central asian paper
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RESEARCH PAPER
Course: Research Methodology
Title: International Dimension of Central Asia
Submitted to: Dr.Mavara Inayat
Submitted by: Muhammad Ali
Department Of International RelationsQuaid-e-Azam University
Islamabad.
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Contents
GEOPOLITICAL PATTERNS IN CENTRAL ASIA AFTER SEPTEMBER 11.
US CENTRAL ASIA RELATION.
RUSSIA CENTRAL ASIA RELATION
POST 9/11 CHALLENGES
NEW WINNERS AND LOSERS
CHINA SETBACK
RUSSIA GAINS
IRAN LOOSES
ANY CHANCE OF THE FUTURE GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIA?
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GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
When everyone is dead, the Great Game in Central Asia is over: Not before.
(As quoted in Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game Revisited)
The geopolitical situation in Central Asia after September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks on the US, which resulted in the deployment of the US-led anti-terrorist coalition
forces in the Central Asian States (CAS), to carry out combat operations in Afghanistan,
where the main suspect held responsible by the US, Osama bin Laden, was taking
refuge under the former Taliban regime.
Given the socio-political complexities of the CAS, their internal dynamics are not
an easy matter to grasp, and least of all to predict its possible directions, which in the
present context of Afghan-related developments, is becoming more and more
complicated with the passage of time. The various states of the Central Asian region, as
well as of neighbouring areas and other global states, remain in pursuit of both
preserving their national interests, or to derive political benefits from this strategically
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important region, whose huge hydrocarbon resources are a source of interest to them.
Since the early 19th century, with the start of the era of industrialisation and its growing
requirements for energy, there was also the corresponding pursuit of the need to
explore, exploit, and control the hydrocarbon resources where these existed, including
the huge oil and gas reserves known even then to exist in the Caucasus and Central
Asian regions.This rationale was a dominant feature in the external factors that
influenced the geopolitics of Central Asian region earlier. After the CAS achieved their
independence, from the disbanded Soviet Union in 1991, it continues to attract various
international state and non-state actors to carve out a share in the abundant oil and gas
resources of the region. But the events of 9/11 have brought some major changes in the
traditional geopolitical landscape of the Central Asian region.
The current geopolitical chess game in Central Asia, referred to as Great Anti-
Terrorist Game, is different from the earlier geopolitical developments of the region in
several ways. Before September 11, Russia figured as dominant actor due to its
geographic proximity and its own compulsions to dominate the region. Post-revolution
Russia in its USSR phase made efforts to forge deep political, economic, linguistic, and
cultural linkages with the CAS. In the current Great Anti-Terrorist Game, along with
Russia, the USA is also emerging as a dominant player due to its military presence in
the region as well as the huge military resources at its command. At present there are
around 1000-1500 troops of the US 10th Mountain Division, stationed at Uzbekistans
Khanabad air base. Another 3000 troops of US-led anti-terrorist coalition are deployed at
the Kyrgyz Manas International airport, and an unidentified number of forces are
stationed both in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. In response to their extensive and active
support to the US in its war on terrorism, the CAS are receiving economic, political, and
military assistance from the US, giving the US greater leverage over Russia in this
strategically important region, vis--vis securing an access to the land-locked region and
consolidating its position in order to exercise control over the huge oil and gas resources
of the region. Using the events of 9/11, the US has enmeshed its short-term goal of
pursuing Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network with its long-term goal to establish
its presence in the Central Asian region. It should not be forgotten that it places the US
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in direct proximity to both Russia and China, where both are vulnerable. Although it
remains to be seen what directions that presence will take in times to come.
To understand the present post-9/11 geopolitical landscape of the region, the following
three sets of relations are essential to understand and analyse, as they form the mainaspects of the new Great Anti-Terrorist Game. These are (a) US-Central Asia
Relations, (b) Russia-Central Asia Relations.
US-Central Asia Relations
The US and CAS had no prior history of diplomatic relations before the demise of
former Soviet Union, but throughout the 1990s they maintained good friendly relations
with each other. Massive economic, political, and military support remained the main
instruments of the US policy towards this region. In fact, the regions strategic
importance, owing to its unique geographic location with proximity to both Russia and
China, and its huge oil and gas resources, and its willingness to welcome and absorb
the US-led western ideals of democracy and free market economy made it one of the
important regions for the US. For CAS, the US provided an alternate to the decades of
Russian supremacy, which they wanted to distance themselves from.
The events of September 11 further strengthened bilateral relations between
various CAS and the US. Their common borders with and geographic proximity toAfghanistan, on an immediate basis made the CAS frontline states in the US war on
terrorism. Four CAS allowed the US to use their airbases in war on terrorism, namely,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Even Turkmenistan, an officially
declared neutral state which is not part of any regional organisation or alliance system in
Central Asia, offered its bases and air corridor to the US air force for logistical support,
search and rescue operations. All the airbases were for re-supply missions, transporting
of aid goods, carrying out search and rescue operations, for handling any emergency
situations, and in some cases launching attacks on Afghanistan, as in the case of theManas airbase in Kyrgyzstan.
Besides attaining its short-term military objectives, in the long-term the US
presence in the CAS offers some other advantages to the US as well. The proximity of
the CAS is not only to Afghanistan, but also to Iran, Russia, China and its Tibet region.
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The Central Asian bases have placed the American forces close to Chinas western
frontier where, in combination with the US bases located in the proximity of Chinas
eastern and southern regions - such as those based in South Korea and the Indian
Ocean - they allow the US to militarily encircle China. These bases in Central Asia have
positioned the US troops close to Russias southern border for the first time in the post-
WW II period. The Central Asian bases also provide the US military with an outreach to
Iran, which Bush singled out as part of the axis of evil in his State of the Union address
in January 2002. Already, under its ICBM regime, the US has missiles and advanced
surveillance systems that can target all important sites in Iran, Russia and China; and
with its troops and air force positioned in active deployment in the Central Asian bases,
indicates a grand and horrific strategy of world dominance that lies behind the current
US strategies. Moreover, for exercising control over the oil and gas resources of Central
Asian region, which according to estimates are around 200 billion barrels of oil and
about 236-237 trillion cubic feet of gas the US military presence gives the US a leverage
over Russia and other states, with regard to the oil diplomacy vis--vis Central Asian
region. Some American political observers and analysts have gone so far as to state that
the September 11 incident was pre-planned to secure an access to and exercise control
over the Eurasian hydrocarbon resources. A pamphlet published in New York in
December 2001, stated as follows:
The heinous terrorist acts of September 11 gave the rulers an excuse tolaunch a war they had already plotted anyhow. As Bush and his advisors have
repeatedly warned, this war has no end in sight. Far more than Afghanistan is at
stake. US imperialist, led by Rockefellers Exxon Mobil, need to grab the profit
bonanza that can come from fuelling the East Asian energy boom anticipated over
the next decade or so. The grander strategic design is nothing less than US control
of the entire Eurasian landmass and the sea-lanes that serve it.
