cases on public land act

5/23/2018 Cases on Public Land Act

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G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,vs.INTEREDIATE A!!ELLATE CO"RT #$% ACE !L&'OOD ( )ENEER CO. INC.,ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NAR)ASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate AppellateCourt affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, hich ordered registration in favor of

Acme !lyood " #eneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring $%&, '() s*uare meters, more orless, ac*uired by it from +ariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings ere for confirmation of title under ection $% of Commonealth Act -o.&$& The !ublic Land Act/. as amended0 and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trialcourt in said proceedings in this ise0

&. That Acme !lyood " #eneer Co. Inc., represented by +r. 1odolfo -a2ario is a corporationduly organi2ed in accordance ith the las of the 1epublic of the !hilippines and registered iththe ecurities and 34change Commission on December 5', &(6(7

5. That Acme !lyood " #eneer Co. Inc., represented by +r. 1odolfo -a2ario can ac*uire realproperties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provisionof its secondary purposes paragraph (/, 34hibit 8+9l8/7

'. That the land subject of the Land 1egistration proceeding as ancestrally ac*uired by Acme!lyood " #eneer Co., Inc., on :ctober 5(, &(;5, from +ariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, bothmembers of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities7

$. That the constitution of the 1epublic of the !hilippines of &('6 is applicable as the sale tooecause it is still public

land and the +eralco, as a juridical person, is dis*ualified to apply for its registration undersection $%b/, +eralco8s application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition ma


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That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because e4pressed in more categorical language,in Susi"

.... In favor of #alentin usi, there is, moreover, the presumption!uris et de !ure established inparagraph b/ of section $6 of Act -o. 5%=$, amending Act -o. (5;, that all the necessaryre*uirements for a grant by the ?overnment ere complied ith, for he has been in actual and

physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of thepublic domain openly, continuously, e4clusively and publicly since @uly 5;, &(%$, ith a right to acertificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter #III of said Act. o that hen

Angela 1a2on applied for the grant in her favor, #alentin usi #ad already ac$uired, %y operationof law not only a rit to a &rant, %ut a &rant of t#e 'overnment, for it is not necessary t#at acertificate of title s#ould %e issued in order t#at said &rant may %e sanctioned %y t#e courts, anapplication t#erefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section $= of Act -o. 5%=$. If by a legalfiction, #alentin usi had ac*uired the land in *uestion by a grant of the tate, it #ad alreadyceased to %e of t#e pu%lic domain and #ad %ecome private property, at least %y presumption, of#alentin usi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Conse*uently, in selling the land in*uestion of Angela 1a2on, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over hich he had no longerany title or control, and the sale thus made as void and of no effect, and Angela 1a2on did notthereby ac*uire any right. 6

ucceeding cases, of hich only some need be mentioned, li


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onership actually gained ould be lost. The effect of the proof, herever made, as not to confer title,but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier la.G

If it is accepted9as it must be9that the land as already private land to hich the Infiels had a legallysufficient and transferable title on :ctober 5(, &(;5 hen Acme ac*uired it from said oners, it must alsobe conceded that Acme had a perfect right to mainan Development Co., Inc. because it had already ac*uired a vested right to theland applied for at the time the &(=' Constitution too< effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the ne Constitution. ection5, Article III of the &('6 Constitution allos private corporations to purchase public agriculturallands not e4ceeding one thousand and tenty9four hectares. !etitioner8 prohibition action isbarred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional la.

444 444 444

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 8A state may not impair vestedrights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subse*uent repeal of a municipalordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the tate, e4cept in a legitimate e4ercise of thepolice poer8&; C.@.. &&==9=%/.

444 444 444

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the &(=' Constitution the rightof the corporation to purchase the land in *uestion had become fi4ed and established and as nolonger open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance ith the re*uirements of the !ublic Land La for the issuance of a patent had the

effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation8s right to obtain apatent for the land is protected by la. It cannot be deprived of that right ithout due processDirector of Lands vs. CA, &5' !hil. (&(/.re//an0123w4 1+

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings ere instituted by Acme in its on name must beregarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than proceduraland in noise affecting the substance and merits of the right of onership sought to be confirmed in saidproceedings, there being no doubt of Acme8s entitlement to the land. As it is un*uestionable that in thelight of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the &('6 or the &(=' Constitution, could have hadtitle in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the la ould deny


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the same benefit to their laful successor9in9interest by valid conveyance hich violates no constitutionalmandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the vie, and so holds, that the majority rulingin Meralcomust be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, asenunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,

personally or through his predecessors9in9interest, openly, continuously and e4clusively for the prescribedstatutory period ') years under The !ublic Land Act, as amended/ is converted to private property by themere lapse or completion of said period, ipso !ure. Folloing that rule and on the basis of the undisputedfacts, the land subject of this appeal as already private property at the time it as ac*uired from theInfiels by Acme. Acme thereby ac*uired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition againstsaid corporation8s holding or oning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not*ualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section $%b/ of the !ublic Land Act is technical,rather than substantial and, again, finds its anser in the dissent in Meralco0

;. To uphold respondent judge8s denial of +eralco8s application on the technicality that the !ublicLand Act allos only citi2ens of the !hilippines ho are natural persons to apply for confirmationof their title ould be impractical and ould just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assumingthat there as a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the

!iguing spouses as the original oners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is noprohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant +eralco and neither is there anyprohibition against the application being refiled ith retroactive effect in the name of the originaloners and vendors as such natural persons/ ith the end result of their application beinggranted, because of their indisputable ac*uisition of onership by operation of la and theconclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go throughall the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to theovercroded court docut this ould be merely indulging in empty charades, hereas thesame result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, ith no prejudice to anyone, by a liberalapplication of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

hile this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, itbrea


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: :1D313D.

5eria, 6ap, 5ernan, *lampay, Cru), 7aras and 5eliciano, 88., concur.

Se#r#-e O$o$/

G"TIERRE, R., J., concurring0

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANEE, C.J., concurring0

I am honored by my brethren8s judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the @une,&(%5 Meralcoand 9&lesia ni Cristocases, 1hich is herein upheld, Ge4pressed hat is the better. . . . andindeed the correct vie.G +y dissent as anchored on the landmar< &()( case of Carino2through the&(56 case of Susi 3and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest &(%) case of erico *that Git isestablished doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the publicdomain for the period provided in the !ublic Land Act provision in force at the time from @uly 5;, &%($

in Susi under the old la Hthis period as reduced to 8at least thirty years immediately preceding the filingof the application for confirmation of title8 by amendment of Commonealth Act -o. &$&, e*uivalent to theperiod of ac*uisitive prescription + / by a private individual personally and through his predecessorsconfers an effective title on said possessor, hereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain andbecomes private property.G I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity8s saut since e arereverting to the old above9cited established doctrine and precedents and discardingthe Meralcoand 9&lesia ni Cristocases hich departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained torite this concurrence in amplification of my vies and ratio decidendi.

Jnder the e4press te4t and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors Gshall be conclusively presumedtohave performed all the conditions essential to a ?overnment grant and shall be entitled to a certificate oftitle under the provisions of this chapter. G

The Court thus held in usi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightfulpossessor of the public land for the statutory period Galready ac$uired, %y operation of law, not only aritto a grant, but a &rant of t#e 'overnment, for it is not necessarythat certificate of title should beissued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an applicationtherefore issufficient . . . .9f %y a le&al fiction, #alentin usi had ac$uiredthe land in *uestion %y a &rant of t#e State,it #ad already ceased to %e of t#e pu%lic domainand had %ecome private property, at least bypresumption, of #alentin usi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands Hand beyond his authority to sellto any other person. G 6

The root of the doctrine goes bac< to the pronouncement of @ustice :liver endell olmes for the J..upreme Court in the &()( case of Carinothe Igorot chief ho ould have been deprived of ancestralfamily lands by the dismissal of his application for registration/ hich reversed the dismissal of theregistration court as affirmed by the upreme Court/ and adopted the liberal vie that under the decree

and regulations of @une 56, &%%), GThe ords 8may prove8 acrediten/, as ell, or better, in vie of theother provisions, might be ta


