causation and the canberra plan

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CAUSATION AND THE

CANBERRA PLAN

DAVID LIEBESMAN

Abstract: David Lewis has a general recipe for analysis: the Canberra Plan.

His analyses of mind, color, and value all proceed according to the plan. What

is curious is that his analysis of causation – one of his seminal analyses – doesn’t. It doesn’t and according to Lewis it can’t. Lewis has two objections

against using the Canberra Plan to analyze causation. After presenting Lewis’

objections I argue that they both fail. I then draw some lessons from their

failure.papq_1395 232..242

1. Causation: the odd man out

David Lewis has a recipe for analysis: the Canberra Plan. The plan pro-

ceeds as follows. First, we find a concept that seems metaphysicallysuspect, e.g. pain. Second, we elicit the folk theory of the suspect concept

and conjoin all of the theory’s tenets. Third, we rid our conjunction of the

word that expresses the suspect concept, uniformly replacing each of its

occurrences with a variable and existentially binding that variable. This

leaves us with only familiar non-suspect language. Fourth, we look into

the world and discover the satisfier of our existential generalization.

Presto! We’ve taken a metaphysically suspect concept and located its

extension in the non-suspect realm (Lewis, 1966 and 1972).

The plan is somewhat flexible. We need not find a perfect satisfier of thefolk theory as long as we find one that is close enough. We also have the

ability to interdefine terms by replacing each suspect term of the joint

theory with a different variable.1

Lewis’ analyses of mind, color, and value all proceed according to the

Canberra Plan.2 What is curious is that his analysis of causation – one of

his seminal analyses – doesn’t. It doesn’t and according to Lewis it can’t.3

Lewis has two objections against using the Canberra Plan to analyze

causation: the miscellany objection and the missing relata objection.4 I aim

to undermine both. While the bulk of my remarks focus squarely on

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2011) 232–242

© 2011 The Author

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

232



causation, they suggest some general considerations regarding the Can-

berra Plan. Each of the objections, I argue, leads not to a vice of the plan

but, rather, a virtue.

2. The miscellany objection

Why seek an analysis of causation in the first place? Lewis gives us a

reason: instances of causation are widely varied. The big bang caused

today’s weather; the nail’s placement on the road caused my tire to flatten;

my hunger caused my irritability. ‘And yet I seem to have picked up a

general concept of causation,’ Lewis reminds us, ‘applicable to all different

kinds of causation, and applicable to causation never found in our ownworld.’ He continues, ‘I think conceptual analysis is required to reveal

what it is that all the actual and possible varieties of causation have in

common.’5

Here, then, is the miscellany objection.6 First, Lewis observes that

instances of causation are widely varied. From this he concludes that if the

Canberra Plan is applied to causation, it will yield something disjunctive

and unnatural. In all likelihood the result will be a gerrymandered relation

but, as I’ll soon argue, there is no requirement that the Canberra Plan yield

a relation. Second, Lewis notes that we have somehow acquired a fullygeneral concept of causation, applicable to all of its disparate instances,

and he claims that it is incumbent on a successful analysis to explain how

we acquired such a general concept of causation. From these two claims,

Lewis concludes that applying the Canberra Plan to causation will not

meet all of the demands placed on a successful analysis.7

As presented, the argument is invalid. An extra premise along the fol-

lowing lines is needed:

EP: Any analysis of causation that yields something disjunctive orunnatural will fail to explain how we acquired a general concept of

causation.

When we add EP to Lewis’ two claims, we can produce a valid argu-

ment. While one may take issue with any of the premises, it is EP that –

even by Lewis’ own lights – is false.

To see how applying the Canberra Plan to causation may account for

the generality of our concept of causation we need only look as far as

Lewis’ theory of mind. In ‘Reduction of Mind’, Lewis acknowledges thatthough a basic supervenenience thesis preserves materialism, it is not

enough to explain all of the interesting facts about the mental. Lewis puts

the point as follows:

CAUSATION AND THE CANBERRA PLAN 233

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The vast majority of supervenient features of the world are given only by miscellaneously

infinite disjunctions of infinitely complex physical conditions. Therefore they are beyond our

power to detect, to name, or to think about one at a time. Mental features of the world,

however, are not at all beyond our ken. Finite assemblies of particles – us – can track them.

Therefore there must be some sort of simplicity to them (1994, pp. 297–298).

He goes on to claim that explanation of this simplicity is a job that falls

to conceptual analysis and that he has a recipe for such an analysis. Lewis’

recipe is to identify the folk theory of the mental: folk psychology. It is folk

psychology that reveals the sort of simplicity had by mental features: folk

psychology reveals how such mental features are not beyond our ken.