The US military presence in Central Asia will have profound effects on the
alliance system of the region, which was earlier marked with the dependence of the CAS
on Russia, given their seven decades of subjugation under the former Soviet rule. In the
post-9/11 period, the CAS are entering into a new phase of strategic partnership with the
US. Of these, Uzbekistan enjoys a more special status, since it signed a strategic
security pact with the US on 12th October 2001, which the Uzbek government termed as
having established a qualitatively new relationship based on a long-term commitment to
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advance security and regional stability. Since then high level US officials have been
streaming in and out of CAS. For instance, the US Defiance Secretary, Donald
Rumsfeld, paid four official visits to the CAS since 9/11, the last one being in April 2002,
to appraise the role that these states played during the war on terrorism. Similarly, the
Presidents of CAS also paid separate official visits to the US. For example, the Kazakh
President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, went to the US on a state visit in December 2001. The
Uzbek President paid a four-day official visit to the US in March 2002. Both the countries
signed with the US the Decleartion on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation
Framework, and affirmed their joint commitments to tackle the threat of terrorism in all
its forms.
The eager receptivity of the CAS to the US presence and role in the region lie in
their own economic, political, and security concerns. Particularly, a major concerncommonly shared by all of the CAS is to attain maximum security guarantees from the
US against the terrorist threats in their own region. Since their independence, all these
states have been faced with varying kinds and degrees of internal unrest bordering on
terrorism, stemming from their religious militant groups, and the historical ethnic disputes
existing in these states, with their own outfits like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), Hizb-ul-Tahrir, and Tajikistans Tajik Opposition Front, which has remained a
security threat to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. As events came to light, it
brought to the surface the fact that these organisations had links with the al-Qaeda andother regional and global militant religious groups. The US, in its terrorist list has already
blacklisted IMU. Its commander, Juma Namangani, was reportedly killed in the early
phase of the US bombing on Afghanistan. Within this commonly shared concern, there
are tensions arising out of the domination of bigger states vis--vis their smaller
neighbours. In Central Asia that domination is exerted by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan,
and resented by other states, particularly Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. As stated in the
observation that the areas two biggest states, Kazakhstan (population 14.8 million) and
Uzbekistan (24.2 million), are sparring for local hegemony, while the two smaller states,
Kyrgyzstan (4.9 million) and Tajikistan (6.2 million), seek security.
When the US troops established their presence in Uzbekistan, there were fears
that Uzbekistan would exploit the US support to exercise its hegmonistic designs over
other states in Central Asia. However, the stationing of US forces in other CAS,
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particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, has helped mitigate such concerns among the
smaller CAS.
All these states need long-term economic support from the US as well, because
of their poor economic conditions. A sizeable increase in the US aid and financialassistance to CAS is further strengthening ties among them. For poorer countries, such
as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the financial resources brought in by the Western troops,
particularly in the form of aid assistance, as well as fee charges for utilising base
facilities and take off and landing charges, are the main inputs into their deprived
economies. Apart from that the US pledged $125 million unconditional assistance to
Tajikistan, while $14 million had already been injected into the Kyrgyz economy. It is
further expected that $40 million will be further put into the Kyrgyz economy by the end
of 2002.
The most important economic boon for these states would be in form of oil and
gas export pipelines from the CAS to the outer world. The recently signed deal between
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to construct a gas pipeline from Daulatabad
gas field in Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to the Gawader sea port in Pakistan is an
encouraging development for the CAS, since the pipelines could be a fore-runner to
roads as well. But the crucial link remains stability and peace in Afghanistan for the
success of any such project. Signs are that the Afghan government and people are
conscious of benefits that would accrue to them out of such developments, and are likely
to work for their interests rather than against it.
The political regimes in power in the CAS hope that in response to their active
support to the US, it would be less critical of their poor human rights and democracy
record. All these regimes in the post-9/11 period, cracked down on their political
opposition, which has led to political unrest notably in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan.
Russia-Central Asia Relations
The US presence in the CAS is likely to have far-reaching impact on the Russia-
Central Asia relations, a fact that is not lost upon the Russian government. Even before
the events of September 11, there were tensions between the CAS and Russia. One
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major reason was the separatist movement by the Chechens, which led to war. After the
first Chechen war (1994-96), around four thousand Russian troops and thousands of
innocent Chechen civilians were killed. The inhumane killings of thousands of innocent
Muslims in Chechnya raised sympathies of the Muslim population in the CAS, especially
when the Russian government asserted that it would fight the threat of Islamic militancy
at all levels and in every former Soviet republic. The Chechen war raised fears of
Russias intentions to interfere in the internal affairs of other Caucasian and Central
Asian states, since Russia insisted that their weak and fragile regimes needed Moscows
active support in their internal affairs if they were to survive Economically, on account of
being dependent on the export routes of Russia for the Central Asian goods and energy
resources, the CAS remain wary of Russian dominance. Russia not only pays poorly,
but is also very tardy with payments whether it is the government or private sector. Many
Russian companies reportedly owe millions of dollars to the CAS.
Getting the desired economic and political support from the US does not mean
that for CAS it will be easy to abandon Russia. Both Russia and the CAS are
economically inter-dependent. Approximately 50% of Russian foreign currency revenues
are generated by the Central Asian regions oil and gas sales, in which the Kazakh
energy resources are a major contributor. Gas from Turkmenistan flows into Russian
markets and supplements Russias European exports. Turkmenistan is entirely
dependent upon Russias state-owned gas giant, Gazmprom, for its gas exports, exceptfor a small pipeline that it runs to Iran. The same is the case with the oil-rich Kazakhstan,
where only one pipeline to the Russian Black Sea port carries Kazakh oil to the outer
world. Although the recent trans-Afghan pipeline deal has raised hopes in Central Asia
for another non-Russian route, but that depends largely upon permanent peace in
Afghanistan.
For security reasons as well, the CAS cannot end their association with Russia,
because of the presence of a large Russian Diaspora in these states, which may resist
such a move. That, too, could have destabilising effects for the entire region of Central
Asia. The presence of Russian military and security guards in these states, makes
Russia an important guarantor of and a factor within the Central Asian security scenario.
Russias historical involvement in the region gives it a deeper understanding of and
insight into the regional dynamics, as compared even to the USA. From the CAS point of
view as well, the known factor would be preferable to the unknown and uncertain factor.
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In fact, Russia itself fears that if regional instability and insecurity, emanating
from the illicit drugs and weapons trade, political suppression, religious extremism, and
international terrorism, is left unchecked, it may spill over into its own territory. That is
why since the independence of the region in 1991, Russia has laid emphasis on close
security relations with CAS, to attain its own security objectives in the region, as well as
to provide the much-needed security to the CAS. The events of 9/11, and the
consequent US military presence in the region, only served to increase the emphasis
Russia places on multilateral and bilateral cooperation with its neighbors in Central Asia.
