infor-mation campaign to develop a national consen-sus on the membership idea, show more interestand activity in the implementation of the ATP,consistently conduct a transformation of the ar-med forces in compliance with the SDB’s provi-sions, and not only ratify the Memorandum onStrategic Airlift but also consistently work to-wards the signing of contracts that would trans-late this political agreement into practical actions.NATO should encourage Ukraine to implement in-ternal democratic transformation, in particularwith regard to building democratic institutionsand a civil society, first of all by enhancing thepolitical components of co-operation as a part ofthe 2005 ATP. If the new Ukrainian authoritiesshow particular determination and efficiency inbringing the state closer to the member-statestandards, it will be reasonable to consider rais-ing the relations up to MAP level during the mini-sterial meeting in December 2005. The Alliance should, both politically and practi-cally (through the group of border protection ex-perts as a part of the JWGDR), support the finalestablishment of the status of Ukraine’s bordersand the development of adequate infrastructureat the borders.Assistance in implementing defence reformshould be one of the priorities. It is particularlyimportant to build on the experience of the suc-cessful co-operation with the Ministry of Defencein the process of transforming other securitystructures, including the Security Service of Uk-raine. Support for multinational units includingUkrainian components should be increased, notdecreased. It would be worthwhile for NATO toconsider supporting the idea of a joint militaryunit designated for peacekeeping missions, whichUkraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan have been try-ing to create as a part of GUUAM. NATO shouldexert pressure on Ukraine to use the skills of sol-diers who have had practical experience in co--operation with the Alliance’s institutions andsubunits in a more comprehensive way.Priority should also be given to activities aimedat liquidating the deficit of information on NATOamong the Ukrainian public. It is worth continu-ing and broadening the programme coveringshort trips to NATO institutions for representa-tives of the mass media (especially TV), non-go-

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20 Opinion polls conducted by Razumkov Centre in October2003 showed that only 11.7% of Ukrainians believed that ifthe political situation became tense, Kyiv could count onNATO assistance (29.8% counted on UN, 20.6% on CIS coun-tries and 19.9% on the EU).

vernmental organisations and local leaders. Itwould be reasonable to develop the Kyiv NIDC byboth employing more people and expanding itsstructure. NATO should strongly emphasise theneed to create the Ukraine–NATO Co-operationinternet information portal, which Ukraine hadalready undertaken to do in the 2003 ATP. In thecontext of building a positive image of the Allian-ce, it is worth supporting projects aimed at alle-viating the problems related to transformationof the armed forces. Support for the destructionof Ukrainian weapon and ammunition surplusesas a part of PfP Trust Fund, and for programmescovering the retraining of retired soldiers, shouldfurther be increased in the longer term. Success-ful implementation of the Project on Flood Pre-paredness and Response in Trans-Carpathia willalso have a positive effect on NATO’s image.Micha∏ Kolasiƒski

MOLDOVA

NATO-Moldovan relations are mainly focused onpolitical dialogue. The basic problems both par-ties are concerned with include settling the issueof the separatist Transnistrian republic whichexists in the territory of Moldova, and the sta-tioning (contrary to international arrangements)of the Operational Group of Russian Forces troopsthere.

Approach to NATO

Officially, Chisinau has announced that Moldovadoes not intend to apply for NATO membership.However, it has declared a desire to join the Euro-pean Union. The policy of this country can besummed up by citing President Vladimir Voro-nin’s speech of 20 May 2004, in which he statedthat Moldova was not going to join NATO, be-cause the constitution guarantees state neutrali-ty. A great part of the Moldovan opposition,which would like their country to be a member ofthe Alliance, has a different opinion on this issue.However, considering the strong position of theruling camp, it seems Moldova will stick to itscurrent line in foreign policy for some consider-able time. Regardless of Chisinau’s stand, the un-resolved Transnistrian conflict excludes the pos-sibility of NATO taking a positive stance, even ifMoldova decided to aspire to membership. NATO member states have been watching andresponding to events in Moldova. When Trans-nistrian authorities started closing Moldovanschools using the Latin alphabet in the territorycontrolled by them in July 2004, their actionsmet with criticism from such countries as theUnited States and Romania. The two countriescaused the Russian initiative of November 2003concerning a resolution of the Transnistrian con-flict (the so-called “Kozak Memorandum”) to endin failure. If the Russian project had proved suc-cessful, this would have made Moldova evenmore dependent on Russia and adversely affect-ed the young Moldovan democracy. Moldova has not put forward any proposals toNATO concerning the possible participation ofthe Alliance’s forces in a potential peacekeepingoperation in Transnistria. Chisinau would ratherwelcome EU engagement; it expects only politicalsupport from NATO.

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Moldova is trying to co-operate closely with themost powerful NATO member, the United States.Chisinau has sent a small military contingent(42 soldiers in the second half of 2003 and 12 sol-diers in the second half of 2004) to Iraq.

The Alliance is concerned with the situation inMoldova for two major reasons: the stationingof remnants of the Operational Group of RussianForces (OGRV) in the country, and the unresolvedconflict over Transnistria. The Alliance startedattaching greater significance to Moldovan pro-blems when Romania joined NATO in 2004. Theissue of Russian troops stationed in the easternpart of the country constantly arises in NATO’sdeclarations concerning Moldova. The Alliancehas criticised Russia on numerous occasions forfailing to fulfil its 1999 OSCE Istanbul summitcommitments, pursuant to which Moscow wasrequired to withdraw its armed forces, weaponry,ammunition and military equipment from east-ern Moldova (the Kolbasna depot) in the territoryof the separatist Transnistrian Moldovan Repu-blic) by the end of 2002. Russia also failed tomeet the extended deadline, which had been setfor the end of 2003, claiming the delays werecaused by objections raised by the authorities ofseparatist Transnistria, where Russian troops arestill stationed. The Alliance has made the ratifi-cation of the adapted Conventional Forces in Eu-rope (CFE) treaty dependent on the withdrawalof Russian forces from Moldova and Georgia.Most NATO member states support this officialstance taken by the Alliance. Germany insists onRussian withdrawal from eastern Moldova and,even though it has not made this a condition forCFE ratification, it does not challenge the officialstandpoint of the Alliance out of solidarity withother Allies. Currently, approximately 1,400 Rus-sian soldiers and more than 15,000 tons of wea-ponry, ammunition and military equipment re-main on Transnistrian-controlled territory. Apartfrom that, the ceasefire line between Moldova“proper” and Transnistria is guarded by a 500--strong peacekeeping contingent (this is a trilate-ral, Moldovan-Russian-Transnistrian, contingent).The Alliance’s aforementioned standpoint wasfully confirmed by the final communiqué at theIstanbul Summit of NATO Heads of State and Go-vernment in June 2004. In this document, theAlliance appealed for a completion of Russian

troops’ withdrawal from Moldova and Georgiaas fast as possible, and declared it would continuemonitoring the process through the OSCE. Thestandpoint was additionally supported by the sta-tements, both made in Chisinau, by NATO Secre-tary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on 23 Sep-tember 2004 and US Defence Secretary DonaldRumsfeld on 26 June 2004. NATO representativeshave also been encouraging the international com-munity to engage more actively in efforts aimedat settling the Transnistrian conflict. However, theAlliance is not considering its participation inthe resolution of the conflict over Transnistria. NATO has declared its desire to develop co-ope-ration with Moldova as a part of the Partnershipfor Peace, though the issue of this country is pe-ripheral to the Alliance’s general policy. The neu-trality of Moldova is not perceived as an obstacleto co-operation by NATO. A certain democratic deficit, which is characte-ristic of Moldova’s political system under Com-munist party rule, is not a serious impediment,either: the Alliance co-operates with countriesgoverned by much more authoritarian regimes.The main problem is Moldova’s limited financialpotential.

Evolution of co-operation

NATO–Moldova co-operation calendar

March 1992 – joins the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)

16 March 1994 – signs the Partnership for Peace Framework Document

September 1994 – signs the PfP PresentationDocument

28 October 1994 – signs the SecurityAgreement; NATO certification in October 1998

1995 – signs the first Individual PartnershipProgramme (IPP)

6 September 1996 – signs the Status of ForcesAgreement (SOFA; ratified on 31 October 1997)

1997 – begins to participate in the Planningand Review Process (PARP)

30 September 2002 – begins to implement thefirst project as a part of the PfP Trust Fund

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Direct co-operation between NATO and Moldovais rather limited. The greatest success of technicalco-operation so far has been the already finishedprogramme for the destruction of landmines,outdated ammunition and rocket fuel as a partof the Trust Fund. Funds for this Netherlands-ledprogramme enabled the destruction of 12,000tons of landmines and 700,000 tons of outdatedammunition and rocket fuel. The project imple-mentation has had a positive impact on NATO’simage in Moldova. A feasibility study for anotherproject, which provides for destruction of chemi-cals and pesticides, has been conducted. Additio-nally, Moldova participates in the Canada-ledAssessment of Natural Risks programme initiat-ed by the NATO Committee on the Challenges ofModern Society (CCMS). As a part of this project,NATO gave Moldova US$ 1.5 million in 2003 formonitoring the quality of water in the Dniesterand Prut rivers. Moldova is a member of the Southeast EuropeanCo-operative Initiative (SECI), which makes itpartly involved in NATO co-operation with theBalkan states. Since the signing of the first Indi-vidual Partnership Programme in 1995, Moldovahas taken part in subsequent IPPs; it implementedthe last Individual Partnership Programme for theyears 2000–01, but chose not to embark uponthe IPP for 2003–04. In 2004, Chisinau announcedit was interested in another Individual Partner-ship Programme and suggested it could be adapt-ed to Moldova’s needs. However, no new IPP wasagreed until the end of 2004. Moldova has adopt-ed the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Insti-tution Building (PAP-DIB) to support its defencereform. The Moldovan side declares interest inachieving interoperability with NATO, co-opera-tion in defence reform and civil emergency, andin language training. Still, co-operation in theseareas is not really advanced. Moldova has been implementing a programmeaimed at establishing civilian and democraticcontrol of the army. The second stage of this pro-cess has been scheduled for 2005–08.Due to financial shortages, Moldovan armed for-ces can only participate in military exercises to a limited extent. One example illustrating Mol-dova’s engagement in joint exercises during thatperiod is the Peace Shield exercises conducted asa part of the Partnership for Peace on 14–21 July2003 in Ukraine, which Moldovan subunits par-

ticipated in. This country also took part in the PfPantiterrorist exercises named RESCUER/MEDCEUR2004, which were held in July 2004 in the Balticstates. Moldova has established the closest security co--operation of the NATO nations with the Nether-lands, proof of which is not only the fact that theHague is in charge of the landmine destructionproject, but also Moldova’s participation in thecomprehensive NOSTRUM programme, which isconducted by the Centre for European SecurityStudies (CESS) at Groningen University, and isaimed at developing draft security sector reformsfor Moldova and Ukraine. The CESS co-operatesin Moldova with the Public Policy Institute andwith the Ministry of Defence.

Problems in co-operation

The gravest problem is the weakness of the Mol-dovan security sector: its financial shortages, in-stitutional inertia, missing basic structural ele-ments, such as a good military property stock-taking system, and incompetence of the officers.This was proven by the thefts of weapons andammunition from Moldovan army warehouses,which were revealed in September 2004.The anxiety on Moldova’s part that overly closecontacts with NATO could provoke a negative re-action from Russia is a problem (though, on theother hand, contacts with the Alliance offer Chi-sinau some freedom of manoeuvre in its dealingswith Moscow). Initially, the ruling camp in Mol-dova intended to strengthen ties with Russia;however, since 2004, it has been following thepro-Western line with increasing determination,and has even been openly criticising Moscow.Nevertheless, Moldova is heavily dependent onRussia in both economic (including energy im-port) and political terms; Moscow is able to di-rectly influence the Moldovan political elites, anda large Russian minority lives in the country.Russia has strong influence in the separatistTransnistrian Moldovan Republic, where Russiantroops are stationed. If Chisinau tightened its re-lations with NATO, this could cause a sharp reac-tion from Moscow. By the end of 2004, Chisinau had not replied toNATO offers of enhancing the dialogue and co--operation.

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Conclusions

Moldova–NATO relations are more important inpolitical than in practical terms. Moldova wantsNATO to press Russia to withdraw its troops fromTransnistria, and counts on the Alliance’s sup-port in the Transnistrian matter. NATO goals aresimilar: it wants Moldova to become a stablestate, capable of fully executing its sovereignrights over its entire territory – provided, how-ever, that it guarantees adequate rights to thenational minorities, and grants a high degree ofautonomy to Transnistria. NATO has been consis-tently urging Russia to fulfil its Istanbul commit-ments (withdrawing Russian troops from Trans-nistria). Moldova does not strive for membershipin the Alliance, pointing out its neutrality. NATOand its member states are monitoring the situa-tion concerning Transnistria; yet, for the timebeing, they are not planning to actively engagein the conflict resolution. The NATO-Moldovanproject for destroying antipersonnel mines, out-dated ammunition and rocket fuel, implementedas a part of the Trust Fund, has proven a success.A feasibility study for another project has beencarried out. Common exercises with NATO havegiven Moldova access to the expertise of memberstates and partners of the Alliance, which provideconceptual support to the development of thecountry’s small armed forces. The structural andfinancial weakness of the Moldovan security sec-tor is a serious problem in co-operation. Anotherproblem is Chisinau’s fear of a negative reactionfrom Russia to excessively close contacts betweenMoldova and the Alliance.NATO should continue to press for withdrawalof Russian forces and weaponry from easternMoldova. Similarly, ratification of the adaptedCFE should still be made dependent on the with-drawal of Russian troops from Transnistria.Moldova’s efforts to establish civilian and demo-cratic control of the army need to be supported.Assistance is also necessary in the case of struc-tural reforms and modernisation of the Moldo-van army. Furthermore, it is worth noting a needto support reform to other law enforcementstructures. The feedback on Moldovan reforms,which NATO receives as a part of the Planningand Review Process, must be appreciated. Themonitoring of the situation concerning Trans-nistria, and co-operation with OSCE and EU on

this issue, are of great significance. It seems thatif the current stalemate in the Transnistrian con-flict continues for a long time, which is proba-ble, NATO will not avoid the need to become in-volved in attempts to settle this conflict in someform. Jacek Wróbel

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GEORGIA

The Georgian “rose revolution” has significantlystrengthened co-operation between NATO andGeorgia. Tbilisi is the Alliance’s most active part-ner in the Southern Caucasus. The country aspi-res to become a member of NATO.

Approach to NATO

Georgia pursues a pro-Western foreign policy,striving for the broadest possible integrationwith NATO and the EU, and enhancing its rela-tions with the United States. Joining the Allianceis one of the priorities of Georgian foreign policy.This goal, which had already been set duringEduard Shevardnadze’s presidency, is supportedby a majority of the Georgian elites. To implementit, the new authorities led by President MikheilSaakashvili have embarked upon profound reformof the state and its defence system. The issue of integration with NATO has the rankof a civilisational choice in Georgia, and is seenas a way of ensuring security to the country inthe case of tense relations with Russia. In exchan-ge for its co-operation with the Alliance and itsspecific member states, Georgia wants to obtainforeign aid for its defence reform process, and toreinforce its international and military positionon the way to reintegrating the country. In itsattempt to regain control over Abkhazia and SouthOssetia, Georgia is striving for the widest possi-ble internationalisation of the process of conflictresolution, by means including raising these issuesin the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)and NATO forums. Tbilisi also counts on the Allian-ce’s negotiating potential, which could contributeto reaching an agreement with Russia concern-ing the liquidation of Russian military bases. Tbi-lisi has, among other initiatives, suggested trans-forming the Batumi base into a common NATO--Russian training centre for either the Caucasianregion alone or for the entire Black Sea area. Co-operation with the Alliance is also intended tohelp Georgia strengthen its role as a transit state,that is, a transfer route for Caspian raw energymaterials. NATO is also seen as an instrument ofpolicy of the USA, Tbilisi’s most important foreignpartner. The December 2003 “rose revolution” contributedto a rise in NATO’s interest in Georgia. The events

in Tbilisi revealed the country’s civilisational affi-nity with the West and the state’s democraticpotential. Additionally, they stimulated the debateon the possibilities of integrating the Caucasiancountries with Euro-Atlantic institutions21. Geor-gia seems to have been evaluated by NATO as itsmost promising partner in the region. Still, suchfactors as the risky actions Tbilisi has taken to re-integrate the country, administrative chaos andincompetence, and the human resources policypracticed by the new authorities have arousedsome criticism.

Evolution of co-operation

Georgia–NATO co-operation calendar

June 1992 – joins the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)

23 March 1994 – signs the PfP FrameworkDocument

December 1994 – signs the SecurityAgreement

18 July 1995 – signs the PfP Status of ForcesAgreement (PfP SOFA)

1996 – adopts the first Individual PartnershipProgramme (IPP)

October 1996 – holds NATO workshops on regional security

October 1998 – holds an EAPC seminar on regional security

1999 – joins the PfP Planning and ReviewProcess (PARP)

October 1999 – sends an infantry platoon to KFOR (as part of the Turkish battalion)

June 2001 – hosts the Co-operative Partner2001 exercises

June 2002 – hosts the Co-operative Best Effort2002 exercises

October 2002 – signs a memorandum ofunderstanding with the NATO Maintenance

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21 The success of the revolution in Georgia, inter alia, provi-ded good grounds for the European Union to decide to in-clude the Southern Caucasus in the European Neighbour-hood Policy in 2004.

and Supply Agency (NAMSA) concerning pro-ject implementation as part of the PfP TrustFund

November 2002 – declaration of will to obtainNATO membership

May 2003 – sends an infantry company toKFOR (as part of the German battalion)

7 April 2004 – submits the IPAP PresentationDocument

September 2004 – sends a contingent to ISAF

29 October 2004 – approval of the GeorgianIPAP by the North Atlantic Council

During the years immediately after Georgia join-ed the PfP programme, the country was not anactive partner. Instead it had the unrealistic ex-pectation of the Alliance engaging in resolvingconflicts in the Southern Caucasus. The situationbegan to change when Poland, the Czech Republicand Hungary became members of the Allianceand NATO launched its Kosovo operation. Geor-gia embarked upon implementation of the PfPPlanning and Review Process (PARP), and was alsothe initiator of an ad hoc working group on pros-pects for regional co-operation in the SouthernCaucasus as a part of the EAPC. Additionally, itsent its contingent to KFOR. In 2001, Georgia wasthe first country in the region to host PfP mili-tary exercises. During the Prague summit, President Eduard She-vardnadze made an official declaration of willfor Georgian membership in NATO. The authori-ties in Tbilisi launched the necessary preparatoryprocesses. However, these were poorly co-ordi-nated and financed, and their level was signifi-cantly at variance with the scope of the pro-inte-gration declarations made by Georgia. Tbilisiadopted the National Euro-Atlantic IntegrationProgramme, which was used by the new authori-ties as the starting point for developing the In-dividual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). PresidentSaakashvili has not only confirmed that the coun-try would follow the pro-Atlantic policy line,but, most importantly, he has also initiated full-scale internal reform, without which restoringthe Georgian defence sector and army to goodcondition would have been impossible. In April

2004, Georgia was the first country to submit anIPAP Presentation Document, and six monthsthereafter, the North Atlantic Council approvedthe final version of this country’s Individual Part-nership Action Plan. Georgia was also the firstcountry where a NATO liaison officer, appointedunder the Istanbul summit decisions, was to starthis work from the beginning of 2005. Tbilisi hasdeclared that, following the implementation ofits IPAP goals, it will make efforts to join theMembership Action Plan (MAP). One of the Georgian authorities’ current priori-ties in their co-operation with both the Allianceand its particular member states is to obtain themost possible external aid to facilitate reform ofGeorgia’s defence system and armed forces incompliance with NATO standards. Until recently,Tbilisi’s participation in the PfP was focused onachieving interoperability. Now, to a great extentthis also covers issues of reforming the securitysector, in the broad meaning of the term, anddefence reform. This has become possible, interalia, owing to the considerably increased amountof foreign aid addressed to Georgia, as well as tothe fact that the USA has trained and equippedfour battalions of the Georgian army, makingthem interoperable with the forces of NATO mem-ber states. The Individual Partnership Action Plan, whichwas approved by the NAC in October 2004, is thekey instrument of co-operation in defence reformbetween Georgia and NATO. The document setsout Georgian plans for reform in the political,security and defence areas. One of its tasks is tofacilitate the co-ordination of Tbilisi’s co-opera-tion with NATO and its specific member statesregarding the internal transformation of Georgia.The IPAP includes both purely political commit-ments by Georgia (respect for human rights andcompletion of the democratisation process) andthose concerning the defence system (changingthe structure of the Ministry of Defence, democra-tic civilian control of the armed forces, grantingseparate powers to the General Staff and the Mi-nistry of Defence, adopting an effective defenceplanning system). The main objectives of the Geor-gian defence reform for the years 2005–06 in-clude the following points: conducting a strategicdefence review, establishing a resource and per-sonnel management system, a logistics and infra-structure management system, developing a trai-

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ning and education system, along with introdu-cing uniform training standards for individualsoldiers and small units, and introducing the Geor-gia–NATO Air Situation Data Exchange (ASDE)system. Georgia has also started the process oftransforming and reducing numbers of militarypersonnel, especially in the National Guard. Theinternal troops have been integrated into thearmy. It is worth emphasising that the imple-mentation of IPAP is the responsibility of Georgiaalone; NATO and the Allies only support and ve-rify the process. Georgia has declared the participation of one in-fantry company in PfP operations and exercisesas a part of PARP, among other units; this infan-try company can be transformed into a battalionby 2005, provided that Tbilisi gets adequate ex-ternal support. In a desire to change its image asa security consumer, Georgia is trying to partici-pate actively in peacekeeping and stabilisationoperations, both NATO-led and conducted by theantiterrorist coalition. Two Georgian units aretaking part in KFOR: an infantry platoon in theTurkish battalion, and an infantry company whichis part of the German battalion. In September2004, Tbilisi sent a small contingent to ISAF. Inaddition, Georgia increased its military contin-gent in Iraq up to 850 soldiers in February 2005(at the end of January this year, it consisted ofapproximately 300 soldiers). It needs to be high-lighted that this is the largest national contribu-tion proportionally to population of all the statesparticipating in the stabilisation operation inIraq. Tbilisi’s other co-operation priorities include bor-der security, and the combating of terrorism andillegal military groups. Georgia and NATO also co--operate in the fields of public diplomacy, scienceand environmental protection, civil emergencyplanning and co-operation in using water resour-ces. A project covering recycling small arms andclearing the Vaziani military test ground of un-exploded ordnances is being implemented as a part of the Trust Fund mechanism. Additionally,Georgia is taking part in PfP exercises and lan-guage trainings.

The greatest proportion of foreign aid comes toGeorgia as a part of bilateral co-operation. It isworth mentioning here, first of all, the significantmilitary and financial aid given by the United

States. In addition to training the aforementio-ned battalions as part of the Georgian Train andEquip Programme (GTEP), which was completedin April 2004, Washington has supported Geor-gia in building its air forces, reforming the Minis-try of Defence, and military and other trainingschemes. Moreover, on 1 February 2005, the Geor-gian authorities started recruiting soldiers for a new US training programme, the Sustainmentand Stability Operations Programme (SSOP), aim-ed at training Georgian forces for participation inpeace support operations. It is anticipated thatfour battalions and several other units of the Geor-gian army will be trained. The United Kingdomis supporting Georgia in its defence reform andlanguage training; Turkey is training troops forpipeline protection, while supporting the educa-tion of officers at the Georgian Academy of Natio-nal Defence; and Germany is providing help injunior officer training and logistics. Apart fromthat, Georgia receives support from the Baltic,Balkan and Scandinavian states. In addition, theAllies helped Tbilisi during the process of IPAPpreparation. Georgia has opted for development of regionalco-operation as a part of the PfP and EAPC, andit is working on its image as a leader of change inthe Southern Caucasus and a moderator of regio-nal dialogue. Yet, on the other hand, it opposesany such regional approach to the Southern Cau-casian countries that would make Georgia’s pro-gress in enhancing its co-operation with theAlliance dependent on the progress made by Azer-baijan or Armenia.

