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FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO,petitioners,vs. HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge ofthe Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and VICENCIO CAYABA,respondents.

Francisco A. Lava, Jr.for petitioners.

Diosdado B. Ramirezfor private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULES OF COURT; APPLICATION IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS IN A SUPPLETORYCHARACTER OR WHENEVER PRACTICABLE OR CONVENIENT ALLOWED.The Land Registration Act (Act 496) does not provide for a pleadingsimilar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules contained therein in landregistration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registrationcase, this Court in Duran vs. Oliva,3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismissfiled by five (5) oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to beregistered in appellant's name had previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to run itsusual course would have been a mere exercise in futility.

2.ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA; REQUISITES. There is no doubt that the principle of res judicataoperates in the case at bar. For saidprinciple to apply: (a) the former judgment must be final, (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of theparties, (c) it must be a judgment on the merits and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and ofcause of action. There is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties,subject matter and cause of action.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUSION OF A CO-OWNER DOES NOT RESULT IN A DIFFERENCE OF PARTIES; CASE AT BAR. The inclusion of privaterespondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the twocases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ownership. (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7thEdition, p. 258) Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the co-ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by the heirs of DrEpifanio Q. Verano in his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE AND THE SAME CAUSE SHOULD NOT BE TWICE LITIGATED ALTHOUGH TWO DIFFERENT FORMS OF ACTION AREEMPLOYED; CASE AT BAR. While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relieftherein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an action reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently,between the two cases there is identity of causes of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and thesame is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to excludeother persons from ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed against particular personswhile in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Courheld in Dais v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, (51 Phil. 896) that the answer in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as rearights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which is different. "But the employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to

escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated."

5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT WHICH DECIDED THE FIRST CASE DOES NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE OF EQUAL JURISDICTION WITH COURTWHICH DECIDED THE SECOND CASE.It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the second case isbeing heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough that the court which decided the first case on the merits had validlyacquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata.

6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING IN THE ABELLERA CASE; ABANDONED.If, as the Abellera case, 74 Phil. 284, held that res judicata can be set upby a claimant to defeat the alleged right of another claimant, what useful purpose would be served by allowing a party to present evidence of ownershipover the land sought to be registered when the final result would necessarily be in favor of the claimant who had set up the defense of resjudicata? Andsupposing the land registration court finds that the party against whom the principle of res judicataoperates does have a better right or title to the landwhat happens to the principle ofres judicata? Can a court sitting as a land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another court of genera

jurisdiction? To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either the application foregistration or the opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably shown, as in the caseat bar, that one or another is barred by a prior judgment. Theruling in the Abellera case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned.

D E C I S I O N

FERNAN, J p:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order are two [2] orders issued by respondent judge in Land RegistrationCase No. Branch II-N204 of the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, entitled, "Application for Registration of Title, Vicencio QCayaba, Applicant, versus Flordeliza Valisno and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors," the order dated July 2,1980, dismissing the opposition filed bypetitioners on the ground of res judicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The antecedents are as follows:

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On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio Valisno purchased from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, namely, GuillermoGuillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed Blanco, two parcels of land, particularly described as follows:

[a]"a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim, Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area ofFive Thousand (5,000) square meters or fifty (50) meters facing the Provincial Road by one hundred (100) meters long; boundedon the North by Pedro del Rosario, on the South by Alberto Tungangui, on the East by the Provincial Road; and on the West, byTerreno del Estado, now Matias del Rosario;"

and,

[b]"a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Six Thousand Two HundredFifty (6,250) square meters or fifty (50) meters at the east side by one hundred twenty-five (125) meters at the North and South;bounded on the north by Matias del Rosario, on the south by Alberto Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and on the west

by Cauayan Diversion Road and Matias del Rosario. " [Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo.]

Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive possession thereof inthe concept of owners by installing as caretaker one Fermin Lozano, who had his house built thereon.

On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale executed in hisand one Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on June 30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano from possession of the land. Hesubsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land.

On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a complaint against private respondent for recovery opossession of said parcels of land. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895, was in due time resolved in favor of petitioners who weredeclared owners thereof, On appeal, however, by private respondent to the then Court of Appeals, the appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-Rthe appellate court in a decision promulgated on January 19,1978, reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the complaint of petitioners ona finding that:

"Firstly, the 'land in question described in the complaint and sketched in Exhibit C . . . by Dr. Guillermo Blanco,' is completelydifferent from the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the appellant, their respective area and boundaries being completely

dissimilar.

"Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence of the appellees showing that their property encroaches, much less covers that ofthe property presently occupied by the appellant, except the self-serving sketch prepared by the appellees' own witness, Dr.Blanco, We refuse to give any weight to this piece of evidence because it was prepared by someone who 'has an incentive toexaggerate or give false color to his statement or to suppress or prevent the truth or to state what is false. [Deering v. WisonaHarvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238].

"Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not been successfully identified with that described in the complaint, theinstant action should have been dismissed outright, in view of the provision of Article 434 of the New Civil Code which reads.

'Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not onthe weakness of the defendant's claim.'

as well as the doctrine enunciated in a long time of decision [sic] starting from Lim Director of Lands,64 Phil. 343.

"Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the present occupant of the land since he purchased the same from Tomasita F.Verano on June 30, 1967, having constructed a six-door apartment in the premises which he lets to both transients and residentsof the locality. Being the actual possessor of the property, he, therefore, possesses it with a just title and he need not show orprove why he is possessing the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil Code].

"Finally, between the evidence of the appellees and that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly choose the latter in the matter ofidentifying the property in question because it is a vicinity plan [Exhibit "8"] showing the position of the land in relation not only tothe properties adjoining the same but also with known boundaries and landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the appellees'evidence, particularly the description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable, since the area and boundaries of the propertyare mere estimations, reached thru pure quess-work. [Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 879]. Expressing the samesentiment, one noted authority states:

'The proposition that in identifying a particular piece of land its boundaries and not the area are the main factors to be consideredholds true only when the boundaries given are sufficiently certain and the identity of the land proved by the boundaries clearlyindicates that an erroneous statement concerning the area can be disregarded.' [Bilog, Effective Judicial Implementation of Landand Forestry Laws, Fourth Advanced Course for Municipal Courts (1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620, September 30, 1963]."(Annex "C-1," Petition, pp. 5355, Rollo.]