The recent Russian military exercises in the Caspian Sea (7-15 August, 2002), involving
around 60 warships and 10,000 men along with some Kazakh and Azeri units, is a
manifestation of how Russia has accelerated its efforts to pursue and maintain its
security influence in this region. The stated objective of these exercises is to check the
preparedness of the Russian seamen for tackling any sort of regional and international
threats, linked to international terrorism in particular. As the Russian Navy Commander,
Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov, stated, these exercises show that Russia can protect its
interests in the Central Asian and Caucasus region. Moreover, the Russian readiness
skills for interaction with other Caspian states, will be improved accordingly. Some of the
regional states, particularly Iran, are sceptical of the Russian designs in the region.
Following the official statements emanating from the US State Department and
Pentagon, with respect to the stationing of the US troops in the CAS on a long-termbasis, Russias resolve to play a decisive role in Central Asian region has also
increased. Wary of the US intentions with respect to its future strategy vis--vis the CAS,
Russia desires to solve all the regional problems by involving the regional states, and
minimising the role of outside powers in any future economic, political and security
problems of the region. The summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO), held at St. Petersburg (Russia) in June 2002, and the first Summit meeting of the
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), held at
Almaty (Kazakhstan) from June 3-5, 2002, is a step in this direction. The fact that the
charter of the SCO was signed in the said meeting and a decision also reached in that
very meeting on the establishment of a counter-terrorism center in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan),
is ample proof of the fact that the revitalization of the organisation at this crucial hour
testifies to Russias desire to play a more proactive role in its backyard. Also Russian
efforts at the CICA conference, which was attended by nearly 16 countries, testifies to
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Russias ambitions to play a more predominant role in world affairs as a Eurasian
power.
Although, at present the geopolitical balance in Central Asia seems to be in
favour of the US, in the long run Russia would not allow the US to totally outweigh itsown influence in the region. A recent meeting of heads of state of CAS, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, discussed the post-war political situation in Afghanistan, and the
prospects of increasing economic cooperation among these states with Russia. In fact,
both the CAS and Russia are aware of the fact that sidelining each other in their policies
will create security and economic problems for them, that is why all of them are trying
hard to maintain a balance in their ties in the American presence in the region. Roger N
McDermott, a political consultant at the Scottish center for International Security at
University of Adenburg, commenting on Central Asia-Russia security interdependence,quite rightly points out; the truth is that the Central Asian states know that Moscow
cannot afford to turn its back on them and their struggles and see militant Islam spread
further northwards: for them it is not a choice Moscow or Washington, so much as
Moscow-plus.
Post-9/11 Challenges to the CAS
The events of September 11, thrust the CAS into a challenging situation.
Overnight these states became important to both the US and Russia, who are bestowing
them with political, economic, and security concessions, which they could not have
thought of during the last one decade following their independence. It largely depends
upon the CAS as to how they exploit the emerging geopolitical situation by balancing the
US and Russian interests in their welfare.
Deriving economic benefits from US presence in their region will have to be
balanced by their manifold linkages with Russia to allay its own security concerns.
Russia can very easily instigate and support the anti-state elements within the CAS, thatfunction as extremist and opposition elements in the region, to sabotage the security
measures in CAS guaranteed by the US, and are thus an important trump card in the
Russian hands, which would be used whenever Russia feels the need. Recently,
Turkmenistans opposition leader, Boris Shikhmuradov was in Moscow, reportedly trying
for an uprising against Turkmen President, Suparmurad Niyazov.
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Moreover, given the manner of the US commitment worldwide, the political and
security support of the US to the CAS is short-term in nature. Meanwhile, the
authoritative regimes in Central Asia have tried to capitalise on the US presence to
strengthen their hold in their respective countries, as the following developments show.
The referendum in Uzbekistan in January 2002, extended the term of President Islam
Karimov for the next five years; the removal of Turkmen Security officials who might
have threatened President Niyazovs rule; the arrest and trial of several opposition
leaders both in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, can be quoted as examples of
undemocratic trends in the CAS. Like in other countries around the region, there is a
rising distrust for the US among the masses of CAS, who, while appreciating the
American effort to eliminate Taliban and al-Qaeda would perceive that USA is
prioritising counter terrorism to the detriment of human rights, and the promotion of
democracy is being translated into direct US support of increasingly repressive and
authoritarian Central Asian regimes. Growing number of disaffected Central Asians are
thus seeking membership of Islamic opposition groups as the only alternative for
invoking change. Most of the regional and international human rights organisations have
expressed grave concerns about the US support to the repressive regimes in Central
Asia, as these states and particularly Uzbekistan have a poor human rights record.
Uzbek President, Islam Karimov has been charged of several human rights abuses like
torture of dissidents, politically motivated arrests and custodial deaths. This has led and
is still leading towards ordinary people joining extremist groups who pledge that theywould get rid of Islam Karimovs repressive rule.
In fact, the US is in a strong position to use its influence in the region to push the
regimes towards reforms, by making its economic and security assistance contingent on
their democratic and economic reforms, thus addressing the root cause of the peoples
dissatisfaction, which lies in ongoing poverty, unemployment, and the lack of education.
The post-9/11 period has brought for the CAS the chances of change in the traditional
geopolitical set-up in the region, which can be beneficial if their leadership rises to the
occasion. The oil and gas resources, which were once the cause of conflict among
various powers in the region, may also become the greatest hope for peace and
development in the region, particularly if the dominant players like the US and Russia
convert their confrontation over the exploitation of the oil and gas in the CAS, to one of
multilateral cooperation. However, much depends on the regimes of the CAS and how
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they preserve their national interests. Like other dominant actors in the region, no one is
more aware than the ruling regimes of the CAS that Central Asian politic is in fact a
house of cards: every time you remove one element, the whole thing comes crashing
down.So sidelining one for the sake of the other may again thrust the CAS in a New
Great Game situation of 1990s, in which Russia and US tried to counterweigh each
other, but at the cost of the entire regions economic and political stability and prosperity.
Although the event of tne September 11 have produced new winner and loosers in the
region.
NEW WINNER AND LOOSERS
The events of September 11 and the onset of the U.S. campaign against
terrorism have produced new winners and losers in and around Central Asia. The region
itself has been the big winner; the world has focused attention on it to a degree
unimaginable in the 1990s. The reason the world cares is different now than in the early
1990s, when Central Asia had nuclear weapons left over from the Soviet Union, or in the
mid-1990s, when oil and gas were of great interest, or in the late 1990s, when
nongovernmental organizations were campaigning for human rights. The world cares
about Central Asia now for two reasons: its proximity to the South Asian tinderbox and
the belated realization by Western political establishments that state failure anywhere in
post-Soviet Central Asia carries significant risks for the West in its efforts to root out al
Qaeda-style terrorist networks.
The new focus on Central Asia is a marked departure from the 1990s when U.S.
and Western attitudes toward Central Asia were full of ambivalence about the nature of
their interests there. Then, the United States could best be described as a bystander
who was interested in the region but unwilling to get involved.
The worst imaginable turn of events from the standpoint of U.S. interests would
be a geopolitical wrestling match between Russia, China, Iran, India, Pakistan, andTurkey for control of Central Asia. It would upset too many other interests that the United
States might have elsewhere. The best approach for all parties involved, the Talbott
speech suggested, would be to allow Central Asia to become a great-power-free zone,
to let it develop its natural resources and achieve stability through economic
development. Hence, the unspoken but obvious conclusion: the United States would be
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willing to help with economic development and democratization, but most of all it would
like to keep the region from becoming an American problem.