Back to causation: just as there is a folk theory of mind, there is also a

folk theory of causation.8 Given that the folk theory of mind was invoked

to explain how we track mental features – even if they are radicallydisjunctive – we can invoke folk causal theory to explain how it is that we

track causal features of this world and others.

Consider a non-materialistic world N. N is populated by wizards. There

is nothing like physical causation in N. Rather, all causation is brought

about by spells. Nonetheless, when discussing N we immediately identify

spell-casting as causal.

Consider an occasionalist world G: all causation is mediated by God.

Causation in G is extrinsic, unlike much causation that occurs in the actual

world. Nonetheless, when we discuss G, we immediately identify someGod-mediated relations as causal.

What explains the ease with which we identify N features and G features

as causal? The proponent of the Canberra Plan has an explanation.

Certain features of N and G satisfy the folk theory of causation. It is this

satisfaction that allows us to identify these features as causal. This is true

despite the fact that the features in question may be extremely different

than the causal features of our own world, as well as different from each

other.

Why think that the Canberra Plan as applied to causation must fail toaccount for our general concept of causation? A convincing reason must

somehow break the analogy between pain and causation.

What could break the analogy? Here are two suggestions, both

doomed. Suggestion 1: causal processes are more diverse than pain

states. Response: this is doubtful both within our world and across other

possible worlds. It is likely that both pain states and causal processes are

extremely diverse. In other worlds, there are entities with entirely differ-

ent constitutions than ours that still manage to feel pain. The diversity of

possible pain states is immense. Without simplification it seems as if grasp of these diverse states as somehow unified is beyond our ken.

Luckily, we can rely on the folk theory of pain to unify these states. If

the folk theory of pain achieves a simplification of something far beyond

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our ken, then there is no reason to doubt that the folk theory of causa-

tion can accomplish the same feat. Suggestion 2: causation is a relation

while pain is a property. Response: this can be granted, but it remains to

be seen what exactly about pain’s being a property that would allow us

to grasp it via a folk theory but prevents the same strategy from workingwith causation. Folk theories allow us to conceptually unify that which

is metaphysically complicated. Conceptual simplification is no different

with properties than relations.

Without being able to identify a relevant disanalogy between pain and

causation, we can conclude that the Canberra Plan for causation has the

resources to explain the generality of our concept of causation as well as

the Canberra Plan for pain explains the generality of our concept of pain.

Since Lewis is perfectly happy with the latter explanation, he has no sound

objection to the former.

3. The missing relata objection

Lewis’ second objection against application of the Canberra Plan to cau-

sation is the missing relata objection. In his own words:

The problem becomes especially acute when we remember to cover not only causation of

positive events by positive events, but also causation by absences, causation of absences, andcausation via absences as intermediate steps. The most fundamental problem is that absences

are unsuitable relata for any causal relation, by reason of their nonexistence. This is every-

one’s problem. It is not to be dodged by saying that causation involving absences is really

‘causation*,’ a different thing from genuine causation – call it what you will, it still needs to

be part of the story. It is my problem too, and I shall return to it; but in the meantime, let the

missing relata objection join the miscellany objection as reasons to think that acquaintance

with ‘the’ causal relation, or characterization of ‘it’ as the occupant of a role, are not

workable rivals to a conceptual analysis of causation (2004a, p. 77).

According to the missing relata objection, the fact that there can becausation by absences (as well as causation of absences and causation via

absences) gives us reason to reject the Canberra Plan as applied to causa-

tion. It is not immediately obvious why causation of and by absence makes

trouble for the Canberra Plan. Causation by absence seems merely to show

that not all instances of causation are relational, due to the fact that there

aren’t enough relata. The only way to infer from the non-relational nature

of causation to the conclusion that the Canberra Plan cannot apply to

causation is via the following principle, which, I claim, provides the

missing link in Lewis’ objection:

CR: The Canberra Plan as applied to causation could only yield a

relation.


