castoriadis and modern political theory

7/28/2019 Castoriadis and Modern Political Theory

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SUNIL KHILNANI

CASTORIADIS AND MODERN POLITICALTHEORY1

II ne fautpas ecouter n politique ui parleau nomde... desqu'il a prononces mots, l trompe u se trompe,eu importe.Plusquetout utre,e politiquet le penseur olitique arle nsonnompropret soussa propre esponsabilite\e quiest,bien videm-ment,a modestieupreme.2

IReading heworkofCornelius astoriadis s inescapablyo be inthepresence f a powerfullyistinctiveoice and temperament:espeakshis mind. Since in politicsall we are ultimatelyumanlyinterestedn is whatotherhumanbeings s humanbeings andnotas thevoice of Logos,Reason,Being,Theory, r whatever appensto be thecurrentandidate orepistemicuthoritativeness)ayandthink,hefirst xperiencef readinghis work s both unusualandattractive.But is thisrestless, ometimes ectoring ersonalvoiceand intellect imply self-indulgence,n eccentric xpression findividual ispositionsnd tastes? Or s itlinked o a powerfultyleand modeofcognitivepprehension,o a senseofwhytsmotivationsmight lso be ourmotivations? s it above all joinedto a coherentviewofhow, nd to whatextent,hesemotivations ight easonablyprovide orus thebasis for practicablemode ofpolitical onduct?In short,does Castoriadis ossess and provide crediblepoliticaltheory?3In his seditious version o the njustices ftheexisting oliticaland social order,his visceral cepticismowards vailablemodes ofunderstandinghis order,and his entireconviction hat,becausehumanhistorys primarilyhedomain n whichnewpolitical ormsare created nd invented,omethingetter s possible,hisworkhasa claimuponour attentions a political heory. s it one thatcanbe sustained?1 I am gratefulo JohnDunn,Anthonyiddens,nd Geoffreyawthornfortheir ommentsn a draft f thisessay.2 Cornelius astoriadis, Institutionmaginairee la societe, aris: Edi-tionsdu Seuil,1975, . 9. All extendeduotations romCastoriadis's orkare givenhere n theoriginal rench.3 There re, of course,manyotherquestionswhichmight e asked ofCastoriadis's iverse utput,which ncludes ontributionso, amongothers,titleociologyfbureaucracy,sychoanalyticheory,hephilosophyf anguage,and nuclear eterrencetrategy.


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406 S. KHILNANIWhat, n its barestdescription,must a modernpoliticaltheorybe? Whatminimal riteriamust t be able to meet? Thereare atleast three uchcriteriawhichmaybe identified,nyand each ofwhich a modernpoliticaltheorymustin some degreebe able tosatisfy.First,tmusthavea cognitivelyirm raspofpolitical ela-tions and arrangementss theynow are, and be able to give areasonablyull ccount fhowthey avecometobe thatway. econd,it must be able to specify conception f humangood, politicalvalue,which s notmerelymaginativelyogentbut which s alsocoherents an account fwhatwemight ish possiblehumanworldto be. Third, nd mostexigently,t mustprovide precise ssess-

mentof how,and at whatrisk,we might ct so as to bringthesituation s we now find t nearer o thatwhichwewouldwish t tobe. A plausiblemodern olitical heory eedsto be powerfuln itscausal understanding,ompellingn its normative ision, nd (andseparately romthe latter)realistic n its judgement bout whathumanlyndpoliticallyan infactbe broughtbout.II

The motivationalriorities f Castoriadis's nterprisere reaso-nablyclear: an acutesense of thestructurallynjusteconomic ndpoliticaldivisionof labour to be found n modern ocieties, ndfollowingrom his,an agitated mpatiencewith the intellectuallyanaemic nd imaginativelyonstrictingdiomofexistingnderstand-ingsof these ocieties. He does,however,akeone idiomofmodernpoliticalunderstandingnd actionvery eriously:Marxism. Of allmodernpoliticaltheories,Marxismmostforcefullyrticulated heclaim to provide definitive ausal account of the formation ndreproductionf modern ocialorder, o reveal he xploitativeounda-tionsof thisorder, nd to unite thisunderstandingnd evaluationwith modalityfactionwhichwouldnecessarilystablish struc-turallyustsocialorder. Marxism romisedo makevaluefact.Yet,as Castoriadis elativelyarlyon saw, in thoseareas whereMarxism chievedpoliticalpower, t in fact rapidly ucceeded nmassively eformingociety. The earlypartof Castoriadis'sntel-lectual ndpolitical areerwas given ver to establishingheextentof thisdeformation,nd to discoveringts causes. Confrontedytheruinous ffectsfMarxism s a politics f stategovernmentewas pushedback to a moregeneral uestion: est-ce e sortde toute4 I take these definitional riteria n a brazenlywholesale fashion from

the workof JohnDunn. Within disciplinewhichhas a feeble and generallyincoherentonception f what it is collectively p to and about,this seems tome by some meausure to be the mostpreciseand helpfulway of setting utwhat a modernpoliticaltheory ould at least hope to be. See in particularJohnDunn, WesternPolitical Theory n the Face of the Future (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress, 1979), nd The Politics of Socialism (Cambridge:Cambridge University ress, 1984).


