center for air transportation systems research air travel at the edge of chaos george l. donohue,...

CENTER FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION CENTER FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS RESEARCHSYSTEMS RESEARCHCENTER FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION CENTER FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS RESEARCHSYSTEMS RESEARCH

Air Travel at the Edge of ChaosGeorge L. Donohue, Ph.D.

Professor Systems Engineering and Operations ResearchDirector of the Center for Air Transportation Systems Research

Volgenau School of Information Technology and Engineering

NEXTOR Workshop 28 Sept, 2007

© George L. Donohue 2007

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CATSRCATSRCATSRCATSROutline

• How bad and widespread is the Problem• Passenger QOS• Economic Impact

• What are the Underlying Causes• Too Many Scheduled Flights into Too Few Runways

• Why the Airlines cannot fix the Problem Themselves• Prisoners Dilemma and Curse of the Commons

• Government (Congress/DOT/FAA) Measures Required to Fix the Problem• Airport Arrival Time Slot Auctions• NEXTGEN ATM system

• Larger Aircraft Fleet Implications for the Environment

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CATSRCATSRCATSRCATSR

Air Transportation System (ATS) is a CAS Network with 6 Interacting Layers

Government Regulatory Control Layer

Physical Layer (i.e. Cities, Airports, Demographics)

Weather Layer (Thunderstorms, Ice Storms)

Airline Layer (Routes, Schedules, A/C size)

TSA/FAA Layer (ATC Radar, Radios, Ctr’s, Unions)

Passenger/Cargo Layer (Delays, Cancellations)

•The ATS is a Public - Private Partnership with conflicting objective functions:

•Public – Commerce and safety; interest groups

•Private – Profit maximization

4

CATSRCATSRCATSRCATSRBackground: Air Transportation System

Passenger Tier Performance = f (Vehicle Tier Performance, Passenger Factors)

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CATSRCATSRCATSRCATSRPassenger Total Delay – Airports

• 29% of the OEP-35 airports 50% Total EPTD

• some airports significantly impact EPTD more than others (e.g. ORD, ATL, DFW and MCO)

50%

Close Network of OEP35 Airport in 2004

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CATSRCATSRCATSRCATSR200 Routes generate 50% of Total EPTD

• 17% of the 1044 routes between OEP-35 airports 50% Total EPTD

• LGA, JFK, EWR, PHL connected Routes 11 out of top 20 routes

50%

Close Network of OEP35 Airport in 2004

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Top 20 Worst Airports in the US:Passenger Quality of Service Metric

Year

Rank Airports

Prob. Of PaxDelay >45 min Airports



Prob. Of PaxDelay >45 min

1 ORD 14% EWR 18% ORD 17% EWR 16%

2 EWR 14% LGA 17% EWR 16% LGA 15%

3 LGA 13% ATL 14% LGA 15% ORD 15%

4 PHL 12% PHL 13% PHL 15% PHL 13%

5 ATL 11% BOS 13% JFK 14% ATL 12%

6 MIA 9% ORD 12% IAD 12% JFK 11%

7 FLL 9% FLL 12% MIA 12% BOS 11%

8 MCO 9% JFK 12% ATL 12% MIA 11%

9 DFW 9% MIA 11% MDW 12% FLL 10%

10 LAS 9% SFO 11% DTW 12% IAD 10%

11 BOS 9% SEA 10% DFW 12% DFW 10%

12 SFO 9% IAD 10% BOS 11% SFO 10%

13 IAD 9% TPA 10% DEN 11% DTW 9%

14 JFK 9% MCO 10% CLT 10% MCO 9%

15 CLE 9% BWI 9% IAH 10% LAS 9%

16 SEA 8% PIT 9% CLE 10% CLE 9%

17 TPA 8% PDX 9% PIT 10% PIT 9%

18 STL 8% DTW 9% DCA 10% SEA 9%

19 PDX 8% LAS 9% MEM 10% MDW 9%

20 BWI 8% DCA 9% SFO 10% DCA 9%

2004 2005 2006 Average of 2004 to 2006

D. Wang, GMU PhD. In Progress

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Many Highly Congested Airports can Shift Passengers to other Large Airports

ConnectingAirport Passengers

%Chicago O'Hare 59

Newark NJ 32NY LaGuardia 8

NY JFK 40Philadelphia 38

Atlanta 66Boston 15Miami 55

Washington Dulles 53Dallas/Fort Worth 60

FAA 2006 NPIAS

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CATSRCATSRCATSRCATSRAirline Load Factors are Increasing

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Year

Per

cen

t A

ircr

aft

Sea

ts O

ccu

pie

d (

Ave

rage

) Load Factor(Anticipated)