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la ithout the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso !ureceases to be of thepublic domain and becomes private property, hich may be lafully sold to and ac*uired by *ualifiedcorporations such as respondent corporation. As stressed in erico supra, Gthe application forconfirmation is a mere formality,the lac< of hich does not affect the le&al sufficiency of t#e title.G/

uch ipso !ureconversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a %ona fideclaim of

ac*uisition or onership is the public policy of the Act and is so e4pressly stated therein. >y virtue of suchconversion into private property, *ualified corporations may lafully ac*uire them and there is noGalteration or defeatingG of the &(=' Constitution8s prohibition against corporations holding or ac*uiringtitle to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that nopublic lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on :ctober &;, &(;5under the aegis of the &('6 Constitution hich contained no prohibition against corporations holdingpublic lands e4cept a limit of &,)5$ hectares/ unli


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are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they ere ac*uiredby the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of ac*uisitive prescription by thepredecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, theconstitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the publicdomain is inapplicable. G 10

To my mind, the reason hy the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citi2ens ho may provetheir undisputed and open possession of public lands for the re*uired statutory thirty9year period, tac


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It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory la and constitutional provision prevent a corporation fromdirectly applying to the Courts for the issuance of :riginal Certificates of Title to lands of the publicdomain +anila 3lectric Company vs. Castro9>artolome, &&$ C1A =((7 1epublic vs. #illanueva, &&$C1A %=67 1epublic vs. Court of Appeals, &&( C1A $$(7 Iglesia ni Cristo vs. on. @udge, CFI of -ueva3cija, >r. &/. It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follos0

a/ The I-FI3L can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in thecase.

b/ After the I-FI3L secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to AC+3.

c/ As AC+3 can eventually on the certificate of title, it should be alloed to directly apply to the Courtsfor the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous GliteralG re*uirement that the I-FI3L should firstapply to the courts for the titles, and afterards transfer the title to AC+3.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the folloing e4cerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Companyvs. Castro-Bartolome&&$ C1A =((, %5' H&(%5/.

To uphold respondent judge8s denial of +eralco8s application on the technicality that the !ublicLand Act allos only citi2ens of the !hilippines ho are natural persons to apply for confirmationof their title ould be impractical and ould just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assumingthat there as a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name ofthe !iguing spouses as the original oners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no pro#i%itionagainst their sale of the land to the applicant+eralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled ith retroactive effect inthe name of the original oners and vendors as such natural persons/ ith the end result of their

application being granted, because of their indisputable ac*uisition of onership by operation ofla and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applicationsin their names and adding to the overcroded court doc


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statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherise e4pressed, nullified, destroyed,emasculated, repealed, e4plained aay, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, ornugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of to constructions, one of hich ill give effect to theact, hile the other ill defeat it, the former construction is preferred. :ne part of a statute maynot be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. +oreover, notithstandingthe general rule against the enlargement of e4tension of a statute by construction, the meaning of

a statute may be e4tended beyond the precise ords used in the la, and ords or phrases maybe altered or supplied, here this is necessary to prevent a la from becoming a nullity.herever the provision of a statute is general everything hich is necessary to ma


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The root of the doctrine goes bac< to the pronouncement of @ustice :liver endell olmes for the J..upreme Court in the &()( case of Carinothe Igorot chief ho ould have been deprived of ancestralfamily lands by the dismissal of his application for registration/ hich reversed the dismissal of theregistration court as affirmed by the upreme Court/ and adopted the liberal vie that under the decreeand regulations of @une 56, &%%), GThe ords 8may prove8 acrediten/, as ell, or better, in vie of theother provisions, might be ta


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ho as natural persons are duly *ualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they hadac*uired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the !ublic Land Act and ho thereafter duly sold tothe herein corporations both admittedly Filipino corporations duly *ualified to hold and on private lands/and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so ac*uired and sold ore4changed.G 8Indeed, then Chief @ustice 3nri*ue +. Fernando li


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b/ Those ho by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,continuous, e4clusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the publicdomain, under a bona fide claim of ac*uisition of onership, for at least thirty years immediatelypreceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title e4cept hen prevented by ar orforce majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditionsessential to a ?overnment grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions

of this chapter.

c/ ...

Article I#, ection &&, of the &(=' Constitution, in part, provides0

3C. &&. .... -o private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domaine4cept by lease not to e4ceed one thousand hectares in area7 nor may any citi2en hold suchlands by lease in e4cess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory la and constitutional provision prevent a corporation fromdirectly applying to the Courts for the issuance of :riginal Certificates of Title to lands of the publicdomain +anila 3lectric Company vs. Castro9>artolome, &&$ C1A =((7 1epublic vs. #illanueva, &&$

C1A %=67 1epublic vs. Court of Appeals, &&( C1A $$(7 Iglesia ni Cristo vs. on. @udge, CFI of -ueva3cija, >r. &/. It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follos0

a/ The I-FI3L can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in thecase.

b/ After the I-FI3L secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to AC+3.

c/ As AC+3 can eventually on the certificate of title, it should be alloed to directly apply to the Courtsfor the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous GliteralG re*uirement that the I-FI3L should first

apply to the courts for the titles, and afterards transfer the title to AC+3.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the folloing e4cerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Companyvs. Castro-Bartolome &&$ C1A =((, %5' H&(%5/.

To uphold respondent judge8s denial of +eralco8s application on the technicality that the !ublicLand Act allos only citi2ens of the !hilippines ho are natural persons to apply for confirmationof their title ould be impractical and ould just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assumingthat there as a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name ofthe !iguing spouses as the original oners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no pro#i%itionagainst their sale of the land to the applicant+eralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled ith retroactive effect inthe name of the original oners and vendors as such natural persons/ ith the end result of theirapplication being granted, because of their indisputable ac*uisition of onership by operation ofla and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applicationsin their names and adding to the overcroded court doc


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The effect is that the majority opinion no nullifiesthe statutory provision that only citi2ens naturalpersons/ can apply for certificates of title under ection $%b/ of the !ublic Land Act, as ell as theconstitutional provision Article I#, ection &&/ hich prohibits corporations from ac*uiring title to landsof the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. GAconstruction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislatureG-e Kor< tate Dept. of ocial ervices v. Dublino HJT '= L. 3d 5d ;%%, (' Ct 56)=7 Jnited tates v.

Alpers ''% J ;%), ($ L 3d $6=, =) Ct '657 cited in =' Am @ur. 5nd., p. '6&/.

It has also been said that0

In the construction of statutes, the courts start ith the assumption that the legislature intended toenact an effective la, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in theenactment of a statute. ence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonablypossible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficientoperation and effect as a hole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under hich thestatute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherise e4pressed, nullified, destroyed,emasculated, repealed, e4plained aay, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, ornugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of to constructions, one of hich ill give effect to theact, hile the other ill defeat it, the former construction is preferred. :ne part of a statute may

not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. +oreover, notithstandingthe general rule against the enlargement of e4tension of a statute by construction, the meaning ofa statute may be e4tended beyond the precise ords used in the la, and ords or phrases maybe altered or supplied, here this is necessary to prevent a la from becoming a nullity.herever the provision of a statute is general everything hich is necessary to ma


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G.R. No. L*9623 4$e 29, 1982ANILA ELECTRIC CO!AN&, petitioner9appellant,vs."DGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO5ARTOLOE o -e Co4r- o Fr/- I$/-#$ce o R#, #:#-5r#$c ;), #$% RE!"5LIC OF THE !HILI!!INES,

respondent9appellees.

A


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In contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the concept of oner by :limpia 1amosand the !iguing spouses for more than thirty years, had become private landin the hands of the latter,and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from ac*uiring alienable publicland, is not applicable to the said land.

The +eralco further contends that it has invo


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This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in :h Cho vs. Director of Lands, =6 !hil. %(), %(5,hich rule is a compendious or *uintessential precis of a pervasive principle of public land la and landregistration la, that;all lands t#at were not ac$uired from t#e 'overnment, eit#er %y purc#ase or %y&rant, %elon& to t#e pu%lic domain. An e4ception to the rule ould be any land that should have been inthe possession of an occupant and of his predecessors9in9interest since time immemorial, for suchpossession ould justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it

had been a private property even before the panish con*uest.G CariNo vs. Insular ?overnment, 5&5 J.. $$(, 6' L. ed. 6($, $& !hil. ('6 and = !hil. &'5/.