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THE MODERN POLITICAL THEORY 407

theorie volutionnaireui est indiquepar le destindu marxisme?"To answerthis,he first laborated trenchantrgumenthowingwhyMarxismmustbe rejectedboth as an economic heory f themechanismsfreproductionf thecapitalist ystem,nd as a theoryofhistorical evelopment:n neitherount nd largely orempiricalreasons was Marxism orrect, astoriadis oncluded.6 But he didnot succumb o a fussy inkering iththeinternal etails and finegrainof Marxist heoryn thehopethat tmight e corrected.Thecentral takeof his critiquewas moregeneral. Marxism's ailure,according im,hadhugely o do withthetype ftheoryt is. Thata fundamentallyevolutionaryhoughthouldhaveendedup bycon-formingo thedictates f existinghoughtan onlybe understoodwhen Marxism s seenas symptomaticnd derivativef theentiretradition f twenty ivecenturies fWestern inheritedhought".7Castoriadis'sccount ndcharacterizationfthis raditionrovidesthephilosophicalasisfor,nturn, isownstrategyfunderstanding,his vision fpolitical alue, ndhis udgementfpolitical ossibility.It is a remarkable ccount,which demonstrateshe formidablecritical energiesof his restive ntellectualmagination. In thisaccount, nherited houghts shown,even at its best and mostradicallynventive oments,o be driven yan obsessive trivingoreduce hatwhich s strangenduniqueto somethingnowable ndrepresentative. lato andAristotle,pinozaandMarx, ll haveoper-ated with flawed unitaryntology" hich ssumes hat tobe is tobe determined". heconsequence asbeena profoundndrecurringontologicalmistakingf the objects'which nheritedhoughteeksto think r render ntothought:t pursuesfixitynd determinacyover areas which cannot be rendered ixedor determinate.ForCastoriadis,heviolentlyistortiveapacities fexistinghoughtremostclearly nd damaginglynstancedn its attempts o graspthecharacter nd propertiesf thesocial world.To theprimary uestion whatholdssociety ogether?",nheritedthought rofferswo dominant ypesof response. The first s a"physicalist"pproachwhich educeshistoryndsociety oa naturalkind:that s, to a set ofgiven nd fixedneedswhich t is thenthefunction fsocialorganizationo serve. In itsmethodologicalorm,this pproachppears s a question-beggingunctionalism:onclusionsare inserted nto premisesand presented s 'explanations'.Thesecond, logicist",mode offers n account fhumanhistoryn terms

5 L' nstitutionmaeinaire, p. cit.. p. 17.6 See ibid., chao. 1.7 There are some sharp resonances betweenthe work of Castoriadisandthat of RobertoMangabeiraUnger: the strategiesof understanding eployedby both share a powerfulnegativeand criticalanalytic mpetus, inked to asense thatdramaticpolitical nd psychicuplift s genuinely ossible. A startingpoint for comparingthese two emigrethinkerswould be their accounts ofwhat Castoriadiscalls "inherited hought." f. Unger, ocial Theory: ts Situa-tion and Task (Cambridge: Cambridge University ress, 1987), p. 138: "Thehistoryf modern ocial thoughtan be written s thehistory ftheparadoxicalrelationsbetweenthe idea of emancipation rom false necessity nd the theo-reticalstages and concepts throughwhich this idea was workedout."


