THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 137013. May 6, 2005]RUBEN SANTOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES TONY AYON and MERCY AYON, respondents.D E C I S I O NSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 4735 and its Resolution[2] dated December 11, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration.The petition alleges that on November 6, 1996, Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon, respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 3506-B-96.In his complaint, petitioner averred that he is the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 108174, 108175, and 108176. Respondent spouses are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-247792. The previous occupant of this property built a building which straddled both the lots of the herein parties. Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse.Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he informed respondents that the building occupies a portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue using the building. But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn over to him their possession. But they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion and even made improvements on the building. The dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a certification to file action was issued.In their answer, respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Respondents denied they were occupying petitioners property by mere tolerance, claiming they own the contested portion and have been occupying the same long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner, thus:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter, their successors-in-interest and other persons acting in their behalf to vacate the portion of the subject properties and peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff as well as dismantle/remove the structures found thereon.Defendants are further ordered to pay reasonable value for the use and occupation of the encroached area in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a month beginning September 1996 and the subsequent months thereafter until premises are vacated; to pay attorneys fees of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and to pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.[3]On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Davao City, in its Decision dated February 12, 1998 in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment.[4] The RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that respondents occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance. Hence, when petitioner needed the same, he has the right to eject them through court action.Respondents then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review. In its Decision dated October 5, 1988 now being challenged by petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer, thus:In this case, petitioners were already in possession of the premises in question at the time private respondent bought three (3) lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which is occupied by a building being used by the former as a bodega. Apart from private respondents bare claim, no evidence was alluded to show that petitioners possession was tolerated by (his) predecessor-in-interest. The fact that respondent might have tolerated petitioners possession is not decisive. What matters for purposes of determining the proper cause of action is the nature of petitioners possession from its inception. And in this regard, the Court notes that the complaint itself merely alleges that defendants-petitioners have been occupying a portion of the above properties of the plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff. Nowhere is it alleged that his predecessor likewise tolerated petitioners possession of the premises. x x x.Consequently, x x x, respondent should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer.WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for unlawful detainer is ordered DISMISSED.[5]Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated December 11, 1998.Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors:ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER SHOULD PRESENT HIS CLAIM BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA.IITHE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding that petitioners complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.Petitioner contends that it is not necessary that he has prior physical possession of the questioned property before he could file an action for unlawful detainer. He stresses that he tolerated respondents occupancy of the portion in controversy until he needed it. After his demand that they vacate, their continued possession became illegal. Hence, his action for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is proper.Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have been in possession of the disputed property even before petitioner purchased the same on April 10, 1985. Hence, he cannot claim that they were occupying the property by mere tolerance because they were ahead in time in physical possession.We sustain the petition.It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.[6] This rule is no different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.[7] All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom.[8] The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the defendants therein raises the question of ownership over the litigated property in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.[9]Section 1, Rule 70 on forcible entry and unlawful detainer of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, reads:Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.[10]Petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96 is properly within the competence of the MTCC. His pertinent allegations in the complaint read:4. That defendants (spouses) have constructed an extension of their residential house as well as other structures and have been occupying a portion of the above PROPERTIES of the plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff since at the time he has no need of the property;5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 and made demands to the defendants to vacate and turn over the premises as well as the removal (of) their structures found inside the PROPERTIES of plaintiff; that without any justifiable reasons, defendants refused to vacate the portion of the PROPERTIES occupied by them to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Matina Crossing 74-A, Davao City for a possible settlement sometime in the latter part of February 1996. The barangay case reached the Pangkat but no settlement was had. Thereafter, a Certification To File Action dated March 27, 1996 was issued x x x;x x x.[11] (underscoring ours)Verily, petitioners allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.[12] Here, there is an allegation in petitioners complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance. Petitioners cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals[13] is applicable in this case: A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47435 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 12, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirming the Decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Davao City in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96, is hereby REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 149599. May 16, 2005]RUDY LAO, petitioner, vs. JAIME LAO, respondent.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR., J.:As early as 1956, the spouses Julian Lao and Anita Lao had constructed a building on a parcel of land in Balasan, Iloilo City, owned by Alfredo Alava and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28382. They then occupied and leased the same without any written agreement thereon. Anita Lao also put up her business in the premises.On May 12, 1982, Alfredo Alava, as lessor, and Anita Lao, as lessee, executed a Contract of Lease[1] over the said property. The parties agreed that the lease of the property was to be for a period of 35 years, at an annual rental of P120.00. However, the contract of lease was not filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds; hence, was not annotated at the dorsal portion of the said title.Aside from Anita Lao, petitioner Rudy Lao also leased another portion of the same property where he put up his business.[2] In fact, Anita Laos building was adjacent to where the petitioner conducted his business. At that time, the petitioner knew that Anita Lao and her husband were the owners of the said building. He also knew that she had leased that portion of the property, and that respondent Jaime Lao, their son, managed and maintained the building, as well as the business thereon.In the meantime, on March 21, 1995, the petitioner purchased the property from Alava, and was later issued TCT No. 152,097 in his name. By then, the property had been classified as commercial, but the yearly rental of P120.00 in the contract of lease between Alava and Anita Lao subsisted.On July 14, 1997, the petitioner filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent with the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Carles-Balasan, Iloilo City. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent had occupied a portion of his property without any lease agreement and without paying any rentals therefor, and that the same was only through his tolerance and generosity. The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor as follows:1. Ordering the defendant, his agents and/or representatives and all persons claiming under him, to vacate the premises he occupies, remove all improvements thereon and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff; 2. Directing the defendant, his agents and/or representatives and all persons claiming under him, when proper, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sums of: P50,000.00 as attorneys fees; at least P15,000.00 as miscellaneous litigation and necessary expenses; such compensation for use of the portion she (sic) occupies, at the rate of P5,000.00 a month from January 24, 1997, until the full and complete surrender thereof to the plaintiff; and 3. The costs of this suit.[3]In his answer to the complaint, the respondent alleged that the petitioner had no cause of action against him, the truth being that the lessee of the property was his mother, Anita Lao, as evidenced by a contract of lease executed by Alava, the former owner thereof. He further alleged that she had been paying the annual rentals therefor, the last of which was on July 16, 1997 and evidenced by a receipt.