centeno vs. municipality of alicia

8/4/2019 Centeno vs. Municipality of Alicia

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Republic of the PhilippinesCOURT OF APPEALS

Manila

FIFTH DIVISION

SPS. RODOLFO CENTENO CA-G.R. CV No. 85254AND NENA (NELIA) CENTENO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Members:

- versus -DE GUIA-SALVADOR, R.,Chairperson,VILLON, S. E., and

LAZARO-J AVIER, A. C., JJ.MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA ISABELA,

GLOBE TELECOM, INC.,REPRESENTED BY CHRISTOPHERQ. HANDOG AND MAGNA RESTUPHILIPPINES, INC. REPRESENTED Promulgated:

BY FRANCISCO G. DURAN,Defendants-Appellees, November 22, 2010X=========================================================X

D E C I S I O N

VILLON, J.:

Before Us is an appeal1 under Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure seeking to nullify the order2

dated 9 June 2005 of Branch 20of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City, Isabela in Civil Case

No. Br. 20-1313 for Mandatory Injunction With Prayer For Issuance of

Preliminary Injunction and Damages filed by plaintiffs-appellants,

Spouses Rodolfo Centeno and Nena (Nelia) Centeno (hereinafter

appellants) against defendants Municipality of Alicia, Isabela, Globe

Telecom, Inc., (hereinafter Globe) represented by Christopher Q.

Handog and Magna Restu Philippines Inc., represented by Francisco

Duran (hereinafter appellees).

1. Rollo, pp. 14-382. Rollo, p.39-42


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CA-G.R. CV NO. 85254 2DECISION===================

The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Court a quo

are as follows:

For their cause of action, plaintiffsalleged the following ultimate facts in their

complaint:

That they are residents of Calaocan,Alicia, Isabela; that Mobile CommunicationGroup, Globe Telecommunications,Incorporated, through Magna Restu, nowAsiacom, defendants, filed with thedefendant Municipality of Alicia, Isabela, anApplication for the Construction andinstallation of a Globe Tower Antenna at

Calaocan, Alicia, Isabela; that the plaintiffsfiled a petition objecting the approval bydefendant Municipality of Alicia, of theApplication aforementioned on the groundthat it is hazardous to their health and thehealth of other residents similarly situated;that there was a hearing on the applicationof Globe where the plaintiffs were notified;that the hearing was postponed, but later on

plaintiffs were not notified of anysubsequent hearing by the Municipality ofAlicia; that on October 1, 2003, thedefendant Municipality of Alicia, Isabela,through its Sanguniang Bayan, passedResolution No. 2003-119, approvingGlobe's Application to construct a TowerAntenna at Calaocan, Alicia, Isabela; thatthe construction of the tower antenna isabout to be finished.

Claiming that they were deprived oftheir right to due process, plaintiffs filedtheir complaint praying that Resolution No.


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2003-119 be declared null and void and thatdefendant be prohibited and enjoined fromimplementing said resolution.3

On June 9, 2005, the court a quo rendered the assailed order which

dispositively provides:

Thus, the plaintiffs could have alsopresented their grievances to theSangguniang Panlalawigan when it reviewedResolution No.2003-119, with the view ofhaving it disapproved because it is hazardousto the health of the plaintiff and other residentssimilarly situated. They opted to come to Courtimmediately invoking judicial interventioninspite of the existence of administrativeremedies available to them.

WHEREFORE, and in view of theforegoing, the complaint is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.4

Undaunted, appellant comes now before Us raising the

following issues:

1.WHETHERE (SIC) OR NOT THE COURT AQUO HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASEAT BAR5[;]

2.WHETHERE (SIC) OR NOT THECOMPLAINT IS PRE-MATURE FOR

FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE

3. Rollo,pp.39-404. Rollo,p.425. Rollo,p.26


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REMEDIES, HENCEFORTH THECOMPLAINT STATE NO CAUSE OFACTION[;]6

3.WHETHER OR NOT THE HEALTH, LIVESAND PROPERTIES OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WERE PUT TO REAL ANDIMMINENT DANGER BY THE

CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OFGLOBE TOWER ANTENNA[;]7

4.WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPALITYOF ALICIA, ISABELA ACTING THROUGHITS SANGGUNIANG BAYAN COMMITTEDGRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETIONAMONTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OFJURISDICTION BY APPROVING THERESOLUTION NO.2003-119 AND OTHER