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408 S. KHILNANIofchangingombinationsf essentiallymmutable lements. In itspoorestform hisappearsas structuralism;t its best,as a formofrationalism.By stressingither ausality r rationality,oth thephysicalistnd logicist pproaches re blind to the emergence fnew forms nd creations n and throughime,history:la question e l'histoirestquestion eEmergencee l'alterit^ adi-cale ou du nouveau bsolu... t la causality st toujours egationderalte*rite\osition'unedoubledentite*:dentityans a repetitiondesmemes ausesproduisantesmemes ffets,dentityltime e lacauseetdel'effetuisque hacunppartientdcessairementl'autreou les deux unmeme.8Bothapproaches xcise ime, nd so eliminate he domainwherenewmeanings nd significationsmerge. Inherited onceptionsnva-riably eparate ociety romhistory,elatethe formero somethingother han tself,n externalmageor telos, nd thenviewhistorysa disturbance hichhelpsor hinders ociety's ttemptomake tselfadequateto or representativefthatexternal elos.Neither s inheritedhought nybetter t graspinghecharacterofsuch crucial onstitutivespectsofthe social-historicalworld slanguage rthepsyche. In eachcase, t tries ompulsivelyo reducewhat s in itself uniquecreation o merely einga representationof somethinghat s alwaysalreadygiven. Thus,dreams re takento be representationsfthe unconscious syche. But a dreamdoesnot standforsomething hichalready xists, t creates, alls intobeing:Le revedonne a representationnconscienteellequ'ellees?...celane rsulteasd'op^rationsurvenues,lterieures,uiauraient rouiliedesfiguresparees,laires tdistinctes; aisde l'etre e la psychequi estgenese e representations...>Thespecial haracter f anguage annot e captured ythedominantunderstandingsf t:both he tructuralistiewof anguage s a self-enclosedsystem f termswhosemeanings erivefrom heirdiffe-rence and opposition o each other (so dissolving eferencentosignification),nd the view that languagemustcorrespond r beadequateto how the world s, that truth r validityre propertiesofthe world hat anguagemust omehow eflect,re at bestpartialsincethey gnore n the one hand theopen character f language("le lexiquedes significationsstpartout uvert; ar la significationpleined'un motesttout e qui,a partir u a proposde ce mot,peutetre socialement it,pense,represent^, ait"11), nd on the otherhand its essentiallyreative haracter,he fact thattherecan be

s Ulnstitutionmaginaire.p. cit.,p. 240. Castoriadisoins the two terms o as to stressthe internal elationbetweenocietyndhistory:ee V nstitutionmazinaire.v. cit.. chaD.4.io Ulnstitutionmaginaire,p. cit.,p. 374.ii Ibid., p. 332.


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termswhich do not refer o a pregiven eality ut constitute hatreality: orexample, erms ike"God" or "citizen" which ervetohold certain ocieties ogether,cting s "centralmaginaryignifica-tions" create theirreferentsnlyonce instituted,nd so definewhat s real for given ociety.Thedefectiventologyfinheritedhought perates ymeansofwhat Castoriadis erms an "identitary-ensemblistogic" (basically,the ogicofclosedsets).To theextent hat uch ogichas a genuinecognitiveripon theworld, t can be moreor less effective.But itis necessarily artial,nd cannever erve s a basisfor heconclusiveinsight laimedby existingmodesof understanding.Most impor-tantly,he dentitaryogicof inheritedhoughtmissesthefact thatdomainsof creative ctivityuchas the social-historicalorld, hepsyche,nd language, ontain nd are constitutedy an irreducibleelement: he"radical maginary".Againsturrent sagesoftheterm(for xample,nLacanianpsychoanalysis),astoriadis ffers is owndefinition. heimaginarys not an imageor reflectionfsomethingalreadygiven r in existence; ather,II est creation ncessante t essentiellementnditermin&esocial-historiquetpsychique)efigures/formes/images,partir esquellessettlementl peutetrequestion e "quelque hose".12Byplacing his easelessly ubblingmagma fpotentialignificationsbothconstitutivelyndconceptuallyt the coreofhumanbeing, ndbythusrequirings to see humanhistorical ormations a continualupsurge f radicallynewmeanings, astoriadismposesuponus arecognitionfour sheerly ontingentimension.Byoccluding his unstable ore ofpotentialmeanings,hesensein whichpolitics s essentiallyhe domain of humancreativityslost. Theconsequences fthis oss are apparentn thesupposition,common o Western olitical hought romPlato downto modernliberalism nd Marxism, hat there exists a complete nd prede-terminedational rderof the world. Politics s thenreduced o atechniquewhichstrives omehowto link the ordering f humanaffairswiththispredeterminedrder. Castoriadis, owever, nder-tandspoliticsnotas an instrumentalechnique ut "as a collectiveactivityxplicitlyriented owards hangingnstitutions",s belong-ingaboveall to thedomainofpraxis. One ready nd helpfulwayof situating astoriadis'swork s to see it as movingn thelineofPraxisphilosophy.This has its modern riginsn Marx's ttemptoshift he locus of reason from he reflectiveonsciousness f theKantianknowingubjectto thepurposive ationalityf theactingsubject. Castoriadis istanceshimself romMarcuse's nd Sartre'sreformulationsf this ine:he defines raxis s "thatdoing n whichthe othersare intended s autonomousbeingsconsidered s theessential gentsof the developmentf theirown autonomy". In

Ibid., p. 7.