Load Factor ATAHistorical Data

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GMU Model Projects Passenger Delays to Greatly Exceed 2000 delays by 2010

Total Passenger Delays

-

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Year

Hou

rs (

mil

lion

s)

Delayed Flights

Cancelled Flights

Poly. (Delayed Flights)

Poly. (Cancelled Flights)

D. Wang 2007

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Annual Passenger Enplanements Predicted to be Lost: FAA Forecast to 2025

Annual Projected Enplanements Foregone Because of Airport Capacity Constraints

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

AT

L

BO

S

BW

I

CL

E

CL

T

CV

G

DC

A

DE

N

DF

W

DT

W

EW

R

FL

L

HN

L

IAD

IAH

JF

K

LA

S

LA

X

LG

A

MC

O

MD

W

ME

M

MIA

MS

P

OR

D

PD

X

PH

L

PH

X

PIT

SA

N

SE

A

SF

O

SL

C

ST

L

TP

A

Airports

An

nu

al E

np

lan

em

en

ts L

os

t (M

illio

ns

)

2025

2015

2005

Optimistic: All Planned Airport Improvements

Occur

All available landing slots fully utilized regardless of congestion

EWR

ORDJFK

FAA 2005 TAF & 2004 Benchmark

LGA

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Estimated Annual Cost to US (Lost Consumer Surplus, 2005$) due to Expected Airport Capacity Limitations

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

100% 95% 90% 85% 80%

Usable NAS Capacity (%)

An

nu

al C

ost

to

US

Eco

no

my

($B

) CY2015, All A/PImprovements

CY2015, No A/PImprovements

CY2025, All A/PImprovements

CY2025, No A/PImprovements

--FAA Assumptions on Growth in Airport Operations--Boeing Passenger Growth Assumptions: 3.6% per year--Aircraft Upgage: 5% in 2015, 10% in 2025

Shaver 2007

Assumes:$200/segment ticketPrice Elasticity = -1

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Minimum Congestion Cost is a function of NEXTGEN Technology Effectiveness and Network Efficiency

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1

Congestion Factor

An

nu

al C

on

ges

tio

n C

ost

($B

)

Consumer Surplus Costs Resulting From Limiting Airport Slots

Sum of Costs ($B)

Costs Resulting from PassengerDelays and Flight Cancellations

Caution: Some Costs Not Included

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Larger Aircraft Fleet Implications for the Environment

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Severe Congestion at NY Area Airports: A 40-year-old Reality

- Limited #IFR slots during specific time periods

- Negotiation-based allocation

1969

HDR at EWR, LGA, JFK, DCA, ORDPerimeter rule at LGA, DCA

4.2000

Exempt from HDR at LGA,

JFK, ORD certain flights

to address competition

and small market access

AIR-211978

Deregulation

Use-it-or-lose-it rule based on 80% usage

1985

Slot ownership

Timeline recap of congestion management measures

early 1970s

Removal of HDR at EWR

Introduction of Hub-and-Spoke Network System

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NYNJ comparison to Comparable European Airports

Data taken from ACI-NA, EC PR2006 and FAA ASPM

Total Total Average DelaysAirport Movements Passengers Minutes

2005 2000 2005 2000 2006Frankfurt, Gr (FRA) 490,147 458,731 52,219,412 49,360,630 2.7London, UK (LHR) 477,884 466,815 67,915,403 64,606,826 3

Newark (EWR) 437,402 450,187 33,999,990 34,188,468 28.8Amsterdam, NL (AMS) 420,736 432,480 44,163,098 39,606,925 0.7

New York Laguardia (LGA) 404,853 384,554 <29,000,000 <28,000,000 23.4Munich (MUC) 398,838 - <29,000,000 1.8

New York Kennedy (JFK) <353,000 <384,000 41,885,104 32,856,220 24.3Madrid, Sp (MAD) 415,677 <384,000 41,940,059 32,893,190 1.8

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EWR a NYNJ Airport with No Slot Controls:Delays 2006

Time of Day (hour)

De

lay

pe

r F

ligh

t (m

inu

tes)

EWR

0 5 10 15 20-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

Passenger Quality of Service Metric that Includes Flight Cancellations & Missed Connections

(D. Wang GMU 2007)

35 Airport BN Model

Summer 2006 Data

(N. Xie GMU 2007)

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Marginal Rate IFR Rate

Calculated Capacity (Today) and Actual Throughput

Optimum Rate

0

20

40

60

80

0 20 40 60 80

Departures per Hour

Arr

ivals

pe

r H

ou

r

Calculated Capacity - Today

Facility Reported Rate - EWR(arrivals, departures per hr)