[4] He further alleged that she had designated him as manager to maintain the building, pay rentals and operate the business. He then prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.During the preliminary conference, the respondent admitted that he was in actual possession of the property. For his part, the petitioner admitted that he had been renting another portion of the same property from Alava for years, and that his business establishment and that of Anita Laos were adjacent to each other. He also admitted that Anita Lao had been renting the said portion of the property for years before he bought it.The respondent adduced in evidence the contract of lease[5] between his mother, Anita Lao, and Alava.On March 4, 1999, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent. The fallo of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing circumstances, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiff, Rudy Lao and as against defendant, Jaime Lao, as follows:1. Ordering defendant, Jaime Lao, his successors-in-interest, agents, members of his family, privies or any person or persons claiming under his name to vacate the portion of Lot No. 3 occupied by him, and to deliver the physical possession thereof to plaintiff, Rudy Lao;2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, Rudy Lao, the sum of P3,000.00 representing as the monthly rentals of the premises occupied by defendant on Lot No. 3 starting the month of January 1997, until the possession thereof is actually delivered and turned over to the plaintiff;3. Ordering defendant, Jaime Lao, to pay plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees;4. Ordering defendant, Jaime Lao, to pay Plaintiff, Rudy Lao, the sum of P10,000.00 representing as litigation expenses; and to pay the costs of this suit.SO ORDERED.[6]The respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo City, Branch 66, which rendered judgment on January 28, 2000 affirming the said decision with modification. The fallo of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from this court is hereby affirmed with a modification that defendant-appellant Jaime Lao is ordered to pay plaintiff-appellee Rudy Lao the sum of P1,000.00 per month as reasonable use of the land subject of the case from January 1997 until possession is turned over to the plaintiff; to pay Rudy Lao the sum of P10,000.00 attorneys fees and P5,000.00 litigation expenses.With cost against the defendant-appellant.SO ORDERED.[7]The RTC ruled that under Article 1676 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner was the purchaser of the property and had the right to terminate the lease between Alava and Anita Lao, it appearing that the lease contract was not registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. Not being the lessee, the respondent could not invoke the same provision. The trial court also held that the respondent, not his mother, was the real party as defendant in the MCTC, since it was he who was in actual possession of the property. The RTC maintained that if Anita Lao was sued as defendant and was ordered evicted, the decision would not be binding on the respondent since he was not impleaded as defendant.The respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), asserting that I. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS FINDING OF THE MCTC THAT THIS CASE WAS PROPERLY BROUGHT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT WHEN HE IS ONLY AN AGENT OF THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST, ANITA LAO.II. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS FINDING OF THE MCTC THAT THERE IS NO AGENCY BETWEEN ANITA LAO AND THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THE FACT OF AGENCY.III. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT THE MCTC BLATANTLY DISREGARDING (sic) THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER IT ISSUED, ISSUING A DECISION CONTRARY TO THE FACTS ADMITTED BY [THE] PARTIES THEMSELVES ESPECIALLY THE ADMISSION OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE THAT HE KNOWS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE LEASE.[8]On February 27, 2001, the CA rendered judgment setting aside and reversing the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the real party-in-interest as defendant in the MCTC was Anita Lao, the lessee of the property, and not the respondent who was merely the administrator/manager of Anita Laos building and the occupant of the property.The petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the appellate court, he now comes to this Court for relief via a petition for review on certiorari, claiming that:The Hon. Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it converted petitioners cause of action against respondent into a cause of action against respondents mother; and on the basis thereof, dismissed petitioners complaint for ejectment against respondent under the mistaken finding that said ejectment case should have been filed against respondents mother.[9]The petitioner avers that the respondent was the real party-in-interest as defendant in the complaint for unlawful detainer because the respondents possession of the property was in his personal capacity, and not as the caretaker of the property and the business in the building owned by Anita Lao, the lessee thereon. The petitioner argues that, in an ejectment suit, the threshold issue is who has the right to the material or de facto possession of the subject property as distinguished from the de jure possession thereof; hence, the defendant in an ejectment case is the person in actual physical possession of the property.The petitioner insists that the respondent, having admitted in the MCTC that he was in actual possession of the property and that in fact, Anita Lao was no longer staying in the property after her husband died, is the real party-in-interest, as defendant. He posits that if he filed a complaint for ejectment against Anita Lao, it would be dismissed because it was the respondent, and not his mother, who was in actual possession of the property.The petition has no merit.We agree with the petitioner that, in ejectment cases, the word possession means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law.[10] The only issue in such cases is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.[11]We, likewise, conform to the petitioners contention that in an action for unlawful detainer, the real party-in-interest as party-defendant is the person who is in possession of the property without the benefit of any contract of lease and only upon the tolerance and generosity of its owner. Such occupant is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the premises upon demand. This situation is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term has expired, but whose occupancy continued by mere tolerance of the owner.[12] He is the real party-in-interest as defendant.[13]However, the records in this case show that the respondent has been in possession of the property subject of the complaint not by mere tolerance or generosity of the petitioner, but as the manager of his mother, Anita Lao, who conducted her business in the building/warehouse which stood on a portion of the property leased from Alava, the former owner. Contrary to the petitioners claim, the respondents possession of the property was in behalf of his mother, the lessee thereof, and not in his own right, independently of that of his mother.The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lease of the subject property by Anita Lao, the existence of the building and her business thereon, and the fact that the respondent managed his mothers building and business. It must be stressed that during the preliminary conference of the parties before the MCTC, the petitioner admitted his knowledge of the foregoing facts.While it is true that the contract of lease between Alava and Anita Lao was not filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the dorsal portion of the petitioners title over the property, nevertheless, the petitioner was bound by the terms and conditions of the said contract of lease. The lease, in effect, became a part of the contract of sale.[14]Under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner, as the vendee of the property, had the right to file an action for unlawful detainer against Anita Lao upon demand, but for breach of the contract of lease:SEC. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.If the petitioner had done so and judgment was rendered in his favor, ordering Anita Lao to vacate the property, the respondent herein, who is in possession of the property for and in her behalf, would then have to abide by the decision and vacate the same. This was the ruling of the Court in Oro Cam Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[15] thus: It is well-settled that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties thereto, if they are: a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant;c) transferees pendente lite;d) sublessee;e) co-lessees; orf) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.[16] Apparently, the petitioner believed that it was unfair for Anita Lao to be paying an annual rental of only P120.00 for the portion of the property leased by her, considering that the said lot had already been classified as commercial property. Moreover, it was not Anita Lao who stayed in the leased premises; it was her son. The petitioner had no cause of action for unlawful detainer against Anita Lao because of the subsisting contract of lease; hence, he could not file the complaint against her. What the petitioner had no right to do directly, he did indirectly by filing a complaint for unlawful detainer against her son, the respondent, believing that by so doing, he will be rid of Anita Laos lease contract.The Court, thus, rules that the CA acted in accord with law when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 150755. June 28, 2005]RENE GANILA,* EDUARDO DUMADA-OG, SR., RAFAEL GANILA, JOSE PASTRANA, LOURDES GANILA, FLORENTINO GANILA, SERAFIN GANILA, LORETO ARELLANO, CONRADO GANILA, VIVENCIO ALVIOR, EDUARDO GANTALA, AMPARO VILLANUEVA, ELEUTERIO SILVA, ADELINA GANILA, FELIZARDO GANILA, SR., ENRIQUE GANILA, ABRAHAM TANONG, EMILIO ALFARAS, JR., BAPTIST CHRISTIAN LEARNING CENTER, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND VIOLETA C. HERRERA, respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J.:For review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated March 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58191, and its Resolution[2] dated October 18, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision denied the petition to set aside the Resolution[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras, Branch 65, affirming the Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for the 19 petitioners to vacate the contested parcel of land.The facts are as follows:On March 19, 1997, private respondent Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment Complaints[4] before the 16th MCTC, Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Valencia, Jordan, Guimaras. Private respondent alleged that she owns Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras, with an area of 43,210 square meters; that she inherited the lot from her parents; and that she only tolerated petitioners to construct residential houses or other improvements on certain portions of the lot without rental. Sometime in September or October 1996, private respondent demanded that the petitioners vacate the lot and remove their houses and other improvements thereon. Petitioners refused, despite offer of money by way of assistance to them. After the barangay conciliation failed, private respondent filed the complaints.In their Answers,[5] eight[6] of the petitioners claimed that Lot 1227 was formerly a shoreline which they developed when they constructed their respective houses. Another eight[7] maintained that their houses stood on Lot 1229 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras. The other three[8] asserted that Lot 1227 is a social forest area.At the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to designate two geodetic engineers as commissioners of the MCTC to conduct a relocation survey of Lot 1227 and to identify who among the petitioners have houses within the lot.