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410 S. KHILNANI

his view, hemost mportantense ofpraxis s not its instrumentalone,but rather tsessentiallyreativebility obring orthhe "radi-callyother".Ill

Castoriadis's eep-seatedcepticismowards ll modesof under-standingwhich ongforontologicallosure nd determinationrawsand buildsupondevelopmentsn modernmathematicsnd physics(forexample, heBourbakigroup's heory f sets,quantummecha-nics).13 It convergestrikinglyiththe deconstructionfphiloso-phicalclaimsto epistemicdequacy ndauthorityhat an be foundin theforcefulrgumentsfthe aterWittgenstein,artinHeidegger,WillardQuine, nd JohnDewey. This line of thought as itsmostdramatic ecentpresentationn RichardRorty's ccountof the tra-jectoryof modernWestern hilosophy.14Rorty ttacks whatheviews s Westernhilosophy'smbition omirror ndcapturenaturein propositionalorm. Like Castoriadis's, orty's rgument lacesweight n thehistorical nd cultural elativityfhumanknowledge,its intrinsicallyutable nd conventionaluality. Thispresseshimto theconclusionhat hecentral resumptionfWesternhilosophyis a futile ne: propositions,anguage, o notmodelthe world s itis,butrather iveus newconceptualchemas nddescriptiveocabu-laries. More mportantly,e concludes oothat hispresumptions apoliticallynsidious ne. Wheretnephilosopher,n Rorty depre-catorypnrase,claims to know "somethingbout knowingwnichnobody lseknows owell", hepurveyortsocialandpolitical now-ledgeclaims a similar xclusivensigntntothesocial and politicalreaims. Whethermanifestedn the formof a LeninistvanguardParty r thedevelopmentallans imposeduponnational conomiesbytneWorldBankand the .M.F., uciiclaims rehollow.But to see, and to see through ully henecessarily retentiousaffectationo possess authoritativeocial understandings not toarriveat any immediatelyelf-evidentor even potentiallyt alldeterminate)onsequenceforwnat politicallywe shouldand cando.16 Indeed, t is preciselyhepointofsucnargumentshatthereis no foundationalumanknowledgecalled, ay,philosophy) hichcan tell us anything,r anythingonclusive,boutpolitics. If philo-sophical nquiry oes haveanythingo say aboutpolitics,t is in a

13Castoriadisdiscusses these developments nd theirphilosophicalconse-quencesin "Science moderne t interrogationhilosophique", es Car efurs dulabyrmtheParis: Editionsdu Seuil. 19/6), p. lt/-zi/.14RichardRorty,Philosophy nd the Mirrorof Nature (Oxford:Blackwell,15See Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism(Brighton:HarvesterPress, 1982),chap. 11. Also Rorty's Northclitteectures, reprinted s "TheContingencyfLanguage", TheContingencyf Selfhood", nd "TheContingencyof Community",n the London Review of Books, 17 April 1986,8 May 1986,and 24 July1986respectively.


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(usuallynegative) rocedural ather hansubstantive orm. Casto-riadis,however, oes not see thebreaking f thehierarchy hichsubordinatesolitics o philosophys in any way disabling: ather,it accordspolitics correcttatuts s an irreduciblyeparatedomainof humanactivity, ith ts own specificforms f knowledgendactivity.IV

Does this harpdrawingn oftheaspirationso ontologicalom-pleteness nd epistemicecurity arboured yexistingocialunder-standinghave any consequencesfor how in practicewe mightbetter thinkof the causal properties f the human world? Toshow that indeed it does, Castoriadisplaces at the centreof hiswork an accountof institution. n the everyday nderstandingsof layamateurs,nstitutions usually aken s a pluralnoun:insti-tutions re seenas "things",nhumanbjectswith heir wnspecificregularities hich are resistant o humanalterationnd changebureaucraticn the worstbut ordinaryenseof theword. In thetheories f theprofessionallerics fsocialandpolitical nderstand-ing, nstitutionsre standardlyiewed s fulfillingertainneeds, spossessingfunctional-economic"tilities hichnstrumentallynsurethe reproductionf social structures.Castoriadisacknowledgesthese enses, ut with more cuteearfor he ctivevoicehefastenson the sens in which nstitutions an activity, process:humanbeings institute bring into being their social structures ndorders. He insists hatwe see institutionss impermanentolidifi-cations f themagmaofimaginaryignifications:hey re historicalresting-places,recarious ites ofhumanmeaning nd belief. Thathuman nstitutionsre best understood s complicatednd consti-tutivelynstable oagulationsfhumanmeaningndbelief s a viewthathas beenstressed ythinkers orkingna range fquitediffe-rent ntellectualontexts. (It lies,forexample, t theheartof theHegelian onception). n theanalytic radition,t has recentlyeenstressedby CharlesTaylorand AlasdairMaclntyre.6 But wherethemore onservativeemperamentfMaclntyreeesthisprecarious-ness and instabilitys a threat, astoriadis uiteemphaticallyakesit as an opportunity.7To see thefragilityfhuman ollectivereations,o comprehendthat nmany asesthey ersist hroughredulousnessndelementarydull habitis certainlyat theveryhighestevel of abstraction) odiscover dimension f politicalpossibility:hingsneed notgo on

