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CBAPTBB '0

AID TO CHINA PROGBAMMB

Seoretar,y Marshall had admonished Wedemeyer scrupulously to avoid discussing the contents of his report with 8111'0ne. The members of his mission had also been similarly warned. Soon 1 t became clear to everybo~ that the General's report had been suppressed. The people, however, Jmev of the Wedemeyer mission. They also knew that Wedemeyer had worked, during the second World War, in close collaboration with Marshall in the ~ General Staff. In October 1944, he succeeded General Stilwell, and re-establi­shed by his tactful handling, Sino-American relations on a basis of mutual trust. Be reorganized the Chinese .&.1'11\Y

"into a real fighting force •, and won th~rast of Chiang Kai-shek and the better elements in the KMr. The American people also knew the recommendations which Wedemeyer had made in November 1945 to help .th~.Chinese Government.

ne>n- ·~ ".,()~~ -... \..<.-_.,.::.-The ea~pPeaalon of his report aroused widespread

suspicion. Those, who were favourably disposed towards the Chinese Government, concluded that the report of Wedemeyer

1. This was what Victor Odlum, the Canadian Ambassador in Chungking, said about Wedemeyer, see Freda Utley, Last Chance in China, 267.

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~e. t) 6~cl< would not have been aapprsesed if, it had supported the Administration's point of view, namely that no militar.r aid should be given the Nationalists in the cinl war.

Public Agitation in America in Javour of the Nationalist Gover.nment

Without waiting for long to know what the report contained, thoee Americans who looked upon the Nationalist Government with faYour lannched an assault on the Adminis­tration's conduct of relations with China. William c. Dullitt, in mid-October, inaugurated the offensive wit~ •Report on China• in Life magazine. Bullitt was B well· known American, and had held different governmental posi­tions since 1911 - ambassadorship to Moscow being one of them. Be presented a strong case for tho Chinese Govern­ment, and called for a ll,360,000,000 aid programme. (2)

Some of the influential leaders of the Republican Party took up the iesue. Representative w. Sterling Cole, New York, and five other members of the Bouse Armed Services and .&.ppropriation Committees bad an interview, while they were on a tour of the Orient, with Chiang, and, on their return, expressed the view that .&merican aid was impera­tive to save China from communism. (3) Republican leader of the Bouse, Joseph w. Hartin, Mass. also expressed similar sentiments. (4) On November 12, Judd, who had only then

2. William c. Dullitt, •A Report to American People on Vbina•, ~. Vol.23, No.l5 {Oct.lS, 1947) 86-6.

3. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 4a3 1 1941. On Oct.l9, two Republi­can members out of the f:a.ve, William B. Bess and Edward F. Herbert again urged aid to China, see ibid., Oct.20, 6aS, 1941.

4. Ibid., Nov. 10, 1:8, 1947. Be became the speaker of ~Bouse of Representative• in 1947.

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returned from the Par Bast • where he had ue t Gen. Mac

.urtllul', aamounced bis determination to include Cbina in the Emergency Aid to Jurope bill which was to go through a special session of Congress convened by frnman to meet in November. (5)

On August 8, the Commander of the u.s. Marines in China, Maj. Gen. Samuel L. Howard, stated in an inter­.tev with the representative of the Honolulu Advertiser that the ODi ted States must furnish arms to the Chinese Government if the whole of the Far Bast vae to be saved from chaos. (6)

the President of the American Cbina Policy Asso­ciation, jJ.fred Kohlbcrg, also reemphasized (on November 1) the urgent need of aid. (7)

The special correspondent of the Rev York Times in China• Henry B. Lieberman, (8) and its ~oreign news analyst Hanson. W. Baldwin, ( 9) outlined the importance of China to American security ODd prosperity and urged all possible aid.

!he influen"ti~l American publisher Henry B. Luoe, born in Shantung Province, put his publishing empire in the vanguard of American supportors of the Chinese Govern­ment. {10)

6. Xb14., Nov. 13, 8aS, 19£7. e. Ibid,, Aug. e. aaa, 1947. 1. Xb1d1 , Nov. s, 1V, 8a7, 1947. a. Ibid., sep.l, 6al, 1947. 9. Xbid,, Oct. 12, 07a9, 1947. Also see ~oustaDtine Brown•s

article on this subject in washington SDD~__star o~ 18th July, 1947. ----- ---- -

10, Xn 1940, when the Japanese were committing huge atroci­ties in china, Henry Luce bad organizod the United China Belief to proVide help and succour to the sufteriug Chinese.

f.iarshall Announces • Aid to China Programme ODder Preparation•

Probably to head off the increasing pressure of the Republicans and other critics Secretar,y Marshall announced before a joint session of the Senate Committee on Poreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the intention of the State Department to present to Congress a programme of aid for the Chinese Government, He pointed out that the CCP was extending forcefully its

control of wide areas of China, and that, the United States and all world Powers recognized the National Government as "the sole legal government of China. Marshall stressed that only a peaceful China could exercise "a major stabilizing influence in the Far Bast•. Asserting that the United States would •extend to the government and its people certain eco­nomic aid and assistance•, the Secretary of state added that a proposal was under preparation for submission to Congress.• (11)

Congress Votes 118 million for China - But Administration Proeoses No Programme

While Vandenberg, and his fellow !enators were inclined to wait for the Administration's programme other leading members of the Republican Party in the House were impatient. On November 21, 1947, Cole, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said that "despite the admitted corrupt practices" aid must be given to the Chinese Government. (12)