The +eralco relies on the ruling in usi vs. 1a2on and Director of Lands, $% !hil. $5$, that Gan open,continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain from time immemorial by aprivate individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor,hereby the land ceases to be publicG and becomes private property.

That ruling is based on the Cari


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The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of hich they had beenin possession at least since @uly 5;, &%($. This the applicant8s immediate predecessors9in9interest meaning the !iguing spouses in the instant case/ failed to do.

+#ey did not #ave any vested rit in t#e lot amountin& to title w#ic# was transmissi%le tot#e applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot hich,

tac


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DE CASTRO, J., dissenting0

@ustice Teehan


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This separate opinion should have had no need to be ritten because the majority opinion ritten by@ustice A*uino is already ell9reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I as impelled torite it only because in the dissenting opinion of @ustice Teehan purposes since 2?@A and realty ta4es ere regularly paid thereon. It isresidential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land. It is li


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corporation and not a natural person, is not *ualified to apply for the registration of title over the publicland.

:n the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the 1epublic presented no evidence in support of its opposition bute4pressly Gsubmitted the case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant.G1espondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for registration of the land in the name

of the Iglesia, holding that it had been Gsatisfactorily established that applicant Iglesia and itspredecessors9in9interest have been in open, continuous, public and adverse possession of the land . . .under a bona fide claim of onership for more than thirty ')/ years prior to the filing of the applicationGand is therefore entitled to the registration applied for under the !ublic Land Act, as amended.

>oth decisions are no ith the Court for revie. I hold that both applications for registration should begranted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the &(56 case of Susi vs. :a)on andDirector of Lands1and reaffirmed in a long line of cases don to the &(%) case of erico vs. Dar2thatthe lands in *uestion ceased, ipso !ure, or by operation of la, to be lands of the public domain uponcompletion of the statutory period of open, continuous, e4clusive, notorious and unchallenged possessionthereof by the applicants8 predecessors9in9interest ho ere *ualified natural persons and entitled toregistration by right of ac*uisitive prescription under the provisions of the !ublic Land Act, and thataccordingly the judgment in the +eralco case should be reversed and a ne judgment entered granting

+eralco8s application, hile the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed.

The principal issue at bar may thus be stated0

It is e4pressly provided in section $%, par. b/ of the !ublic Land Act Commonealth Act -o. &$&, asamended by 1ep. Act -o. &($5, approved on @une 55, &(6=/ that citi2ens of the !hilippines ho arenatural persons ho have occupied lands of the public domain but hose titles have not been perfectedor completed may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims and theissuance of the certificate of title therefor under the Land 1egistration Act in cases here they Gbythemselves or t#rou t#eir predecessors-in-interesthave been in the open, continuous, e4clusive, andnotorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim ofac*uisition of onership, for at least t#irty years immediately precedin& t#e filin& of t#e application forconfirmation of title e4cept hen prevented by ar or force ma!eure. These shall be conclusively

presumedto have performed all the conditions essential to a ?overnment grant and shall be entitled to acertificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.G3In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operationof la converted into private land upon completion of the ')th year of continuous and unchallengedoccupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and onedby private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent judge in the +eralco case, remain partof the public domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial confirmation proceedingsand the formal court order for the issuance of the certificate of titleO

&. This issue has been s*uarely resolved by this Court since the &(56 case of Susi vs. :a)onand a longline of cases, infra/. It is established doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse andpublic possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the !ublic Land Act provision inforce at the time from @uly 5;, &%($ in usi under the old la/ by a private individual personally andthrough his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, hereby the land ceases to be land

of the public domain and becomes private property.

At that time in &(56 in the Susicase, such possession as re*uired ;from 8uly , 2?@;as thenprovided for in section $6b/ of the old !ublic Land Act -o. 5%=$, amending Act -o. (5;7 hereas at

present, as provided for in the corresponding section $%, par.b/ of the later and subsisting !ublic LandAct, Commonealth Act -o. &$&, as amended by 1ep. Act -o. &($5 approved on 8une , 2?A, in forcesince &(6=, the period of open and unchallenged possession as reduced to Gat least t#irty yearsimmediately precedin& t#e filin& of t#e application for confirmation of title, e$uivalent to t#e period ofac$uisitive prescription. This is admitted in the main opinion of +r. @ustice A*uino, herein it is stated thatGI/n the Susicase, this Court applied section $6 b/ of Act -o. 5%=$ hich corresponds to hat is now


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section @F%G. It as held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of onership since@uly 5;, &%($ gave rise to the conclusive presumptionthat the occupant had complied wit# all t#econditions essentialto a ?overnment grant and as thus entitled to a certificate of title.G *The te4t of thecorresponding section $%b/, as amended by 1ep. Act &($5 referred to is reproduced ver%atimin +r.@ustice A*uino8s opinion+and *uotes the reduced statutory period of open and unchallenged possessionof Gat leastt#irty yearsimmediately preceding the filing of the application.G/

Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period,ac*uired the same %y operationof la as a grant from t#e 'overnment, ;not only a rit to a &rant,G andthe land thereby Galready ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at least bypresumptionG as e4pressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of Lands ofthe same land to another person as void and of no effect and Susias the rightful possessor couldrecover the land as hisprivate propertyfrom the supposed vendee ho did not ac*uire any right theretosince it had ceased to be land of the public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied tothe specific facts of the case, that0

. . . In favor of #alentin usi, there is, moreover, the presumption!uris et de !ure, established in paragraphb/ of section $6 of Act -o. 5%=$, amending Act -o. (5;, that all t#e necessary re$uirements for a &rant%y t#e 'overnment were complied wit#for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and

through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain, openly continuously, e4clusivelyand publicly since @uly 5;, &%($, ith a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions ofChapter #III of said Act. o that hen Angela 1a2on applied for the grant in her favor, #alentin usihad already ac$uired, %y operation of law, not only a rit to a &rant, %ut a &rant of t#e 'overnment, for itis not necessary t#at certificate of title s#ould %e issued in order t#at said &rant may %e sanctioned %y t#ecourts, an application t#erefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section $= of Act -o. 5%=$. 9f %y ale&al function, #alentin usi had ac*uired the land in *uestion by a grant of the tate, it #ad alreadyceased to %e of t#e pu%lic domain and #ad %ecome private property, at least %y presumption , of #alentinusi, %eyond t#e control of t#e Director of Lands. Conse*uently, in selling the land in *uestion to Angela1a2on, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over hich he had no longer any title or control, and thesa


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The Director of Lands contends that the land in *uestion being of the public domain, theplaintiff9appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.

If, as above stated, that land, the possession of hich is in dispute, had alreadybecome, operation of law, private property, there is lacin& only t#e !udicial sanction of#is title, #alentin usi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof

and hold it.

In Mi&uel vs. Court of *ppeals, 10 the Court again held that here possession has been continuous,uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an oner, there is a presumption!uris et de !urethatall necessary conditions for a grant by the tate have been complied ith and he ould have been %yforce of lawentitled to the registration of his title to the land citing 7amintuan vs. 9nsular 'overnment, %!hil. $%6 and usi vs. 1a2on, $% !hil. $5$/.