That attitude prevailed for the rest of the 1990s. By the end of the second Clinton
administration, U.S. relations with Central Asia reached a difficult stage. The region'simage in Western media had become tarnished by widespread reports of corruption,
growing authoritarianism, and lack of progress on economic reform. Increasingly, the
expert community came to view the "stans" not as the next generation of Asian tigers but
as the next wave of failed states. The region's energy wealth--once thought to be the
engine of its economic recovery--had come to be viewed as the source of rampant,
debilitating corruption that one day would ensure it a permanent place among those
resource-rich nations, such as Nigeria or Congo, that had failed to take advantage of
their natural wealth. As a result, by the end of the 1990s, the U.S. strategic debate (tothe extent that there was one) about Central Asia was left pondering whether it was
"strategic quicksand" or a "mission too far." The change of administrations in
Washington in 2001 initially seemed to trigger few changes in this attitude of general
indifference. Prior to September 11, the Bush administration evidently had little time to
revisit U.S. policy toward Central Asia. It did not figure prominently in reports of the Bush
administration review of foreign policy priorities, which focused heavily on major
powers--China, Russia, and India. Perhaps the sole exception was the region's energy
potential, which the authors of the May 2001 report of the National Energy PolicyDevelopment Group identified as a promising source of hydrocarbons that could help
diversify the world's energy supply and lessen global dependence on the Persian Gulf.
China's Setback.
In the near term, the most prominent victim of the new post-September 11
security order in Central Asia has been the Shanghai Forum and, by extension, China.
Established in the mid-1990s by Russia, China, and the Central Asian states, the forum
was intended to serve many purposes. For Russia and China, it was a chance to
manage Central Asian security affairs and cross-border issues free of U.S. influence.
The Shanghai Forum offered the Central Asian states the opportunity to sit at the same
table with the two biggest players in the region, to harness their resources to help make
Central Asia more secure against Afghanistan-based and domestic insurgents and
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militant Islamic movements, and to do all this while getting both Moscow and Beijing to
guarantee their existing borders.
But since September 11 the United States has established itself as the main
power broker in China's strategic backyard. Moreover, the United States has displacedChina as Russia's principal interlocutor in Central Asian regional affairs and has pursued
a new strategic relationship with India--China's long-term competitor. Finally, the United
States has resumed a patron-client relationship with Pakistan--long a Chinese partner.
None of this is to be taken lightly by the national security establishment in Beijing,
especially given the tensions in relations with Washington in recent years.
In the near term, China's reversal of fortune in the heart of Eurasia has been
breathtaking. A regional power broker prior to September 11, China now finds itself
marginalized, displaced, and virtually alone, pondering the unenviable (for Beijing) option
of playing second fiddle to the United States and a host of its newfound best friends. No
matter how much China gains from the U.S. military campaign--and there can be little
doubt that it has been a beneficiary of the campaign against the Taliban and the ensuing
blow to operations of its own Uighur militants--U.S. preponderance in Central Asia must
be a serious setback to the government that aspires to the role of the Asian superpower.
Russia's Gain.
Russia's post-September 11 position in the Central Asian region is more
bittersweet. Undoubtedly, few among Moscow's foreign policy and military elite cherish
the sight of U.S. troops in their strategic backyard. U.S. military presence has been an
awkward reality for Russia's national security establishment; after all, the Russian
government granted the United States access to facilities that the Russian military still
controlled in areas that were Soviet only a decade ago. At least, some must have
thought resentfully, the United States had the decency to consult with Russia before
moving into the region.
Still, the uncompromising public stance by President Vladimir Putin in support of
U.S. actions has brought a number of important advantages to Moscow. The United
States has tacitly acknowledged certain Russian droit de regard in Central Asia. Russia's
own military campaign in Chechnya ceased being a barrier to Moscow's relations with
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the West and instead became something of a bridge on the strength of the argument
that both Russia and the United States are fighting the same militant Islamic enemy.
Russian claims of Osama bin Laden's complicity in Chechnya's separatist (Moscow
prefers to call it terrorist movement have also been perceived in a different light since
September 11. The issue of violations of human rights in Chechnya has been effectively
relegated to the back burner in favor of the more immediate concerns about terrorism
and other issues in relations with Washington.
Furthermore, Russia got a major post-September 11 boost in its standing in
relation to China, whose growing economic, military, and strategic might had become a
source of increasingly vocal concern among Russian politicians and foreign policy
specialists. New regard for Russia in Washington, as well as prospects for continuing
improvements in U.S.-Russian relations, must send an important signal to Beijing,further contributing to its sudden sense of isolation.
In Central Asia proper, the new spirit of accord and cooperation in U.S.-Russian
relations has had important implications as well. Central Asian potentates have learned
well how to play Washington and Moscow against each other. The fact that there is now
less light between respective Russian and U.S. positions on a number of important
issues leaves Central Asian governments less room to maneuver and exploit their
differences, whether in regard to pipeline routes, Caspian boundaries, or security ties to
rogue regimes.
In practical terms, Russia can do little other than offer the United States
unimpeded access to Central Asia. It has no military muscle that would have allowed it
to play a significant role in the Afghanistan military campaign in the air or on the ground.
In the short and medium terms, the best that Moscow can do in support of counter
terrorism is to provide unfettered access to and from the Central Asian region, share
intelligence, and do all it can (including accepting international aid) to put its own house
in order--to secure its nuclear weapons, material, and expertise, as well as its chemical
weapons and biological warfare capabilities.
The nature of Russia's contribution to the war in Afghanistan indicates its likely
role in the region beyond the near term. Geography will ensure its continuing importance
to the region for years to come, if only as an outlet for oil and gas. Alternatives to
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existing shipping routes will take years to build, and even then they will complement,
rather than substitute for, the routes currently crossing Russia.
In addition to its geographic proximity, Russia is bound to stay involved in Central
Asia for a long time because of its residual ethnic population there. Despite considerableemigration from Central Asia, the region is still home to some 8 million ethnic Russians
(the largest populations residing in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan--5.1 million and 1.4
million, respectively). Although the fate of ethnic Russians abroad is unlikely to be as
important a theme in domestic politics as some politicians have claimed, no government
in Moscow will be in a position to ignore this issue, especially in the event of regional
destabilization.
But Russia's military weakness, lack of power projection capabilities, and limited
resources (already under multiple domestic demands) will mean that it is not a realistic
candidate to become the region's security manager or hegemon for years to come,
regardless of the future of U.S.-Russian relations. Even so, given the congruence of U.S.
and Russian interests in combating radical Islamic terrorism, Moscow's military
weakness means that U.S. military presence in Central Asia will benefit Russian security
interests, no matter how difficult it will be for the Russian elite to come to terms with this
turn of events.
Iran's Loss.
