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DOI: 10.1177/072551369002600109

1990 26: 123Thesis Eleven

Cornelius CastoriadisDoes the Idea of Revolution Still Make Sense?

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Interviews

Does the Idea of Revolution Still Make Sense?

An Interview with Cornelius Castoriadis*

Interviewer: How does one properly situate the French Revolution in

the series of great revolutions, the English Revolution, the American

Revolution, which mark the advent of political modernity? And how

is one to understand that, in relation to its predecessors, the French

Revolution has acquired the status of model-revolution, of revolution

par excellence? What does it introduce that is genuinely new? And in

the history of the very idea of revolution, what place does it occupy?

C.C.: It is important to begin by emphasizing the historical speci-

ficityof the French Revolution. It is the first revolution to

pose clearlythe idea of an explicit self-institution of society. In world history one

knew of bread riots, slave revolts, peasant wars; one knew of coups

d’Etat, monarchies undertaking reforms, one knew too of a few more or

less radical reinstitutions such as that of Mohammed, for example, but

in these cases a revelation, that is, an extrasocial source and founda-

tion, is invoked. In France, however, it is society itself, or an enormous

portion of this society, that launches into an undertaking that becomes,very rapidly, one of explicit self-institution.

This radicality is not to be found in the English Revolution, cer-

tainly, but not even in the American Revolution. In North America the

institution of society, even if it is declared to proceed from the will of

the people, remains anchored in the religious sphere, as it also remains

anchored in the past by English Common Law. Above all, it is limitedin its ambition. The Founding Fathers, and the movement they express,

receive from the past a social state which they consider appropriate and

which they do not think needs to be changed in any way. In their view,it remains only to institute the political complement of this social state.

In this regard, the parallel with the democratic movement in the

ancient Greek world is interesting. It was the Greeks, certainly, who








124

discovered that every institution of society is self-institution-that it

pertains to normos, not to phusis. They anticipate on a practical level

the consequences of this discovery; in any case, they did so in the demo-

cratic cities, and notably in Athens. That is clear as early as the 7th

century BC, is confirmed with Solon and culminates in the Cleisthenian

revolution (508-506), which was characterized, as one

knows, by itsaudaciously radical attitude toward the inherited ways of articulatingsocio-political arrangements, arrangements which it threw into upheavalin order to make them conform to a democratic political way offunction-

ing. Nevertheless, explicit self-institution, never became for them the

principle of political activity encompassing the social institution in its

totality. Property is never really challenged, any more than the status

of women, not to mention slavery. Ancient democracy aims at realizing,and it does realize, the effective self-government of the community of

free adult males, and touches to the least extent possible the received

social and economic structures. Only the philosophers (a few sophistsin the 5th century, Plato in the 4th) will go any further.

Likewise, for the American Founding Fathers there is a social (eco-nomic, moral, religious) given which is accepted, which even is to be

actively preserved (Jefferson is against industrialization because he sees

in the agrarian freehold the cornerstone of political liberty), and which is

to be provided with the corresponding political structure. The latter, of

course, is &dquo;founded&dquo; elsewhere--on the &dquo;principles&dquo; of the Declaration

which express the universalist imaginary of &dquo;natural rights&dquo;. But, bya miraculous coincidence-which is decisive for American &dquo;exception-alism&dquo; -the two structures, the social and the political, will happento correspond to each other for a few decades. What Marx called the

socio-economic basis of ancient democracy, the community of indepen-dent small producers, also happens to be in part the reality of North

America in the age of Jefferson and the underlying support for his po-

litical vision.

Now, the grandeur and the originality of the French Revolution is

to be found, in my judgment, in that very thing for which it is so often

reproached, viz., that it tends to put in question, de jure, the exist-

ing institution of society in its totality. The French Revolution cannot

create politically if it does not destroy socially. The members of the

Constituent Assembly know it and say it. The English Revolution and

even the American Revolution can give themselves the representation of

a restoration and recuperation of a supposed past. The few attempts,








125

in France, to refer to a tradition rapidly aborted, and what Burke says

about it is pure mythology. Hannah Arendt commits an enormous blun-

der when she reproaches the French revolutionaries for having become

involved with the social question, presenting the latter as amountingto philanthropic gestures and pity for the poor. A double blunder.

