caste democracy

8/7/2019 caste democracy

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Is India a

‘Caste Democracy’?

Submitted by:

Anjali Chhabra

B.A (hons) Journalism 5th Semester Enrolment no.: 08/451

Subject: Seminars on current issues



Introduction: Caste based politics in India

Though the idea that caste is a part of a natural and moral order of things, that it is a hereditary

quality which once for all defines ones position and occupational affiliation and which is

associated with a particular law of conduct is rejected both by intellectuals and political leaders,

caste is in Indian post independence politics continually used and abused in different ways.

State politics in India has been particularly the hot bed of political casteism. Caste enters muchmore directly into the composition of political elites at the state level. For example the mysore

cabinet is dominated by Lingayats and Vokkaliga, the Maharashtra Cabinet by Marathas, and

some have refereed to the Madras Cabinet as a federation of dominant backward castes.

And though the Indian constitution has outlawed caste-based discrimination, the caste system, in

various forms does continue to play a major role in Indian society and politics. A strikingfeature of the Indian democratic experiment has been the increasing use of reservations to

achieve greater social justice and equality of opportunity. Much of this has occurred due to the

shifting balance of power across demographics.

Since the 1950s, political power has been shifting away from upper caste Hindus to the rest, whoare far more numerous. From a society where politics once held a marginal public role, India has

become an intensely political society. By the 1970s, for instance, many Shudra castes—located

above the outcastes—had gained enough economic and political clout to become a powerful

‘vote bank’. They now aspired to a larger share of administrative and educational opportunities,where they were underrepresented. Some of the largest and best-organized Shudra castes were

the ‘Yadavs in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, Jats in Haryana and Punjab, Marathas in Maharashtra,

Vokkaligas in Karnataka, and Gounders in Tamil Nadu.’

And during the recent years, caste mobilisation has become an important factor in shaping Indian politics. Caste is a dominant factor particularly, in Bihar, MP, UP, Kerala, and Orissa. It can be a

more potent force than ideology. A socialist voter would rather vote for a candidate of his own

caste in a constituency that is also contested by the CPI-M or the CPI. Of course, in urban areas

casteism is not a determinant. In large parts of the country, it is not politics that becomes caste-ridden; on the contrary, it is caste that gets politicized.

On one hand there is a struggle for equality but on the other hand group and caste identities aresharpened and boundaries between groups reinforced. As paradoxical as it may seem, this

contradiction is already present in the Indian constitution, which on one hand calls for equality of

opportunity and status for all citizens irrespective of caste, sex, religion etc. and on the other hand has a full package of reservations prepared for scheduled castes and tribes, OBCs etc.

There is thus an inevitable tension emerging between two basic notions – the notion of individualand the notion of group rights. This tension runs through the whole Indian politics like a red

thread, which can be observed in different states in diverse variations according to the

composition of society and other important traits, but the principle remains basically the same.

Caste is not disappearing, nor is ‘casteism’ – the political use of caste – for what is emerging in

India is a social and political system which institutionalizes and transforms but does not abolish

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caste. The Indian political parties are well aware that to build the electoral support and vote

banks it is necessary to appeal to particular castes, tribes and religious communities. The caste

rhetoric emerged especially in the context of mobilization of the lower castes especially by theIndia National Congress, which introduced the system of affirmative action – reservations – for

scheduled castes and tribes. The caste thus became especially salient in mobilizing and

organizing lower castes – with a long history of social, political and economical discrimination – in their struggle for equality, same opportunities and incorporation into the political system and

processes of decision making.

“Caste, once an instrument for the maintenance of hierarchy, is, paradoxically, seen as a vehicle

for egalitarianism between castes, though not within them.” But which type of identity is

politically salient of course varies – in a land as great, as stratified, and as pluralistic and

heterogeneous as India – over time and territory. While caste identities and Hindu nationalismare now particularly salient in the north of India, regional and linguistic identities are strong in

Assam and the states of northeast, class identity and membership serves as a basis for

mobilization and political action in Kerala and West Bengal.

Not only is caste institutionalized in politics through the system of reservations, which guarantee

seats in government, access to educational institutions and employment in the administrative(which is a way how to get into position of political power) for selected – large – segments of

society, but caste-based organizations are also emerging within the framework of the civil

society. The particular group rights remain a source of conflict between those who support them

and those who oppose them – while the forward castes oriented more towards the equality of opportunity than equality of outcome together with Hindu nationalist, who perceive the

reservations as creating fission and conflicts within the Indian society which they are trying to

unite under the ideology of Hindutva (and thus weakening it in the face of the threat of theMuslim Other), oppose the system of reservations, lower and middle classes mainly support the

system of reservations and perceive it as a matter of social justice for victims of the Brahmin

dominated caste system.