A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by petitioners before this Court was denied due course.

Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court of First Instance of Isabela an application for registration in his name othe title of the lands in question, basing his entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale as well as the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex "A", Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo).

On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private respondent, however, moved for thedismissal of said opposition on the ground that the same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R.Despite the opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the first of the assailed orders dismissing the petitioner's oppositionon the ground of res judicata[Annex "E", Petition, p. 83, Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed the instant petitionraising as grounds therefor the following:

"RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS'APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.

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RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT OFABELLERA VS. FAROLTHAT RESJUDICATACANNOT BE SET UP IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES JUDICATAEXIST IN THE CASEAT BAR, ASSUMINGARGUENDOTHAT A MOTION TO DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A LAND REGISTRATIONCASE, AND THATRES JUDICATAMAY BE RAISED IN SAID MOTION TO DISMISS.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF THEIR DAY IN COURT, SPECIALLY INTHE FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS, ALREADY IN THE RECORD, THAT RESPONDENT CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYINGTO SECURE TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF THE PETITIONERS.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION INISSUING HIS ORDERS OF JULY 2, 1980 [ANNEX "E"] AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980 [ANNEX "H"]. (pp. 18-19, Rollo)

On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their briefs. Petitioners did so on August 26, 1981. Privaterespondent, on the other hand, failed to file his brief within the given period which expired on October 9,1981. Thus, the case was considered submittedfor decision without the brief of private respondent.

On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. IIN-204, praying that he be included as co-applicant to the land sought to be registered.

In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe that the situation obtaining in the case at bar, i,e., a motion to dismiss the oppositionhaving been filed and more importantly, granted, is indeed unique and peculiar. But while this may be so, it is not highly irregular as petitioners wouldcharacterize it.

Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules ofCourt, however, allows the application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicableand convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva,3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal othe application far registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court aquodid not have jurisdiction over the resas the lands sought to be registered in appellants' name had previously been registered in the names of the

oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same considerationapplies to the case at bar.

It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would beconsidered a complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaimmay either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The latter choice was what respondentCayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitionerscomplain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorized.

The case ofAbellera vs. Farol74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by petitioners needs re-evaluation. In said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo, speaking for theCourt, ruled that "while in a cadastral case, res judicatais available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, neverthelessprior judgment can not be set up in a motion to dismiss." Concurring in said opinion were then Chief Justice Yulo and Associate Justices Moran andOzaeta. Mr. Justice Paras dissented, saying "in my opinion, Rule 132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, instead of prohibiting expresslyauthorizes the lower court in land registration or cadastral proceedings to entertain a motion for dismissal on the ground of res judicataor prescriptionOf course, the dismissal of petitioner's claim will not necessarily or automatically mean adjudication of title to the individual respondents but it wilcertainly facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to be contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is the main purpose of saidrules. Let there be no retrogression in the application of sound rules and doctrines." (Ibid, pp. 286-287) In support of his opinion, Justice Paras cited the

cases of Menor v. Quintana,56 Phil, 657, Versoza v. Nicolas,29 Phil. 425 and Santiago v. Santos,54 Phil. 619, wherein the Court invariably ruled that a"final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining the ownership of certain land is res judicatain a registration case when the parties and the propertyare the same as in the former case. " [Menor v. Quintana, supra.]

There is no doubt that the principle of res judicataoperates in the case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] itmust have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there musbe between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v, Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] Thedecision in C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the partiesThere is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter andcause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in adifference in parties between the two cases, One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ownership, [Paras, Civil Code of thePhilippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he wasdoing so in behalf of the co-ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the deed of saleexecuted by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.

With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels of land beingsought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's names.

While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the issue ofownership, In effect, it is in the nature of an action reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two cases thereis identity of causes of action because in action reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the same is true in registrationcases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons fromownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed against particular persons, while in the latterproceedings, the exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais vCourt of First instance of Capiz,[51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are involvedtherein. It is only the form of action which is different. "But the employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the operationof the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated." [Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases citedtherein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411; Sumarariz v. Development Bank othe Phil., 21 SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v. Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Ph il. 68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil258; San Diego v. Cardona, et al., 70 Phil. 281].

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It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the second case is being heard by one of a limited jurisdictionsuch as a registration court, It is enough that the court which decided the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matteand the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite ofres judicata.

If, as the Abellera case, supra,held that res judicatacan be set up by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of another claimant, what useful purposewould be served by allowing a party to present evidence of ownership over the land sought to be registered when the final result would necessarily be infavor of the claimant who had set up the defense of res judicata?And supposing the land registration court finds that the party against whom theprinciple of res judicataoperates does have a better right or title to the land, what happens to the principle of res judicata?Can a court sitting as a landregistration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another court of general jurisdiction?

To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either the application for registration or theopposition thereto, once it has been indubitably shown, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is barred by a prior judgment. The ruling in the

Abellera case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned.

Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition, respondent court had denied them their day in court. It is well to remind petitioners that they hadtheir day in court in Civil Case No. Branch II-895 as well as C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R, where their claim over the land in question was fully aired andventilated.

The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with respect to the land under consideration had been put torest in C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R. Said decision having attained finality, the same remains the law of the case between the parties.

Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing petitioners' opposition, such dismissal must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

DOROTEA DAIS, ET AL.,petitioners,vs

. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAPIZ, ET AL.,respondents.

Jose Y. Torres, for petitioners.

Jose Altavas, for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. HEIRS; RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN AN ACTION INVOLVING INHERITANCE. The heirs have the right to intervene in an actioninvolving some of the property of the hareditas jacensof a decedent when they believe that the acts of the judicial administrator are prejudicial totheir interests.

2. CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Act No. 496, known as the Land Registration Act, contains nospecial rule as to the procedure to be followed in contesting the sufficiency of answers in cadastral registration proceedings, or in determiningwhether their dismissal will lie; therefore the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable.

3. ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF ANSWERS IN CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; GROUNDS.When two persons claim the ownership of oneand the same cadastral lot, both of them are claimants and opponents at the same time, and their respective answers cannot be dismissed by thecourt except upon the grounds mentioned in sections 101 and 127 of Act No. 190, to wit, default at the trial, failure to prosecute, or defects providedby the law as grounds for demurrer.

4. ID.; ANSWERS; DISMISSAL; JURISDICTION. In ordering that the answer presented by the judicial administrator of an intestateestate in the name of the heirs be stricken out, notwithstanding the latters' objection and for a cause not provided by law as a ground for dismissal,the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction, for it is necessary not only that it have jurisdiction over the subject matter in li tigation and the partiesbut that it have authority over each and every one of the essential particulars of the action.

D E C I S I O N

VILLA-REAL,J p:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Dorotea Dais et al., against the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Seventeenth JudicialDistrict, Jose Altavas and Jose Morente, in which it is prayed that an order be issued to the respondent judge requiring him to certify and transmit tothis court an exact and complete transcription of the record, decision and proceedings in cadastral proceeding No. 18 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 714),entitled the Director of Lands vs. Justo Abiertas et al., concerning the portion referring to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136, for review by this SupremeCourt; and that after hearing both parties, judgment be rendered declaring the judicial orders of the Court of First Instance of Capiz dated July 25,1927, August 8, 1927, and September 22, 1927, as well as the judgment-rendered by the same court on September 29, 1927, and all otherproceedings had in connection therewith, void and of no effect.

The facts appearing from the pleadings and documentary evidence attached thereto, presented in this case, are hereinafter set forth inthe order of their occurrence.

In the course of the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Serapion Dais, civil case No. 988 of the Courtof First Instance of Capiz, Manuel Arnaldo was appointed administrator of the estate. For the payment of some of the debts of the deceased, said

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administrator was authorized to sell certain parcels of land of said estate; whereupon he sold lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 in the form prescribed by thelaw, to Antonio Habana, which sale was approved by the court on February 15, 1926. The herein petitioners or some of them objected to suchapproval and filed a motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1926, which was denied on March 10,1926. They appealed accordingly on April 6,1927, and the same was denied on August 1, 1927, on the ground that it was not presented within the time prescribed by section 783 of the Codeof Civil Procedure, because more than twenty days had elapsed since the orders appealed from had been entered. It appears from the orderdenying said appeal that the appellants contend that the time within which said appeal should be taken must be counted from the date of thenotification of said orders and not from the date on which they were entered.

On May 20, 1926, Manuel Arnaldo filed an answer in the cadastral proceeding No. 18 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 714), in the name ofSerapion Dais's heirs, claiming title to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136 of said proceeding. Jose Morente also filed an answer claiming title to lots Nos.1132 and 1136. Jose Altavas also filed an answer claiming title to lot No. 626.

Before the hearing of the case, and in pursuant of a motion of the claimants Jose Altavas and Jose Morente, respectively, with the

consent of Manuel Arnaldo, as judicial administrator of Serapion Dais's intestate estate, the respondent court ordered the answers presented bysaid administrator in the name of Serapion Dais's heirs with respect to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136 stricken out.

Dissatisfied with this order striking out their answer, the heirs of Serapion Dais presented a motion for reconsideration, objecting to themotions to strike out their answer and praying that the order of July 25, 1927, granting said motions, be annulled. The motion for reconsiderationbeing denied, the movants, heirs to Serapion Dais, took formal exception to said order, and gave notice of their intention to appeal to this court,and, to perfect their appeal, filed the proper bill of exceptions, which was disapproved by the court on the motion of claimants Jose Altavas andJose Morente.

After the afore-mentioned answers presented by the Judicial administrator Manuel Arnaldo on behalf of the heirs of Serapion Dais anentlots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136, had been stricken from the record of the cadastral proceeding, the court proceeded to the hearing of the answers ofJose Altavas and Jose Morente in regard to the said lots, after which the respondent court rendered a judgment on September 29, 1927,adjudicating lot No. 626 to the spouses Jose Altavas and Socorro Laserna, and lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 to Jose Morente and Patria Altavas.

There are two principal questions to be determined in the present instance, to wit:

1. Have the petitioners the right to intervene in a cadastral proceeding for the purpose of objecting to the striking out of an answer filed bythe judicial administrator of the intestacy of the petitioners' predecessor in interest, claiming several parcels of land as the property of said estate,when the aforementioned administrator consents to its being stricken out?

2. And in case they have, has the respondent judge exceeded his powers in ordering that the answer be stricken from the record, overthe objection of the said petitioners?

In relation to the first question, article 657 of the Civil Code provides:

"ART. 657. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death."

And article 661 of the same Code says:

"ART. 661. Heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death."

Interpreting the above quoted legal provisions, this court has held in various decisions that the rights to the succession of a person aretransmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs immediately succeed to the dominion, ownership and possession of theproperty of their predecessor. (Quison vs. Salud, 12 Phil., 109; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434;Beltran vs. Doriano, 32 Phil., 66; Bondad vs Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Velazco vs. Vizmanos, 45 Phil., 675; vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317.) The fact that thelaw provides for the appointment of a legal administrator for the liquidation of the deceased's property, and the partition of his hareditas

jacensamong his heirs, does not deprive the heirs of the right to intervene in the administration of said property for the protection of their interests.On the contrary section 714 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in connection with section 722 of the same Code, requires that the written consent and

approval of the heirs be obtained for the sale of the deceased's property in order to pay his debts and the costs of administration. This provisionshows that, notwithstanding the appointment of a judicial administrator, the heirs have a right to intervene when they believe the administrator'sacts are prejudicial to their interest. And it cannot be said that the administrator answers with his bond for any damage he may cause to theinterests of the estate, since such bond might not be sufficient to cover said damages.