By contrast, Iran--Russia's long-time partner in Central Asia and ally in the anti-
Taliban cause--has found itself among the losers in the region's post-September 11
realignment. Long the pivotal member of the anti-Taliban coalition and loyal backer of
the Northern Alliance, Iran has been squeezed out of its key foothold in Central Asia--
Tajikistan--with which it shares strong common cultural, linguistic, and ethnic ties.
The speed and eagerness with which the Tajik government accepted U.S.
military presence on its soil must have seemed the ultimate betrayal to Tehran. The
opening of Turkmen airspace to American over flights (even if officially only for
humanitarian purposes) and the deployment of allied troops to Central Asia must have
underscored to Iran's political establishment that in a confrontation with the United
States, it would now need to worry about U.S. presence not only in the Persian Gulf but
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also in the north--Central Asia and the Caucasus--to say nothing of the east and south--
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
There can be little doubt that Iran, like China, has been an immediate beneficiary
of the military defeat of the Taliban, with which Tehran had had a very tense relationship.But the aftermath of the military campaign and the de facto establishment of a U.S.
protectorate in Afghanistan must have been a blow to Iranian interests, adding to a
growing sense of encirclement by the United States.
In the immediate post-September 11 periods and the active phase of the military
campaign in Afghanistan, U.S.-Iranian relations showed glimmers of hope. Both the
United States and Iran had long been opposed to the Taliban regime. Iran's expression
of sympathy for the United States after the tragedy of September 11, pledge of
cooperation in delivering essential humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and offer of
assistance to U.S. airmen in cases of emergency had further fueled those hopes. In the
absence of a common enemy, however, the United States and Iran found themselves on
opposite sides of the Afghan divide. Iranian attempts to play factional politics in
Afghanistan threatened the stability of the fragile U.S.-backed Hamid Karzai
government.
In addition, Iranian rejection of the invitation by Washington to join the war on terrorism
manifested itself in continuing Iranian support for terrorist attacks against Israel, most
notably, as suggested in the so-called Karine-A incident of January 2002, in which Israel
Defense Forces intercepted a major clandestine shipment of Iranian-supplied weapons
and munitions to the Palestinian Authority. The episode sent a powerful signal that
expectations of an imminent U.S.-Iranian thaw in the aftermath of September 11 had
been premature indeed. This in turn was a blow to Iranian influence in Central Asia,
where a new sheriff--the United States--was in charge.
ANY CHANCE OF THE GREAT GAME IN THE CENTRAL ASIA?
The Great Game in Central Asia itself may appear to have considerably slowed
down in 2006. But nothing could be more deceptive an impression. True, we've
witnessed nothing like the cataclysmic events of the previous year - "Tulip
Revolution" or the Andizhan uprising in Uzbekistan.
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Partly this was because the bickering over geopolitical influence became somewhat
manifestly lopsided, with Russia and China not only retaining their gains of
yesteryear but also consolidating them, and the US painstakingly attempting to
recoup its lost influence in the region.
The single biggest "success story" of US diplomacy in the Great Game during the
past year has been that Washington prevailed on Russia and China to give
consideration to its reasoning that granting full membership to the Islamic Republic of
Iran in the SCO might not be consistent with their own long-term interests. This was
no mean achievement, considering that both Russia and China have such high
stakes in their bilateral relations with Tehran. But Iranian President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad attended the summit as a special invitee.
Equally, the fact that, unlike its previous year's summit, the SCO meeting in June
2006 did not assume an overt anti-American overtone must remain a matter of relief
for Washington. In many ways, the SCO demeanor has come to be the litmus test of
the United States' geopolitical standing in Central Asia at any given time. Contrary to
earlier US estimations, the SCO is increasingly acquiring a swagger that is
suggestive of its potential to become the main powerhouse of the Eurasian region -
arguably, a leading Eurasian economic and military bloc.
During the five-year period since its birth in 2001, the SCO, which has as members anumber of underdeveloped countries including some desperately poor ones with
nothing ostensibly to bind them together except their common geography, has not
only held together but has grown in size and influence.
Initially drawing on the Chinese tri-fecta of "terrorism, separatism and extremism",
the SCO speaks today about the establishment of a free-trade area and about
common energy projects such as exploration of hyrdrocarbon reserves, joint use of
hydroelectric power and water resources. But from the US perspective, the SCOagenda continues to be laden with a heavy cloud of suspicion regarding the United
States' geostrategic intentions in the Central Asian region.
This impression gets further confirmed by the SCO's decision to hold large-scale
joint military exercises scheduled for the coming summer in central Russia with the
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Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the military alliance that is
Moscow's answer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's enlargement into the
post-Soviet space. The CSTO includes Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
That the military exercises will take place against the backdrop of the chill that has
descended on Russia-US relations in the past year or two, and in the light of the
likely deployment of the first interceptors of the US missile defense systems in
Central Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, is no doubt significant.
It is irrelevant whether the SCO can be called a latter-day Warsaw Pact or a "NATO
of the East". What is important is that on a practical plane, when it transpired that the
US aircraft deployed at Manas Air Base might be undertaking reconnaissance
missions into sensitive military regions in central Russia and China's Xinjiang,
Moscow and Beijing put their foot down and acted in concert within the framework of
the SCO, insisting that the stated purpose of the US military presence in Central Asia
must be fulfilled in letter and spirit, namely that it restricted itself exclusively to
undertaking resupply missions for the "war on terror" in Afghanistan.
The then-Kyrgyz president, Askar Akayev, was caught in the middle and overthrown
from power in the process as a furious Washington let loose the "Tulip Revolution"on him for his perceived intransigence in turning down the US request for the
stationing of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft in Manas. But
the SCO quietly and firmly held its ground. Thereby it made an important point - that
it had gained traction as a security organization. Not only that, the SCO proceeded to
follow up at its summit in June 2005 with the call for the vacation of the US military
presence in the region.
Indeed, going one step further, the SCO emphatically rallied behind the leadership ofUzbekistan in its move to ask for the vacation of the US air base at Karshi-
Khanabad. On both counts - restrictions placed on the use of Manas and the eviction
from Karshi-Khanabad - Washington meekly had to give in. In the process, Bishkek
even renegotiated the bilateral agreement on Manas a few months ago by getting
Washington to increase the annual rent of the base from US$2.7 million to between
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$150 million and $200 million.
The year 2006 has thus made it clear that the US is unlikely to become a single
dominant power in Central Asia. Simply put, Russia and China have together put up
the SCO dikes delimiting the US influence in the region, which will be difficult for
Washington to breach for the foreseeable future. During the year, by and large
Washington has vainly exhausted its energies in attempts to create
misunderstandings between Russia and China and in pitting one SCO member state
against another.
The heart of the matter is that apart from the bleeding wounds in Iraq and
Afghanistan, which remain a major distraction for US diplomacy worldwide, US policy
in Central Asia is seriously handicapped in two other respects. First, the United
States' complete loss of influence in Tashkent after the Andizhan mishap in May
2005 is cramping overall US diplomacy in the region.