© 2011 The Author




I am not claiming that CR is true; in fact, I will soon argue otherwise. All

I suggest is that Lewis, in the above passage, must have tacitly endorsed

CR. The evidence is as follows. It is clear from the final sentence that Lewis

thinks that missing relata produce trouble for the Canberra Plan as

applied to causation. Earlier in the passage, Lewis spells out the preciseproblem posed by missing relata. He claims that ‘The most fundamental

problem is that absences are unsuitable relata for any causal relation, by

reason of their nonexistence.’ If the Canberra Plan as applied to causation

could yield anything but a relation then this ‘most fundamental problem’

would not affect the Canberra Plan at all! In fact, without CR, it is a non

sequitur to move from ‘the most fundamental problem’ to an objection

that the Canberra Plan as applied to causation is problematic. Given that

it is extremely doubtful that Lewis provides us with a non sequitur, I

propose that Lewis tacitly endorses CR.Independently of the cited passage, it is plausible that Lewis endorses

CR. After all, Menzies, a main proponent of the Canberra Plan as applied

to causation endorses CR. Menzies claims that a central folk platitude

about causation is that it is an intrinsic relation. This, of course, entails

that it is a relation. Insofar as Lewis is targeting Menzies, it is plausible

that he adopts CR.

The missing relata objection, then, is as follows. (P1) There are instances

of causation that aren’t instances of a causal relation. (P2) The Canberra

Plan, if successful, could only yield a relation. (C) The Canberra Plancannot provide a successful analysis of causation.

I’ll now argue that the missing relata objection is plagued by the falsity

of both of its premises. P1 is undermined because endorsing Lewis’ moti-

vation for it would lead to severe overgeneration problems. P2 is under-

mined by other work of Lewis’; in this way it is like the miscellany

objection. Its flaw is sourced in an overly narrow view of the resources at

the disposal of the proponent of the Canberra Plan.

P1 entails that causation is not a relation. The idea is that if causa-

tion is a relation then all instances of causation are relational. From thefact that some instances of causation aren’t relational, we can then con-

clude that causation is not a relation. Lewis supports P1 by appeal to

causation by (of and involving) absences. However, supporting this

premise in such a way is dubious. This is due to the fact that such

reasoning can be generalized to support claims to the effect that a

wide variety of properties and relations are not, in fact, properties and

relations.

I am building a house. When I lay the foundation, it is true that I have

built part of my house. Unfortunately, I run out of money and the houseis never finished. Thus, we have an instance of the parthood relation where

a relata is missing: my house. According to Lewis’ reasoning, there are

non-relational instances of parthood and parthood is not a relation.


© 2011 The Author




I am in love with Catherine Barkley from A Farewell to Arms. She does

not exist: she is purely fictional. Thus, we have a purported instance of the

love relation with a missing relata. According to Lewis’ reasoning, there

are non-relational instances of love and love is not a relation.

Consider holes. Holes are surely as dubious existents as absences, in factthey seem to be the object analog of absences. If we refuse to reify absences

we will likely refuse to reify holes. Nonetheless, I can be inside a hole, near

a hole, above a hole, next to a hole, see a hole, and avoid a hole. According

to Lewis’ reasoning, being inside, being near, being above, being next to,

seeing, and avoiding all fail to be relations. After all, they are sometimes

missing relata.

These conclusions will strike many as absurd. Since the reasoning

employed in these cases is not relevantly different than the reasoning

employed by Lewis to support P1, we can conclude that P1 is unsupportedand, ipso facto, the missing relata objection is unconvincing.

Let me stress that I am not claiming that my building of the never-

finished house provides us an instance of the building relation, nor that my

love for Catherine Barkley provides us with an instance of the love rela-

tion, nor that being next to a hole provides us with a genuine instance of

the next to relation.

Rather, I merely claim that these cases are analogous to the case of

causation by absence. The idea is that, in cases of causation by absence,

there doesn’t seem to exist any entity to serve as the first relata of acausation relation. This is exactly what we find in the other cases. For

instance, in the case of my loving Catherine Barkley, there doesn’t

seem to be an entity that can serve as the second relata of the loving

relation. Of course, what we are going to say at the end of the day about

these cases is up for debate. My only point here is that the cases are

analogous.

Perhaps we do not wish to treat any of the cases under consideration as

genuine cases of relational instantiation. On this view, e.g. the loving

relation is not instantiated when I appear to love Catherine Barkley. If thisis the strategy, then analogous remarks will apply to causation. We’ll deny

that apparent causation by (of and via) omission is genuine causation. If

this choice is made, then absences give us only apparent causation, and,

they provide us with no support for P1.

If causation by absence gives us reason to doubt that causation is a

relation, than the other cases give us reason to doubt that loving , building ,

and being next to are relations. Furthermore, such cases could be con-

structed for almost any proposed relational analysis. We would then be

faced with the absurd conclusion that there are almost no relations what-soever. Given that this is absurd, I conclude that the above cases do not

give us reason to doubt that loving , building , and being next to are rela-

tions. Given the analogy of these cases with the case of causation by


© 2011 The Author




absence, I conclude that absences give us to reason to doubt that causation

is a relation.