On November 26, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted to slash $108 million from the Administratioh'S programme of giviug stop-gap relief (interim aid) to Austria and Prance, and recommended that 160 million be given to the Chinese Government, as a stop-gap measure to meet its

economic difficulties. (18)

On December 11, the Senate Appropriations Committee, with Senator styles Bridges presiding, began hearings on the Chinese situation. Wedemeyer asserted that China should not be excluded from any foreign aid programme, and that, aid should be given on a scale •commensurate• with the ability of the United States to meet commitments all over the world, and the ability of the recipient to make effective use of it. He also pointed out that the American people were confronted throughout the world "with the expansion of an incompatible idiological power•, that Chiang Rai-shek had opposed communism •throughout his history•, and that, he •also stayed on with us as an ally in the war, containing in China one million and a half Japanese soldiers•. The General emphasized that Chiang was sincerely desirous of improving the lot of • his people, and was in real need of American aid and assistance.

When asked by Bridges Wedemeyer replied that the American Government had not fmlfilled its •commitments• to CbiDa, while on his part the Generalissimo endeavota" ed to meet all American reqmirements.• If I were he•, Wedemeyer said, •I would be quite impatient with America, but he never appeared so•. (14)

Judd also appeared before the Committee. He stated that the Bussians rendered three types of assistance to the Chinese Coumnmists: by blocking the entry of the 1M! troops into Manchuria, and facilitating that of the Communists, by delaying their withdrawal from Manchuria thereby enabling the Communists to take control of the

13. ~ee ibid., Nov. 26, llal, 1947. 14. u.s. Congress Senate, Appropriations Committee,

Hearings, Third Supplementa;r Apfropriation Bill for 1948, 80th Cong., 1st Seas., WaSblngton D.c. 1947) 128-32.

area, and by allowing them to take control of the dumps of arms and ammunition left by the Japanese there. Be

denounced the State Department's insistence on reforms, efficiency, and democracy in China, which, he said, were

never talked about in the past while the territorial inte­grity of that country vas always emphasized. Be stated that the American belief in the past had been that what happened in Asia was of considerably leas importance to the United States than tihat happend in Burope, or eeversing it, that what happened in Europe was more likely to get the united states into a war than what happend in Asia. fhis belief, he said, was responaible for i21volving the United States in the second world war. No government and no people, he said, could endure war, invasion, inflation, hunger, suffering and disintegration indefinitely. Judd strongly pleaded for the inclusion of appropriations for China in the interim 4id bill. {15)

Another tdtness who supported the Chinese case waa Bullitt. He expressed agreement with the ideas of Wedemeyer and Judd, and outlined the importance ot relatively small sum which the Bouse Poreign A£fa1rs committee provided in the said bill, tor the Chinese Government as th~lat~~s confronted td.th a terrible economic crisis. Be aieteti;d..., the Administration ~cL ~ not supplU~g to the Chinese, since ~ 1946, a single cartridge or a shell rendering American equipment with the Nationalist troops ineffective before the Communist armiea to whom the Soviet Government had made available JapaDese war

15. Ibid., 182-45. Also see ibid., 182-3.

material. Be urged the urgency of appropriating 160 million for China "immediately•. Be asserted that the needs of China were greater than those of Prance, Italy, and Austria. Bullitt also urged that an American of exceptional militar,y ability, like Hac Arthur, should be at once put on duty in Nanld.ng to concert with Chiang ways and means to protect China from falling into the hands of the CCP. (16)

Alfred Kohlberg (11) offored four recommendations on behalf of the China Policy Association: a) an appropria­tio~o/860 million in the interim-aid bill; b) grant to China of surplus arms and ammunition immediately; c) further arms, ammunition and training, and d) immediate discharge of all State DepartmeDt personnel whose sympathies leaned to the Chinese Communists. (18)

The State Department's stand was expounded before the Committee by Willard Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic .f.ffajr e, and w. Walton Butterworth, Director of

the Office of Par Bastern Affairs. Explaining the reason for excluding China from the Interim Aid bill, fhorp stated that China was not threatened with immediate collapse, and therefore, no need for including that country in this pro­gramme was felt. Moreover, Thorp said, the fear was lest any allocation of funds to China should jeopardize the Interim Aid programme for the European countries. Nov that

16. Ibid., 145-50.

11. In Sllbsequent years Kohlberg and several others who advocated the case of the Chinese Government for American aid were styled as belonging to the 'China Lobby•. This vchina Lobby• was not an organization or a distinct bo~. For qQite a few years it just meant all those Americans both in the Government and outside the Government who were totally opposed to the CCP. The Be~orter magazine published an article on the subject. Var ous ulterior motives were attributed to these peptle by their critics.

18. For details of Koblberg•s statement, see ibid., 171•2.

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• I 60 million have been set up for China, !horp observed; a programme for the purchase of rice, wheat, petroleum, and cotton could be worked out. When asked by Bridges whether the State Department vas still against furnishiq arms and ammunition to the Chinese Nationalists, Butterworth replied that 1 t was not, and that, the Chinese Government would not herearter be prevented from acqmiriug arms and ammun1tion.(l9)

Probably believing that the Administration was soon ~~to bring forward an extensive programme of aid for Cldna, the Senate Appropriations Committee earmarked only $20 million and not S 60 million in the Foreign Aid bill. Vandenberg suggested a further cut, and the Senate ultimately voted ~18 million. fhe Bouse conferees accepted the reduction, and thus the final Congressional plan of economio assistance to China aaounted to the meagre aum of 118 mlllion. The Administration, however, brought forth no spendiug programme, and the money remained Ullspent.