In the latest &(%) case of erico vs. Dar, 11the Court once more reiterated the usi doctrine thatGA/nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the issuance of theTorrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared and void, and has become absoluteand indefeasible. . . . econdly, under the provisions of 1epublic Act -o. &($5, hich the respondentcourt held to be inapplicable to the petitioner8s case, wit# t#e latterHs proven occupation and cultivation for

more t#an IJ years since 2?2@, %y #imself and %y #is predecessors-in-interest, title over the landhasvested on petitioneras to se&re&ate t#e land from t#e mass of pu%lic land. Thereafter, it is no longerdisposable under the !ublic Land Act as by free patent. This is as provided in 1epublic Act -o. &($5,hich too< effect on @une 55, &(6=, amending ection $%9b of Commonealth Act -o. &$& hichprovides0 . . . As interpreted in several cases hen the conditions as specified in the foregoing provisionare complied ith, thepossessoris deemed to have ac$uired, %y operation of law, a rit to a &rant, a&overnment &rant, wit#out t#e necessity of a certificate of title %ein& issued. +#e land, t#erefore, ceasesto %e of t#e pu%lic domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. +#eapplication for confirmation is a mere formality, t#e lac of w#ic# does not affect t#e le&al sufficiency oft#e titleas ould be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of saidpatent.G

'. In fine, since under the Court8s settled doctrine, the ac$uisitive prescriptionof alienable or disposable

public lands provided for no in section $%, par. b/ of the !ublic Land Act ta


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It is true that the language of Articles $ and 6 attributes title to those 8ho may prove8possession for the necessary time and e do not overloo< the argument that this meansmay prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an 3nglish conveyancer ould haverecommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it as notcalculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient familypossessions ere in danger, if he had read every ord of it. The ords;may

prove;acrediten/, as ell, or better, in vie of the other provisions, might be taen tomean w#en called upon to do so in any liti&ation . There are indications that registrationas e4pected from all, %ut none sufficient to s#ow t#at, for want of it, owners#ip actually&ained would %e lost. +#e effect of t#e proof, henever made, as not to confer title,but simply to esta%lis# it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier la.

To the same effect is the Court8s ruling in Le&arda and 7rieto vs. Salee%y, '& !hil. 6(), that Gan onerdoes not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he hasa fee simple title.G

6. ince the public land because private property upon completion of the ')th year of continuous,e4clusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant +eralco8s predecessors9in9interest, particularlythe !iguing spouses ho sold the private land to the +eralco, there is no justification for denying the

+eralco8s application for registration of its duly ac*uired title to the land. +eralco8s predecessors9in9interest had ac*uired onership of the land by ac*uisitive prescription as provided by the !ublic Land Actand by the Civil Code. The land became private property and +eralco duly ac*uired it by right ofpurchase. To deny +eralco8s application to register the property because it is not a natural person isunjustified because neither the ne constitutional ban under the &(=' Constitution against privatecorporations oning lands of the public domain or the !ublic Land Act8s limitation on the right ofapplication for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invo


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=. All that has been said here applies of course ith e*ual force to the Iglesia case, save that as alreadystated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application as granted because the 1epublic presented noevidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect that the property had ceased tobe land of the public domain and had become private property, the title to hich could be duly issued inthe name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors9in9interest.

%. It should bear emphasis that hat are involved here are small parcels of land, of &;6 s*uare meters inthe +eralco case used for installation of an Ganchor guyG for its steel posts in connection ith its tasercise, if e consider theprovision of Section 2@, *rticle K9(of the Constitution hich appears to have been lost sight of, hichprovides that 8save in cases of hereditary succession, noprivate landsshall be transferred or conveyede4cept to individuals, corporations, or associations *ualified to ac*uire or hold lands of the public domain8Gat page 5/ that Ghence, even ifthe land involved in the present case is consideredprivate land, the citedsection prohibits its ac*uisition by the +eralco or Iglesia hich admittedly are 8corporations orassociations8 ithin the meaning of the aforecited provisions of the -e Constitution. This observationshould end all arguments of the issue of hether the land in *uestion is public or private landG idem/might mislead one to the rong conclusion that corporations ith ;)B Filipino onershipmay notonprivate landshen the e4press provisions of Art. I#, section ( 1+and section &$ as *uotedby himself as ell as the counterpart provisions of the &('6 Constitution have alays e4pressly permittedFilipino9oned corporations to onprivate lands, and the only change effected in the &(=' Constitution issection && hich no prohibits even such Filipino corporations to on or hold lands of the pu%licdomaine4cept by lease not to e4ceed &,))) hectares in area.

ACC:1DI-?LK, I vote for reversal of respondent court8s judgment in the +eralco case and for the entryof a ne judgment granting +eralco8s application and for affirmance of judgment in the second casegranting the Iglesia application.


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Se#r#-e O$o$/

A5AD SANTOS, .> co$c4rr$?>

I concur in the result. I am of the opinion that the lots hich are sought to be registered have ceased to belands of the public domain at the time they ere ac*uired by the petitioner corporation. They are alreadyprivate lands because of ac*uisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that isneeded is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporationor association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. oever, the petitioner isrelying on ec. $% of the !ublic Land Act for the confirmation of its title and +r. @ustice A*uino is correctin holding that said provision cannot be availed by juridical entities.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring and dissenting0

I concur in the ruling of the Court that +eralco Gas a juridical personG is dis*ualified to apply for itsregistration under ection $%b/.. 1I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court ould characteri2e suchjurisdictional defect, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to therelief sought. I ould apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach folloedby us in Francisco v. City of Davao, 2here the legal *uestion raised, instead of being deferred andpossibly tay legal fiction 3and in the e4ercise of our e*uitable

jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solutionould be to decide the matter as if the application underection $%b/ ere filed by the !iguing spouses, ho I assume suffer from no such disability.

DE CASTRO, J., dissenting0

@ustice Teehan


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It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicialconfirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many cases, such asthose cited by @ustice Teehan


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has %ecome private property.G Accordingly, the prohibition of the &(=' Constitution and of the !ublic LandAct against private corporation holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the presentcases. hat +eralco and Iglesia have ac*uired from their predecessors9in9interest had already ceased tobe of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and thereforetheir applicatins for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors9in9interest8 vested right and titlemay be duly granted.

The land covered by the +eralco application of -ovember 5;, &(=; consists of to &/ small lots ith atotal area of &;6 s*uare meters located at Tanay, 1i2al ith an assessed value of !',5=).)). This landas possessed by :limpia 1amos before orld arr II hich bro purposes since 2?@A and realty ta4es ere regularly paid thereon. It isresidential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land. It is lioth decisions are no ith the Court for revie. I hold that both applications for registration should begranted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the &(56 case of Susi vs. :a)on andDirector of Lands1and reaffirmed in a long line of cases don to the &(%) case of erico vs. Dar2thatthe lands in *uestion ceased, ipso !ure, or by operation of la, to be lands of the public domain uponcompletion of the statutory period of open, continuous, e4clusive, notorious and unchallenged possession

thereof by the applicants8 predecessors9in9interest ho ere *ualified natural persons and entitled toregistration by right of ac*uisitive prescription under the provisions of the !ublic Land Act, and thataccordingly the judgment in the +eralco case should be reversed and a ne judgment entered granting+eralco8s application, hile the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed.

The principal issue at bar may thus be stated0

It is e4pressly provided in section $%, par. b/ of the !ublic Land Act Commonealth Act -o. &$&, asamended by 1ep. Act -o. &($5, approved on @une 55, &(6=/ that citi2ens of the !hilippines ho are


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natural persons ho have occupied lands of the public domain but hose titles have not been perfectedor completed may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims and theissuance of the certificate of title therefor under the Land 1egistration Act in cases here they Gbythemselves or t#rou t#eir predecessors-in-interesthave been in the open, continuous, e4clusive, andnotorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim ofac*uisition of onership, for at least t#irty years immediately precedin& t#e filin& of t#e application for

confirmation of title e4cept hen prevented by ar or force ma!eure. These shall be conclusivelypresumedto have performed all the conditions essential to a ?overnment grant and shall be entitled to acertificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.G3In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operationof la converted into private land upon completion of the ')th year of continuous and unchallengedoccupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and onedby private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent judge in the +eralco case, remain partof the public domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial confirmation proceedingsand the formal court order for the issuance of the certificate of titleO

&. This issue has been s*uarely resolved by this Court since the &(56 case of Susi vs. :a)onand a longline of cases, infra/. It is established doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse andpublic possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the !ublic Land Act provision inforce at the time from @uly 5;, &%($ in usi under the old la/ by a private individual personally andthrough his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, hereby the land ceases to be landof the public domain and becomes private property.