Each symbol represents actual traffic during a single hour

Infrequent Most Frequent

42, 42

0

20

40

60

80

0 20 40 60 80

Departures per Hour

Arr

ivals

pe

r H

ou

r

40, 40

0

20

40

60

80

0 20 40 60 80

Departures per Hour

Arr

ivals

pe

r H

ou

r

33, 33

EWR :

DoT/FAA

2004 Capacity Benchmark Report

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EWR Free-Market Fleet Mix Appears to be Far from Optimum

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New York LaGuardia Airport:Case Study of a Slot Controlled Airport

Data (2005):• Throughput:

404,853 flights/yr• Average flight delay:

38 min• Revenue passengers:

26,671,787• Average aircraft size: 96 passenger• Average inter-city fare: $133

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NYNJ Airport with Current Slot Controls:LGA 2004 – 2006 (DOT Data)

Marginal Rate IFR Rate

Calculated Capacity (Today) and Actual Throughput

Optimum Rate

0

20

40

60

0 20 40 60

Departures per Hour

Arr

iva

ls p

er

Ho

ur

Calculated Capacity - Today

Facility Reported Rate - LGA(arrivals, departures per hr)

39,39

Each symbol represents actual traffic during a single hour

Infrequent Most Frequent

0

20

40

60

0 20 40 60

Departures per Hour

Arr

iva

ls p

er

Ho

ur

37,37

0

20

40

60

0 20 40 60

Departures per Hour

Arr

iva

ls p

er

Ho

ur

37,37

Time of Day (hour)

De

lay

pe

r F

ligh

t (m

inu

tes)

LGA

0 5 10 15 20-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

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Current Government Rules at LGA Lead to Poor Use of Runway Resources

• Inefficient use of resources

Airports loseAirlines lose

(Low load factor/Small

Aircraft)

Airports winAirlines win

(High Load Factor/Large

Aircraft)

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LGA High Frequency Flights:Current and 90% of Optimum

Market Daily A/C Model Model Normalized RankFreq seats Freq seats Freq Seats

Boston Logan BOS 73 106 60 208 0.8 2.0 1Washington DC Reagen Nat DCA 69 108 68 131 1.0 1.2 2Chicago O'Hare ORD 62 138 56 139 0.9 1.0 3Atlanta Hartsfield ATL 48 156 32 145 0.7 0.9 4Fort Lauderdale Fl FLL 43 157 26 181 0.6 1.2 5Raueigh/Durham NC RDU 37 46 22 95 0.6 2.1 6Detroit Mi DTW 32 122 22 175 0.7 1.4 7Charlotte NC CLT 32 102 30 97 0.9 1.0 8Columbus OH CMH 26 46 22 102 0.8 2.2 9Dallas Ft Worth DFW 26 148 26 146 1.0 1.0 10

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Why do the Airlines Schedule beyond the Maximum Safe RW Capacity with Flights that Loose Revenue?

• There is no government regulation to limit schedules for safety or compensate passengers for delays and cancellations• These were errors in the 1978 Deregulation Act

• Passenger surveys indicate that frequency and price are the most desirable characteristics of a flight

• Passengers are not told of consequences of schedule to travel predictability

• If any one airline decided to offer rational schedules, their competition will offer more frequency to capture market share• Thus, still producing delays and cancellations for all

• In Game Theory, this is called the Prisoner’s Dilemma

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• What would happen if schedules at major airports were capped by predictable runway capacity and allocated by a market mechanism?• What markets would be served?• How would airline schedules change?

– Frequency– Equipment (#seats per aircraft)

• How would passenger demand change?– At airport– On routes

• How would airfares change?– What would happen to airline profit margins?

• How would airport and network delays be altered?

A Natural Question? Is There an Optimal Allocation of Scarce Runway Resources?

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Larger Aircraft Fleet Implications for the Environment

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CATSRCATSRCATSRCATSRModeling Approach and Assumptions

• Port Authority of NY&NJ has the ability to Determine and Set an Optimum Schedule to:• Operate at Competitive Profit Margins• Maximize Passenger Throughput• Ensure an Airline Operating Profit (Max, 90%,80%)

• All Current Origin and Destination Markets are Considered• 67 Scheduled Daily Serviced Markets

• Current Market Price Elasticity Remains Constant

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CATSRCATSRCATSRCATSRNY LGA Has 67 Daily Markets

30


Network Flow Optimization Problem

(Le, 2006)

Demand-Price Elasticity$

#

S1

S2

DASPM, BTS databases

Delay Network Simulation

Flight schedulesFleet mixAverage fareFlight delays

Airline Competitive Scheduling: Modeling Framework

Auction 32 Slots/Hr

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CATSRCATSRCATSRCATSRModel Estimate of Aircraft Gauge Change

