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Latin America's Left Turn

Jorge G. Castanieda

A TALE OF TWO LEFTS

JUST OVER a decade ago, Latin America seemed poised to begin avirtuous cycle of economic progress and improved democraticgovernance, verseen y agrowingnumber f centrist echnocraticovernments.nMexico, PresidentCarlos SalinasdeGortari,buttressedby the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, wasready orhishandpickeduccessorowin thenextpresidentiallection.Former Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso was about tobeat out the radical labor leader Luiz In'acioLula da Silva for thepresidencyf Brazil.ArgentinePresidentCarlosMenem hadpeggedthe peso to the dollar andput his populist Peronist legacybehind him.And at the invitation of President Bill Clinton, Latin American leaderswere preparing to gather inMiami for the Summit of theAmericas,signaling an almost unprecedented convergence between the southernand northern halves of theWestern Hemisphere.

What a difference ten years canmake. Although the region hasjust enjoyed its best two years of economic growth in a long timeand real threats to democratic rule are few and far between, thelandscape today is transformed. Latin America is swerving left, anddistinct backlashes are under way against the predominant trends ofthe last 15years: free-market reforms, agreement with the UnitedStates on anumber of issues, and the consolidation of representative

JORGE . CASTANEDAs the authorof UtopiaUnarmed: heLatinAmerican Left After the Cold War and Compafiero:The Life and Death ofChe Guevara. Having resigned asMexico's Foreign Minister in 2003,he is currently Global Distinguished Professor of Politics and LatinAmerican Studies at New York University.

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Latin AmericasLeft Turndemocracy. This reaction ismore politics than policy, and morenuanced than it may appear. But it is real.

Starting with Hugo Chaivez'svictory inVenezuela eight years agoand poised to culminate in the possible election of Andres ManuelLopez Obrador inMexico's July 2 presidential contest, awave ofleaders,parties, and movements generically labeled leftist haveswept into power in one Latin American country after another.After

Chavez, itwas Lula and theWorkers' Party inBrazil, thenNestorKirchner inArgentina and Tabare Vazquez inUruguay, and then,earlier this year, Evo Morales in Bolivia. If the long shot Ollanta

Humala wins the April presidential election in Peru and LopezObrador wins inMexico, itwill seem as if a veritable left-wing tsunamihas hit the region. Colombia and Central America are the only exceptions, but even inNicaragua, the possibility of awin by SandinistaleaderDaniel Ortega cannot be dismissed.

The rest of theworld has begun to take note of this left-wingresurgence, with concern and often more than a little hysteria. Butunderstandingthe reasonsbehind these developments requiresrecognizing that there is not one Latin American left today; there aretwo.One ismodern, open-minded, reformist, nd internationalist,and it springs, paradoxically, from the hard-core left of the past. Theother, born of the great tradition of Latin American populism, isnationalist, strident, and close-minded. The first iswell aware of itspast mistakes (aswell as those of its erstwhile role models in Cubaand the Soviet Union) and has changed accordingly. The second,unfortunately, asnot.

UTOPIA REDEFINEDTHE REASONS for Latin America's turn to the left are not hard todiscern.Along with many other commentators and public intellectuals,I starteddetecting those reasonsnearly fifteen years ago, and I recordedtheminmy bookUtopiaUnarmed: heLatinAmerican eftAfter theColdWar,which made severalpoints. The firstwas that the fallof theSoviet Union would help the Latin American left by removing itsgeopolitical stigma.Washington would no longer be able to accuseany left-of-center regime in the region of being a Soviet beachhead

