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IV. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ANNULMENT OR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY
Enrico case: PDF
CARLOS v. SANDOVAL
Teofilo and Felicidad got married in 1962. Thirty years after marriage, Teofilodied intestate leaving his wife and son Teofilo Carlos ll. In 1995, Teofilo’s brother
Juan filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of Teofilo and Felicidad's
marriage in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewisemaintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father
of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Can Juan file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage?
SUGGESTED ANSWER
In Carlos vs. Sandoval, although the marriage was celebrated before Aug. 3,1988and the petition was filed before March, 15, 2003, Juan should first showthat he is a real party-in interest before he may be allowed to file the saidpetition.
"The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a licensefor any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person mustappear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgmentin the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Elsewise stated, Juanmust be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that everyaction must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest."
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest
in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguishedfrom mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction ofthe court as plaintiff in an action.
Is Juan a Real Party-in-Interest?
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The SC ruled that "the case must be remanded to determine whether or not Juan isa real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.
It bears stressing that the legal personality of petitioner Juan to bring thenullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo IIis not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and theirson, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights aretransmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs inArticle 887, CC. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does notfall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to theestate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
xxx
xxx Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner Juan succeeds to the otherhalf of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widowpursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes Juan a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceasedbrother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be voidab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
However, If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legallyadopted son of Teofilo, then Juan has no legal personality to ask for the nullity
of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is basedon the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, doesnot have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may befound to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This isbecause the presence of descendant, illegitimate, [34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
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Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits todetermine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But theRTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack ofcause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother ofpetitioner.(Carlos vs. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008)
ISIDRO ABLAZAvs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 158298 August 11,2010BERSAMIN,J.FACTS:On October 17, 2000, the petitioner, Isidro Ablaza filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) inCataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of theabsolute nullity of the marriagecontracted on December 26, 1949 between hislate brother Cresenciano Ablaza and LeonilaHonato. The petitioner allegedthat the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had beencelebratedwithout a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9,1950,thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having beensolemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the survivingbrother of Cresenciano who had died without anyissue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death,therebymaking him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included,could impugnthe validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila atany time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being voidab initio.
ISSUE:Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek thedeclaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
HELD:
The Court Ruled that, being good for no legal purpose other than remarriage,a void marriageinvalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which thefact of marriage may be material,either direct or collateral, in any civil courtbetween any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either orboth the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the factsrenderingsuch marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by thecourts." It isnot like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
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attacked except in direct proceedinginstituted during the lifetime of theparties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot beimpeached, andis made goodab initio
Aurelio vs Aurelio, G. R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011
Facts: Petitioner Danilo Aurelio and respondent Vda. Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23,1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed
with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition,respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing andcomplying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that suchstate of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of their marriage ceremony.Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue: May the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to be waived pursuant toSupreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10?
Ruling: This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10 has modifiedthe Molina guidelines, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the SolicitorGeneral required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Codemandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned on behalf of the State to takesteps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated orsuppressed.
G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011
DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner,
vs.VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the October 6, 2005 Decision2 and October 26, 2006 Resolution,
3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March
23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition, respondent alleged that
both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with
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their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of
psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony.
Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of theFamily Code which provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondent’s petition are the following
allegations, to wit:
x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically
incapable of performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said
psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said psychologicalincapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and
incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousyand distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He
refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his family’s needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the
feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in the presence of their
children.
Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her
feelings change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she
cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset
when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostilitytowards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essentialobligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested
psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The psychological
make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is grave,
incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal
obligations of a marriage.5
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss6 the petition. Petitioner principally
argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set
by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order 7 denying petitioner’s motion.
On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however,
denied by the RTC in an Order 8 dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioner’s motion, the
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RTC ruled that respondent’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the
requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would
depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit:
A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of
Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of theroot cause of the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent contained in
paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of juridical antecedence was alleged in
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of psychologicalincapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in
paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quoted in
paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the
nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by both
parties. This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the
hearing on the merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of evidenceto sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through
the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity.
9
On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition forcertiorar i
10 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portionof which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.11
In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondent’s complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the FamilyCode and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Court’s consideration, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONSCONTAINED IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF
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MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY
OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLELAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO
DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITHGRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN,
ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 12
Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondent’s complaint been filed after March
15, 2003, this present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court AdministrativeMatter No. 02-11-10
13 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of
marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review of the arguments raised by petitionerherein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14
this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in
the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assumethe essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 ofthe same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in thetext of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the CatholicChurch in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.
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(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless theSolicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, brieflystating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, tothe petition.
15
This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the
above pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the
Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 ofthe Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.16
Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondent’s
petition are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the
Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged inthe complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition.
17
First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychologicalincapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of
respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the
complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert
psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature asto bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive
(Negativistic) Personality Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both parties to perform theirmarital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with
were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition,
respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the husband
and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and rendermutual help and support."
It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitatedto fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal
of the Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties
have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached bythe court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer
to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome
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to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are
sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case
involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
18
Itwould thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the
testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties.
Given the allegations in respondent’s petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. By
grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as isequivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse
of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplationof law.19
Even assuming arguendo that this Court were to agree with petitioner that the
allegations contained in respondent’s petition are insufficient and that the RTC erred in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error of judgment correctible by appeal andnot an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
20
Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioner’s petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motionto dismiss, which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioner’s remedy is
to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for
nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in duetime.