Of course these remarks, in and of themselves, give us no solution to the

metaphysical troubles raised by absences, unfinished houses, fictional enti-

ties, and holes. Exactly how we can give a satisfying treatment of suchcases that is compatible with relational analysis is a substantial open

question. However, the question is fully general: it does not target

absences in isolation.9

The conclusion, then, is that P1 is false. Causation by, of, and involving

absence gives us no reason to doubt that causation is a relation, on pain of

doubting that there are any relations whatsoever. If we have no reason to

doubt that causation is a relation, then the missing relata objection fails.

Undermining P1 is sufficient to undermine the missing relata objection.

However, I think there is an even deeper reason that the objection fails,which stems from the falsity of P2. P2 is especially plausible when we

adopt a traditional Platonistic interpretation of second-order logic. Cau-

sation, in the folk theory of causation, will be denoted by the transitive

‘causes’, a two-place predicate. When we replace ‘causes’ with a variable,

it will be a second-order variable (due to its filling a predicative position)

which, prima facie, denotes a universal. However, it is familiar that we are

not forced into a Platonistic interpretation of second-order quantification.

In fact, Lewis, in independent work, executes the Canberra Plan in a

non-Platonistic setting. In Parts of Classes, Lewis aims to reduce set theoryto mereology supplemented with the singleton function. However, Lewis

harbors serious doubts about the mysteries inherent in taking the singleton

function as primitive. He considers a way to avoid this: conjoin the crucial

tenets associated with the function and replace the word denoting the

function with a variable, then existentially binding the variable. The strat-

egy is familiar: it is a version of the Canberra Plan as applied to the

singleton function. Like the plan as applied to causation, the most obvious

result of the plan as applied to the singleton function would be a dyadic

relation. However, Lewis thinks that taking such a relation to be sui generis would be objectionable. In a set-theoretical context, it is ordinary

to identify relations with ordered pairs, which then are given a set-

theoretic reduction. In this context, such a strategy is unavailable to Lewis.

He is attempting to reduce set theory, so sets had better not appear in his

reduction! George Boolos (1984, 1985) provides the seeds of a solution.

Boolos interprets higher-order quantification as plural. Instead of taking

‘wise’ to commit us to the property of wisdom, we take it to commit us

merely to the wise things. There are technical difficulties generalizing this

to non-monadic predicates, but Lewis, Hazen, and Burgess, in an appen-dix to Parts of Classes, provide us with a way to interpret dyadic second-

order quantification as plural, using the resources of mereology (and given

some independent metaphysical assumptions).10


© 2011 The Author




So, when it comes to the singleton function, we’ve seen that the Can-

berra Plan can be executed without producing a relation. Rather, what

appears to be quantification over a relation is, in fact, innocent plural

quantification.11

In fact, the lesson is more general. The Canberra Plan provides us witha mechanism to locate apparent ontological commitments in non-suspect

realms. This mechanism crucially involves existential quantification, and,

in the case of causation, second-order existential quantification. As such,

the proponent of the plan can, in principle, provide any available inter-

pretation of the second-order quantifier, e.g. plural, substitutional, or

adverbial.

To be clear, my claim is not that a proponent of the Canberra Plan for

causation should interpret the second-order existential quantifier as plural.

Rather, my claim is merely that such an interpretation is available. Givenits availability, the proponent of the Canberra Plan for causation is no

more committed to a relational analysis of causation than any theorist

utilizing second-order logic is committed to an ordinary Platonistic inter-

pretation of second-order variables. P2 then fails because it was supported

by a suspect link between quantification and ontological commitment.

4. Two battlefronts in Canberra

We can now set aside causation and articulate some general lessons about

the Canberra Plan. The miscellany objection leads us directly to a virtue of

the plan. Many of our terms seem to denote highly unnatural properties

and relations. This is so despite the fact that the concepts associated with

these terms may play a central role in our conceptual scheme. Given the

assumption that, all other things being equal, it is far easier to denote a

natural property or relation than a highly unnatural one, how we succeed

in picking out such properties and relations is puzzling. If reference is fixed

via a folk theory, then this folk theory can provide the explanation. TheCanberra Plan will, then, reveal the nature of the denoted property or

relation. As seen in the passage from ‘Reduction of Mind’, Lewis was well

aware of this advantage. What’s puzzling is that he seemed to think it

couldn’t be utilized in the case of causation. I hope to have made compel-

ling the claim that this advantage of the plan is just as general as the plan

itself.