At that time in &(56 in the Susicase, such possession as re*uired ;from 8uly , 2?@;as thenprovided for in section $6b/ of the old !ublic Land Act -o. 5%=$, amending Act -o. (5;7 hereas at

present, as provided for in the corresponding section $%, par.b/ of the later and subsisting !ublic LandAct, Commonealth Act -o. &$&, as amended by 1ep. Act -o. &($5 approved on 8une , 2?A, in forcesince &(6=, the period of open and unchallenged possession as reduced to Gat least t#irty yearsimmediately precedin& t#e filin& of t#e application for confirmation of title, e$uivalent to t#e period ofac$uisitive prescription. This is admitted in the main opinion of +r. @ustice A*uino, herein it is stated thatGI/n the Susicase, this Court applied section $6 b/ of Act -o. 5%=$ hich corresponds to hat is nowsection @F%G. It as held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of onership since@uly 5;, &%($ gave rise to the conclusive presumptionthat the occupant had complied wit# all t#econditions essentialto a ?overnment grant and as thus entitled to a certificate of title.G *The te4t of thecorresponding section $%b/, as amended by 1ep. Act &($5 referred to is reproduced ver%atimin +r.@ustice A*uino8s opinion+and *uotes the reduced statutory period of open and unchallenged possessionof Gat leastt#irty yearsimmediately preceding the filing of the application.G/

Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period,ac*uired the same %y operationof la as a grant from t#e 'overnment, ;not only a rit to a &rant,G andthe land thereby Galready ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at least bypresumptionG as e4pressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of Lands ofthe same land to another person as void and of no effect and Susias the rightful possessor couldrecover the land as hisprivate propertyfrom the supposed vendee ho did not ac*uire any right theretosince it had ceased to be land of the public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied tothe specific facts of the case, that0

. . . In favor of #alentin usi, there is, moreover, the presumption!uris et de !ure, established in paragraphb/ of section $6 of Act -o. 5%=$, amending Act -o. (5;, that all t#e necessary re$uirements for a &rant%y t#e 'overnment were complied wit#for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally andthrough his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain, openly continuously, e4clusivelyand publicly since @uly 5;, &%($, ith a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions ofChapter #III of said Act. o that hen Angela 1a2on applied for the grant in her favor, #alentin usihad already ac$uired, %y operation of law, not only a rit to a &rant, %ut a &rant of t#e 'overnment, for itis not necessary t#at certificate of title s#ould %e issued in order t#at said &rant may %e sanctioned %y t#ecourts, an application t#erefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section $= of Act -o. 5%=$. 9f %y a


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le&al function, #alentin usi had ac*uired the land in *uestion by a grant of the tate, it #ad alreadyceased to %e of t#e pu%lic domain and #ad %ecome private property, at least %y presumption , of #alentinusi, %eyond t#e control of t#e Director of Lands. Conse*uently, in selling the land in *uestion to Angela1a2on, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over hich he had no longer any title or control, and thesa


32/158

provides0 . . . As interpreted in several cases hen the conditions as specified in the foregoing provisionare complied ith, thepossessoris deemed to have ac$uired, %y operation of law, a rit to a &rant, a&overnment &rant, wit#out t#e necessity of a certificate of title %ein& issued. +#e land, t#erefore, ceasesto %e of t#e pu%lic domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. +#eapplication for confirmation is a mere formality, t#e lac of w#ic# does not affect t#e le&al sufficiency oft#e titleas ould be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said

patent.G

'. In fine, since under the Court8s settled doctrine, the ac$uisitive prescriptionof alienable or disposablepublic lands provided for no in section $%, par. b/ of the !ublic Land Act ta


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purchase. To deny +eralco8s application to register the property because it is not a natural person isunjustified because neither the ne constitutional ban under the &(=' Constitution against privatecorporations oning lands of the public domain or the !ublic Land Act8s limitation on the right ofapplication for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invo


34/158

land is still public land. It ould cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title toany Filipino citi2en claiming it under section $%b/ Hof the !ublic Land ActG at page 6/, suffice it to cite hison pronouncement in ericoreiterating the ell9established and prevailing doctrine hich this Courthas not overturned, as it cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor forat least ') years is Gconclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to agovernment grantG/ herein +r. @ustice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that GAs

interpretated in several cases . . . the possessoris deemed to have ac$uired, %y operation of law, a ritto a &rant, a &overnment &rant, wit#out t#e necessity of a certificate of title %ein& issued. +#e and,t#erefore, ceases to %e of t#e pu%lic domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to disposeof. +#e application for confirmation is a mere formality, t#e lac of w#ic# does not affect t#e le&alsufficiency of t#e titleas ould be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon thestrength of said patent.G

In only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that +r. @ustice De Castro8sseemingly *uerulous statement that Gthe discussion of the *uestion of hether the land involved is stillpublic oralready private land, is, hoever, entirelypointless or an idle e>ercise, if e consider theprovision of Section 2@, *rticle K9(of the Constitution hich appears to have been lost sight of, hichprovides that 8save in cases of hereditary succession, noprivate landsshall be transferred or conveyede4cept to individuals, corporations, or associations *ualified to ac*uire or hold lands of the public domain8Gat page 5/ that Ghence, even ifthe land involved in the present case is consideredprivate land, the citedsection prohibits its ac*uisition by the +eralco or Iglesia hich admittedly are 8corporations orassociations8 ithin the meaning of the aforecited provisions of the -e Constitution. This observationshould end all arguments of the issue of hether the land in *uestion is public or private landG idem/might mislead one to the rong conclusion that corporations ith ;)B Filipino onershipmay notonprivate landshen the e4press provisions of Art. I#, section ( 1+and section &$ as *uotedby himself as ell as the counterpart provisions of the &('6 Constitution have alays e4pressly permittedFilipino9oned corporations to onprivate lands, and the only change effected in the &(=' Constitution issection && hich no prohibits even such Filipino corporations to on or hold lands of the pu%licdomaine4cept by lease not to e4ceed &,))) hectares in area.

ACC:1DI-?LK, I vote for reversal of respondent court8s judgment in the +eralco case and for the entryof a ne judgment granting +eralco8s application and for affirmance of judgment in the second casegranting the Iglesia application.


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G.R. No. L2*066 December 9, 192+

)ALENTIN S"SI,plaintiff9appellee,vs.ANGELA RAON #$% THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, %ee$%#$-/. THE DIRECTOR OF

LANDS,appellant.

*ctin& *ttorney-'eneral :eyes for appellant.Monico :. Mercado for appellee.

)ILLAREAL, J.:

This action as commenced in the Court of First Instance of !ampanga by a complaint filed by #alentinusi against Angela 1a2on and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment0 a/ Declaring plaintiff the soleand absolute oner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint7 b/annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela 1a2on, on the ground that the land isa private property7 c/ ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela 1a2on7 andd/ sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of !6)) as damages, ith the costs.

For his anser to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained thereinand, as special defense, alleged that the land in *uestion as a property of the ?overnment of the Jnitedtates under the administration and control of the !hilippine Islands before its sale to Angela 1a2on,hich as made in accordance ith la.

After trial, hereat evidence as introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of !ampangarendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made bythe Director of Lands in favor of Angela 1a2on, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of titleissued to her, ith the costs against Angela 1a2on. From this judgment the Director of Lands too< thisappeal, assigning thereto the folloing errors, to it0 &/ The holding that the judgment rendered in a priorcase beteen the plaintiff and defendant Angela 1a2on on the parcel of land in *uestion is controlling in

this action7 5/ the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land7 theannulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela 1a2on7 and the ordering that thecertificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the !rovince of !ampanga to Angela 1a2on by virtueof said sale be cancelled7 and '/ the denial of the motion for ne trial filed by the Director of Lands.