But it must be noted that the system of reservations has helped mainly those forward within

lower castes and was practically incapable of substantially changing the position of the backwardin the lower castes. Material benefits to the lower castes have largely gone to their more

advanced members, some castes (Yadavs, for example) have befitted substantially, others hardly

at all, there are growing class divisions within each of the lower castes as the more successful

individuals obtain positions in government while others receive few if any benefits. Also, thoughwe do not have the place to elaborate on it here, that caste was and is linked in diverse ways to

the former monarchical structures that are reflected in the patron-client relationships that

substantially affect the Indian political scenes and that questions of honor – again interlinkedwith the idea of caste in diverse ways – are another essential part of the Indian politics.



Different approaches to caste

Mahatma Gandhi, B R Ambedkar and Jawaharlal Nehru had radically different approaches to

caste especially over the constitutional politics and the status of ‘untouchables’.

Mahatma Gandhi's views on the caste system--which constitutes the main social problem in

India-were fully elaborated by him in 1921-22 in a Gujrati journal called Nava-Jivan. He

considered caste system as a natural order of society but resented the then present form of castesthat existed in the society, which was due to caste being given a religious coating. He asserted

that small castes should fuse themselves into one big caste and wanted to reproduce the old

system of four big castes, i.e Varna system.

For Dr Ambedkar, Reservations were designed only for the Scheduled Castes so that they couldgain socially valuable assets after centuries of deprivation. Dr Ambedkar and others believed that

once members of Scheduled Castes attained a measure of self-respect and dignity they would

take the fight against untouchability forward and finally extirpate caste from its roots.

Reservations were never meant to be a resource to be flogged in perpetuity. Its specific intent

was, in fact, to make itself irrelevant, over time, by removing its raison d’être from our everydaylives.

Ambedkar approached the Dalits problem through a minority view point. He wanted to ensure

constitutional rights so that the Dalits don’t become victim of majoritarian assertion during theelections. So he fought for the separate electorate for them in 1932 and which was justifiably

awarded by the British that time known as communal award. In all his life time, he addressed the

issue of the untouchables from the view point of a democratic polity and not just politics.

After India got independence and Ambedkar led the drafting of the Indian constitution, Dalits got

17.5% seats reserved in parliament and state assemblies. Actually Ambedkar never asked for this

reservation as he feared that the leadership that would emerge after this would be serving more tothe high caste Hindus who form the majority than the Dalits. And this resulted in defeat of Ambedkar in the very first election he contested from Mumbai, Maharashtra as all the high caste

Hindus ganged up against him and got him defeated. Ambedkar could not live more but the

Dalits became vote bank of the ruling party. Many leaders were elected and became ministersand governors and chief ministers of the state. This was the citizenship manifesto that Ambedkar

was putting forward. Like most of his other colleagues in the Constituent Assembly, he too

believed that reservations were not to be seen as a blunt instrument, but needed to be constantlyfinessed keeping in mind its most important final objective, viz., to rid India of the hated

institution of caste. For Ambedkar there was no half-way house. Caste had to go.

Nehru was opposed to the idea of reservations. He saw them as divisive—perhaps led by theview that the existence of separate Hindu and Muslim electorates was partly to blame for thePartition. But he had other grounds to resist them as well. A decade earlier, however, he had

agreed to reservations for the ‘untouchables’ and the tribal peoples, referred to in the

Constitution as SC’s and ST’s, respectively. They made up nearly a quarter of the population andthe Constitution reserved for them 22.5% of the seats in the central and state legislatures.



A brief look at three examples of the role and meanings of caste in the Indian politics in three

states – in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh:

The Dravidian Movement in Tamil Nadu

Decades after B R Ambedkar criticized its use as a political plank, caste continues to be amongthe key determinants of electioneering, and Tamil Nadu could be one of the more striking

examples of caste leanings playing a part in the choice of representatives.

Tamil Nadu serves as a good example for conceptualizing caste in a different way than it is

traditionally understood, i.e. as a peculiar social institution and a distinguishing feature of the

Indian society. It has been observed that untouchables in Tamil Nadu understood their own

position and status not as a result of some inherent, inborn lowness, but as a result of specifichistorical conditions. The model implicit in the inter-caste relations in Tamil Nadu is thus one of

kingship – where the status of the overlord is bound to his practical capacity to command the

labor of others (the possibility to claim kingly status is thus potentially open to all caste-men who

have acquired land) and where untouchables serve “as feudal retainers, and symbols of publichonor and prestige for their high-caste overlords”

Tamil Nadu was one of the first states to witness mobilization of low castes and substantial

changes which both reached its peak between 1949 and 1967, when the political party Dravida

Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) which administered the movement won control of the government

of Madras. Tamil nationalists (and the DMK speakers) constructed a new conception of Tamilnationalist cosmology which included the notion of honor which was related to the belief that all

castes are equal and rejected the idea of ones superiority as based on ones caste status.