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One left:Brazil/s Luiz InacioLula da Silva and ChilesMichelle Bachelet(asithad everysuchgovernment ince it fomentedtheoverthrow fJacoboArbenz's administration nGuatemala in 1954); eft-winggovernmentswould no longerhave to choose between theUnitedStates and the SovietUnion, because the latterhad simply disappeared.The secondpointwas thatregardlessf the successor failure feconomic reforms n the 1990Sand the discreditingof traditionalLatinAmericaneconomicpolicies,LatinAmerica's xtreme nequality(LatinAmerica is theworld'smost unequalregion),poverty, ndconcentration f wealth, income,power,andopportunitymeant that itwould have tobe governed rom the leftof center. he combinationof inequality and democracy tends to cause amovement to the lefteverywhere.his was trueinwestern Europe from the end of thenineteenth century until afterWorld War II; it is true today inLatinAmerica.The impoverishedasses vote for the typeof policies that,theyhope,willmake them lesspoor.Third, the adventofwidespreaddemocratizationnd the consolidationof democraticelectionsas the only road to powerwould,sooner or later, lead to victories for the left-precisely because of thesocial,demographic,nd ethnic configuration f the region.Inotherwords, evenwithout the other proximatecauses,Latin Americawould almostcertainly ave tiltedleft.This forecast ecame all themore certainonce itbecame evidentthattheeconomic, ocial,andpoliticalreforms mplementednLatin

Americastartingnthemid-198oshadnot delivered n theirpromises.With the exception of Chile, which has been governed by a left-of[30] FOREIGN AFFAIRVS * olume85No.3


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And another:BoliviaEvoMorales andMexico'sAndresanuelLopezObradorcentercoalitionsince1989, he regionhashad singularly nimpressiveeconomic growth rates.They remainwell below those ofthe glory daysof the region's development (1940-80) and also well below those ofother developing nations-China, of course, but also India,Malaysia,Poland, and many others. Between 1940 and 1980,Brazil andMexico,for example, averaged six percent growth per year; from 1980 to 2000,theirgrowth rateswere less thanhalf that.Low growth rateshavemeantthe persistence f dismalpoverty, nequality,igh unemployment,alack f competitiveness,ndpoor infrastructure.emocracy, lthough

welcomed and supported by broad swathsof Latin American societies,did little to eradicate the region's secular plagues: corruption, aweakornonexistent ule f law, neffectiveovernance,nd theconcentrationof power in the hands of a few.And despite hopes that relationswiththe United States would improve, they areworse today than at anyother time in recentmemory, including the 1960s (an era defined byconfficts overCuba) and the 1980s (defined by the Central Americanwars and Ronald Reagan's contras ).But many of uswho rightly foretold the returnof the leftwere at leastpartlywrong about the kind of left thatwould emerge.We thoughtperhaps naively-that the aggiornamento of the left inLatin Americawould rapidly and neady follow that of socialist parties in France andSpain and of New Labour in theUnited Kingdom. In a few cases, thisoccurred-Chile certainly,Brazil tenuously.But inmany others, itdid not.One reason forourmistake was that the collapse ofthe Soviet Uniondid not bring about the collapseof itsLatin American equivalent,Cuba,

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JorgeG. Castanedaasmany expected itwould. Although the links and subordination of

many left-wing parties toHavana have had few domestic electoral implications (andWashington has largely stopped caring anyway), theleft's close ties to and emotional dependency on Fidel Castro becamean almost insurmountableobstacle to its reconstruction on many issues.But themore fundamental explanation has to dowith the rootsof manyof themovements that are now in power. Knowing where left-wingleadersand parties come from-in particular,which of the two strandsof the left inLatin American history they are a part of-is critical tounderstandingwho they are andwhere they aregoing.