[9]The commissioners reported that: (1) the house of Henry Gabasa, defendant in Civil Case No. 288-J, is almost outside Lot 1227; (2) the house of Ludovico Amatorio, defendant in Civil Case No. 289-J, diagonally traversed the boundary; and (3) the houses of the 19 petitioners are inside Lot 1227.[10]Eight months after herein petitioners failure to comment on the manifestation of private respondent to terminate the preliminary conference, the MCTC terminated the preliminary conference.[11] Thereafter, petitioners counsel Atty. Nelia Jesusa L. Gonzales failed to file her clients position papers and affidavits, even after they sought a 30-day extension to file the same.[12]Consequently, the MCTC decided the cases as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff whereby each of the twenty-one (21) defendants are hereby ordered:1. To vacate Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras;2. To pay Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) per month from October, 1996 as compensation for the use of the property until the same is vacated; and3. To pay Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.SO ORDERED.[13]Petitioners appealed to the RTC, Branch 65, at Jordan, Guimaras, which decided as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision in Civil Cases Nos. 0270-J, 0272-J, 0273-J, 0274-J, 0275-J, 0276-J, 0277-J, 0278-J, 0279-J, 0280-J, 0281-J, 0282-J, 0283-J, 0284-J, 0285-J, 0286-J, 0287-J, 0291-J and 0292-J are hereby affirmed.The decision of the court below in Civil Cases Nos. 0288-J and 0289-J are set aside. Civil Cases Nos. 0288-J and 0289-J are hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.[14]The RTC ruled that the evidence showed the better right of private respondent to possess Lot 1227. Private respondents position paper, affidavit and tax declaration supported her allegations. In addition, the commissioners report and sketch plan showed that indeed petitioners occupy Lot 1227. On the other hand, according to the RTC, the petitioners failed to present evidence which would show that they are entitled to possess the lot.Based on the sketch plan, the RTC dismissed the cases against Gabasa and Amatorio since their houses occupy only a small area of Lot 1227. It declared that Gabasa and Amatorio believed in good faith that the whole area they occupied was part of the seashore.The 19 petitioners, who were ordered to vacate the lot, filed a joint petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied the petition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration and filed an amended petition. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the factual findings and conclusions arrived at by the trial courts and denied the amended petition for lack of merit.[15] It also denied the motion for reconsideration.Petitioners are now before us, on a petition for review, alleging that:The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect and deference, committed a reversible error in the interpretation/application of the law in the instant case and in the appreciation of the facts and evidence presented. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it denied and dismissed the petition filed by the petitioners.[16]After considering the parties submissions, we find three basic issues: (1) Did the MCTC err in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the cases? (2) Did the RTC err in sustaining the MCTCs judgment? (3) Did the CA err in denying the petition for review filed by the 19 petitioners ordered to be ejected? Petitioners insist that private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de jure, not a mere complaint for ejectment, for two reasons. One, they possessed Lot 1227 in good faith for more than 30 years in the concept of owners. And two, there was no withholding of possession since private respondent was not in prior possession of the lot.Private respondent states in her Comment before us that the allegations in her Complaints make out a clear case of unlawful detainer which is cognizable by the MCTC. We are in agreement with her stance. There was no error in the choice of the complainants remedy, a matter left to her determination as the suitor. And the complaint itself is defined by the allegations therein, not the allegations of the defendants.At the outset, we note that petitioners question the MCTCs jurisdiction yet they admit in their preliminary statement that the Complaints filed are indeed for unlawful detainer, and that the only issue to be determined is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure), much less ownership.[17]While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of possession, they confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.[18] Thus, the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them to remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all in a suit for unlawful detainer, simply because prior lawful possession by virtue of contract or other reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. Here there is no evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts.If only to stress the fundamental principles related to present controversy, jurisdiction over unlawful detainer suits is vested in municipal trial courts.[19] And in ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint.[20]In this case for ejectment, private respondents allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful detainer. She alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227; (2) she tolerated petitioners to construct their houses thereon; (3) she withdrew her tolerance; and (4) petitioners refused to heed her demand to vacate the lot. The Complaints were also filed within one year from the date of her demand. The cause of action for unlawful detainer between the parties springs from the failure of petitioners to vacate the lot upon lawful demand of the private respondent. When they refused to vacate the lot after her demand, petitioners continued possession became unlawful. Her complaint for ejectment against respondent, to put it simply, is not without sufficient basis.Petitioners contention that private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de jure with the RTC is not supported by law or jurisprudence. The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is settled in our jurisprudence. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.[21]It is not up to defendants, now petitioners herein, to dictate upon plaintiff, now the private respondent, what her initial recourse should be. Her choice of an action for ejectment against so-called squatters is well within her rights.Petitioners cite the case of Bayubay v. Court of Appeals,[22] and argue that the MCTCs decision was without jurisdictional or legal basis because the MCTC did not issue a preliminary conference order. They assert that the 10-day period to file position papers and affidavits only starts after the parties had received a preliminary conference order. They insist they were denied due process when the MCTC decided the cases based merely on private respondents Complaints and affidavit, without considering their Answers.For her part, private respondent maintains that there was substantial compliance with the rules in the MCTCs conduct of the preliminary conference, hence there was no violation of due process nor disregard of its proper jurisdiction.Petitioners present contention was first raised only in their appeal to the RTC. Raising it before the appellate tribunal is barred by estoppel.[23] They should have raised it in the proceedings before the MCTC. In our view, this issue is a mere afterthought, when the MCTC decided against them. Basic rules of fair play, justice and due process require that as a rule an issue cannot be raised by the petitioners for the first time on appeal.[24]Besides, petitioners did not question initially the MCTCs Order dated February 19, 1999, when they moved for an extension of time to file their position papers and affidavits. They wanted another 30 days on top of the 30 days set by the MCTC, which strictly should have been 10 days only. In this regard, petitioners could not claim that they were denied sufficient time to file their position papers and affidavits before the trial court. Further, they cannot validly invoke our ruling[25] in Bayubay, for in that case there was no order at all terminating the preliminary conference and requiring the parties to submit position papers and affidavits.We note with dismay petitioners insistence that we order the MCTC to conduct the requisite preliminary conference. The summary character of ejectment suits will be disregarded if we allow petitioners to further delay this case by allowing a second preliminary conference. Ejectment by way of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings, designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession over the property involved. It is a timely procedure designed to remedy the delay in the resolution of such cases.[26]Lastly, petitioners aver that private respondent failed to prove her allegation of ownership of Lot 1227 as it is only based on a tax declaration which is not an evidence of ownership. They also claim that their possession of the lot was not and could not be by mere tolerance. However, this is a factual matter best left to the trial courts.What we have now is sufficient evidence showing that private respondent has a better right to possess Lot 1227. The commissioners report and sketch plan show that the 19 petitioners occupy the lot, which corroborate private respondents allegation and disprove petitioners defense that Lot 1227 is a shoreline; or that Lot 1227 is a social forest area. While not a conclusive evidence of ownership, private respondents tax declaration constitutes proof that she has a claim of title over the lot. It has been held that:Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[27]The lower courts did not err in adjudicating the issue of possession. Mere absence of title over the lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case. Plainly stated, the trial court has validly exercised its jurisdiction over the ejectment cases below. The policy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder, and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what she claims is hers. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his or her own hands.[28] For their part, herein petitioners could not be barred from defending themselves before the court adequately, as a matter of law and right.However, petitioners in their defense should show that they are entitled to possess Lot 1227. If they had any evidence to prove their defenses, they should have presented it to the MCTC with their position papers and affidavits. But they ignored the courts order and missed the given opportunity to have their defenses heard, the very essence of due process.[29] Their allegations were not only unsubstantiated but were also disproved by the plaintiffs evidence.In sum, we find no reversible error much less any grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of Appeals. A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.[30] His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.[31]WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2001 and its Resolution dated October 18, 2001 are AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, G.R. No. 132197INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS, INC., Present: Petitioners, PUNO, J., Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG, Promulgated: Respondents. August 16, 2005x-------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O N Tinga, J.:In a Decision[1] dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court of Appeals overturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This petition for review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision.The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ongs ownership of the lots previous to theirs. On 26 January 1995, Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But respondents refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners alleged. Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by respondents in a complaint filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty.[2] Per record, this case is still pending resolution. Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the decision ordering respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession thereof to petitioners. On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment affirming the MTCs decision in its entirety.On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the following day, they filed a motion for reconsideration. On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due course to respondents notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997; denied their motion for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997,[3] and granted petitioners motion for immediate execution pending appeal.In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as a Petition for Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside. Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The principal issues raised before this Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the time the petition for review was filed; (ii) whether the allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC; and, (iii) whether petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the possession of the subject premises.We resolve the first argument to be without merit. The following sequence of events is undisputed:(1) On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision affirming the judgment of the MTC.(2) On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned decision. (3) On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. (4) On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision. (5) On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration. (6) On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned 23 June 1997 Order. (7) On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion for an additional period of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for Review. (8) On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review.Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period for appeal. They theorize that the period started running on 28 April 1995, the date of receipt of the RTC decision, and ended on 13 May 1997. According to them, this reglementary period could not have been interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of the Motion for Reconsideration because of the filing one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997, albeit the wrong mode of appeal, expressly manifested their intention to file a petition for review to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.[4] Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having filed the Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the RTC, cannot take an inconsistent stand such as filing a Motion for Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which started running from the date of receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May 1997. Respondents, in their Comment,[5] submit that the filing of the Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997 was improper, and as such did not produce any legal effect. Therefore, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration immediately on the following day cured this defect. The RTC refused to subscribe respondents position. It justified the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. The Order dated 23 June 1997 stated:On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on May 8, 1997.Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for Reconsideration.Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier which the court hereby approves, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious, is GRANTED.[6] (Emphasis in the original.) Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point when it took cognizance of respondents position and reversed the RTC. But does this necessarily mean that the RTC was correct when it declared that the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of Appeal, no matter how erroneous the latter mode was?Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. -- A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellees brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz[7] that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the two cases are different. De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal. In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed. Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether the Complaint satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC.The MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and disposed of the same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts and found the complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds, namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer. We disagree with the Court of Appeals.The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations:. . . . 3. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and Lot No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said Transfer Certificate of Titles are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, and C respectively and made an integral part hereof;4. That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said lots;5. That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her husband and co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the house constructed on said lots;6. That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel, wrote defendants a letter informing them or their intent to use said lots and demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30 days from receipt of said letter. Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex D and made an integral part thereof;7. That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;8. That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the plaintiffs, plaintiffs have suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in the amount of P10,000.00 a month . . . .[8]Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[9]Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners possession was originally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express or implied contract. The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter.In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals,[10] it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.[11]Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.[12] In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient. Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that: . . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;[14]is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case. In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the former owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis.[15] But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70[16] of the Rules of Court. The case doesid not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz[17] justifies a more liberal approach, thus: . . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided.[18]Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case involving the annulment of deed of sale and title over said property. Petitioners know better than to question this in an ejectment proceeding, which brings us to the nature of the action in this case. Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being an accion reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that petitioners were constantly claiming ownership over the lands in the guise of filing an action for ejectment. In their Comment,[19] respondents maintain that they occupy the subject lots as the legal owners. Petitioners, on the other hand, are seeking recovery of possession under a claim of ownership which is tantamount to recovery of possession based on alleged title to the lands, and therefore is within the original jurisdiction of the RTC, so respondents conclude.This contention is not tenable.The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential.[20]Neither the allegation in petitioners complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of respondents present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case. Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction.[21] This Court in Ganadin