Problems in co-operation

Georgia still has many serious security problems;some parts of its territory, Abkhazia and SouthOssetia, are out of central control, which in turncontributes to the development of organised cri-me and weapon & drug smuggling. The key ob-jective of Tbilisi’s internal and foreign policy isto regain authority over those territories, whichare unofficially supported by Russia. Some ex-perts even believe that Georgia could agree toslow down the process of its integration withNATO in exchange for concessions from Moscowin resolving the problem of Abkhazia. On the other hand, the Georgian elites seem tooverestimate their country’s strategic significance

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for the United States and the scale of the US en-gagement in the region. It also seems that Tbilisihas unrealistic expectations about both prospectsof Georgian integration with NATO and any pos-sible engagement by the Alliance in resolvingthe problem of the “frozen conflicts”. Georgia’s security is undermined by Russian poli-cy, which is contrary to the vital interests of Geor-gia. In the opinion of the great majority of theGeorgian public, Russian policy towards Georgiais aimed at maintaining Tbilisi’s dependence onMoscow and decreasing the country’s stability.Moscow unofficially supports the secessionisttendencies in the territories that have rebelledagainst Georgia, maintains its military bases inthe country (in Akhalkalaki and Batumi), and stillhas extensive economic influence. The allegationsthat Tbilisi shelters Chechen terrorists, which arerepeatedly raised by Moscow, are particularlydangerous for Georgia. Russia has also announ-ced that it is considering the option of launchinga preventive attack against terrorist hideawaysoutside the Russian Federation. Apart from that,Moscow has so far made signing the interstatetreaty to regulate Russian-Georgian relations de-pendent on concluding an agreement concern-ing the status of the Russian military bases inGeorgia. Additionally, it demands that Georgiashould make a legal undertaking that no militarybases of any third state will be located on its ter-ritory (this concerns a potential US base).

Regardless of the numerous positive internal chan-ges that have taken place since the “rose revolu-tion”, Georgia still has to cope with malfunction-ing state structures, administrational confusionand a non-transparent human resources policy.The chaos is worsening due to the fast rotation ofpeople in the government positions; since the re-gime change in autumn 2003, the minister of de-fence has changed three times. Furthermore, theauthorities’ policy towards the mass media andpolitical opponents, as well as the operation ofthe police, stray far from democratic standards. Even though the defence budget was increasedin 2004 (up to approximately US$ 50 million),Georgia remains unable to allocate adequatefunds to maintain the national defence system.For this reason it has decided to reduce its armedforces and shorten the period of mandatory mil-itary service. Tbilisi is also forced to face the pro-

blem of inefficient defence planning. AlthoughGeorgia has promised to conduct a defence re-view that will serve as a basis for planning its ul-timate defence system structure by 2005, it hasnot so far developed a national security strategy.Other serious persistent problems are that Geor-gia lacks effective mechanisms to co-ordinate theprocess of receiving and using foreign aid, as wellas the duplication of that external aid. It seemsthat these issues can be resolved, at least partly,by implementing the IPAP goals. The condition of the armed forces and the mana-gement system thereof are far from perfect. Thearmy has, in a sense, been divided into two dif-ferent groups: the GTEP-trained part (consolidat-ed as a part of the elite 11th Brigade), which is bet-ter equipped, receives better pay and operateson the basis of contracts, and the weaker part,which has not received such training. There arealso great differences between officers. For theirpart, the authorities frequently change the com-manding officers and use the army in their pro-paganda campaign against the rebel regions.The problem of theft and corruption in the armyhas not yet been settled; the mass media recentlyreported the theft of rocket fuel from a former So-viet airbase, and the sale of a large amount of wea-pons (still in good technical condition) to a scrap-yard by military men. As experts have noted, thepersonnel clean-up carried out in February 2005in the General Staff was linked to the investiga-tion into the embezzlement of funds and corrup-tion at the Ministry of Defence conducted by thelocal prosecutor’s office. Moreover, even thoughthe internal troops have been included in thestructure of the armed forces, they have not yetbeen reorganised. Furthermore, the duties of thefleet and the coast guard overlap.

Conclusions

The change of regime in Georgia has contributedto improving the country’s internal situationand a positive change to Georgia’s internationalimage. It has also facilitated faster developmentof co-operation with NATO. The support Georgiareceives from the Alliance is too small to have a sig-nificant effect on the improvement of this coun-try’s security. Georgia still has enormous securi-ty problems, which if it does not resolve, it willhave no chance of achieving NATO membership.

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Nevertheless, the prospects for developing co--operation between NATO and Georgia within thescope set under the Partnership seem to be quiteinviting, provided that Georgia manages to con-duct a real, and not merely superficial, reform ofthe defence sector, and does not treat its rela-tions with the Alliance and the aid received fromit as simply a means of reintegrating the coun-try. It also appears that Georgia should lower itsexpectations regarding the pace of its integrationwith the Alliance. Increasing material and technical aid will not helpGeorgia improve its security situation, unless theproblem of the “frozen conflicts” in South Ossetiaand Abkhazia is resolved. NATO should not avoidthis issue, and should consider the possibility ofits limited participation in resolving these prob-lems. The Alliance should also support Georgiain its attempts to bring these issues for discus-sion in a wider international forum. NATO shouldnot cease reminding Russia of the need to fulfilits Istanbul commitments under the Adapted Con-ventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. NATOwould also be acting appropriately if it made anattempt to create a draft strategy covering theSouthern Caucasus, an attempt to answer thequestion concerning the long-term interests ofthe Alliance member states in this area. Never-theless, NATO should not on any account give upits “open door” policy towards the candidates,or disregard the membership aspirations of suchcountries as Georgia. As for more detailed issues, it seems that NATOshould exert efforts for the IPAP to become an effi-cient tool for co-ordinating the bilateral aid gran-ted by its member states to Georgia, and an in-strument for enforcing profound internal chan-ges, and should not just be one more mechanismof co-operation as a part of the PfP, which are al-ready numerous. NATO should also consider thepossibility of sending a team of advisors, andnot just one liaison officer, to Georgia. Broaderregional co-operation, with the participation ofthe Caucasian states, Romania or Ukraine, andthe process of sharing transformation experien-ces by the Baltic states also need to be support-ed. Considering the insufficient level of knowl-edge about the Alliance among the Georgianpublic, NATO should also support Tbilisi’s plansto found a NATO Information Office. Marta Jaroszewicz

AZERBAIJAN

Azerbaijan is striving for closer co-operation withNATO, as well as for closer bilateral co-operationwith some of the member states, yet it has notso far decided to make an unambiguous declara-tion of desire to join the Alliance.

Approach to NATO

For more a decade Azerbaijan has been pursuinga cautious and careful foreign policy, which con-sists in walking a fine line between the West andRussia, trying to avoid any formal political dec-larations and decisions that Moscow could inter-pret as aimed against Russian interests. In spiteof this limitation, Baku has taken action to gra-dually tighten its co-operation with Western struc-tures, including NATO and the European Union.According to Baku’s declarations, co-operationwith the Alliance is one of its foreign policy prio-rities; while definitely the key objective is to re-gain the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh, whichit lost as a result of the war with Armenia, andthe neighbouring areas occupied by Armeniantroops. Maintaining appropriate relations withRussia and Iran is also important for Baku. The Azeri authorities have not decided yet whe-ther to unambiguously announce Azerbaijan’sdesire to join the Alliance. As a matter of fact,such a declaration was made on 18 April 2003 bythe then president Geidar Aliev at the time of hismeeting with Bruce Jackson, President of the USCommittee on NATO, and it was repeated on seve-ral occasions thereafter by politicians of variousranks. Still, contrary to some observers’ expecta-tions, it was not confirmed by President IlhamAliev during the Istanbul NATO Summit on 28–29June 2004. This choice not to raise the issue ofAzerbaijan’s aspirations to NATO membershipwas above all dictated by the aforementionedconditions under which Baku must conduct itsforeign policy, and should not be interpreted asa lack of will to join the Alliance in the longerterm. Azerbaijan actively co-operates with bothNATO and its particular member states; it hassent military contingents to Kosovo, Afghani-stan and Iraq. Most experts are convinced thatBaku will make its declaration of desire to joinNATO “in due time”.

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Baku is aware of its strategic importance for theAlliance (namely its geopolitical and transit ad-vantages: its geographic location between Russiaand Iran and between the Caspian region andTurkey; its economic advantages, based on depo-sits of raw energy materials) and hopes for closerco-operation. However, independent observersbelieve that it is the success of the Georgian pro--Western foreign policy which will be the keyissue in Azerbaijan’s integration with Westernstructures, and that both capitals should conductconsistent and coherent actions to mutually sup-port one another in their integration with theEuro-Atlantic world. Unfortunately, this is not al-ways reflected in the activities taken by Baku.The main assumptions of the current NATO policytowards Azerbaijan are not to exclude integration,and enforce transformation at the same time.

Evolution of co-operation

Azerbaijan–NATO co-operation calendar

4 May 1994 – signs the PfP FrameworkDocument

1997 – joins the Planning and Review Process(PARP)

1999 – sends an infantry platoon to KFOR (as a part of the Turkish battalion)

2 April 2000 – signs the PfP Status of ForcesAgreement (PfP SOFA)

2002 – sends a platoon to Afghanistan as a part of the Turkish contingent: since 2003as a part of ISAF

25 January 2002 – USA waives section 907 of the Freedom Support Act

2003 – sends a military contingent to Iraq(under US command)

2 April 2003 – signs a memorandum of understanding with the NATO Maintenanceand Supply Agency (NAMSA)

19 May 2004 – submits an IndividualPartnership Action Plan (IPAP) PresentationDocument

13 September 2004 – NATO cancels the Co-operative Best Effort 2004 exercises, whichwere supposed to be held in Azerbaijan

For most of the last decade, especially before 11September 2001, a great disproportion was noti-ceable between the actions taken by Baku for es-tablishing closer ties with NATO and the stepstaken to that effect by the Alliance. This was dueto several factors: the lack of a precise policy onthe part of the Alliance towards the Southern Cau-casus; the incompatibility of the then PfP withthe expectations and capabilities of the post-So-viet states, and the unresolved conflict over Na-gorno-Karabakh, which seriously curtailed (andstill curtails) the possibilities of development ofmilitary co-operation with Azerbaijan. Until 2002,the US Freedom Support Act, Section 907 was inforce, which, inter alia, banned the granting ofmilitary assistance to Azerbaijan. For its part, Baku has done much to intensify itsco-operation with NATO. Azerbaijan actively par-ticipates in military and civilian events as a partof the PfP, as well as in bilateral and regionalevents with NATO members and countries in theregion (except for Armenia, which is treated as anoccupier). Azerbaijan is interested in transform-ing the National Training Centre into the Regio-nal PfP Training Centre, though this initiative maynot arouse broad interest in the region. In 1997, Baku decided to take part in the Plan-ning and Review Process (PARP), made availablea peacekeeping unit, and established an inter-agency Governmental Commission on co-opera-tion with NATO, which holds monthly meetingson the ministerial level (its Working Group, whichdevelops most of the documents, meets twice a month). However, one should not forget that,regardless of the commission’s existence, all andany decisions concerning co-operation with NATOare taken by the president of Azerbaijan, and thecommission merely co-ordinates the co-operation.The role of the parliament boils down to a passiveand loyal rubber-stamping of the necessary actsof law.As a part of the PARP for 2000–02, Baku set 27goals, 25 of which have been met; the implemen-tation deadline for the remainder has been ex-tended until 2006. Azerbaijan has undertaken toimplement 33 goals in the years 2004–06. It is

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worth noting that in January 2004, the State Bor-der Service and the internal troops were coveredby the PARP. Azerbaijan has offered one infantrycompany, one rescue platoon, one medical pla-toon and one engineer platoon for participationin the PARP and exercises; one squadron of Mi-8helicopters will join them in 2005. Azerbaijanhas chosen the ambitious task of extending theinteroperability commitments it made under PARPover all its armed forces (though the implemen-tation of this declaration is rather dubious, main-ly due to insufficient funds).Azerbaijan has made the best possible efforts toadopt Western (including NATO) norms and stan-dards (STANAGs). The Commission on NATO Stan-dards, which has translated and made availablemore than 250 NATO standards, was created inNovember 1997. NATO communications and to-pography standards have been partly adopted(any broader and faster adjustment is impeded,inter alia, by financial difficulties). Representati-ves of the authorities claim in their official state-ments that NATO standards have been fully im-plemented in the field of military training. Still,independent experts have expressed seriousdoubts about this, pointing out to the fact thatSoviet methods are still used as a model both inthe military education system (as was proven,inter alia, by the protest of students of the Bakumilitary academy in September 2002) and in thearmy itself (in January 2005, a scandal involvingofficers of the Barda and Shamkir garrisons wasuncovered: in December 2004, at least ten, or(according to other sources) several tens of high-ranking military officers, were arrested on char-ges of corruption and demoted). The first Individual Partnership Programme (IPP)was signed in 1996. In connection with the im-plementation of the Individual Partnership Pro-gramme (IPP) for the years 2001–02 Azerbaijantook part in 335 events, in which 850 people tookpart. On 2 April 2003, Azerbaijan and NATO Mainte-nance and Supply Organization (NAMSO) signeda memorandum of understanding, which madeit possible to employ the PfP Trust Fund mecha-nism. An agreement initiating a project as a partof the Trust Fund, which provides for the liqui-dation of unexploded ordnances in the area ofthe former Sologlu military base, was signed on14 February 2005. The project, which costs 1.4 mil-

lion euro, is managed by Turkey, and the UNDP isone of its contributors. Azerbaijan has been taking part in the work ofthe NATO Parliamentary Assembly (associate de-legation status), and is actively participating inthe Rose-Roth Initiative (a co-operation pro-gramme for the NATO Parliamentary Assemblywith parliaments of the post-socialist countries).The serious process of comprehensively reform-ing the State Border Service, scheduled for manyyears, is aimed at transforming it from a typicallymilitary structure (Soviet concept of border troops)into a civilian-type law enforcement organisation,and was set in motion in summer 2002. This re-form is supported by many NATO member sta-tes, including Poland.The participation of Azeri military personnel inforeign missions – as a part of KFOR (since 1999)and ISAF (since 2003), as well as in the stabilisa-tion operation in Iraq (since 2003) – has greatlycontributed to Azerbaijan’s closer co-operationwith NATO and, in particular, to the developmentof bilateral contacts with Washington. Baku hasalso made its airspace and airports available forthe needs of the operations in Afghanistan andIraq. In May 2003, the NATO Secretary General, GeorgeRobertson, received a memorandum wherebyAzerbaijan declared its will to embark upon an In-dividual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The Pre-sentation Document was presented in May 2004.It provided for intensive co-operation with NATOin the fields of defence structure and political re-forms, and presented various aspects of such re-forms. The declared priorities included border con-trol, defence reforms and the struggle against ter-rorism. The authorities in Baku also undertookto successively implement NATO standards in thefields of democratisation, transparency and ade-quate relations between military and civilianstructures. Work on the document is pending. Azerbaijan’s co-operation with NATO memberstates is characterised by its unusually active en-gagement in co-operation with the United Statesand Turkey, and relatively less active co-operationwith other members of the Alliance. The signifi-cant intensification of co-operation between Bakuand NATO was a result of the rapid developmentof US-Azeri co-operation during the first term inoffice of President George W. Bush who, follow-ing 11 September 2001, took a number of actions

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to enhance co-operation with several CentralAsian and Southern Caucasian states, includingwith Azerbaijan. Washington waived section 907of the Freedom Support Act in January 2002, andAzerbaijan sent one platoon to Afghanistan in thesame year. In August 2003, the first Azeri militarycontingent (150 soldiers) was deployed in Iraqunder US command. US aid, including direct aidto Azeri armed forces, has clearly increased overthe past two years. However, its level is still un-satisfactory for Baku; it is impeded, inter alia, bythe very strong pro-Armenian lobby in the USA(the Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issuesconsisted of more than 130 congressmen in Ja-nuary 2005). A topic that regularly arises duringUS politicians’ and military officials’ visits toAzerbaijan is the issue of the possible location ofsome sort of US military base in this country,which poses a serious problem to the relationsof Baku with Tehran and Moscow. Along withthe United States, Turkey is the most importantpartner for Azerbaijan of the NATO member sta-tes. Ankara has for many years been actively en-gaged in providing financial, technical and advi-sory assistance to Azerbaijan. The Azeri-TurkishMilitary Co-operation Council, which is in char-ge of both issues concerning the training of Azeriofficers in Turkey and the training held by Turksin Azerbaijan (in compliance with NATO stan-dards) is operating in Baku. Turkey is one of thekey weapons suppliers for the Azeri army. The decisions of the NATO Istanbul summit con-cerning the Caucasus and Central Asia met witha positive reception in Baku. The satisfaction ofboth parties with the mutual co-operation, in-cluding with the Azeri IPAP, which is still at theconsultation stage, was clearly emphasised at thetime of the visit of NATO Secretary General Jaapde Hoop Scheffer to Baku on 5 November 2004.Nevertheless, the Alliance once more excludedthe possibility of its participation in the processof settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (NATObelieves the OSCE Minsk Group has an adequatemandate to deal with this issue), or of opening a “NATO base” in any of the three Southern Cau-casian republics.

Problems in co-operation

The Alliance’s co-operation with Azerbaijan facesa number of serious problems, which greatly frus-

trate both any intensification thereof and the im-plementation of the commitments already made. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, the unresolvedconflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is the gravest pro-blem of state. Regardless of numerous declara-tions by NATO stating that the Alliance acknow-ledges the OSCE Minsk Group’s powers to dealwith this matter, Azerbaijan keeps expecting theAlliance to engage in some way in settling theNagorno-Karabakh conflict (the Alliance’s inter-vention in Kosovo is the most frequently mentio-ned precedent here). The pressure exerted by Bakuon NATO is partly connected with the sentimentsof public opinion, which has insufficient know-ledge of the essence of the Alliance and the bene-fits Azerbaijan may get from co-operating withNATO, even if the Alliance does not engage insettling the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Thecommonly shared view among the public is thatNATO is, first of all, an anti-Russian alliance, andshould therefore take decisive actions against theArmenians in Karabakh, who, according to mostof the public, have been and are still supportedby Russia (further, the perceived inefficiency ofthe OSCE or the UN is in public opinion a resultof Moscow’s activities). The negative responsefrom the Alliance is perceived in Azerbaijan asWestern states applying double standards, and isthe main reason for disillusionment with the West(as well as providing a good excuse for Baku toavoid military reform, on the pretext that theyneed to keep significant forces in readiness in casea military conflict breaks out).The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which hasnot been settled for more than a decade now, hasradicalised public sentiment so much (which isadditionally stirred up by state propaganda) thatany open co-operation with Armenia has becomeimpossible for the authorities. Numerous inci-dents show the scale of this phenomenon. On 13January 2004, three Armenian officers were refu-sed permission to board a plane going from Istan-bul to Baku. The officers were going to take partin the NATO conference on preparations for thePfP Co-operative Best Effort exercises, which wereintended to be held in September in Azerbaijan;in spite of having NATO invitations to the meet-ing, the Armenian delegation were refused entryvisas. Several months thereafter, an aggressivepropaganda campaign was launched against theparticipation of Armenian military personnel in

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the exercises in Azerbaijan. Even though inten-sive talks continued between Baku and NATOHeadquarters in Brussels until the last moment,the parties failed to reach a compromise. As a re-sult, the Allied Command Europe cancelled theCo-operative Best Effort exercises on 13 Septem-ber 2004, which were supposed to have takenplace between 14–26 September. Another seriousincident happened on 19 February 2004, whenan Azeri officer murdered an Armenian lieutenant(they had both been attending an English courseheld in Budapest as a part of the NATO PfP pro-gramme). The incident caused growing tensionand mutual accusations between Yerevan and Ba-ku, and provoked a wave of public outrage inAzerbaijan (where the Azeri officer became a herofor part of the public). A serious problem that casts a shadow on bilate-ral co-operation is the non-democratic rule inAzerbaijan. The Azeri political elites are aware ofthe insufficient level of implementation of theWestern democratic standards, the rule of law,human rights, etc., but the common opinion isthat democratic values should be adopted gradu-ally and carefully, and in cases where democrati-sation is not necessary, it should be avoided.Moreover, certain changes are often made onlyin the formal aspect to satisfy the requirementsof Western states, and even then they are not infact respected. Such convictions and behaviourmay seriously affect Azeri aspirations in the lon-ger term. The fact that Ilham Aliev became president in Oc-tober 2003 guarantees the maintenance of thestatus quo in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, includ-ing on the issue of integration with Euro-Atlan-tic structures. However, according to some ex-perts, his less than fully secure position on theinternal scene may prove to be a serious obsta-cle in fostering further tightening of relationswith NATO – and, above all, the internal reformsnecessary for this to continue. Finally, a significant problem is Azerbaijan’s (re-latively) weak financial condition, which serious-ly hampers the development of co-operation withthe Alliance, and especially the republic’s adjust-ment to NATO standards (even more so becausea very large part of the armed forces’ budget isallocated for maintaining operational readinesson the Azeri-Armenian border/ceasefire line). Ne-vertheless, it needs to be emphasised that even

though Azerbaijan’s military budget does not ful-ly correspond to its needs, in comparison to itsSouthern Caucasian neighbours, this state hasmuch greater capabilities for self-financing. The Azeri ruling class emphasises the mutualstrategic dependence of Azerbaijan and Georgiaon the path to integration with Euro-Atlanticstructures; moreover, most of them are convin-ced that Azerbaijan is a much more importantpartner than Georgia for the West because of itsgeographic location, the Caspian oil reserves andthe country’s greater economic potential (accor-ding to this theory, Georgia is only to be treatedas a transit state). This conviction that Azerbaijanhas a unique significance for the West at timesresults in Baku disregarding some of NATO’s ap-peals, especially those concerning democratisa-tion. The standpoint presented by the United Sta-tes and many other Western states after the un-democratic presidential election (October 2003)additionally strengthened Baku in its convictionthat political stability and the oil business is muchmore important for the West than democracy.