RELATED RESOLUTIONS ALLOWING THECONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OFGLOBE TOWER ANTENNA PRIOR TORESOLUTION/ DECISION OF PETITION TODISALLOW THE CONSTRUCTION OFGLOBE TOWER ANTENNA WITHING (SIC)THE RESIDENTIAL ZONE OF BRGY.CALAOCAN, ALICIA, ISABELA FILED BYPLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WITH THE

OFFICE OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYANOF ALICIA, ISABELA.8

The primary issue posed for Our consideration is whether or not

the court a quo erroneously dismissed the instant case for failure of

the appellants to exhaust their administrative remedies. Appellants

maintain the existence of their cause of action and allege mainly,

deprivation of their right to due process and failure of the

6. Ibid7. Ibid8. Ibid


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Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Alicia, Isabela (hereinafter

Sangguniang Bayan) to act on their petition9 dated 18 March 2003 to

prevent the construction of Globe's antenna tower. The construction

was subsequently approved on 1 October 2003 through Resolution

Nos. 2003-119 enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan. To bolster their

stance, appellants invoke state policies under the constitution and

related laws for protection of life, liberty and property which was

allegedly violated.10

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for

resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the

resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the

same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review, and non-

observance thereof is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.11

Thus, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be

resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every

opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction

then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial

power can be sought. In fine, premature invocation of court'sintervention is fatal to one's cause of action.12

This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not

without its practical and legal reasons. Availment of administrative

remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier

disposition of controversies. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of

9. Records,pp.9-1110. Rollo,pp.27-2811. Celestial vs. Cachopero, G.R. No. 142595 dated 15 October 2003.12. Paat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111107 dated 10 January 1997


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administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the

administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge

their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective

competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded

an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly,

or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore,

reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from

entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative

agencies.13 The principle, however, is a relative one and is flexible

depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and

circumstantial settings of a case.14 Thus, it is no less true to state

that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will

shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress

has been completed and complied with so as to give the

administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error

and to dispose of the case. The requirement of prior exhaustion of

administrative remedies is not absolute, there being instances when it

may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to

immediately, among which are:

1.when the question raised is purely legal,

2. when the administrative body is in estoppel;

3. when the act complained of is patently

illegal;

4. when there is urgent need for judicial

intervention;

13. Celestial vs. Cachopero, G.R. No. 142595 dated 15 October 2003.14. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Dumlao, G.R. No. 167809 dated 27 November 2008.


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5. when the claim involved is small;

6. when irreparable damage will be suffered;

7. when there is no other plain, speedy and

adequate remedy;

8. when strong public interest is involved;

9. in quo warranto proceedings;

10. when there is a violation of due process;

11. when respondent is a department

secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the

President, bears the implied and assumed

approval of the latter;

12. when to require exhaustion of

administrative remedies would be

unreasonable;

13. where the rule of qualified political agencyapplies;

14. when the issue of non-exhaustion ofadministrative remedies has been renderedmoot.15

From among these exceptions, appellants claim principally the

denial of due process arising from alleged want of notice to them of

the proceedings before the Sangguniang Bayan resulting to violation

of their constitutional right for a safe, healthy and convenient social

environment. The evidence on record, however, do not support

appellants' allegations. Appellants were given an opportunity and

right to be heard concerning their objection to and grievances on the

15. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Dumlao, G.R. No. 167809 dated 27 November 2008.


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construction of the antenna tower through their petition16 dated 18

March 2003 which was submitted before Sangguniang Bayan. It

bears stressing that due process does not necessarily mean or

require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.

One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and

perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral

argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings

moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly

applied as administrative process cannot be fully equated with due

process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process

cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance

to be heard as in the instant case. The essence of due process is

simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative

proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to

seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal

or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.

The requirements are satisfied when appellants were afforded fair

and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at

hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearingwhich do not appear to be obtaining in the case at bar.17 Viewed in

the light of the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but

rule that appellants' averment is without merit. To sustain their claim

would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the

principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the

ambit of excepted cases above-enumerated. It bears emphasis that

before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a

16. Records,pp.9-1117. Paat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111107 dated 10 January 1997


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pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of

administrative processes afforded him and premature invocation of

court's intervention without resorting to administrative remedies is

fatal to one's cause of action. Thus, absent any finding of waiver or

estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of

action.18 As aptly stated by the court a quo:

xxx

It is evident that plaintiff opted to file theircomplaint invoking judicial intervention indisregard to the principle of exhaustion ofadministrative remedies. Failure to exhaustadministrative, when the same is available, isfatal. The complaint would be premature. In

short, it states no cause of action.