The evidence shos that on December &%, &%%), -emesio !inlac sold the land in *uestion, then a fishpond, tho Apolonio ?arcia and >asilio +endo2a for the sum of !&5, reserving the right to repurchase thesame 34hibit >/. After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond havingbeen destroyed, Apolonio ?arcia and >asilio +endo2a, on eptember 6, &%((, sold it to #alentin usi forthe sum of !&5, reserving the right to repurchase it 34hibit A/. >efore the e4ecution of the deed of sale,#alentin usi had already paid its price and son GbacaanG on said land, availing himself of the fireoodgathered thereon, ith the proceeds of the sale of hich he had paid the price of the property. Thepossession and occupation of the land in *uestion, first, by Apolonio ?arcia and >asilio +endo2a, and

then by #alentin usi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, ithout any interruption, e4ceptduring the revolution, or disturbance, e4cept hen Angela 1a2on, on eptember &', &(&', commencedan action in the Court of First Instance of !ampanga to recover the possession of said land 34hibit C/,herein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of#alentin usi and against Angela 1a2on, dismissing the complaint 34hibit 3/. aving failed in herattempt to obtain possession of the land in *uestion through the court, Angela 1a2on applied to theDirector of Lands for the purchase thereof on August &6, &(&$ 34hibit C/. aving learned of saidapplication, #alentin usi filed and opposition thereto on December ;, &(&6, asserting his possession ofthe land for tenty9five years 34hibit !/. After may virtue of said


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grant the register of deeds of !ampanga, on August '&, &(5&, issued the proper certificate of title toAngela 1a2on. Armed ith said document, Angela 1a2on re*uired #alentin usi to vacate the land in*uestion, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justiceof the peace court of ?uagua, !ampanga, hich as dismissed for lac< of jurisdiction, the case beingone of title to real property 34hibit F and +/. #alentin usi then brought this action.

ith these facts in vie, e shall proceed to consider the *uestions raised by the appellant in hisassignments of error.lawp#i2.net

It clearly appears from the evidence that #alentin usi has been in possession of the land in *uestionopenly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year&%%), that is, for about forty9five years. hile the judgment of the Court of First Instance of !ampangaagainst Angela 1a2on in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controllingas to Angela 1a2on and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. hen on August &6,&(&$, Angela 1a2on applied for the purchase of said land, #alentin usi had already been in possessionthereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty9four years. And if it is ta


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G.R. No. L17+97 Febr4#r@ 7, 1922

E. '. cDANIEL,petitioner,vs.Ho$or#be GALICANO A!ACI5LE, Secre-#r@ o A?rc4-4re #$% N#-4r# Re/o4rce/ o -e

!$e I/#$%/, #$%"AN C"ISIA,respondents.

:oss Lawrence for petitioner.*ctin& *ttorney-'eneral +uason for respondents.

OHNSON, J.:

This is an original action commenced in the upreme Court for the rit of prohibition. Its purpose is toprohibit the respondent onorable ?alicano Apacible, as ecretary of Agriculture and -atural 1esources,from granting a lease of a parcel of petroleum land located in the municipality of an -arciso, of the!rovince of Tayabas, !hilippine Islands, hich parcel of land is particularly described in paragraph ; ofthe petition. To the petition the respondent ?alicano Apacible demurred. The respondent @uan Cuisianeither demurred nor ansered.

The facts upon hich the petition is based are admitted and may be stated as follos0

&. That on or about the =th day of @une, &(&;, the petitioner entered upon and located, inaccordance ith the provisions of Act of Congress of @uly &, &()5, as ell as the provisions of Act-o. ;5$ of the !hilippine Commission, three petroleum placer mineral claims, each of an area of;$ hectares, on an unoccupied public land in the municipality of an -arciso, !rovince ofTayabas, !hilippine Islands7

5. That on or about the &6th day of @uly, &(&;, the plaintiff recorded in the office of the miningrecorder in the municipality of Lucena, !rovince of Tayabas, !hilippine Islands, notices of location

of the aforesaid three placer claims under the names of G+aglihi -o. &,G G+aglihi -o. 5,G andG+aglihi -o. '7G

'. That the plaintiff, at all times since the =th day of @une, &(&;, has remained in open andcontinuous possession of said three mineral placer claims7

$. That plaintiff, in the year &(&= and in each year thereafter, performed not less than tohundred pesos !5))/ orth of labor on each of the said three mineral claims7

6. That in the year &(&% plaintiff drilled five ells on the said three mineral claims, and by meansof such ells in the said year &(&%/ made discoveries of petroleum on each of the said threeclaims7

;. That on or about the &%th day of @une, &(5&, the respondent @uan Cuisia made application tothe respondent ?alicano Apacible, as ecretary of Agriculture and -atural 1esources, under theprovisions of Act -o. 5('5 of the !hilippine Legislature, for a lease of a parcel of petroleum landin the municipality of an -arciso, !rovince of Tayabas, !hilippine Islands, hich said parcel ofland included ithin its boundaries the three said mineral claims G+aglihi -o. &,G G+aglihi -o. 5,Gand G+aglihi -o. ',G hich said three mineral placer claims had therefore been located as aboveindicated and held by the plaintiff as above described7


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=. That upon the filing of the said application for lease, as described in the paragraph immediatelypreceding, by the said @uan Cuisia, the petitioner herein protested in riting to the respondent?alicano Apacible against the inclusion in the said lease of the said three mineral claims G+aglihi-o. &,G G+aglihi -o. 5,G and G+aglihi -o. ',G located and held by him as above recited7

%. That the respondent ?alicano Apacible, as ecretary of Agriculture and -atural 1esources, did

on or about the (th day of +arch, &(5&, deny petitioner8s said protest7 and

(. That the plaintiff is informed and believed, and upon that information and belief averred, thatthe respondent ?alicano Apacible, as ecretary of Agriculture and -atural 1esources, under andby virtue of the supposed authority of Act -o. 5('5, is about to grant the application for the saidlease of the respondent @uan Cuisia, and to place him @uan Cuisia/ in possession of the saidthree mineral claims located and held by the petitioner.

Jpon the foregoing facts the petitioner contends that said Act -o. 5('5, in so far as it purports to declareopen to lease, lands containing petroleum oil on hich mineral claims have been validly located and #eld,and upon w#ic# discoveries of petroleum oil have been made, is void and unconstitutional, in thatit deprives t#e petitioner of #is property wit#out due process of law and wit#out compensation , and thatthe defendant ?alicano Apacible, as ecretary of Agriculture and -atural 1esources, is ithout

jurisdiction to lease to the respondent @uan Cuisia the folloing mineral claims G+aglihi -o. &,G G+aglihi-o. 5,G and G+aglihi -o. ',G and prays that the rit of prohibition be issued out of this court, directing andprohibiting the respondent ?alicano Apacible to desist from issuing the lease of the mineral placer claimsherein mentioned.

The respondent ?alicano Apacible, as ecretary of Agriculture and -atural 1esources, in support of hisdemurrer, contends0 a/ That the acts complained of are in conformity ith the authority given by Act -o.5('57 %/ that the petitioner has no vested right in the three mineral claims7 and c/ that the demurrer putss*uarely in issue the constitutionality of Act -o. 5('5.

Act -o. 5('5 as approved on the '&st day of August, &(5). ection & provides that Gall pu%liclands containing petroleum or other mineral oils and gas, on hich no patent, at the date this Act taploration, location and lease,G etc. aid section further provides, Gthat parties having heretofore filedclaims for any lands containing said minerals, shall be given preference to lease their respective claims,provided they file a petition to that effect ithin si4 months from the date of the approval of this Act.G

ection 5 provides that Gall such lands public lands/ may be leased by the ecretary of Agriculture and-atural 1esources in the manner and subject to the rules prescribed by the Council of tate.G

It ill be noted from the provisions of said Act -o. 5('5 that Gall public lands containing petroleum, etc.,on hich no patent, at the date this Act ta


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+r. Lindlay, one of the highest authorities on +ining La, has discussed e4tensively the *uestion nobefore us. Lindlay on +ines, vol. I, sections '55, 6'(./

The general rule is that a perfected, valid appropriation of public mineral lands operates asa wit#drawal of the tract from the body of the public domain, and so long as such appropriation remainsvalid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemedprivate property. A mining claim perfected under

the la is property in the highest sense, hich may be sold and conveyed and ill pass by descent. It hasthe effect of a grant patent/ by the Jnited tates of the right of present and e4clusive possession of thelands located. And even though the locator may obtain a patent to such lands, his patent adds but little tohis security. &% 1uling Case La, p. &&65 and cases cited./

The oner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is entitled to the e4clusive possessionand enjoyment against every one, including the ?overnment itself. here there is a valid and perfectedlocation of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of thelocator.