For the reasons above stated, we are of opinion that the heirs have a right to intervene in a cause involving certain property of thedecedent's hareditas jacenswhenever they believe the legal administrator's acts are prejudicial to their interests. The second question to determineis whether or not the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering that the answers filed by the legal administrator in the name of the heirsbe stricken out, said administrator having consented against the opposition of said heirs.

In determining the first question, we have seen that the heirs have a right to intervene when they believe that the acts of the judicialadministrator of the property of the hareditas jacensof their predecessor in interest are prejudicial to their interests. The petitioners have made useof this right in the present proceedings, opposing the dismissal and taking exception to the order granting the motion filed to that end.

The answers in cadastral proceedings partake of the character of an action to recover title, as real rights are claimed therein. Accordingto section 10 of Act No. 2347, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are of a suppletory nature in land registration cases. Since Act No. 496,known as Land Registration Act, contains no special rule as to the procedure to be followed in impugning the sufficiency of the answers in cadastralproceedings nor in determining whether or not they must be dismissed, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. According to

the said Code, complaints can only be dismissed by a failure to prosecute, by default, by abandonment, or by defects provided by the law asgrounds for a demurrer (Secs. 101 and 127, Act No. 190). When two persons claim the ownership of one and the same cadastral lo t, both of themare claimants and opponents at the same time, and their respective answers cannot be dismissed by the court without the presence of any of saidcircumstances; and a motion for dismissal that is not based on any of said grounds does not confer jurisdiction on the court to dismiss thecomplaint, and if it does so, it exceeds its powers.

In this case, the motion presented by Jose Altavas, claimant of lot No. 626, praying for the dismissal of the answer filed by the judicialadministrator, Manuel Arnaldo, on behalf of the heirs of the deceased Serapion Dais, with reference to the same lot, is based on the allegation thatsaid lot never pertained to the mass of property of said decedent, and that it had never been in the possession of said administrator. The motionpresented by Jose Morente for the dismissal of the answers presented by the judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Serapion Dais onbehalf of the latter's heirs, with reference to lots Nos. 1132 and 1136, is based on the claim that said lots were sold by the said administrator withthe approval and authority of the court. Neither of these grounds is found among those mentioned by the present law of civil procedure as causesfor dismissal. It is true that the judicial administrator agreed to the dismissal asked for, but the heirs, in whose name he had presented saidanswers, objected to it, and presented a motion for reconsideration in time, which was denied by the respondent court. In view of such opposition of

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the heirs, who are interested parties in the case, the court should not have ordered the dismissal of the said answers, but should have proceeded tothe trial on the merits of the lots in question with the intervention of said heirs.

In ordering the dismissal of the answers presented by the judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Serapion Dais, in the name ofthe latter's heirs, notwithstanding their opposition and for a cause not provided by law as a ground for dismissal, the respondent court did reallyexceed its jurisdiction; because it is not enough that a court have jurisdiction over the subject matter in litigation and the parties, but it is necessarythat it have authority in and over each and every one of the essential particulars of the case.

In the case of Larrobis vs. Wislizenus and Smith, Bell & Co. (42 Phil., 401), this court laid down the doctrine that the erroneous exerciseof interlocutory powers is irregular and justifies the institution of certiorari proceedings. And on page 104 of volume 11 of Corpus Juris, the followingrule may be found:

". . . But it has been held that 'any departure from the recognized and established requirements of law, however closethe apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect to deprive one of a constitutional right is asmuch an excess of jurisdiction as where there is an inceptive lack of power.' "

In dismissing the answer presented by the judicial administrator, Manuel Arnaldo in the name of the heirs of the deceased Serapion Dais,over their objection, and in finally deciding the case on the merits awarding the controverted lots to their adversaries, without hearing said heirs, thecourt not only exceeded its jurisdiction, but also deprived them of their constitutional right to be heard before being deprived of their property rights,and its proceedings were in this sense, void and of no effect.

The appeals taken by the petitioners from the orders which are the subject of this proceeding were denied by the respondent judge;hence, said petitioners have no other adequate and speedy remedy in law to protect their rights other than a writ of certiorari.

It is, therefore, proper to grant, as we do hereby grant, the remedy sought, and the decree of the Court of First Instance of Capiz of July25,1927, ordering the dismissal of the answers concerning lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136 filed on behalf of the petitioners in cadastral proceedingNo. 18 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 714) is set aside, as well as the orders dated August 8, 1927, and September 22, 1927, denying the motion forreconsideration and the appeal respectively, and the judgment of the same court dated September 29, 1927, awarding lot No. 626 to the spousesJose Altavas and Socorro Laserna and the lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 to the spouses Jose Morente and Patria Altavas, with all the orders renderedin connection with said decision, without costs. So ordered.

JOSE O. DURAN and TERESA DIAZ VDA. DE DURAN,applicants-appellants, vs. BERNABE OLIVIA, FE ALMAZAN, HEIRSOF VICENTE GODESANO, MANUEL ARCE and ESPERANZA SALUD, oppositors-appellees.

Reyes & Dy-Liacco for applicants-appellants.

German G. Vilgera for oppositors-appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; RULES OF COURT APPLICABLE TO LAND AND CADASTRAL CASES IN A SUPPLETORYCHARACTER.By express provision of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the rules contained therein apply to land registration and cadastral cases in a

suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient (Dulay vs. The Director of Lands, 53 Off. Gaz., p. 161). The Land Registration Act doesnot provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a motion to dismiss is necessary for the expeditious termination of landregistration cases, said motion contained in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties.