The Tamil nationalism was thus focused on two main themes – equality and the special nature

of Tamils as a people. Another important focus of the Tamil nationalist movement was the

emphasis put on education as a mean of promotion of equality – open to all. On the other handthough the Dravidian movement was ideologically committed to the abolition of the caste

system, in practice it used caste as a means of political mobilization and thus increasing rather

than decreasing its (not only political) significance.

But it must be admitted that a certain “transition had taken place in people’s conceptions from

focus on a hierarchical nature of caste structures to a view of castes as embodying different

substances”. Though human beings are considered as primarily equal, this fact does not deny theimportance of ones rank or prestige, on the other hand, though “the DMK was against caste order

among other orders that were suggested in the vision which were developed around a specific

notion of dignity, that could be potentially achieved by anyone regardless of caste” (though before it was related to ones wealth, authority, caste membership etc.).

The focus on personal status and authority in a domain that one finds in this area is a function of the political particularism of social segmentation, the many informal units (including caste)

within which much activity takes place. These small-scale sociopolitical units (segments)

reproduce themselves partly through the utilization of ideologies which focus on the maintenance



of relations of respect/honor for the person or persons who administer the affairs of the unit and

manage both its infernal disputes and relationships with the world outside”.

The Case of Devaraj Urs in Karnataka

What distinguishes Karnataka from other Indian states is a comparatively higher social cohesionof its society and the fact that though we can find there a significant Muslim minority, clashes

between Hindus and Muslims have been very rare. The social changes in the pre-Independence

period were rather mild and Karnataka stepped into the post-Independence period without almostany change in patterns of land control and local power.

At the local level the most villages have been dominated by two powerful minorities –

the vokkaligas and the lingayats – who were mainly peasant proprietors whose wealth camemainly from crop cultivation. These two caste-based segments of society control a great portion

of land around the villages; they serve as patrons and money-lenders for their clients and have a

relatively high position in the caste system and they also dominate politics at the state level and

other supra-levels.

Politics still mean power relations among persons and groups within the village or circle of villages. Though the dominance in Karnataka is less oppressive than in other parts of India,

Karnataka’s poorer villagers do perceive inequalities and exploitation are to a large extent

product of class differences, but they tend to express this in the language heavily laced with caste

clichés. Caste is thus a crucial element in the system of dominance that can be observed inKarnataka and is continually reinforced by the present economic inequalities – caste and class

differences thus interplay at various levels.

A slight change in this trend came with the Chief Minister Devaraj Urs who brought more people

from disadvantaged groups into the Congress party (during the elections of 1972) and thus

disrupted the control of the dominant groups over the society and control of state politics. Healso developed a series of development projects for disadvantaged groups – especially children;

and provided houses to the poor. But “his programmes penetrated downward to the grassroots

only imperfectly, intermittently and unevenly. The result of all this therefore fell short of major social change. Notably, he adapted the Congress machine politics to modestly progressive

purposes. Urs also tried to stimulate caste sentiments in order to develop new political base, he

tried to revive old forgotten identities or create them anew and appeal to them.

Thus he established diverse caste and group associations, he thus strengthened what he

considered as well-rooted divisions in the concrete realities of village life and did not expect

them to change in a short time and so he tried to get use of the rising political awareness of thedepressed and weak castes. But lingayats and vokkaligas still enjoy and maintain the traditional

dominance over the village.

They remain dominant at the local level and there is precious little evidence to suggest that any

serious challenge is likely to arise soon to their position, or to the relative cohesion of rural

society in Karnataka which is bound up with that system of dominance.



The NTR Phenomenon in Andhra Pradesh

Though the trajectories and the situation of the state of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka appear to be similar, there are significant differences. There is a higher level of social tension in Andhra

Pradesh. This fact made it much more difficult to create broad coalitions of support among

diverse social groups and the politics itself – especially in the era of N. T. Rama Rao (NTR) andhis party Telugu Desam (TDP) – did not appeal to and represent (and did not even have the

potential to do so) concrete social groups.

NTR as a popular (and populist leader) dominated the government and its “ministers and

legislators had few opportunities to channel goods and services to the social groups from which

they came and which the TDP needed to cultivate.