There is no denying that Uzbekistan is a key country in Central Asia. In the Soviet
era, everyone from Josef Stalin down knew the axiom that Uzbekistan was the hub
of the geopolitics of the region. True, the US put out several feelers to Tashkent
through intermediaries for reconciliation, and lately even the European Union lent a
hand, but Tashkent wouldn't budge. The laceration of Uzbek national pride by the USover Andizhan opened such painful wounds that forgiveness may take much time
coming and will extract sincere repentance on the part of Washington for its role in
the Andizhan uprising. Meanwhile, the US has been left with no option but to watch
Russian and Chinese influence in Tashkent expanding by leaps and bounds.
In a similar fashion, but in an even more fundamental sense, US diplomacy in
Central Asia is seriously hobbled by Washington's alienation from Iran. Ten years
have gone by since the famous article by Zbigniew Brzezinski in Foreign Affairsmagazine calling for unconditional abandonment of the US policy of containment of
Iran. Brzezinski had brilliantly argued the case (which most US career diplomats
assigned to the region then also believed) that for US regional diplomacy to be
anywhere near optimal in the Caucasus, in the Caspian region and in Central Asia, it
must befriend Tehran. But Washington's mental block over Iran persists.
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Meanwhile, the "Greater Central Asia" strategy unveiled by Washington last April
with so much elan has already fizzled out. The strategy was avowedly intended to
roll back Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Testifying before the US
Congress that month, a senior State Department official said, "A lot of what we do
here is to give the countries of the region the opportunities to make choices ... and
keep them from being bottled up between two great powers, Russia and China."
The US official conjured up visions that could only belong to the world of fantasies:
"Students and professors from Bishkek and Almaty can collaborate with and learn
from their partners in Karachi and Kabul, legitimate trade can freely flow overland
from Astana to Islamabad, facilitated by modern border controls, and an enhanced
regional power grid stretching from Almaty to New Delhi will be fed by oil and gas
from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and hydropower from Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan."
No wonder there are no takers in Central Asia for Washington's policy construct.
Central Asian states are aware of the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan, and
reckon that peace is a distant goal. Even New Delhi seems embarrassed. Islamabad
keeps quiet. The only capital to evince enthusiasm for Washington's paradigm of
steering Central Asian states toward South Asian allies has been Kabul.
Sino-US convergence?
But failures may often hold the key to success. In a way, the current failures in
regional policy may open a window of opportunity for the US in the period ahead.
The point is: Without the glue of a serious US geopolitical challenge to bind them
together into undertaking collective countermeasures, can the Sino-Russian
condominium hold together in Central Asia for long? It is apparent that divergenceshave already appeared in the respective Chinese and Russian interests in Central
Asia.
China has used the SCO forum and the Russian influence in Central Asia to return to
the region, which is indeed its back yard, for the first time in nearly 1,000 years. It is
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important to bear in mind that Beijing launched the idea of the SCO, and Russia
accepted it. China views Central Asia as its "near abroad". As China's economic
muscle grows, Beijing can afford to be more assertive.
China's soft power is already at work in the region. It is increasingly able to invoke its
bilateral-cooperation mechanisms with Central Asian countries. There is hardly any
need for China to ride piggyback on Russian goodwill or Russian influence in the
region. China has used the SCO for acquiring local knowledge, and in building
relations with the region's indigenous political, economic and military elites.
It is in the area of energy security that Chinese interests and concerns have already
begun diverging significantly from those of Russia. The trend during 2006 has been
that Russia's energy interests - in controlling the region's transportation routes for oil
and gas, in sourcing the region's energy for meeting Russia's domestic needs that
would leave an exportable surplus for meeting its commitments in Europe, in having
a say in determining the price of energy in the region - are increasingly affected by
China's robust quest for oil and gas in the region.
The early signs of this contradiction in Sino-Russian cooperation in Central Asia
began appearing in 2005 when the China National Petroleum Corp acquired the
PetroKazakhstan oil company for $4.18 billion.
China's gas deal with Turkmenistan in April 2006; the commissioning of an oil
pipeline from Kazakhstan; China's proposal for an energy-pipeline grid for Central
Asia and connecting it with Xinjiang; China's cooperation agreement with Iran in the
Caspian region; China's gas deals with Uzbekistan; China's interest in participating in
a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline - all these are happenings within
one calendar year, each imbued with strategic significance.
This past year, too, China has waded into the controversial waters of the Caspian
Sea in search of oil when last January Iran's North Drilling Co and China Oilfield
Services Ltd signed an oil-exploration agreement relating to the disputed deep
waters of the southern Caspian. In one way or another, all these developments cut
into Russian interests in Central Asia's energy sector.
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Having said that, however, the China-Russia strategic partnership has a much
greater regional and global logic than Central Asia, and the attempt in Moscow and
Beijing will presumably be to harmonize their differences in Central Asia from
spinning out of control. Also, both Moscow and Beijing realize that Central Asian
states themselves will seek out Russia to balance their relations with China.
How these contradictory tendencies will play out within the SCO processes presents
an engrossing topic. Clearly, the opportunity arises for the US to establish a dialogue
with the SCO. A breakthrough may come in 2007. The prominent Russia hand in the
Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, Ariel Cohen, wrote recently, "Given that the
SCO primarily serves as a geopolitical counterweight to the US, Washington stands
little chance of ever receiving full membership in the group ... But US officials do not
necessarily need full membership in the organization in order to work closely with the
Central As states. It would serve Washington's best interests to remain in close
contact with the SCO. To do so, it could resubmit an application seeking observer
status.
"To boost the chances of success," Cohen added, "the US should engage Central
Asian states by balancing democracy promotion and democratization with its other
national interests, including security and energy."
Conceivably, we may expect even a NATO overture to the SCO in the coming year.
Without doubt, a palpable sense of urgency is already apparent in US thinking to the
effect that the Chinese-Russian strategic partnership poses a serious threat to the
United States' geopolitical position in Central Asia, and second, that China is actively
remaking Central Asia's order. Last September, the US Congress held a special
hearing titled "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is it Undermining USInterests in Central Asia?"
Moscow seems to anticipate that another US bid for observer status with the SCO is
looming - and that unlike in 2005, Beijing may not oppose it this time. Curiously, at
the end of December, Russia formalized a mechanism for regular political dialogue
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with the Mercosur grouping of Latin American countries, which has a definite slant
(comparable to the SCO's) against US economic hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere.
Speaking on the occasion in Brasilia, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said,
"We have, by and large, been watching with the most sincere sympathy the
integration processes in South America. We consider that the strengthening and
elevation of the level of integration within the region works objectively in favor of the
creation of a more stable and more fair world order in which all problems will be
tackled multilaterally. I am certain that the partnership between Russia and Mercosur
will be instrumental in attaining this goal."
The US estimation is basically that behind the facade of unity, China, Russia and the
other SCO members and observer countries harbor serious differences of opinion.
While "discord" may be too strong a word, to quote a US strategic analyst, "It is quite
possible that differences will grow behind the facade of [SCO] unity. Washington
must be alert to exploit any openings to gain geopolitical advantage. While the
political, ideological and military dimensions of the New Great Game in Central Asia
continue to heat up, it should be clear to all players that plenty of time remains in the
contest. The SCO now appears to have momentum on its side, but such an
advantage can dissipate quickly."