2. ID.; ID.; FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE; HOMESTEAD PATENT AND SALES PATENT; EFFECT OF REGISTRATION UNDER THE LANDREGISTRATION ACT. The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles to land and put to stopany question of legality of title thereto. That being the purpose of the law, there would be no end to litigation if every property covered by torrens title maystill be relitigated in a subsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to this purpose, a homestead patent once registered under the LandRegistration Act, can no be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, and any title issued thereon is null and void. The same may be said of a salespatent. Once a certificate of title is issued under the Land Registration Act in lieu of a sales patent, the land is considered registered under the Torrenssystem and the title of the patentee become indefeasible.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE WITHOUT POWER TO DECREE AGAIN REGISTRATION OF LAND ALREADY DECREED. A Courof First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree fothe same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined isalready ares judicata binding on the whole world, the proceeding beingin rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraudand within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of the

first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latterapplicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a t itle so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declarethe later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It wouldundermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of the registration law. (Rojas et al., vs. The City of Tagaytay, et al. 106 Phil., 512; 60Off. Gaz., 820.)

D E C I S I O N

LABRADOR, J p:

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This is an appeal from two orders dated July 31, 1959 and September 12, 1959, both of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,Hon. Perfecto R. Palacio, presiding, rendered in Land Registration Case No. N-564; G.L.R. Rec. No. N-7544, entitled "Jose O. Duran and TeresaDiaz vda. de Duran, applicants, versus Bernabe Olivia, Fe Almazan, Heirs of Vicente Godesano, Manuel Arce and Esperanza Salud, oppositors."The order of July 31, 1959 is for the dismissal of the land registration case for lack of jurisdiction of the lower court with respect to Lots Nos. 3, 6, 7,9 and 15, and that dated September 12, 1959 with respect to Lots Nos. 12 and 16.

On December 3, 1953, Jose O. Duran and Teresa Diaz vda. de Duran filed an application for the registration in their names of sixteen lots (denominatedin said application as Lots Nos. 1 to 16, inclusive) under Plan PSU-128386 in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. On April 20, 1954, the casewas heard initially and on May 5, 1954, the oppositors filed their opposition to the application. On August 27, 1958, the oppositors filed a motion todismiss the application on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots respectively claimed by them, because said lotsare already registered and certificates of title have been issued thereon in their names. They attached to the motion to dismiss the following: OriginalCertificate of Title No. 2342, in the name of Bernabe Olivia (covering Lot 6); Original Certificate of Title No. 2343, in the name of Fe Almazan (covering

Lot 7); Original Certificate of Title No. 514, in the name of Manuel Arce (covering Lots Nos. 9 and 15); Original Certificate of Title No. 433, in the name oEsperanza Salud (covering Lot No. 16); and Original Certificate of Title No. 7439, in the name of Heirs of Florencio Godesano (covering Lots Nos. 3 and12). The applicants filed their objection to said motion, alleging that the reasons for the motion to dismiss do not appear in the application but are mereassertions of the parties and that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider the application even though the lots subject matter thereof are alreadycovered by certificates of title. After a reply to the opposition was filed by the oppositors, the lower court resolved the motion to dismiss and renderedsuccessively the two orders of dismissal appealed from. Hence this appeal.

The applicants-appellants assign two errors of the lower court, to wit:

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AND GRANTING THE OBJECTORS-APPELLEES'MOTION TO DISMISS THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION WITH RESPECT TO LOTS 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15 and 16

ALTHOUGH IT WAS BASED MERELY ON THE SUPPOSED FACTS ALLEGED IN THE SAID ITSELF; AND

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPLICATION WITH RESPECT TO LOTS 3, 6, 7, 9, 12,15 and 16 FOR ALLEGED LACK OF JURISDICTION UPON PUBLIC LAND PATENTS GRANTED TO THEM."

In support of their first assignment of error, appellants claim that oppositors-appellees can not avail of a motion to dismiss in a land registration case and

that the application and the titles do not show similar identities between the lots covered by said titles and those applied for in these proceedings.

The first assignment of error can not be sustained. By express provision of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the rules contained therein apply to landregistration and cadastral cases in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient (Dulay v. The Director of Lands, Vol. 53 O.G. p161). The Land Registration Act does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a motion to dismiss is necessary fothe expeditious termination of land registration cases, said motion contained in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties in this case.

With respect to the alleged failure of the oppositors-appellees to prove similar identities of the lots covered by the titles and those applied for, We haveexamined the certificates of title and the application, and We concur with the finding of the trial court that the lots covered by said titles are the same assome of those applied for by the appellants. We, therefore, find no justification for reversing the orders appealed from based only upon the firstassignment of error.

Appellants argue in support of their second assignment of error that a certificate of title based upon a mere homestead, sales or free patent coveringprivate land is null and void; that it is the decree of registration, not the certificate of title which confers the character of incontestability of title; that theappellants have been deprived of their property without hearing; and that the cases cited in the order of the lower court do not apply to the case at barConsequently, they claim that the lower court possesses jurisdiction to try and decide the instant land registration proceedings even with respect to thelots already covered by certificates of title.

Appellants' claim is without merit, if we have to consider that a patent once registered under Act No. 496 becomes indefeasible as a torrens title (Manalov. Lukban, et al., 48 Phil., 973).

"Sec. 122.Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United Statesor to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or privatecorporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands . . .

After due registration and issue of the certificate and owner's duplicate, such land shall be registered land for all purposesunder this Act." (Act 496)

The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles to land; to put to stop any question of legality otitle thereto. That being the purpose of the law, there would be no end to litigation if every property covered by Torrens title may still be relitigated in asubsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to the above purpose, we have held in a long line of decisions that a homestead patent onceregistered under the Land Registration Act can not be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title issued thereon is null and void.

"A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrenstitle, and cannot thereafter be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in a cadastral case. Any newtitle which the cadastral court may order to be issued is null and void and should be cancelled. All that the cadastral court

may do is to make correction of technical errors in the description of the property contained in its title, or to proceed to thepartition thereof if it is owned by two or more co-owners." (Ramoso v. Obligado, et al., 70 Phil., 86; See alsoPamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil., 558; El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil., 17; Republic v. Carle, et al., G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959; Samonte et al., v. Descallar, et al., G.R. No. L-12964, Feb. 29, 1960).