21 The existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of his petition for
certiorari in the CA.22
WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision
and October 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; elements. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance ofmarital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation
and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychologicalabnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married
person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due
to some psychological illness. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012.
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Marriage; psychological incapacity; expert evidence; thorough and in-depth assessment required.
The expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence
of psychological incapacity. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No.
159594. November 12, 2012.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; proof of natal or disabling supervening factor required. It is
not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty incomplying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations – must be shown. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; Santos and Molina guidelines. The pronouncements in
Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the
psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of
evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the
existence of the psychological incapacity. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos,
Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; three basic requirements. To entitle petitioner spouse to a
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse’s psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior
to the time of the marriage. Arabelle Mendoza v. Republic of the Philippines and Dominic Mendoza, G.R. No. 157649. November 12, 2012.
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DEQUINTOS, .JR., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinanof the nullity of the marriage between respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and
Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina) based on the latter's psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
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We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold once again the validity of a
marriage on the ground that the alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.
Antecedents
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the MunicipalMayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalina’s
hysterectomy following her second miscarriage.3
On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage ,4 citing
Catalina’s psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina didnot interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house
and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.5 After conducting an investigation, the public
prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina.6
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in
petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that shespent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household chores andcaring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live
with Bobbie Castro, her paramour .7
Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L.
Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina,8 Dr. Reyes opined that
Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr.
Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered
her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.9
Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation,10
whereby she
admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo’sconsent and flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and
that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to live there
or to receive her share should the residence be sold.11
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff and judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos Santos deQuintos, a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
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2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the marriage
of the parties from the Civil Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this
decision.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with
her family, and her incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her
duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held that considering that the matterof determining whether a party was psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like
Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the best evidence of
Catalina’s psychological incapacity.13
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE NULL ANDVOID, DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS’ PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA
concluded that Eduardo proved Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing that the results ofthe neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina had been
"mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital obligations;"
and that Catalina’s psychological incapacity had been medically identified, sufficiently proven,
duly alleged in the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.
Issue
In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA
gravely erred because:
I
THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINA’S ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS
ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE
TIME OF MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO
BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
III
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ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION.
IV
GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE ASYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
V
THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR.ANNABELLE REYES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF CATALINA’S
INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF
MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE.14
The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform to the
guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina);
15
and thatCatalina’s refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take care of her husband and theiradopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature warranting the declaration of
nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect to perform her
marital obligations.
The OSG further argues that Catalina’s infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of theconjugal home were not grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof
that her infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to the marriage, while her abandonment
would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that the
neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalina’s psychological
incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to look into Catalina’s past life,attitudes, habits and character as to be able to explain her alleged psychological incapacity; that
there was not even a finding of the root cause of her alleged psychological incapacity; and thatthere appeared to be a collusion between the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the
trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.
The OSG postulated that Catalina’s unsupportive in-laws and Eduardo’s overseas deployment
that had required him to be away most of the time created the strain in the couple’s relationship
and forced her to seek her friends’ emotional support and company; and that her ambivalent
attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable to her inability to bear children of herown.
Issue
The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity ofCatalina’s marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Ruling
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We grant the petition for review.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity orinability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer tothe essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his orher responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.16
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17
we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a
mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such
as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in
deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we thenlaid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina,18
viz:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
x x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. x x x.
x x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. x x x.
x x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent orincurable. x x x.
x x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assumethe essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.
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x x x x
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 ofthe Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in thetext of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the CatholicChurch in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x.
x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor Generalto appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
19
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guidesin deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has
declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of
each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.20
Indeed, theincapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial,
21 making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological
incapacity.22
Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained the
gravity and severity of Catalina’s psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
23
We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement ofsufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported
psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their appreciation of the scanty evidence
that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.
To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving
the house without Eduardo’s consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of theiradopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established. Eduardo presented no other
witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was self-serving
and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted to acourt of law.
Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychologicalevaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of
Catalina’s psychological incapacity. In particular, they relied on the following portion of the
report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:
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REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly byimmaturity in several aspects of the personality. One aspect is in the area of personal
relationships, where a person cannot really come up with what is expected in a relationship that
involves commitments. They are generally in and out of relationships, as they do not have the patience to sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be attended to
as they might end up doing things which are often regrettable. These people however usually do
not feel remorse for their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from their mistakes, and theyhave the habit of repeating these mistakes to the detriment of their own lives and that of their
families. Owing to these characteristics, people with these pattern of traits cannot be expected to
have lasting and successful relationships as required in marriage. It is expected that even with
future relationships, things will not work out.
Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If this be
the background of the developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up
as such.
x x x x
With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendantmade, it is being concluded that she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of heras a wife. Her behavior and attitude before and after the marriage is highly indicative of a very
immature and childish person, rendering her psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet
the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina miserably failed to fulfillher role as wife and mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her duties inherent in
marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be expected that this attitude and behavior of defendant will
still change because her traits have developed through the years and already ingrained withinher .24
Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalina’ssupposed psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source
of vital information that the report missed out on. Aside from rendering a brief and general
description of the symptoms of borderline personality disorder, both the report and courttestimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have brought about
such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalina’s various acts or
omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline personality, and did not also discuss
the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to perform her basic marital duties. Dr.Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and immature, and that her childishness and
immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having already reached an age "beyond
maturity."25
Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment ofthe parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
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The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her
abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of
the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of
the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing thatsuch marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completelyunable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not
adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.
Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The
assertion was based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50,000.00
as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his petition or to bringany action on her part,
34 to wit:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG
Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant,
Catalina delos Santos-de Quintos, has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticedthat she is no longer attending and represented by counsel, did you talk to your wife?
A No, sir.
Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not attendthe hearing of this case you filed against her, is it not?
A No, sir. I did not.
Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this
case?
A None, sir.
Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount of
P50,000.00, please tell us, what is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?
A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.
Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your marriage?
A Yes, sir.
Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?
A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.
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Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of
marriage which you filed against her?
A She does not opposed [sic], sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division ofyour conjugal properties?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal properties,so that she will not pursue whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed
against her, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she is no
longer around here?
A Yes sir, it could be.35
Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and
Eduardo.1âwphi1 To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of
conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she wasunwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave
her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her
unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did soalso to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for
nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence in determining the issue of
collusion between the spouses.
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina,
we cannot but resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.36
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision theCourt of Appeals promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.
Costs to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality ofthe evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was
grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.
Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC)
declaring her marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as null and void.
Antecedents
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in
Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while
they were still in college – she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda College taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and their
intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca.They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on
June 24, 1991,2 after which they moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their
parents for support.
When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioner’s best
friend to settle the hospital bills. He remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support
until he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet the
family’s needs, first as a part-time aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-timeemployee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one with the fixed income, she
shouldered all of the family’s expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s educational
needs).
On his part, Dominic sold Collier’s Encyclopedia for three months after his graduation from
college before he started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in1994.3 Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends
inasmuch as she shouldered all the household expenses and their child’s schooling because his
irregular income could not be depended upon. In September 1994, she discovered his illicitrelationship with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between
them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual
relationship.4
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In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he
asked her to issue two blank checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance coverage.
She soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid for the car’s insurance coverage butfor his personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her
to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of
P120,000.00.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with
P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of BatasPambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner and
her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindled many clients
some of whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister themselves.5
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for
"time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house
to live in another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity ofher marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition.
Ruling of the RTC
In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr.
Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during
trial and presented no evidence.
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute
nullity,6 holding in part:
xxx. The result of Dr. Samson’s clinical evaluation as testified to by her and per Psychiatric
Report she issued together with one Dr. Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to bemature, strong and responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her vulnerable
and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also believes that marriage was a partnership "for better
and for worse", she gave all of herself unconditionally to respondent. Unfortunately, respondent
cannot reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent was found to have a personality that can becharacterized as inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His criminal acts in the present time are
mere extensions of his misconduct established in childhood. His childhood experiences of
separations and emotional deprivation largely contributed to this antisocial (sociopathic) attitude
and lifestyle.
She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is required of him as ahusband and father. Besides from his adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent
conduct and lack of true remorse indicate that he is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the
role of a married man.7
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The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence
and incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina),8 were attendant,
establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity, viz:
Gravity — from the evidence adduced it can be said that respondent cannot carry out the normal
and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing underordinary circumstances of life and work. Respondent is totally incapable of observing mutual
love, respect and fidelity as well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the start
of the marriage respondent had left all the household concerns and the care of their child to petitioner while he studied and indulged in night outs with friends. This continued even when he
finished his studies and landed a job. He concealed his salary from the petitioner and worse, had
the gall to engage in sexual infidelity. Likewise worthy of serious consideration is respondent’s
propensity to borrow money, his deceitfulness and habitual and continuous evasion of hisobligations which (sic) more often than not had led to the filing of criminal cases against him.
Antecedence — Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of respondent’s personality
disorder and it was only after marriage that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared thatrespondent’s behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and lack
of remorse are mere extensions of his misconduct in childhood which generally attributable torespondent’s childhood experiences of separation and emotional deprivations. In fine, his
psychological incapacity is but a product of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and influence
of the environment although its over manifestation appear only after the wedding.
Incurability — Respondent’s personality disorder having existed in him long before he
contracted marriage with petitioner, there appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic)
ordinary means from such incapacity.
All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does not possess the proper outlook, disposition and temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimaterecourse of nullity is the only way by which petitioner can be delivered from the bondage of a
union that only proved to be a mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner .9
Ruling of the CA
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominic’s personality
traits either constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of
the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert
witness, while persuasive, was not conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties’ separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters and the criminal cases
brought against Dominic.10
On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the
RTC.11
Specifically, it refused to be bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioner’s expert
witness, holding:
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It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that respondent’s condition, assuming it is
serious enough, was present before or during the celebration of the marriage. Although
petitioner’s expert witness concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated even before the parties’ marriage, the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the fact
that the witness’ findings, admittedly, were concluded only on the basis of information given by
the petitioner herself, who, at the time of the examination, interview, was already head strong inher resolve to have her marriage with the respondent nullified, and harbored ill-feelings againstrespondent throughout her consultation with Dr. Samson.
12
The CA held the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient to establish Dominic’s
psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically
rooted. Relying on the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag,13
Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals14
and Pesca v. Pesca,15
the CA observed:
In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without remorse
for his dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily
constitute a case of psychological incapacity. A person’s inability to share or take responsibility,or to feel remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, are
indicative of an immature mind, but not necessarily a medically rooted psychological afflictionthat cannot be cured.
Even the respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent to psychologicalincapacity, although it may constitute adequate ground for an action for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a criminal suspect for
estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to
petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal separation provided the respondent isconvicted by final judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of more than six (6) years.