The plaintiffs could have availed of theremedies envisioned under the LocalGovernment Code, rep.7160. First, is the vetopower of the Mayor and second, the review bythe Sangguniang Panlalawigan of ResolutionNo. 2003-119.

Section 54 and 55 of the Local GovernmentCode, provides:

'SEC. 54. Approval of Ordinances-(a) Everyordinance enacted by the sangguniangpanlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, orsangguniang bayan shall be presented to theprovincial governor or city or municipal mayor,as the case maybe. If the local chief executive

concerned approves the same, he shall affixhis signature on each and every page thereof;otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same

18. Ibid


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with his objections to the sanggunian, whichmay proceed to reconsider the same. Thesanggunian concerned may override the vetoof the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3)veto of all its members, thereby making theordinance or resolution effective for all legalintents and purposes.

'(b) The veto shall be communicated by thelocal chief executive concerned to thesanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the caseof a province and ten (10) days in the case ofa city or a municipality; otherwise, theordinance shall be deemed approved as if hehad signed it.

'(c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniangBarangay shall, upon approval by the majority

of all its members, be signed by the PunongBarangay.

'SEC. 55. Veto Power of the Local ChiefExecutive.-(a) The local chief executive maym\ veto any ordinance of the sangguninangpanlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, orsangguniang baya (sic) on the ground that it isultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare

stating his reason therefor in writing.

'(b) The local chief executive, except thepunong barangay, shall have the power to vetoany particular item or items of anappropriations, ordinance, an ordinance orresolution adopting a local development planand public investment program, or anordinance directing the payment of money orcreating liability. In such a case, the veto shall

not affect the item or items which are notobjected to. The vetoed item or items shall nottake effect unless the sanggunian overridesthe veto in the manner herein provided;


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otherwise, the item or items in theappropriations ordinance of the previous yearcorresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall bedeemed reenacted.

'(c) The local chief executive may veto anordinance or resolution only once. Thesanggunian may override the veto of local

chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3)veto of all its members, thereby making theordinance effective even without the approvalof the local chief executive concerned.'Thus, plaintiffs could have presented theirgrievances to the Mayor of the defendantMunicipality of Alicia to disapprove ResolutionNo. 2003-119 because the construction of thetower antenna is hazardous to their health and

other residents similarly situated. But they didnot.

On the other hand, Section 56 of the LocalGovernment Code, provides:

'SEC. 56. Review of Component City andMunicipal Ordinances or Resolutions by theSangguniang Panlalawigan.- (a) Within three

(3) days after approval, the secretary to thesangguniang panlungsod or sangguniangbayan shall forward to sangguniangpanlalawigan for review, copies of approvedordinances and the resolutions approving thelocal development plans and public investmentprograms formulated by the local developmentcouncils.

'(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of

copies of such ordinances and resolutions, thesangguniang panlalawigan shall examine thedocuments or transmit them to the provincialattorney, or if there be none, to the provincial


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prosecutor for prompt examination. Theprovincial attorney or provincial prosecutorshall, within a period of ten (10) days fromreceipt of the documents, inform thesangguniang panlalawigan in writing of hiscomments or recommendations, which may beconsidered by the sangguninag panlalawiganin making its decision.

'(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds thatsuch an ordinance or resolution is beyond thepower conferred upon the sangguniangpanlungsod or sangguninag bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolutioninvalid in whole or in part. The sangguniangpanlalawigan shall enter its action in theminutes and shall advise the correspondingcity or municipal authorities of the action it has

taken.

'(d) If no action has been taken by thesangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30)days after submission of such an ordinance orresolution, the same shall be presumedconsistent with and therefore valid.'

Thus, the plaintiffs could have also presented

their grievances to the SangguniangPanlalawigan when it reviewed Resolution No.2003-119, with the view of having itdisapproved because it is hazardous to thehealth of the plaintiffs and other residentssimilarly situated. They opted to come to Courtimmediately invoking judicial interventioninspite of the existence of administrativeremedies available to them.19

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant appeal is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed order of the

19. Rollo,pp.40-42


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Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 20 of Cauayan City, Isabela in

Civil Case No. Br. 20-1313 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

SO ORDERED.

SESINANDO E. VILLON

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REBECCA DE GUIA-SALVADOR AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIERAssociate Justice Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is herebycertified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached inconsultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion ofthe Court.

REBECCA DE GUIA-SALVADORAssociate Justice

Chairperson, Fifth Division

centeno vs. municipality of alicia

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