v. Ramos[22] stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case.In Drilon v. Gaurana,[23] this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same.[24] In Oronce v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court held that the fact that respondents had previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same

Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez[26] when it ruled:We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of ownership over the lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, although the issue of ownership is inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the proper forum.The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack. In Apostol v. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court had the occasion to clarify this:. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.[28] With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss the third assignment of error which is related to the second issue.WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 January 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24

April 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.SO ORDERED.FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 151815. February 23, 2005]SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID AND ERLINDA T. NUGUID, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEDRO P. PECSON, respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[footnoteRef:2][1] dated May 21, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64295, which modified the Order dated July 31, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Civil Case No. Q-41470. The trial court ordered the defendants, among them petitioner herein Juan Nuguid, to pay respondent herein Pedro P. Pecson, the sum of P1,344,000 as reimbursement of unrealized income for the period beginning November 22, 1993 to December 1997. The appellate court, however, reduced the trial courts award in favor of Pecson from the said P1,344,000 to P280,000. Equally assailed by the petitioners is the appellate courts Resolution[footnoteRef:3][2] dated January 10, 2002, denying the motion for reconsideration. [2: [1] Rollo, pp. 6-17. Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr., with Associate Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos, and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole concurring.] [3: [2] Id. at 19-20. Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos, and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador concurring.]