16
Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
Issues
Petitioner assails the CA’s refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation
she had presented in the trial of the case, and the CA’s reliance on the pronouncements inDagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the psychiatric evaluation
conducted by Dr. Samson more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v.
Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that
the CA should have applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000,343 SCRA 755) to the effect that personal medical or psychological examination was not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
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We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well
taken and warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards
Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis todoubt the findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic
was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert; and that he
also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptionsand characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.
Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in order
to verify the facts derived from petitioner about Dominic’s psychological profile considering the
ill-feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the only people she
interviewed about Dominic were those whom petitioner herself referred, as the followingtestimony indicated:
Fiscal Zalameda
Q: So you’re saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards the respondent? At the time
you interviewed?
A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.
Q: How about during the subsequent interview?
A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was able to talk regarding her
marital problems which is uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to condition
herself regarding her problems, Sir.
Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?
A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.
Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as the respondent is concerned,
would you say that the petitioner would only tell you information negative against the
respondent?
A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people the facts given to me by the
petitioner, Sir.
Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the name are given to you by the
petitioner, Madame Witness?
A: Yes, Sir .17
In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr.
Samson’s findings. The CA rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such
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expert for being avowedly given to show compliance with the requirements set in Santos and
Molina for the establishment of Dominic’s psychological incapacity.
The CA’s reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is easy to see why.
In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that theroot cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband."18
But here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological
incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before completing her report
but simply relied on other people’s recollection and opinion for that purpose.
In Hernandez, we ruminated that:
xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent’s psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception ofthe marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. TheCourt is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.19
but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed
psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existedat the inception of the marriage.
The Court in Pesca observed that:
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone atthe time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychologicalincapacity.
20
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical
expert’s testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners’ failure to satisfactorily discharge
the burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage.
In other words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of themarriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical andunderstandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highlyadvisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of
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marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examinationof the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by
the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
Petitioner’s view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent spouse therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his psychological incapacity
22 is not entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as
follows:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos
v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that canadequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medicalexamination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine quanon in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical
examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was
enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the
presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychologicalincapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence ofevidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition," as the Court said inMarcos.
But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and expertopinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trial
courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality ofevidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
23
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered
from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not
err in dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
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fees in the amount of P150 defendant took the case directly to this Court attributing five errors to
the court below. This implies that the facts are not disputed.
The important facts which need to be considered in relation to the errors assigned appear well
narrated in the decision of the court below which, for purposes of this appeal, are quoted
hereunder:
On November 19, 1937, plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier had their
marriage solemnized by Judge Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of Manila. At thetime of their marriage, they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier, Junior who
was born on December 2, 1931. Sometime in 1938, defendant Alfredo Javier left for the
United States on board a ship of the United States Navy, for it appears that he had joinedthe United States Navy since 1927, such that at time of his marriage with plaintiff Salud
R. Arca, defendant Alfredo Javier was already an enlisted man in the United States Navy.
Because of defendant Alfredo Javier's departure for the United States in 1938, his wife,
Salud R. Arca, who is from (Maragondon), Cavite, chose to live with defendant's parents
at Naic, Cavite. But for certain incompatibility of character (frictions having occurred between plaintiff Salud R. Arca's and defendant's folks) plaintiff Salud R. Arca had found
it necessary to leave defendant's parents' abode and transfer her residence to(Maragondon), Cavite — her native place Since then the relation between plaintiff Salud
R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier became strained such that on August 13, 1940
defendant Alfredo Javier brought an action for divorce against Salud R. Arca before the
Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, docketed as civil case No.14313 of that court and marked as Exhibit 2(c) in this case. Having received a copy of the
complaint for divorce on September 23, 1940, plaintiff Salud R. Arca — answering the
complaint — alleged in her answer that she received copy of the complaint on September23, 1940 although she was directed to file her answer thereto on or before September 13,
1940. In that answer she filed, plaintiff Salud R. Arca averred among other things that
defendant Alfredo Javier was not a resident of Mobile County, State of Alabama, for the
period of twelve months preceding the institution of the complaint, but that he was aresident of Naic, Cavite, Philippines. Another averment of interest, which is essential to
relate here, is that under paragraph 5 of her answer to the complaint for divorce, Salud R.
Arca alleged that it was not true that the cause of their separation was desertion on her part but that if defendant Alfredo Javier was in the United States at that time and she was
not with him then it was because he was in active duty as an enlisted man of the United
States Navy, as a consequence of which he had to leave for the United States without her.She further alleged that since his departure from the Philippines for the United States, he
had always supported her and her co-plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior through allotments
made by the Navy Department of the United States Government. She denied,
furthermore, the allegation that she had abandoned defendant's home at Naic, Cavite, andtheir separation was due to physical impossibility for they were separated by about
10,000 miles from each other. At this juncture, under the old Civil Code the wife is not
bound to live with her husband if the latter has gone to ultra-marine colonies. Plaintiff
Salud R. Arca, in her answer to the complaint for divorce by defendant Alfredo Javier, prayed that the complaint for divorce be dismissed. However, notwithstanding Salud R.
Arca's averments in her answer, contesting the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Mobile
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County, State of Alabama, to take cognizance of the divorce proceeding filed by
defendant Alfredo Javier, as shown by her answer marked Exhibit 2(d ), nevertheless the
Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered judgment decreeing dissolution of the marriageof Salud R. Arca and Alfredo Javier, and granting the latter a decree of divorce dated
April 9, 1941, a certified copy of which is marked Exhibit 2(f). Thereupon, the evidence
discloses that some time in 1946 defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines butwent back to the United States.