Conclusions

For Azerbaijan, enhancing co-operation with NATOis a process that has contributed to improving itssecurity condition, though only the friendly Tur-key is a real guarantor of the country’s security. As for regional security, any potential greater en-gagement by the Alliance in the Southern Cau-casus may have consequences that are difficultto predict. Moscow’s negative reaction would bevery probable, and the Kremlin could readily exertpressure on Baku to limit its co-operation withthe Alliance, as the Azeri ruling class know howimportant Moscow’s standpoint is for resolvingthe conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The approach to NATO, which can be determinedas “think regionally, act individually”, seems tohave the greatest chance of success, as any re-gional initiatives based on the joint participa-tion of Azerbaijan and Armenia will be doomedto failure until the conflict over Nagorno-Kara-bakh is resolved. Therefore, in spite of financiallimitations, NATO should consider the possibili-ty of responding positively to Azerbaijan’s pro-posals for opening an Information Office and a Mi-litary Liaison Mission, or a NATO Information andDocumentation Centre in Baku, especially as this

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would tangibly support the co-ordination of co--operation under the IPAP.It seems that Azerbaijan’s priorities in the PfP andin establishing closer ties with NATO, apart fromdemocratic reform, should include achieving in-teroperability with NATO and adopting NATOstandards, and in particular strictly adhering tothose standards in military education. Azerbaijanis another area where great opportunities for theNATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)and using the Trust Fund mechanism (projects fordecontaminating one of the post-Soviet bases, de-mining and rocket fuel oxidation) could open up.It thus appears that, considering Azerbaijan’s in-ternal and external conditions, NATO is able toefficiently support and, if necessary, exert pres-sure on Baku to embark upon certain democraticreforms; this opportunity has however been usedin an inefficient manner so far. All efforts mustbe made to develop an IPAP that will enforcetransformation, provided however that it allowsthe authorities in Baku to maintain tangible ca-pabilities as well as genuine will to implementsuch transformation. This is because the Indivi-dual Partnership Action Plan for Azerbaijan isunder serious threat of becoming “virtual”, dueto the internal conditions resulting from the po-licies Baku pursues, including the undemocraticnature of the regime. The complex process of transforming the StateBorder Service from a typically military structureinto a civilian-type law enforcement organisation,and using the Trust Fund mechanism in the mostcomprehensive way, deserve special support. Wojciech Bartuzi

ARMENIA

Armenia does not aspire to NATO membership,and its security policy is mainly Russia-oriented.Nevertheless, the country’s co-operation withthe Alliance has significantly intensified duringthe past three years.

Approach to NATO

Armenia is in a close defence alliance with Russia,while at the same time being the Southern Cau-casian link of the Collective Security Treaty Orga-nization (CSTO). These factors limit Armenia’sopportunities to develop co-operation with theAlliance, and cause the country to refrain from as-piring to NATO membership. Maintaining friend-ly relations with NATO is an element of the so--called complementarity policy aimed at diversi-fying external ties, which actually boils down tofinding a counterbalance to the influence of Rus-sia, and making security provisions in case Rus-sia chooses to change its policy towards Arme-nia. Moreover, Yerevan seems to be anxious aboutthe increasing closeness of relations betweenBaku and Washington. As some analysts emphasise, the alliance withRussia gives Armenia a firm security guarantee,yet it does not lead to a reduction in the tensionbetween Armenia and its neighbours. Develop-ing relations with the Alliance contributes to a po-sitive evolution of the country’s immediate in-ternational environment. Co-operation with NATOis used by Yerevan as a means to participate inprocesses taking place in the region, from whichArmenia is partly excluded due to the conflictwith Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. On theother hand, it is worth remembering that it isthe existence of this unresolved antagonism thatforces other regional players and internationalorganisations to enter into dialogue with Arme-nia. The anxiety that Azerbaijan could integratewith NATO provides strong motivation for Yere-van to draw closer to the Alliance. Moreover, theEuro-Atlantic Partnership, in the broad meaningof the term, is one of the few forums where Ar-menia can hold discussions with Turkey, which itdoes not maintain diplomatic relations with. Owing to its co-operation with NATO, Armeniareceives material and advisory aid for its defencesector and is gaining valuable military expertise.

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Co-operation with NATO is also seen as an in-strument of Armenian-US relations, and as an op-portunity to highlight Armenia’s European heri-tage. The authorities’ representatives emphasise thatArmenia is pursuing a pragmatic strategy, free ofempty political declarations, with regard to NATO,which is aimed at the broadest possible develop-ment of co-operation with the Alliance. None-theless, this cautious strategy seems to be dicta-ted by the fear of a possible negative reactionfrom Moscow. Armenia’s geostrategic location, which affectsthe country’s security and development oppor-tunities, its close ties with Russia, its lack of mi-neral raw materials and the not fully democraticregime mean that both the Alliance and its par-ticular member states attach less significance toco-operation with this country than they dowith Georgia or Azerbaijan. Still, NATO seems toappreciate the conscientious manner in whichArmenia has fulfilled its commitments under thePfP, as well as the relatively low level of corrup-tion in the country.

Evolution of co-operation

Armenia–NATO co-operation calendar

March 1992 – joins the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)

5 October 1994 – signs the PfP FrameworkDocument

January 1995 – signs the Security Agreement

1996 – adopts the first Individual PartnershipProgramme (IPP)

September 2001 – participates in Co-operativeBest Effort 2001

October 2002 – joins the Planning and ReviewProcess (PARP)

November 2002 – wins associate delegationstatus at the North Atlantic Assembly

June 2003 – hosts Co-operative Best Effort2003 exercises

February 2004 – sends a contingent to Kosovo

30 March 2004 – ratifies the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (PfP SOFA)

August 2004 – appoints an ambassador to NATO

Armenia was an inactive partner immediately af-ter joining the PfP. However, the geopolitical chan-ges in the region, the improvement of relationsbetween NATO and Russia, and the fact that Geor-gia and Azerbaijan had embarked on the path ofintegration with the Alliance caused Armenia totake part in PfP military exercises for the firsttime in history in 2001. Yerevan joined the PARPin 2002, and one year later it hosted the Co-ope-rative Best Effort 2003 exercises. In February 2004,Armenia sent an infantry platoon to KFOR, andentered into the PfP SOFA with NATO in March.Apart from that, Yerevan participates in the Ope-rational Capabilities Concept. Armenian forceswere to have taken part in the Co-operative BestEffort 2004 exercises in Azerbaijan, which werecancelled by NATO due to the actions taken bythe Azeri authorities to prevent Armenia from par-ticipating in the event. Armenia has also declaredits will to embark upon an Individual Partner-ship Action Plan (IPAP), and it has submitted anofficial document to that effect. Work on develop-ing the Presentation Document is pending. Addi-tionally, Armenia has offered to host the Co-ope-rative Associate 2005 exercises in its territory,and it has appointed an ambassador to NATO. The key priorities of Armenia’s co-operation as a part of the PfP include achieving interoperabil-ity by selected units of the Armenian armed for-ces with NATO member states’ forces, as well asparticipation in NATO-led peacekeeping opera-tions. Ultimately, Armenia plans to have a moto-rised infantry battalion operating in accordancewith the Alliance’s military standards formed by2010, and to take part in multinational peace-keeping operations. Currently, a thirty-strong Armenian infantry pla-toon serves as a part of the Greek battalion at theUS-commanded multinational brigade in Kosovo.The authorities in Yerevan have sent a 46-strongcontingent consisting of engineers, medical per-sonnel and drivers to Iraq.Other priority areas in Armenia’s co-operation in-clude participation in NATO exercises and training,and obtaining material and technical assistance

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from the member states. The Armenian authori-ties, in co-operation with the USA, have openeda demining centre, which they are now striving totransform into a regional PfP training centre. Thanksto support from Washington, Yerevan is also mo-dernising its military communications system.Other areas of co-operation between Armeniaand NATO include detecting weapons of mass de-struction, civil emergency assistance, languagetraining and scientific co-operation. Armenia isinterested in receiving advisory assistance fromthe Alliance to reform its defence sector. The au-thorities also state that a potential Armenian IPAPwould have a limited form, and would hardlytouch the issue of defence reform. The officialreasons Yerevan gives for the impossibility ofconducting defence reform are the conflict overNagorno-Karabakh and the need to keep the ar-med forces in constant operational readiness.Still, this standpoint seems to originate from theauthorities’ unwillingness to establish rules fordemocratic control of the defence system. Armenia opposes the option of NATO engage-ment in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issueout of fear that Georgia – or even worse, Azer-baijan – could achieve a higher level of co-opera-tion with NATO. Instead, it promotes the idea ofregional co-operation in the Southern Caucasus,and of treating the region as an indivisible whole. Armenia’s joining the IPAP is a separate issue. Be-fore Yerevan finally confirmed its desire to par-ticipate in this mechanism, the Armenian autho-rities had been sending self-contradictory messa-ges to Brussels on the possibility and time of join-ing the IPAP. This appears to have been a resultof the instrumental treatment of IPAP not as a me-chanism supporting the reform process, but as a response to the presentation of such a docu-ment by Azerbaijan. The situation could also bea sign of the existence of some tension betweenthe “pro-Western” MFA and the “Russia-loyal” Mi-nistry of Defence.

Problems in co-operation

Development of Armenia’s co-operation withNATO is curtailed by three interlinked factors:the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,the alliance with Russia, and poor relations withTurkey. The unsettled conflict with Azerbaijanover Nagorno-Karabakh limits the possibilities

of granting military aid to Armenia for fear of con-tributing to improving Yerevan’s war capabili-ties. The conflict also dooms to failure any con-cept of regional co-operation as a part of the PfP.In turn, Armenia’s close military ties with Rus-sia, the existence of a large Russian military basein Gyumri, and the joint Russian-Armenian bor-der protection system on the Turkish and Iranianborders leave Armenia little freedom of manoeu-vre in developing its co-operation with the Allian-ce. Doubtless, the tense Turkish-Armenian rela-tions also pose a serious obstacle on this path.Turkey as a member of the Alliance co-decideson NATO’s policy towards Armenia. The politicalco-operation between Armenia and Iran, whichis accused of working on a nuclear weapons pro-gramme, seems to be of some significance in thisissue also. It is also worth noting concept-related and ideo-logical problems. It appears that some of the Ar-menian officers linked to the Ministry of ForeignAffairs overestimate Armenia’s capability for ma-noeuvring in foreign policy, while another part,linked to the Ministry of Defence, is unaware ofthe existence of a certain margin of freedom thatArmenia could use to establish international tiesto improve state security. The Armenian rulingclass treats co-operation with the Alliance as aninstrument, a bargaining chip, in their relationswith other entities. Moreover, the uncompromi-sing anti-Turkish stance of the Armenian diaspo-ra and the predominant role the Karabakhi eliteplays among the authorities in Yerevan, serious-ly reduce Armenia’s room for compromise in ne-gotiations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Other significant limitations on co-operation withNATO include Armenia’s unwillingness to con-duct defence reform and implement Western so-lutions to that effect, its undemocratic politicalsystem, and Armenia’s financial problems anddependence on foreign aid. There is also a lack ofreliable information on the mechanisms of NATOoperation, because the Armenian media has beenmonopolised by Russian sources. Worth mentio-ning are also such organisation-related and tech-nical problems as poor knowledge of Englishamong the military personnel and civil servants,an organisational culture inherited from the So-viet period, and the existing tension between va-rious internal structures dealing with NATO co-operation.

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Conclusions

For the aforementioned reasons Armenia is NATO’sleast active partner in the Southern Caucasus,and there seems to be no chance of changing thissituation in the immediate future. Nevertheless,the certain evolution that Yerevan’s policy to-wards the Alliance has undergone proves thatNATO is becoming increasingly important to Ar-menia. For this reason, the Alliance can play a po-sitive part in stimulating changes both in thiscountry and throughout the entire region. Thesituation would radically change if Turkey andArmenia established diplomatic relations, which,considering Turkey’s pro-EU aspirations, seemspossible. In its policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, in-stead of making subsequent attempts to foster a regional approach to the Partnership, which isdifficult to achieve in Southern Caucasus, NATOshould engage more actively in resolving the realproblems of these countries, and encourage Russiato participate constructively in this process. Inthe case of Armenia, the Alliance could take thefollowing actions: exert more emphasis on theneed to hold peace negotiations with Azerbai-jan, and encourage Armenia and Azerbaijan toconduct defence reforms. NATO should also raisethe issue of democratisation in its dialogue withYerevan, and make any further development ofmilitary co-operation (which is beneficial for Ar-menia) dependent on the need to undergo inter-nal transformation. If Armenia joins the IPAP, real implementation ofthe document’s provisions should be insistedupon. It also seems that consenting to Yerevan’sadopting a very limited IPAP could cause a deva-luation of this mechanism. Moreover, NATOshould launch a more active information policyaddressed to Armenia, and make it a more gene-rous offer of training and foreign studies, givingtop priority to the Ministry of Defence’s officersand experts. Marta Jaroszewicz

KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan is not aiming at integration withNATO, and its policy towards the Alliance is rathercautious, avoiding any specific undertakings. Ne-vertheless, over the past year and a half, the scopeof Kazakhstan’s co-operation has significantly ex-panded as part of the Partnership for Peace pro-gramme.

Approach to NATO

Co-operation with the Alliance is not one of Ka-zakhstan’s foreign policy priorities. For Astana,Russia is still the strategic ally in the field of se-curity. Membership in the Collective SecurityTreaty Organisation (CSTO) and in the ShanghaiCo-operation Organisation (SCO) is also of keysignificance for this country. Additionally, Kazakh-stan attaches great importance to the develop-ment of its bilateral relations with China as wellas with the United States. According to declarations by representatives ofthe authorities, Kazakhstan is not aiming at in-tegration with the Alliance; instead it seeks tobe its active partner. Developing co-operationwith NATO is perceived in Astana as a way of ob-taining tangible material and political benefits.Kazakhstan uses its co-operation with the Allian-ce as a valuable bargaining chip in its relationswith Russia. The main strategic goals of Kazakh-stan with regard to NATO include: – achieving practical material and technologicalbenefits (in the military field) and diversificationof military co-operation;– obtaining certain concessions from Russia aswell as more room for manoeuvre in its relationswith this country;– intensification of relations with the West, in-cluding the USA;– building up its prestige in the internationalarena and raising its rating against its regionalrival, Uzbekistan.Kazakhstan pursues a cautious wait-and-see poli-cy towards the Alliance. It is unwilling to under-take not only such obligations that could meetwith a negative reaction from Russia but also anyobligations that might bring forth changes in itsinternal system. It seems possible that this poli-cy could evolve, if a crisis similar to the Batkenevents of 1999–2000 broke out in the region; the

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basic determinant of such a possible change wouldbe the effectiveness of the policy line adopted byRussia, the CSTO, the SCO and the West with re-gard to such a crisis. In the opinion of some experts, Kazakhstan’s po-licy towards NATO is realistic and based on theconviction that the Alliance’s interest in CentralAsia is only temporary. However, it seems that Ka-zakhstan is not totally convinced that the inte-rest in the region of NATO and its member sta-tes, in particular the USA, is short-term and dic-tated merely by the need to ensure logistic back-up for the operation in Afghanistan. On the onehand, this uncertainty raises Astana’s anxiety,yet on the other encourages it to broaden thescope of its co-operation with the West. Kazakh-stan’s growing interest in NATO, which has beenvisible in recent years, can therefore be seenmainly as a function of Astana’s policy towardsRussia; it can nevertheless also be linked to thewish for some limited diversification of its de-fence co-operation, and for an adequate responseto NATO’s growing engagement in the region. For the Alliance, Kazakhstan (along with Uzbeki-stan) is its most important partner in CentralAsia. The main reasons for this include the coun-try’s relatively stable political situation, its signi-ficant economic and military potential, and itsoil reserves. Other important factors in this con-text include the friendly relations between Ka-zakhstan and Russia, its modest expectations withregard to the Alliance, and the geographical clo-seness of China. On the other hand, it has somedisadvantages, including its overall geographicalsituation, i.e. the greater distance to Afghani-stan as compared to Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, littleroom for manoeuvre in its relations with Russia,and the close links between the security sectorsof the two countries.

Evolution of co-operation

In March 1992, Kazakhstan joined the North At-lantic Co-operation Council (NACC) and, follow-ing that structure’s transformation, it became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Coun-cil (EAPC). It signed the PfP Framework Docu-ment on 27 May 1994, and in July 1996 it joinedthe PfP Status of Forces Agreement (PfP SOFA). Itprepared the first Individual Partnership Pro-gramme (IPP) in 1996. As late as 2001–02, the co-

operation between Kazakhstan and NATO wasvery modest, and was limited to diplomatic con-tacts, and Kazakhstan’s participation in EAPCmeetings, seminars and exercises. The events of11 September 2001 and the intensification of theUS policy towards Central Asia as a result there-of, the Alliance’s consequent engagement in theoperation in Afghanistan and the closer relationsbetween NATO and Russia caused a revitalisationof the NATO-Kazakh co-operation. At that point,Kazakhstan declared its willingness to make itsairports available for the needs of the Afghanoperation. In May 2002, it joined the Planningand Review Process (PARP), and in January 2004,the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC). Ka-zakhstan also delegated one officer to the PfPStaff Elements (PSE). Apart from that, Astana tookpart in the exercises conducted in 1997–2000 aspart of the Central Asian Peacekeeping Forces Bat-talion CENTRASBAT, as well as in numerous PfPmilitary exercises, and those held by the USA, in-cluding in Co-operative Nugget, Co-operative Os-prey, Combined Endeavour and Steppe Eagle. Ka-zakhstan was the only country in the region tosend a contingent to Iraq. This 27-strong unit ofengineer personnel serves as a part of the Multi-national Brigade Centre-South under Polish com-mand. During the EAPC meeting of ministers in Decem-ber 2004, Kazakhstan declared its wish to jointhe Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP); ithas however not yet confirmed this by present-ing any official document. Until recently, some re-presentatives of the Kazakh authorities were an-xious that participation in the programme entail-ed far-reaching political commitments that Asta-na was unable to fulfil. In general, Kazakhstanhas a positive opinion about the decisions takenat the Istanbul summit. Nevertheless, Kazakh offi-cials emphasise that Kazakhstan had already sug-gested opening a NATO office in Almaty severalyears ago, and sending only one liaison officer tothe region will be of merely symbolic meaning.Nevertheless, Kazakhstan is interested in accept-ing the officer. Additionally, Kazakhstan express-ed its will to host an EAPC Security Forum. The OSCE and International Security InstitutionDepartment deals with co-operation with NATOas part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and theMinistry of Defence has a separate Directorate incharge of operational co-operation with NATO.

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The structure of the Ministry of Defence also in-cludes a special information centre, which is usedby other ministries and offices as a basic sourceof information on NATO, the PfP and the EAPC.One of Kazakhstan’s priorities as a part of PfP isstrictly military co-operation: achieving interope-rability with forces of the Alliance member sta-tes by selected units (chiefly, the peacekeepingbattalion KAZBAT) and participation in trainingand exercises. Kazakhstan is also interested inobtaining material and consulting aid in the mili-tary and technical field. Kazakhstan is reformingits armed forces, and wants aid from the Westfor that purpose. Astana has declared that it willadjust its armed forces’ structure to meet West-ern standards by 2010. However, in the opinionof some experts, Kazakhstan will not give up Rus-sian standards for weapons, command structu-res, communications, etc. On the other hand, sig-nificant US military aid for that country cannotpass unnoticed. Kazakhstan has declared itself in favour of parti-cipation in PARP by sending one peacekeepingbattalion, KAZBAT, including support units, whichis supposed to achieve full interoperability withNATO forces by the end of 2006. One air-bornecompany of the battalion is intended to be fullyready from the beginning of 2005. Kazakhstan isalso interested in applying NATO standards to allits airmobile forces, and it plans one more bri-gade of those forces to have achieved full inter-operability by the end of 2006 so that it can takepart in NATO PfP operations. Services reportingto the emergency agency (it has offered the par-ticipation of a crisis management team in PARP)and border guards also take part in PARP, althoughto a limited extent. Kazakhstan’s other priorities include co-opera-tion in combating terrorism and co-operation incombating illegal religious extremist groups. Ka-zakhstan also emphasises the need for NATO’sengagement in the fight against drug smugglingand border security in the broad meaning of theterm. Kazakhstan has suggested that it createwith NATO a Regional PfP Training Centre to trainantiterrorist units operating in mountain areas.Kazakhstan is also searching for leading nationsto help it as a part of the PfP Trust Fund mecha-nism in managing the waste coming from rocketfuel, unexploded shells on the test grounds andlight arms. Most probably, the United States will

take part in the implementation of this project.Other areas of co-operation between Kazakhstanand NATO include non-proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction, participation in languagetraining, scientific co-operation and ecological co--operation. In 2004, Kazakhstan founded a linguis-tic academy for military personnel; there are plansto turn it into a regional institution. Kazakh ex-perts believe that regional co-operation as a partof PfP is hardly possible, yet they can see somepossibility of limited operational co-operation. Kazakhstan benefits more from bilateral assis-tance by the Alliance’s member states than fromthe support granted to it as a part of the PfP. Ma-jor donors include the USA, Turkey, Germany, Fran-ce and the United Kingdom. Washington provi-des Astana with significant aid in the process ofensuring security on the Caspian Sea, includingequipping the coastline guards and forming thefleet, as well as the training of sailors.

Problems in co-operation

The non-democratic government in Astana, Ka-zakhstan’s dependence on defence co-operationwith Russia and the limited interest of the Allian-ce in Central Asia mean that the area of co-ope-ration between the Alliance and Astana is signi-ficantly curtailed. For those reasons, NATO hashardly any capability to influence Kazakhstan,while Astana wants from the Alliance concretematerial aid that would not oblige them to mu-tual commitments in terms of political co-opera-tion. It sometimes seems that Kazakhstan seesassistance from the Alliance as a reward due tothe country because of its strategic geographicallocation. The nature of Kazakhstan’s strategy towards theAlliance is rather reactive; this means that Asta-na expects NATO to make co-operation proposalswhile itself it barely tries to attract the Alliance’ssupport for issues that are important for Ka-zakhstan. The development of mutual relationsis also impeded by Kazakhstan’s unwillingnessto make political commitments. The impact of theRussian factor on Kazakhstan’s policy towards theAlliance is part of a separate group of problems.It seems that a great part of the proposals madeby Kazakhstan to NATO and Western countriesare aimed only at strengthening Astana’s posi-tion against Moscow.

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The significant organisational and technical fac-tors hampering co-operation with NATO includediffering organisational cultures, strong centrali-sation of the bureaucratic apparatus in Kazakh-stan, and an inability to work in compliance withthe organisational principles applicable withinthe Alliance. Kazakhstan has still not ratified theSecurity Agreement with NATO, and in conse-quence it fails to provide NATO with a great partof the information necessary to implement PARP.The Kazakh ruling elites, both political and mili-tary, have not rid themselves of a Soviet mindsetof stereotypes which inherently mistrusts West-ern countries and organisations. Intellectually,they are relatively closed-minded, and peoplewho have been able to change their approach towork thanks to participation in training in theWest cannot find their way among the organisa-tional arrangements in Kazakhstan. There also aresome linguistic problems; very few officers speakEnglish, and those who do are mainly junior offi-cers. Even though Kazakhstan’s economy is ra-pidly developing, the country is still rather reluc-tant to co-finance the events it undertakes joint-ly with NATO or the Alliance’s member states. Another problem is rather the unfavourable ima-ge of the Alliance among the governing elites.Kazakh experts reproach NATO for the followingperceived failings: a lack of any strategy towardsCentral Asia, a lack of knowledge of the region’sspecial features, promoting democratisationinstead of granting assistance in fighting regio-nal threats, and an unwillingness to face the pro-blems deepened by the ISAF operation, includ-ing the growth in drug smuggling from Afgha-nistan. They are also critical about the course ofNATO’s operation in Afghanistan so far. There isalso some anxiety that NATO could interfere withKazakhstan’s internal affairs, and that the Allian-ce’s member states could provide assistance tothe democratic opposition in Kazakhstan. It alsoseems that, because NATO offers assistance inan inflexible way, Kazakhstan prefers to developbilateral relations with individual Alliance mem-ber states, especially with the USA.

Conclusions

Kazakhstan has great economic potential and a relatively stable political situation, which opensup some prospects for co-operation with NATO.

