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Petitioner Yap worked with the PNB as special assistant the rank of Second Assistant Manager

and was then promoted as Senior Vice President in 1983.

While she was on leave, E.O. no. 80 was approved which authorized the restructure and

reorganization of PNB. Consequently, the Fund Transfer Department where the petitioner is

working was abolished and was transferred to the International Department.

Issue:

Whether or not there is bad faith in the reorganization of the PNB resulting in the separation

from the service of the petitioner.

Held:

The court ruled that the assailed CSC resolution is affirmed. The petition failed to show that

there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC.



Issue: Whether the loan on Monte de Piedad was charity for an ecclesiastical pious work, and if

the government is the proper authority to the cause of action towards this case (who may sue to

recover this loan?).

Held: If such loan was for ecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not exercise its civil

capacities. The Philippine government as a trustee towards the funds could maintain action for

there has been no change of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae. These

principles based upon the foundation of a principle of public policy. The judgment appealed is

affirmed.

4.

Cabanas v. Pilapil

58 SCRA 94/ G.R. No. L-25843

July 25, 1974

Facts:

Florentino Pilapil, had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman Melchora Cabanas.

Florencio Pilapil insured himself and instituted his child Millian as the beneficiary and authorized

his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughter’s minority. Upon his death,

the proceeds were paid to him. The mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed a complaint

seeking the delivery of the sum of money to be placed in favor of her and for her to be the

child’s trustee and the child’s benefits. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and

that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and

intended beneficiaries. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora



Cabanas, the right to act as trusteeciting the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the

consideration of the child’s welfare. The defendant appealed for the case

Issue:

Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the

proceedsof an insurance policy from the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the

insurance policy?

HELD: The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and

that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his

interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to

the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the

mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother

shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae

here is in consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family

hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.

5.

Co Kim Cham v. Eusebio Valdez Tan Keh

75 PHIL 113/ G.R. No. L-5

September 17, 1945

Facts:

Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court

of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation,

Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued

by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and

judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no

jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the

defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

The court resolved three issues:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were

valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;

2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared

that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of

the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines

free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and

proceedings of the courts;



Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for

the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the

grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens

was then suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the

proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE:

1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?

2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD:

The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy

of their legitimate government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy

occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to

the occupier. There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does

not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to

the same government and same sovereign people.

8.

People of the Philippines v. Gregorio Perfector

August 20, 1920 Fernando Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Sentae discovered that

certain documents which constituted the records of testimony by witnesses in the investigation

of oil companies had disappeared from his office. On September 7, 1920, the newspaper La

Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article criticizing the Senate and its

members in general. Consequently, he was charged with having published an article reflecting

on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code.

ISSUES: whether or not Article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was

presented, is in force.

HELD:

The court held that the accused be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the

information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Three members of the

court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to

American sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic principles of

government and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so

much of Article256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the

information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of Article 256 of the

Penal Code nor of the Libel Law.

It is a general principle of the public law that the previous political relations of the ceded region

are totally abrogated. All laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character,



institutions and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Article 256 was

enacted to protect Spanish officials which were representatives of the King. Such intent is

contradictory to the ideology of the new government where “In the eye of our (American)

Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with

every other man”. As such, Article 256 is deemed abrogated and the case is consequently

dismissed and judgment reversed.

9.

Bernardita Macariola v. Honorable Elias Asuncion

114 SCRA 77

May 31, 1982

FACTS:

Judge Eliias B. Asuncion was the ponente of that Civil Case No. 3010., a complaint for partition of

properties. One of the properties mentioned in the partition was Lot 1184. On July 31, 1964,

Reyes et al sold some of their shares particularly Lot 1184 to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold

the property to judge Asuncion in 1965. On August 6, 1968, petitioner, Bernadita Macariola

charged respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of CA, with “acts

unbecoming of a judge” when the latter purchased a property which was previously the subject

of litigation on which he rendered decision. Respondent and his wife were also members of

Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares and interests in said

property were conveyed. According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly violated Article 1491

(5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14 (1) and (5) of Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 12 XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of

Judicial Ethics. Also, Macariola said that Asuncion’s act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola

said that the project partition was unsigned by her and that what was given to her in the

partition were insignificant portions of the parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force and did?

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.

HELD:

1. Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the

government and certain public officers and employees like justices and judges. Said provision

must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the

political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated. As such, Article 14 is not in

force. The respondent is not found to have violated the articles invoked by the petitioner but he

was advised by the Court to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

2. No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the

property in 1965 – 2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the



Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less

serious physical injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate

penalty from arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the

decision on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the

Philippines during Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of writ of

habeas corpus from petitioner.

ISSUE:

Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?

HELD:

Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and valid for the sentence which

petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a political

complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already

penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government but taken out of territorial

law and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant which is

necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the

occupier. Such is the case at hand, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

12.

VILAS v. CITY OF MANILA

220 US 345

April 3, 1911

FACTS:

Petitioners are creditors of the city of Manila before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the

United States. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the

present municipality is a totally different corporate identity from the previous one and is not

liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality.

ISSUE:

Is the present municipality liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the cession to

the United States?

HELD:

The contention that the liability of the city upon such obligations was destroyed by a mere

change of sovereignty is one which is without a shadow of moral force. The city, acting as a

corporation, possesses two kinds of powers: governmental and public. In view of the dual

character of municipal corporations, there is no public reason for the presuming their total

dissolution as a consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. The cession did not

operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations. The present city is, in every legal sense,

the successor of the old. As such, it is entitled to the property and property rights of the

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