i See, for example, the essays collected in Charles Taylor,PhilosophicalPapers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity ress. 1985),and AlasdairMaclntvre,Againstthe Self Images of theAge (London. 1971).!7 Again the resonancewith Unger: cf. Social Theory,op. cit., p. 65: "Tounderstand ociety deeplyis always to see the settledfromthe angle of theunsettled."


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412 S. KHILNANI

as theyhave done and do now. But it equallycertainly oes notimply ny udgements to theprobabilitiesf success andattendantrisks) nactually ttemptingo create bettertate faffairs.Humancreativitys, as Castoriadis uite rightlynsists,n thefirst nstancea fundamentalactofhistory.But to install t also as a supremeandsupremelyolitical alue s notnecessarilyhemost ntellectuallyedifying ayof tryingo thinkwhat, n thesefinaldecadesof themillenium,tmight e prudent oliticallyo do. Thiscenturylonehas seen some of the least felicitous xamplesof humanpoliticalcreativity.V

Castoriadis,fcourse, s well awareofthisfact. 8 So too is healert to thepressing uestionwhichfollows rom heacknowledge-ment hat here reno overrulingconomicaws,nobindingxternaldeterminationsrexigenciesnhuman ction:what hendirects oli-tical action? If the epistemic oapboxon whichpoliticalthoughtand discoursehas hitherto laced itself s kicked way, f in onto-logicalterms here s no necessary losureof whatpoliticallymightbe,whatguarantees ave we againstmalign r even ustplainworsepoliticaloutcomes? It is precisely his set of worrieswhichmoti-vates Habermas's ntellectualucubrations.But whereHabermaspursues vainly,n Castoriadis's iew someprinciple f certitudelocated outside,beyond,historyCastoriadishimselfoffersus avision, conception f politicalvaluewhich remainsfirmlyootedinhistory.Creativity,utonomy,ndpraxis re the central ermsnthisconception.Asa vision f disalienated uman ollectivectivityitclearlyhares omething ith hat ftheyoungMarx. But, ccord-ingto Castoriadis,nhis theoreticallaborationsf the mechanismsofcapitalismMarxmissedforhimself nd obscurred orothers hefact hat apitalist eification,hepervasiveendentialrive osubjectthe domain fhuman ctivityo the mperativesf a claimeduniver-sal rationality,as only partof theprocess,necessarilymatchedandopposedby contraryendency:he truggleor utonomy.asto-riadis thusseems to givethe drive towards utonomy cognitiveand historical asis. He justifies his first hroughn analysisofwhathe seesas the conflictualtructure"fcapitalistwork elations,and secondly hrough psychoanalyticalccountof the constitutionof thepsyche s a social ndividual.Given hepremisses f hismoregeneral hought, owever, astoriadismustand does stop shortofascribing nynecessitarianuality othis endency. e acknowledges

is Indeed by far the greaterpart of his early thinkingnd writing n theoutcomeof the Soviet revolutionwas givenover to showing ust how badlywrong political creations can go. See the articles in CorneliusCastoriadis:Political and Social Writings, vols., edited and translatedby David AmesCurtis (Minneapolis:Universityf MinnesotaPress, 1988).


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THE MODERN OLITICALTHEORY 413that ultimatelythe pressure for greater autonomymust rest on acollectivewilled desire or preferenceforone futurerather than anyother.This vision of a communityof free agents, acting towards eachother in non-instrumental ays, participating n individual and col-lectiveself-creation,as a good deal to commend t,and mightundercertain circumstancesbe compelling. As a vision, it would certainlybe more compellingwere it linked to some specificationof how itmightbe brought bout, instituted. So far,however,Castoriadis hasoffered uch specification n onlythe mostmeagerterms. It is clearthat he takes the ideals and institutionalforms of Atheniandemo-cracy very seriously. He shares the modern sense of libertyas afundamentalpolitical right,but to this he returns the more ancientconceptual dimension of the responsibilitiesand the participatoryduties which arguably gives the termits fullmeaning.19 In askingus to subscribe to this considerablymore demandingsense of poli-tical commitment han that to which we are currently ccustomed,Castoriadis does not seek to defend it from the potential damagesof eitherthe eminentlymodernWildean intuition "Socialism is anexcellent dea,but it would takeup toomanyevenings")20or themoreintricatelymodelled arguments (in the view of some, rationaliza-tions21) for individual political inaction produced by Game Theory.For Castoriadis, such views are essentiallymisguided in their con-ception of what politics is: the collective self-creation f new (andbenign) institutions.