However, Astana is not interested in broadeningthe scope of its co-operation with the Alliancemore than necessary, one of the reasons for whichbeing its strong ties with Moscow. Therefore, theprocess of intensifying NATO’s policy towardsKazakhstan must be handled with great care, es-pecially considering the fact that NATO does notprovide too many stimuli, either positive or ne-gative, for this country. Therefore, the Allianceshould offer Kazakhstan concrete benefits andset some requirements, such as ratification of theSecurity Agreement. Astana should also be en-couraged to join the IPAP, on condition howeverthat it will be a real driving force for democraticreform in this country. It is also worth raisingthe issue of conducting defence reform in rela-tions with Kazakhstan. The Alliance should also determine at least itsshort-term strategy concerning Central Asia, tobe followed with regard to each country of theregion individually. In addition to the operatio-nal tasks connected with the Afghanistan opera-tion, they must set goals that could yield tangi-ble benefits to Central Asian countries to helpthem resolve the problems existing in the re-gion.Kazakhstan hopes it will be given the opportuni-ty for economic and expert engagement in Af-ghanistan, and aims at obtaining modern mili-tary technologies. Kazakhstan would certainlywelcome the Alliance’s participation in the fightagainst the actual threats to its security, as wellas co-operation with other organisations in com-bating drug trafficking, border security or the re-solution of ecological problems. These wishes ofAstana should be taken advantage of wisely. Ka-zakhstan’s aspirations to play a more importantrole in the international arena and to earn great-er prestige in international relations must alsobe employed in encouraging the country to co--operate. It is also worth putting greater empha-sis on the Alliance’s PR addressed to the Kazakhpublic, breaking Russia’s information monopoly,and promoting a positive image of NATO and theWest, in the broad meaning of the term, as sys-tems representing an attractive form of moderni-sation. It would also be worthwhile to considerthe possibility of supporting Astana in its striv-ing to open a Regional PfP Training Centre, orparticipation in the PfP Trust Fund mechanism.The option of NATO granting support to BOMCA

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(the EU Border Management Programme for Cen-tral Asia) or launching a process similar to theOhrid Process for Border Management and Se-curity should also be considered. Marta Jaroszewicz

KYRGYZSTAN

Note: the following text was prepared prior to theMarch 2005 regime change in Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan’s co-operation with NATO is develop-ing, even though it is not a priority for the coun-try’s authorities. Further, it remains dependenton financial support from the Alliance’s memberstates.

Approach to NATO

NATO is one of the numerous security structuresthat Kyrgyzstan co-operates with. The countryauthorities clearly give higher priority to Kyr-gyzstan’s membership in the Collective SecurityTreaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Co--operation Organisation (SCO) and to its bilateralco-operation with Russia, than to relations withNATO. Kyrgyzstan shows some interest in deve-loping co-operation with NATO, yet it emphasi-ses that it is not intending to integrate with theAlliance. Consequently, Kyrgyzstan does not stri-ve to adopt NATO standards. NATO is primarily perceived in Kyrgyzstan as a structure that can provide financial and tech-nical assistance for its armed forces and othersecurity structures in both multilateral and bila-teral forms (from particular member states). So-me experts notice that the image of NATO isquite negative among public opinion, and thatthe Kyrgyz governing elites are anxious that NATOand its member states could interfere with thepolitical processes in Kyrgyzstan. The current re-lations between Russia and the Alliance, and theposition of China, are the key factors influencingKyrgyzstan’s approach to NATO.

NATO’s interest in developing relations with Kyr-gyzstan, which had been very slight, has grownin recent years. The establishment of the antiter-rorism coalition’s airbase and the Alliance’s in-creasing engagement in Afghanistan have great-ly contributed to this. Nevertheless, due to Kyr-gyzstan’s limited potential and activity as partof the Partnership, these relations are not a mat-ter of priority for the Alliance. Bilateral engage-ment and aid from specific NATO member statesare noticeably more substantial than those of-fered by the Alliance as a whole.

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Evolution of co-operation

Political relations between Kyrgyzstan and NATOwere initiated in 1992. Kyrgyzstan formally be-came a member of the North Atlantic Co-opera-tion Council (NACC) on 10 March 1992, and itcontinued its participation in this forum follow-ing its transformation in May 1997 into the Eu-ro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). After thePartnership for Peace (PfP) programme waslaunched in 1994, Kyrgyzstan’s president AskarAkayev signed the PfP Framework Documentand submitted the PfP Presentation Documenton 1 June 1994 in Brussels. In May 1995, Kyr-gyzstan and NATO agreed on the first IndividualPartnership Programme (IPP), which was imple-mented in 1996. Initially, the IPP provided forimplementation of approximately 80 events an-nually, mainly seminars and training sessions.With time, this number exceeded 100. Kyrgyzsoldiers started participating regularly in a num-ber of exercises as a part of the Partnership forPeace programme or other similar events, inclu-ding in Co-operative Osprey, Co-operative Aura,Co-operative Support, Combined Endeavour, Co-operative Dragon, and in 1997–2000, as a part ofCENTRASBAT, the common battalion of peace-keeping forces from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan andKyrgyzstan. On 23 June 1995, Kyrgyzstan signed the SecurityAgreement with NATO and obtained NATO certi-fication in March 1997. Following the events of 11 September 2001, co--operation between the Alliance’s member statesand Kyrgyzstan became more active, particularlyas a part of the antiterrorist coalition in Afgha-nistan. In December 2001, Kyrgyz authoritiesprovided the coalition forces with access to theManas civil international airport near Bishkek,where the Gansi airbase was created. Fighterplanes and over 2,000 soldiers of the coalitionforces are still stationed there under bilateralagreements. The Kyrgyz authorities support NATOefforts to stabilise Afghanistan, and declare theirreadiness to support that country’s economic re-construction. In 2004, Kyrgyzstan made proposalsto NATO concerning its potential engagement asa part of ISAF, though on a limited and non-mili-tary basis. However, Kyrgyz experts are critical ofthe effects of the Afghan operation, including theactivity of ISAF forces, which have been under

NATO command since 2003. In particular, theyemphasise the problem of the growing influx ofdrugs from Afghanistan to Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan’s co-operation with NATO has notice-ably grown since 2001, although it is still ratherlimited. Declared priorities include co-operationin combating terrorism, preparing selected unitsof the armed forces and other forces (includingthose of the Ministry of Ecology and EmergencySituations and the National Guard) to achieveinteroperability with NATO member state forcesfor peacekeeping operations and antiterroristactions, creating and training (with the aid ofthe Alliance member states) special units designa-ted to fight against terrorism in mountain areas,and co-operation in communications. Kyrgyz-stan places particular significance on non-mili-tary co-operation, especially in the fields of me-dicine, emergency, civil communication, scientificco-operation and language training. Kyrgyzstanalso strives for co-operation with NATO in bordersecurity, which is a matter of priority for Bishkek. The authorities engaged in co-operation on theKyrgyz side include the Ministries of ForeignAffairs, Defence, and Ecology and Emergency Si-tuations, the National Guard, the Border Guard,the International Strategic Studies Instituteunder the president of Kyrgyzstan, and the Kyr-gyz Academy of Sciences. Political decisions concerning co-operation aretaken by the president, and the Ministry of De-fence plays the main part in the implementationthereof. There are no independent units in char-ge of co-operation with NATO among the Kyrgyzstate administration authorities.

Kyrgyzstan declared its will to join the Planningand Review Process (PARP) during the visit ofNATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer toBishkek in October 2004. As a result, work onPARP documents has commenced in Kyrgyzstan.At the same time, the Kyrgyz side emphasisesthe difficulties, mainly financial, in implementingthose objectives. By 2005, Kyrgyzstan plans tocreate (or rather recreate the previously liquidat-ed) peacekeeping company that will be designa-ted for co-operation with NATO, along with thespecial search and rescue unit of the Ministry ofEcology and Emergency Situations and specialforce subunits. There are also plans to create a re-

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gional training centre for rescuers in Kyrgyzstanas a part of the PfP, and to transform it thereafterinto a training centre for peacekeeping forces.Kyrgyzstan is not considering participating inthe Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP),claiming it is not ready and has insufficient in-formation about this initiative. Instead, it appliesfor aid to various countries and structures, inclu-ding NATO, for liquidating uranium waste stor-age yards, which are hazardous to the environ-ment, and re-cultivating the land previously usedby military bases (the latter action as a part of theTrust Fund mechanism on the basis of a declara-tion of support from the Netherlands and Luxem-burg), inter alia. Kyrgyz representatives have alsosuggested that the new NATO member states candonate it any military equipment they have leftover from the Soviet period. Kyrgyzstan wantsthe annual meeting of the new EAPC Security Fo-rum to be held in Bishkek in 2006, and that itsmain subject should be trans-border threats inCentral Asia. In December 2004, during the meet-ing of EAPC ministers, Kyrgyzstan suggested ex-panding the scope of the Trust Fund to cover is-sues of border security and control, in particularin the context of antiterrorist actions as a part ofthe Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism(PAP-T). It also appealed to NATO to hold region-al tactical exercises and training in Central Asiato promote interoperability, and to hold intro-ductory courses in interoperability and PARP. In January 2003, Kyrgyzstan joined the IT net-work as a part of the Virtual Silk Highway (VSH)project, and received computer hardware of sig-nificant value that enabled it to connect a num-ber of higher education institutions and researchinstitutes with their counterparts abroad. Kyr-gyzstan has also created (with US aid) a computernetwork that connects its security institutionswith other PfP participants as part of the PfP In-formation Management System (PIMS). Kyrgyzstan does not accept any far-reaching con-sulting assistance from NATO member states,nor has it declared any desire to adopt NATOstandards in reforming its armed forces. Instead,it is greatly interested in aid from the Alliance’smember states in equipping and training its ar-med forces in selected areas. Kyrgyzstan has de-clared its intention to enter into the PfP Status ofForces Agreement (PfP SOFA), although it has notso far done this.

Kyrgyzstan’s bilateral co-operation in the field ofsecurity with particular NATO member states, aswell as with Russia and China, is clearly betterdeveloped than as a part of NATO. The mostactive Allies include the USA and Turkey, and toa lesser extent Germany, the United Kingdom andFrance. Kyrgyz officers study at military academies inTurkey (over 500 graduates), the USA, Germany,France and the United Kingdom, as well as at thePfP training centre in Ankara. Soldiers of theKyrgyz special forces are trained in the USA andTurkey. The USA has helped Kyrgyzstan, interalia, to create a NCO school with US instructors,purchased two helicopters, and is planning totrain Kyrgyz peacekeeping forces. English, French,German and Turkish language courses, which aresponsored by individual Allies, have been madeavailable at the higher school for officers in Bish-kek. Kyrgyzstan is still dependent on Russian mi-litary equipment, and this dependence has so farnot been significantly curtailed by the aid theAllies have offered in the form of equipment (es-pecially communication equipment).

Problems in co-operation

The country’s serious economic difficulties andlow level of socioeconomic development, and,consequently, the extremely low level of financ-ing and poor condition of the armed forces,greatly impede the development of co-operationbetween Kyrgyzstan and NATO. All this makesKyrgyzstan dependent on external aid regardingco-operation in the field of security, includingco-operation with NATO; the country is often un-able to allot even small amounts of money for theimplementation of joint events. Another seriousproblem is insufficient political will on Kyrgyz-stan’s part to enhance its co-operation with theAlliance (in contrast to its willingness to workwith certain selected Allies), which basically ori-ginates from the fear of a negative reaction fromRussia and China. An additional, essential prob-lem is the fact that the security priorities ofNATO and Kyrgyzstan differ to some extent. ForKyrgyzstan, most important is effective assistan-ce in the struggle against terrorism, Islamic ex-tremism, drug smuggling and illegal immigra-tion, in border security and building its own se-curity forces, as well as guaranteeing effective

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external security. In Bishkek’s opinion, NATO isnot able to offer much in these fields. In turn,the Alliance wants the whole region to conductdemocratic reform of its security structures andprovide effective support to stabilise the region,which Kyrgyzstan is either unwilling (in the for-mer case) or able to only a limited extent (in thelatter) to ensure. A further significant problem isthe authoritarian nature of Kyrgyzstan’s politicalregime and the great distance between the res-pective socio-political, legal, economic and secu-rity-related reality of Kyrgyzstan and NATO mem-ber states. Numerous specific problems in Kyrgyzstan––NATO co-operation include the low level ofknowledge about the Alliance, its policy and ope-rating principles among the Kyrgyz elites andpublic; the predominant Soviet-type training me-thods and mindset in the security structures;and a malfunctioning bureaucracy. The bad finan-cial situation also causes serious personnel shor-tages in the defence sector, in particular, a greatdeficit in staff who know foreign languages; anda high level of corruption. The fact that Kyrgyz-stan currently does not have a military represen-tative at NATO Headquarters in Brussels clearlyaffects the development of co-operation. This ismainly due to financial shortages, although a lackof political will on the authorities’ part also seemsto have an effect in this case.

Conclusions

First of all, in its policy towards Kyrgyzstan NATOmust clearly define its priorities as a part of thegeneral policy towards the region. NATO shouldbear in mind that Kyrgyzstan will remain depen-dent on foreign aid in the immediate future. TheAlliance’s member states should increase the vo-lume of the aid they grant to Kyrgyzstan to im-plement concrete objectives that both strength-en this country’s armed forces (including train-ing and equipping special forces dedicated tocombating terrorism in mountain areas), andbuild a positive image of NATO in Kyrgyz publicopinion (including in the fields of disaster res-ponse and liquidation of uranium waste storageyards). Part of these activities can, and shouldbe, carried out using the Trust Fund mechanism.The Alliance should co-ordinate the aid it pro-vides to a greater extent. However, NATO should

combine an increase in the aid level with a step-ping-up of its requirements of Kyrgyzstan con-cerning the fulfilment of the commitments madeby the country as a part of the PfP, regulating thelegal basis for relations with NATO (includingratification of SOFA), increasing transparency inthe defence policy, gradual adoption of NATO stan-dards in reforming security structures (imple-menting objectives under the Partnership ActionPlan on Defence Institution Building), and moreextensive political and legal changes of a demo-cratic nature. NATO should pursue an active information policyin Kyrgyzstan, co-operating on this with the part-ly free local mass media and the numerous andactively operating non-governmental organisa-tions; increase the number of internships andtrainings addressed mainly to representatives ofthe younger generation, in particular those heldinside Kyrgyzstan itself. It is also necessary tofight actively against negative stereotypes ofNATO.NATO’s image in Kyrgyzstan will depend heavilyon how the NATO operation in Afghanistan pro-ceeds. The Alliance should make all possible effortto improve its efficiency and encourage Kyrgyz-stan (along with other countries in the region) tosupport the operation, even if only symbolically. The Alliance could either implement (in co-oper-ation with other structures such as the EuropeanUnion and the OSCE) some soft security tasks(e.g. border security, combating drug smuggling,etc.) or only support them in certain fields. Thisis one reason for supporting the proposal to ex-pand the Trust Fund mechanisms into border se-curity, and increasing assistance from NATO andparticular Allies in this field, including reform-ing, training and equipping border services.Marek Menkiszak

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UZBEKISTAN

Uzbekistan, which aspires to become the regionalleader, has shown the greatest engagement ofall the Central Asian countries in co-operatingwith NATO since 11 September 2001. However,this co-operation has been impeded by the natu-re of the regime of Uzbek president Islam Karimov,which is a cause of serious internal problems.

Approach to NATO

Uzbekistan is the most populous country of Cen-tral Asia (holding almost 50% of the region’s po-pulation); it is located in the centre of the region,and there are large Uzbek minorities in every ofthe neighbouring states. For these reasons, Uz-bekistan perceives itself as the most importantcountry in the region, and treats NATO as one ofthe tools that allow it to play this role. In thefirst years after gaining independence, relationswith NATO were treated by Tashkent as a factorwhich reinforced its young statehood. Uzbekistan’s foreign policy is characterised byrelatively substantial independence from Russiain comparison to other Central Asian states. Uz-bekistan has the best opportunities among theregion’s other countries to develop co-operationwith NATO, although it is worth noting that Uz-bekistan tries to avoid excessively antagonisingRussia, which is not favourably disposed towardsoverly high activity on the part of the Allianceand its member states in this region. Tashkenthas preferred NATO to other Western organisa-tions as it has paid relatively less attention tothe issues of human rights, democratisation andeconomic reform in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is not interested in becoming a mem-ber of NATO. In foreign relations, Uzbek authori-ties give top priority to bilateral relations, in-cluding with the Alliance’s member states. Forthis reason, NATO is seen through the prism ofrelations with the USA. Uzbekistan sticks to therule of maintaining a balance between the threegreat actors (Russia, China and the USA) and avoid-ing too close ties with any of them in its foreignand security policy. As part of this strategy, Uz-bekistan joined the Shanghai Co-operation Or-ganisation (SCO) in June 2001. In the opinion ofUzbek president Islam Karimov, too close co-ope-ration with any of the individual actors could

endanger the country’s sovereignty, which heidentifies with his unlimited authority inside thecountry. There are periods when Uzbekistan’s re-lations with Russia, USA and China become cold-er or warmer. Following the terrorist attacks inTashkent in late March/early April 2004, thecountry’s relations with NATO and the USA havesomewhat cooled, proof of which are the criticalopinions expressed by Tashkent of the operationin Afghanistan, and allegations that Westerncountries have been interfering with Uzbekistan’sinternal affairs. Instead, ties with Russia havetightened, as exemplified by the signing of a stra-tegic partnership agreement in June 2004.

Tashkent sees no contradiction between its rela-tions with Russia and China and those withNATO and the USA. In the opinion of Uzbekistan,since 11 September 2001, all those countries havecommon interests in the fields of security, thefight against Islamic terrorism and drug traffick-ing. Since that date, Uzbekistan has treated itsco-operation with NATO as an element of its par-ticipation in the coalition against internationalterrorism and radical Islam. US and NATO opera-tions in Afghanistan are perceived by Tashkentas factors that improve the country’s security,because the base for armed radical Uzbek-Isla-mic opposition has been liquidated as a result ofthem. Uzbekistan, as a member of the antiter-rorist coalition (providing logistic support) and a frontline country, bordering on Afghanistan,perceives itself as a state directly endangered byinternational terrorism, and in effect aspires tobe the USA and NATO’s most important partnerin Central Asia. This strategy is aimed at bothobtaining large amounts of financial aid andlegitimising the regime by persuading NATO andthe USA to refrain from raising the issue of presi-dent Karimov’s policy towards the internal oppo-sition in their mutual relations. President Kari-mov brands all internal opposition as inimical tothe regime and the antiterrorism coalition, andlabels every political movement referring to Is-lam as extremist. The regime blames the appear-ance of Islamic terrorist groups in Uzbekistannot on internal factors (authoritarianism and thedire socioeconomic situation) but on externalones, to wit, an attack by international terrorism.The West disagrees with this standpoint, andindividual member states of the Alliance have

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raised the issue of human rights violations; Tash-kent’s hopes of getting large financial aid havetherefore not materialised, and Uzbekistan hasbeen reviewing its attitude towards NATO andthe USA.

Evolution of co-operation

Uzbekistan became a member of the North At-lantic Co-operation Council (NACC) – since 1997,the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – in March1992. On 13 July 1994, Uzbekistan signed thePartnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Docu-ment. In August 1995, Tashkent submitted thePfP Presentation Document. On 16 August 1995,Uzbekistan signed the Security Agreement withNATO, which guarantees secure exchange of in-formation between the Alliance and its partners.On 24 July 1996, the PfP Status of Forces Agree-ment (PfP SOFA) was signed by Uzbekistan andNATO. The Individual Partnership Programme(IPP) was developed on the basis of the UzbekPartnership Presentation Document. A documentto that effect was signed on 26 June 1996. Theterrorist attacks against the USA on 11 September2001, which were logistically supported from al--Qaida bases in Afghanistan, appeared to be a realturning point in the history of relations betweenNATO and Uzbekistan. Several weeks afterwards,US forces launched Operation Enduring Freedomin Afghanistan using bases in Uzbekistan. Since16 April 2003, when NATO decided to take overcommand of the International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF) operation which had been conduct-ed in Afghanistan from December 2001, the ter-ritory of Uzbekistan has become the key logisti-cal base for that mission. In 2002, Uzbekistan signed a memorandum ofunderstanding with the NATO Maintenance andSupply Agency (NAMSA). In June 2002, Uzbekistanjoined the Planning and Review Process (PARP). InSeptember 2004, Tashkent submitted the Indivi-dual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) PresentationDocument. NATO–Uzbekistan political relations are relativelyintensive as compared to other countries of theregion. In the period 1996–2003, several impor-tant visits were made. In November 1996, Presi-dent of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov paid a visit toNATO Headquarters in Brussels. In 1997, 2000,2003 and 2004, subsequent NATO Secretaries Ge-

neral visited Tashkent. President Karimov tookpart in NATO summits in Washington (1999) andPrague (2002). In 2004, the heads of the UzbekMinistry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defen-ce participated in the Istanbul NATO summit. In July 2001, the Uzbek mission to NATO head-quarters was established. In November 2001,the first consultations of the Uzbek ministers ofdefence and foreign affairs with ambassadors ofthe Alliance member states were held in Brus-sels as a part of the “19+1” formula. Uzbekistan is the most actively engaged of allthe Central Asian states in practical co-operationwith NATO. Since 1996, Uzbek armed forces havetaken part in numerous common exercises aspart of and in the spirit of PfP, including in Co--operative Aura, Co-operative Automation, Co--operative Banner, Co-operative Chance, Co-ope-rative Demand, Co-operative Determination, Co--operative Guard, Co-operative Nugget, Co-ope-rative Osprey, Co-operative Support, Strong Re-solve and Co-operative Safeguard. In 2001–03,representatives of the Uzbek armed forces tookpart in 11 exercises as a part of PfP. In April 2003, the Ferghana-2003 exercises wereheld in Uzbekistan. Their objective was to trainparticipants how to manage consequences ofnatural disasters. These were the first exercisesof this kind to be held in Central Asia. As a partof IPP 2003/2004, Uzbekistan was engaged in182 events. As a part of IPP 2004/2005, Uzbeki-stan has been and is going to be engaged in 139events. The operation in Afghanistan has been the mostimportant area for developing co-operationbetween Uzbekistan and NATO since the attacksof 11 September 2001. Uzbekistan has providedNATO and the USA with access to its militarybases, which is vital for implementation of theoperation. The Khanabad airbase has been madeavailable to US forces, and the Termez base hostsNATO forces (under German command).

Uzbekistan has chosen 10 goals for implementa-tion as a part of PARP. Among other things, thesehave included military personnel training and theteaching of Western foreign languages. The mostimportant issue has been the training of a peace-keeping forces’ battalion with a medical unit.PARP ensures that the battalion will be trainedand equipped in accordance with a special pro-

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gramme complying with NATO standards. Cur-rently, the battalion is composed of 150 soldiersto rise to a maximum strength of 450. Accordingto some observers, the original plan that provi-des for readiness of the battalion by the end of2005 is unrealistic, and its implementation dead-line has been extended to the end of 2006. A 12--strong unit of the battalion took part in the PfPexercises Co-operative Best Effort in Armenia inJune 2003. The only PARP 2002 goal pertainingto air forces concerned strategic air transport, i.e.ensuring transport to the peacekeeping battalion.PARP 2004 includes 13 goals covering, inter alia,logistics, communications, air transport for thepeacekeeping battalion, communication systemand increasing demining capabilities. However,preparing the peacekeeping forces’ battalion re-mains the most important task.