Public Sentiment in Favour of Huge Aid to Chinese Government

ihe 818 million appropriations in economic aid for China gave no satisfaction to those elements in America who favoured the Chinese Government in the civil strife. Se~re­

tary Marshall had stated (November 10) thD.t aid-to-China programme was under preparation in the State Department, but no such proposal was forth-ciming. The militar,y situation of the government armies was deteriorating. The American friends of the Chinese Government were getting impatient with the lukewarmness of the Admlnistration. They stepped up their drive and strongly urged military and economic aid to

the government. Judd, for example, in a radio address on January o, 1948, pointed oat that the whole of Asia

19. Por the testimony of Butterworth and Thorp, see ibid., 180-8, and 148-58.

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"would pass behind the iron-curtain" if immediate mili ta17 aid were not gi~en to the Nationalists. (20)

Senator Bobert A. Tatt, Republican, Ohio, an aspirant for the Party Presidential nomination for 1948, speaking before the Lincoln Republican Club of st. Paul, Minn., assailed the Administration for sponsoring costly foreign projects to atem communism in Burope, and at the aame time, for "• •• strengtheniug Russia by acts of omission or commission in China•. Be styled Chiang Kai-shek as "the only hope in China.• (21)

Some distinguished Americans, who bad held responsi­ble positions in the government, also advocated the cause of the Chinese Government. On November 29, twelve former ambassadors of the united States sent telegrams to the Department of State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Bouse Foreign Affairs Committee, urging prompt aid and

militar,y eqoipment. (22) In early Pebruary 1948, Gen. Chennault, formerly head of the' Plying figers • and well­versed with Chinese problems wrote that the d•fence of Manchuria was the defence of China, and the defence of China vas the defence of the "free nations of Asia". Be ur,ged firm aid to China as a "warning to the Soviet Union that the united States was committed to the defence of free nations, including China, against communism. {28)

20. Cong. Bd., App. 8oth Cong., 2nd Seas, Vol. 94 1pt.9, A68-7. Judd spoke at fown Meeting of the Air on "What should we do in China Nov?", and he included that address in his remarks on the House floor on Jan.7,1948.

21. R.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 4z2 1 1948. 22. Ibid~, Nov.30, 26a8, 1947. The ambassadors were: ~.P.

Belin, Poland, Bullitt, BDssiaa W.M. Collier, Chi~t J. Daniels, MexicoJ w. Prost, Paraguay, J.W. &era~, Germany, Boaz Long, Guatemal.aJ L. Osborne, Norway1 W. Philipsci Italyl B.P. Sld.DDer, Turkey, W.H. Standley, Russia, an A.W. Weddell, Spain.

23. Chennault's article entitled 'United states can Stamp Out the fhreat of Wart vas published in WashingtoJ) @aily News, Feb. 2, 19481 p.5. Be was adViser to Chiang from l93""'r to 1941. In 1942 he organized the China Air fask Force, and in 1946 he retired for the second time.

On November 22, 1947, the Young Democrats of New York, affiliated to young Democratic Clubs of America

(YDCA) - an organization of the Democratic Part.y to encourage young citizens to take an active part in public affairs, to educate them as to public issues, and to deve­lop support for the platform and policies of the Democratic Part.y, adopted a resolution urging Congress to adopt quickly the Marshall aid plan for Jurope and China. (24)

Some American intellectuals also urged aid to China. For example, John E. Orchard, Professor of Bconomic Geograpb1' at Colrunbia University warned that failure to pro­vide aid to China in the present emergency tfould have as disastrous effects for the United States as failure to help Burope. (25)

Similarly Paul M.A. Linebarger, Professor of Asiatic Politics, School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, having experience as liai­son officer between the CCP and DJ.T intelligence systems presented a ver,y strong case for help to the National Government. (26)

24. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 19:3, 1947. 25. Ibid., Nov. 18, 4:5, 1947. Orchard was associated with

several organizations like the Association of American Geographers, Council on Foreign Relations, Institute of Pacific Relations, and so on. Be had several books to his credit. Be was also connected with the foreign Bconomic Administration.

26. Far Baetern SUrvey, Peb.ll, 1948, Vol. XVII No.3, 87~9. IJ]iebarger also told the author that he consi­de,ed' aid to China as imperative to American interests, int'erriewJ June M, 1962, washington, D.c.

Vehement opposition to any aid to the Chinese Government vas expressed by New York Congressman Vito Marcantonio of the American Labour Party. !he Congressman, a consistent supporter of Communist causes, told a rally of the •American Youth for Democracy - an organization dominated by the Communist Party, that Chiang was the •murderer of Chinese democracy.• (27)

Par more weighty than the name calling of ~Jarcan• tonio were the criticisms of the influential and eminently respectable business group • the National Foreign trade Council. (28) Ita 400 representatives issued a statement, calling as •unwise and ansound • any American assistance to China on a •government to government basisN. !heir contention was that such aid amounted to interference in the internal conflict of an independent sovereign nation.()?;

w~ ~7 ¥el'a:::Derat,om yJ aotaa~-to 4Dea tile £QP"1-e wn=t~ea fi& ta t~W.:Jteee~

Critics of aid also pointed out to the ~ondemna- ./ tion of Chiang b7 a Christian general, l'eng Yu-b. h$iang,

" who had been very prominent.in Chinese political life for the past thirty years. On January 14, 1948, Feng et)rled the Chinese Government •reactionary and dictatorial• and said that his relations with it were •totally severed•. Be announced intention to work on behalf of a new revolu­tionar.y movement in Hongkong which would include represen­tatives of all democratic forces in China, including

87. N.Y. Times, Dec. au, 15a7, 1941. 28. Tbis vas an organization to promote and protect

American foreign trade and inves'tment and comprised of manufacturers, exporters, importers. foreign invea­tora, banks, transportation lines, insurance, communi­catio~, and so on.