First-and this remains eternally true-----the social question is a politicalquestion. In classical terms (in Aristotle, already): Is democracy com-

patible with the coexistence of extreme wealth and extreme poverty?In contemporary terms: Is not economic power ipso facto also politicalpower? Second, in France the Ancien Regime is not simply a politicalstructure; it is a total social structure. Royalty, nobility, the role and

function of the Church in society, properties and privileges are woven

into the innermost texture of the old society. It is the whole social edifice

that is to be reconstructed, for without that a political transformation is

materially impossible. The French Revolution cannot even if it wanted

to, simply superimpose a democratic political organization onto a social

regimes that it would leave intact. As so often in Hannah Arendt, ideas

prevent her from seeing the facts. But the great historical facts are ideas

more

weighty than the ideas of philosophers. The &dquo;thousand-year-oldpast&dquo;, as opposed to the &dquo;virgin continent&dquo;, necessarily carries with it

the need to mount an attack on the social edifice as such. From this

standpoint, the American Revolution can actually be only an &dquo;excep-tion&dquo; in modern history, in no way the rule and still less the model.

The members of the Constituent Assembly are fully conscious of that

and say so. Where the American Revolution can build on the illusion of

an &dquo;equality&dquo; already existing in its social state (an illusion which will

remain the foundation for Tocqueville’s analyses fifty years later), the

French Revolution finds itself faced with the massive reality of a highlyinegalitarian society, of an imaginary of royal rule by divine right, of a

centralized Church whose role and social functions are omnipresent, of

geographical differences which nothing can justify, etc.

Interviewer: But is it not at this very point that it runs afoul of

Burke’s criticism, and in its most profound aspect? Can a generationmake a gap in history by acting in pure discontinuity with its past? Is

a foundation for freedom, which no longer has as support either Prov-

idence or tradition but which rests rather entirely within itself, not

evanescent?

C.C.: That is why the revolutionaries constantly invoke Reason in

1789-as they will also do throughout the 19th and the 20th century-








126

which also will have disastrous consequences.

Interviewer: You would grant, then, at least a part of the Burkean

line of argument, which states that it is difhcult to found freedom on

Reason?

C.C.: Here there are several points.First,

it is not a matter of

founding freedom on Reason, since Reason itself presupposes freedom-

autonomy. Reason is not a mechanical device or a system of ready-madetruths, it is the movement of a thought which does not recognize any

authority other than its own activity. To accede to Reason, one must

first want to think freely. Second, there is never pure discontinuity.When I say that history is creation ex nihalo, that does not signify in any

way that it is creation in nihilo, or cum nihilo. The new form emerges,it takes up what it finds lying about, the rupture is in the new meaningit confers upon what it inherits or utilizes. In the third place, Burke

himself is inconsistent. He is drawn onto the field of the revolutionaries

and grants implicitly the cogency of their presuppositions since he tries

to refute their conclusions &dquo;rationally&dquo;. He feels himself obliged to givea foundation in reason to the value of tradition.

Now,that is a

betrayalof tradition: a true tradition is not discussed. Burke, in other words,cannot escape from the reflectiveness whose effects in the Revolution he

denounces.

Interviewer: Does this inconsistency take all pertinence away from

his criticism?