Owing to the aid from the USA and the UnitedKingdom, a language training centre has beenestablished as a part of PfP structures. Brancheshave been opened at senior military institutions.English, French and German courses are avail-able at the centre. The best graduates receivegrants to study foreign languages abroad.In 2003, Uzbekistan decided to create a PfP train-ing centre, where officers could be trained in com-pliance with NATO standards and, as a result, toincrease the interoperability of the Uzbek armedforces and other PfP members during commonexercises. Approximately 3,000 officers are to betrained at the centre. The opening of the centre,which had been planned for September 2004, hasbeen delayed. In October 1999, a seminar andconference on security in Central Asia were joint-ly held by NATO and Uzbekistan in Tashkent. Inturn, in June 2002, a conference was held by theNATO Science Committee. Uzbekistan receivesnearly 60% of the NATO-sponsored academicgrants allocated to Central Asia. In August 2002, Uzbekistan was the first CentralAsian state to join the Virtual Silk Highway (VSH).The project has most users in Uzbekistan, com-pared to other countries in Central Asia. In 2003,thanks to US support, the Special InformationTechnology Centre for Modelling and Simulationwas created, which enables Uzbek officers toparticipate in computer training and exercises. Individual NATO member states provide militaryassistance to Uzbekistan. Most significant was

the aid granted by the USA (US$ 36 million in2002–03). Twenty Uzbek officers either have beenor are being trained at the US Armed Force CENT-COM HQ. At least 10 Uzbek officers take part intraining covering the priority areas of bilateralco-operation every year. Four joint exercises ofUS and Uzbek forces are held annually. Germany,the United Kingdom and Turkey are, respectively,Uzbekistan’s second, third and fourth most im-portant bilateral co-operators from among NATO’smember states.

Problems in co-operation

The basic problem in the relations of NATO withUzbekistan is the difference of their mutual per-ceptions and expectations. Tashkent often over-estimates the Alliance’s capabilities, expectingassistance (especially financial), equipment sup-plies and support in resolving such basic securityproblems as terrorism, religious extremism anddrug trafficking. Following 11 September, Uz-bekistan’s expectations were very high. Now, thedisillusionment of the Uzbek side is in direct pro-portion to those earlier expectations. On the one hand, NATO is implementing concre-te goals in the region: co-operation with part-ners to receive support for its antiterrorist andpeacekeeping operations (in particular, ISAF inAfghanistan, which is of great political significan-ce for NATO); on the other, it encourages demo-cratic defence reforms in those countries. TheAlliance is not interested in engagement in thesoft security field, considering that it basicallyhas no mandate for such work. From NATO’s perspective, the key obstacle to thedevelopment of its co-operation with Uzbekistanis the authoritarian rule in the country, whichprevents greater openness on the Uzbek side andits readiness to accept external monitoring to ve-rify how the country fulfils its commitments. Thefact that there usually are fewer candidates thanplaces available for them at trainings abroad is themost flagrant symptom of this problem. In theopinion of independent observers, increasing thenumber of foreign grant holders is seen by Presi-dent Karimov as a potential threat to the regime’ssecurity. According to experts, other sources ofproblems in developing co-operation with Uzbe-kistan include ineffective bureaucracy, centrali-sed decision-making (any decision, even on the

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least significant issue, must be taken by the Pre-sident), limited interest in matters concerningreform of the armed forces to adjust them toNATO standards, serious shortages of personnelspeaking foreign languages (the Uzbek IPAP sentto Brussels used Russian), the hidden hostilitysome of the administration feels towards NATO(an inheritance of the Soviet mindset), abusingthe term “state secret”, the weak position of thearmy (the proportion of its forces to those of theMinistry of Internal Affairs and National Secu-rity Committee is 1:3), non-transparency of thedefence budget, inability to use allocated fundseffectively, lack of co-ordination between theparticular sectors which make mutually contra-dictory statements, and scant knowledge of therules according to which the Alliance operates.According to the Uzbek side, NATO does not un-derstand the peculiarity of the region and the lo-cal way of thinking, e.g. when it demands demo-cratic reform. Uzbekistan is reluctant to becomeinvolved in the regional co-operation which is,in turn, fostered by NATO. Tashkent emphasisesthat each of the region’s countries has a differ-ent character. In the opinion of the Uzbek elites,the Alliance allocates too little financial meansfor aid to PfP participants. They see this as dueto the fact that the West does not have a com-prehensive vision of aid to Central Asia, the foun-dation for which should be financial support foreconomic development, as the best guarantee ofpolitical stabilisation and eliminating causes ofterrorism. Tashkent has reservations towardswhat it sees as NATO’s patronising and paterna-listic approach to its partners. They say this hasbeen proven by the fact that PfP members werenot admitted to participate in work on the docu-ment The Euro-Atlantic Partnership – Refocusingand Renewal. Tashkent is also aware of the lack ofconsensus within NATO with regard to its Cen-tral Asian policy, as well as of the great dividescaused by the Iraqi crisis. The Uzbek elites areconfirmed in their conviction that the decision-making process at NATO, composed as it is of 26member states, is too time-consuming, and thatbilateral co-operation with specific Alliance mem-bers is much more effective. Similar to the other Central Asian states, Uzbe-kistan provides NATO with access to its air spaceand bases on condition of obtaining financialbenefits from doing so. In 2004, serious tension

in the relations between Uzbekistan and NATOarose due to the issue of the Alliance’s liaisonofficer in Central Asia. Uzbekistan, perceiving it-self as the regional leader, suggested that the per-manent liaison office should be located in Tash-kent, to which the Alliance disagreed and intro-duced a rotation system. As a result, Uzbekistanwas the last country in the region to agree to theliaison officer’s stay in its territory.

Conclusions

Uzbekistan plays the role of an important logis-tical base for the antiterrorist operation in Af-ghanistan. Even though Uzbekistan is activelyinvolved in military co-operation with the Allian-ce’s member states, albeit predominantly bilate-ral (especially, with the USA), it seems unlikelythat Uzbekistan could use IPAP in accordancewith its planned goals (principally as an instru-ment for controlled and Alliance-supported de-mocratic defence and institutional reform). Thisis even truer because Tashkent’s demanding, andrecently critical, approach towards the Allianceis curtailing the chances of closer co-operation.Nor is the bad and worsening domestic situationof Uzbekistan not conducive to this. Any poten-tial destabilisation of Uzbekistan, considering itssituation and number of inhabitants, would cer-tainly greatly affect the entire region. On the other hand, Uzbekistan will remain animportant base for the ISAF operation in Afgha-nistan, owing to its geopolitical situation. De-veloping logistics (ground supply) for this ope-ration may prove conducive to keeping the rela-tions between Uzbekistan and NATO on an evenkeel. The Alliance may try to strengthen co-oper-ation on the “Afghan foundation”, offering Tash-kent joint actions in the border region (exercises,co-operation on Uzbek-Afghan border security)or sending Uzbek liaison officers to Afghanistan.Another platform for co-operation betweenNATO and Uzbekistan could be built on practicalactivities as part of the struggle against Islamicterrorism, i.e. the potential training and equip-ping of Uzbek special units. In the longer term,NATO could extend this programme over otherunits of the Uzbek army. By training special unitsand maintaining co-operation in the border re-gion, NATO could indirectly support Tashkent incombating drug trafficking, which Uzbekistan

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claims is a serious threat to the country’s securi-ty. Nevertheless, NATO should make increasingits assistance dependent on Uzbekistan’s fulfill-ing its commitments. It is also worth strength-ening NATO’s information policy to promote a po-sitive image of the West (in the broad meaningof the term) as a good example to follow. TheAlliance should include in its political marketingsuch elements as increasing the number of in-ternships and trainings addressed to representa-tives of the young generation and local implemen-tation thereof. Nevertheless, the success of the recommendedactions depends on reaching a consensus amongNATO member states as to the nature of theAlliance’s engagement in the region and, evenmore so, on a constructive approach on the partof the Uzbek government. President Karimov’sdistrust of enhancing co-operation with NATO isdue to the difficult internal situation in the coun-try, which raises the authoritarian regime’s fearof any “interference” from outside that could ad-versely affect its stability. Reinforcement of theregime’s domestic position depends on improv-ing the socioeconomic situation, which requiresliberal economic reforms and softening the hardline towards the opposition. NATO member sta-tes could attempt to convince the Uzbek authori-ties to conduct reforms as a necessary conditionfor investment and financial aid, and to acceptlimited political reform (controlled, slow, top-down liberalisation). An additional cost of such a strategy would be criticism by human rightsorganisations. Another problem would also begetting all the Alliance’s members to supportsuch a “pragmatic” standpoint. However, takinginto account the style of ruling and the mindsetof President Karimov, even if NATO adopted sucha strategy, it would not provide any serious op-portunity to change the Uzbek regime’s conser-vative approach. Therefore, it needs to be assumedthat a cooling of the relations between NATOand Uzbekistan in the future is a probable sce-nario. Moreover, Uzbekistan may, as a result of a potential destabilisation of its internal situa-tion, turn from a partner to a problem for theAlliance – into a kind of failing state. Adam Balcer

TAJIKISTAN

Tajikistan has declared its will to intensify itscurrently underdeveloped co-operation withNATO, even though the country’s relations withRussia impede its development to a considerableextent; insufficient knowledge of the mecha-nisms for co-operation on the Tajik side is one ofthe problems.

Approach to NATO

Tajikistan is closely tied to Russia in both politi-cal and military terms, which has a direct effecton its relations with NATO. In the field of securi-ty, this country relies on the Collective SecurityTreaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Co--operation Organisation (SCO), and above all onthe presence of Russian military forces on its ter-ritory. Under the terms of the agreement signedduring President Putin’s visit to Dushanbe in Oc-tober 2004, the status of the Russian 201st Di-vision has been changed: it has been transformedinto a permanent base, which means a streng-thening of Russia’s influence there (the base alsoserves as a guarantee of the country’s stability,to some extent). Russian border guards who ser-ve at the border with Afghanistan will be gradu-ally replaced by Tajiks; the process is planned tobe concluded by the end of 2005.The country’s strong bonds with Russia do not to-tally prevent Tajikistan’s co-operation with NATOand the West, although they limit it. The Allianceis seen as one of the most important Westernstructures, and as an organisation that is able toprovide financial and technical assistance in mo-dernising the army. The Tajik side has also begunto consider NATO as a potential partner that cancontribute to an at least partial three-way diver-sification of co-operation in the international are-na, including in the field of security. Before adopting the PfP, Tajikistan was the leastactive country in Central Asia; however, over thelast three years, it has been trying to intensify itscontacts with NATO and the West (which wasproved by its signing of an agreement on partner-ship and co-operation with the European Unionin October 2004). This is mainly linked to theAlliance’s engagement in Afghanistan, which hasa direct effect on Tajikistan’s security and inter-nal situation. NATO’s image in Tajik public opi-

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nion is relatively positive, although very fewTajiks know what the Alliance is; many identifyNATO with the United States. For NATO, Tajiki-stan is a first-rank actor in Central Asia becauseit borders on Afghanistan, and because of its sig-nificance for regional stability.

Evolution of co-operation

Tajikistan was a member of the North AtlanticCo-operation Council (NACC) and since 1997 hasbelonged to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Coun-cil (EAPC). However, it has not actively engagedin co-operation, the only exception being its par-ticipation in the NATO Science Programme (therewere even cases when the right to represent thecountry at EAPC meetings was transferred to theRussian delegation). Tajikistan was the last NIScountry to sign the PfP Framework Document; itdid so as late as 20 February 2002. This can beexplained by the fact that during the civil warthe current president, Emomali Rakhmonov, wasmainly supported by Russia, while the West wasmuch more critical about him. Another vital fac-tor was Tajikistan’s reluctance to become invol-ved in any initiatives of military nature becauseof its war experiences (e.g. it has not joined CEN-TRASBAT). Dushanbe was showing signs of a de-sire to join the PfP and intensify its relationswith the Alliance as early as mid-2001. The Tajikauthorities have emphasised that the change intheir approach to NATO has also resulted fromthe Alliance’s new Tajikistan policy in connectionwith the beginning of the Afghan operation. Tajikistan adopted its Individual Partnership Pro-gramme (IPP) for the years 2004–05 in late 2003.Nevertheless, it has declared that it is still tooearly to develop an Individual Partnership ActionPlan (IPAP), and that it is not ready yet for parti-cipation in the PfP Planning and Review Process(PARP); it has been quite cautious about imple-menting the principles of the Partnership ActionPlan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB),claiming that its knowledge is insufficient. Workon ratifying the PfP Status of Forces Agreement(PfP SOFA) has already taken some considerabletime. In March 2003, President Rakhmonov paida visit to NATO Headquarters. He also headed theTajik delegations to NATO summits in Prague andIstanbul.

Tajikistan’s priorities in its co-operation withNATO as a part of PfP include civil emergencyplanning, fight against terrorism, rescue opera-tions, personnel training, language training, ex-pert assistance in transforming defence institu-tions, adopting planning standards and estab-lishing civilian control of the armed forces. YetTajikistan is most interested in co-operation withNATO in the fields of border security and com-bating drug and people smuggling, while at thesame time claiming the Alliance shows insuffi-cient understanding towards it. The Tajik autho-rities are waiting for NATO’s decision on estab-lishing a border guard training centre; the talks(with OSCE participation) have been going on fortwo years now, yet it seems that the centre willnot be created in the immediate future. Dushanbedisplays a positive attitude to the Istanbul sum-mit’s decisions, including the initiative to desig-nate a NATO liaison officer for Central Asia; Tajiki-stan has officially declared that it is ready to pro-vide an office for the officer. Tajikistan has offered significant assistance toNATO member states during the Afghan opera-tion by providing the United States and Francewith access to its air space and designated air-ports. Currently, under a bilateral agreement, onlythe French forces, who have a small contingentof soldiers (approximately 150) stationed in theDushanbe airbase, are staying on Tajik territory.During the visit of NATO Secretary General Jaapde Hoop Scheffer in October 2004, Tajikistan wasthe first country of the region to sign an agree-ment with NATO on transit to Afghanistan. Tajikistan has so far not participated in any exer-cises of a military character together with NATO,although it does not exclude such an option forthe future. The greatest multilateral event it hasparticipated in as a part of the PfP were the Fer-ghana-2003 civilian exercises covering emergen-cy management at the time of natural disasters.Nevertheless, Tajik units have taken part in exer-cises and training on Tajik territory, jointly withthe French and Americans. Tajikistan’s bilateralco-operation with some NATO member states isbetter developed than is its engagement in mul-tilateral co-operation as a part of the PfP. Veryfew officers go on trainings to NATO member sta-tes. Traditionally, most of them graduate frommilitary education institutions and take coursesin Russia, which is due to both the modest offer

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of scholarships in the West and to language-re-lated problems. It is worthwhile paying attentionto the systematically growing engagement of In-dia in Tajikistan, including in co-operation in themilitary training area. Tajik state structures do not include a centre forco-ordinating co-operation with NATO; all keydecisions to this effect are taken in the presi-dent’s inner circle. According to observers, Tajikistan is currently con-ducting an ambitious reform of its armed forces.The Tajik army is considered one of the most ex-perienced in the region, yet its greatest problemis its insufficient level of financing (this also ap-plies to other security structures, in particularthe border guards). There is persistent depen-dence on Russian military technology. Except forsome limited control by the parliament, there isno civilian control of the armed forces. Tajikistan participates in the Alliance’s scienceprogramme. In February 2003, it joined the Vir-tual Silk Highway (VSH). As a part of the TrustFund, it has implemented one project concern-ing mine destruction (with financial support fromthe Netherlands and Canada).

Problems in co-operation

Tajikistan is one of the poorest countries in Cen-tral Asia. The five-year civil war has exacerbatedthe already serious economic crisis, and there arehardly any prospects for overcoming it today.Another problem is the undemocratic politicalsystem, even though Tajikistan is one of themost pluralist countries of the region (an Islamicparty is operating there legally), with at leastpartly free mass media and, as some experts em-phasise, at least a chance of political transfor-mation. Tajikistan’s international co-operation in the mili-tary field has to a great extent been monopo-lised by its close ties with Russia. Dushanbe’s cau-tious approach to developing co-operation withNATO stems from its fear of how Russia (and in-creasingly China) will react. Nearly a million Tajikimmigrants working in Russia, and the presenceof the Russian military base in the territory ofTajikistan, are tools that Moscow may use toaffect the country’s internal situation. Manypeople note that information about the externalworld reaches Tajikistan mostly via Russian-lan-

guage mass media. Tajik elites, including MFAand MoD officers, do not have even elementaryknowledge about NATO, do not understand thedifference between particular instruments of co--operation, the potential options of its develop-ment, nor of the benefits it gives. Other obsta-cles to Tajikistan’s co-operation with NATO in-clude a lack of foreign-language knowledgeamong military personnel (this is important forpotential interoperability), a Soviet-type mind-set, bureaucratised structures which show almosttotal lack of activity and readiness to co-operate,extremely low financial potential, and a lack ofrepresentation at NATO Headquarters. The latterproblem is due not to insufficient political will,but to financial shortages; meanwhile, as theTajik MFA emphasises, its representation is nec-essary to further develop mutual relations. Tajikistan welcomes any financial, material andtraining assistance offered by NATO and its mem-ber states, while complaining at the same timethat what it receives is still far from sufficient.Nonetheless, it is not interested in implement-ing the standards applicable in the Alliance (ex-cept for some individual areas covering planning,among other things). The opinion that the coun-try has practically received nothing in exchangefor its co-operation with NATO in the Afghanoperation is becoming increasingly widespreadamong official structures in Tajikistan. The prob-lem of growing drug smuggling, which poses a threat to the security and stability of the state,is also worth mentioning. The authorities do notfight effectively against the smuggling, and theproblem is worsened by the high level of corrup-tion. Many independent experts are anxious thatsmuggling will intensify once the Tajik side takesover control of the border.

Conclusions

Tajikistan, due to its strong bonds with Russia, isforced to pursue a cautious policy, which cur-rently excludes anything other than a moderateclosing of its relations with NATO. The engage-ment by the Alliance’s member states in Tajiki-stan following the commencement of the opera-tion in Afghanistan has not challenged Russia’sdominant position in the security field, althoughthis has enabled Tajikistan to diversify its secu-rity policy to a certain degree. It seems that co-

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-operation with NATO will develop, albeit veryslowly. It is very important to determine preci-sely the Alliance’s priorities and expectations withregard to Tajikistan and the entire region, as willbe the success of the operation in Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s co-operation with NATO could defini-tely become more active, if the Alliance engagedin soft security, i.e. border protection and com-bating drug and people smuggling. This wouldmean the provision of greater technical, expertand financial assistance. In this area, NATO coulduse its co-operation with other international or-ganisations, in particular with the OSCE and theEU (e.g. as a part of the EU Border ManagementProgramme for Central Asia). The Alliance shouldcreate a training centre for border guards as a fa-cility for the entire region, which would also con-tribute to building a positive image of NATO.However, this would mean that NATO would ha-ve to decide to become engaged in the field of softsecurity. Development of military co-operationcould also be stimulated, if the Alliance and itsspecific member states presented a set of specificactions covering participation in the modernisa-tion of the Tajik armed forces, and training & cour-ses at military schools in NATO member states.Increasing assistance should definitely be madedependent on the implementation of the commit-ments Tajikistan has made as a part of the PfP andon advancing the ratification of SOFA. However,the Alliance should be very cautious and carefulin taking such steps, so that they are not perceivedas an attempt to squeeze Russia out of the region(which is also important because of the potentialreaction of China and Iran). NATO should takeinto account the fact that Tajikistan will remaindependent on external aid (which currently com-prises approximately 20% of the country’s GDP),and therefore incapable of co-operation thatwould involve any financial input on its part. The Alliance should put a greater emphasis onthe development of its information policy, inclu-ding covering possible programmes and mecha-nisms of co-operation with NATO. In particular,the Trust Fund has great and unused develop-ment potential in Tajikistan. The creation of aninformation centre would, at least partly, breakthe monopoly of Russian-language mass mediaon information about the Alliance. IncreasingNATO’s activity in the field of public diplomacy,which can for instance be done by using the NATO

Contact Point Embassy and by co-operating withmass media and non-governmental organisa-tions, is a very important task. The number ofprogrammes and language training workshopsaddressed to military personnel should be signifi-cantly increased. NATO should consider the possi-bility of granting financial support, through oneof its member states, to Tajikistan in opening a re-presentation office for this country at NATO Head-quarters (Germany has proposed a similar initia-tive), which would contribute to improving Tajikofficers’ and military personnel’s knowledgeabout NATO and its co-operation mechanisms. Wojciech Konoƒczuk

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TURKMENISTAN

Turkmenistan, governed by a totalitarian regime,emphasises its neutrality and is uninterested indeveloping co-operation with NATO.

Approach to NATO

Relations with NATO are not one of the prioritiesof Turkmen foreign policy, which is determinedby its neutral status and the isolationist natureof the political system. The Alliance is perceivedby the country as one of the key structures of theWestern world, and it is identified with the Uni-ted States. Since 1991, Turkmenistan has beenstriving to lessen its dependence on Russia. Itsrelations with NATO fit into a broader strategyof diversifying its partners in the internationalarena. Unlike other countries in the region, Turk-menistan has not been a member of the Collec-tive Security Treaty Organisation or the Shang-hai Co-operation Organisation, the creation ofwhich had been initiated by Russia, and its mem-bership in the Commonwealth of IndependentStates is in fact limited to the role of an observer.Nevertheless, Moscow’s reaction is still taken in-to consideration in deciding about the form ofrelations with NATO (though to a lesser extentthan before), due to the country’s heavy econo-mic dependence on Russia. Notwithstanding that,Turkmenistan has repeatedly emphasised that itdoes not perceive enlargement of the Alliance asa threat to either itself or the region. As a rule,Ashgabat does not get involved in the institu-tionalised co-operation of Central Asian stateseither, as it prefers bilateral relations to multi-lateral ones. Even though Turkmenistan is the least active par-ticipant of the PfP and its participation in the pro-gramme is merely formal, Ashgabat believes thatpassive participation is better than being outsidethe Partnership altogether, especially as Turkme-nistan can see the growing significance of theAlliance in the region and its engagement in Af-ghanistan. For NATO, Turkmenistan is importantbecause of its geographical position (it borderson Iran) and the significance of this country forthe stability of the region (the Afghan operation).