ORIGINS OF THE SPECIESTHE LEFT-defined as that current of thought, politics, and policythat stressessocial improvements vermacroeconomicorthodoxy,egalitarian distribution of wealth over its creation, sovereignty overinternationalooperation, emocracy atleastwhen inopposition,ifnot necessarily nce inpower)overgovernmentalffectiveness-hasfollowed two different paths in Latin America. One left sprang upout of the Communist International and the Bolshevik Revolutionand has followed a path similar to that of the left in the rest of the

world. The Chilean, Uruguayan, Brazilian, Salvadoran, and, beforeCastro's revolution,Cuban Communist Parties, for example, obtainedsignificant sharesofthe popularvote atone point or another,participatedin popular front or national unity governments in the 1930Sand1940S, established a solid presence in organized labor, and exercisedsignificant influence in academic and intellectual circles.By the late 1950Sand early 196os, however, these parties had lostmost of their prestige and combativeness.Their corruption, submissiontoMoscow, accommodationwith sitting governments, and assimilationby local power elites had largely discredited them in the eyes of theyoung and the radical.But the Cuban Revolution brought new lifeto this strain of the left. In time, groups descended from the oldcommunist left fused with Havana-inspired guerrilla bands. There

were certainly some tensions. Castro accused the leaderof the BolivianCommunist Party of betraying Che Guevara and leading him to hisdeath in Bolivia in 1967; the Uruguayan and Chilean Communist

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JorgeG. Castafiedatogive awaybut did not like taxes.They squared that circle by capturingnatural-resourcermonopolyrents, hich allowedhem o spendmoneyon the descamisados, he shirtless,without raising taxes on themiddleclass.When everything else fails, the thinking went, spend money.

The ideological corollary to this bizarre blend of inclusion of theexcluded,macroeconomic folly,and political staying power (Peronwasthedominant igrurenArgentinepolitics rom

1943 through his death in 1974, theCardenasdynasty ismore present than ever inMexicanpolitics)was virulent, stridentnationalism.Per6n was elected president in 1946with theslogan BradenorPer6n (SpruilieBradenwasthen the U.S. ambassador toBuenos Aires).

When Vargas committed suicide in 1954,he

A makeover for theradical eft is exactly

what isneeded forgoodgovernance ntheregion.

darkly insinuated that he was a victim of American imperialism. Suchnationalismasmore thanrhetorical.n regimes hose domesticpolicy platformwas strictlypower-driven and pragmatic, itwas the agenda.

These two subspecies of the Latin American left have always hadan uneasy relationship.On occasion they haveworked together, but atother times they have been atwar, aswhen Peron returned from exileinJune 1973andpromptly massacred a fair shareof theArgentine radicalleft.In somecountries, hepopulist eftsimplydevouredheotherone,although peacefully and rathergraciously: inMexico in the late 198os,the tinyCommunistPartydisappeared,ndformerPRI InstitutionalRevolutionaryParty) members, such as Cuauhtemoc Cardenas,PorfirioMufioz Ledo,andthecurrent residentialront-runner,opezObrador, took over everything from itsbuildings and finances to itscongressional representation and relations with Cuba to form theleft-wingPRDParty f theDemocraticRevolution).

More recently, something funny has happened to both kinds ofleftist movements on their way back to power. The communist,socialist, and Castroist left,with a few exceptions, has been able toreconstruct itself, thanks largely to an acknowledgment of its failuresand those of its erstwhile models. Meanwhile, the populist left-withan approach to power that depends on giving away money, a deepattachment to the nationalist fervorof another era,and no realdomesticagenda-has remained true to itself.The latter perseveres in its cult

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Latin AmericasLeft Turnof the past: itwaxes nostalgic about the glory days of Peronism, theMexican Revolution, and, needless to say,Castro. The former, familiarwith its ownmistakes, defeats, and tragedies, and keenly awareof thefailuresof the Soviet Union and Cuba, has changed its colors.