It may be recalled that relatedly in our Decision dated May 26, 1995, in G.R. No. 115814, entitled Pecson v. Court of Appeals, we set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 and the Order dated November 15, 1993, of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 and remanded the case to the trial court for the determination of the current market value of the four-door two-storey apartment building on the 256-square meter commercial lot.The antecedent facts in this case are as follows:Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot located at 27 Kamias Road, Quezon City, on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for P103,000 to the spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-41470. In its Decision,[footnoteRef:4][3] dated February 8, 1989, the RTC upheld the spouses title but declared that the four-door two-storey apartment building was not included in the auction sale.[footnoteRef:5][4] This was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and thereafter by this Court, in its Decision[footnoteRef:6][5] dated May 25, 1993, in G.R. No. 105360 entitled Pecson v. Court of Appeals. [4: [3] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 501-510.] [5: [4] Ibid.] [6: [5] 222 SCRA 580-586.]

On June 23, 1993, by virtue of the Entry of Judgment of the aforesaid decision in G.R. No. 105360, the Nuguids became the uncontested owners of the 256-square meter commercial lot.As a result, the Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building.In its Order[footnoteRef:7][6] of November 15, 1993, the trial court, relying upon Article 546[footnoteRef:8][7] of the Civil Code, ruled that the Spouses Nuguid were to reimburse Pecson for his construction cost of P53,000, following which, the spouses Nuguid were entitled to immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the lot and improvements. In the same order the RTC also directed Pecson to pay the same amount of monthly rentals to the Nuguids as paid by the tenants occupying the apartment units or P21,000 per month from June 23, 1993, and allowed the offset of the amount of P53,000 due from the Nuguids against the amount of rents collected by Pecson from June 23, 1993 to September 23, 1993 from the tenants of the apartment.[footnoteRef:9][8] [7: [6] Records, Vol. 2, pp. 578-580.] [8: [7] Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.] [9: [8] Records, Vol. 2, p. 580.]

Pecson duly moved for reconsideration, but on November 8, 1993, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession,[footnoteRef:10][9] directing the deputy sheriff to put the spouses Nuguid in possession of the subject property with all the improvements thereon and to eject all the occupants therein. [10: [9] Id. at 587.]

Aggrieved, Pecson then filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 with the Court of Appeals.In its decision of June 7, 1994, the appellate court, relying upon Article 448[footnoteRef:11][10] of the Civil Code, affirmed the order of payment of construction costs but rendered the issue of possession moot on appeal, thus: [11: [10] Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.]

WHEREFORE, while it appears that private respondents [spouses Nuguid] have not yet indemnified petitioner [Pecson] with the cost of the improvements, since Annex I shows that the Deputy Sheriff has enforced the Writ of Possession and the premises have been turned over to the possession of private respondents, the quest of petitioner that he be restored in possession of the premises is rendered moot and academic, although it is but fair and just that private respondents pay petitioner the construction cost of P53,000.00; and that petitioner be ordered to account for any and all fruits of the improvements received by him starting on June 23, 1993, with the amount of P53,000.00 to be offset therefrom.IT IS SO ORDERED.[footnoteRef:12][11] [Underscoring supplied.] [12: [11] Records, Vol. 2, p. 744.]

Frustrated by this turn of events, Pecson filed a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 115814 before this Court.On May 26, 1995, the Court handed down the decision in G.R. No 115814, to wit:WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 and the Order of 15 November 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 101, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-41470 are hereby SET ASIDE.The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to determine the current market value of the apartment building on the lot. For this purpose, the parties shall be allowed to adduce evidence on the current market value of the apartment building. The value so determined shall be forthwith paid by the private respondents [Spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid] to the petitioner [Pedro Pecson] otherwise the petitioner shall be restored to the possession of the apartment building until payment of the required indemnity.No costs.SO ORDERED.[footnoteRef:13][12] [Emphasis supplied.] [13: [12] Pecson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115814, 26 May 1995, 244 SCRA 407, 416-417.]

In so ruling, this Court pointed out that: (1) Article 448 of the Civil Code is not apposite to the case at bar where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later lost ownership of the land by sale, but may, however, be applied by analogy; (2) the current market value of the improvements should be made as the basis of reimbursement; (3) Pecson was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom; (4) the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial courts determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering Pecson to account for the rentals of the apartment building from June 23, 1993 to September 23, 1993.On the basis of this Courts decision in G.R. No. 115814, Pecson filed a Motion to Restore Possession and a Motion to Render Accounting, praying respectively for restoration of his possession over the subject 256-square meter commercial lot and for the spouses Nuguid to be directed to render an accounting under oath, of the income derived from the subject four-door apartment from November 22, 1993 until possession of the same was restored to him.In an Order[footnoteRef:14][13] dated January 26, 1996, the RTC denied the Motion to Restore Possession to the plaintiff averring that the current market value of the building should first be determined. Pending the said determination, the resolution of the Motion for Accounting was likewise held in abeyance. [14: [13] Records, Vol. 2, pp. 706-707.]