Evolution of co-operation

Turkmenistan was a member of the North Atlan-tic Co-operation Council (NACC) from 1992, andit has been a member of the Euro-Atlantic Part-nership Council (EAPC) since 1997. On 10 May1994, it was the first Central Asian country tojoint the PfP. President Saparmurad Niyazov paida visit to NATO Headquarters as early as 1993 inhis search for support in creating national armedforces, as well as technical assistance and aid inpersonnel training. In the early 1990s, many Turk-men military officers took part in courses andinternships at education institutions in NATOmember states. When the UN officially grantedneutral status to Turkmenistan in December 1995,the country’s relations with the Alliance nearlycame to a standstill, which was also an effect ofthe growing isolationist tendencies and the in-creasingly active raising of issues of human rightsviolations and the non-democratic system of go-vernment by the West and NATO. President Niya-zov paid another visit to Brussels in 1998. Low-ranking Turkmen delegations also took part inthe NATO summits in Prague and Istanbul, thoughthey acted there more as observers than as ac-tive participants. As the operation in Afghanistan began, the Turk-men side started making declarations of increas-ing its co-operation with NATO. Still, it soon ap-peared that no real implementation thereof fol-lowed. Turkmenistan has not totally given up itscontacts with the Alliance, nor has it taken anysteps towards actual development thereof. InMarch 2004, Turkmenistan presented its Indi-vidual Partnership Programme (IPP) for the years2004–05, yet it shows no interest in developingthe Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) orjoining the PfP Planning and Review Process(PARP). It is also unwilling to ratify the PfP Statusof Forces Agreement (even though it has embar-ked upon negotiations in this matter) or to im-plement the principles of the Partnership ActionPlan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB). In its official declarations, Turkmenistan specifiesthe following priorities of co-operation as a partof PfP: civilian personnel training, strengtheningthe armed forces, defence budget planning anddisaster response. At the same time, Ashgabat’sactivity in partnership programmes is very low.Since the mid 1990s, Turkmenistan has not taken

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part in any exercises or training that provide formilitary participation; its co-operation is only li-mited to the civilian area, and the scope of thisco-operation is rather small. The only exceptionthat Turkmenistan makes to the rule of non-en-gagement in initiatives of military character withNATO member states are its quite intense rela-tions with Turkey, as a part of which, inter alia,Turkmen military personnel study at Turkishhigher education institutions (approximately 200people annually). In the period 1999–2000, atleast ten Turkmen officers were on internship atthe US Defence Department as a part of the Inter-national Military Education and Training (IMET)programme. The training held by US specialistsfor Turkmen border guards serving on the mari-time border is also worth mentioning. Because of its tense relations with Uzbekistan,Turkmenistan has purchased great amounts ofmilitary equipment in recent years. Still, parado-xically, in spite of the relatively high level of itsdefence spending (according to some estimates,this is the highest per capita rate among theCentral Asian states), the armed forces of Turk-menistan are gradually becoming less professio-nal. This is an effect of a deliberate policy linetaken by President Niyazov, who does not wantthe generals to become politically important, asthis could pose a threat to his absolute power. The actual areas of Turkmenistan’s activity as a partof PfP cover participation in civilian training, civilemergency planning and science programmes ofthe Alliance. In August 2003, it joined the VirtualSilk Highway (VSH) project. The most significantof the few PfP activities hosted by Turkmenistanwas the annual training in Civil Emergency Plan-ning (CEP) and in Civil Military Co-operation(CIMIC) held in 2002 in Ashgabat. NATO represen-tatives have on numerous occasions taken partas observers in Turkmen army exercises (includ-ing large exercises in August 2004).Following the beginning of the operation in Af-ghanistan, the United States and NATO paid mo-re attention to Turkmenistan and its strategic lo-cation. It was the first country to consent to useof air and ground corridors in its territory to sup-ply humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Yet Ashga-bat did not agree to the establishment of a tran-sit airbase, which Germany had striven for. Onthe other hand, it unexpectedly agreed to acceptthe Alliance’s liaison officer.

Problems in co-operation

The key problem in co-operation with NATO isthe non-democratic and totalitarian nature of thepolitical regime, which is potentially profoundlyunstable. Almost all decisions are taken exclusi-vely by the president; there is practically no pub-lic opinion. Ashgabat welcomed the abolishmentof the Taliban regime (despite the fact that before11 September 2001, Turkmenistan had maintain-ed extensive economic and political relations withthem), yet it was not a beginning of a new stagein the country’s relations with NATO. Turkmeni-stan can see neither any need for nor any bene-fit from developing its co-operation with theAlliance, which is also demonstrated by the lackof any mission from the country at NATO Head-quarters. One can guess that the Turkmen sidelacks knowledge of the existing mechanisms forco-operation with NATO that could be used evenin the circumstances of the current internal situ-ation in the country. Unlike other states in theregion, Turkmenistan does not show any interestin co-operation in the field of soft security, re-gardless of the growing problem of drug smug-gling from Afghanistan. As the Alliance’s operation extended over thenorth-western part of Afghanistan, it becamenecessary to sign an agreement on transit withTurkmenistan that would cover a greater scopethan humanitarian aid. NATO Secretary GeneralJaap de Hoop Scheffer raised this issue duringhis visit to Ashgabat in October 2004, yet theTurkmen side responded with reluctance to hisproposals. In contrast to other countries in the region, theRussian-language mass media have little impactin Turkmenistan, which enables the state propa-ganda to draw the image of the Alliance as it seesfit, depending on how the situation develops.Even though the Turkmen press depicts the ac-tive relations of Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan withNATO as negative examples that pose a threat tothe stability of the entire region, it would be a gross overstatement to say that a deliberatepolicy aimed at discrediting NATO exists.

Conclusions

The possibilities for co-operation between NATOand Turkmenistan are still very limited. President

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Niyazov’s regime is uninterested in activatingthese relations, and systematically rejects any ini-tiatives of co-operation offered by the Alliance. Itseems that only a more active NATO policy in theCentral Asian region, with clearly determinedgoals, could lead to the greater engagement andparticipation of Ashgabat in PfP programmes.The Alliance should take into consideration thefact that Turkmenistan will remain a totalitarianstate in the immediate future, and that its inter-nal instability will continue to worsen. The suc-cess of the operation in Afghanistan, especiallyin view of the fact that it has expanded onto areasbordering Turkmenistan, will be vital for impro-ving NATO’s image there. In its contacts with the Turkmen side, NATOshould emphasise the benefits that Turkmeni-stan may gain as a result of using the partnershipprogrammes. There is great potential for develop-ing co-operation between Turkmenistan and theNATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)as a part of the Trust Fund mechanism. Turkme-nistan has to be invited to greater participationin the training, internships and science program-mes held by the Alliance, even though it mayseem difficult because of the distrust the countrymanifests. NATO could use Turkey, which has es-pecially close relations with Ashgabat, in its at-tempts to encourage Turkmenistan to resume co--operation. Wojciech Konoƒczuk

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Part III

NATO policy towards

its Eastern partners:

Proposals

Marek Menkiszak

Introduction: NATO’s character,limitations and capabilities

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) isa political and military alliance and an intergo-vernmental international organisation. As an or-ganisation, therefore, NATO has no interests ofits own and does not pursue any independent po-licy of its own. Its decisions are based on a con-sensus of member states, and it is the memberstates who hold all the power in the Alliance.NATO cannot take any action whatsoever if anyone of the twenty-six member states objects.This fact naturally imposes certain limitationson the Alliance’s activities.

NATO expresses the interests of its member sta-tes. All of them have endorsed the provisions ofthe North Atlantic Treaty, including the commit-ment to collective defence and the values namedin the Treaty’s preamble. NATO is therefore notonly a functional organisation, but also a struc-ture representing a community founded on demo-cratic values. At the same time, it is the Westernworld’s most important security organisation.

The community for which NATO provides an or-ganisational framework has certain importantshared interests. It protects a certain way of lifeand a certain formula of state organisation, andit is in this community’s best interest that thismodel, usually termed liberal democracy, shouldspread in its environment, improving stability,and reducing threats to member states.

All NATO member states are formally equal with-in the organisation, and this equality is safeguar-ded in the consensus-based decision-making me-chanism. However, it is only natural that mem-ber states with the largest military and financialpotential, as well as those who have special in-terests, should influence the Alliance’s activitiesto the greatest extent. Those member states should have clear and co-herent visions of the objectives that the Allianceis supposed to implement in its relations withpartners, and of the instruments with which suchobjectives should be accomplished. If such visionsexist and their fundamental elements are con-cordant, then one can reasonably speak of a stra-

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tegy of the Alliance’s activities, although thisstrategy does not stand for a detailed plan, butrather a vision, which one should consistentlyput into practice. Hence, the provisional term“NATO policy”, used in the further part of thisReport, is subject to the limitations discussedabove.

An analysis of the fourteen years of dialogue andco-operation between NATO and its Easternpartners in the NIS area leads to certain conclu-sions which are briefly presented below.

Major obstacles in NATO’s relations with its Eastern partners

The partnership between NATO and countriesthat once belonged to the hostile Warsaw Pacthas, generally speaking, been a success story. Itis a record of the victory of a democratic defenceorganisation’s force of attraction, and the aspira-tions of countries which used to be deprived ofthe possibility to freely decide their policies andways of safeguarding security. A large number ofcountries that formerly belonged to the WarsawPact are presently NATO members. The remain-der co-operate with the Alliance, participating invarious forms of partnership, and some of themhave been making serious efforts to join theAlliance in the future.

However, even though the successes are unques-tionable, the further development of partner-ship between NATO and the Eastern partners isstumbling on certain major obstacles, which arefound both on the part of individual partners andon the part of the Alliance. Briefly, these obstacles could be characterised asfollows.

a. Obstacles on the part of NATO’spartners:

– a lack of understanding of the principles ofNATO’s operationMany of the Eastern partners possess very limit-ed knowledge about NATO, its policy and its ope-ration, or understand them incorrectly. In parti-

cular, partners tend to show little understandingfor NATO’s limited financial and human resour-ces, the consensual decision-making methodwhich affects the speed and quality of decisions,the procedures in force at NATO, the mecha-nisms of partnership, the significance that NATOattaches to the fulfilment of commitments, thelimits of the scope of NATO’s activities and theinstruments at the Alliance’s disposal, especiallywith regard to “soft” security. In addition, part-ners sometimes fail to understand the funda-mental truth that NATO is a collective defencesystem rather than a collective security system.This deficit of understanding is found in its se-verest form in Central Asian partners.

– wrong expectations, or the absence of anyclearly defined expectations, regarding theAlliance, and a tendency to use co-operation tothe partners’ own ends This problem is closely linked to the precedingone. The failure to understand the way the Allian-ce operates leads to wrong expectations. Mostfrequently, partners expect the Alliance to pro-vide substantial financial and technical aid forsecurity and defence purposes, and to materiallysupport their efforts in the sphere of “soft” secu-rity (especially with regard to combating drugsmuggling, illegal migration and organised cri-me). Such expectations are most common in Cen-tral Asia. In the Southern Caucasus, on the otherhand, NATO is usually expected to become in-volved in the regulation of regional and localconflicts (while no regard is paid to the scepti-cism of most NATO members in this respect), orto provide training and technical support to helppartners develop armed forces that will be ableto restore their territorial integrity by force. Part-ners, including those in Eastern Europe, fre-quently overestimate the dominant role of theUnited States in NATO, and the US’ ability to in-fluence the Alliance’s policy; they overlook thelimitations imposed by the consensus principle.Some partners, especially in Central Asia, find itdifficult to clearly define their expectations, andadopt passive and receptive attitudes. Even mo-re frequently, certain partners (especially thosein Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus) try touse co-operation to their own ends, striving tomaximise their measurable benefits while at thesame time avoiding making any concrete commit-

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ments to NATO. In some cases, the chief reasonfor starting co-operation with the Alliance is thedesire to use NATO to solve certain internal issuesor problems in relations with neighbours, whilethe countries in question do not really intend tosubscribe to NATO’s standards.

– the incompatibility of NATO’s and the part-ners’ priorities concerning co-operationThis problem is closely linked to the two discuss-ed above, and is analysed in detail with regardto individual partners in the respective parts ofthis Report.

– the deficit of democracy in internal systems(including in the defence sector) or fully deve-loped authoritarian systemsA common problem among the Eastern partnersis that they subscribe insufficiently to NATO’svalues or do not subscribe to them at all, and failto abide by the principles and procedures towhich NATO member states adhere, in what iscalled a value gap. A great majority of the East-ern partners are more or less authoritarian sta-tes, and some of them could even be termed tota-litarian (Turkmenistan). The incompatibility withNATO’s standards and the democratic principlesof this defence system’s operation is a serious ob-stacle not only to political dialogue, but also tothe practical implementation of partnership ini-tiatives. This problem is found in the most acuteform in Central Asia, as well as in Azerbaijan andBelarus. In a related problem, most Eastern part-ners subscribe only superficially to the “Atlanticvalues”, and are unwilling to make any commit-ments concerning democratic defence reforms.

– defence reforms which are non-compliantwith NATO standards, or the absence of any de-fence reform Nearly all the Eastern partners are implementingdefence reforms, or declare that they plan to doso. However, only some of them are using the ex-perience and standards of NATO countries to anysignificant extent in their reform efforts. This isdue to the undemocratic character of their sys-tems, as mentioned before, and/or unsolved re-gional and local conflicts. Meanwhile, supportingdemocratic defence reforms in partner countriesis one of NATO’s fundamental objectives.

–- local conflicts and disputes between partnerstatesThis is a fundamental problem, which has a high-ly detrimental effect on NATO’s co-operation withsome Eastern partners. This issue affects theSouthern Caucasus and Moldova most seriously,and to some extent it is also found in Central Asia.The conflicts, which are usually “frozen”, notonly destabilise the security situation in the re-spective regions, but also prevent or seriouslyhamper regional horizontal co-operation betweenpartners and the implementation of democraticdefence reforms by individual partner states.Thus the conflicts are a fundamental obstacle tothe implementation of the very objectives ofNATO’s partnership policy.

– poor organisational culture, inefficiency ofstate apparatuses, dominance of Soviet menta-lity and proneness to corruptionIn the early phases of their independence, theEastern partners inherited ineffective and unde-mocratic structures and mechanisms of defenceinstitutions, and indeed the entire state appara-tus, from the Soviet Union. Very few partners ha-ve made serious efforts to alter this condition,and frequently the changes have been only par-tial. These problems were conserved by the un-democratic political systems discussed above.This led to serious consequences, such as ineffi-ciency of the state bureaucracy, poor organisatio-nal culture, and the incompatibility of procedu-res in many partner states with the standardsprevailing in NATO countries. The most seriousproblem, however, is the residue of the Sovietmindset frequently found among the military andstate officials. Such a way of thinking manifestsitself in the systemic intransparency of decision-making processes in the security and defencesphere, a high degree of centralisation, covert-ness and obsession about state secrets, superfi-cial declarations, and problems with implement-ing decisions. These problems are conserved bythe presence of officers trained in the former USSRand Russia, who still predominate in the com-mand structures of nearly all the Eastern part-ners. Finally, most partner states, especially thoseexperiencing economic difficulties, are seriouslyaffected by corruption and nepotism.

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– financial and human resource shortagesThe Eastern partners commonly suffer from de-fence funding deficits and shortages of qualifiedpersonnel. This significantly limits the ability ofsome partners to co-operate within the partner-ship framework, and makes some partners de-pendent on external support to be provided bythe Allies. This problem is coupled with the ques-tion of corruption and nepotism referred to above.

It is up to the partners themselves to address theabove problems. In order to do this, they willhave to show determination and make seriousefforts, and the Alliance can and should supportthem in this endeavour.

b. Obstacles on the part of NATO

There are also some obstacles to the developmentof partnership on the part of the Alliance and itsmember states. Briefly, they can be characterised as follows:

– lack of consensus, or difficulties reaching con-sensus, over a series of important issuesIndividual Allies have different approaches to a number of important questions concerning theAlliance’s character, transformation, enlargementand relations with other defence organisations.The differences that most greatly affect the part-nership relate to questions such as the directionsand scale of NATO’s external activity (includingoperations), the permanent representation of theAlliance in partner countries, the scope of theAlliance’s commitments (especially with regardto “soft” security), the possibility of NATO co--operating with other structures within the part-nership policy framework and the “division oftasks” between NATO and such structures, theevolution of certain partnership mechanisms (in-cluding the IPAP and Trust Fund), and NATO’s po-licy towards individual partner states. This affectsthe speed and quality of decision-making over a number of questions in NATO’s partnership po-licy.

– NATO’s focus on issues other than partner-shipThe partnership with the East is presently re-garded as one of the pillars of NATO’s activities.However, contrary to official declarations, not all

Allies see this partnership as a priority. In the pre-sent transformation period, the Alliance facesother highly important tasks, such as reform ofits own internal structures and forces, certain im-portant operations, and the development of dia-logue and partnership with the European Union.This affects financial decisions related to part-nership, leading to mounting problems with thefinancing of projects (especially within the TrustFund framework).

– the need to consolidate the Alliance follow-ing the second wave of eastward enlargement,and the reluctance of most Allies to considerfurther enlargementsThe recent NATO enlargement in March 2004,which involved a decisive majority of the officialcandidates (seven out of ten states having beenadmitted), arrested the attention of Allies andgave rise to some concern over the cohesion andeffectiveness of NATO and its decision-makingmechanisms. The enlargement entailed a substan-tial change of the geo-strategic situation in Eu-rope. Hence, many Allies are cautious or unwill-ing to discuss the prospects of further NATO en-largements, especially in an easterly direction.Moreover, many of them are satisfied with theinstitutional solutions and mechanisms imple-mented for partners in 1997, 1999, 2002 and2004. Meanwhile, the prospect of membershipplays a very important role in policy towards cer-tain partners.

– attachment to the idea of “ownership” ofpartnershipNATO and a number of its member states arestrongly attached to the principles which under-lie the existing partnership mechanisms, thesebeing inclusiveness, self-differentiation and ow-nership. As a result, the more ambitious ends andmeans of NATO’s partnership policy are some-times curbed, routine steps in, and poor co-opera-tion results are regarded as acceptable. Anotherrelated problem is the tendency to maintain anartificial balance between policies towards cer-tain partners (especially within the same region),and to make actions addressing certain partnersdependent on the opinions of other partners.Sometimes this approach impedes the develop-ment of co-operation with certain partners.

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– limited interest shown by some Allies in de-veloping relations with Eastern partners, anddiffering views on the geographic priorities ofpartnership Different Allies see different regions and statesas priorities of NATO’s partnership policy. In part,this is due to objective circumstances such as thegeographic location of individual NATO mem-bers. Some Allies tend to pay more attention tothe Mediterranean region and Greater MiddleEast than to Eastern partners.

– fear of Russia’s negative reaction to increa-sed NATO activity in the NIS and to closer rela-tions between the NIS and the AllianceThe position of Russia is a special factor whichaffects the attitude of some Allies towards co-ope-ration with certain of the Eastern partners. Theespecially close ties existing between some NATOmembers and Russia, and the sensitivity of suchmembers to the views of Russia (as the latter isopenly critical about certain aspects of NATO’spartnership policy), impede the development ofNATO’s relations with some of the Eastern part-ners, and make it difficult to reach consensus insome situations.

– absence of a clear vision of an “eastern poli-cy” in some leading NATO membersSome member states, especially the United Sta-tes, exert significant informal influence on theAlliance’s policy. However, at times these coun-tries appear to have no clear, coherent vision ofNATO’s policy strategy towards the Eastern part-ners, which should be implemented using the in-struments available within NATO.

– the Allies’ reluctance to get involved in the re-solution of “frozen” conflicts in the NIS areaMost NATO member states are sceptical or criticalof the idea that NATO should become involved insome way in the regulation of regional and localconflicts in the NIS. There are various reasons foradopting this kind of attitude, including the per-ceived contradiction between such involvementand NATO’s role as a collective defence system,concerns about the effectiveness and possible ne-gative consequences of such involvement, reluc-tance to interfere with what is regarded as thepartners’ internal problems, fear of a negative re-action from Russia, etc. However, as was noted

above, such conflicts significantly curtail NATO’spossibility of developing co-operation with somepartners.

– shortages of human and financial resourcesThere are some objective factors such as limitedresources in NATO’s budget and the financial dif-ficulties experienced by some member states, aswell as subjective factors such as the differencesbetween individual Allies’ attitudes towardsNATO’s partnership policy, including the policytowards Eastern partners (as mentioned before),which seriously hamper the development of thepartnership. NATO and some member states pos-sess insufficient financial and human resourcesto fully implement the more ambitious objecti-ves of the partnership policy.

Suggestions concerning thebasic objectives and principlesof NATO policy towards the Eastern partners

a. Basic objectives

Given the situation in the NIS area, the impor-tance of the Eastern partners to NATO, and theAlliance’s character, all discussed above, one canconclude that the fundamental objective of theAllies’ policy towards their Eastern partners im-plemented within the NATO framework shouldbe to actively support transformation and stabi-lisation in the partner states.

Supporting transformation means a series of ac-tions by NATO and its member states aimed attransformation of the greatest possible numberof Eastern partners, and of their defence institu-tions in particular, through the implementationof modern democratic Euro-Atlantic standards.

Supporting stabilisation means a series of actionsaiming to engage as many Eastern partners aspossible in close, constructive co-operation withNATO in order to strengthen regional and inter-national security, in keeping with the Atlantic in-terests and values (especially through the part-ners’ participation in NATO-led peace support

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operations or joint operations), and to supportresolution of conflicts that destabilise the area.

These two objectives are complementary. En-couraging and supporting the development andreform of democratic defence institutions andwider institutional frameworks in the Easternpartners is a necessary precondition for lastingstabilisation in Eastern Europe, the Southern Cau-casus and Central Asia. Without it, it will not bepossible to eliminate or reduce the threats to theAllies’ security generated in that part of the world.On the other hand, solving the security problemsin these regions and minimising threats fromoutside, especially through closer co-operationwith NATO, may provide the necessary shield fordemocratic reforms.

b. Principles

The implementation of the above-mentioned basicobjectives within the framework of partnershipinstitutions and mechanisms must be foundedon certain principles. These principles should be:

– DiversificationThe Eastern partners do not form a uniformgroup. On the contrary, they increasingly differfrom one another in every respect. The differen-ces are both individual and regional. The Easternpartners may be provisionally divided accordingto two criteria: their aspirations and their capa-bilities. As far as aspirations are concerned, thereis a group of states that hope to join NATO (Ukrai-ne, Georgia, Azerbaijan), and a group of countriesthat do not aspire to NATO membership (theremaining Eastern partners). In terms of capabili-ties, there are countries which are able to co-fi-nance their co-operation with NATO more thanothers, in spite of the economic difficulties theyare experiencing (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Azer-baijan, Kazakhstan as well as Uzbekistan andTurkmenistan), and those that largely depend onexternal assistance (Moldova, Georgia, Armenia,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan). It is obvious that whenformulating its Eastern policy, NATO should adoptdifferent approaches to the different categoriesof partners. It is very important that NATO’s Eastern policytake into account regional differences betweenpartners. Eastern Europe differs from the South-

ern Caucasus (because of its potential, Russiaforms a separate category of its own), which inturn differs from Central Asia. It is wrong to jux-tapose the latter two regions, as the Alliance hasdone in its policy to date. While Central Asia andthe Southern Caucasus are similar in some ways,there are too many political and cultural differ-ences between the two regions. In addition, itappears that these two areas have different poli-tical outlooks. The Southern Caucasus has pro-spects of membership in NATO, even if they areonly theoretical at this time, while the CentralAsian countries should develop closer co-opera-tion with NATO without such prospects in theforeseeable future.

Thus, the policy of NATO and the Allies towardsEastern partners should be multilevel, and shouldcomprise:1. general principles applicable to all Easternpartners;2. regional policies (for Eastern Europe, a provi-sion being made for the specifics of Russia, forthe Southern Caucasus and for Central Asia);3. functional policies (for partners who aspire toNATO membership and for the remainder; forpartners with greater capabilities and for thosewho require more support);4. separate policies for individual Eastern part-ner states.

– Ambitious approachSome of the mechanisms developed over thefourteen years of the NATO partnership policyevolution are founded on very ambitious assump-tions. In particular, this refers to the Member-ship Action Plan (MAP), the NATO–Ukraine ActionPlan (NUAP), and the Individual PartnershipAction Plan (IPAP). Indeed, these instrumentswere conceived in order for the Alliance to sup-port a planned and comprehensive democratictransformation of the defence systems and otherinstitutions of the participating partner states.Using these instruments, NATO and the alliedstates can obtain insights into the situations ofthe partner states, as well as the tools to supportnecessary changes by providing advice and aid.The partner states make voluntary commitmentsto NATO, and the Alliance evaluates the imple-mentation of such commitments by using vari-ous formulae. Thus, the initial assumption of

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these instruments is that they should be “intru-sive” in the positive sense of the word. The effec-tive use of such instruments by the partnersmay, but need not necessarily be, the first step to-wards their future membership in the Alliance. Therefore it is very important that the instru-ments in question should be used precisely in themanner described above. NATO should not allowany curtailing of ambitions, especially by thepartners. Neither should it accept the exclusionof any important spheres or objectives (e.g. de-mocratic defence reform) from the commitmentsmade by partners, nor remain passive if partnersfail to fulfil their commitments. Partnership in-struments should not become routine, or merelya way to sustain ineffective dialogue with part-ners. Should this be the case, it would be advis-able to scrap such instruments in relations withcertain of the partners. Other partnership insti-tutions and mechanisms should also be approach-ed in an ambitious manner.