C.C.: His criticism touches on truth when it bears on what must

be called &dquo;mechanical rationalization&dquo;, which begins rather early in the

Revolution and which will enjoy a brilliant future. That leads us to the

ambiguity of the idea of Reason, to which I just alluded. To phrase it

in philosophical terms, the Reason of the Lumières is both an open pro-

cess of criticism and elucidation-which implies, among other things,the clear-cut distinction between fact and right-and mechanical, stan-

dardizing understanding. Philosophical criticism, and then revolution-

ary practice destroy the mere fact-existing institutions-showing that

they have no reason to be other than that they have already been. (Heretoo, Burke is caught in ambiguity, since he supports that which is both

because it has been and because it is intrinsically &dquo;good&dquo;.) But then,after having destroyed one must construct. Starting from what? It is

here that the rationality of the understanding, mechanical rationality,quickly takes the upper hand. The solutions which appear to some as








127

&dquo;rational&dquo; will have to be imposed upon everyone: people will be forced

to be rational. The principle of all sovereignty resides in the Nation-

but this Nation is replaced by the Reason of its &dquo;representatives&dquo;, in

the name of which it will be knocked down, forced upon, violated and

mutilated.

That, however, is not a &dquo;philosophical&dquo; development. The imaginaryof abstract and mechanical rationality is an integral part in a weightysocial-historical process which here again prefigures in an exemplaryfashion key characteristics of modern history. Power becomes absolu-

tized, the &dquo;representatives&dquo; become autonomised. An &dquo;apparatus&dquo; (theJacobins), which doubles the official authorities and controls them, is

constituted, it is an embryo of what later we would call a specificallypolitical bureaucracy. Now, this is possible--on this point, Michelet’s

interpretation is in my view the right one--only on the condition that

the people withdraw from the scene, and in fact this retreat is, if not

fomented, at least encouraged by the new power. In this way, every

living mediation is suppressed: there is on the one hand the abstract

entity of the &dquo;Nation&dquo;, on the other hand those who &dquo;represent&dquo; it in

Paris, and, between the two, nothing. The members of the Convention

were neither willing nor able to see that the autonomy of individuals-

freedom-cannot effectively become instrumented in &dquo;rights&dquo; and in

periodic elections alone, that it is nothing without the self-governanceof all intermediary collective formations, whether &dquo;natural&dquo; or &dquo;arti-

ficial&dquo;. The old mediations are destroyed (which is deplored both byBurke and, fifty years later, by Tocqueville, while idealizing them fan-

tastically), without permitting new ones to be created. The &dquo;Nation&dquo;,a dustcloud of theoretically homogeneous individuals, no longer has any

political existence other than that of its &dquo;representatives&dquo;. Jacobinism

becomes delirious and the Terror is set up from the moment the peopleretire from the scene and the indivisibility of sovereignty is transformed

into absoluteness ofpower, leaving

the

representativesin a sinister face-

to-face relationship with abstraction.

Interviewer: How do you appraise the role the formation of the mod-

ern State has played in the genesis of the idea of revolution? Does not

the French case lead one to think that it is considerable?

C.C.: Here again I think that it is necessary to make distinctions.

The central idea realized by the Revolution-and in it I see its capitalimportance for us-is that of the explicit self-institution of society by








128

collective, lucid, democratic activity. But at the same time the Revo-

lution never frees itself from the grasp of this key part of the modern

political imaginary that is the State. I say expressly &dquo;the State&dquo;-a

separate and centralized apparatus of domination-and not &dquo;power&dquo;.For the Athenians, for example, there is no &dquo;State&dquo;--the very word

does not exist; the power is &dquo;we&dquo;, the &dquo;we&dquo; of the political collectivity.In the modern political imaginary, the State appears as ineliminable.

It remains so for the Revolution, as it remains so for modern politicalphilosophy, which finds itself in this regard in a more than paradoxicalsituation: it has to justify the State even as it makes every effort to

think freedom. What is happening here is the basing of freedom on the

negation of freedom, or the entrusting of it to the care of its principalenemy. This antinomy reaches the point of paroxysm under the Terror.

Interviewer: If one grants that the modern State constitutes one

of the absolute preconditions for the revolutionary idea, does that not

limit the scope of the self-institution you have just invoked? Is a self-

institution which carries with it a tradition all the stronger when it is

denied?