It as said by the upreme Court of the tate of :regon, GThe ?overnment itself cannot abridge therights of the miner to a perfected valid location of public mineral land. The 'overnment may not destroyt#e locatorHs rit %y wit#drawin& t#e land from entry or placin& it in a state of reservation .G >el< vs.

+eagher, &)$ J.., 5=(7 ullivan vs. Iron ilver +ining Co., &$' J.., $'&./

A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and ut theupreme Court of the Jnited tates, in the cases of Jnion :il Co. vs. mith 5$( J.., ''=/, and t.

Louis +ining and +illing Co. vs. +ontana +ining Co. &=& J.., ;6)/, held that even ithout a patent, thepossessory right of a locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullestsense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the Jnited tates. There is noconflict in the rulings of the Court upon that *uestion. ith one voice they affirm that hen the right to apatent e4ists, the full e*uitable title has passed to the purchaser or to the locator ith all the benefits,immunities, and burdens of onership, and that no third party can ac*uire from the ?overnment anyinterest as against him. +anuel vs. ulff, &65 J.., 6)$, and cases cited./

3ven ithout a patent, the possessory right of a *ualified locator after discovery of minerals upon theclaim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is inthe ?overnment, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or devise. Jnion :il Co. vs.mith, 5$( J.., ''=7 Forbes vs. @arcey, ($ J.., =;57 >el< vs. +eagher, &)$ J.., 5=(7 Del +onte+ining Co. vs. Last Chance +ining Co., &=& J.., 667 3lver vs. ood, 5)% J.., 55;, 5'5./

Actual and continuous occupation of a valid mining location, based upon discovery, is not essential to thepreservation of the possessory right. The right is lost only by abandonment as by nonperformance of theannual labor re*uired. Jnion :il Co. vs. mith, 5$( J.., ''=7 Farrell vs. Locradford vs. +orrison, 5&5 J.., '%(./

The discovery of minerals in the ground by one ho has a valid mineral location perfects his claim and hislocation not only against third person, %ut also a&ainst t#e 'overnment. A mining claim perfected underthe la is property in the highest sense of that term, hich may be sold and conveyed, and ill pass by


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descent, and is not therefore subject to the disposal of the ?overnment. >el< vs. +eagher, &)$ J..,5=(, 5%'7 ullivan vs. Iron ilver +ining Co., &$' J.., $'&7 Consolidated +utual :il Co. vs. Jnitedtates, 5$6 Fed. 1ep., 65&7 #an -ess vs. 1ooney, &;) Cal., &'&, &';, &'=./

The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected hislocation in accordance ith la, the poer of the Jnited tates ?overnment to deprive him of the

e4clusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim as gone, the lands had becomemineral lands and they ere e4empted from lands that could be granted to any other person. Thereservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations7 and, ofcourse, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterard included in a reservation, suchinclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. >y such location and perfection,the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the ?overnment. Jnion :il Co.vs. mith, 5$( J.., ''=7 #an -ess vs. 1ooney, &;) Cal., &'&7 5= Cyc., 6$;./

From all of the foregoing arguments and authorities e must conclude that, inasmuch as the petitionerhad located, held and perfected his location of the mineral lands in *uestion, and had actually discoveredpetroleum oil therein, he had ac*uired a property right in said claims7 that said Act -o. 5('5, hichdeprives him of such right, ithout due process of la, is in conflict ith section ' of the @ones La, andis therefore unconstitutional and void. Therefore the demurrer herein is hereby overruled, and it is hereby

ordered and decreed that, unless the respondents anser the petition herein ithin a period of five daysfrom notice hereof, that a final judgment be entered, granting the remedy prayed for in the petition. oordered.

*raullo, C.8., Street, Malcolm, *vance


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+arch ;, &()=

G.R. No. 29*0

OSE FIANA, ET AL., #$-/#eee/,

/.

. F. REA)IS, %ee$%#$-#e#$-.

Coudert Brot#ers for appellant.

inney, Odlin Laurence for appellees.

'ILLARD, J.:

The plaintiffs brought this action in the court belo to enjoin the defendant from interfering ith to gold

mines alleged to be the property of the plaintiffs. A temporary injunction as granted as prayed for in the

complaint7 the case as tried in the court belo and the injunction made perpetual. The defendant moved

for a ne a trial, hich as denied, and he has brought the case here by bill of e4ceptions. the court

belo found, among other things, substantially as follos0

+ore than fifty years prior to the commencement of this suit one Toctoc, an Igorot, and the grandfather of@ose Fian2a, one of the plaintiffs, as in the sole and e4clusive possession of certain mineral lands

containing gold *uarts, situated in Antamoc, in the jurisdiction of Itogon, in the province of >enguet. These

lands, being the same in dispute in this case, ere of irregular boundaries and contained about &%',)))

s*uare meters, and ere situated on the slope of the mountain or hill called P Antamoc +ountain,P and

ere divided into to parts by a small arroyocalled Antamoc, the mine on one side being


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For more than fifty years these mines ere held and or


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The court further found that 1eavis entered upon the mines in the year &()& and sta


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The real objection is that the court erred in alloing the amendment. In vie of the provisions of sections

&)( and &&) of the Code of Civil !rocedurerelating to amendments, this objection can not be sustained.

The second defense, according to the appellantRs brief, is that the record does not disclose ho or in hat

ay the land claimed by plaintiffs conflicts ith defendants locations.

+ore or less evidence as offered to sho here the defendantRs claims ere. It is apparent that all or

nearly all of the defendantRs Q:te

>Q Q Q Q Q Q >>>Q Q Q Q Q Q >>>

R. Q Q Q #at wor, if any, did you ever do on t#at &round after you denounced t#emT
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*. Q Q Q Not#in&, %ecause t#ey were not ceded to us, wit# t#e e>ception of t#e road we made w#ic#

&oes to t#e mines. . . . e #ad to %uild a road from t#e main trail to t#e mout# of t#e mine.

e testified also that he bought gold from Domingue2, and hen ascavations from a distance. 5rom a distance 9 saw w#ere dirt #ad %een t#rown up out of

t#e e>cavations, %ut 9 never #ave %een up to t#e mines.

Francisco #alencio, another itness for the defendant, testified0

R. Q Q Q ow many times did you see 5ian)a and #is fat#er &o up to t#ese mines in *ntamocT

*. Q Q Q 9 saw #is fat#er &oin& up t#ere often.

R. Q Q Q ow often did you see 5ian)a &oin& up to t#e minesT

*. Q Q Q Sometimes 9 saw #im in t#e mines at *ntamoc.

ans olman, another itness for the defendant, on hose adverse claim to this same property the

defendant relies to defeat the prescription alleged by the plaintiffs, shos the e4istence of ell9defined

mines. e testified0

*. Q Q Q e denounced t#at mine and t#e papers w#ic# we made out were %urnt up in

t#ecomandancia durin& t#e Spanis# 'overnment. e commenced t#e denouncement of t#at mine in

2?.

. !. hitmarsh, a itness for the defendant, testified0

*. Q Q Q 6es. +#e first trip 9 made up to t#e +rinidad 9 went over to *ntamoc. 9 went t#ere to &et

information a%out t#e mines and t#e country. 9 was a newspaper reporter t#en. . . .

R. Q Q Q Did you #ave any tal wit# #im F5ian)aG in reference to mines in *ntamocT

*. Q Q Q *ll a%out t#e mines in t#e vicinity. e advised me to &o over to *ntamoc to loo at t#em.


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@. 3. Melly, a itness for the defendant, testified that he became ac*uainted ith the property no

claimed by 1eavis in @anuary, &()&, hen he first arrived in >enguet7 that having learned that olman

had an interest therein he ent to +anila to see him in +arch or April of the same year Qith a vie to

purchasing his Antamoc holdings.P olman then told him that he had a mine there.

1eavis aguio and as at Antamoc on the (th of @anuary, &()). e

as as>>Q Q Q Q Q Q >>>Q Q Q Q Q Q >>>

*. Q Q Q +#e Spaniard and 9 went down to 9to&on. e looed for t#e president or someone t#at new of

t#is mine or property, w#o it %elon&ed to, and w#o was supposed to own it. +#is man 5ian)a said #e

new t#e property and new it %elon&ed to Mr. olman. . . . Of course we couldnt do anyt#in&, so w#en 9


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went %ac to Manila 9 went to see Mr. olman a%out it and #e s#owed me maps and papers of t#e

different pieces of property.