CASTRO S UNLIKELY HEIRSWHEN THE reformed communist left has reached office in recentyears, its economic policies have been remarkably similar to those ofits immediate predecessors, and its respect for democracy has provedfull-fledgedand sincere.Old-school anti-Americanismhas beentempered by years of exile, realism, and resignation.The best examples of the reconstructed, formerly radical left are tobe found in Chile, Uruguay, and, to a slightly lesser extent, Brazil.This leftemphasizes ocialpolicy-education, antipovertyrograms,health care, housing-but within amore or less orthodox marketframework. It usually attempts to deepen and broaden democraticinstitutions. n occasion,LatinAmerica'sage-oldvices-corruption,apenchant for authoritarian rule-have led it astray.It disagrees withtheUnited States frequently but rarely takesmatters to the brink.InChile, formerPresidentRicardo Lagos andhis successor,MichelleBachelet, both come from the old Socialist Party (Lagos from itsmoderatewing, Bachelet from the less temperate faction).Their left-wingpartyhas governed for 16consecutive years, ina fruitftilalliancewith theChristian Democrats. This alliance hasmade Chile a truemodel forthe region.Under its stewardship, the country has enjoyed high ratesofeconomic rowth; ignificant eductionsnpoverty;qually ignificantimprovements ineducation, housing, and infrastructure; slight drop ininequality;a deepening of democracy and the dismantling ofAugustoPinochet's political legacy;a settlingof accounts (although not of scores)regardinghuman rightsviolations ofthe past;and, lastbut not at all least,a strong,mature relationshipwith theUnited States, including a freetrade agreement signed by George W. Bush and ratifiedby the U.S.Congress andWashington's support for theChilean candidate to headtheOrganization fAmericanStates.U.S.-Chileantieshavecontinuedtoprosper espiteChile'sunambiguouspposition otheU.S. invasionof Iraq ntheUNSecurityCouncil in2003.

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JorgeG. CastafiedaIn Uruguay, Vazquez ran for president twice before finallywinninga littlemore than a year ago.His coalition has always been the same:

theoldUruguayan Communist Party, the Socialist Party, andmany former Marxist Tupamaro guerrillas,who made history in the 1960s and1970Sby, among other things, kidnapping and executing CIA stationchiefDan Mitrione inMontevideo in 1970 and being featured inCostaGavras' 1973film State of Siege.There was reason to expectVXazqueztofollow a radical line once elected-but history once again trumpedideology.Although Vazzquez as restoredUruguay'srelationswith

Cuba and every now and then rails against neoliberalism and Bush,he has also negotiated an investment-protection agreement with theUnited States, sent his finance minister toWashington to explorethe possibility of forging a free-trade agreement, and stood up to theantiglobalization,oliticallyorrect roups nneighboringrgentinaon the construction of two enormous wood-pulp mills in theUruguayRiver estuary.He refused to attendMorales' inauguration aspresidentof Bolivia and has threatened toveto a bill legalizing abortion if itgetsto his desk. His government is, on substance if not on rhetoric, aseconomically orthodox as any other.And with good reason: a countryof 3.5million inhabitantswith the lowest poverty rate and the leastinequality inLatin America should not mess with its relative success.

Brazil is a different story, but not a diametrically opposed one.Even before his inauguration in 2003, Lula had indicated that hewould follow most of his predecessor's macroeconomic policiesand comply with the fiscal andmonetary targets agreed on with theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF).He has done so, achievingimpressive results in economic stability (Brazil continues to generateahefty fiscalsurpluseveryyear),but GDPgrowth has been disappointing,as have employment levels and social indicators. Lula has tried tocompensate for hismacroeconomic orthodoxy with innovative socialinitiatives (particularlyhis ZeroHunger drive and land reform).Atthe end of the day,however, perhaps his most important achievementon this front will be the generalization of the Bolsa Familia (FamilyFund) initiative, which was copied directly from the antipovertyprogram ofMexican Presidents Ernesto Zedillo and Vicente Fox.This is a successful, innovative welfare program, but as neoliberal andscantly revolutionary as one can get.

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On foreignpolicy,Brazil, likejust about every Latin Americancountry, has had its run-ins withthe Bush administration, ver issues including trade,UN reform,and how to deal with Bolivia,Colombia, Cuba, and Venezuela.But perhaps the best metaphor forthe current state of U.S.-Brazilianrelations today was the scene inBrasilia lastNovember, when Lulawelcomed Bush at his home,while across the street demonstrators from his own party burnedtheU.S. presidentineffigy.