C.C.: The imaginary of the State limits the French Revolution’s

work of self-institution. It also limits, later on, the actual behaviour of

revolutionary movements (with the exception of anarchism). It makes

the idea of revolution become identical with the idea that, if one wants

to transform society, it is both necessary and sufficient to seize control

of the State (the taking of the Winter Palace, etc.). It becomes amalga-mated with another cardinal imaginary signification of Modern Times,the Nation, and finds therein an all-powerful source of affective mobi-

lization ; it becomes the incarnation of the Nation, the Nation-State.

Without the challenging of these two imaginaries, without the break

with this tradition, it is impossible to conceive a new historical move-

ment of self-institution of society. What is certain is that the statist

imaginaryand the institutions in which it is incarnated have for a

longtime channelled the imaginary of revolution, and that it is the logic of

the State that has finally triumphed.Interviewer: The 19th century adds an essential component to the

idea of revolution, with the element of history.

C.C.: It effects--and this it does basically with and through Marx-a conflation, a chemical compound of Revolution and history. The old

transcendencies are replaced by History with a capital H. The myth








129

of History and of the Laws of History, the myth of the revolution as

midwife of History-therefore, born and justified through an organicprocess-are put into operation as religious substitutes, within a mil-

lenarian mentality. Marx fetishizes a fabricated representation of the

revolution. The model of Ancien R6gime/development of the forces of

production/violent birth of new relations of production, which he con-

structs from the alleged example of the French Revolution, is erected

into a schema-type of historical evolution and projected into the future.

And what still remains ambiguous and complex in this regard under

the brilliant pen of Marx becomes totally flat and transparent in the

Marxist vulgate.Interviewer: Here you are leading us right to the second paradig-

matic revolution, that of 1917. What specific development, from your

point of view, does it contribute?

C.C.: It contributes two entirely antinomic elements. First, and this

as early as 1905, a new form of democratic collective self-organization,the soviet, which will acquire a new scope in 1917 and will be carried

on

inthe

factory committees,which were

veryactive and

importantduring the 1917-1919 period and even until 1921. But at the same

time it is in Russia that Lenin creates the prototype of what all modern

totalitarian organizations will become: the Bolshevik party, which very

rapidly after October 1917 came to dominate the soviets, to stifBe them

and to transform them into instruments and appendages of its own

power.

Interviewer: Are we not here fully within the domination of the

revolutionary idea by the logic of the State?

C.C.: Certainly. The construction of this machine for seizing state

power testifies to the dominance of the imaginary of the State. But

it bears witness as well to the dominance of the capitalist imaginary:everything happens as if one did not know how to organize in any other

way. It has not been pointed out enough that Lenin invented Taylorismfour years before Taylor. Taylor’s book dates from 1906, What Is To

Be Done? dates from 1902-1903. And Lenin speaks there of the strict

division of tasks, with arguments based on pure instrumental efficiency;one can, in reading between the lines of Lenin’s book, find the [Taylorist]idea of the &dquo;one best way&dquo;. He obviously cannot time each operation.But he is striving to fabricate this monster that is a mixture of a party-

army, a party-State and a party-factory, which he will actually succeed








130

in setting up starting in 1917. The statist imaginary, masked during the

French Revolution, becomes explicit with the Bolshevik party, which is

a budding army-State even before the &dquo;seizure of power&dquo; . (This double

character will be even clearer in the case of China.)Interviewer: The evocation of the soviet revolution inevitably raises

the question of revolutions going astray, which seems to constitute their&dquo;iron law&dquo;. Let us squarely formulate this question: Is not the slide

towards totalitarianism of necessity inscribed in revolutionary ambitions

when they become, as they do among the moderns, the explicit projectof reinstituting society?

C.C.: First, let us reestablish the facts. There was a revolution

in February 1917, there was no &dquo;October Revolution&dquo;: in October 1917

there was a putsch, a military coup d’Etat. As has already been said, the

authors of this putsch will succeed in achieving their ends only againstthe popular will as a whole&horbar;cf. the dissolution of the Constituent

Assembly in January 1918-and against the democratic organs created

starting in February, the soviets and factory committees. It is not the

revolution that, in Russia, produces totalitarianism, but the coup d’Etat

of the Bolshevik party, which is something else entirely.Interviewer: But can one so easily sever the ties between revolution

and totalitarianism?