Ce que nous appelonspolitiquervolutionnairest une praxis quise donne commeobjet l'organisationt l'orientation e la socit nvue de l'autonomie e tous et reconnait ue celle-cipresupposeunetransformationadicalede la socitui ne sera,k son tour,possibleque par de*ploiemente l'activitutonomedes hommes.22He has a vivid sense of the key historicalmoments of such col-lective creation: the inventionof democracy in ancient Athens,the

creation of Soviets in 1917, the formation of worker's councils in*9For a skillful defenceof the claim that these two dimensionsare inprinciplenecessarilyinked, es QuentinSkinner The idea of negative iberty:philosophical nd historicalperspectives",n RichardRorty,J.B. Schneewindand QuentinSkinner, hilosophy n History:Essays on the HistoriographyfPhilosophyCambridge:CambridgeUniversityress, 1984),pp. 193-221.20For an earlier and more elaborated formulation f this intuition ee,famously, enjaminConstant, The Liberty f theAncients omparedwiththatof theModerns", oliticalWritings,ditedand traslatedbyBiancamariaFontana(Cambridge:Cambridge University ress, 1988),pp. 309-328.21See, forexample,MichelPlon, La thioriedes jeux: une politique imagi-naire (Paris: Maspero, 1976).22L' nstitutionmaginaire,p. cit, p. 106. CompareUngers characterizationof the "radicalproject* n Social Theory, p. cit., p. 76: "The projectof seekingindividual nd collective mpowermenty creatingnstitutionshatweakenthehold of preestablished ocial divisions or hierarchiesover our practical orpassionate dealingswithone another nd impart o normal ocial lifesomethingof the heightenedmastery ver contextthat characterizesmomentsof revolu-tionary onflict r invention."


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414 S. KHILNANIHungaryn 1956. Momentswhere t seemed hepoliticaldivision flabourhad collapsed,moments fdefinite uman mpowerment.But t shardly lausible o claimtoday hatwemight aveaccessto a setofcoherent iews bout thepossibilityfcreatingarge-scaleand durable ocietal tructures hichdo notinvolve highlylabo-rate politicaldivision f labour. The counterparto Castoriadis'sinsistence hata genuinelyarticipatoryemocracys both feasibleand,ultimately,heonlyfrom fhumanpolitical ocietywhich ouldpossess egitimacy,s a denialof thenecessityrpotentialegitimacyof any politicaldivision f labour.23 The insistence nd denialareopen to severaltypesof objection, f varying ravity.First, t isclearthateventhedemocracyf theancient olis,as Moses Finleyincontrovertiblyhowed,rested on a fairly laborate divisionoflabour.24 Second,as it stands,Castoriadis's pecificationothofwhata political ociety f autonomous nd empoweredndividualsmightook ike, nd of theconditionsnderwhich tmaybe possibletobring bout such a society emainshopelesslyorperhaps ll toohopefully) ague. He has certainlyiven houghto thequestion fwhathis visionwould npractice ntail, lthought is notevident owhatextenthe wouldstill standby ideas first utlinedmore thanthirty ears go.25 But thereal force f thisobjection estson thesecondconsideration:he conditions f possibility. t mayindeedbe possible omapout institutionalorms nd proceduresuch thatinprincipletcouldbe agreed hat heywouldbemore ustand moreefficienthan hose urrentlynexistence,ndsuch a mappingwouldbe a necessaryonditionorbringingboutCastoriadis's ision. Butit would hardlybe sufficient.All societiestoday rest on andreproducetructures hich llocateeconomic ndpolitical esourcesunequally etweenheirmembers.Any ttemptt transforminghesestructuresmust anticipate esistance.Whatmodality f politicalactionwouldbring bout a reallocation; ow, nMarx's harpphrase,are the "expropriatorso be expropriated"?This,of course, s tocomeuponthetreacherousutunavoidable rea of the"politics fthetransition".