29. B.Y. r.lmes, January 17, 20a4, 1948.

sections of the 1M! (which disagreed with the Chiang Government) and representatives of the Chinese Communists, (30)

Truman's A.id to China Prosposal - Mo Provision for H111ta£f Aid

During this phase of the debate, some important leaders of the Republican Part.y, like Dullea and Vandenberg,

were conspicuous by their silence, The attitude of these men as also of organizations like the Foreign Trade Council

probably gave to the Administration an impression that there vas no str:u:g tide of opinion in the countr.y favouring entanglement in ChiDa's civil conflict. !he fact that Congress appropriated 118 million for economic assistance to the Chinese Government farther indicated that militar.y support to that govemment vas not very milCh in the interest of the United States. !he Secretary of State, however, had

stated (in November 1947) that a programme of aid for the Chinese Government vas under preparation, and it was pro­bably in f:ulfilment of that assurance that the Chief Bxecu­tive recommended (Pebruar,y 18, 1948) that Congress authorize a programme of aid to China in the amount of 15170 million for fifteen months, that is until June ao, 1949, so as to enable that countr;y to obtain •a respite from ~a~\-1 economic deterioration.• The President indicated that~ million ot the total should be used for the purchase of consumer goods such as coal, cereals, textiles, medicines, and fertilizers etc. , and the balance of 160 million be used for reconstruction purposes in areas "shattered from militar.r

80. Ibid,, J&Duary US, 24a3, 1948. Peng ;said all this lD New York etty.

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operations• such as the rebuilding of roads, railw~s, factories and power plants etc.

!he President emphasized that the programme did not provide for militar.y assistance to the Chinese Govern­ment. Be gave almost a public warning to Chiang b7 point­ing out that Washington should retain the right to termi­nate assistance if the policies of the Chinese Government were •inconsistent with the object of using aid to help to achieve a aelf supporting econo~•. (81)

House Poreisn Affairs Committee Hearings on !ru.man' s Proposal

!he House Committee on Foreign Ufair s, with Baton presiding, took immediate action on the President's Aid to China bill. Some distinguiehed Americana were inn­ted to e%press their views on the Chinese situation as also on Truman •s proposal to meet that situation. Marshall was the first to appear. Be stated (February 20, 1948) that the CCP troops had terribl7 wrecked the econo~ of China, and tbat, to :force an economic collapse was their •announced purpose•. The Chinese Government, he said, was in dire need of assistance in its present serious economic difficulties. The p•litical, economic, and :financial conditions in China, ftlarshall said, were so unstable and so uncertain that tbe American Government could not possibly develop a practical, effective, long-term over-all programme of economic recover.y. Nevertheless, Marshall observed, it was desirable that the United states Government should take steps to support the

31. For fUll text of Truman•a message, see World Peace Foundatipn, Documents on American Porei Belationa (Princeton Un vera y Press, u.s.A., 1950 Vol.X, 610·75. Also see N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, la6, 1948.

Chiang Kai-shek Government. {32)

~he Secretary of State also emphasized to h~ ~.ho..t the Chinese Government }to have ". • • a breathing space in which the Chinese Government could initiate important steps towards more stable economic conditions. Marshall voiced his conviction that Chiang must set his house in trder to improve the political situation. until certain to.ndamental thiugs were done, he said, the Chinese would not support the National Government. "The United State~ ,-._e :-f::o..h-crl_, ~~ should not by its actions be put in the position of being charged with a direct responsibility for the conduct of the Chinese Ge>vernment and its political, economic, and military affairs." {83)

Three years later, testir,ying before the Joint Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services in 1961, Marshall stated tbat the ei tuation in China in

1948 was such that the American Government had literally to take over cmtrol of the country in order to insure that the armies functioned with efticiency.•we would have to make", he observed, •a very considerable initial contribution and

we would be involved in the possibility of very extensive continuing responsibilities in a very large area ••• •

Marshall fUrther saida !Y. /' "I mew of my own knowledge the very doubtful basis

on which (the Nationalists) operations and their govemmental procedure rested. I knew the difficulties they would have

32. Before a meeting of the National security Council on :February 12, 1948 Marshall read two documents he intended to submit to the Senate and Bouse For61gn Belations Committees. The gist of both vas that the United States regarded the China problem •under present cond!tiona of disorder of corruption,inefficiency and importance of the Central Government as being practi­cally unsolvable", see Forrestal Diaries, 864.

88. u.s. congress, Bouse Committee on Foreign A£fairs Bearings, united Stat9s Foreign Policy for a Post-war Re•overy Programme, 80th co~., 2nd Sese., Fe~. 20, 1948 (Washington D.c., 1948) 1545-76.