C.C.: Let us continue on the level of facts. There was an instal-

lation of totalitarianism in Germany in 1933, but no revolution (the&dquo;national-socialist revolution&dquo; is a pure slogan). Under completely dif-

ferent specific circumstances, the same thing goes for China in 1948-

1949. On the other hand, without the actual intervention or the virtual

threat of Russian divisions, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 as well

as the movement in Poland in 1980-1981 would certainly have led to

the overthrow of the existing regimes; it is absurd to think that theywould have led to totalitarianism. And it also has to be pointed out

that &dquo;revolution&dquo; does not at all necessarilymean

barricades, violence,bloodshed, etc. If the King of England had listened to Burke in 1776,no blood would have been spilled in North America.

Interviewer: But perhaps there would have been no revolution either.

Can one completely separate the idea of revolution from the idea of a

rupture or of an overthrow of established legality?C.C.: Surely not; but this rupture is not bound to take the form

of murder. Without the War of Independence, the thirteen colonies








131

would probably have adopted a republican constitution anyway, therebybreaking with monarchical legality.

On the level of ideas, now: revolution does not signify only the at-

tempt at explicit reinstitution of society. Revolution is this reinstitution

by the collective and autonomous activity of the people, or a large por-

tion of society. Now, when this activity unfolds, in Modern Times, italways exhibits a democratic character. And every time a strong social

movement has wanted to transform society radically but peacefully, it

has run up against the violence of the established power. Why does one

forget Poland in 1981 or China in 1989?

As for totalitarianism, it is an infinitely weighty and complex phe-nomenon. One will understand little about it by saying: revolution

produces totalitarianism (which we have seen is empirically false at

both ends: not all revolutions have produced totalitarian [regimes],and not all totalitarian [regimes] have been tied to revolutions). But

if one thinks of the germs of the totalitarian idea, it is impossible not

to think, first of all, of the totalitarianism immanent in the capitalist

imaginary-unlimitedexpansion of &dquo;rational mastery&dquo;-and of the cap-

italist organization of production-the &dquo;one best way&dquo;, discipline made

mechanically obligatory (the Ford factories in Detroit in 1920 constitute

totalitarian minisocieties)-and second, of the logic of the modern State

which, if one allows it to reach its limits, tends to regulate everything.Interviewer: You were speaking just a minute ago of the role of

reason in the idea of revolution. Does not reason in particular take

the form of the project of a rational mastery of history? And does not

this project contain, despite everything, at least as one of its virtual

components, the risk of totalitarian enslavement?

C.C.: We then arrive at an idea which is completely different from

the current vulgate: if, and to the extent that, revolutionaries are caughtup in the fantasy of a rational mastery of history, and of society, whose

subjects they at that moment evidently consider themselves to be, thenthere obviously is here a possible source for an evolution towards totali-

tarianism. For, they will then tend to replace the self-activity of societywith their own activity: that of the members of the Convention and of

the &dquo;representatives on mission&dquo; of the Republic, later that of the Party.But even in this case, society would have to give in [se laisse fairer As was just said, one sees this process occur during the French Revo-

lution (although it would be absurd to identify the Jacobin dictatorship








132

and the Terror with totalitarianism). Reason tends to be reduced to the

understanding; for autonomy (for freedom), the idea of rational masteryis substituted. In the same stroke, this &dquo;rationalism&dquo; reveals its lack of

wisdom, its imprudent character.