The same may be said of a sales patent. Once a certificate of title is issued under the Land Registration Act in lieu of a sales patent, the land isconsidered registered under the Torrens system and the title of the patentee becomes indefeasible.

As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of FirsInstance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of therespondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:

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"As thus, viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. All the other contentionsof respondent regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an appropriateordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a quo,sitting as landregistration court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in favor ofrespondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners.

"In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdictionto decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for thesame land is null and void.1This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to theland thus determined is already a res judicatabinding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has nopower in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title infavor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first registered owner in the

Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the laterapplicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no rightwhatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is toquiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in theefficacy of the registration law.2

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. With costs against appellants.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes,and De Leon, JJ.,concur.

Concepcion, J.,took no part.

MAMERTA DE LA MERCED,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS and AMPAROMACAPAGAL, respondents.

Meliton Pajarillaga for petitioner.

Esteban C. Manuel for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND TITLES, REGISTRATION OF; VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION UNDER ACT 496; WHAT DECREE QUIETS TITLE TO AND BINDS THELAND.In voluntary registrations under Act 496, it is the decree of registration to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be thebasis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to, and binds the land.

2. ID.; PUBLIC LANDS; ENTRY IN REGISTRATION BOOK NECESSARY TO EFFECT REGISTRATION. In cases of public land, the property is noconsidered registered, until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the registry of deeds has been accomplished.

3. ID.; ID.; CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; WHEN TITLE BECOMES VESTED ONCE REGISTERED, LAND NOT LOST BY ADVERSE POSSESSIONIn the absence of fraud, title to land in a cadastral proceeding is vested on the owner, upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision oadjudication by the cadastral court, without such appeal being perfected; and from that time the land becomes registered property which cannot be losby adverse possession.

D E C I S I O N

BARRERA, J p:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the original decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (in Civil Case No946), upholding the right of ownership of Ezequiel Santos over Lot No. 395 of the Rizal (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre.

As may be gathered from the extant records, the facts of the case are:

In a complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dated May 3, 1952, which was later amended, Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claimingownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court denied December 26, 1923 in favor of his father, soughrecovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named defendants, andof the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 19501956.

Defendants, in their answer, resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their ownership over said property as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and their continuous possession ofthe land for more than 30 years.

In the course of the proceedings, Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate daughter of Juan de la Merced, was allowed to intervene and make commoncause with the defendants.

On January 16, 1957, the court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after making a finding that Lot No. 395 was part of the Original Certificate of TitleNo. 425, issued on May 30, 1916 in the name of the spouses Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal, parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos; thain a decision rendered by the cadastral court on December 26, 1923 (Cad. Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281), the said lot was also adjudicated in

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favor of the conjugal partnership of Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal; that pursuant to said decision, the cadastral court issued onDecember 17, 1925 an order for the issuance of a certificate of title for the said property; that on December 8, 1926, Transfer Certificate of Title No1971 was issued in the name ofEzequiel Santos in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 425 which was cancelled; that on December 28, 1926, thecadastral courtdeclared lot 395 public land, as a consequence of which Juan de la Merced, after filing a homestead application therefor, was able toobtain Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 on October 10, 1931. Holding that the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lotpublic land, and, therefore, the same as well as the certificate of title issued thereafter was null and void, thecourt ordered the cancellation of OCT No.3462 in the name of Juan de la Merced; directed defendants to vacate Lot No. 395 ofthe Rizal Cadastre and surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs;and to pay the latter as the landlord's share, 50 cavans of palay yearly for the agricultural years 1950 to 1956 or their equivalent, and costs of the suitand the receiver to deliver to plaintiffs the palay in his custody representing the harvest for the agricultural years 1953-1955.

Upon defendants' motion for reconsideration, however, the promulgation of the decision was ordered suspended and the case was re-set for hearing foreception of additional evidence.

On August 6, 1957, the court amended its original decision, thus:

"The plaintiffs now admit that the litigated 'Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, is outside the parcel of land describedin Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1971 and Original Certificate of Title No. 425, both of which cover Lot 396'. They, however,claim ownership over said Lot 395 by virtue of the decision rendered on December 26, 1923 in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O.Rec. No. 21, entitled 'Government of the Philippines versus Justo Abacan, et al.,' (Exh. A-1), and the other dated December 17,1925 directing the issuance of a decree pursuant to said decision (Exh. V-2, p. 10, rec. ofexhibits).

"No decree has yet been issued pursuant to the said order, Exhibit B-2, much less was there a title issued in the name oftheplaintiffs over the said lot.

"The defendants, on the other hand, predicate their claim of ownership over the said lot of Original Certificate of Title No. 3462issued on October 10, 1931 in favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-in-interest, pursuant to a homestead patent issuedon September 15, 1931 (Exh. 1, for the defendants and intervenor), contending that the decision of December 26, 1923,adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs, was still subject to review since there was no decree issued pursuant thereto.

"The position of the defendants and intervenor would have been correct if there was actually a petition for review of the

decision of December 26, 1923, or a new trial or a reopening of the case concerning Lot No. 395. The fact of the matter is thatOriginal Certificate of Title No. 3462 was issued pursuant to a homestead patent long after Lot No. 395 was declared a publicland in a decision dated March 29, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28,1926 at Manila for Cabanatuan City (Exh. 4) states that Lot No. 395, together with Lots Nos. 394 and 2044, was declared a publicland and was the object of a homestead application by the respective concessionaires (p. 21, rec.of exhibits). . . .

"It would seem that the cadastral court in the same cadastral cases No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281, entitled Government ofthePhilippines vs. Justo Abacan, et al. erroneously re-opened the hearing of Lot 395 which was already adjudicated in favor of theplaintiff by the decision dated December 26, 1923 (Exh. A-1, and A-2, pp. 2 and 5, rec. of exhibits) and decreed that lot 395 ispublic land. The same cadastral court should have taken judicial notice of the said decision and the other promulgated therein forthe issuance of a decree in favor of the plaintiffs over Lot 395 (Exh. B-2)."