An interesting example of the caste politics in Andhra Pradesh also in relation to the NTR is the

case of Guntur. There exists an enduring conflict between Reddis and Kammas. The Kammas

dominate the district in social and economic spheres. The emergence of NTR (himself being

Kamma chief minister; 1983) in this district is conceived as a defeat of Reddis and theemergence of “Kamma raj”. The political structure in Andhra Pradesh thus enabled these caste

divisions to be expressed through different parties – the two competing castes allied with tworival parties. NTR thus hardened the caste cleavage already existing.

So it is palpable that caste interplays with Indian politics in numerous ways. And though we have

not elaborated the examples in detail, we have given an idea of how caste and caste sentimentscan be used for political purposes, generating or partially solving conflicts, creating more

tensions or on the other hand also tempering them. None of the examples can be generalized and

none of them can be considered as representative, but they all shed at least a bit of light on thehighly complex position of caste in Indian politics.



Mandal Commission

An artifact of this social change was the Mandal commission of 1979, tasked to ‘identify the

socially or educationally backward’ communities of India. It was designed to consider question

of seat reservations and quotas for people to redress caste discrimination. In 1980, the

commission’s report affirmed the affirmative action practice under Indian law whereby membersof low castes were given exclusive access to a certain portions of government jobs and slots in

public universities. When VP Singh’s government tried to implement the recommendations in

1989, massive protests were held in the country. Many alleged that the politicians were trying tocash in on caste based reservations for purely pragmatic electoral purposes.

The Issue of Reservations

Today, reservations have taken on a new character. This provision is no longer aimed at rootingout caste but in representing them. The caste-based reservations have led to widespread protests,

with many complaining of reverse discrimination against the forward castes. The 2006 Indian

anti-reservations protests are one major example. The modern view is caste-based reservations

should be based on the individual’s personal economic status, as there are now many dalits whoare more wealthy and more educated than forward castes but still benefit from reservations and

other government advantages. A considerable amount of violence and hate crimes have been

motivated by caste. Ranvir Sena, a caste-supremacist group in Bihar, has committed violent actsagainst Dalits and other members of the Scheduled Castes community. Phoolan Devi, who

belonged to Mallah lower caste, was mistreated and raped by upper caste Thakurs at a young

age. She then became a bandit and carried out violent robberies against upper caste people. In1981, her gang massacred 22 Thakurs, most of who were not involved in her kidnapping or rape.

She further went on to become a politician and a Member of Parliament from her constituency.

Over the years, various incidents of violence against dalits, such as Kherlanji Massacre have been reported from many parts of India. At the same time many violent protests by dalits, such as

2006v Dalits protests in Maharashtra, have occurred as well.

Caste census

CASTE-BASED enumeration of the population has not been carried out in India since 1931. In

the last 70 years, some caste names have changed, quite a few new ones have emerged, several

castes have merged with others or have moved up or down the social hie rarchy, and many have

become politically active.

Opponents of caste enumeration tend to hark back to the ideals of the freedom struggle and theConstitution, which treat caste as illegitimate and see Census enumeration of caste as a tool of

‘divide and rule.' By not collecting caste data, the Census, a great national undertaking, strikes a blow for social equality. Supporters of caste enumeration tend to argue the opposite, namely that by collecting data on the caste-inequality link, the Census could become a promoter of

progressive social change, chiefly by strengthening the case for compensatory discrimination

policies across the land.

So whether a caste-based Census will be socially divisive or help establish equality for all

remains debatable. But the grounds on which Vallabhbhai Patel scrapped such an exercise holds

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good even today. We must go beyond caste identities and politics to establish a casteless society.

The opponents cite the stand taken by India’s first Home Minister Vallabhbhai Patel, who

decaled that such a Census would never be undertaken. Successive Governments since then hadresisted it. The last such Census was enumerated in 1931 when Lord Irwin was the Viceroy. In

1941, there was no Census on account of the World War Second. After independence founding

fathers were in favour of building a casteless society. Moreover, caste is a subjective and not anobjective measurable category like occupation, age, sex and education. There is no uniform

definition of the OBCs across the country. In the past six or more decades some castes have

changed and some others have merged and new ones have emerged.



The triumph of development over caste in Bihar

Not too long ago, Bihar was considered the most backward of India’s 28 states - the epitome in

fact of everything that is wrong with the country: oppressive poverty, widespread anarchy,

government malfeasance, and divisive caste-based politics. In fact there's an old joke in India's

eastern state of Bihar: "People don't cast their votes, they vote for their caste."