Interviewer: Is not one of the manifestations par excellence of this

imprudence the valuing of the revolution as end in itself-a valuingwhich has been at the same time one of the most powerful motives for

its ascendency?C.C.: There is indeed a moment when one begins to encounter for-

mulas whose spirit, pretty much, is this: &dquo;revolution for the sake of rev-

olution&dquo;. Moreover, we know the echo this mind-set has had, in the 19th

century and afterwards, in the intellectual and spiritual world: rupture,the rejection of established canons, becomes value as such. To confine

ourselves here ~to the properly political level, however, the problem of

a revolution is to instaurate another relationship with tradition-not

to try to suppress tradition, or to declare it &dquo;Gothic nonsense&dquo; [Sieyès]from the beginning to end.

Interviewer: We will be in

agreementif we say that two centuries of

history of the revolutionary project show us that this project is burdened

with two major illusions: the illusion of rational mastery and the illusion

of the end of history. If one removes these two illusions, does the idea

of revolution still today have any content?

C.C.: You will not be surprised if I reply that it is precisely because

today we are familiar with these two illusions and because we can com-

bat them that we can give to the revolutionary project its true content.

Once it is recognized that a full-scale constructivism is both impossi-ble and undesirable; once it is recognized that there can be no repose

for humanity in a &dquo;good society&dquo; defined once and for all, nor trans-

parency of society to itself; once it is recognized that, contrary to what

Saint-Just believed, the object of politics is not happiness, but liberty,

then one can

effectively think the question of a free society made up offree individuals. Is the present state of our societies that of democratic,effectively free societies? Certainly not. Could one reach that pointby making incremental changes, and without the great majority of the

population entering into activity? Again, no.

What is a free, or autonomous, society? It is a society that itself

gives to itself, effectively and reflectively, its own laws, knowing that

it is doing so. What is a free, or autonomous, individual, once we








133

recognize that this individual is conceivable only in a society in which

there are laws and power? It is an individual that recognizes in these

laws and this power its laws and its power-which can happen without

mystification only to the extent that this individual has the full and

effective possibility of participating in the formation of the laws and

in the exercise of power. We are very far from that-and who wouldimagine for an instant that the burning concern of the ruling oligarchieswould be to bring us around to such a situation?

A second, more sociological consideration is added to this first, fun-

damental one. We are living-I am talking about wealthy, Western

societies-under liberal oligarchic regimes, which are no doubt prefer-able, both subjectively and politically, to what exists elsewhere on the

planet. These regimes have not been engendered by some automatic and

spontaneous process, nor by the previous good will of ruling strata, but

by means of much more radical social-historical movements-the French

Revolution itself is one example---of which these regimes constitute the

side effects or the byproducts. These movements themselves would have

been impossible if they had not been accompanied by the emergence-asboth &dquo;effect&dquo; and &dquo;cause&dquo;-of a new anthropological type of individual,let us say, to be brief, the democratic individual: that which distin-

guishes a peasant of the Ancien Regime from a French citizen today,or a subject of the Czar from an English or American citizen. With-

out this type of individual, more exactly without a constellation of such

types-among which, for example, is the honest and legalistic Weberianbureaucrat-liberal society cannot function. Now, it seems evident to

me that society today is no longer capable of reproducing these types.It basically produces the greedy, the frustrated and the conformist.

Interviewer: But liberal societies progress. Women, for example,have attained an equal status over the past thirty years without there

being a revolution, but they have done so massively, irreversibly.

C.C.: Certainly. There are also important movements, over the longhaul of history, which are not strictly political or condensed in a precisemoment of time. The change in the status of young people offers another

example. Liberal society has been able, not without long resistance-

the feminist movement in fact began in the middle of the last century,women obtained the right to vote in France in 1945-to accommodate

itself to such changes. But could it accommodate itself to a true democ-

racy, to effective and active participation of citizens in public affairs?








134

Do not present-day political institutions also have as their goal [tinalite1to distance citizens from public affairs, and to persuade them that theyare incapable of concerning themselves with these matters? No serious

analysis can contest that the regimes which proclaim themselves demo-

cratic are in reality what every classical political philosopher would have

called oligarchical regimes. An ultrathin stratum of society dominatesand governs. It coopts its successors. Of course, it is liberal: it is open

(more or less ... ) and it gets itself ratified every [four,] five or seven

years by a popular vote. If the governing part of this oligarchy goestoo far afield, it will be replaced-by the other part of the oligarchy,which has become more and more like it. Whence the disappearance of

any real content in the opposition of &dquo;left&dquo; and &dquo;right&dquo;. The frighten-ing emptiness of contemporary political discourses is a reflection of this

situation, not of genetic mutations.