– Comprehensiveness NATO is first and foremost a defence alliance, andits co-operation with partners naturally focuseson security and defence-related issues. Obvious-ly, however, the Alliance must not fail to see thatsecurity and defence have to be regarded in con-nection with the other spheres of a state’s func-tioning, including political, legal and economicissues. No democratic defence reform can be im-plemented in a state that has no intention ofchanging the undemocratic character of its re-gime, of respecting human rights and the rule oflaw, or of adhering to other Atlantic values. There-fore, the tendency to expand the Alliance’s areaof interest, as is visible in the development ofpartnership mechanisms, is the correct one. Forobvious reasons, this applies first and foremostto states wishing to become NATO members inthe future. However, NATO should also continuetrying to encourage comprehensive democraticreforms in those partner states that do not aspireto membership. In addition, the appropriate atti-tude of individual partners in this respect shouldbecome a necessary precondition for closer co--operation with the Alliance.

– Inclusiveness and “joint ownership”NATO partnership is founded on two basic prin-ciples (expressly quoted and defined in the BasicDocument of the EAPC22):– inclusiveness, which means that all partnershave equal opportunities to participate in dia-logue and co-operation with the Alliance;– self-differentiation, which means that individualpartners themselves decide on the areas and thelevel of their relations with the Alliance.Properly construed and applied, both these prin-ciples appear to be generally sound. However,there is also the concept of “ownership”, a termthat is frequently used in discussions about part-nership. Ownership means that it is the partnerswho in fact define the objectives of their partner-ship with the Alliance. They are the hosts of sucha partnership, and they are supposed to initiateactions and define the level of ambition in part-nership co-operation. It appears advisable to revise or even re-definethese principles. Inclusiveness and self-differen-tiation offer the partners a chance to participatein various partnership mechanisms, provided theythemselves want to, but these principles cannotguarantee participation to all partners or ensurethe same level of co-operation to everyone: thesemust depend on the partners meeting certain re-quirements defined by the Alliance. Thus, the ideaof the partners owning partnership mechanismsshould be replaced by the concept of “joint own-ership” by the partners and NATO. Both NATOand the partners are the hosts of the partnership.It is NATO who defines the general objectives ofindividual partnership mechanisms, and the part-ners subscribe to them (or not), formulating theirown detailed goals, tasks, schedules and imple-mentation methods that suit both sides, in inter-action with NATO. While respecting its partners’sovereign decisions, the Alliance should not re-frain from clearly expressing its own interestsand objectives concerning co-operation with in-dividual partners, and it should assess the part-ners’ attitude towards co-operation in this con-text. Partners who are ready and able to imple-ment more ambitious partnership goals shouldget an opportunity to do so, participating in moreadvanced forms of co-operation and benefiting

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22 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,Sintra 30th May 1997.

from more support from the Alliance, than thosewho adopt a different attitude.

– No artificial linkagesIn its co-operation with individual partners, NATOsometimes tends to maintain some artificial ba-lance, or to compensate to some partners for thedecisions concerning closer co-operation withother partners. This phenomenon is most appar-ent in certain specific “triangles”, i.e. in the rela-tions between NATO, Russia and Ukraine; NATO,Azerbaijan and Armenia; and NATO, Kazakhstanand Uzbekistan. This policy is usually founded ongood intentions, as NATO endeavours not to pro-voke some partners by its co-operation with otherpartners, not to harm relations between partnersinvolved in ongoing mutual disputes, and endea-vours to encourage partners involved in less ad-vanced co-operation to start closer co-operation,and to avoid granting excessive privileges to cer-tain partners. Nevertheless, this kind of approachusually undermines the fundamental objectivesof NATO’s partnership policy. The basic criteria according to which the Allianceevaluates its partners should be their commit-ment to co-operation with NATO, and to internaltransformation in keeping with NATO’s valuesand standards, as well as the compatibility ofNATO interests and the given partner’s interestswith respect to security. NATO should acknow-ledge the positions of individual partners, in-cluding their views on the scope of partnershipco-operation; but it must not make the develop-ment of co-operation with some partners depen-dent on the opinions of other partners. NATOand individual partners must remain sovereignin their decisions concerning partnership. TheAlliance must not artificially restrain co-opera-tion with selected partners; neither should it com-pensate to some partners for decisions concern-ing co-operation with other partners, if there is nosufficient justification for such compensation.

– Open door to membershipOne of the declared aims of partnership is to pre-pare selected partners for future membership inthe Alliance23. This poses the question about thelimits of NATO enlargement in general, and in

the easterly direction in particular, the prospectof membership being one of the strongest stimuliencouraging NATO’s partners to implement com-prehensive transformation. NATO should reassert the formula expressed inthe Alliance’s Strategic Concept and communiquésof the North Atlantic Council in connection withthe provision of Article 10 of the North AtlanticTreaty: “No European democratic country whoseadmission would fulfil the objectives of the Treatywill be excluded from consideration [for an acces-sion invitation by the Allies]24”. However, whileexisting NATO documents (in particular, theNorth Atlantic Treaty, the Study on NATO En-largement and the Membership Action Plan) setforth the conditions for accession in a fairlydetailed manner, the term “European country”has not been defined. It seems that according to the above provisionsand declarations, the natural geographic limit ofNATO enlargement in the foreseeable futureshould be the area of “political Europe” includingEastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Still,this concept should not predetermine develop-ments in the more distant future. It should mere-ly be conducive to the creation of a system of di-versified levels of partners’ integration and co--operation with the Alliance. NATO should provide all the European partnerswho, in the Allies’ opinion, are genuinely willingto become members with as much assistance aspossible to this end. However, this must not leadto an artificial lowering of the membership crite-ria or putting certain partners in a privileged po-sition. In order for NATO to keep its cohesion andpower, it is absolutely imperative that the candi-date countries demonstrate the following:1. in their internal and external policies, they sub-scribe to the Atlantic values genuinely and notsuperficially;2. they meet the basic standards shared by theEuro-Atlantic states, and are able to ensure effec-tive interoperability with the Allies;3. their fundamental security interests are com-patible with those of NATO members.

– Better co-ordination with other bodiesNATO’s policy towards the Eastern partners doesnot exist in a vacuum. The New Independent Sta-

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23 The Euro-Atlantic Partnership – Refocusing and Renewal,Brussels, 23rd June 2004. 24 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, op. cit., point 39.

tes are partners not only of NATO and its mem-bers, but also of other international organisations,in particular the European Union, the OSCE andthe Council of Europe. In recent months and yearssome of these organisations have activated poli-cies towards the Eastern partners, and as a resultit has become enormously important for theseorganisations to exchange information and co-or-dinate policies, so that they implement conver-gent or complementary objectives, do not mutu-ally torpedo their efforts, and do not carry outsimilar, hence redundant, undertakings. NATOshould intensify dialogue with the EU and theOSCE in order to create a platform for regular ex-change of information, discussion and, possibly,co-ordination of policies addressing the Easternpartners. Obviously, NATO’s priority will remainthe broadly understood security and defence-re-lated issues; the Alliance will maintain its auto-nomy of decision, and will not depend on the in-tentions of other organisations. However, by for-mulating its political requirements to partners(especially those aspiring to membership) in co--operation with other European organisations,the Alliance can contribute to the democratictransformation of those partners.As the scope of NATO’s interests gradually ex-pands to include “soft” security issues, includingborder security in particular, it is essential andtimely to co-operate with organisations that pos-sess skills and experience in this respect (such asthe UN, EU or OSCE), thus benefiting the Alliance’spartnership policy.

Problems affecting the partnership policy’s implementation, and suggested solutions

Multiple partnership institutionsOver the last fourteen years of the partnership’sevolution, many institutions and mechanismshave been developed which serve similar purpo-ses, or are designed to satisfy the political ambi-tions of individual partners. Presently, there areseven main formulas/circles of partnership inthe eastern direction, including the EAPC, the “re-gular” PfP, the PfP-PARP, the IPAP, the MAP (po-tentially), the partnership with Ukraine and the

partnership with Russia. They form a complicat-ed system, and the relations between them aresometimes unclear.

Suggestions: The Alliance should step up efforts to simplifythe main partnership formulas and reduce theirnumber, while at the same time making themmore flexible and more individual, and develop-ing “functional partnerships” and regionally-orien-ted partnerships. The following four general part-nership formulas might well be left in place:1. EAPC/”regular” PfP (combined) – for generalpolitical and security dialogue, and for practicalco-operation with “inactive partners”;2. IPAP/PfP-PARP – for partners wishing to co-ope-rate more closely with the Alliance, but whichdo not have membership aspirations;3. MAP – including Ukraine and, prospectively,also Georgia and Azerbaijan (initially, “MAP-orien-ted IPAP”) – for active partners with membershipaspirations;4. dialogue with Russia.Functional forms of partnership, such as thematicAction Plans, Trust Fund mechanisms and mentorpartnerships, could develop alongside the aboveformulas.

The problem of priorities and areas of co-operation with partners Defining interoperability as the chief priority ofco-operation with partners does not always pro-duce the desired results. Due to serious financialor institutional difficulties, some partners are un-able to reach an adequate level of interoperabi-lity with NATO within a satisfactory timeframe.If the Alliance restricts its interest in the trans-formation of partner states solely to the area ofdefence, these countries will not become full-fled-ged partners, and the stabilisation effect will notbe achieved. A separate issue relates to the pos-sibility of NATO starting co-operation with part-ners on “soft” security, including border protec-tion, the fight against weapons and drugs smug-gling, human trafficking and organised crime,etc., which is presently the subject of debatesamong Allies.

Suggestions:An adequate minimum level of interoperabilitywith NATO, necessary to enable joint action, is

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very important for both practical and politicalreasons. In the case of some partners, more em-phasis should be placed on assisting them in de-veloping basic democratic state institutions (inthe area of defence as well as in other sectors),laying a foundation for real interoperability. Inthis context, the assumptions presented in theReport on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro--Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership forPeace, Euro-Atlantic Partnership – Refocusing andRenewal, and especially the implementation ofthe Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institu-tion Building (PAP-DIB), should be supported. Interms of “soft” security, while remaining a politi-cal and military alliance, NATO could join the co--operation with partners to some extent, actingjointly with organisations such as the United Na-tions, the European Union or the OSCE, especiallyin areas in which it possesses certain competen-cies, such as border service reform.

The problem of flexibility of partner co-operation mechanisms Although decisions taken within the Alliance aregenerally addressed in the right direction, the me-chanisms for co-operation with partners (whichgenerally deserve good reviews) are still not fle-xible enough, especially in terms of rapid res-ponse to the partners’ needs and evolving secu-rity situations.

Suggestions: It is worth supporting the direction of the part-nership’s evolution outlined in the Report on theComprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Part-nership Council and Partnership for Peace, andthe document entitled The Euro-Atlantic Partner-ship – Refocusing and Renewal. In particular, oneshould consider creating new functional ActionPlans in selected important spheres of co-opera-tion. The scope of the Trust Fund mechanism’sapplication should be expanded to new areas ofco-operation, in particular to address the socialconsequences of defence reforms and border se-curity. One could also back the idea of develop-ing functional mentor partnerships (i.e. mentorpartnerships in selected areas of co-operation),based on the formula of a partner coupled witha mentor (a NATO member), and designed to im-plement specific co-operation projects underNATO’s aegis.

The problem of devaluating some partnerco-operation mechanismsThere is a risk that some new important mecha-nisms for the co-operation with partners, suchas the IPAP and the PAP-DIB, might become de-valued. According to its initial assumptions, theIPAP was an ambitious instrument through whichthe Alliance intended to support democratic de-fence reforms and broader institutional reformsin selected partner countries. At present, however,this mechanism is beginning to change its shape.By encouraging successive partners to join thismechanism, NATO appears to have accepted a lo-wering of IPAP’s ambitions, and the exclusion ofkey elements such as democratic defence reformsfrom the commitments made by some partners.Thus, IPAP may become the standard partnershipco-operation instrument available to all partners,which runs counter to its primary assumptionsand its initially “exclusive” character. In the caseof the PAP-DIB, no separate mechanism has beenprovided to verify the fulfilment of commitments:it was assumed that such verification could bedone through the IPAP, the PARP and the IPP. How-ever, these mechanisms (except for the IPAP, pro-vided it is implemented according to its initialassumptions) do not guarantee the Alliance a suf-ficient degree of control over the implementa-tion of commitments made by partners. As a re-sult, there is a risk that the PAP-DIB concept maybecome diluted and less effective, and some part-ners may adopt a selective or superficial approachto the Plan with NATO’s de facto approval. Thiswould run counter to the very objectives ofNATO’s partnership policy.

Suggestions: The Alliance should not allow a devaluation ofthe IPAP and PAP-DIB. Rather than focusing onthe number of partners participating in thesemechanisms, NATO should ensure that their useby selected partners is adequate. The Allianceshould not accept unambitious commitments bypartners, and in particular it should not allowany de facto exclusion of important areas fromsuch commitments (such as democratic defencereform and its components). Any IPAP that failsto meet the fundamental objectives defined bythe Alliance should not be adopted. NATO shouldconsider developing separate mechanisms forsupervising the implementation of PAP-DIB by

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individual partners, e.g. through thematic reportssubmitted by partner states and evaluated byNATO.

The problem of insufficient financingand “virtualisation” of co-operation with partnersThe amounts of funds allocated to co-operationwith partners are insufficient, and the funds thatare available are not always used effectively. Co--operation with partners is sometimes “virtual”(there are no measurable results except for a “goodatmosphere”). The existing system of co-opera-tion financing does not encourage increasedspending.

Suggestions: NATO’s present budget reform (according to theobjective-based budget principle) should be back-ed, and co-operation with the partners shouldbe reviewed. The number of undertakings imple-mented within the partnership frameworkshould be reduced in favour of improving theirquality and effectiveness. In particular, thoseprojects that do not yield any specific benefits toNATO or the partners, but serve merely to main-tain dialogue or make reports more appealing,should be eliminated. More funding should beearmarked for selected promising co-operationprojects with individual partners (according tothe benefit criterion). To this end, one could con-sider establishing separate funds for the most im-portant priority projects. The Trust Fund mecha-nism should definitely be used more extensively,as it is a most flexible tool that provides fast andeffective financing of specific projects in variousareas of co-operation. Member states should beencouraged to implement bilateral assistance andfinance it from their own resources, in co-ordi-nation with one another and under NATO’s for-mal auspices. The mentor partnership mecha-nism could be applied in this context.

The problem of bilateral co-operationbetween member states and partners There is a tendency to develop deeper, purely bi-lateral co-operation between individual Allies andpartners, while co-operation under the auspicesof NATO lags behind. In addition, member statesdo not exchange information and co-ordinatetheir assistance/co-operation with partners to

a sufficient extent. The result in some cases is re-dundant actions addressing the same issues, in-teroperability problems, and in extreme situa-tions, the wasting of a portion of assistance. Theefforts undertaken within NATO to address thisproblem have failed to produce fully satisfactoryresults. Moreover, some member states are usingassistance to partners as a way to get rid of obso-lete military equipment of doubtful value. An-other problem is the growing need (mentionedbefore) to co-ordinate assistance provided byNATO and other international organisations.

Suggestions: The Allies should definitely be encouraged to ex-pand their commitments to partners under theauspices of NATO. This is in the best shared in-terest of the Allies. It is worth backing the sug-gestions concerning co-ordination that are pre-sented in the Training and Education Enhance-ment Programme (TEEP) and the Report on theComprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Part-nership Council and Partnership for Peace. Theexisting channels for co-ordination and informa-tion exchange should also be strengthened, inclu-ding those within the framework of the Inter-national Military Staff, the PfP Co-ordination Cell(PCC), the NATO Training Group (NTG) as well asother structures, agencies and working groups,not to mention the clearing house mechanisms.In addition, we could consider strengthening theverification mechanisms for the implementationof Partnership Action Plans. Ideally, assistance/co--operation should be co-ordinated by the part-ner state concerned. In practice, however, the in-ternal structures in a number of partner statesdo not function effectively, and for this reasonthe burden of such co-ordination has to be divid-ed among NATO, the partners and the Allies. Ob-viously, overlapping assistance/co-operationprojects are not always an evil in themselves. Yetsuch overlapping should be eliminated in thosecases where it leads to wasting of NATO’s jointfunds, or creates problems for the partner sta-tes. It might be worthwhile to consider imple-menting some mechanisms for evaluating thequality of the military equipment provided freeof charge to partners. The idea of individual Alliesspecialising in co-operation/assistance, as pre-sented in the Report, should also be considered,and possibly actively supported. The idea of co-

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-ordinating assistance to partners provided byNATO and other organisations should also be en-couraged. This concept should be put on theagenda of NATO’s dialogue with the EU, OSCEand the UN. Finally, the creation of a permanentchannel for ongoing assistance co-ordinationand information exchange should be considered.

The problem of NATO’s institutionalpresence in partner states A number of partner states have been makingefforts, as yet in vain, to have NATO Informationand Documentation Centres or (civilian) NATOInformation Offices (and possibly NATO MilitaryLiaison Offices (NMLO)) established in their res-pective territories. The functioning of NATO Con-tact Point Embassies is not always effective, andis not of itself sufficient to satisfy the growingco-operation needs. The Istanbul Summit’s deci-sion to send NATO liaison officers to the regionsof the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia wasan appropriate but insufficient move, as it alonecannot provide for effective implementation ofthe tasks identified in that decision.

Suggestions: NATO should respond affirmatively to sugges-tions concerning the creation of NATO Informa-tion Offices and NMLOs in the territories of ac-tive partners, and NATO Information and Docu-mentation Centres in the less active partnerswho need an increased supply of reliable infor-mation about the Alliance. The conditions forestablishment of such offices, as set out in Euro-Atlantic Partnership – Refocusing and Renewal, ap-pear to be excessively rigorous, especially thoserelating to financing. In fact they deprive part-ner states with limited resources of any possibil-ity to have such offices established in their terri-tory. Given the shortage of financial and humanresources within NATO, one could consider someoff-budget financing mechanisms for such under-takings, including in particular the mentor part-nership mechanism. Another option is to createtarget funds on terms similar to those of the TrustFund. It must be ensured that the centres/officesthus established represent the interest of theAlliance as a whole. NATO should treat the Istan-bul decisions concerning liaison officers as a firststep towards expanding the Alliance’s institu-tional presence in the partner states. In particu-

lar, such officers should be provided with offices,auxiliary personnel and all necessary equipment.

The problem of NATO’s informational policyIn most partner states, little or very little is knownabout NATO, its policies and the principles under-lying its activities. This seriously limits opportu-nities for closer co-operation. As a result of somepartners’ deliberate state policies, harmful stereo-types and false information about NATO are some-times spread. The Alliance’s activities in the fieldof informational policy, as implemented chieflyby the NATO Contact Point Embassies, are appa-rently insufficient.

Suggestions:NATO should make an active informational policya priority in its co-operation with Eastern part-ners. Both NATO and individual Allies should pro-vide more financing for NATO’s information ef-forts in the partner states, including through lo-cal and cross-border mass media. The Alliance andits members should organise conferences, semi-nars, workshops, training and briefings to spreadinformation about NATO among the elite and thewider public. Also, NATO should always react toany false information being spread about itthrough the media in some partner states. In ad-dition, NATO should firmly support, financiallyand otherwise, local initiatives aiming to disse-minate reliable information about the Alliance(by translating NATO’s materials and materialsabout NATO into local languages, organising li-braries, seminars and conferences on subjects re-lated to the Alliance and its policy, internshipsfor activists of local non-governmental organisa-tions dealing with NATO-related issues, etc).

The problem of horizontal regional co-operationNATO is right to support the development of ho-rizontal regional co-operation, especially in cer-tain regions. However, in some cases the Allianceseems to have insufficiently considered the fun-damental obstacles to such co-operation (mostapparent in the Southern Caucasus).

Suggestions: Without addressing fundamental obstacles suchas unregulated local conflicts and the lack of con-

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fidence between some partners, effective hori-zontal regional co-operation will not be practi-cable. Therefore NATO should make its policy onthis issue more realistic, and not simply push forco-operation where it is not practicable. On theother hand, the Alliance should support any ideaswhich are conducive to the expansion of an areaof democracy and stability by the use of regionalco-operation mechanisms. First and foremost,this refers to co-operation in the Black Sea regionunder the auspices of NATO. NATO should notlegitimise or back regional security structuresfounded on standards different from NATO prin-ciples, or structures pursuing policies that arenot fully compliant with the Alliance’s valuesand interests. In the NIS area, this refers in parti-cular to the Collective Security Treaty Organi-sation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Co-operationOrganisation (SCO), the two organisations withwhich NATO should not establish relations ordevelop co-operation. The Alliance should backproposals submitted by some partners such asthe one to create Regional PfP Training Centres.NATO should consider developing a network ofspecialised centres of this kind. This is why it isadvisable to support the proposals presented inthe TEEP programme concerning the creation ofsuch networks, the creation of the Consortiumof Defence Academies and Security Studies In-stitutes and the SIMNET simulation network forPfP training. In this context, it is a good idea touse the positive experiences from the Virtual SilkRoad (VSR) project launched within the NATOresearch co-operation programme.

The problem of NATO’s involvement in the resolution of local conflicts in the CIS area NATO is evading a debate on local conflicts inthe NIS and the Alliance’s possible role in effortstowards resolving such conflicts. Meanwhile: 1. the conflicts in question threaten to destabi-lise the region, create security threats in the di-rect vicinity of the North-Atlantic area or threatsto some member states of the Alliance;2. it will not be possible to carry out effectivedemocratic defence reforms in a number of part-ner states before these conflicts are resolved;3. before these conflicts are resolved, closer co--operation between some partners and NATO willnot be possible, let alone such partners’ mem-

bership in the Alliance (this is clearly stipulatedin the Study on NATO Enlargement and the MAPprogramme25);4. before these conflicts are resolved, effectivehorizontal regional co-operation between somepartners will not be possible;5. Russia’s de facto monopoly on conflict resolu-tion in the NIS area is politically unacceptable,while a possible NATO commitment in the areacould become a testing ground for the new me-chanism of co-operation with Russia, namely theNRC peace support operations;6. some partner states involved in conflicts re-gard NATO as an effective guarantor of their se-curity.

Suggestions: NATO should include the question of local con-flicts in its dialogue with the partners concern-ed. It should also back political efforts towardspeaceful and permanent resolution of such con-flicts, including through activities such as theorganisation (e.g. in the EAPC forum) or support-ing of conferences, seminars, workshops, expertmeetings, etc. It should also consider supportingproposals for ways to resolve the conflicts in ques-tion by providing expert assistance, and possiblyfinancial assistance, and it should include theissue of conflict resolution in the agenda of NATO’sdialogue with the EU, OSCE and the UN. Finally,it should open a debate on the terms, forms andmechanisms of its possible involvement in con-flict regulation once the parties have reachedpreliminary political agreement, and possiblystart operational planning in this field. If thereare adequate political conditions for a peace sup-port operation in one of the conflict areas, NATOcould theoretically become involved in conflictresolution in one of the following ways: – NATO providing protection for an OSCE obser-vers’ mission, or logistic and/or staff support fora stabilisation mission carried out by EuropeanUnion forces based on the “Berlin Plus” formula26;

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25 Cf. Study on NATO Enlargement, op. cit., Chapter I, point 6;Chapter 5, point 72; Membership Action Plan, op. cit., I/2.26 EU operation using NATO resources, according to docu-ments from December 2002 and March 2003. See EU–NATODeclaration on ESDP, Brussels, 16 December 2002. TheNATO–EU Security of Information Agreement, effective asof 14 March 2003, is unpublished.