23See,for xample,La polisGrecque t la creation e la democratic",nDomaines e VhommeParis:Editions u Seuil.1986), . 289.24 t is of course ruethatthe malecitizenryf the ancient oliscould,if it so chose, ctually eterminetateaction. But I take one of the mainconclusionshat mergesromMosesFinley'studyfancient oliticso be thatin thecircumstancesf significantconomic isparity hichprevailedmongthecitizenryf theancient olis, cleardivision f politicalabour did infact evelop:herewere dentifiableeaderswhogoverned,xercisedtate ower.Theauthorityf thosewhogoverned,heir bility o enforceecisions,estednot (as it does to a considerablextent n the modern tate)on access tocoercive ower, uton economicndmaterial actors.Thus, or xample,heestablishmentf patron-clientelationsthat s, reciprocal elations etweenunequals)was an importantactor n helping o ensure he legitimacynddurabilityf specific ity-states.ee Moses Finley, olitics n theAncientWorldCambridge: ambridge niversitvress. 1983).25See "On The Content f Socialism", artsMil, in Social and PoliticalWritings,p. cit.,vols.1 and 2.


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Third, y consideringhe massivehistorical act f thestatefromanunshakeably egative erspective,s a constrainto be dismantledand dispersed, astoriadis voids those mportantenses in whichstates simply re the centralformwhich modernpoliticalagencymaytake. The formationnd concentrationfhithertonmatchedlevels of coerciveand destructive ower is the centraldefiningcharacteristicf political modernity.The beliefthat such powermaybe returned o and controlledy large-scaletructuresfparti-patorydecision-makings, at thevery east,to make a mistake npolitical ausality.Andto think therwise as it would eemCasto-riadis does26 is to be forced o thinkmuchharder bout howtheintentionsnd actions fparticulartatesmight e made ess untrust-worthy othto theirownmembers nd to themembers f otherstateswhom hey re in a position o affect.Fourth,f t is acknow-ledged hat tates rean unavoidable eaturefmodern olitics, henthe mportantontrastormodern olitical heorys notthat etween"totalitarianism"nd a visionof the participativeotentialitiesfAthenianemocracy,utbetweenhoseforms fthepolitical ivisionof labour thestate)whichdo possessand place enforceableimitson governmentalower, nd thosewhichdo not. By figuringhiscontrast,n and acrossspecific ontexts,t maybe possibleto per-ceive moreclearlywhat factors re relevantforestablishinghenature nd extent f the networks f obligation inking articularstates o their itizenry.Oneimportantermn sucha contrasts a conceptionfpoliticswhich places value on agents participativelynd cooperativelycreating heirownpoliticalorder. Does Castoriadisgiveus somesenseofwhatmight onceivablyoldsucha political ommunityfautonomousndividualsogether?Becauseheplacessuchconceptualandmoral tresson human gency nd autonomy,e cannot nvokesome extraneousnstrumentallyr normativelyindingprinciple:not thenecessitiesftheeconomic ivision flabour,nottheweightof tradition,ot fraternalove,not someuniversallycknowledgedprinciple f distributiveustice,nor even intersubjectivelyindingnorms fcommunicativection. Whatwouldbe thenecessaryom-ponentsmaterial, sychological,omeintricatemixofthetwo?)ofsucha bond?JohnDunnhas arguedforthecentralityfa conceptionf trustin anyviewofpoliticswhich akesagency eriously:

In politicalgencywhatthere s in theendforhuman eings oreckonwith s only heirudgementsfhowotherhuman eingscanbeexpectedoact. NoonecanKnowhow notheruman eing26See, for example,his remarkably isabused (thoughnow obviouslyoutof date) analysisof Sovietand Americannuclearpowerand strategy: evantlaguerre (Paris: Fayard, 1981).


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416 S. KHILNANIwill act in the future. Trust is a policyapt forconditionswhereknowledges unavailable, s in the case of the freeacts of anotherperson... t will alwaysremain. 7 (p. 84-5)