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in maintaining morale, and in maintaining their milita17 force with any degree of fighting efficiency, and I had

very decided professional militar.y doubts as to the compe-

tence of the leadership that would have to undertake these operations ••• • (34)

Besides the Secretar,y of state, some military and diplomatic leaders were also invited to express their ideas. Among tho military anthorities were Generals Mac Arthur, Wedemeyer, Glen B.Bdgerton, and Chennault. Due to the heavy pressure of work Mac:Arthur could not appear in persons, and on March a, he sent a wire to Chairman Baton. He submitted that China was "the f1Uldamental ke7stone to the Pacific arch," and •to the peace of the world and to the position of the United States. He observed that no amount of economic assistance could restore internal rehabilita­tion until milita;r aid was given to the Nationalist armies. The threat of international Communism was global, and it would be •utterly fallacious to underrate either China•e ..... needs or her importance.• Mac~Arthur decried the policy

" of insistence on reforms, and observed that desirable as those reforms might be, their importance vas •secondar,y to the civil strife now engulfing the land. "

With the restoration of peace and security, he said, reforms would gradually be introduced, "in the evolutionary processes of China's fUture•. (35)

Wedemeyer also pointed out that eoonomie aid alone, Wlder the present circumstances, would not suffice to prevent the onward maroh of collllllUDism in Chilla, or for

84. Joint Heari.Dgs, M1lita17 Situation in the Far :last, I, 465-6.

""\

85. Por text of Ma~A.rthur•s wire, see Bearings, Postwar Becove~ Prog~-~ n. 38, 204~-42.

that purpose. in any part of the worldJ military protection was essential. In answer to a question from Congressman Judd, Wedemeyer said that he found Chiang Kai•shek •absolu­

tely straightforward • • free from a!V' •chicanery• or any

•so-called oriental machinations•. fhe General also told the Committee members that Mao and Chou •categorically• stated to him that they were Communists •as such•, and that, they were interested in fUrthering world Communist movement. (38)

Gen. Jdgerton, who had been Director of China Office of UNBBl during 1946-47, told the Congressmen that the •termination of civil strife was essential to build a strong economic situation in China•. but that. he would not attempt to offer a~ recommendation as to ~t should be done in China. (37)

Gen. Cheunault told the Committee that the Soviet Union was endeavouring •to reduce China to a communist State • t and that, .A.mericu planning to ooabat coiDJll1Uliaa had been •woefUlly unbalanced•. Be emphasized that China was of the utmost importance to world peace and to the defence of the united States. No time must be lost, Chenn­ault pointed out, in fUrnishing to China aU types of mili­tary supplies, and the Soviet Union would not go to war with the United states if she did so. {38)

In addition to the above three Generals, Lowell w. Books also testified before the Committee. Books retired from the u.s. ~ in December 1946 after thirty years of aerTice, and made two trips to China as Director-General of UNRBA., one in 1946 and another in October 104:7. Be stated

86. Ibid., 2065·76. 87. Ibid., 2164-68. 38. Ibid., 2209·37.

that economically not a great deal could be accomplished in China until the military situation was set right. Be expressed his belief that unless the Chinese Government

vas assisted in ita military efforts to an extent where she could win- the war, the economic situation would never

N.l. be satisfactory. He said1 "• •• there should be no hiei-tancy in introducing into China and making available to the Chinese Government, American forces to the extent these are necessary in training, organizing, equipping, and even 1n advising in the over-all strategy and tactics of their campaign.• (39)

Another UNBBA Official, Harlan Cleveland, also testified. He was with the Foreign Economic Administra­tion during the war, and towards the end of that period he participated in the work of the Allied Control Commission in Italy. In May 194'1, he vas assigned to China as Director of the China E:>ffice of the UNBBA.. Be stated that China was well on the road to industrial revolution for a couple of decade, aDd that, had it not been for the civil war, the country would have gone far ahead. China, he said, was relatively a more self-sufficient count17, and would not present over the long term, &QT substantial drain on *merica. ( 40)

Among the former diplomats, who testifie«; were Bullitt, Robertson, and Gauss. While Bullitt welcomed the President's proposal of economic assistance to China he outlined the necessity of military aid and advice. The

military situation, be said, domiDated the economic' and

political situations, since military defeat would mean the loss of all. And no permanent improvement, he observed, in the economic or financial situation in China could be

89. Ibid., 215'1-64. 40. Ibid., 2168-'1&.

achieved until the war vas won. Be styled the violation in the past, of promises to China by the American Govern­ment as "dishonorable and disgraceful", and urged first, that an officer ot the "highest quality• be sent to co­operate ri th Chiang, and second, huge stocks of arms aDd

ammunition must be made available to the Chinese Govern­ment. (41) Walter Robertson, who was assigned to the .American Embassy in China as CoUDselor of Boonomic Affairs in 1045, and vho became cbarse' dfaffaires ~ interim in September of that year, pointed out that while the Sino­Soviet Communists were engaged in a plot to communize China, the Nationalists were fighting for the cause of the •tree world", that the Chinese Communists never had any desire for coalition, and that, if China went communist, tremendous weight would be added to the side of the Soviet union which was bent upon world domination. Bobertson observed that piecemeal assistance, unrelated to a general over-all pro­gramme of aid, would be of no effect. Be also said that if China could have, as detll8Dded by the A.dmi nis trati on, stabilized its econo~, reconstructed its communications, and broaden the base of its government, she would not have needed American aid. (42) Gauss, United states Ambassador in China till November 1944, questioned the wt•dom of a purely economic aid programme for China. He pointed out that the military situation and the economic position there had deteriorated so mnch during the past eighteen months that no econolli.c aid would be effective unless, along-s~y ~ d of it, there was a sound military prograDIIle. He also ~

c Q Yl.:.. (!.,f.; ?!7 ~·t)

Gat that dne to the bluaders, Which Roosevelt made at Yalta in restoring in China the position of Russia to tbat she enjoyed before the Basso-Japanese war, the UDited ~tatea oved a great obligation to China. (48)

4l.. !!!!!·' 1891-1980. 42. Ibid., 2016-92, 48. Ibid,, 2176-94.