From 1990-2005, the state government was lead by the husband-wife combo of Lalu Prasad

Yadav and Rabri Devi, who were focused less on the common good than on rewarding the long-

marginalized lower caste groups and Muslims comprising their political base. This approach to

governance left Bihar in shambles. Economic growth was anemic, and sometimes even

negative; governmental services, including education, decayed; public infrastructure fell into

disrepair; and criminal gangs operated with impunity. The corruption-riddled state

administration became known as the “Jungle Raj.”

But the dramatic turnaround in the voting patterns in the recent Bihar elections has been anexample of the true development model for the whole country. Since assuming office in late

2005, Nitish Kumar has managed a remarkable turnaround of the state’s fortunes. He forcefully

cracked down on the criminal syndicates; undertook an energetic program of road and bridge

construction; improved the delivery of education and health services; and fostered the political

empowerment of women. To be sure, Bihar remains impoverished, but it is also now one of the

country’s fastest-growing regions. Rather than appealing to narrow sectarian interests, Kumar

campaigned on the shared benefits that come from development and good government, and his

re-election bid received widespread support across ethnic, religious and gender lines.



The flawed logic of caste politics

There is no caste in this country which has a clear majority in any constituency, even Assembly

size. The closest are some castes like the Marathas in Maharashtra that make up about 30 per

cent of the population but are internally fractionated along political lines, as it should be.

Elsewhere, in the vast subcontinent, the so-called dominant OBCs like the Yadavs, Jats, Gujars,Lodhs, etc., barely climb up to 15 per cent of the population. Usually they are around 10 per cent

in those areas where it is said that they have a strong political presence. It must also be kept in

mind that there is no such thing as a natural affinity between castes. Jats and Gujars may cometogether politically, but they heartily despise each other and have elaborate origin tales that

justify their mutual animosities.

"Mutual repulsion" has always been a cardinal feature of caste and it has withstood the test of

time. The truth is that no caste sees any virtue in any other caste. This is why caste politics can be so damaging to the cause of citizenship. All caste alliances are ephemeral and self-serving.

How else can one imagine such wild combinations that bring the Muslim with the Kshatriyas as

in KHAM alliance, or the Ahir with the Rajputs, as in the AJGAR combine? All this is well

known, and yet the caste bogey is successfully set in motion by all variety of politicians, and, sadto say, intellectuals too.

Given this simple demographic fact, it has to be more than just caste for a person to win an

election. Once this is accepted the unavoidable conclusion is that voters cannot vote along caste

lines even if they wanted to. Why then do they elect these caste virtuosos? The answer simply isthat an ordinary, garden variety electorate has to choose from what is available. One cannot vote

for a dream candidate: but only from among those that are in the political market place. This

means the market place needs to be scrutinized because the political vendors here have converted

elections into caste festivals and we, the voters, have little choice in the matter.

Second, the idea that certain parties enjoy a kind of political "zamindari", or stronghold, in particular areas needs revision. Rae Bareilly type situations are rare for in the bulk of this

country, the dusty BIMARI bowls included, no party has an assured position in any region of

India. Even in the latest UP elections where Mayawati and BSP have triumphed, they had to winfresh territory as they were largely dispossessed of their 2002 seats. Again, not in every

Scheduled Caste reserved constituency has the BSP won, nor in every Yadav dominated region

(with about 15 per cent of the population) has Samajwadi won. Even so, intellectuals,

psephologists and politicians have spread the canard that in India people vote along caste lines.

In the recent past, playing identity politics has given a diminishing marginal return. Indians are

generally comfortable with multiple identities— ethnic, linguistic, regional and religious, as well

as caste. Hardly any narrow homogeneous identity dominates any specific electoral constituencyor region.

That’s why in a country where at least 80% of the population professes to be Hindu, the

Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) attempt to mobilize support based on that identity did not assure it

electoral success. UP chief minister Mayawati figured this out in 2007, when she expanded the base of her Bahujan Samaj Party to include all castes, rather than just untouchables. The strategy

propelled the party to power by itself for the first time ever in India’s most populous state.



So it can be concluded that the caste system may have fallen apart, but it will be a while before

caste identities disappear. It is no longer the case that members of the "upper caste" people can at

will command the so-called ‘lower castes" to do their bidding. The old fashioned "vote banks"are no longer quite valid. And yet because the practice of marrying within one’s own caste still

remains, identity assertions retain a certain charisma. Sadly, one has to wait for the long duration

of urbanisation to undermine castes. If only we had used the wand of citizenship morethoroughly in our Constitution and more consistently in our political practice then we might have

seen the back of caste much sooner.

caste democracy

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