In July, 1941 — that is after securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Arca on April 9,1941 — defendant Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American citizen, and
bought a house and lot at 248 Brooklyn, New York City. In 1949, Thelma Francis,
defendant's American wife, obtained a divorce from him for reasons not disclosed by the
evidence, and, later on, having retired from the United States Navy, defendant AlfredoJavier returned to the Philippines, arriving here on February 13, 1950. After his arrival in
the Philippines, armed with two decrees of divorce — one against his first wife Salud R.
Arca and the other against him by his second wife Thelma Francis — issued by the
Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, defendant Alfredo Javiermarried Maria Odvina before Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the Municipal Court of
Manila on April 19, 1950, marked Exhibit 2(b).
At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an information for bigamy was filed by the City
Fiscal of Manila on July 25, 1950 against defendant Alfredo Javier with the Court of First
Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13310 and marked Exhibit 2(a).However, defendant Alfredo Javier was acquitted of the charge of Bigamy in a decision
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila through Judge Alejandro J. Panlilio,
dated August 10, 1951, predicated on the proposition that the marriage of defendantAlfredo Javier with Maria Odvina was made in all good faith and in the honest belief that
his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca had been legally dissolved by the decree of
divorce obtained by him from the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama,
USA which had the legal effect of dissolving the marital ties between defendant AlfredoJavier and plaintiff Salud R. Arca. At this juncture, again, it is this court's opinion that
defendant Alfredo Javier's acquittal in that Criminal Case No. 13310 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila by Judge Panlilio was due to the fact that the accused had no criminalintent in contracting a second or subsequent marriage while his first marriage was still
subsisting.
Appellant was a native born citizen of the Philippines who, in 1937, married Salud R. Arca,
another Filipino citizen. Before their marriage they had already a child, Alfredo Javier, Jr., who
thereby became legitimated. In 1927 appellant enlisted in the U.S. Navy and in 1938 sailed for
the United States aboard a navy ship in connection with his service leaving behind his wife andchild, and on August 13, 1940, he filed an action for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile
County, Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife. Having received a copy
of the complaint, Salud R. Arca filed an answer alleging, among other things, that appellant wasnot a resident of Mobile County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and that it was not true that the
cause of their separation was abandonment on her part but that appellant was in the United
States, without her, because he was then enlisted in the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit
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Court of Mobile County rendered judgment granting appellant a decree of divorce on April 9,
1941.
The issue now to be determined is: Does this decree have a valid effect in this jurisdiction?
The issue is not new. This court has had already occasion to pass upon questions of similarnature in a number of cases and its ruling has invariably been to deny validity to the decree. In
essence, it was held that one of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is
that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may beacquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins
Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856). Most recent of such cases is Sikat vs. Canson , 67 Phil., 207,
which involves a case of divorce also based on the ground of desertion. In that case, John Cansonclaimed not only that he had legal residence in the State of Nevada, where the action was
brought, but he was an American citizen, although it was proven that his wife never
accompanied him there but has always remained in the Philippines, and so it has been held that
"it is not ... the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but
his legal residence within the State." The court further said: "And assuming that John Cansonacquired legal residence in the State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers,
this would not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status, because the wife was
still domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her person."
It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in
view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as
placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim
of appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show thatthe ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be considered
as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over thecase.
In deciding the Canson case, this court did not overlook the other cases previously decided on
the matter, but precisely took good note of them. Among the cases invoked are Ramirez vs.Gmur , 42 Phil. 855; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales,
58 Phil., 67. In the cases just mentioned, this court laid down the following doctrines:
It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which
neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely
for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonialstatus; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143) The voluntary appearance of the
defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs.
Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.)
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in theState or country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves
the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce,
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and with no intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the courts of the State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is
one not recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile. (14 Cyc. 817, 181.)"(Ramirez vs. Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.)
But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is not
binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of
Manila, and no new domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not having entered an appearance in the case, either personally or by
counsel, did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over her person. (Cousins Hix vs.
Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851.)
At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine
Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose
of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon
the court of the State to dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he had entered in1919. (Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)
In the light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court
of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the simple reason that at the time it was
filed appellant's legal residence was then in the Philippines. He could not have acquired legalresidence or domicile at Mobile County when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that
time he was still in the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he used to stay
during his occasional shore leave for shift duty. That he never intended to live there permanently
is shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New Yorkwhere he bought a house and a lot, and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement
from the U.S. Navy, he returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite,where he lived ever since. It may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile County, notwith the intention of permanently residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent
abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.
It is claimed that the Canson case cannot be invoked as authority or precedent in the present case
for the reason that the Haddeck case which was cited by the court in the course of the decisionwas reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Williams vs. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287. This claim is not quite correct, for the Haddeck case was merely cited as
authority for the statement that a divorce case is not a proceeding in rem, and the reversal did not
necessarily overrule the ruling laid down therein that before a court may acquire jurisdiction overa divorce case, it is necessary that plaintiff be domiciled in the State in which it is filed. (Cousins
Hix vs. Fluemer, supra.) At any rate, the applicability of the ruling in the Canson case may be
justified on another ground: The courts in the Philippines can grant divorce only on the ground of
adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, and if the decree is predicated on another ground, that decree cannot be enforced in this jurisdiction. Said the Court
in the Canson case:
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. . . In Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales (55 Phil., 67), we observed:
. . . While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity offoreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack
of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of
the Civil Code now enforced in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
"The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal
capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreigncountry."