- -2H - .26{-

The above military and diplomatic officials believed that no economic rehabilitation and administra­tive reformation could be achieved Without suppressing the Communist menace. !hey were convinced that the threat o~ commonlsm vas global, and that, the Chinese CoiDDI1lDism vae but a part of the world revolutionary movement. Viewing 'he Bast-West cold war vi th concern, theee men pointed out that China was of great significance to the •tree world• and to the American security interests. Some of these dis­tinguished Americans also believed that if the United States did give large-scale military assistance to the Chinese Government, the Soviet Union would not do the same on behalf of the CCP. Even these men, it might be pointed out, did not favour the active participation of American troops in the conflict with the Chinese Communists. They thought of only supplies, training and advice.

The Chief Executive, the Secretary of State, and Heads of the Jar Eastern Division did not li~ to give to the Chinese Government military spp~rt either. They favoured

A.

limited economic aid coupled with threats that even that aid would be stopped if certain conditions were not fulfilled, and reforms of a far-reaching importance were not introduced. They disagreed with the point of view put forward by persons like Mac Arthur, and they stuck to the belief that the Chinese Government had degenerated beyond repair.

Public Sentiment in America in Favour o~ Aid to Chinese Government

In addition to the military and diplomatic officials who were called upon to testify on the Aid to China bill, many responsible Americans and public organizations also expressed their ideas in favour of economic and military aid to the Chinese Government. In the fore-front were the Republican protagonists of the Nationalist regime. (44)

44. See £or instance the speech by Vandenberg in Congress­ional Becord1 Senate, 8oth Coug., 2nd Sees., Vol.94, pt.a, March ao, 1948, 8667-0.

Governor Devey of New York said at his first press conference after his nomination as the Party•s candidate for Presidency that military advisers, far greater finan­cial assistance and the •kind of material the Chinese need• should be given to the Chinese Government. (45)

fhe National Republican Club in Mev York cit,y adopted a resolution asking for sufficient support to the Nationalists in their efforts to resist communism. (46)

On May 6, the Columbia university Committee of the New York Young Republican Club asked for both economic and military assistance. (47)

Some Democratic Congressmen also spoke in support of continued aid for the Nationalists. Por e~ple speakigg on the Porelgn Assistance Act of 1948, Representative Jame• P. Richards, s.c., said that it was true Chiang's Govern­ment did not meet the United States requirements for a democracy, his was the only government to rally around in opposition to the Communists. •If the present Chinese Government is supported" • he said, •then I am sure that the people will ultimately liberalize that government through democratic processes.• {48) B.B. Cox, Oa, asserted on the House floor that the United States did not keep faith with China in the past, and that, she should help the Rationalist's to stop Bnssia, -now franticallY prosecuting her campaign to enslave the world. • (49)

45.

40.

47.

N.Y. !imes, June 28, la5, 1948. Ibid., Ap. 28, 24al, 1948. Also see ibid., June 22, 2r1, 1948. ~. May 7, 15a2, 1948.

48. Cong. Bd., House, March 24, 1948, 8oth Cong., 2nd Sess., 8432.

49. Xbid., 8431.

I

AD important military figure, Admiral De W1 tt C.

Bamsay • Pacific Pleet Commander, announced at a press conference at Pearl Barbour on March e, 1948, that he favoured military aid. (50)

!he New York Times organized a forum, in the series 'What•s on Your Mind•t, and invited two leading advocates of aid to the Nationalists. One of them vas Dr. Lin Yu-tang, novelist and philosopher, and the other was Preda Utley, (51), a vocal spokesman of the pro-chianc group in the United ~tates. Both of them presented a atrong case for the Chinese Government. (GB) The Executive Committee of the Jederal Council of the Churches of Christ expressed concern over the situation of the Chinese Govern­ment. It welcomed fruman•s proposal and urged that the United States should do all within its power to save China from Communism.(&S)

Writing for the December 194? issue of the China Monthly, William B. Johnson, who had been residing in China for 39 years, and was closely connected with international relief projects, reported that the Russian agents had begun

60. N.Y. Times, March '1, lOil, 1948. Bamsay had only then been in China.

U. She was formerly a Communist, and first visited China in 1928 when she imparted instructions to CCP leaders from Cominter.o in Moscow.

52. Bobert B. Martin, Par Bast correspondent of the New York Post, and Annalee Jacoby, an author, opposed all aid, see 1bidt• March 10, 13a2, 1948.

53. Ibid., March 1?, 16:8, 1948. The Pederal Council of the Churches of Christ was a federation of 84 commquio~s including most major Protestant and Ortho­dox churches, which had 144,000 local churches with 38,ooo,ooo members.

the training of thousands of Chinese in all the techni· ques of Bolshevik revolution in south China as early as

1924. (54)

fhe same month, B.E. Paul Yu-pin D.D., Archbishop of Nanld.ng • brought forth a report alleging that the Soviet UDion sheltered_,armed and trained the Chinese Communists in order to take control of Manchuria and North China. (55)

Similarly, a report from Dr. William M. NO Govern appeared in the Washington Daily News of March 7, 1948. He was a professor at North Western University, and in the capacity of special investigator for the Bouse Committee on foreign Affairs, made a survey of the political situation in the •ar Bast. ne pointed out that the USSB bad been supplying arms to the Chinese communists tor the past two years. (56)

Preda Utley published her book under the title •Last Chance in China • and pointed out how important China vas to the security and solidarity of the •tree world'. Similarly, Geraldine Pitch brought out an article entitled •Blunder Out ot China• and stressed that there was still timG to save China from communism. (67)

M. William B. Johnson, "!he United States sells China Down the Jaur", The China Monthll, (December 1947} Vol. VIII No.l2, 112:&18. Be established in his arti­cle that while the u.s. ignored the Nationalists, the Soviet Union all through helped Communists.