The Workers' Party,which Lulafounded in 1980 after a longmetalworkers' strike in the industrialoutskirts of Sao Paulo, has largelyfollowed him on the road towardsocial democracy. Many of themore radical cadres of the party, orat least thosewith themost radicalhistories (such asJoseGenoino andJoseDirceu), have become moderatereformisteaders, espitetheirpastsand their lingering emotionaldevotion to Cuba. (Lula sharesthis devotion, and yet it has notled him to subservience toCastro:when Lula visited Havana in 2004,Castro wanted to hold amass rallyat the Plaza de la Revolucion;instead, Castro got a 24-hour inand-out visit from the Brazilianpresident,with almost no publicexposure.) Lula and many of his


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JorgeG. Castafiedacomrades are emblematic of the transformation of the old, radical,guerrilla-based,astroist r communist eft.Granted, the conversionsnot complete: hecorruptioncandals hathaverocked razil's overnment havemore to dowith a certain neglect of democratic practices than

with any personal attempt at enrichment. Still, the direction inwhichLula and his allies aremoving is clear.Overall, thismakeover of the radical left is good forLatin America.Given the region'snequality,overty, till-weak emocratic radition,andunfinished ationbuilding, his leftoffersprecisely hat isneededforgood governance in the region. IfChile is anyexample, this left'spath

is theway out of poverty, authoritarian rule,and, eventually, inequality.This left is also a viable, sensitive, and sensible alternative to the otherleft-the one that speaks loudly but carries a very small social stick.

POPULISM REDUXTHE LEFTIST eaderswho have arisen from a populist,nationalistpastwith few ideological underpinnings-Chavez with his militarybackground, Kirchner with his Peronist roots,Morales with his cocaleafgrowers'militancy and agitprop, Lopez Obrador with his originsin the PRI-have provedmuch lessresponsive tomodernizing influences.For them, rhetoric ismore important than substance, and the fact ofpower ismore important than its responsible exercise. The despairof poor constituencies is a tool rather than a challenge, and tauntingtheUnited States trumps promoting their countries' real interests in theworld. The difference is obvious:Chavez isnot Castro; he isPeronwithoil.Morales is not an indigenous Che; he is a skdiftiland irresponsiblepopulist. Lopez Obrador is neither Lula norChavez; he comes straightfrom the PRIof Luis Echeverria,Mexico's president from 1970 to 1976,from which he learned how to be a cash-dispensing, authoritarianinclined populist. Kirchner is a true-blue Peronist, and proud of it.For all of these leaders, economic performance, democratic values,programmatic achievements, and good relations with the UnitedStates are not imperatives but bothersome constraints that missthe real point. They aremore intent on maintaining popularity atany cost, picking asmany fights as possible with Washington, andgetting asmuch control as they can over sourcesof revenue, including

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JorgeG. Castanedaor when the country is forced to return to capital markets for freshfunds.Nor does anyone reallyknow what Kirchner intends to dowhenhis economic recovery runsout of steam. But it seems certain that thePeronistchromosomes n the country'sDNAwil remaindominant:Kirchnerwill hand outmoney, expropriate hatever is needed andavailable, and lash out at the United States and the IMFon everypossible occasion. At the same time, he will worry little about thenumber of Argentines living under the poverty line and be as chummy

with Ch'avez as he can.Chavez isdoingmuch the same inVenezuela. He is leading the fight

against the FTAA, hich isgoing nowhere anyway.He ismaking life increasinglyiserable orforeign-aboveallAmerican-companies.Heis supporting, oneway or the other, left-wing groups and leaders inmanyneighboring countries.He has established a strategicalliancewith Havanathat ncludes hepresencef nearly 0,000Cubanteachers,octors, ndcadres inVenezuela. He is flirtingwith Iran andArgentina on nucleartechnology issues.Most of all,he isattempting,with some success, to splitthe hemisphere into two camps: one pro-Cha6vez,one pro-American.