While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant thehomestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title was actually issued therefor, the said lotmay be acquired by adverse possession. And, as defendants had been in possession of the property for over 20 years, they were declared to haveacquired the right over the same by prescription. The complaint was consequently ordered dismissed; OCT No. 3462 cancelled and a new oneissued to defendants in lieu thereof; and plaintiffs were directed to vacate the one-third portion of Lot No. 395 occupied by them, and to pay the

costs.

Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in its decision of July 20, 1960, sustained the contention of appellants on thebasis of the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abural (39 Phil. 997), that upon the finality of thedecree by the cadastral court, adjudicating ownership of the land, the title thereto becomes incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired byprescription. And, as the land was no longer part of the public domain when the homestead patent was obtained by Juan de la Merced, the same cannot prevail over the cadastral court's decree ofregistration of Lot No. 395 in favor of appellant Santos' predecessor.

Hence, the filing of the instant petition for review of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals.

The questions actually raised by the present appeal are: What is the effect of the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923 adjudicating the loin favor of Santos, and the subsequent order dated December 17, 1925, directing the issuance of a certificate of title to Inocencio Santos? Did thoseorders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has not been issued? In the affirmative, could the propertythereby affected still be lost by adverse possession?

For purposes of resolving the above questions, these salient facts must be considered:

By virtue of the final decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 21, dated December 26, 1923, Santos' title to Lot No. 395 was

definitely confirmed as against the whole world, including the Government;

That the same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19, 1925 declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing the Chief of theGeneral Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de los Santos, although no such certificate was actually issued;

That under date of December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without reopening the case, declared the same Lot 395 public land as a result of which Juande la Merced, after due application, was able to obtain therefor a homestead patent and OCT No. 3462 on October 10, 1931;

That as found by the Court of Appeals, Juan de la Merced, until his death in 1931, was the overseer of Inocencio de los Santos for a big portion of landwhich included Lot 395 in question and was, therefore, a trustee for said lot at the time he applied for it as a homestead;

That the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed in 1952.

There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by specific provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the operative act toconvey and affect the same, and such registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. (Sec. 122, Ac

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496). In other words, in cases of public lands, the property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of theregistry of deeds had been accomplished.

With respect to private lands, however, the pertinent provisions of Act 496 are:

"SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverseclaim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registrationshall be entered. Every decree ofregistration shall bindthe land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exception stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon andagainst all persons including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,notice or citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may concern'. Such decree shall not be opened byreason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing

judgment or decrees; subject, however, to the rightof any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein bydecree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year afterentry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of oneyear, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. . . ."(Emphasis supplied.)

"SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by theChief of the General Land Registration Office (now Land Registration Commissioner). . . . The decree shall be stated in aconvenient form for transcription upon the certificates of titles hereinafter mentioned." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is apparent from the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496, are two different things. And it is thedecree of registration, to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequentlyby the corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land.

But, it must be remembered that the abovementioned provisions apply only to voluntary registration under the Land Registration Act. With respect tolands titled through compulsory proceedings, the Cadastral Act prescribes:

"SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convenient place within the province in which the lands are situated or at suchother place as the court, for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record of the case, may designate, and shall be conductedin the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of First Instance and shall be governed by the same rules.

Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the same manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall havethe same effect. All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by thecourt and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled tothe lands or the various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for original certificates of title infavor of said persons which shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land underthe Land Registration Act. . . . " (Emphasis supplied.)

Confronted with the question of when title to the land in a cadastral proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case of Government ofthe PhilippineIslands vs. Abural,1said:

"After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. Thisconstitutes the decision the judgment the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The second action is thedeclaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the LandRegistration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is takenfrom the decision. This again is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.

"The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office. This office has been instituted 'for the dueeffectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land.' (Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 174.) . . . .

"The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decreewhen final is the base of the certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is a ministerial act. Thedate of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to beperformed is the mere formulation of the technical description. . . . .

"As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passageof thethirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of thecourt adjudicatingownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the

judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception isthe special provision providing for fraud."

Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from thedecision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary forpurposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where courtproceedings would no longer be necessary.

As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 afte

the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the saidcadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the dateof the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for allintents and purposes, had become, from that time, registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredesand Dizon, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-35778. January 27, 1983.]

http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/34509?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=34509&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=23635&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12566&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=merced+vs+court+of+appeals&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/34509?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=34509&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=23635&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12566&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=merced+vs+court+of+appeals&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/34509?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=34509&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=23635&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12566&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=merced+vs+court+of+appeals&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/34509?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=34509&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=23635&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12566&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=merced+vs+court+of+appeals&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_0

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS ,petitioners,vs.HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI,Bataan I, and LUISITO MARTINEZ,respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35779. January 27, 1983.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS ,petitioners,vs.HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI,Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA TANALEGA,respondents.

The Solicitor Generalfor petitioners.

Benjamin M. Reyesfor private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES; CADASTRAL ACT; ABSENCE OF SUCCESSFUL CLAIMANTS; PROPERTY DECLARED PUBLIC LAND; CASE ATBAR. In a cadastral proceeding any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition ss required by Section 9 of Act No2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. In the absence of successful claimants, theproperty is declared public land. In the case at bar, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedingsor failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question publiclands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; RES JUDICATA; CADASTRAL PROCEEDING; PARTIES PRECLUDED FROM RE-LITIGATING FINALLY DECIDEDISSUES. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under the doctrine of res judicata, parties are precluded from re-litigating

the same issues already determined by final judgment. (Yusingco vs. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 589, 602).

3. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES; JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES; CASUAL CULTIVATION OF THE LAND DOES NOTCONSTITUTE POSSESSION UNDER CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP.The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extendednever confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless theoccupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from theState. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195.) A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possessionunder claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.

4. ID.; ID.; APPROVAL OF SURVEY PLANS BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS; A STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF MANDATORY CHARACTER. Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation which are expropriated and sub-divided infavor of new amortizing-owner- beneficiaries. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and itstechnical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes. supra).