55. Yu-pin • s report was included by Judd in his remarks on the House floor on Dec. 8, 1947, see Cong.Bd., App. 80th Cong., 1st seas., Vol.03, pt. 13, A.4609.

56. \fashington Daily News, March 7, 1048, 6. 57. fhis article was included in his remarks by JuddJ see

Cong. Bd., 8oth Cong., 1st sess., Vol.OS, pt.lS, A.8962.

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some newspaper columnists and foreign affairs analysts also alleaed that the CCP vas in close collabora­tion with the Kremlin, and that, the former vas getting moral and material support from the latter,Gonstatine Brown

of the Washington BVen!ng Star (June 12, 1947, p.l3) wrote that a small Soviet air force had gone to China to help the Communists. Baldwin of the New York Times reported that the CCP was being assisted by Moscow with leadership and direction, in addition to arms and ammunition. (58) Cl7de Farnsworth wrote in the Washington Daily News (Dec. 1, 1947, p. 12) that the infiltration of Chinese Communists into Manchnria during and following Soviet occupation great­ly facilitated them to get aid from the Soviet union.

All these men asse~ed that since the Soviet Union vas fully backing the CCP, the tJDi ted States should not hesitate in aiding the Chinese Government to eave ber fzom going uncter the heels of international communism.

OpRosition to Aid

Opposition to aid of any kind to the Chinese Government was also expressed. This primarily came either from the American Communist Party or from organizations in which the Commanist Party was reportedly infiuential. ~he

Communists laanched an all-out campaign in order to prevent any aid that might help the Chinese Government. Mass meet­ings and petitions were their usual tactics, and the propa­ganda campaign was furthered through newspapers and maga­zines vilifYing the Administration in washington on the one hand and the Chinese Government on the other. On October 20, 1947, for example, the Dailf Worker, official organ of the Party, asserted: ;\: ./.

&8. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 87a4, 1947.

I

- -en - A71-

1'1 "Pu.rther Jmerican aid can only postpone but c~ot prevent Chiang•s inevitable defeat ••• The people of the Iuomintaug areas are rallying increasingly to support the democratic tront, led b.Y the Communist Party, which is now the main leader ot tbe national struggle tor independence and democracy.• (60)

A commentator wrote in Poli tic• Affairs :·: •theore­tical• organ of the CoDUDUDist Party, that the UDited States interYention vas •directly responsible tor the civil war •• •

In scope, magnitude and strategic significane, the u.s. -sponsored war, directed at preventing China from becoming united, democratic and tree, is the decisive post-war mili­tar,y operation of the imperialist forces•. "The vast aid to Chiang Kai-shek•, the author further wrote, •has not resolved the conflict in favour of imperialism. On the contrary, the reactionary Iuomintang clique that American imperialism is supporting has suffered military reveraes ••• • (60)

When Truman brought forth the aid to China pro­gramme, the opposition of the Communists became all the more trenchant. On february 22, the eighth annual conven• tion of the National Lawyers' Guild adopted a resolution urgiug the President to withdraw "all military and naval personnel" from China and cease operation of air bases and

naval installations in that country. (61) JDother allegedly Communist supported group calling itself the •committee tor a Democratic Par Eastern Policy' presented to the House Poreign Affairs Committee a atatement totally opposing &QT

60. The Daily worker. oct. 26. 1047. 4.

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and ever,- kind of aid to the Chinese Government. (88) Ita arguments werea

a) It the united State• gave aid to National Government, the USSB would support the Chineae CoiiUJ11Ulists J and that would mean a prolonged civil war - a danger to interna­tional peace and aecurit7. b) De conflict between tbe DJ! and the CCP vas a primarl-17 domestic iaau~,and outside Powers ahould not take sidea. c) fhe Ill! Government was so corrupt aDd ill-organized that no amount of American aid would put her on her own feet. d) Chinese coJIIDI1Uli1m vas essentially not comnnmiemJ it vas only an economic reform movement, and was therefore heal tilT and good. e) American interference would cost her the good will of the Chinese people. f) China vas too big for effective aid. g) Much aid had been giYen in the past few years by the UDi~ed States or by ONNBA, and had been ineffective. h) SUch considerations as the importance ot Chinese inde­pendence to the national security of the United States mnat be excluded from the design for world peace under the united Nations. i) American ~d could not guarantee •a ~ree, democratic,

C."'-lJ1.~ and vigorous able to stand on its ovn feet and assist in

" building the peace of the world. (68)

68. this CoDIDittee held a

) oa. 68.