At the same time, Chavez isdriving his country into the ground.A tragicomic symbol of thiswas the collapse of the highway fromCaracas to theMaiquetia airport a fewmonths ago because of lack ofmaintenance. Venezuela'spoverty figuresand human development indices have deteriorated since 1999,when Chavez took office.Asimple comparison with Mexico-which has not exactly thrived inrecentyears-shows how badlyVenezuela is faring.Over thepast sevenyears,Mexico's economy grew by 17.5percent,while Venezuela's failedto grow at all. From 1997 to 2003,Mexico's per capita GDP rose by9.5 percent,while Venezuela's shrankby 45 percent. From 1998 to 2005,theMexican peso lost 16 percent of its value,while the value of the

Venezuelan bolivar dropped by 292 percent. Between 1998 and 2004,thenumber ofMexican households living inextreme poverty decreasedby 49 percent,while the number of Venezuelan households in extremepoverty roseby 4.5percent. In 2005,Mexico's inflation ratewas estimatedat 3.3percent, the lowest inyears,while Venezuela'swas 16percent.

Although Chavez does very little for the poor of his own country(amongwhom he remains popular), he isdoing much more for othercountries: giving oil away toCuba and other Caribbean states, buying[40] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume85sNo.3


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Latin America'sLeft TurnArgentina's debt, allegedly financing political campaigns in Boliviaand Peru and perhapsMexico. He also frequently picks fightswithFox and Bush and is buying arms from Spain and Russia. This isabout as close to traditional Latin American populism as one canget-and as far from amodern and sociallyminded left asone can be.The populist left leaderswho arewaiting in thewings look likelyto delivermuch the same.Morales inBolivia has alreadymade it topower.L6pez Obrador inMexico is close.Although Humala inPeruis still a long shot, he certainly cannot be dismissed. Such leaderswillfollow the footsteps of Chavez and Kirchner, because they have thesame roots and share the same creed. They will all, of course, beconstrained by their national realities-Morales by the fact thatBolivia is South America's poorest nation, Lopez Obrador by a2,000-mile borderwith theUnited States, Humala by a fragmentedcountry and the lackof an established political party towork with.Still, theywill tread the samepath.Morales andHumala have both saidthat theywill attempt either to renationalize their countries' naturalresources(gas,oil, copper,water) or renegotiatethe termsunderwhich foreign companies extract them.L6pez Obrador has stated thathe will notallow private investment in PEMEX,exico's state-owned oil company,or in the national electric power company.He has given awaymoneyright and left inMexico City, financing hismagnanimity with debt andfederal taxrevenues.Morales has deftly played on his indigenousoriginsto ingratiate himself with themajority of his country's population, towhom he is promising everything but giving very little.MoralesandHumala have received at least rhetorical support fromChavez, and

Morales' first trip abroad was to Havana, his second to Caracas.Humala, a retired lieutenant colonel in the Peruvian army,has confessed tobeing an admirerof theVenezuelan president. Like Chavez, hestartedhis political careerwith a failed coup, inhis case againstAlbertoFujimori in2000. Lopez Obrador's deputy, certain tobe thenextmayorofMexico City, has openly declared his admiration forChavez andCastro, despite having been ahigh-level official under Salinas.What will prove most damaging is that the populist left lovespower more than democracy, and itwill fight to keep it at great cost.Its disregard for democracy and the rule of law is legendary.Oftenusingdemocraticmeans, ithasoften sought toconcentrate tspower

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JorgeG. Castafiedathrough ew constitutions,ake ontrol f themediaand the legislativeand judicial ranches f government, ndperpetuate ts ruleby usingelectoral eforms, epotism,andthe suspension f constitutional uarantees. Chavez is the best example of this left, but certainly not theonlyone:LopezObradorhasalreadyommitted imselfto cleaningp

Mexico's Supreme Court and central bank and opposes any autonomyfor the country's nfantregulatory gencies.This populist left has traditionallybeen disastrousfor LatinAmerica, and there isno reason to suppose itwill stop being so in thefuture.As in the past, its rulewill lead to inflation, greater poverty andinequality, nd confrontation ithWashington. It also threatens oroll back the region'smost important achievement of recent years: theestablishment f democraticruleand respect orhuman rights.