– a NATO-led peace support operation involvingthe partners; – a NATO–Russia (NRC) peace support operationinvolving other partners.

An NRC operation would be the most ambitiousform of NATO involvement. If such an operationis implemented, some underlying principlesshould be agreed upon in advance. When formu-lating such principles, the following considera-tions should be taken into account:– special regulations should be agreed concern-ing Russia’s role in operation planning and man-agement, which should not undermine the secu-rity principles and the interests of the Allies andother partners;– the operation should be implemented in com-pliance with NATO standards and procedures;– the Alliance should have adequate control overoperation planning and implementation; – selected partners should be allowed to take partin the operation;– conditions should be created in which the ope-ration will produce a genuine resolution of theconflict, rather than simply conserving the sta-tus quo;– conditions should be created in which the ope-ration will not maintain the presence of foreigntroops in the countries concerned against thewill of such countries;– conditions should be created in which the ope-ration will not one-sidedly affect the interests ofany of the sides in conflict, their neighbours orany other countries concerned.

The problem of human resource managementThe skills of state institution personnel (both ci-vilian and military) who have been trained at NATOor member state academies, are not utilised ade-quately in a number of partner states. Such per-sons are not promoted adequately and some-times resign from service. On the other hand,training is at times provided to the wrong per-sons, who fail to meet the criteria or guaranteebenefits to both sides.

Suggestions: The question of personnel use should be raisedregularly in dialogue with partners. NATO shouldeither monitor recruitment to various kinds of

training or be otherwise involved in the process.It should be suggested to partners that they de-velop institutional solutions such as national mo-nitoring systems for human resource manage-ment.

The problem of exercises and trainingIn some cases, the opportunities to participatein training and exercises offered to partners areinsufficiently adjusted to the partner’s needs andcapabilities. The language barrier remains an im-portant factor, impeding the development of part-nership.

Suggestions: NATO’s offer to partners in this respect shouldbe continually reviewed and optimised, based toa large extent on the partners’ suggestions, i.e.partners should not be invited to take part in exercises on too large a scale, and many more re-gular language courses should be organised inthe partner states. Special emphasis should beplaced on language training on the widest pos-sible scale. The development of a separate Part-nership Action Plan on language training shouldbe considered.

The problem of study visits and internships In the case of some countries, the programmesof study visits to NATO are still too narrow, ad-dressing mostly journalists and NGO personnel.Insufficient use is being made of the internshipopportunities at NATO.

Suggestions: The number of study visits for representatives ofthe state administration of selected partner sta-tes should be increased, and the adequate qualityof such visits should be ensured. The proposalspresented in the Report on the ComprehensiveReview of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Counciland Partnership for Peace with regard to extend-ing the duration and scope of internships atNATO should also be supported, especially thoseoffered to civilian specialists from partnerstates. Such internships should be offered main-ly to the younger generation.

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Conclusion: NATO’s new role in the NISarea?

A section of the NIS area belongs to Europe in geographical terms. It is therefore in the best in-terest of the Euro-Atlantic community to ensurethat countries from that area adopt Europeandemocratic values, standards and institutions tothe widest possible extent, leading to the com-pletion of the natural process of Europe’s unifi-cation as an area of freedom and prosperity. Onthe other hand, some of the New IndependentStates belong to a belt of instability that gener-ates a number of “soft” and conventional securi-ty threats to NATO member states, or they direct-ly border areas creating such threats. Instabilityin the NIS area is exacerbated by the democracydeficit in countries belonging to this area. For these reasons, the democratic transformationand stabilisation of the NIS constitute an impor-tant task and an important challenge to theWestern world, and promoting such transforma-tion and stabilisation is in the Western commu-nity’s best interest. As a powerful political andmilitary alliance defending the interests and val-ues of the democratic world, NATO has a poten-tially very important role to play in this respect.The Alliance and its member states can help de-mocratic transformation and stabilisation of theNIS by promoting their standards, especially inthe fields of security and defence, and by pro-viding practical assistance to strengthen the part-ner states’ ability to counter common securitythreats affecting both the partner states and theAllies (including through joint participation inpeacekeeping and stabilisation missions).

Over the fourteen years of its partnership policydevelopment, NATO has created instrumentsthat can significantly influence the security situ-ation in the NIS area, provided they are usedappropriately and consistently. NATO could playa new, important role, promoting democraticchange and stability. The most important meansin this context are “intrusive” (in the positivesense of the word) instruments such as the Mem-bership Action Plan (MAP), the NATO–UkraineAction Plan (NUAP) and the Individual Partner-ship Action Plan (IPAP). With those instruments,

NATO can monitor and support the planned pro-cess of democratic transformation in willingpartner states, in the defence sphere in particu-lar, but also in other fields. For some of the part-ner states, this can be the first step towards theirfuture membership in NATO. Other partnershipinstruments can also influence partners in keep-ing with the Allies’ interests, although to a lesserextent.

The lack of political will on the part of some part-ner states is a serious obstacle which impedesthe implementation of those objectives. In par-ticular, this refers to the partners’ reluctance tojoin those spheres and forms of co-operation withthe Alliance which are designed to lead to demo-cratic reforms in the defence sector in the broadmeaning of this term. The main reason for this isthe undemocratic character of the political regi-mes in a great majority of the Eastern partners.Consequently, a comprehensive approach is need-ed towards transformation tasks on the part ofNATO and the Allies, as well as an expansion ofthe scope of NATO’s interest and commitment tospheres that are not related to defence exclu-sively. It is increasingly urgent that the Allianceco-operate with other democratic organisations,the European Union and the OSCE in particular,in their efforts addressing the NIS. Only co-ordi-nated action aimed at the same or complemen-tary ends can be truly effective.

Any full realisation of NATO’s potential with res-pect to democratic transformation and stabilisa-tion in the NIS stumbles on the Alliance’s inter-nal problems. The Allies do not have a coherentcommon vision of NATO policy towards the area,and sometimes fail to reach consensus on someforms of the partnership policy and the questionof developing relations with individual partnerstates. If the Allies fail to reach such a consensus basedon their shared fundamental interests, NATOwill be unable to play its new important role inthe NIS. We believe that there exists a naturalcommunity of interests of the Allies with respectto NATO policy towards the NIS, even if it is notalways realised. Reaching such a consensus willnot be possible without a serious debate amongthe Allies, to which the present Report may be a modest contribution.

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In this connection, it should be emphasised that: 1. A strategic, long-term and comprehensive ap-proach is necessary in the policy of the Allianceand its members towards the Eastern partners.2. Co-operation with different Eastern partnersposes different demands, and each partner coun-try should be treated individually. However, so-me issues, problems and tasks of partnership arecommon for different Eastern partners, whichjustifies thinking about some general assump-tions of NATO policy in this respect.3. The Alliance needs to adopt a philosophy ofmore active involvement in the transformationprocesses taking place in the Eastern partnerstates, in order to safeguard the security of theAllies and the entire international community,and it has to make this task its genuine priority.Marek Menkiszak

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Part IV

Poland and NATO’s

policy towards their

Eastern partners

Marta Jaroszewicz

The peculiar character of the NIS area

Poland’s geopolitical location, economic situationand historical background make its relationswith Eastern neighbours one of its foreign policypriorities, and any destabilisation in that areamay constitute a threat to the Republic of Po-land’s vital interests. Although the outbreak of a large-scale armed conflict in the NIS area is notvery probable, the current situation in that areaimplies a number of challenges and threats to thesecurity of both Poland and Europe as a whole.In this context, such threats are related to thepossible outbreak of local armed conflicts, wea-pons and drugs smuggling, the development oforganised crime and informal paramilitary groups.Numerous unresolved ethnic and territorial con-flicts, serious political and social problems andthe lack of efficient mechanisms for handling re-gional conflicts can lead the situation in the NISarea to develop in a highly unpredictable way.Conflicts, followed by rapid destabilisation inthe region and the surrounding area, should notbe excluded. Furthermore, tensions are rising asa result of the paternalistic tendencies in Russia’spolicy towards the region. Other worrying situa-tions arising in this region include the develop-ment of authoritarian tendencies, the use of mil-itary forces for political purposes, the increase inthe level of military expenditure and the lack ofefficient control over the export of weapons fromthe NIS area. It is in Poland’s strategic interestthat the NIS achieves greater stability, and thatthe threats mentioned above are minimised oraverted from Poland’s borders to as great an ex-tent as possible. Poland’s security is principally influenced by thepolitical and military situation in three of its neigh-bouring countries, the former Soviet republics ofRussia, Belarus and Ukraine. The keys to streng-thening this security are as follows: maintainingpositive relations with Russia; supporting the de-velopment of a civil society with a parallel main-tenance of contacts with lower-level authoritiesin Belarus; helping Ukraine integrate with Euro--Atlantic structures; and finally, offering ablesupport for the transformation processes in theentire NIS area. From the point of view of Poland’sraison d’état, the most favourable evolution of

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the Euro-Atlantic Partnership would be one whichsimultaneously allowed the development of friend-ly relations with Russia and the integration of in-terested partners from the NIS area (in particularUkraine) with the Alliance. However, such a pro-cess of evolution should not allow the Alliance’sdefence functions to be weakened.

Polish strategy assumptions

Since it joined the Alliance, Poland has frequentlyemphasised the need to energise its co-operationwith its Eastern partners, and considers it a keyelement of its policy within the Alliance. Thisassumption is an element of a wider strategy ofPolish foreign and security policy which priori-tises the development of relations with its East-ern neighbours in both bilateral and interna-tional (EU and NATO) contexts. Poland strives toextend the zone of stability and security to thediscussed area by (inter alia) creating new, moreefficient regional co-operation mechanisms, coun-teracting stereotypes according to which the NISarea is seen as a homogenous zone of exclusivelyRussian influences, differentiating EU and NATOpolicy towards the countries of that region, andrefocusing Western policy towards the Easternpartners. Furthermore, Poland supports the ideathat the EU and NATO should leave an “opendoor” for those NIS-area countries which haveexpressed their willingness to join the two struc-tures and have fulfilled membership conditions.Additionally, active participation in the “Easterndimension” of NATO’s policy is a means of fami-liarising Western countries with problems occur-ring in the NIS area, and will also strengthen Po-land’s image as a country which is well acquain-ted with the situation in that region. Combatingthe false image of Poland as a Russophobe coun-try – an image still popular among some West-ern elites – would appear to be another objec-tive of this line of Polish foreign policy.Bearing in mind Russia’s location as a neighbour-ing country, its international importance andthe volume of its military potential, Poland istrying to expand the scope of its co-operationwith Russia by (inter alia) taking active part in theNATO–Russia Council (NRC). Poland sees Ukraine’sdeeper integration with NATO as a particularlyimportant objective of its policy within the

Alliance. Due to fundamental political obstaclesrelated to the nature of the current governmentin Belarus, the co-operation with this countrycarried out within PfP is rather limited, a positionwhich is inconsistent with Poland’s raison d’état.It is in Poland’s interest that Belarus does not be-come completely isolated from international in-fluences. Warsaw has offered political support toMoldova in its efforts to withdraw Russian troopsfrom Transnistria. Poland’s relations with thecountries of Southern Caucasus and Central Asia,aimed at supporting the transformation and sta-bilisation processes, have so far been rather limi-ted; however, they currently are gaining momen-tum due to the international community’s inten-sified interest in that region.

Poland’s potential and limitations

Poland’s economic and military potential doesnot predestine it to play the role of an indepen-dent architect which could shape the “Easterndimension” of NATO’s policy. Nonetheless, Po-land’s security interests and historical and politi-cal ties do not allow it to withdraw from in-volvement in that respect. Setting priorities andintroducing a hierarchy of priorities to its policycould be one possible solution that Poland mayimplement to minimise any such divergence. Itshould be stressed that even the most active at-titude reflected in declarations and documents ishardly effective if not supported by even theslightest financial involvement. By offering itsmaterial and financial participation in the opera-tion in Iraq, Poland has demonstrated its inten-tion to be an active “exporter” of security on a glo-bal scale. Carrying out efficient actions at a regio-nal level also requires considerable financial in-volvement. Poland has emphasised its role as a promoter ofUkraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and as a count-ry which tries to counteract the total isolation ofBelarus. However, a large proportion of commonPolish-Ukrainian initiatives is effected outside ofthe NATO channel, and the Trust Fund projectrecently started in Belarus has so far been imple-mented without any financial involvement onPoland’s part. This should be changed; that is,Poland should become involved in these projects.

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What is important in this context is Poland’scredibility as a country which promotes the ideaof further development of the “Eastern dimen-sion” of the Alliance’s policy. As a medium-sized country, Poland is obliged tosearch for partners willing to support its con-cept of the “Eastern dimension” of NATO policy.In this sense, the key partners certainly includethe USA, Turkey and the Baltic states. It shouldbe noted here that while pursuing its policy with-in the Alliance, Poland must consider the differ-ences in NATO’s development concepts whichare being promoted by different members of theAlliance. In the current situation, Warsaw’s in-terests and aspirations may be achieved only byway of careful consideration and diplomatic stra-tegy. Equally important is the fact that Poland shouldco-ordinate its actions towards Ukraine andother NIS states, carried out within NATO andEU, and win support for its initiatives from otherAlliance members such as Germany. At the same time, it should be remembered thatPoland – driven by its raison d’état – must takethe Russian factor into consideration in its actionsrealised within NATO. The stereotype of Polandas a country characterised by anti-Russian atti-tudes, which is still popular among most of theelites in the NATO allies, is a false image of Po-land’s real interests, an image which hampersthe process of Poland’s achieving its goals. In or-der to change this image, which is highly un-favourable to Warsaw, Poland should continueits participation in the NATO–Russia Council inspite of the fact that Polish initiatives have so farbeen often disregarded by the Russian partners.In doing so, Poland should take into considerationsome of the Alliance members’ unwillingness todevelop relations with the NIS states in a way in-consistent with Russia’s concepts.The basic potential which Poland has contribu-ted to the “Eastern dimension” of NATO’s policyis its knowledge of the NIS area and its experiencerelated to its successful defence reform. Polandshould continue to shape its image as a source ofvaluable opinions and analyses of the problemsof Eastern countries; it should use its historicalties and familiarity with the Eastern culture ofadministration to propagate democracy and free-dom in that area; and – when necessary – itshould offer its good offices in negotiations. How-

ever, it should be remembered that due to cer-tain still unresolved historical problems, the ac-tions Poland carries out in the NIS area must becautious and tactful. On the other hand, Poland’s experience in con-ducting defence reform can be important for theNIS states, as it was thus transformed from a coun-try with a military system compliant with Sovietstandards into an EU and NATO member state.Poland’s experience may be particularly valuablein the context of ensuring civilian control of thearmed forces, conducting a defence review, build-ing a system of standards for arms, etc. FromPoland’s perspective, a transformation of the Part-nership into a mechanism which actively sup-ports reforms of the security sector (inter alia,through the implementation of the IndividualPartnership Action Plan) could be highly benefi-cial. Such a transformation would promote a de-mocratic transformation in its broad meaning,and offer solutions for real security problems inthe NIS area. Poland’s valuable experience result-ing from its defence reform might contribute toa further strengthening of Poland’s position with-in the Partnership, if Warsaw could offer appro-priate financial means to achieve this goal.

Poland’s priorities and activity areas

Since it joined NATO, Poland has striven to be-come an active participant in the dialogue andco-operation with its Eastern partners, bothwithin the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council andin the course of practical co-operation withinthe PfP. Furthermore, Poland has played a signif-icant role in the second wave of NATO’s enlarge-ment, and has been an active advocate of Ukrai-ne’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Polish diplomaticposts in Kyiv and Minsk served as NATO contactpoint embassies for a considerable period of time. Ukraine is Poland’s closest non-NATO militarypartner. Polish-Ukrainian co-operation in the se-curity field (both within the PfP and bilaterally)is flourishing. Regular higher-level visits are or-ganised, permanent expert consultation channelsare active and common peacekeeping troops arebeing formed. The co-operation plan for 2004 in-cluded nearly 80 events, focused on joint partici-pation in peacekeeping missions and on sup-

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porting Ukraine in its co-operation with theAlliance and achieving the goals set in the NATO––Ukraine Action Plan. Co-operation in operationsin Iraq and co-ordination of activities carried outby the common peacekeeping battalion POLUKR-BAT are considerable parts of that collaboration.Moreover, Poland is an active member of theJoint Working Group on Defence Reform, exist-ing within the PfP, where it has been supportingUkraine in strengthening civilian control of thearmed forces, conducting a defence review, per-forming duties resulting from Host Nation Sup-port, setting standards for military equipmentand arms, etc. The lack of projects focusing onco-operation between the defence industries isprobably the weakest element of the military co--operation between Poland and Ukraine. So far, one of the greatest obstacles preventingthe further development of relations betweenUkraine and NATO has been related to the factthat the former authorities in Kyiv exploitedthose relations for their own ends, as well as thedeficiency of democratic standards in Ukraine. A successful outcome of the Ukrainian politicalcrisis which resulted from forged presidentialelections, and Poland’s role in these events, havenow however given new impetus for the develop-ment of co-operation. Poland plans to present anddiscuss new initiatives focused on Ukraine with-in the forum of EU and NATO.Proportionally to its political and financial capa-cities, Poland is an active member of the NATO––Russia Council. Furthermore, it seeks an enhan-cement of bilateral co-operation with Russia;sadly, Polish initiatives are usually ignored by theRussian side. In the context of co-operation with-in the NRC, Poland is particularly interested inthose areas which may prove useful in boostingmutual confidence in relations with Russia, andincreasing the level of complementarity betweenthe defence systems of Russia and the NATO sta-tes. These areas include non-proliferation of wea-pons of mass destruction, defence reform, theCo-operative Airspace Initiative (CAI), the TheatreMissile Defence (TMD) and Civil Emergency Plan-ning (CEP). In 2003, within the NRC’s framework,Poland organised a series of workshops on theconsequences of using weapons of mass destruc-tion. In September 2004 a meeting took place inWarsaw which focused on the issue of restruc-turing the Ministry of Defence. Poland has gran-

ted financial support to the project, which isaimed at unifying the principles of airspace con-trol between Russia and the NATO states, the Co--operative Airspace Initiative (CAI), and at NRCactivities focused on elaborating the assump-tions of co-operation in the area of theatre mis-sile defence (TMD). Furthermore, Poland was a co--organiser of the Kaliningrad 2004 civil emergen-cy exercise. The problem of determining the sta-tus of licences and property rights with respectto arms manufactured in the USSR remains unre-solved, and continues to cast a shadow over mili-tary co-operation between Poland and Russia.Russia demands that its military intellectual pro-perty rights relating to arms produced in the So-viet era, which are still used by the Polish army,are acknowledged.The serious electoral manipulations which tookplace during the referendum in Belarus in Octo-ber 2004, combined with the policy of persecu-tion and arrest pursued towards the political op-position by Belarus’ president Alyaksandr Lu-kashenko’s regime, has obliged Poland to limit itsco-operation with Belarus. The bilateral defenceco-operation is focused inter alia on border issues,weapons smuggling and trafficking, confidence &security building measures, and civil emergencyactivities. In contrast, Poland’s relations with thestates of the Southern Caucasus have been inten-sified. Poland has donated military equipmentand arms to Georgia, and in 2002 it expressed itswillingness to take part in the Train and Equip(GTEP) program. Georgia, on the other hand, hasasked Poland whether the latter would be inte-rested in supporting Georgia in setting up and im-plementing military standards. In the context of the still-unresolved Karabakhconflict, the scope of Poland’s co-operation withArmenia and Azerbaijan is limited. Nonetheless,an agreement between Poland and Armenia ondefence co-operation was signed in Warsaw inSeptember 2004. It is hoped that a similar docu-ment will be signed with Azerbaijan in theimmediate future. In Iraq a 46-strong Armeniancontingent has recently been included in the mul-tinational division under Polish command. Furthermore, as part of its co-operation with thestates of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia,Poland offers training programs for officers orga-nised by the National Defence Academy and theTraining Centre for Peacekeeping Troops. As re-

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gards the Central Asian states, Poland’s co-opera-tion with Uzbekistan is developing rapidly, andpractical co-operation with Kazakhstan is beingcontinued. In Kazakhstan a 27-strong Kazakh con-tingent has been included in the multinationaldivision Centre-South under the Polish command.

Conclusions

Poland’s co-operation with its Eastern neigh-bours, although readily apparent and sometimesexceptionally successful (as in the case of therecent events in Ukraine), still seems to be insuf-ficiently backed by strategic vision and a definiteplan of action. The significance of the NIS areafor Poland’s security requires carefully designedand far-reaching activities aimed at promotingEuro-Atlantic values and stabilisation in the re-gion. It is in Poland’s interest that these goalsare efficiently pursued within the strong Euro--Atlantic partnership. From this perspective, itseems that the policies most worthy of recom-mendation are to strengthen this mechanismand carry out the largest possible proportion ofbilateral co-operation between Poland and theEastern partners within NATO. For instance, Po-land could develop practical co-operation withUkraine within ISAF forces in Afghanistan. As a NATO state with a 5-year membership his-tory, and as part of its strategy focused on the“Eastern dimension” of NATO’s policy, Polandshould shift the emphasis from the sphere of de-clarations to the sphere of practical actions,backed by appropriate financial involvement. Po-land should seriously consider the option of esta-blishing a permanent item in the budgets of theMoD and the MFA, to be used for implementingactivities which result from the PfP and forincreasing the flexibility of financing bilateralinitiatives and actions carried out within NATO. Poland’s activities as part of the “Eastern dimen-sion” of NATO’s policy should be made attractiveto other allied states, in particular Western Eu-ropean countries. In its strategy within NATO,Poland should take Russia’s international impor-tance into consideration, but at the same time itmust not abandon its own security interests.Poland should promote the idea of establishing a group of countries within NATO which wouldbe particularly interested in eastern issues and

serve as a catalyst for the Alliance’s activity inthe NIS area. Bilateral relations between Polandand former USSR countries should not be focusedsolely on making and maintaining contacts andimproving statistics, but also on the developmentof effective co-operation adjusted to the activi-ties carried out within the PfP. Above all, Poland should focus on maintainingeastern issues within the Alliance’s area of inte-rest. From the perspective of Poland’s raison d’état,particular emphasis should be placed on includ-ing Ukraine into NATO and promoting Euro-At-lantic values among other states of the NIS area,so that Poland is not obliged to play the role of a “bulwark” or “bridge” between Western andEastern Europe. Poland’s geographical locationpredestines it to strive for the widening of co--operation in the field of “soft” security. Poland’smost valuable contribution to the “Eastern di-mension” of NATO’s policy is its knowledge ofthe East combined with its experience in con-ducting defence reform. It is important to makesure that this potential is used wisely.All the tasks discussed above are exceptionallydifficult and require significant amounts of time.However, a successful completion thereof will bea sine qua non condition of guaranteeing a per-manent strengthening of Poland’s security. Marta Jaroszewicz