"And Article 11, the last part of which reads
". . . prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended
to promote public order and good morals shall not be rendered without effect by anyforeign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign
country."
"It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the
Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and
under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce."
The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for under section
1 of Act No. 2710. The divorce decree in question was granted on the ground of
desertion, clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws. That our divorce law, Act No.
2710, is too strict or too liberal is not for this court decide. (Barretto Gonzales vs.
Gonzales, supra). The allotment of powers between the different governmental agenciesrestricts the judiciary within the confines of interpretation, not of legislation. The
legislative policy on the matter of divorce in this jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710 and has been upheld by this court (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252;
Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana Tuazon, 40 Phil., 943-952; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855;
Chereau vs. Fuentebella, 43 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs. De Castro, 48 Phil., 123; Gorayeb
vs. Hashim, supra; Francisco vs. Tayao, 50 Phil., 42; Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian NgShun and Lim Tingco, 52 Phil., 571; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, supra; and Barretto
Gonzales vs. Gonzales, supra).
The above pronouncement is sound as it is in keeping with the well known principle of Private
International Law which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or the law affecting the
same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the State of the forum. (Minor, Conflict
of Laws, pp. 8-14). It is also in keeping with our concept or moral values which has alwayslooked upon marriage as an institution. And such concept has actually crystallized in a more
tangible manner when in the new Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided to eliminate
altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of such concept we cannot but react adversely toany attempt to extend here the effect of a decree which is not in consonance with our customs,
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morals, and traditions. (Article 11, old Civil Code; Articles 15 and 17, new Civil Code; Gonzales
vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)
With regard to the plea of appellant that Salud R. Arca had accused him of the crime of bigamy
and consequently she forfeited her right to support, and that her child Alfredo Javier, Jr. is not
also entitled to support because he has already reached his age of majority, we do not need toconsider it here, it appearing that these questions have already been passed upon in G. R. No. L-
6706.1 These questions were resolved against the pretense of appellant.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
ENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAÑO Case Digest
TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAÑO
FACTS: In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escaño secretly married each other and of coursewithout the knowledge of Escaño’s parents who were of prominent social status. The marriagewas celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaño’s parents learned of this, they insisted achurch wedding to be held but Escaño withdrew from having a recelebration because she heardthat Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship wentsour; 2 years later, Escaño went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce andshe subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged thatEscaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged fromhim hence he’s asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did notgrant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of
counter-claim by the Escaños.
ISSUE:Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar. Whether or not the divorce and the second marriage of Escaño were valid. Whether or not sexual infidelity of Escaño may beinvoked by Tenchavez as a ground for
legal separation.
HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez:
His marriage with Escaño was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result topublic humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling themarriage earlier (because Escaño filed for annulment before she left for the US but the samewas dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaño’sparents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claimcannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escaño left without the knowledge ofTenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable toremarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees to bepaid by Escaño and not her parents.
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On the part of Escaño’s parents:
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaños isunfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, thesame could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them,
lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and hasbeen correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of anyimproper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded fromP45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only. The Supreme Court held that the divorce is notvalid, making the second marriage void sincemarriageties of Escaño and Tenchaves is existing.Tenchavez can file a petition for legalseparationbecause Escaño committed sexual infidelity because ofthe fact that she had childrenwith the American.Sexual infidelity of a spouse is one of thegrounds for legal separation.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. Case Digest
Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.139 SCRA 139
Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, thewife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She latermarried Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, BranchLXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business,which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with aright to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss thecomplaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no“community property”.
Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipinawife and American husband held binding upon the latter.
Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can beno question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. Thedecree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, asher husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationalityprinciple under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce inNevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus,pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He wouldhave no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to exercise controlover conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevadacourt from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continueto be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
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PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA174 SCRA 653FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina andtherespondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a German national, weremarried atFriedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After aboutthree and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceedingagainst Pilapil in Germanyin January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action forlegal separation, support andseparation of property before RTC of Manila inJanuary 23, 1983 where it is stillpending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986,the local Court of Germanypromulgated a divorce decree on the ground offailure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child,Isabella PilapilGeiling, was granted to petitioner.On June 27, 1986, private respondent filedtwo complaints for adultery alleging that,while still married to respondent,petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chiaand Jesus Chua sometime
in 1982 and 1983 respectively. The respondent city fiscalapproved a resolutiondirecting the filing of two complaints for adultery againstpetitioner.Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to deferherarraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merelyreset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date,petitioner movedfor the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987,respondent judge deniedthe motion to quash and also directed thearraignment of both accused. Petitionerrefused to be arraigned and thuscharged with direct contempt and fined.ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery charges against
thepetitioner is still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior tothe filingof charges.HELD:The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage
theperson who can legally file the complaint should only be the offendedspouse. Thefact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in hiscountry in 1983, isadmitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, withrelation to the status of Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the legal
separation of the petitionerand respondent has been finalized through thecourts in Germany and the RTC inManila, the marriage of the couple werealready finished, thus giving no merit to thecharges the respondent filedagainst the petitioner. Private respondent, being nolonger married topetitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery case asthe offendedspouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary restrainingorder issuedin this case was made permanent.