Estimate of Aircraft Up-Gauging

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

19 to 37 44 to 50 69 to 77 88 to110

117 to133

138 to158

166 to181

194 to225

Aircraft Seating Capacity

Nu

mb

er o

f D

aily

Fli

ghts

Current Fleet Allocation - 1010 Flts

90% Optimum Fleet Allocation - 806 Flts

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CATSRCATSRCATSRCATSRUnprofitable daily markets at LGA

• Three markets (13 Flights) that are not profitable to operate on a daily basis are identified to be:• Lebanon-Hanover, NH (LEB),• Roanoke Municipal, VA (ROA),• Knoxville, TN (TYS).

Runway Cap. Market seats/AC Fare Passengers RPM Yield Flights/day unconstrained LEB 19 $153 50 $0.72 6

10,9,8,7 ROA 37 $186 77 $0.46 5 6,5,4 TYS 50 $125 85 $0.19 2

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•Airlines• Reduced frequency with

larger aircraft• Most Markets Retained• More Profitable (90% of

Optimum)

•Passengers• Markets served: Little

change• Airfares no change• Improved Predictability

• Airports• Increased passenger

throughput• Reduced delays (70%)

•Air Traffic Control• Reduced delays

– Demand within capacity– Reduced Prob. SRO

Airlines adapt with aircraft size and frequency to congestion constraint: Positive impacts on passengers, airports, airlines, and ATC

Research Results – Win Win

34







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The Predicted Growth in Aviation Demand is based on Passenger Demand NOT Aircraft Operations

• Larger Aircraft will be required to meet X2 or X3 demand• Business Jet and VLJ Air Taxi Service will emerge to

compete with Commercial aviation due to current System Failure• May not be able to put the Geni back in the Bottle• Environmental Implications?

• New Aircraft (e.g. B 787) should be Environmentally Friendly (Emissions/passenger/mi.?)• US airlines are not currently ordering them due to poor financial

position

• New Public Policy will be needed to Deal with these Complex Adaptive System Problems• NEXTGEN System not addressing these issues

36


Center for Air Transportation System Research Publications and Information

• http://catsr.ite.gmu.edu

– Other Useful Web Sites

• http://mytravelrights.com

• http://gao.gov

• http://www.airconsumer.ost.dot.gov

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BACKUP Material

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Summary of European Passenger Bill of Rights -http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4267095.stm

• Overbooked Flights • Passengers can now get roughly double the existing compensation if they are bumped off a

flight. – Compensation must be paid immediately. – These passengers must also be offered the choice of a refund, a flight back to their

original point of departure, or an alternative flight to continue their journey. • May also have rights to meals, refreshments, hotel accommodation if necessary even free e-

mails, faxes or telephone calls. • Cancelled Flights

• Offered a refund of your ticket, along with a free flight back to your initial point of departure, when relevant. Or, alternative transport to your final destination.

• Rights to meals, refreshments, hotel accommodation if necessary, even free e-mails or telephone calls.

– Airlines can only offer you a refund in the form of travel vouchers if you agree in writing

• Refunds may also be paid in cash, by bank transfer or cheque• If the reason for your flight's cancellation is "within the airline's control", it must pay

compensation. • Compensation for cancellations must be paid within seven days.

• Delayed Flights • Airline may be obliged to supply meals and refreshments, along with accommodation if an

overnight stay is required. • If the delay is for five hours or more, passengers are also entitled to a refund of their ticket

with a free flight back to your initial point of departure if this is relevant.

39


Air Transportation is Characterized as aComplex Adaptive System (CAS)

Market Clearing

Baseline Demand

Effective Price

Effect on GDP

Fleet Revenue

Trips flown by fleet

Reference demand

Ticket price

Effective price by length of trip

Aircraft Fleets

Fleet Costs

Airline Profits

Schedule Active fleet

Offered Flights by Fleet

Flight Delays &

Cancellations

Passenger Delays

Delays

Inconvenience

Airport Capacity

Enroute Capacity

Fleet Attributes

Market Clearing

Baseline Demand

Effective Price

Effect on GDP

Fleet Revenue

Trips flown by fleet

Reference demand

Ticket price

Effective price by length of trip

Aircraft Fleets

Fleet Costs

Airline Profits

Schedule Active fleet

Offered Flights by Fleet

Flight Delays &

Cancellations

Passenger Delays

Delays

Inconvenience

Airport Capacity

Enroute Capacity

Fleet Attributes

Bengi Mezhepoglu, PhD in progress

center for air transportation systems research air travel at the edge of chaos george l. donohue,...

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