Mnouber testified that he ent out to the property ith Fian2a, ho pointed out olmanRs sta


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Fian2aRs statement, *uoted by the appellant, to the effect that Qour custom is if e do not find gold in &

fathom or 5 fathoms, e ma>>Q Q Q Q Q Q >>>Q Q Q Q Q Q >>>

R. Q Q Q #at is t#e reason you didnt continue your denunciaT

*. Q Q Q 9 was afraid. 9 left t#at mine %ecause 9 am not a miner.

R. Q Q Q as it in 2? or 2?? w#en you suit t#e mines t#enT

*. Q Q Q No, 9 didnt wor t#e mines. 9 didnt care to. 9 only %out t#e &old.

R. Q Q Q Did you ever #ire any wor done on t#ese minesT

*. Q Q Q NoV no one.

R. Q Q Q Did anyone pay for t#e wor for youT
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*. Q Q Q +#ey wored for me. 9 didnt pay for t#eir wor, %ut t#e &old.

R. Q Q Q 9n w#at capacity did you mae contracts wit# t#e 9&orots to wor t#ose minesT

*. Q Q Q 9 didnt mae any contracts.

R. Q Q Q Didnt 9 understand you to say t#at you made contracts wit# certain 9&orots to mine t#ere and

t#ey &ave you a certain part of t#e &old as owner of t#e mineT

*. Q Q Q No.

R. Q Q Q Did you #ave any contracts wit# 9&orots at allT

*. Q Q Q No.

R. Q Q Q 9 mean after you denounced t#e mines of *ntamocT

*. Q Q Q 6esV 9 told t#e 9&orots t#at were worin& t#ere t#at t#ey must &ive t#e &old to me and not sellto any ot#er one. +#at was t#e contract.

It is very clear that these acts constituted no interruption of the possession of Fian2a. And so Fian2aRs

possession continued up to the time of 1eavis. 1eavis entered upon the land and sta


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from this property during those years. The or< that 1eavis did as evidently that hich he thought as

re*uired by the la. +ost of it appears from the evidence to have been done on the claim called Q:te


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&()&, &()5, and &()' hile 1eavis as in Antamoc. hatever he did upon the land as done hile the

plaintiffs still remained in the actual possession thereof. As before stated, the court found that 1eavisRs

only possession as hen he entered on the land from time to time to do assessment and development

orenguet undertoo< to establish the QAntamoc mining district,P and to appoint a

mining recorder. ith this mining recorder 1eavis filed certain locations on a part of the property in

*uestion. These steps ere ta


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plaintiffs. The court belo held that even these locations ere invalid, in accordance ith the said act. It is

not necessary, hoever, to determine this *uestion.

The judgment of the court belo is affirmed, ith the costs of this instance against the appellant. o

ordered.

*rellano, C.8., +orres and Mapa, 88., concur.

Se#r#-e O$o$/

OHNSON, J., dissenting0

This as an action begun in the Court of First Instance of the !rovince of >enguet by the plaintiffs for the

purpose of enjoining, restricting, and inhibiting the defendant from entering upon to certain gold mines

lying and being in the barrio of Antamoc, in the tonship of Itogon, !rovince of >enguet7 no certain

description of said mines could %e &iven at the time of the commencement of the action according to the

complaint of the plaintiffs.

Jpon the filing of the complaint the court granted a temporary injunction to prevent the defendant from

entering upon this indefinite, unlocated, indescribable tract or parcel of land. >y computation it as found

that this indefinite, unlocated parallelogram contained about =),))) s*uare meters. After the beginning of

the trial of said cause, the plaintiff caused a survey of the alleged mines to be made by one >alpiedad7

the result of said survey is represented in 34hibit C, presented in evidence by the plaintiffs, hich

represents the parallelogram or mines to be in the folloing form0

insert map from original file here/

This e4hibit or survey, shoing the limits of said land in *uestion, as not completed or offered in

evidence until after practically all of the itnesses for the plaintiffs had been e4amined. After the

admission of the said e4hibit, the plaintiffs as


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FG +#at in t#e attempt to descri%e it, it was desi&nated as a parallelo&ram containin& a%out J,JJJ

s$uare meters.

FIG +#at t#e lower court at t#e %e&innin& of t#e action en!oined t#e defendant from enterin& upon t#e tract

of land not located nor descri%ed, and admittedly a tract w#ic# could not %e definitely located nor

descri%ed.F@G +#at t#e lower court, at t#e conclusion of t#e trial, made suc# temporary in!unction perpetual after it

#ad %een clearly proved t#at t#e land reffered to in t#e first in!unction was not t#e same land w#ic# t#e

plaintiff claimed in said E>#i%it C.

FAG +#at t#e plaintiffs, at t#e %e&innin& of t#e action, were not t#e owners of t#e said tract of land, %ut t#at

t#e same %elon&ed to t#e 'overnment of t#e 7#ilippine 9slands and was %ein& #eld in trust %y said

'overnment for t#e plaintiffs.

FG +#at t#ey were una%le to definitely locate t#e lines of said mines until after t#e %e&innin& of t#e trial of

said cause, and w#en it was definitely descri%ed it was not a parallelo&ram, and contained nearly t#ree

times as muc# area as t#at descri%ed in t#e petition of t#e plaintiffs. 9t would seem %ut reasona%le to

%elieve t#at if t#e plaintiffs, t#eir fat#ers and &randfat#ers #ad %een in t#e possession of a definite, well-

nown tract or parcel of land for so many years, to t#e e>clusion of all ot#er persons w#omsoever, its

limits mit in some way #ave %een definitely descri%ed, or at least it mit #ave %een descri%ed in a way

to #ave included more t#an one-t#ird of a tract of land w#ic# t#ey, t#eir fat#ers and &randfat#ersP #ad

occupied for many years to t#e e>clusion of all ot#er persons.

e assert in the beginning that these facts engender suspicion of the e4clusive right of the plaintiffs to

any ell9defined tract of land. e are also of the opinion that until it is proved a/ t#at t#e plaintiffs #ave

an a%solute and e>clusive rit to a particular tract of land7 and %/ t#at said tract of land #as well-defined

metes and %ounds, the court had no right or authority to issue an injunction prohibiting or restraining the

defendant from entering thereon. The court had no authority to issue an injunction to prevent the

defendant from entering upon any parcel of land until that parcel of land as ell9defined by metes and

bounds, for otherise the defendant ould be unable to enguet somehere on the mountain called Antamoc. This temporary injunction, at the conclusion of

the trial, as made perpetual.After the decision as rendered, the defendant, through his attorneys, made a motion for a ne trial,

basing the same upon the folloing reasons0

2. +#at t#e findin&s of fact were openly and manifestly a&ainst t#e weit of t#e evidence.

. +#at t#e evidence was insufficient to !ustify t#e decision.

I. +#at t#e decision and !ud&ment of t#e court were a&ainst t#e law.


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This motion for a ne trial as denied.

This motion being based e4pressly upon the provisions of paragraph ' of section $(= of the Code of

!rocedure in Civil Actions, e are justified in e4amining the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining

hether or not the conclusions of the loer court ere justified by such evidence. e, therefore, purpose

to e4amine the evidence adduced during the trial of said cause upon each of the respective *uestions of

fact presented, and allo the record to spea< for itself.

:urfirst proposition is, that neither the plaintiffs nor their predecessors occupied any definite piece or

parcel of land or mines in the !rovince of >enguet or elsehere for any period, to the e4clusion of all

other persons7 that the plaintiffs and their predecessors ere Igorots7 that they lived in tribes much as the

American Indians did7 that they never asserted their rights to any ell9defined parcel of land nor occupied

any ell9defined parcel of land to the e4clusion of other persons, either strangers or members of the

particular tribe. Jpon this proposition e refer to the record for the anser.

The petition alleges that the said mines are in the barrio of Antamoc. hat is AntamocO

+adarang Igorot/ said 1ec., p. &%/ 0 QThe hole mountain is isgue

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