Interviewer: Have not our societies, rightly, left behind participatorydemocracy such as you describe it? Have they not, as they have devel-

oped, privileged the private individual to the detriment of the citizen,as Constant had diagnosed the situation as early as the 1820s? Is not

this the strongest imprint it has produced?C.C.: In no way would I challenge the diagnosis on the level of

facts-quite the contrary, I have placed it at the centre of my analysessince 1959: it is what I have called privatization. But to note a state

of fact does not mean one approves of it. I am saying, on the one

hand, that this state of fact is not tenable in the long run; on the other

hand and especially, that we ought not to accommodate ourselves to

it. This same society in which we live proclaims principles-liberty,equality, fraternity-that it violates or diverts and deforms every day.I am saying that humanity can do better, that it is capable of livingin another state, the state of self-government. Under the conditions

of the modern era, its forms certainly remain to be found, better: to

be created. But the history of humanity in the West, from Athens to

the modern democratic and revolutionary movements, shows that such

a creation is conceivable. Beyond that, I too have noted for a longtime the predominance of the process of privatization. Our societies

are progressively sinking into apathy, depoliticization, domination bythe media and celluloid politicians. We are arriving at the completerealization of Constant’s formula, asking no more of the State than &dquo;the

guarantee of our enjoyments [jouissancesJ&dquo;-the realization of which

would probably have been a nightmare for Constant himself. But the








136

the more effective as it falls on receivers lacking their own criteria of

judgment. And this is also what the empty speeches of politicians are

adapting themselves to. More generally speaking, we may ask: What

does it mean for an individual today to live in society, to belong to a

history, what is the contemporary individual’s vision of the future of its

society? Allwe have here is a perplexed mass, which lives from day to

day and without any horizon-not a critical-reflective collectivity.Interviewer: Are you not underestimating the impact of two con-

junctural phenomena, on the one hand the disarray provoked by the

collapse of the eschatology of socialism, and on the other the after-

shock of the thirty years of expansion (1945-1975). On the one hand,the figure which dominated the future, even for its adversaries, is van-

ishing, leaving a terrible void as to what might give an orientation to

collective action. On the other hand, we are exiting from a period of un-

precedented economic and social upheavals, under the effect of growthand redistribution. What gave an orientation to history is disappear-ing at the same time that, from a different angle, history is proving to

have travelled much faster than anyone had foreseen-and, in addition,rather in the right direction from the standpoint of the well-being of

everyone. How would citizens not be tempted to lower their arms?

C.C.: Certainly. But to point out the causes or the conditions of a

phenomenon does not exhaust its signification or circumscribe its effects.

For the reasons you have cited, and for many others, we have entered

into a situation which has its own direction and its own dynamic. But

your allusion to growth and to well-being introduces quite rightly a keyelement of the problem, which until now we have left aside. We have

spoken in terms of political and philosophical values. But there are eco-

nomic values and, more exactly, the economy itself as central value, as

central preoccupation of the modern world. Behind Constant’s &dquo;enjoy-ments&dquo; there is the economy: these &dquo;enjoyments&dquo; are the subjective side

of what the economy has become in the modern world, that is to say,

the central &dquo;reality&dquo;, the thing that truly counts. Now, it seems evident

to me that a genuine democracy, a participatory democracy like the one

I have evoked, is incompatible with the dominance of this value. If the

central obsession, the fundamental drive/push [pousée] of this society is

the maximization of production and of consumption, autonomy disap-pears from the horizon and, at most, a few tiny liberties are tolerated as

the instrumental complement of this maximization device. The unlim-

ited expansion of production and ofconsumption becomes the dominant,








137

and almost exclusive, imaginary signification of contemporary society. As long as it retains this place, as long as it remains the sole passion of

the modern individual, there can be no question of a slow accretion of

democratic contents and liberties. Democracy is impossible without a

democratic passion, a passion for the freedom of each and of all, a pas-

sion for common affairs which become, as a matter of fact, the personalaffairs of each. One is very far from that.