With the submission of the parties assessment and the reports of the subject realty, and the reports of the Quezon City Assessor, as well as the members of the duly constituted assessment committee, the trial court issued the following Order[footnoteRef:15][14] dated October 7, 1997, to wit: [15: [14] Id. at 824.]

On November 21, 1996, the parties manifested that they have arrived at a compromise agreement that the value of the said improvement/building is P400,000.00 The Court notes that the plaintiff has already received P300,000.00. However, when defendant was ready to pay the balance of P100,000.00, the plaintiff now insists that there should be a rental to be paid by defendants. Whether or not this should be paid by defendants, incident is hereby scheduled for hearing on November 12, 1997 at 8:30 a.m.Meantime, defendants are directed to pay plaintiff the balance of P100,000.00.SO ORDERED.[footnoteRef:16][15] [16: [15] Ibid.]

On December 1997, after paying the said P100,000 balance to Pedro Pecson the spouses Nuguid prayed for the closure and termination of the case, as well as the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the title of the property on the ground that Pedro Pecsons claim for rentals was devoid of factual and legal bases.[footnoteRef:17][16] [17: [16] Id. at 832-833.]

After conducting a hearing, the lower court issued an Order dated July 31, 1998, directing the spouses to pay the sum of P1,344,000 as reimbursement of the unrealized income of Pecson for the period beginning November 22, 1993 up to December 1997. The sum was based on the computation of P28,000/month rentals of the four-door apartment, thus:The Court finds plaintiffs motion valid and meritorious. The decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case [Pecson vs. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 407] which set aside the Order of this Court of November 15, 1993 has in effect upheld plaintiffs right of possession of the building for as long as he is not fully paid the value thereof. It follows, as declared by the Supreme Court in said decision that the plaintiff is entitled to the income derived therefrom, thus . . .Records show that the plaintiff was dispossessed of the premises on November 22, 1993 and that he was fully paid the value of his building in December 1997. Therefore, he is entitled to the income thereof beginning on November 22, 1993, the time he was dispossessed, up to the time of said full payment, in December 1997, or a total of 48 months.The only question left is the determination of income of the four units of apartments per month. But as correctly pointed out by plaintiff, the defendants have themselves submitted their affidavits attesting that the income derived from three of the four units of the apartment building is P21,000.00 or P7,000.00 each per month, or P28,000.00 per month for the whole four units. Hence, at P28,000.00 per month, multiplied by 48 months, plaintiff is entitled to be paid by defendants the amount of P1,344,000.00.[footnoteRef:18][17] [18: [17] Rollo, pp. 74-75; CA Rollo, pp. 25-26; Records, Vol. 2, pp. 836-837.]

The Nuguid spouses filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit.[footnoteRef:19][18] [19: [18] Records, Vol. 2, p. 861.]

The Nuguid couple then appealed the trial courts ruling to the Court of Appeals, their action docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64295.In the Court of Appeals, the order appealed from in CA-G.R. CV No. 64295, was modified. The CA reduced the rentals from P1,344,000 to P280,000 in favor of the appellee.[footnoteRef:20][19] The said amount represents accrued rentals from the determination of the current market value on January 31, 1997[footnoteRef:21][20] until its full payment on December 12, 1997. [20: [19] Rollo, p. 44.] [21: [20] Records, Vol. 2, p. 805.]

Hence, petitioners state the sole assignment of error now before us as follows:THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS LIABLE TO PAY RENT OVER AND ABOVE THE CURRENT MARKET VALUE OF THE IMPROVEMENT WHEN SUCH WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE SUPREME COURTS RULING IN G.R. No. 115814.Petitioners call our attention to the fact that after reaching an agreed price of P400,000 for the improvements, they only made a partial payment of P300,000. Thus, they contend that their failure to pay the full price for the improvements will, at most, entitle respondent to be restored to possession, but not to collect any rentals. Petitioners insist that this is the proper interpretation of the dispositive portion of the decision in G.R. No. 115814, which states in part that [t]he value so determined shall be forthwith paid by the private respondents [Spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid] to the petitioner [Pedro Pecson] otherwise the petitioner shall be restored to the possession of the apartment building until payment of the required indemnity.[footnoteRef:22][21] [22: [21] Rollo, p. 37.]

Now herein respondent, Pecson, disagrees with herein petitioners contention. He argues that petitioners are wrong in claiming that inasmuch as his claim for rentals was not determined in the dispositive portion of the decision in G.R. No. 115814, it could not be the subject of execution. He points out that in moving for an accounting, all he asked was that the value of the fruits of the property during the period he was dispossessed be accounted for, since this Court explicitly recognized in G.R. No. 115814, he was entitled to the property. He points out that this Court ruled that [t]he petitioner [Pecson] not having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.[footnoteRef:23][22] In other words, says respondent, accounting was necessary. For accordingly, he was entitled to rental income from the property. This should be given effect. The Court could have very well specifically included rent (as fruit or income of the property), but could not have done so at the time the Court pronounced judgment because its value had yet to be determined, according to him. Additionally, he faults the appellate court for modifying the order of the RTC, thus defeating his right as a builder in good faith entitled to rental from the period of his dispossession to full payment of the price of his improvements, which spans from November 22, 1993 to December 1997, or a period of more than four years. [23: [22] Supra, note 12 at 416.]