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PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et alG.R. No. 80116June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a
German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, suchconnubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling,Pilapil ―had an affair with a certain William Chia.‖ The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution
directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled ―PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia‖ was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judgeIbay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed
this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery,
considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE andanother one entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in
this case … is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a swornwritten complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a
formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to doso at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison
d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to
be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
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Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognizedin the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale,
private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing tocommence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed suit.
Quita case on PDF
LORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS Case Digest
LLORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS345 SCRA 592 (November 23, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo
Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war,Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzobecame an American citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of thePhilippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the
Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzo’s brother Ceferino. InDecember 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate saying that thechild was illegitimate, and the father’s name was left blank.
On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolvingtheir marital union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file acase of adultery against her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951which was granted in 1952.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines;afterwhich, they bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executeda will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and three children. Before the proceedingcould be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985.
On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters ofadministration over Lorenzo’s estate, contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving
spouse.In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating that Lorenzo’s divorce decree was
void and inapplicable in the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void.The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the
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estate – the two-thirds would be divided equally among the illegitimate children. Paulawas appointed as legal administratix of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo
Llorente.
HELD: Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are
governed by foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the fore ther en voi doctrine, wherethe case was referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, thePhilippine law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine lawapplies when determinging the validity of Lorenzo’s will.
The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of thewill ofthe deceased.
Llorente vs CA
On November 5, 2010
345 scra 592
Nationality Principle
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of
war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzowas naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and
visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous
relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente;they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters
administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decisionwas modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence,
this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are
entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce
abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held thatdivorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
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The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo’s will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
The deceased is not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity” since he was a foreigner.
Garcia-Recio vs. RecioTI TLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederi ck A. Recio CITATI ON: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australianfamily court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and
Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still inAustralia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy onMarch 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with
Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though
the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public orofficial record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record isnot kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
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(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to
receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
Garcia vs Recio
On November 5, 2010
366 scra 437
Foreign Law – Divorce
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1,
1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the AustralianFamily Court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Subsequently,respondent entered into marriage with petitioner a Filipina on January 12, 1994. Starting October
22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriageon the ground of bigamy. Responded contended that his prior marriage had been validly
dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between petitioner andrespondent dissolved and both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated
him to remarry.
HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records,the court cannot conclude that respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare
her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under
Australian law he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the divorce decree. TheSC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil
Code.
Republic vs. Orbecido Case Digest
Republic vs. Orbecido472 SCRA 114
Facts:
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On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were marriedin Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, LadyMyros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she wasnaturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living
with his wife in the States – that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorcedecree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invokingpar. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboangadel Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that,petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional TrialCourt. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to theinstant case.
Issue:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).
Ruling: Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instantcase is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were twoFilipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen andsubsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed sheremarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of
Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtainedabroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, therewas still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fatewould have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorcecapacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipinospouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization heis still barred from remarrying. Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidenceshowing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorcedecree and had remarried. GERBERT CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN STO. TOMASG.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadiancitizenship through naturalization on Nov. 2000. On, Jan. 18 2005, he married a Filipinanamed Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert
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left for Canada soon after their wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise her wife but was shocked to discover that Daisylyn was having anaffair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and fileda petition for divorce and was granted.
Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to marry his newFilipina fiancée, Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered theCanadian divorce decree on their marriage certificate. Despite its registration, an NSOofficial informed Gerbert that their marriage still exists under Philippine Law; and to beenforceable, the foreign divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a Philippinecourt.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration ofmarriage as dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested forthe same prayer.
RTC denied Gerbert’s petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos andnot to aliens. Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made.
HELD: Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that“no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order.” TheRules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for aspecial remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judiciallycancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictionaland procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizingthe cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.
Civil Law:
Bigamy; Legal
Standing
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[G. R. No.
169766, March 30
: 2011]
ESTRELLITA
JULIAJVO-LLAVE,
PETITIONER,VS. REPUBLIC
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OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
HAJA
PUTRIZORAYDA A. TAMANO
AND ADIBAHMAD A.
TAMANO,RESPONDENTS.
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Facts:
Around 11
months before his
death, Sen.Tamano married
Estrellita twice -initially under the
Islamiclaws andtradition on May
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27, 1993 in
Cotabato City and,
subsequently,
under a civilceremony
officiated byanRTC Judge at
Malabang, Lanaodel Sur on June 2,
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1993. In their
marriage contracts,
Sen. Tamano's
civilstatusw a s
i n d i c at e d a s
' d i v o r c e d . ' Sinc
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e then, Estrellita
has been
representing
herself to thewhole world as
Sen. Tamano'swife, and uponhis
death, hiswidow.On
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November 23,
1994, private
respondents Haja
Putri Zorayda A.Tamano (Zorayda)
and her sonAdibAhmad A.
Tamano (Adib),in their own
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behalf and in
behalf of the rest
of Sen. Tamano's
legitimatechildrenwith
Zorayda, filed acomplaint with the
RTC of QuezonCity for the
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declaration of
nullity of marriage
between
Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being
bigamous. Thecomplaint alleged,
inter alia
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he
marriedEstrellita
in 1993.Summons
was then served onEstrellita. She then
asked from thecourt for an
extension of 30days to fileher
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answer, and again,
another 15 days,
both of which the
courtgranted. Instead of
submitting heranswer, however,
Estrellita filed aMotion to Dismiss
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where she declared
thatSen. Tamano
and Zorayda are
both Muslims whowere married
under the Muslimrites, as had been
averred in
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the latter's
disbarment
complaint against
Sen. Tamano.Estrellita argued
that the RTC hasno jurisdiction to
takecognizance ofthe case because
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under Presidential
Decree (PD) No.