Castoriadis's tresson indeterminacynd opacity s botha causalpropertyf thehumandomain nd (becausethisopacityhas as itscounterpartreativity)s a value in itself s in an importantensea recognitionhat thisdomain s constituted y the freeacts ofhumanbeings, ndhence s nottractable o thepredictivehetoricsimputed o scientificnderstanding. et, in place of these,Casto-riadisdoesnotgrant nymore ntricatelyextured ayofconceivingand believingn theregularitiesf the human domain. Nor doeshe give satisfactoryccount fwhatmayserve s limits o reducethe evident evels of risk and hazard raised by a communityfempoweredndautonomousndividuals.He is scornful f the iberalresort oConstitutions,hichhe rightlyees as being hecontingentoutcomes f and alwayssubjectto- specific elations f power.Autonomy,nhisunderstandings onlypossible fa societyonstantlyrecognizestself s thesole sourceof its ownnorms nd laws. Inthis view,democracys essentially tragic politicalmode: it issubjectto no external r pre-givenimits, nd mustperpetuallyacethe possibilityof collectivehubris. He does, however,speakapprovinglyfsuchancientAthenianroceduress thegraphe ara-nomon,8 nd (andmore mbiguously)finstitutionshich hrougheducationpaideia)would nternalizen individuals conceptionfautonomys self-limitation.Butthis s a deeply roblematicrea,whichdemandsmuchgreater lucidationn hispart.Thoughtremains hin, astoriadis imselfmayhavegoodreasonto trusthis conception s it stands. In an importantense,theforce fhis entire rguments to insist hat nyspecificationf hisvisionmustremain hin, ince to attempt o givefuture reationsanymoredeterminacyr imaginativeoliditys to remain tumblingwithin hecageof nheritedntological bsessions. Thefutures bydefinitionpistemicallynd ontologicallynaccessibleto us: howcouldwe knowwhat tmightooklike, et alone whethertworks?Castoriadis'strategys tosteer learboth ftheprevisionaryocabu-lariesof Marxism nd other"totaltheories"whichclaimabsoluteknowledge,nd oftheknow-nothingo-nothingrinciplesfconser-vative hought.Forhim,political ctivity, raxis,s basedon know-2*John Dunn, "Trust and Political Agency", n Diego Gambetta,Trust:Makingand BreakingCooperativeRelations Oxford!Blaekwell 198RV n 71-Qr28On this,see Finley,Politicsin theAncientWorld, p. cit.,pp. 53-55; lsoMoses Finley.DemocracyAncient nd Modern.2nd edition London: HogarthPress, 1985),p. 72 and pp. 113-118.29For a somewhatdifferent iew of the liberatingpotentialities f suchinstitutions f "self-government",ee, for example,Michel Foucault, The Useof Pleasure: The History of Sexuality,vol. 2 (London:Viking,1986).


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ledge which is always fragmentarynd provisional:fragmentarybecause there an be no exhaustiveheory f humanityr history,provisionalecausepraxis onstantlyreatesnewknowledge.VI

This exultation n the possibilities f politicalcreationyokestogetherwopowerfulmodernmaginativemodes:a Romantic iewof aesthetic elf-invention,nd a post-Enlightenmentonception fpolitics s therealm of humancollective reation. To the modernear, oining hesetwo diomsproduces n appealing one ofauthen-ticity, recognizablyumanvoice which addresses us as humanbeings. But this tone mustalso be able to persuadeus as humanbeings. Why should we trust Castoriadis'svision? Why,moreimportantly,houldwe trust is udgement?Thosemodern oliticalvisionswhichhave been able to persuadesignificantumbers fhumans to struggle o give such visioninstitutionalolidityhaveoffered otonly perspectivenwhatmight e possiblebut also-at leastrhetorically a sense of what given hedetected egularitiesof all thathasgonebefore)s politicallyikely, robable or, s inthecase ofMarxism,nevitable).BecauseCastoriadis laces such valueon radicalcreativity,nd on the mplicationshismusthaveforourunderstandingf politicalcausality nd possibility,e is leftwithan analytically eakvocabulary orspecifyingheprobableresultsof suchcreativity.In politics, s in otherdimensions f life, t is importantlwaysto entertain senseof theopacity f thefuture,imply ecause itwillbe the outcome fwhatwe (at theveryeast)believe o be freeactions;but it isn'tparticularlyensible o see it as pureand sheerpossibility.To think fpolitics n thiswayis not to enhancepoli-tical judgement. Political udgementmustbe based on a soundunderstandingf the causal properties f the social and politicalworld, nd on a compellingisionofhumanvalue; butwhat sets itoff s themostdifficultnd importantmoment f a political heoryis itsability o identifynd provide easonsforparticulargents oact differentlyhantheywould otherwise ave done,witha goodchanceofsuchactionsresultingnbenign utcomes.It is hardto avoidthe force fCastoriadis'scepticism, is insis-tence hatthinkingbout the social and politicalworld s always neffortfulctivity ather hana more or less suave deploymentfinstrumentslreadyforged. So too his characterizationf institu-tionas a crucialbut perishable spectof thehuman domain s avaluableone. Indeed,as a loosening f the atrophiedmaginativeand intellectualigatures fprofessionalnd routine nderstandingsof the social and politicalworld,readingCastoriadis s a bracinggymnastic.But as a conception f whatwe mightrightlyee as

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418 S. KHILNANI

humanlynd politicallyf value, t is too slim to be compellinglyattractive.And s a wayofthinkingbout what t wouldmakegoodpolitical ense to do, its existences virtual. If it is as a politicaltheory hatCastoriadiswishes his workto be read,he has yettocreateone.

castoriadis and modern political theory

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