The missing relata objection also leads us to a virtue of the plan. First,

though, consider a fairly obvious (and fairly substantial) worry about the

Canberra Plan. The worry is that our folk theory is disconnected from itssubject matter. If this is the case then Ramsification over the tenets of the

theory could hardly yield an existential generalization that would be

expected to latch onto the right thing. There is a lot to say about this


© 2011 The Author




objection, in particular a Canberra Plan sympathizer can appeal to the

purported reference- fixing nature of the folk theory. However, much must

be said before the issue can be settled. This, I take it, is the primary

battlefront for a Canberra Plan sympathizer.

What is interesting about Lewis is that he purports to identify an entirelydistinct battlefront for the Canberra Plan. The plan, he observes, can only

yield values for variables. If we are skeptical that our suspect notion really

could be the satisfier of those variables then we should abandon the plan.

The lesson of the missing relata objection is that this is a pseudo-

battlefront. Given the availability of distinct, non-committal, interpreta-

tions of second-order variables – interpretations that Lewis is happy to

rely on elsewhere – the proponent of the Canberra Plan can relieve herself

of commitment. In fact, the availability of such interpretations leads to a

virtue of the plan. There are all sorts of notions about which we may desireanalyses but hope to avoid commitment to. As Lewis stated, we may desire

an analysis of a given notion to explain the ease with which we grasp it.

The Canberra Plan can provide this. Importantly, it can provide this

without committing us to the notion. If we interpret the relevant quanti-

fication as non-committal, then we’ll have our cake (explanation of our

grasp) and eat it too (lack of ontological commitment).12

Department of Philosophy

Boston University

NOTES

1 Another possibility: there are multiple distinct satisfiers of the existential generalization.

In this case, the Canberra Plan gives us the foundation for a structuralist view of the notion

in question. See Lewis, 1991 on the singleton function.2 On mind see Lewis, 1980 and 1994; on color see Lewis, 1997; on value see Lewis, 1989.3 Tooley, 1987 and Menzies, 1999 attempt Canberra Plan-based analyses of causation.

4 Both of these objections are given in the first several pages of Lewis, 2004a. A shorterversion of Lewis, 2004a was published in The Journal of Philosophy 2002, but this version

does not contain the relevant section.5 2004a, p. 76. This quote is taken (very) slightly out of context. In its original context,

Lewis invokes the generality of causation as evidence against a direct realist account of

causation according to which we immediately perceive the causal relation. The causal rela-

tions that we do perceive, Lewis claims, are simply not enough to explain the generality of

causation.6 What follows is a reconstruction of Lewis’ reasoning in his 2004a. I aim to be charitable

when there is any interpretative difficulty.7

There is a slightly different argument suggested by the last sentence of the paragraph inwhich Lewis articulates the miscellany objection. He writes ‘If causation is, or might be,

wildly disjunctive we need to know what unifies the disjunction. For one thing the folk

platitudes tell us is that causation is one thing, common to the many causal mechanisms’

(2004a, p. 76). This suggests the following objection. The Canberra Plan will not work for


© 2011 The Author




causation because executing it will not help us to explain what it is that unites the common

causal mechanisms. This objection is flawed. Discovering the satisfier of the existentially

generalized Ramsey sentence and then investigating the nature of that satisfier may help us to

understand its underlying nature. I think that this objection is far weaker than the interpre-

tation of the miscellany objection that I give above.8 How can I be so confident of the existence of a folk theory? Simple: a folk theory is

constituted simply of a set of largely uncontroversial judgments and principles. Such a set

provides the foundation for just about every extant theory of causation.9 Lewis, 1986, 2004b and Beebee, 2004 consider causation by absence in greater detail.10 Hazen has further developed his method in his 1997 and 2000. There are a number of

noncommittal alternatives to plural quantification. For example, Rayo and Yablo, 2001 offer

an adverbialist alternative, and Hofweber, 2005 offers an inferential role view of (some

occurrences of) second-order quantifiers.11 In his 2002, Lewis rejects the view that instantiation is a relation and suggests that we

take it to be a non-relational tie. He attempts to explicate this by claiming that we should

refuse to reify an instantiation relation. Given the observation about plural quantification,

we may now see a way to demystify Lewis’ view: take apparent quantification over the

instantiation relation to be merely plural.12 Thanks to Karen Bourrier, Matti Eklund, Andrew McGonigal, Brian Weatherson, and

two anonymous referees.

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