It is not disputed that the construction of the four-door two-storey apartment, subject of this dispute, was undertaken at the time when Pecson was still the owner of the lot. When the Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the lot on June 23, 1993, by virtue of entry of judgment of the Courts decision, dated May 25, 1993, in G.R. No. 105360, the apartment building was already in existence and occupied by tenants. In its decision dated May 26, 1995 in G.R. No. 115814, the Court declared the rights and obligations of the litigants in accordance with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. These provisions of the Code are directly applicable to the instant case.Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.While the law aims to concentrate in one person the ownership of the land and the improvements thereon in view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership,[footnoteRef:24][23] it guards against unjust enrichment insofar as the good-faith builders improvements are concerned. The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for possession of the property) for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed.[footnoteRef:25][24] Accordingly, a builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the period of retention[footnoteRef:26][25] nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate. In addition, as in this case, the owner of the land is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the fruits received by the builder-possessor in good faith. Otherwise, the security provided by law would be impaired. This is so because the right to the expenses and the right to the fruits both pertain to the possessor, making compensation juridically impossible; and one cannot be used to reduce the other.[footnoteRef:27][26] [24: [23] 2 Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated 205 (1999 ed.) citing 3 Manresa 213 (4th Ed).] [25: [24] Ortiz v. Kayanan, No. L-32974, 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 146, 159.] [26: [25] San Diego v. Hon. Montesa, No. L-17985, 29 September 1962, 116 Phil. 512, 515.] [27: [26] 2 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 261 (1983 ed.) citing 4 Manresa 290.]

As we earlier held, since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as June 1993, when they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not include the apartment building, they could not benefit from the lots improvement, until they reimbursed the improver in full, based on the current market value of the property.Despite the Courts recognition of Pecsons right of ownership over the apartment building, the petitioners still insisted on dispossessing Pecson by filing for a Writ of Possession to cover both the lot and the building. Clearly, this resulted in a violation of respondents right of retention. Worse, petitioners took advantage of the situation to benefit from the highly valued, income-yielding, four-unit apartment building by collecting rentals thereon, before they paid for the cost of the apartment building. It was only four years later that they finally paid its full value to the respondent.Petitioners interpretation of our holding in G.R. No. 115814 has neither factual nor legal basis. The decision of May 26, 1995, should be construed in connection with the legal principles which form the basis of the decision, guided by the precept that judgments are to have a reasonable intendment to do justice and avoid wrong.[footnoteRef:28][27] [28: [27] See Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. De Los Angeles, G.R. No. L-26112, 4 October 1971, 148-B Phil. 902, 924.]

The text of the decision in G.R. No. 115814 expressly exempted Pecson from liability to pay rentals, for we found that the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial courts determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering him to account for the rentals of the apartment building from June 23, 1993 to September 23, 1993, the period from entry of judgment until Pecsons dispossession. As pointed out by Pecson, the dispositive portion of our decision in G.R. No. 115814 need not specifically include the income derived from the improvement in order to entitle him, as a builder in good faith, to such income. The right of retention, which entitles the builder in good faith to the possession as well as the income derived therefrom, is already provided for under Article 546 of the Civil Code.Given the circumstances of the instant case where the builder in good faith has been clearly denied his right of retention for almost half a decade, we find that the increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable and equitable. The petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement introduced by the respondent during said period, without paying any amount to the latter as reimbursement for his construction costs and expenses. They should account and pay for such benefits.We need not belabor now the appellate courts recognition of herein respondents entitlement to rentals from the date of the determination of the current market value until its full payment. Respondent is clearly entitled to payment by virtue of his right of retention over the said improvement.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 21, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64295 is SET ASIDE and the Order dated July 31, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 101, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-41470 ordering the herein petitioners, Spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid, to account for the rental income of the four-door two-storey apartment building from November 1993 until December 1997, in the amount of P1,344,000, computed on the basis of Twenty-eight Thousand (P28,000.00) pesos monthly, for a period of 48 months, is hereby REINSTATED. Until fully paid, said amount of rentals should bear the legal rate of interest set at six percent (6%) per annum computed from the date of RTC judgment. If any portion thereof shall thereafter remain unpaid, despite notice of finality of this Courts judgment, said remaining unpaid amount shall bear the rate of interest set at twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the date of said notice. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 133705. March 31, 2005]C-J YULO & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN PABLO, INC., respondent.D E C I S I O NGARCIA, J.:Appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated December 19, 1997 and Resolution[2] dated April 30, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45392, reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34, which ruled in favor of the herein petitioner C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., in a suit for revocation of donation with reconveyance of title, thereat commenced by the petitioner against the herein respondent, Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc.The facts are not at all disputed:On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna with an area of 41,117 square meters and registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-82803. The deed of donation which also bears the acceptance of the donee recites the considerations therefor and the conditions thereto attached, to wit:WHEREAS, Donee is a religious corporation engaged in much (sic) humanitarian Christian work in Laguna and elsewhere, educating and forming the young, caring for the infirm and the aged in the fulfillment of its mission;WHEREAS, Donor recognizes the need for a privately endowed institution that will care for the homeless and destitute old people in the community, as well as the other senior citizens who for some reason or other find themselves without family with whom to live the last years of their life:WHEREFORE, Donor is willing, in order to help establish and support such an institution to donate the land necessary for its housing, as well as an area of land whereon it may raise crops for its support and for the sustenance of its residents;WHEREAS, Donee is willing and able, with the wanted help of Donor and of other benefactors, to establish, operate and maintain such a home for the aged.NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of all the foregoing premises, Donor hereby transfers and conveys to Donee by way of donation all its rights, title and interest in that certain parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82803 of the Land Records of Laguna, the technical descriptions of which are recited above, subject to the following conditions and covenants, each of which is a material consideration for this Deed:1. So much of the land as may be necessary shall be used for the construction of a home for the aged and infirm, regardless of religion or creed, but preferably those coming from Canlubang, Calamba