1083, or the Code
of MuslimPersonal Lawsof
the Philippines(Muslim Code),
questions andissues involving
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jurisdiction over
the case for
declaration
of nullity. Thus,Estrellita filed a
certiorari
petition with the
SC questioning thedenial of her
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Motion to
Dismiss.The SC
referred the
petition to theCA. During the
pendency of the petition before the
CA, the RTCcontinued to try
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the case since
there can beno
default in cases of
declaration ofnullity of marriage
even if therespondent failed
to file an answer.Estrellitawas
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allowed to
participate in the
trial while her
opposing parties presented their
evidence. When itwas
Estrellita's turn toadduce evidence,
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the hearings set
for such purpose
were postponed
mostly at herinstanceuntil the
trial court,suspended the
proceedings inview of the CA's
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temporary
restraining order
enjoining it
fromhearing thecase.Eventually,
however, the CAresolved the
petition adverse toEstrellita. She then
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elevated the
appellatecourt's
j u d g m e n t t o
t h e C o u r t b yw a y o f a
p e t i t i o n f o rr e v i e w o n
certiorari.
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Unhappy with the
delays in the
resolution of their
case, Zorayda andAdib moved to
submit the casefor decision,
reasoning thatEstrellita had long
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been delaying the
case. Estrellita
opposed, on the
ground that shehasnot yet filed
her answer as shestill awaits the
outcome of GR. No. 126603.
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RTC rendered
judgment
declaring
Estrellita'smarriage with
Sen. Tamano asvoid
ab initio
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.The CA upheld
the RTC’s
decision.
Issue:Whether or not
Zorayda and Adibhave the legal
standing to haveEstrellita's
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marriage declared
voidabinitio.
Ruling:Yes.Her marriage
covered by theFamily Code of
the Philippines,"Estrellita relies
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on A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SCwhich
took effect on
March 15, 2003claiming that
under Section 2(a)thereof, only the
husband or thewife, tothe
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exclusion of
others, may file a
petition for
declaration ofabsolute nullity,
therefore only sheand Sen.Tamano
may directly attackthe validity of
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their own
marriage.Estrellita
claims that only
the husband or thewife in a void
marriage can file a petition for
declarationof nullity of
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marriage.
However, this
interpretation does
not apply if thereason behind the
petition is bigamy.In the
Rationale of theRules on
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Annulment of
Voidable
Marriages and
Declaration ofAbsolute
Nullityo f V o i dM a r r i a g e s ,
L e g a lS e p a r a t i o n
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a n d
P r o v i s i o n a l
O r d e r s ,
only an aggrieved
or injured spouse
may file a petitionfor annulment of
voidablemarriages or
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declaration
of absolute nullity
of void marriages.
Such petitioncannot be filed by
compulsory orintestate heirs of
the spousesor bythe State. The
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Committee is of
the belief that
they do not have
a legal right tofile the petition.
Compulsory orintestate heirs
have onlyinchoate rights
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prior to the death
of their
predecessor, and
hence canonlyquestion the
validity of themarriage of the
spouses upon thedeath of a spouse
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in a proceeding
for thesettlement
of the estate of the
deceased spousefiled in the regular
courts. On theother hand, the
concern of the
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refers to the
"aggrieved or
injured spouse." If
Estrellita's
interpretation is
employed, the prior spouse is
unjustly precludedfrom filing
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ana c t i o n .
S u r e l y ,
t h i s i s n o t
w h a t t h eR u l e
c o n t e m p l a te d . The
subsequent spousemay only be
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expected to take
action if he or she
had only
discovered duringtheconnubial
period that themarriage was
bigamous, andespecially if the
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conjugal bliss had
already
vanished.Should
parties in asubsequent
marriage benefitfrom the bigamous
marriage, it would
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not be expected
that they
would file an
action to declare
the marriage void
and thus, in suchcircumstance, the
"injured spouse"whoshould be
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given a legal
remedy is the one
in a subsisting
previous marriage.The latter is
clearly theaggrieved party as
the bigamousmarriage not only
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threatens the
financial and the
property
ownership aspectof the prior
marriage but mostof all, it causes an
emotional burdento the prior
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which sanctity
is protected by the
Constitution.Indee
d, Section 2(a) ofA.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC precludesthe son from
impugning thesubsequentmarria
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ge. But in the case
at bar, both
Zorayda and Adib
have legal personalities to
file an action fornullity.Albeit the
Supreme CourtResolution
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governs marriages
celebrated under
the Family Code,
such is prospectivein
application anddoes not apply to
cases already
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commenced before
March 15, 2003.
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Zorayda and Adibfiled the case for
declaration of
nullity of
Estrellita's
marriage in November
1994.While theFamily Code is
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silent with respect
to the proper party
who can file a
petition fordeclaration
of nullity ofmarriage prior to
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has
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been held that in
a void marriage,
in which
nomarriage hastaken place and
cannot be thesource of rights,
any interested party may attack
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the
marriagedirectly
or collaterally
without prescription,
which may befiled even beyond
the lifetime of the parties to
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themarriage.
Since A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC does
not apply, Adib,as one of the
children of thedeceased who
has property rightsas an heir, is
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judgment in the
suit.Since the
Philippine laws
protect the maritalunion of a couple,
they should beinterpreted in a
way thatwould preserve
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their respective
rights which
include striking
down bigamousmarriages.