Thus the US would tell China that Russia was needlessly dragging it into an anti-
American bloc, and that there was nothing irreconcilable involving US and Chinese
interests in Central Asia. US strategic analysts have been arguing that both the
United States and China are interested in the stability of the region; both are against
the ascendancy of extremist forces in the region; both are interested in Central Asia's
transition to market economies and in the region's globalization; both have stakes in
the rapid development of Central Asia's hydrocarbon sector and in the diversifiedand efficient flow of the region's energy to the world market.
There are signs that the US is also using the oil-price issue as a wedge to divide
Russia and China. The US has also been campaigning in the capitals of SCO
member countries (and observer countries) that Russia is aspiring to transform the
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SCO into a club of energy producers and to be its dominant partner, and that if the
Russian stratagem is allowed to proceed unchecked, that will be detrimental to the
interests of Central Asian energy producers - and even of China and India. These
are interesting straws in the wind.
The recent five-nation energy summit of major Asian consuming countries (China,
Japan, South Korea, India and the US) hosted by China is partly at least an
expression of Beijing's commonality of interests with Washington in leading an
energy dialogue of consuming countries vis-a-vis Russia. Conceivably, Beijing may
be harboring grievances that Moscow is keeping Chinese companies out of
investment opportunities in Russia's strategic oil and gas fields in Russia's Siberia
and the Far East, and even in the Russian pipelines leading to the Chinese market.
China may also be displeased with Gazprom's insistent attempts to get in on the
Sakhalin energy projects. ExxonMobil is under pressure for a proposed gas pipeline
from Sakhalin-1 to China. Russia's gas monopoly seems to want to discount any
competition for its own plans for a gas pipeline to China through the Altai highlands
near the Russian-Kazakh-Mongolian border. Its preference seems to be to buy all
gas from Sakhalin-1 so that it remains the sole exporter of gas to China. China is
also keenly watching the holdup in Sakhalin-2, being the highest-profile foreign-
investment project in Russia's energy sector to date.
Important investment decisions are pending in 2007 with regard to Sakhalin-1,
Sakhalin-2, Sakhalin-3, the Shtokman gas fields and the vast Russian energy
reserves in the Far East on the whole. How the Kremlin makes these decisions will
have a significant bearing on Chinese thinking and, indirectly, that can cast shadows
on the geopolitics of Central Asia.
Besides, the ground reality is that according to recent studies, Russia will need toimport 79 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually from Central Asia's gas-producing
countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) to meet its domestic needs
and to fulfill its export commitments. How this plays out in Russia's overall political
and economic ties with Central Asian countries will have a significant impact on the
regional milieu.
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It is obvious that Gazprom views Central Asia as a priority area. A major
development in 2006 in Central Asia's energy sector was the agreement between
Gazprom and Uzbekneftgaz to undertake a geological survey of Uzbekistan.
Gazprom is committing $260 million in the coming three years alone for the
exploration of the Ustyurtki oil and gas deposits in Uzbekistan. Again, Russia and
Kazakhstan entered an agreement in October to set up a gas joint venture at the
Orenburg gas refinery in Russia - the first time Kazakhstan was making a major
investment in the Russian economy.
The joint venture is expected to process 30.6bcm gas in 2012, including 15bcm from
Kazakhstan's Karachaganak gas field (which has an estimated 1 trillion cubic meters
of reserves), which Russia and Kazakhstan are pledged to develop jointly.
Niyazov's secret
The struggle over control of oil and gas and their transportation routes is bound to
intensify in 2007. It will remain central to the geopolitics of Central Asia. In turn, pipeline
politics in the Caspian can be expected to produce strange bedfellows.
Already, geopolitical circumstances in the Caspian Basin have led to a sharp
deterioration in Russia-Azerbaijan relations. Again, despite all the wooing of Kazakhstanby Washington, the indefinite postponement of the Odessa-Brody pipeline project last
week has stemmed from Kazakhstan having to be mindful of Russian sensitivities.
Least of all, Iran remains the wild card in the pack. Depending on which way the Iran
nuclear issue develops in 2007, Iran can impact on the energy map of China, Central
Asia, the Caspian, the Caucasus, Russia and Europe - and, conceivably, the United
States itself.
But an entirely new ball game opens up with the sudden demise of Turkmen president
Saparmurat Niyazov on December 21. It calls attention to the fragility of the Central
Asian calculus. The political uncertainties centered on Niyazov's successor come at an
extremely tricky time when Russia, China and the US are virtually preparing to besiege
Ashgabat with offers and counter-offers for gaining access to Turkmenistan's gas
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reserves.
Will Niyazov's successor follow his policy of "positive neutrality"? Russia strives to retain
its strategic leverage as the monopolist transporter and re-exporter of Turkmen gas. The
European Union, supported by the US, on the other hand, is attempting to resist the
Russian leverage by opening direct access to Turkmen gas.
In 2006, the US and Turkey revived the 10-year-old idea of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline
project (as part of the so-called East-West Energy Corridor) to supply Turkmen gas to
Europe via Turkey. Turkmenistan's gas output may well approach 80bcm annually at
present. The trans-Caspian pipeline envisages an annual draw of 16bcm from the
Turkmen output in the first stage, to be expanded to 32bcm in the second stage. In the
US geostrategy, the project is vital for reducing Europe's heavy dependence on Russian
energy supplies. Niyazov had prevaricated in the light of Moscow's opposition. But what
will be the outlook of Niyazov's successor?
Russia, on the contrary, will insist on the fulfillment of its April 2003 framework
agreement with Turkmenistan, which provides for a 25-year contract on gas supplies to
Russia, with Ashgabat pledging to supply 100bcm per year of gas from 2010 onward (a
total of 2 trillion cubic meters cumulatively over the 25-year period). Moscow now seeks
to tap even more deeply into Turkmenistan's gas reserves for meeting Russia's domesticneeds and for re-export to Europe as "Russian gas".
Meanwhile, Turkmenistan also stands committed to supply 8-10bcm of gas to Iran's
northern region, apart from occasionally voicing interest in the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline project. China, on its part, entered an agreement with
Niyazov in April for purchase of 30bcm of Turkmen gas annually from 2009 onward for a
30-year period, and jointly to explore and develop Turkmen gas deposits on the right
bank of Amu Darya River.
Besides challenging Russia's monopoly control of Turkmen gas hitherto, China has also
undercut the Russian practice of buying cheap Turkmen gas, by agreeing that China will
pay a price "set at reasonable levels, and on a fair basis, pegged on comparable
international market price". At the same time, China's deal also threatens the West,
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which will be a strategic loser if Turkmenistan decides to send its gas eastward instead
of Europe.
The European Union's 3,400-kilometer Nabucco gas pipeline from eastern Turkey to
Austria and central Europe at an estimated cost of $5.8 billion, to be commissioned in
2010, will be a net sufferer in that case, as it is predicated on the expectation that
Turkmenistan can be a key supplier country.