-sa .2/3-

!he sponsors of the •committee for a Democratic •ar Jastern Policy• had skillfully brought together in their statement the misgiving• and anxieties that many Americans experienced over the whole issue, Some member• of Congress gave expression to these misgivings, Bepresen­tatiYe Celler, Democrat, N.Y., while speaking on the bill on 20 March, said that the money asked for Chiang Govern­ment was •money poured down a drain, • (8£) Congressman Manefield said that the Chinese problem could not be resolved by ~ amount of ~erioan dollars, and that. the aolution was to come eventually from the Chineae. (8G) John A. Blatnik, Democrat, Minn., decried the •bolsteringup• of •corrupt and feudalistic• regime of Chiang Eai-shek, {88)

Maxwell S, Stewart, a long-time student of China and its problems stated in The Ration (february 7, 1948) that more thaD 13 billion given to China in the form of credits, surplus property, direct military aid, aDd other forms of assistance had done no good to China, and that •pouring 1 billion o• 80 billion dollars more down the same rat hole won't help China.• It would, he wrote, help create more discontent, and make •a laughing stock• of tho v.Dited States. Be suggested that no help should be given UD1••• a coalition government •genuinely representative of all maJor parties• was established, and reforms and honesty were

84,

86.

66.

Coug, Bd., House, 80th Cong., 2nd sees., Vol.04, pt.8, 8821. Ibid,, March 81, 1948, 3869-80. Also see ibid,, 3866.62 for his address of Nov. 18, 1947. Ibid., March 26, 1948, pt,a, 3664, Be cited neverend Spencer J. Kennard, Jr. , who spent ;yeart in China in support of his contention& He also quoted Bdgar P. Snov, newspaper correspondent and writor of several books on China and Soviet Bueaia, like Bed Star over China (1937)J Battle for Asia (194l)J Pattern of §oViet Power (1945),

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1Dtro4uoe4 in the COUDt~. (8?)

A aon-pariiaan orguization, known aa the •People•• Lob'by*, submitted to senate Committee on roroisn & Belationa and House Committee on Joroign Affaire a brief on fUrther aiel to China and Greece, and styled the aid programmes ae a poverty of .&mel'loan stateamanablp• • (88)

C2JWEOSe1onal Agti;on on ft'aman '• .&y to Qhiy Propotl\

!he House Poreip Utairs Committee wae maoh lmp~ssed b,y the oplnlona e3Preased before it aa also outside in favour of milita17 aid to the Batlonal Gowrament. It realized tmt Chlua • a land of eoo.ooo.ooo, about 18 percent ot mnkin4 was of great atretegio eigalftoanoe to tbe •tree vorld • in its fight against the international VoJ21DDtdat movement. fbe argument that appealed most to the Bepublloan members of the Committee was tbat eu.bmisalon to coemmi• was not the way to hture peace, but to war, that tatun security 1&¥ in building a stable and anassaU.ablo noa­Comnmntet world, and that, tbo tfest would not win the not with tbe soviet UDlon without rmmiq 1 t to the last. D•T felt tbat tho programme o~ economlo ai4 alono would~ no good to the Nationalists, ana that, military aid was most .ttal.(OI)

!he Comad.ttee reported tbe bill es part of an omuibus floreisn A.seistance bill ot 1048 • which ha4 the European Recovery Progrnmme (D.B.P.J as ita ooro. !he

O'l. stewart •s article was inoluded in the report o~ the nouse Poro-ign Af1:alrs CoJ!IId.ttee, hearings, Po§S•vg !@eoveg Pros~t lh 83 1 SPA.-&1.

ea. %b!&. t24o-4o. 69. SQb.Comaittee No.3, of Houee Commlttoo on Foreign

Affaire, Befort on tbe strate& GDl Taetioa ot World Cgnqg.p1zsm rasLlng\on D.c., 1 6) Document iJo.l10,'48.

recommendation was to earmark $160 million for militar,v aid to China - leaving 1420 million ror economic aid, but part of that might also be diverted towards milita17 assistance.

!here was no serious opposition on the House floor from either part7 to the militar,y aid provieioneJ and on April e, J:tCS, it approved the China Aid .let of 1948 in­

corpomted as Title IV of Public Law 4'11 (The Foreign Assistance .let of 1948). It authorized t 488 million for the Nanking Government - 1838 million in economic assistance, and 1126 million for special grants to be uaed at RanJd.ng.•s discretion, i.e., for militar.y purposes. This amount waa roughly the 12-month equivalent of the original 16'10 million proposed for 16 montha by the Administration as well aa the Committee.

On April a, !fruma.!i:put his signature on the Poreign Assistance Act, and oalled~•Amerioa•s answer to the challenae facing the •tree world••. ('10)

The President's signatures, however, did not make the money available for expenditure. Under Congressional procedure, a specific appropriation bill vas neoessar.y. SUch a bill could provide, it Congress so wished, for a amaller anount than that authorized 1n the earlie1~ legis­lation.

The Rouse Appropriations Committee, headed b7 John Taber, made sharp lnitial outs in aU phaeee ot the B.B.P. authorization including a reduction in China aid from 1463 million to 1400 million and an extension of the period from 18 to 15 months. ('11)

10. B.Y. Times, April 4, lal, 1948. 11. On June 8, Taber explained the reasons for reduction

and said that if there vere less money, the Chinese Gove~nt and the Boonomio Cooperation Administration vouldD'fmore c aretuJaB spending 1 t, see ibid. , June 4, ,.. . 8a3 1 1948. '

-211 -)..7~-

on June 4, the Bouse of Bepresentativea pa•se4 a slashed B.B.P. bill including the China total propoaed by the Appropriations Committee.

!he bill then vent to the Senate. fbe Appropria­tions Committee there recommended t400 million for 18 months - virtually the same as the original authorized amount. After the differing bills bad been ironed. out in conferen~e, the final China appropriation, as passed by both Houses and sent to the White Bouse on June ao, was $400 million • I 276 million for economic and Sl2G million in effect for•militar.y• purposes tor twelve months. It was signed by the President on June 28.