D E C I S I O N

DECASTRO, J p:

The two (2) above-entitled petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972 issued by the CFI of BataanBranch I, in LRC No. N-210, and in LRC No. N-206, respectively, involve a common issue. For convenience, they are hereby decided jointly.

G.R No. L-35778

On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land,situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less.

On July 7, 1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as to the Republic of the Philippines and the Province of Bataan.

On July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a

portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to private appropriation.

On September 16, 1972, the lower court issued an order reading:

"Considering the testimony of the Provincial Forester Leonides B. Rodriguez during the hearing of August 8, 1972 that this land,subject matter of this application, was a subject of cadastral proceeding and that this land was assigned as Lot No. 626 (Tsn,

August 3, 1972, page 41), this case is ordered re-opened and the Land Registration Commissioner is directed to submit his reportand/or comment as to whether this lot is covered by the Mariveles Cadastre within five (5) days from receipt hereof."

xxx xxx xxx

On October 5, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration submitted to the lower court a report stating:

"That the parcel of land applied for registration in the above-entitled case is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey ofMariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case no. 19, LTC Cad. Record No. 1097."

xxx xxx xxx

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Records show that in the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez, 62 years old, testified that he is the owner of the land appliedfor, having inherited the same from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the land in 1938; that about 8hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon;that he declared the land fotaxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost during the war, and that possession was continuous, open, undisturbed and in theconcept of owner.

Another witness, Antonio Reyes, 67 years old, testified that he is the overseer of Luisito Martinez; that the area of his land is 32 hectares, more oless; that since 1938, applicant has possessed this land; that eight (8) hectares of land is devoted to palay, and his son Manuel Reyes and SilvestreGarcia are the ones tilling the land, and the harvest is shared alike between applicant, on one hand, and Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia, on theother; that eighteen (18) hectares, more or less, is planted to vegetables.

While another witness, Silvestre Garcia, 60 years old, testified that he worked on the land of the applicant since 1932 which is 32 hectares, more or lessthat said Luisito Martinez inherited the land from his parents; that he plants palay only on four (4) hectares; that there are 42 mango trees on the land.

G.R. No. L-35779:

On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of Bataandocketed as Land Registration Case No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884, of two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya, municipality ofMariveles, province of Bataan, containing an area of 443,297 square meters, more or less, and 378,506 square meters, more or less, respectively, andmore particularly described and identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre, covered by Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431,respectively.

On March 21, 1972, the corresponding notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration.

On March 21, 1972, the lower court ordered the Bureau of Lands to submit a report within ten (10) days if the land subject of the application has beenissued patents or is the subject of any pending application for the issuance of patents. Likewise, the lower court directed the Commissioner of LandRegistration to submit within the same period his report if the land applied for has been issued a title or is the subject of a pending decree.

On May 23, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed a report in the lower court, stating that the parcels of land applied forregistration "do not appear to have been passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands as required by Section 1858 of the Revised Administrative

Code." Later, on July 24, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed in the lower court another report or manifestation stating"that Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and 13431, LRC Case No. N-206, LRC Record No. N-41884, when plotted on the Municipal Index Map on file in theCommission does not appear to overlap with any previously titled property under Act 496; that the plan and records of said Land Registration applicationwill be subjected to further examination as soon as the decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court is received in this Commission to determinewhether or not a patent or title has in the meantime been issued in order to avoid duplication or overlapping of titles."

At the hearing on June 21, 1972, on motion of the applicant's counsel, the lower court issued an Order of General Default aga inst all persons, with theexception of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, represented by the Office of the provincial fiscal, and the oppositor Eliseo Martinezrepresented by Atty. Angelino Banzon, who were directed to file their respective oppositions.

On July 7, 1972, the provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the Directors of Lands and of Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied foare portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation.

Thereafter, the case was tried. The applicant, Thelma Tanalega (respondent herein), testified in her behalf, and presented two (2) witnesses, namely,Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, and Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, as well as her documentary evidence in support of her app lication for registrationOn the other hand, Fiscal Arsenio Roman appeared for the government, and submitted documentary proof in support of the opposition filed by theprovincial fiscal's office in this case.

At the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Thelma Tanalega, 27 years old, testified that she had possessed the land "openly, adverselynotoriously and in the concept of owner since February 2, 1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who allegedly possessed this land"in the same manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the land for the years 1970-1972.

Another witness, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, testified that his parents were the ones working on the land before 1935 and due to the illness of hisparents, on their request to owner Elisa Llamas, he became overseer up to 1970 when the same was sold to applicant; that 16 hectares of these landswere planted to palay while others were devoted to pasture land and planting vegetables.

Witness Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, who testified that since childhood, he had known Elisa Llamas to be the owner of the land applied for; thatshe was the one managing the planting and improving of the land; that he used to see Leopoldo de Guzman and another one also named Agapito deRosario worked on the 16 hectares portion of the land; that Elisa Llamas informed him that in 1970 she sold the land to Thelma Tanalega.

At the hearing on August 24, 1972, Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for the government, submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 oLeonidas B. Rodriguez, District Forester of Balanga, Bataan (Exhibit 3) which states "that the tract of land situated at Barrio Camaya, Mariveles, Bataancontaining an approximate area of EIGHTY TWO HECTARES more or less, as shown and described in the attached photostat copy of Plans in two

sheets, as surveyed for Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within the Alienable and Disposable Block, Project 4-B, Mariveles, Bataan, certified bythe Director of Forestry as such on February 16, 1972."

The applicant did not present as witness her predecessor-in-interest, Elisa Llamas, to testify on the alleged possession of the land. The applicant alsofailed to present Guillermo Ramirez, who was hired by her as overseer and her alleged tenants. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to provethat the applicant had possessed the land as owners.

In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles tosubject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.

In the instant petitions for review, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, argued that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre was declaredpublic land by the decision of the Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937 and such being the case, the lower court is without jurisdiction over thesubject matter of the ap