Niyazov was always an enigmatic figure on the Central Asian political chessboard. But
the biggest puzzle he has left behind was no doubt his chance remark shortly before his
death in a conversation with visiting German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in
Ashgabat that Turkmenistan recently discovered a super-giant gas field, South Iolotansk,
with proven reserves of 7 trillion cubic meters of gas.
Like Corporal Hatfield in his sentry post in Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, Niyazov didn't
probably realize what a maelstrom he was creating. If South Iolotansk indeed holds such
untold treasures, the impact on the energy map of Russia, Europe and China will be
dramatic. And certainly, the center of gravity of the Great Game will overnight shift
eastward to the home of the fabled Ahalteke race horse - away from the SCO and all
that. Central Asia, then, may never be the same again.
Toward a New Strategy
Given those stakes and the enduring nature of Central Asian resistance to political and
economic modernization, the only sensible option for U.S. policy is to work with the
region's ruling regimes but simultaneously to seek gradual change in their domestic
political and economic environments. The watchwords in this context should be
continuity and gradualism.
In the area of economic assistance, the emphasis should be on alleviating widespread
poverty and eliminating potential sources of political destabilization, such as high
unemployment in rural and urban areas. Given the region's need for major
improvements in basic infrastructure, the water supply system, and other labor-intensive
projects, U.S. and other international assistance could go a long way toward providing
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much-needed jobs and income, defusing political tensions, and improving intraregional
cooperation.
Domestic politics represents a far more challenging target for U.S. assistance. The entire
experience of the 1990s in Central Asia suggests that the region's political elites havenot embraced the basic concepts of democracy and have only paid lip service--at best--
to admonitions from Western leaders and international organization. Thus, the real
challenge--given the inevitability of political succession throughout Central Asia--is to
make sure that succession does not lead to destabilization, as befell Tajikistan in the
early 1990s. In the absence of stable domestic institutions and in the presence of
personality-based regimes, whose chief aim has been to avoid political succession,
political succession is the biggest long-term threat to regional stability.
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REFERNCES
For the online archive of Clinton administration statements, see
and
. [BACK]
Address by Strobe Talbott on July 21, 1997. See
. [BACK]
See, for example, Kenneth Weisbrode, "Central Eurasia: Prize or Quicksand?
Contending Views of Instability in Karabagh, Ferghana and Afghanistan," International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 338; and Richard D. Sokolsky and Tanya
Charlick-Paley, "NATO and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far?" (Washington, DC:
RAND, MR-1074-AF, 1999).[BACK]
See . [BACK]
China's post-September 11 isolation in Central Asia is underscored by the
unprecedented new positive relations between Russia and the United States, which
were unaffected even by U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty--a move
that is more likely to affect the U.S.-Chinese strategic balance than U.S.-Russian
strategic balance. [BACK]
See, for example, materials from discussion on China and the future of Russian-
Chinese relations held by the leading Russian foreign and defense policy organization
Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, accessed at
. [BACK]
See Robert Satloff, "The Peace Process at Sea: The Karine-A Affair and the War On
Terrorism," National Interest (Spring 2002), accessed at
; James
Bennet, "Seized Arms Would Have Vastly Extended Arafat Arsenal," The New York
Times, January 12, 2002; and "President Bush, Prime Minister Sharon Discuss Middle
East," February 7, 2002, accessed at
.[BACK]
31
http://clinton.archives.gov/welcome/welcome.htmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_1ahttp://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/970721talbott.htmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_2ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_3ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_3ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_4ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_5ahttp://www.svop.ru/yuka/856.shtmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_6ahttp://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/satloff/satloff-peace.htmhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-15.htmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_8ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_8ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_1ahttp://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/970721talbott.htmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_2ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_3ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_4ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_5ahttp://www.svop.ru/yuka/856.shtmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_6ahttp://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/satloff/satloff-peace.htmhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-15.htmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_8ahttp://clinton.archives.gov/welcome/welcome.html -
8/4/2019 Central Asian Paper
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See remarks by Tommy Franks in August 2002 that U.S. troops will remain in
Afghanistan "indefinitely," accessed at
. [BACK]
Colin L. Powell, remarks at International Conference for Reconstruction Assistance toAfghanistan, Tokyo, Japan, January 21, 2002, accessed at
.[BACK]
United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation
Framework, March 12, 2002, accessed at
.[BACK]
In fiscal year 2002, assistance funding to the five Central Asian states was estimated at
$442 million. Since 1992, U.S. Government assistance to Kazakhstan has amounted to
roughly $1 billion; Uzbekistan, $600 million; Turkmenistan, $250 million; Tajikistan, $475
million; and Kyrgyzstan, $725 million. Compiled from Department of State data, it can be
accessed at ,
,
-
8/4/2019 Central Asian Paper
33/34
Americas Afghan War: Courting the Central Asian States,
www.subcontinent.com/sepral/bulletin/bulletin200111269.htm
Ibid.
Tamara Makarenko, The Dangers of Playing the Central Asian Game, Janes
Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, No.6, June 2002.
Ahmed Rashid, Jihad; The Rise of Islamic Militancy in Central Asia, 2002,
(Vanguard; Lahore), pp. 193-195.
Ahmed Rashid, ibid, pp.193-195
Fiona Hill, The Caucasus and Central Asia in US Foreign Policy,www.brook.edu/default.htm
Constantine Dmitriev and Mark Eaton, The Trans-Caspian After 11 September,
2001, Central Asia and the Caucasus: Journal of Social and Political Studies, No.
3(15), 2002, pp.21-23.
Ibid.
Ibid.
J. Colton and Micheal McFaul, Americas Real Russian Allies, Foreign Affairs,Vol.
80 No. 6, November-December 2001, p. 48.
Central Asia: Seven Months Without Russia, www.rosbalt.com/2002/06/ 46575.html
US and Russia seed of New World Order seen, www.rense.com/political/politics.htm
M. A. Shaikh, op.cit.
Information on the internal situation in Central Asia is widely available to the general
public. For example, the International Crisis Group has published a series of reports
describing conditions in Central Asian countries and highlighting their implications for
their stability: "Central Asia: Water and Conflict, May 2002," accessed at
33
-
8/4/2019 Central Asian Paper
34/34
; "Central
Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, April 2002," accessed at . See also "Nations in
Transit," published annually by Freedom House, accessed at
. [BACK]
In December 2001 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, A. Elizabeth Jones,
summarized the past 2 centuries of Central Asian history as a transition from
"squabbling and despotic warlords" to Russian colonization to Soviet-imposed isolation.
Testimony accessed at .
[BACK]
All five Central Asian states have seen major increases in infant mortality, a basic
indicator of a country's health, since their independence and are comparable to some of
the least developed countries in Africa. See the Central Intelligence Agency, The World
Factbook 2001, accessed at
; and Demograficheskiy
Yezhegodnik SSSR 1990 (USSR Demographic Yearbook 1990) (Moscow:
http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=668http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=606http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=606http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htmhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_13ahttp://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/11299pf.htmhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_14ahttp://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.htmlhttp://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=668http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=606http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=606http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htmhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_13ahttp://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/11299pf.htmhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_14ahttp://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html