RIGHT LEFT, WRONG LEFTDISTINGUISHINGETWEENhesetwobroad left-wingcurrents sthebestbasis orserious olicy,romWashington,Brussels,Mexico City,or anywhere else.There isnot a tremendous amountWashington or anyother government can actually do to alter the current course of eventsinLatinAmerica. The Bush administration couldmake some differenceby delivering on itspromises to incumbents in the region (onmatterssuchas immigrationndtrade), herebyupportingontinuity ithoutinterfering in the electoral process; inSouth American nations wherethere is a strongEuropean presence, countries such asFrance and Spaincould help by pointing out that certain policies and attitudes havecertainconsequences.But there ismuch bolder course, amore statesmanlike approach,thatwould foster a right left instead ofworking to subvert any left'sresurgence.his strategywould involveactivelyand substantivelysupporting the right leftwhen it is inpower: signing free-trade agreements with Chile, taking Brazil seriously as a trade interlocutor,engaging thesenations' governments on issues involving thirdcountries(such asColombia, Cuba, andVenezuela), and bringing their leadersand public intellectuals into the fold.The right left should be able toshow not only that there areno penalties forbeing what it is,but alsothat it can deliver concrete benefits.

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Latin Americas Left TurnThe internationalcommunity should also clarifywhat itexpects fromthe wrong left, given that it exists and thatattempts todisplace itwould

be not onlymorally unacceptablebut alsopragmatically ineffective.Thefirstpoint to emphasize is that Latin American governments of anypersuasion ust abide y their ountries'ommitmentsegardingumanrights anddemocracy.The region has built up an incipient scaffoldingonthesematters over recentyears,and anybacksliding, forwhatever reasonorpurpose, should bemet by a rebukefrom the internationalcommunity.The second point to stress is that all governments must continue tocomply with the multilateral effort to build a new international legalorder, ne thataddresses,mongotherthings, heenvironment,ndigenous people's rights, internationalcriminaljurisdiction(despite

Washington's continued rejectionof the InternationalCriminal Courtand itspressureon severalLatin American governments todo the same),nuclearnonproliferation,orld TradeOrganization ulesandnorms,regional greements, nd the fightagainst orruption, rugtrafficking,and terrorism,consensually defined. Europe and theUnited States haveenormous leverage inmany of these countries. They should use it.Finally,Washington and other governments should avoid themistakesof thepast. Some fights are simply not worth fighting: IfMoraleswants to squabblewith Chile over access to the sea,with Argentina overthe price of gas,with Peru over border issues and indigenous ancestry,stand aside. If, forwhatever reason,Lopez Obrador wants tobuild abullet trainfromMexico City to theU.S. border, live and let live. IfChavezreallywants to acquire nuclear technology fromArgentina, let him, aslong as he does itunder InternationalAtomic EnergyAgency supervision

and safeguards.Under no circumstances should anyone accept the division of the hemisphere into two camps-for theUnited States, againsttheUnited States-because under such a split, theAmericas themselvesalways lose out. Such a division happened overCuba in the 1960s andover Central America in the 198os.Now that theCold War is over,it should never happen again. So instead of arguing overwhether towelcome or bemoan the adventof theleft inLatin America, itwould bewiser to separate the sensible from the irresponsible and to supportthe former and contain the latter.If done right, thiswould go a longwaytoward helping the region finally find its bearings and, asGabrielGarcfaMairquez might put it, end itshundreds of years of solitude.@9

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