Interviewer: But one can understand the optical effect that can be

attributed to public opinion since 1945, the idea that the economy is in

the service of democracy.

C.C.: In reality it has been in the service of oligarchical liberalism. It

has permitted the ruling oligarchy to provide bread, or cake [la brioche] if

you prefer, and circuses [les spectacl~sj, and to govern in full tranquillity.There are no more citizens, there are consumers who are content to givea vote of approval or disapproval every [few] years.

Interviewer: Is not the pressing problem today above all to extend

democracy to the rest of the world, with the enormous diflficulties this

implies?C.C.: But could that be done without fundamental challenges? Let

us consider, first of all, the economic dimension in particular. Prosperityhas been purchased since 1945 (and already beforehand, certainly) at

the price of an irreversible destruction of the environment. The famous

modern-day &dquo;economy&dquo; is in reality a fantastic waste of the capitalaccumulated by the biosphere in the course of three billion years. If

one wants to extend to the rest of the planet (its other four-fifths, from

the standpoint of population) the liberal oligarchic regime, one would

also have to provide it with the economic level, if not of France, let us

say of Portugal. Do you see the ecological nightmare that signifies, the

destruction of non-renewable resources, the multiplication by fivefold or

tenfold of the annual emissions of pollutants, the acceleration of

globalwarming? In reality, it is toward such a state that we are heading, and

the totalitarianism we have got coming to us is not the kind that would

arise from a revolution, it is the kind where a government (perhapsa world government), after an ecological catastrophe, would say: you

have had your fun, the party is over, here are your two litres of gas and

your ten litres of clean air for the month of December, and those who

protest are putting the survival of humanity in danger and are publicenemies. There is an outside limit which the present unfettered growth








138

of technical developments and of the economy is sooner or later goingto run up against. The poor countries’ exit from a life of misery could

occur without catastrophe only if the rich part of humanity agrees to

manage the resources of the planet as a diligens pater familias, to put a

radical check on technology and production, to adopt a frugal life. That

can be done, with arbitrariness and irrationality, by an authoritarianor totalitarian regime; it can also be done by a humanity organizeddemocratically, on the condition that it abandons economic values and

that it cathects [investisse] other significations. But there is not only the

material-economic dimension. The Third World is prey to considerable,uncontrollable and essentially antidemocratic forces of reaction-let us

think of Islam, but that is not the only one. Does the West todayhave anything to offer the Third World, apart from an abundance of

gadgets, to jolt it in its imaginary institution? Can one say to them

that jogging and Madonna are more important than the Koran? If

changes in these parts of the world are to go beyond the mere adoptionof certain techniques, if they are to effect cultures in their deepest and

most obscure recesses, so as to render them permeable to democratic

significations, for which nothing in their history prepares them, a radicaltransformation is required on the part of that part of humanity which

I do not hesitate to call the most advanced: Western humanity, the

part of humanity which has tried to reflect on its fate and to change it,not to be the plaything of history or the plaything of the gods, [but]to put a greater part of self-activity into its destiny. The weight of the

responsibility that weighs on Western humanity makes me think that a

radical transformation must take place first here.

I am not saying that it will take place. It is possible that the actual

situation will endure, until its effects become irreversible. I refuse for

all that to make reality into a virtue and to conclude that somethingis right just because it is a fact. It behoves us to oppose this state of

things in the name of the ideas and of the projects which have made

this civilization and which, at this very moment, allow us to discuss.

Translated by David Ames Curtis

NOTES

* Originally published in Le Débat, 57 (November-December 1989),pp. 213-224.

castoriadis, does the idea of revolution still make sense

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